

LENTEN SERMONS

BY
REPRESENTATIVE PREACHERS

EDITED BY
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EDITOR OF "EASTER SERMONS," "ADVENT AND CHRISTMAS SERMONS,"
"HARVEST THANKSGIVING SERMONS," "LIFE'S BEGINNINGS,"
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PREFACE

THE season of Lent, no less than the great Christian Festivals, makes a strong appeal to all who believe on the Lord Jesus Christ, and give Him their allegiance. The sermons contained in the following pages are set forth as a contribution to the devotional literature so largely in demand for this solemn season, and in the hope that they will be found helpful to those who desire to make the Forty Days a time for serious thought and reflection on the "things which a Christian ought to know and believe to his soul's health."

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THE LORD'S PRAYER

BY THE VERY REV. A. E. BURN, D.D.
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"Our Father"—St. Matt. vi. 9.

The Lord's Prayer

HAVE you ever noted how the Lord's Prayer is built up on this single thought? There are two things which every good earthly father expects from his children, reverence and obedience. Our Father in Heaven will therefore expect them from us. And in speaking of the reverence thus due our Lord carries us up to the highest point of the ladder of prayer. As the saintly Bishop Wilson of Sodor and Man once put it: "He knows little of himself who is not much in prayer, and he knows little of God who is not much in praise." On all the lower steps of penitence and petition, and even of thanksgiving, self is concerned, is rightly concerned. For the vision of God constrains even an Isaiah to cry out, "Woe is me! for I am undone; because I am a man of unclean lips, and I dwell in the midst of a people of unclean lips: for mine eyes have seen the King, the Lord of Hosts." And as in asking for all that we need both in body and soul, and in that prayer of asking for others, which we call Intercession, so even in the complementary act of Thanks-

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giving, often ungratefully neglected, self enters in; for it is an increase of our personal happiness if those who are dear to us are blessed with us. But beyond the highest reach of thanksgiving lies the fair region of praise, where self drops out. We thank God for what He has done. We praise Him for what He is. This is the worship of holy angels, and all the company of Heaven, both in the Old Testament and in the New. "Holy, Holy, Holy is the Lord of Hosts, the whole earth is full of His Glory." "Praise God in His holiness" is the final message of the Old Testament Psalter, as it is the supreme message of the Christian Apocalypse.

Surely we ought to couple the words "on earth as it is in heaven" with the words "Hallowed be Thy Name," no less than with "Thy kingdom come" and "Thy will be done."

"Hallowed," i.e., worshipped, glorified as holy, "be Thy Name." What then do we mean by Holiness? We have been taught lately by Professor Otto to think of "Holiness" as something both fascinating and awe-inspiring. There is no doubt that this is true of the age-long progress of human thought towards more spiritual ideas of God's Being. For us Christians it may suffice to say that Holiness is love raised to its

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highest power, utterly separated from evil, and utterly concentrated on good. For Love is greater than Righteousness in so far as Love includes self-sacrifice. The measure of Divine Love is hinted at, it is not fully expressed in the Apostolic reflection, "God so loved the world that He gave His only Son." For the love of the Father passes knowledge. But we must be careful to note that such reflection lay beyond the ken of the disciples when the Lord first taught them thus to pray: "Our Father, hallowed be Thy name," though it would be ungrateful of us not to bring it in as the fruit of the seed-thought which He had planted in sympathetic minds. From reverence we pass on to obedience. There are two kinds of obedience, active and passive. At the beginning of His ministry, the Lord took up the theme of the forerunner, John the Baptist: "The Kingdom of Heaven is at hand." In every age it is the duty of His followers to dare something for the extension of that kingdom in the hearts of men. We know it as "the Kingdom of righteousness and peace and joy in the Holy Spirit." But it needs, as the Lord at the end of His ministry made clear, "Power from on high," to enable us to be witnesses for the Kingdom and for the King. It is no easy calling to stand up for honesty and

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purity and truth in a society honeycombed by fraud and impurity and deceit. The Lord knew what was in man, He hastens to add that we must be ready to "bear" as well as to "dare." And all that His witnesses have to suffer of ridicule and persecution finds utterance in the prayer, "Thy will be done." "Though He were a son yet learned He obedience by the things that He suffered." And the disciple is not above his Master, he, too, must take his cross. This thought seems a far cry from the picture of the radiant joy of the heavenly life in which our Father receives the adoration of all the citizens of the kingdom of glory, but it is only too true that the kingdom is not yet established in the dark places of the earth, and it is the outstanding characteristic of our Lord as a teacher to face facts, living as man among men, for Himself, when true to His own teaching this was the prayer of His own Agony in the garden: "O my Father, if it be possible, let this cup pass away from me: nevertheless not as I will but as thou wilt."

We pass on to the second part of the Prayer, in which we think of the things which a child may rightly expect from a father. So familiar are the words that we find it difficult to fathom the depths of their appropriateness. "Which of

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you that is a father," the Lord asked in His teaching, "if his son ask bread will he give him a stone?" No, the first duty of a father is to feed. It is the primary parental instinct, for if the young lions do lack and suffer hunger it is because the lion has failed to find his prey. So the Lord bids us ask quite naturally and simply for daily bread. And here again so simply does He teach what is one of the great principles of His teaching, that we often miss its significance. We are to pray for food, not dainties, and that from day to day. I suggest that we should carry on this word "day by day" when we come to prayer for forgiveness and protection, for we need them also each day as it comes. In the Sermon on the Mount He has much to say about worrying. "Be not over-anxious about the morrow, for the morrow shall take care for the things of itself. Sufficient unto the day is the evil thereof."

It has been well said that "to-day has two enemies, yesterday and to-morrow." If we think too much about the past, we are apt to become pessimistic, talking of the good old days which will never return. If on the other hand we think too much about the future, we spend our time in day-dreams and forget that the use of castles in the air is that we may begin to build

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foundations under them. True wisdom for man is to work in "the living present," and to trust the Heavenly Father from day to day to provide food and raiment, and with it the deep contentment which is the brightness of all who, like St. Francis of Assisi, are willing to live the simple life in the Master's steps.

But "man doth not live by bread alone." His soul, so far as it is aware of God, needs daily quickening, "for no man hath quickened his own soul." And it is characteristic of the Lord to teach that man needs daily forgiveness. For He spake as never man spake, and yet could only remain silent when John the Baptist spoke to Him of repentance, alone silent among all that crowd of penitents whom John baptized in Jordan! Well might he exclaim: "I have need to be baptized of thee, and comest thou to me?" The Lord would have us quite simply ask for forgiveness, and trust our Father to give it as freely as He may fairly claim that we should forgive others. On different occasions He seems to have used two words, the one, "trespasses," including all wrong things done and said and thought, the other, "debts," including good things left undone, unsaid, and unthought. It is of deep significance that He always laid so much stress on sins of omission, as He was

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always stern in condemning the sins of religious people, especially the pride which could say: "Come not near to me, for I am holier than thou." No one who has begun his prayer with the thought of Divine Holiness can feel like that, or when tempted to think it fail to reflect on his daily shortcomings, even if his quickened conscience has no other fault to find with him at the moment of that passing day.

How naturally then the words follow, "And lead us not into temptation." Temptation is a necessary element in the history of moral growth. As has been well said: "Man gains the strength of the temptation that he has overcome." He would not blame himself for sin if he did not in his heart of hearts feel that he might have done better. There is no need to dispute about the limitations of his free will, for the recorded experience of the saints witnesses to the fact that in God's service they have found perfect freedom. And it is to their experience that we appeal for confirmation of the mysterious words that follow, "Lead us not into temptation, but deliver us from the evil *one*." All that we know of the possibilities of thought transference, of the power of suggestion, lends point to the Lord's plain teaching that the evil thoughts of pride and envy and malice, which come,

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as He says, "from the heart and defile the man," are not self-induced in the first instance, but from without. The world of to-day is hard hit by envy and malice. Is it not some comfort to say with Christ, "An enemy hath done this," and learn to pray with confidence, "Deliver us from the evil *one*"? We are indeed in the dark, but we know that a little child with his father's hand clasping his is not afraid of the dark. He trusts him for protection as he trusts him for daily bread and forgiveness. "We have had fathers of our flesh and we gave them reverence," we recognize their claim on our obedience; "shall we not rather be obedient to the Father of our spirits and lives?" The Lord's Prayer is a prayer for living men founded on experience of human life.

One might be tempted to think that this line of interpretation was artificial if we could not supplement it by reference to that wonderful parable, "the Gospel in the Gospel," as it has been called, in which Christ traces the downfall of a wasteful son and his restoration. Why did the Prodigal Son go wrong? Because he did not honour his father. We hear of him growing up and picture him a bright, restless boy, in every way a contrast to his elder brother, inclined to be rebellious to discipline, not un-

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naturally eager to go out and make his own way in the world. His fatal mistake was that he did not honour his father. It was equivalent to saying, "I am tired of waiting till you die" when he claims, "Give me my portion." And when he gets it, without care for the way he hurts his father's love, without thought of sin against Heaven, "not many days after" (ah, the mischief has been done many days ago), he goes off to the far country and wastes it in riotous living. Irreverence and disobedience work their havoc in his character. What does he soon lack? "Daily bread." "There arose a mighty famine in that land." How true is the proverb, "Waste not, want not." He wanders from one boon companion to another. They were willing enough to help him squander. Now all that he hears is, "My dear fellow, I am just as hard up as you." Have you ever heard noted the force of the tense in the Greek word, "No one kept giving to him"? Some days there was something to spare, on others nothing. He hires himself out to feed swine. "He would fain have filled his belly with the husks that the swine did eat," possibly the beans of the carob tree eaten by the peasants of Calabria in times of dearth. He comes to himself, his true self; he reflects, "How many hired servants of my father have bread

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enough and to spare, while I perish with hunger ! I will arise and go to my father, and will say unto him, ' Father, I have sinned against heaven and before thee and am no more worthy to be called thy son.' ” He lacks daily bread. What does he want more ? Forgiveness. What does he find ? We picture him in his rags and weariness tramping the long road, coming in sight at last of familiar landmarks, wondering what sort of a reception he will find from his father and that elder brother. Yet see, there is his father looking out for him as he has so often done, running to meet him, to fall on his neck and kiss him. He is allowed to make his confession, but not to plead to be received back as a servant. As a son he is welcomed, fed with a banquet, clothed with the best robe, shoes for his feet, a ring for his hand, forgiven, safe in the protection of home. It was meet that they should make merry and be glad, for (as the father said) “ this my son was dead and is alive again ; he was lost and is found.”

Here we have the same plan of thought outlining the true relationship of a son of man to an earthly father as a mirror of our relationship to our Father in Heaven. We bow our heads in silence, for we are conscious of deep mystery. Who is it that has this unfathomable knowledge

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of the mind of the Father of spirits ? Jesus, the prophet of Nazareth. Whence this knowledge ? By inspiration alone ? Or is there a deeper mystery of Sonship in His life known only to Himself until men learn with Paul of Tarsus to speak of " the light of the knowledge of the glory of God seen in the face of Jesus Christ " ?

There is another question which I venture to think throws light on the former. Neither in the Prayer nor in the Parable is anything said about Atonement. Forgiveness is freely granted upon repentance and confession of sin, with the implied condition in the Prayer that we must be ready to forgive others as freely.

But we must remember that the Parable is one of a series, and that the first speaks of a good shepherd seeking through the night at risk of life and limb to find the lost sheep. We know how the Lord thought of Himself as the Good Shepherd and prepared to lay down His life for the sheep. He could not put everything into one parable, but the offer of His life as " a ransom for many " was deliberately purposed, and both St. Peter and St. Paul assume that He died for our sin (1 Cor. xv. 3; 1 Peter iii. 18).

As Mr. Selwyn has well said: " The message which the Apostles took into the Gentile world was not simply a message of Divine forgiveness;

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for few felt any need of forgiveness. It was first of all a message about God—about His Holiness, His Kingdom, His purpose for man; about sin and its satisfaction; and only then about grace and eternal life. In other words, it was a Theodicy: and it was to those who accepted this Theodicy that they taught Christ's story of the Prodigal Son.”*

Lent is passing away and each day brings us nearer to the Holy Week in which we shall follow our Lord to His Cross, and learn again how in the hour of His supreme self-sacrifice He was true to Himself and to His teaching. For the first word from the Cross was, “Father forgive them for they know not what they do,” and the last, “Father, into Thy hands I commend My spirit.”

Let us pray for grace to make a resolution which may have an abiding influence on our lives: in the light of His teaching we will revise our prayers, will enlarge and enrich our intercourse with God. Few of us would dare to say that our prayers need no improvement, and the greatest saint would be the first to acknowledge that we have set before us a never-ending path of progress in understanding, as the Psalmist says, “of the God of our joy and gladness.”

* *The Approach to Christianity*, p. 159.

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There are three questions of outstanding importance which claim our most careful thought. The first is this. Do we give enough room in our prayers to praise, that glorifying of the name of the Father, to which the Lord Himself assigns the first place in His Prayer? It was a true instinct which led the early Church in its Liturgies to make so much of the *Sanctus* in the forefront of the Great Offering. "Praise waiteth for Thee in Zion," sang the Psalmist, but there is far too little of it in many hearts to-day. Some Psalm verses and the *Gloria* would make all the difference in tuning many a heart to that pitch of devoutness at which we offer ourselves to do God's will, and receive from His Holy Spirit guidance as to its meaning for us.

This brings us to our second question. Do we face out the fact that Obedience implies "daring" as well as "bearing"? We ought to be more adventurous as citizens of God's Kingdom, letting our light shine before men, carrying the light into the dark places of the earth. The World Call has made that plain enough, and the very least we can do about it is to give the words "Thy kingdom come" a definite application to one or other of the Overseas Mission Fields. Of course a really heroic response means suffering and sacrifice,

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but as Dante said, "In His will is our peace."

Thirdly, we must ask ourselves whether we have ever properly understood the teaching of the Sermon on the Mount, the plain invitation to ask God, when thus prepared by acts of devotion to His service, for all things that we need both for soul and body.

It is strange that in early Christian writers our prayer "daily bread" is explained as food for the soul, which is paralleled in Keble's line, "Nor by 'our daily bread' mean common food." But it must have meant food for the body in its first context. Only let us be careful to remember the qualifying "day by day." Each day as it comes the Lord will provide, the Lord will forgive, the Lord will protect. Such an ideal of prayer is within the scope of the young as well as the old. It is an ideal with which the fire of imagination can be kindled, and the wisdom of the wise can never surpass its range. When young men see visions and old men dream dreams, a day of the Lord is at hand, and an outpouring of His spirit upon all flesh. "Even so come Lord Jesus."

LIFE THROUGH CHRIST'S DEATH

BY THE REV. H. C. CARTER, M.A.
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*"And it came to pass, when the time was come
that he should be received up, he stedfastly set
his face to go to Jerusalem;"—Luke ix. 51.*

Life through Christ's Death

VERY early in the Christian era, one of the New Testament writers, summarizing the work which Jesus Christ had accomplished by His mission to the world, said that He had brought life and immortality to light through the Gospel. That was the difference Jesus had made for mankind. He had given the promise of *life*, given it in such a way that men could lay hold of it with sure confidence.

The New Testament is the record of an experience, a many-sided experience, the wealth of which it is taking all the centuries to explore and to unfold. But if we try to gather up in a word what that experience was at the heart of it, we must say that it was an experience of *life*, discovered through Jesus Christ.

The Christian Gospel came into a world over which death brooded like a pall. It was the world of Jew and Gentile. The Jews were the little minority, the Gentiles the great mass of human kind; yet the world was thus truly divided; for the Jews had knowledge of the unity, the sovereignty and the ethical holiness of God,

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while the nations outside their pale were groping in a hundred different ways amidst idolatries. But for both Jew and Gentile alike the course of man on earth was shadowed by the forebodings and the fear of death turning it into tragedy. It was not, for either, a world over which there shone a serene sky of happiness. Man cannot be happy, with happiness that is more than a flare that blazes and expires, unless he knows that he lives, with life that cannot be quenched or injured by calamity or any doom. He must be secure in the consciousness of life, certain that it is not perishing, and cannot perish, within him. Neither Jew nor Gentile had that security.

We may take as witness their literature. No one could say that the Old Testament is a happy book. It is lighted by gleams of hope. There are songs of rejoicing, and countless utterances of dogged confidence in a final victory of good, past all seeming. But it is shot through with these rather as a dark day of cloud and storm is shot through with gleams of sunshine. Its general tone is of judgment and retribution. There is thunder everywhere in the air. Its human story is in large part of man's vindictiveness. The story of God's dealings is mostly of His laws and vengeance. It is no gospel.

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The hints of good news for men gleam out confusedly from clouds of fear and terror. There is more promise in it of death than of life.

And no one, I think, could affirm that the literature of the Pagan world was a literature of happiness. Its best poetry, when it is not light and frivolous, is set in a tragic key, despairing of human life and ending with a great interrogation, however nobly uttered. The same is true of its best history and philosophy. The classics have moved men by ideals of truth and beauty and virtue. Homer and Æschylus and Thucydides, Plato and Aristotle, Horace and Virgil and Lucretius and Tacitus, could teach men much, give them much food and pleasure on the way, but they were never able to be in men's hands and hearts as books that opened to them the secret of the victory of life over death. They showed the world, to the end, as the scene of tragedy, most so when they were honestest and truest.

But the New Testament—the literature of the generation that woke with wondering eyes to faith in the Gospel of Jesus Christ—is above all things happy, as is all the literature that has been born out of its inspiration up to this day. It comes from men passing through fires

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of tribulation and persecution—a despised and often outraged minority in a great world set against them. And yet it rings with joy, with the sense of triumph, certain, complete and final. It is no sad story. There are sad things in it. We must endure to read there of men bearing great sorrow of heart, of some men's awful sinning, of men dying under showers of stones and slain by the sword, of one man of perfect heart torn in the agony of Gethsemane, deserted and betrayed by His friends, and crucified. But the sad things are as discords in a piece of music which are resolved into glorious harmony. Here it is the brightness which is shot through with shafts of darkness, that pass to vanish into the light. And the joy and the brightness and the triumph come from this—that here is a message for men, which they have been able to receive and believe and prove for themselves in the experiment of living by it, of *life* poured into them which nothing can hinder or destroy. Death stands in front of them still, death as one of the facts of this present world, with its premonitory weakness and pains, sometimes its accompanying tortures. Still loved ones pass, one by one, out of their sight. Still the body decays. Still the passage through this world is a pilgrimage which ends at a portal where the

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gate opens only to those outgoing, to none returning, and allows none to see the mysteries hidden on the further side. But these men who have embraced this message of the Gospel are certain that they *live*, and that the passing of that portal is but an incident in life. This life of theirs is beyond the reach of harm. It is hid, they say, with Christ in God, and when Christ, who is their life, shall appear they also will appear with Him in glory.

And with this conviction of *life*, everything is changed for them in what we call living. This transmutes all values. Things that were great before became small now; some things that seemed small became great. Is it not bound to be so? Before, without Christ and His Gospel, men were all their time fighting for life, surrounded by tyrannous forces that were for ever threatening to deprive them of it, to thwart its peace, to hinder its fulness, and in front of them stood always the last grim spectre waiting to demand the last toll and take all away. Now they had life as a gift to them, life unassailable, which nothing in Heaven or earth could injure. They had come into intimate personal union with the Eternal Spirit of life. They were God's. God was *for* them. The things that loomed so large before, the troubles of this world, its losses

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and pains, these were small things. Now, they could not touch this life of theirs, they could only minister to it, giving it material on which to grow, over which to conquer. And yet, with that, the things of this world that had seemed small and insignificant, its opportunities and responsibilities, became magnified. The life secured to them, free from fear of being damaged by the assaults of the world, was free to spend itself in drawing good from the world and giving good to it. Released from the care of fighting for life, and the fear of losing it, men were free to fight for other things. Their living here had been lifted clean out of an earthly context into a heavenly. That is what Christ had done by His Gospel. He had brought life and immortality to light.

It is well that we should sometimes look back like this and try to see in the broad light of the New Testament record as a whole what it was that Jesus had done for men, looking at it as a fact of human history. He made men—those who believed the message—secure in their confidence in *life*, life eternal, begun here and now, life in God.

And Christianity has gone on being believed and proving itself worthy of men's acceptance, through all the centuries that have passed since

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the beginning, because people have been brought by it continually into that same confidence. It has shone into men's souls with the light of a Gospel indeed. It has been able to make them happy in the deepest sense. They have found themselves in union with the eternal God, in which is blessedness. It does that for men still. It does that for us—just in proportion as we receive and welcome it and put it to the proof. *To as many as received Him to them gave He power to become sons of God. Beloved now are we the sons of God. The Spirit beareth witness with our spirit that we are the children of God: and if children, then heirs, heirs of God and joint heirs with Christ.* It is the Gospel of life—life which cannot fail or perish.

I am come that they might have life. Ye will not come unto Me that ye may have life. So the Fourth Evangelist reports Jesus Himself as saying. That was His mission, to give men life. And what a promise it is!

“ 'Tis life whereof our nerves are scant,
More life and fuller that we want.”

That is the truth about men always.

Now I have only one thing that I want to bring you to think of, and I am not going to try to philosophize or argue about it. It is

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this: that Jesus Christ brought that gift of *life* to men by going, of set purpose, to meet *death*. *He steadfastly set His face to go to Jerusalem*. And we know the Gospels well enough to know that that is the meaning of it. Jerusalem meant death. He went to Jerusalem, not only with the prospect, but with the intention, of dying there.

The more we read the story of Jesus the more it comes home to us that the most astonishing thing of all in it, the thing which removes Jesus farthest away in uniqueness from all others we have ever read or heard of, is the fact that He took this dying at the hands of men as a purpose. That is most wonderful. And it must be true. It is woven into the whole narrative. Early in the story, in the days of His success and popularity as a teacher in Galilee, when the storm clouds of opposition had hardly begun to gather, we read of His defending His disciples against the Pharisees' rebuke because they did not fast, by comparing them with the bridegroom's friends who could not be mournful while the bridegroom was with them. *But the day will come when the bridegroom shall be taken away from them*. When the clouds had begun to lower, and He had withdrawn more and more into solitude with His disciples to concentrate on teaching them and

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preparing them for their work in coming days, after Peter had confessed his belief that He was the Messiah, He startled them all by beginning to tell them plainly that He must go to Jerusalem and be rejected and killed. He took three of them apart to share with Him a vigil of prayer on a hill by night. They had a remarkable experience of seeing Him transfigured to a form of dazzling brightness, and hearing Him in converse with Moses and Elijah. And what they heard them talk of was the death which He should "accomplish" at Jerusalem. And as the story draws on to its close, more and more persistently this is in it : Jesus is certain that He must die. It is on the path marked out for Him which He must tread. We have it in the parable which He told to His enemies of the wicked husbandmen who slay their master's son—the last messenger sent to them to recall them to their duty. Jesus knows He has a baptism to be baptized with and a cup to drink; He is straitened till it be accomplished; He is shut up to it by a divine constraint. It is the baptism in the waters of death, it is the cup of the shedding of His own life blood. And when He sits to keep the Passover with His disciples, He draws them into a final, loving covenant with Himself and with His Father by the cup which

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He bids them drink henceforward in remembrance of Him, and says it is the covenant in His blood. The Son of Man is come, He had said before, to give His life a ransom for many.

As we try to think into the story, this is the most wonderful thing in all the life of Jesus. This makes Him stand truly alone. We may compare His teaching with that of others and not be sure that His words are absolutely unique. His example of integrity and unselfishness, that may perhaps be paralleled in others who have been great and good, faithful and devoted even to death. His mighty works of compassionate power, these are not without analogies in other records. But in Jesus we find all this, this high teaching, this pure example, this compassionate power, along with something unparalleled—the purpose to die, that thereby men may live. *Except a corn of wheat fall into the ground and die it abideth alone, but if it die, it beareth much fruit.*

That is what makes the death of Jesus different from—something more than—a martyr's death. Socrates was willing to die, believing that gain might come to others from his death. So has been many another. Jesus was *determined* to die. *Therefore doth the Father love me*—the Fourth Gospel lets us hear Him say again—

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because I lay down my life. No man taketh it from me. I lay it down of myself. Men did take it from Him. It was by their cruelty that He was betrayed and crucified. Yet it was His own deliberate offering. He knew He must die. He died of choice. This was His purpose. He shrank from death, yet He went to find it. It was not a fate He had to suffer ; it was a work He had to do. Now is my soul troubled and what shall I say ? Father, save me from this hour. Yet for this cause came I unto this hour. Father glorify thy name. Did ever any other man pray like that ?

He set his face steadfastly to go up to Jerusalem. We touch mystery there. Here we have the co-operation of a human will with the divine purpose in a way that passes our comprehension. We can only wonder at the fact and accept it. We know that life has come for men out of Jesus going thus to death. The love of God, uniting them to Himself, has reached them at the cross of Jesus. Jesus knew that it must and would be so. He was human, and all the circumstances of His death were human circumstances. Yet He was so much of one mind and heart with God, His Father, as that. His death was the deed of man's sin, but it was the deliberate deed of God's love.

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I am asking you to think about this on Palm Sunday. The day recalls for us that triumphal procession winding up the hill into the holy city, Jesus riding in the midst as a king of peace, the people singing their hosannas. He was going to Jerusalem. And He chose to accept the people's fickle homage and to go there as a king. For He was indeed coming to reign, to reign as only one who has the power to give the greatest gift of God, the gift of life abundant, can reign over men. He was entering Jerusalem to take up that kingdom. He was going to His coronation. He was ascending the throne from which He should give men that gift of life. But He was going to die. Only out of death could that life come.

“ Ride on, ride on, in majesty !
In lowly pomp ride on *to die*.
O Christ, Thy triumphs now begin
O'er captive death and conquered sin.
Ride on ! Ride on in majesty !
In lowly pomp ride on *to die*.
Bow Thy meek head to mortal pain ;
Then take, O God, Thy power and reign.”

What does it mean ? Not for theology, not for theory, but for the business of our living ?

It means that we have been loved with an everlasting love ; that God, the eternal source

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and Lord of all the worlds, cares that we should live with life abundant; that He has done and given the uttermost that love can do and give that we might come to life with Him. Christ died for us.

It means that we are debtors. Was that the love of God in Christ—that made Him set His face steadfastly to go to Jerusalem, to that death? Was it? Then love for *whom*? For others, but not for *us*? Are *we* not in debt to it? *We love because He first loved us.*

“ Oh, 'twas love, 'twas wondrous love,
The love of Christ to me ;
It brought my Saviour from above
To die on Calvary.”

“ This have I done for thee: what hast thou done for Me? ” Is that not something that concerns our everyday living? What are we going out from here to do? How are we going to act and speak and think to-day, to-morrow, all the coming days, in work and holiday? Are we going to live for ourselves, or for God? We are debtors.

And it means that we know how our debt must be paid. *Hereby know we love, because He laid down His life, and we ought to lay down our lives for the brethren.* We have been saved

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for life, because He went up to death; and life here means service and sacrifice in love to others, following Him.

Hold back nothing. Give royally. Count not your lives dear unto yourselves. Go after Christ. Love Him. Show your love for Him in the only way you can, the only way He asks—by loving men, loving them most where they are most in need, for His sake. *He that loveth his life shall lose it : he that loseth his life for my sake and the Gospel's the same shall find it.* And to us, if we believe in Him and love Him and follow Him, He says, *Because I live, ye shall live also.*

THE PURPOSE OF LENT

BY THE REV. E. A. DOWN, M.A.
Hon. Canon of Southwark

*"I will hearken what the Lord God will say
concerning me."*—Psalm lxxxv. 8.

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(1) THERE is good reason for thinking that the psalm from which these words are taken was written shortly after the return of the exiles from Babylon. This signal act of the divine lovingkindness was generally interpreted as a pledge of God's continued favour. The poem opens, therefore, with a thankful acknowledgment of His mercy in restoring them to the beloved home of their ancestors. It was a proof to them that the offences of God's people had been forgiven, their sins covered, the divine displeasure removed, and that the wrathful displeasure under which they suffered had been turned away.

But there were some disquieting signs on the horizon which filled their minds with apprehension. It was but a feeble remnant, a mere handful of the captives, that had returned, and they found themselves "in great affliction and reproach." The national life had not revived, and the great hopes held out by the prophets had not been realized. They were confronted, in fact, on all sides with opposition

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and discouragement. It was but to a desolate land, and to a forsaken city, that they had come back. The walls of Jerusalem were thrown down; its gates were burnt with fire; and jealous enemies were constantly on the watch to assail them. That is why the note of triumph passes so quickly into the more subdued language of prayer.

“ Turn us then, O God our Saviour ;
And let thine anger cease from us.
Wilt thou be displeased at us for ever,
And wilt thou stretch out thy wrath from one
generation to another ?
Wilt thou not turn again and quicken us,
That thy people may rejoice in thee ?
Show us thy mercy, O Lord,
And grant us thy salvation.”

In spite of such gloomy forebodings, however, they feel sure that there is a more glorious future in store for them. “ The gifts and calling of God are without repentance.” “ The vision is yet for the appointed time, and it hasteth toward the end, and shall not lie; though it tarry, wait for it; because it will surely come, it will not delay.” Herein lies the solid ground of their confidence. They have only to wait in calm and quiet expectation for what God has to teach them, and the divine answer is bound to come

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back in the language of renewed hope and reassurance.

(2) "I will hearken what the Lord God will say concerning me." But these words admit of a far wider application. They represent an attitude, in fact, which has been very common among the most saintly characters in every age. Our thoughts travel back to Abraham, "the father of all them that believe," called to leave his "country, his kindred, and his father's house," and the ready response with which the call was obeyed as "he went out, not knowing whither he went." Or we think of Samuel, the little temple acolyte, roused from his slumbers in the Tabernacle to bear an unwelcome message and to undertake an irksome task, and of his faithful answer, "Speak, Lord; for thy servant heareth." Or we recall the story of another boy in later times who received his summons under far different circumstances. "Whom shall I send, and who will go for us?" was the opportunity which befell Isaiah, and it was met by the prompt resolve of unquestioning obedience, "Here am I, send me." Or to come down to much later times, we remember that striking scene on the Damascus road, when Saul, the persecuting Pharisee, was struck to the ground "trembling and astonished," together with the

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question which rose instinctively to his lips, "Lord, what wilt thou have me to do?" Or once again, and most wonderful of all, there was that "answer of Mary's profound and humble obedience to the greatest call ever addressed from heaven to a mortal creature; a call to prepare for being the instrument of the final and complete accomplishment of God's highest words and most amazing acts; a call to be the human mother of the Eternal Son"—together with the absolute self-surrender and perfect readiness for all that might be required of her, as she replied, "Behold the handmaid of the Lord; be it unto me according to thy word." The Psalter, likewise, is full of similar aspirations. "Show me thy ways, O Lord: and teach me thy paths. . . . Teach me to do the thing that pleaseth thee, for thou art my God. . . . Show thou me the way that I should walk in, for I lift up my soul unto thee."

(3) "I will hearken what the Lord God will say concerning me." But this attitude of patient expectancy which God Almighty requires of His creatures at all times, is peculiarly the kind of spirit in which we should embark upon the season of Lent. For what is the purpose which lies behind these solemn weeks? We are too apt to connect them with the performance of a

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number of irritating little rules which make serious inroads upon our comfort and ordinary occupations. Not, of course, that one would be understood as desiring to disparage such restrictions on our inclinations—nay, human nature being what it is, it is difficult to see how, under ordinary circumstances, we could secure our true end without them. But the point is, that we need to keep steadily in front of us the result which Lent is intended to produce in our lives, and not merely the method by which we reach it. For what we ought to aim at is this: to get into closer communication with God; and this can be accomplished only in so far as we gain a greater mastery over sin and self. What the Church invites us to do, therefore, is to go with our Lord in spirit into the wilderness, and wrestle out the great problems which surround our life without the intervention of those ordinary pursuits and pleasures which (though quite innocent and harmless in themselves) tend to warp the judgment and weaken the will. We want to make ourselves more conscious of our real condition in God's sight, somewhat in the same way as Newman describes his own state in the early pages of the *Apologia*, where he speaks of certain convictions as influences in "isolating him from the objects which surrounded him,

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in confirming him in his mistrust of the reality of material phenomena, and making him rest in the thought of two, and two only, absolute and luminously self-evident beings, himself and his Creator."

It has been often noticed how frequently God's most striking manifestations have been made to mankind when they were called away from the world to be alone with themselves and their Maker. It was so with Moses when he was summoned to spend those mysterious days on Sinai before receiving the Law. It was so with Elijah when he was driven to Horeb, and lodged in the cave, that he might learn now God was neither in the strong wind which rent the mountains, nor in the earthquake, nor yet in the fire, but in the "still small voice." It was the way in which God prepared St. John the Baptist for his great mission in life. of whom we read that he "was in the deserts till the day of his showing unto Israel." Or we think of the Apostles in the Upper Room "continuing with one accord in prayer and supplication," as their preparation for receiving the gift of the Spirit at Pentecost; or of St. Paul spending his three years in Arabia, ere God commissioned him to proclaim his great message of salvation to the Gentiles; or of St. John living an exile in Patmos,

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as the condition for looking through the open door of heaven on revelations which disclosed "the things which are, and the things which shall be hereafter." But we can point to an example far higher than any of these, since we notice how each crisis in our Saviour's life was preceded by a period of retirement. Thirty years were spent in the seclusion of Nazareth before He entered on the three short years of His ministry. Forty days were passed in the desert, in conflict with Satan, before He was fully equipped for the work which the Father had given Him to do. A whole night in prayer on the mountain-side formed a prelude to the solemn task of selecting His Twelve Apostles; while the Wednesday in Holy Week was regarded, apparently, as a kind of quiet retreat at Bethany before facing the awful task which reached its climax in Gethsemane and on the Cross.

That, surely, is the right way of looking at Lent. God, we may be quite sure, if only we place ourselves in the attitude of listeners, has some message to disclose to each one of us. It is no small part of prayer to listen for God's voice, since prayer includes not only speaking to Him, but also waiting for His answer. It is a kind of intercourse or communion in which all the talking should not be on our side. It

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includes the duty and the privilege of a childlike attitude which tries to hear what God has to say. It is for this reason that it becomes so important to secure a few quiet moments each day away from the noise, and the bustle, and the distractions of our ordinary life, so that we may not only realize what God wants us to do, but may resolutely determine to perform it.

(4) “I will hearken what the Lord God will say concerning me.” It would be futile, of course, to try and sketch out a rule which would be suitable for everybody, since its details must be determined by various conditions of age, health, habits, which are peculiar to each of us. There are certain underlying principles, nevertheless, which are more or less applicable to us all. Anyhow, the Church seems to suggest three main lines, or directions, in which fresh effort should be made.

(a) First, there is Prayer, both public and private. How difficult we all find it to pray! Nor does it become simpler as life goes on. Everybody seems to imagine that prayer is easier for other people than for themselves, and that we are the only people who find it hard to pray. The trial, however, is almost universal, and it is well that we should recognize the fact. It is wise in most cases, probably, to add very little to our

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ordinary prayers, and to concentrate our attention on trying to say them much better and more thoughtfully than we usually do. If only we could succeed in repeating them more slowly, in fixing our thoughts on what we say, and in meaning the words which our lips may utter, what a difference it would make to our life ! It was the late Bishop Hamilton of Salisbury who said that " no man was likely to do much good at prayer, who did not begin by looking upon it in the light of a work, to be prepared for, and persevered in, with all the earnestness which we bring to bear upon subjects which are, in our opinion, at once most interesting and most necessary." That might well be the kind of spirit which should mark our prayers in Lent.

(*b*) Then there is *fasting*, about which it would be impossible to speak except in quite general terms. Let us realize, however, that it is of universal obligation. Our Lord fasted Himself, He assumes that all His disciples will do so, and He puts it side by side (in the Sermon on the Mount) with other duties from which no serious Christian would wish to excuse himself. Its application, nevertheless, must be governed by considerations of health, age, opportunity, occupation; and it is a point which must be left primarily to each one's conscience, and to the

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judgment of those whom God has appointed to guide them.

(c) And there is *almsgiving*. Possibly we can give much, or else it may be little that we can give; but at least it can involve something in the way of real self-denial. This is a duty, probably, which we connect too little with our religion, in spite of the emphasis which is laid upon it by our Lord. But almsgiving is a *religious* act, without which any true religion must be defective.

(5) "I will hearken what the Lord God shall say concerning me." Harkening, however, is profitless unless followed by obedience. The expectation of a message must be accompanied by a fixed resolve to accept its obligations, whatever they cost. In theory, at any rate, most of us would like to make religion the *main* business of our life; but theory must be transfigured into practice. There are so many other competing interests which claim to absorb our attention, and our hearts become in danger of being crowded with so many other things that God is constrained to take a secondary place. But God will never be satisfied with a divided allegiance. You must put Him first, or nowhere. This does not mean, of course, that we must always be on our knees, nor that we must always

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be thinking and talking about religion; but it *does* mean that religion ought to be the secret and inspiration of our whole life. Our work, our study, our friendships, our correspondence, our tastes, our recreations—these all can be, and must be, bathed in the cleansing waters of a religious motive. Our prayers, our worship, the sacraments, should colour all that we do, even what seems to be the most secular occupation. It is fatal to shut off parts of our life from God, and divide it up into watertight compartments. There is nothing, except sin, which is not capable of consecration—our memory, our thoughts, our imagination, our pleasures, our conversation—they all can be brought beneath the consecrating touch of Jesus Christ. The great thing is that God should get the chance of making His will known to us in Lent; that we should listen to what He has to say; and above all, that we are resolved to carry out in our lives any demand which may be made on our obedience by Him to whom we belong, and in whose service alone is perfect freedom.

ON THE ART OF THINKING IN
TERMS OF THE CROSS

BY THE REV. ARTHUR JOHN GOSSIP, M.A.
Aberdeen

"Any one who does not take up his cross and follow where I lead is not worthy of me."—Matt. x. 38. (Weymouth.)

On the Art of Thinking in Terms of the Cross

Is it not fearsomely easy to come to take the Cross for granted; really to forget about it, and to be no different because that tremendous fact is there?

In every village in our land, that day its War Memorial was unveiled a wild surge of emotion rose up chokingly in every heart. And for weeks after nobody could see it except through eyes grown suddenly dim. But now the women coming from the well set down their pails under its very shadow, and chatter eagerly about the little nothings of their little world, and scarcely so much as remember it is there. And so our heedless eyes can run unarrested over that Cross that all our days has been a bit of our mental landscape. It has been always there, and so we barely notice it.

Sometimes, indeed, we do grow hot-faced because this amazing thing does not haunt us, claim us, lay compulsion on us, as we feel it ought to do. And now and then—at a Communion, or at a Good Friday service, or, thank

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God, upon occasion for no very definite reason and at quite ordinary times, the mists lift and scatter. And, staringly, it looks at us, how real, how near, how awesome, till our hushed hearts hold their breath. But the fog soon closes down again, and it fades out; and we forget once more.

How are we to avoid this dull, unseeing callousness? How can the Cross become really effective in our lives?

Well, I suppose that in most homes in Jerusalem, after that Passover when Jesus died, things moved on just as usual; that the worshippers from elsewhere scattered, each of them back to the life that he had left, and continued the pattern of that with no very noticeable break. Even Pilate, according to Anatole France, by and by remembered nothing about that little incident that for the moment had worried him. For other matters, closer to him in point of time, and more important as he estimated things, or at least touching his own interests more nearly, jostled it from his mind.

But there was one at least who would not, and could not, forget—that worthy man who, coming into town on his own business by the Calvary road, chanced, just where it dips down into the city, upon a clustered knot of folk, and among them here and there the glint of

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helmets glittering in the sunshine; and, pushing in to see what it was all about, found that a prisoner had more or less collapsed under His Cross; and, seeing that was all, was, no doubt, turning to go upon his way when a hand fell on his shoulder. "Hie, you! Lend a hand here! Here's the man for the job!" And with that he was being hauled and hustled into the centre; and they were laying the Cross upon his shoulder—how he shuddered at the touch of the grim thing—were steadying it—"Grip it, man, can't you! There now!"—were roughly bidding him move on. It was in vain that he protested he was going the other way, and that he had urgent duties waiting for him; in vain that he cried out indignantly that it was a gross outrage that he, a respectable citizen, should be so villainously insulted and demeaned, paraded through the streets as if he were a condemned felon on the way to execution. "Do you expect us to carry the thing?" the soldiers growled. "Not likely, on a day as hot as this! On with you! or perhaps you'll know more about a cross than the weight of it before you are many moments older!" And, with a burning face, and a heart seething with rage and shame, he had to do their bidding. No! he would not forget, would talk of it until the day he died, with the

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old fierceness flaming out uncooled. Or if, as it appears, Simon became a Christian, ah ! then still less could he forget. For every time he sinned a sin would not he cry out, Miserable me ! Is it not enough that I had an unwilling share in my Lord's crucifixion; that these very hands of mine held the Cross to which I saw them nail Him down, and this my shoulder, accursed to the end of time, carried it for Him yonder to the place of horror ? I ! I did that ! And now once more I must hurt Him, and take sides against Him, and break His heart afresh. Or, with a change of mood, when some sacrifice was asked of him, would not he break out into happy exultation ? In the mysterious providence of God, He gave to me a share in the salvation of the world, yes, even me, enabled me to make it all a little less hard for the Saviour. And now again He grants me a new opportunity of helping Christ, of close comradeship with Him in His sorrow. No, he would not forget ! But all his days, for him at least, it would remain vivid and real.

And Thomas à Kempis tells us, getting very near the heart of things, that if you and I wish the Cross of Christ to come home and grow real to us, we also shall effect that best, not by arguing about its meaning, not even by long brooding on it in a hush of spirit, but by carrying it after

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Him—we, too. And how? Each of us must of course particularize that for himself. There are sins, our individual sins, that each of us must crucify in Jesus' strength: and sacrifices, our personal sacrifices, that each of us must make for Jesus' sake. But, for complete success, we need something less spasmodic and occasional, broader and more general, than that. The spirit of the Cross must, as it were, be soaked into the very stuff and fibre of our mind. It must become the standard by which we judge everything, the background before which our whole life is enacted, so that that solemn shadow falls across it all, and tells on every incident.

The war has radically changed us as a people in many ways, not least in this that it gave us a new standard of measurement. In the old days, the mass of us had a small wage and meagre incomes, thought in little sums; and what nowadays seem trifling figures sounded then huge and staggering and impossible. But the reckless flinging about for years of hundreds of millions, and much glib talk of really unimaginable monies, have altered the whole scale of people's thinking, made us by far larger in view and bigger in outlook, more wasteful and extravagant. In these times a mere million or two seems a negligible thing. And the Cross ought

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to have changed us, too. Before it was set up, our standards were far lower. Duty, uprightness, honour, these seemed tremendous calls upon us then. But the generous prodigality of Christ's self-sacrifice, once it is seen, alters the whole scale of one's thinking. Here, as elsewhere, what Wordsworth says is true, that a life given for truth becomes a law of nature for the rest of us. In view of that we daren't live on in the old way, for this new fact has made that out of date. Or so at least it ought to be. But, in hard fact, our problem is just this, that obstinately we still live in the old obsolete fashion, with the old cramped ideas of what becomes us, and the old niggardliness of view. We have not learned the habit of thinking in terms of the Cross, of applying that in all things as our standard, of carrying it after Christ through all the multitudinous details of our daily life, of putting those through, as each of them arises, in the spirit of that. And yet until we learn that art, we are not really Christians. What would you say to making for Calvary from a new direction ; following not the beaten way to it, but a round-about, little frequented, grass-grown path, hardly a bridle track? For, coming on it from that unfamiliar angle, it might strike us as it does not do now, viewed from where we have seen it all our lives.

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Well, hidden away in a forgotten nook of the Old Testament is one of the most daring flights alike of Scripture sarcasm and Scripture faith. A brave man, Zechariah, was attempting what appeared to be a hopeless task, to rekindle an enthusiasm that had died away, been stamped out into blackness and cold ashes, so that not one spark of it remained; to rouse again the very hopes which folk were feeling bitterly had fooled them of their lives; and which, so they alleged, they had already proved to be impossible. And indeed it was some twenty years since they had set out from their exile and captivity in Babylon, with what enthusiasm and high leaping flames of confidence and hope; since, with bewildered thanksgiving to God, they who but yesterday when they lay down had been a broken people with no future, a mere crushed group of serfs lost in the crowds of mighty Babylon, had wakened up to find themselves free folk again, and with their faces once more turned towards home, ah ! with what lofty dreams and bold assurances ! For they were going to rebuild Jerusalem; to restore the ruined Temple; to rally Jewry once more round it into a great people, and set up again the fallen glories of the race in more than the old splendour. And it was all so real to them, so sure, so near ! Yet,

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that was twenty years ago; and not one of their dreams had grown into reality, not even one ! They had indeed, two little groups of them, struggled through the long deserts, fearful and harassed and often all but blotted out; still they had reached their goal. But more than that they could not do. For although twenty years had come and gone since then, and the young heads that dreamed the big dreams were now growing grey, still Jerusalem lay in her ruins, more or less; still the wild beasts prowled through the fallen Temple courts; still they themselves were, not a mighty people with wide-spreading territory, but a little huddle of famine-stricken folk, encamped precariously there amid the debris and black ashes of their ruined greatness, and hard be-sted by the insolent tribesmen round about. All hope and expectation had long died away; and they had sunk for years into a sullen resignation to their lot, had become half-content with it, at least accustomed to it, so that it no longer stung them. Till God sent among them the manful voices of Haggai and Zechariah ringing out the old intolerable longings, stirring the old memories, urging them on to the old lofty hopes.

But this time it was doubly difficult. For when every hand was needed in the work, at least

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half of the people were mere idle critics and wet blankets, scoffing and jeering at whatever was attempted; or at least sadly shaking pessimistic heads, and confidently prophesying failure and disaster. Were the foundations of the Temple once more laid? Ah! this will never be like the old Temple of our day, they croaked. How poor and cramped and shabby this is going to be! Did they restart the long-neglected task of rebuilding the city? What is the use? these others muttered. At best anything that we can raise must be, not a great capital, like that of which fools who will not face ugly facts still dream, but a mere paltry provincial town, like any other country town. Till Zechariah both summed up and answered all this murmuring and faithlessness and discontent in one vivid picture of a fatuous youth blandly proposing to measure the immeasurable with a foot-rule! "And I saw a young man with a measuring line in his hand. Then said I, Whither goest thou? And he said unto me, To measure Jerusalem, to see what is the breadth thereof, and what is the length thereof. And the angel that talked with me said, Run, speak to this young man, saying, Jerusalem will be a mighty city that will overflow whatever walls are built for it, whatever boundaries are set it; will grow

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yet more and more and more. And you propose to measure this with that futile yard-stick of yours ! ”

That is a piece of sarcasm that never becomes out of date, but which requires to be repeated year by year. For this poor creature, with his absurd measuring-stick, is never far away. What generous movement has not, at its rise, to run the gauntlet of his suspicion and belittlement and confident predictions that, talk how they like, it will end in little or nothing.

And it is no small part of our duty as Christian people to be done with that; to escape from this mania of valuing things by their sensible size, or by the world's crude standards; to lay aside yard-sticks and foot-rules and the like, to turn to the Cross of Christ, and in all our thinking measure things by that.

So to do lands one in a singular world, where the relative importances of what lies about us have been strangely altered. Some things that loomed up huge and imposing grow suddenly dwarfed, shrinking into paltry nothings. For example, you have grievances, sore grievances, and slights, real slights; and you can't forget and can't forgive them, so you say. You know that Plutarch warns us that anger is a mist that magnifies things oddly out of all proportion to their actual size. But it is not so in this case,

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so you cry doggedly. Here there is no exaggeration. You are aware that our Lord lays it down inexorably that, without exception, and time after time, however trying people prove, we on our side must seek to maintain the old friendly feelings towards them, that He makes that an absolute condition of our own forgiveness at God's hands, so that, as Johnson says, if we harbour a mood of ill-will towards any one at all, because of that, for us "the throne of mercy is inaccessible, and the Saviour of the world is born in vain." And yet, perhaps, even so knowing, your heart remains hard and implacable, won't change. But let the shadow of the Cross fall across our injury and sore, let us take in the wonder of our own forgiveness by a God whom we have so grievously and repeatedly insulted, heaping up wrongs against Him day by day, let us see ourselves as that hot, angry creature of Christ's parable seizing his fellow by the throat, demanding instant payment of his trumpery bill of twenty pounds, he who has just had cancelled his own staggering debt of some three millions, has his discharge for that, there in his pocket, given him not half an hour ago, and the thing grows impossible, and our anger dies away. For what had seemed so huge that it filled our whole mind looks upon Calvary how trifling !

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And so with the world's prizes and the like. Elsewhere it seems natural and well worth our while to give ourselves for these. But beside the Cross so to do seems as unseemly as the rattling of the dice-box yonder, where men, cursing, laughing, quarrelling, are gaming for the poor perquisites before Christ's dying eyes. Face to face with Him can you do only that with life?

So in a hundred things, if you would see them in their true proportions, measure them, not with that preposterous yard-stick of yours, but by Christ's Cross.

But there are many matters which so measured become, not dwarfed, but bigger by far than we had realized.

Take sin, your daily sins and trespasses, and mine. There was a time when that lay across life dark and terrible, appalling as an eclipse's threatening shadow, a fearsome and immeasurable horror. But in our day we have applied the foot-rule to it, and discovered it is no great matter after all. There is the length of it, and there the breadth of it, we say, the merest bagatelle that need disquiet no one. Maeterlinck pictures God as sitting on a sunny mountain smiling at our gravest offences as only the naughtiness of puppies playing on the hearthrug. And many an one who is a little startled at that is living

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life in such a way as proves that he believes it true. What do we care about our selfishness or outbursts of temper? Do we not rise from them and go our way, and clean forget about such trifles altogether? Ah! but the yard-stick cannot measure everything. For some things we require the Cross of Christ. And with that in our mind how dreadful our sins grow, our little daily trespasses and falls. Not sitting on a sunny mountain do we see God now, but bowed in agony within the darkness round the Cross where His uttermost self-sacrifice was just enough to save us, and no more. For God gave all God's all. And every bit of it was needed. And not smiling at our worst offences as at mere playful naughtiness, but wounded to the quick by it, and so determined that this hideous horror must take end that He accounts no loss, no sacrifice, no sorrow to Himself too vast if thereby it can be obliterated, and eagerly goes through them all for you and me. Look at the Cross, if you would measure sin aright, your little daily trespasses and falls; look at its cost to God; look at the man Christ Jesus on the tree, and take it in that is the perfect picture of how God always is affected by it, every time so hurt, so wounded, so heartbroken! So will you grasp its hideousness and horror.

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and be filled with loathing for this awful thing. Our one chance, Newman thought, is that we be shocked by sin. Look upon Him whom we have pierced, and surely that must shock us, till we hate what caused Him that, fly from it, find a new power surging up within us that gives the strength to cast it forth, and make an end of it.

Or take the biggest thing in the whole universe, the deepest, the most inexhaustible, God's love. How busy we have been all down the ages with our wretched little footrules upon that, complacently measuring the immeasurable, marking it off—this is its length, and this its breadth—fixing the bounds and limits of this illimitable thing, setting up barriers which we declare it never passes, and marks which we say with assurance it can never overflow, declaring confidently this and that it cannot overlook, and that and this it never does, judging of God, in short, by our own petulant, foolish, sullen, earthy human hearts !

For my part I am done with that. Isn't it amazing, this assurance with which we little creatures talk of the deep things, forgetful that even in this dust-speck of a world of ours so many wonders are constantly happening of which we know and can know nothing at all, because we have no senses with which to pick them up.

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We can see, for we have eyes; can hear, for we have ears. But to how much as real as beauty or as music, we must remain impervious. And is it not ridiculous that we, so limited in our equipment, should claim to be, of course, able to plumb the unfathomable thoughts and all wise ways of God !

You have looked into a tiny pool and watched small insects wriggling at the bottom of that, their whole world. And you and I, are we not also petty creatures, hardly larger, crawling about the bottom of a little pool of air—some three miles deep or so—an infinitesimal pond in this huge universe ? And yet we dare to take the love of God into our puny hands, and talk of that bewilderment as if we can see over it, and under it, and on all sides of it, and round and round about it, this thing so tremendous, so unreckonable, that Paul declares that it will take the whole of us, throwing in all our experiences into a common heap, even to glimpse an adequate hint of what, even then, will prove by far too overwhelming for our human minds really to grasp at all. Stand by the Cross, and surely you must see that what God means by loving is an amazement we can never understand, a thing that has no ends nor bounds nor limits anywhere. What it can do, or cannot do, I

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do not know. But after my experience of it, anything seems possible. All that is sure is that we, one and all, even the worst of us, yes, this whole blundering earth of ours, are hemmed in and surrounded by this unthinkably glorious thing, so strong, so patient, so enduring, so not to be shaken off, that however desperately we have failed Him, that however often we have thwarted Him, that however far we may have wandered from Him, God still loves us; and that there is no place in all His universe where that love of His is but a faded memory of what once was but is not any more; that even though men make their beds in hell, God, who is love, and cannot cease from loving, loves them even there.

Have you allowed your sins, your doubts, your fearfulnesses to persuade you that He has grown cold to you, must have grown cold? Well, it is natural enough, for you and I would not have stood one tithe of such deliberate and impudent wrong as we have done to God. And yet, lay down your little human footrule, and turn to the Cross, and measure this by that. Do you not see it was for those who were His enemies Christ died? Do you not understand the parable of these arms spread so wide upon the Cross, that anybody, everybody may be gathered

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in ? Do you not grasp, not even here, how dear you are to God, that He shrinks back from nothing that can help and save you ? Don't measure Divine love by our poor human thoughts, and ways, and hesitations, and supposings, but by the Cross of Christ. And you will find, however poor a thing you are, it stretches out to you : however vast your need be, it can meet it all.

Or take it of our fellow men. They tell me that there are uninteresting people in the world. For my part I have never been unfortunate enough to meet them. Still, have it as you say. Certainly Anatole France in his final look round upon life gave it as his verdict that there is at least one thing of which we can be absolutely sure, that men are always smaller than they seem. No so thought Christ. Not smaller, always bigger; that was His confident assumption. Yet in truth it is a little difficult at times not to lose patience with them. In the herd they seem so slow to rouse to high enthusiasm, can be so woefully ungenerous, are so apt to be easily fooled by any glib-tongued trickster, that they tire out our sympathy. And we ourselves, the mass of us, are far from clever, are indeed a little dull and stupid, are we not ? At least we are very ordinary people, whose tame, uneventful

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lives consist of a round of petty nothings, whose interests are very limited, whose conversation hops futilely enough, like a canary in a narrow cage, back and to, and back again, between a little spar or two, even in this wonderful world crowded with thronging interests. Well, certainly it does not sound exciting ! And no doubt at all some personalities do seem colourless and drab. But lay aside your footrule; think in terms of the Cross; and, ah ! how that changes our estimate ! In the New Testament, when people are provoking and impossible, the Apostles never tried to explain the ugly facts away. Yes, they agreed at once: and still Christ loved them. That is their sole argument; and is it not enough ? Once in Annandale there was a plain old peasant woman, crouching over her cottage fire. And you would not have looked at her a second time. But had somebody whispered, "That is Carlyle's mother," with what a new respect you would have treated her. And she was worthy of it. Ask her famous son. And there is not one among all we meet but is a friend of Jesus Christ, or might be, would he take the honour. No, not one. And that does make us look at them with other eyes. "I couldn't love him, but his mother did," declared Pompilia of her black-guard husband. And the thought of that came

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to her as a corrective, softening her own rising bitterness against him. So when people seem narrow and bigoted or hopelessly unreasonable, I couldn't love them, but Christ does; and knowing that, I, too, can do it; see they are far bigger than I thought; and gladly give my life for them whom Christ esteemed worthy of all His all.

Or take it of our use of life, our work for God, our efforts to justify our existence. Tut, we cry, busy with our tape measures, what would it all amount to, anything I have to offer? What possible difference could I make in this mighty world-wide conflict between good and evil? I might perhaps teach a class of half a dozen unattractive urchins; or look in on an old soul now and then; or trudge round a collecting district, or the like. But such a petty thing could never tell upon the general struggle.

Yet to attempt to measure what God's grace can do through our poor efforts is the maddest folly. Is it so small a thing to bend and tinge and make even one of those little minds, though all the rest remain impervious to all your efforts all the years? "I can't realize that I should ever be so honoured of God," writes Smetham; "I can go on working, I can sow a little, I can add my labour to the heap, in hope that among other

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agencies I may help rather than retard. But to save a soul as the direct result of my personal effort!" And yet that august possibility lies open to us all. And we can never tell. For momentous happenings have a way of slipping in through unwatched doors, where indeed there seems to be no opening at all. Has not Gore told us that he, brought up in a Protestant atmosphere, had his mind turned in the new direction it has followed ever since, by a forgotten tale—if I do not misunderstand him, a child's story—on which he chanced as a boy? How much has flowed from that! Didn't a certain Black Friar one day open his heart to a youth? He is forgotten, and yet he made Scotland. For his words gripped, haunted, laid compulsion on John Knox! And didn't a disappointed man in an Argyleshire glen, with nothing to encourage him, keep on teaching his dwindling class year in, year out? And have not the ends of the earth good cause to honour him because one day one little lad, as he sat there and listened, made up his mind to be what he became, James Chalmers of New Guinea, whom Stevenson so envied?

Ah! put away your footrule. It is out of place and makes you look ridiculous. Go, tell that young man with his grotesque yard-stick

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yonder, quick, hide it out of sight, for you are setting out to measure the immeasurable with a footrule !

In any case, and let the visible result be what it may, this at least is certain, that you can help and hearten Jesus Christ ; and that He takes these little services as personal kindnesses done toward Himself. Old Dr. Duncan used to say that, if he had been given his choice of any rôle in history, he would have chosen to be the angel sent to strengthen Our Lord in His Agony. Yet even that tremendous task is open to us all. Come to the Cross, and standing here beneath it, look up into Christ's face, and do you grudge Him anything that you can give and do ? There was a bluff but kindly soldier who held up a sponge with vinegar to the poor parched lips. " Let be," the others cried. But he would not desist : rough fellow though he was, he did what he could for Christ.

And you, can you stand here unmoved ; and hugging your life close, say snarlingly " No, it is mine, and I must have the whole of it all for myself," and spare Him nothing ? Standing here beside the gift of His whole life for you, dare you, and can you, and do you ?

Surely the most thorough way to carry Christ's Cross after Him is to get it so into our minds

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that it becomes our rule, our norm, our standard in all things, a kind of watermark that shows through all we think and are and do.

So will it grow at last effective in our lives :
so shall we really prove our gratitude to Christ ;
so will He see with gladness it was not in vain
He died.

THE AMAZING CHRIST

BY THE REV. H. MALDWYN HUGHES, D.D.
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"They were in the way going up to Jerusalem, and Jesus went before them; and they were amazed, but some as they followed were afraid."—(R.V. marg.) Mark x. 32.

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It is well that during Lent we should follow Jesus along the way that led to the Cross. The text indicates a strange experience which came to the disciples. The Master's concentration of their minds on the things of the Kingdom, during the last few weeks of His earthly life, must have been very intense. Jesus had, at the most, only three short years in which to teach them. No wonder that they were slow of understanding ! Nineteen centuries have passed away, and despite the countless interpreters of Christ who have arisen, we have not, even yet, fully grasped or assimilated the teaching of Jesus. But the disciples had to grasp it in three short years. In the earlier months they were hardly awake to the magnitude of the enterprise to which they had committed themselves. The last few weeks were a time of concentrated and intensive teaching, and as He steadfastly led them along the way that could only end at Calvary, they were amazed and afraid. If we, too, follow Him to the Cross we shall share the amazement and the fear of the Twelve.

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I. THE WONDER WHICH CHRIST ENGENDERS.

There is nothing more vital to the Christian life than to keep the sense of wonder alive. A dull and deadly sense of familiarity is one of the worst foes of the spiritual life. In the Gospels there is a Temple of Wonder, but very often the gates are closed to us—self-closed. The Gospel story is one of our earliest recollections. Now we read it and take everything as a matter of course. We feel that it is a very beautiful story. Sometimes, perhaps, the incidents are a little surprising, but there is nothing that pulls us up rudely and violently, nothing that gives us a shock, nothing that makes us gasp with astonishment. It is all part of a very old story with which the world has become familiarized.

Sunrise in Alpine regions awakens the wonder of the tourist. But the ordinary inhabitant does not trouble to lift the blinds and look out of the window. And Jesus may evoke wonder in the Eastern or African who has never heard of Him before, but to most of us, His followers, He has become a very conventional figure. His contemporaries were shocked by His unconventionality. He was always doing and saying startling things. They never knew what He would say or do next. This was one of the root causes of the hatred of Him, which brought

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Him to His death. The charges recorded in the Gospels were trumped-up charges. The real charge against Him was that He insisted on shaking them out of the ruts along which they were comfortably jogging. He surprised, astonished and startled them. He made them wonder, and their wonder made them uncomfortable and afraid.

Read this chapter from which the text is taken. It does not matter whether the events are recorded in strict chronological order. In any case, the record affords striking examples of the Master's teaching. You cannot fail to note the breathless speed at which He hurries His disciples along. He makes them gasp as He overthrows old standards and sets up new ones. First of all, He is confronted with the problem of divorce. Moses, He tells them, made a concession to a comparatively low stage of moral development, but He Himself affirms the absolute law of the indissolubility of marriage. What blasphemy to speak of Moses thus ! But Jesus implies that human teachers, even though inspired, are subject to the limitations of their own time. It is not sacrilege to challenge the most sacred traditions in the name of the eternal truth of God. And it may be (indeed it is certain) that He is challenging some of our traditions and institutions to-day. If He came

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amongst us in the flesh, He would astonish us. If we could only hear what He is saying of some of our laws and customs we should be amazed.

The next picture on the screen is that of the little children who are brought to Him. He astonishes His hearers by telling them that a little child is the type of the true citizen of the Kingdom. Greece gloried in philosophy, Rome in military prowess, and Judaism is the accumulation of works of righteousness. But Jesus sets up a little child, with no learning or strength, and without time to have accumulated merit, as the type of the Kingdom. The great qualities, He says in effect, are innocence, wonder and joy. It is not strange that the disciples were amazed. That is a transvaluation of values which we have barely accepted even yet.

Then follows the incident of the rich young man. Most teachers would have eagerly welcomed him to their following. It is easy to excuse in the rich what we do not overlook in the poor. But Jesus sets up a hard test. "One thing thou lackest, go sell whatsoever thou hast and give to the poor," etc. And He said to His disciples: "How hardly shall they that have riches enter into the Kingdom of God!" "And the disciples were amazed at His words." Do these words astonish us? Do they send an uncom-

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fortable feeling through a congregation of rich men? Hardly, for they are not taken seriously, and most men apply them to everybody except themselves. Jesus elaborates further and says, "How hard it is for them *that trust in riches* to enter into the Kingdom of God." "And they were *astonished exceedingly*, saying, *Then, who can be saved?*" If the rich man, with all his opportunities of education, leisure, refinement, spaciousness of life, philanthropy, can with difficulty be saved, who can be saved? And Jesus replies, "With men it is impossible, but not with God."

Then Peter takes the stage. With a touch of self-complacency he says, "Lo, we have left all and have followed Thee." But then comes the crashing rejoinder. You "shall receive a hundredfold now in this time, houses and lands, brethren and sisters and mothers, *with persecutions*; and in the world to come eternal life." "*With persecutions*"—that was the rub. He offered them a spiritual inheritance and with it a cross. Here again there is a complete transvaluation of values.

Surprise follows surprise. Long-cherished ideas are overthrown and destroyed one by one. The disciples are mazed and dazed.

If we could but recapture the picture of Jesus

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and place it in the frame of to-day, we should be astonished beyond measure. We, too often, present to the world a conventional, deadly dull, orthodox Jesus. But the real Jesus is full of sudden and startling surprises. He shocks our foolish prejudices, and challenges our self-complacent conservatism and hide-bound orthodoxy. He revolutionizes our theories, standards and ideas. He leaves us mazed and dazed, yet rejoicing in an inexpressible wonder and rapture, which impels us to follow Him whithersoever He goeth.

2. THE FEAR WHICH CHRIST ENGENDERS.

Someone has said, "If Christianity has never frightened us, we have never found out what it is."

We have toned down the Jesus of the Gospels. Too often He is presented as an emasculated, effeminate figure. We remember His pity, compassion and tenderness, but we forget His strength, anger and indignation. We remember His pitiful words, but forget His severe words. Read the Gospels and see how many times His hearers were made afraid by Christ. At the Transfiguration "they became sore afraid." When He spoke to them of His coming death, "they were afraid to ask Him." When He stilled the storm, "being afraid they marvelled."

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On another occasion we read, "they were filled with fear, saying, We have seen strange things to-day." And again, "And fear took hold on all."

It was not that He was always speaking burning words of anger. There was something about His Personality which made them afraid. A great personality, however humble he may be, unconsciously makes us feel our littleness. He turns His clear, steady eyes upon us and we are afraid.

But there were some who never feared Him. Little children came to Him trustingly and He blest them. The poor and outcast, too, those who had never had a chance, those who had sinned and were ashamed of their sin and craved for comfort and healing—these saw nothing to be afraid of in Jesus, and they instinctively sought a refuge in Him.

But His enemies He filled with fear. He looked at them and they were afraid. They tried to show a bold front, to bully and bluster, but they could not stand His eyes, and they ended by slinking away. They were afraid of Jesus, and fear is the most cruel of all the passions. Men will do from fear what they will do from no other motive. Fear makes them treacherous, crafty, merciless and untruthful.

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It was because Jesus made His enemies afraid with a fear which they could only half analyse and understand, but which struck their conscience with an icy chill, that they hounded Him to His death.

The disciples, though He looked on them in love and they loved Him, were often afraid. He penetrated to their inmost motives and knew what they were thinking. James and John came to Him with a request couched in ambiguous terms. But they knew that He read their thoughts and they were compelled to blurt out, "Grant unto us that we may sit one on thy right hand and one on thy left hand in thy glory." He deals gently with them and says, "Ye know not what ye ask. Are ye able to drink of the cup that I drink?" They answer light-heartedly, "We are able." But they know not what they are saying. He answers, "The cup that I drink ye shall drink." They understand enough to know that He is making boundless demands on them, and they are humbled, chastened and afraid.

We can imagine the experience of Judas in these few weeks. He was plotting and scheming and cherishing dreams of avarice. But now and again he caught a glimpse of the eyes of the Master, and his soul must have

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shrivelled up within him. Jesus makes us feel that sin is a terrible thing. He does not do it by threatenings or by holding before us the terrors of Hell. You cannot read the Gospels without being struck by the comparative infrequency of Christ's appeal to the motive of fear of punishment in the hereafter. Rather does He make us afraid by what He is.

It is generally agreed that our age is deficient in the sense of sin. Some would have us revive the threatenings of Hell. But it is not in that way that we shall awaken the sense of sin in most men. Our dim sense of sin is due to our lack of fellowship with Christ. If we live in His fellowship we shall be afraid of sin. We shall feel in our inmost soul that it is a violation of love, that it is to ride rough-shod over the holiest laws of our being, and that it is to set up a barrier between us and our Eternal Father and Friend. "He makes me ashamed to live as I do, neglecting my soul," said one of the disciples of Socrates concerning his master. And the same is true, in an infinitely greater degree, of Jesus. He makes us ashamed and afraid to live as we do, neglecting our souls.

That is how Jesus makes us feel the terrible-ness of sin. He shows it to us as it is—as an outrage on holiness and love, as misplaced

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faith and trust, as disloyalty and disobedience to One who loves us, believes in us and has entrusted great things to us. As we realize these things we are afraid.

We have taken upon ourselves the name of Christ. Are you not sometimes frightened by what you have done? Are you not afraid of calling yourself a Christian, when you realize how high and holy and far-reaching are the demands of Christ, and how He trusts us and believes in us and entrusts to us all manner of commissions on which depend the welfare of His hosts and of His cause?

If you are afraid, be glad that you can still be frightened. Be glad that you are still able to marvel at the wonders of the Gospel. Be glad that Jesus Christ is not a lay figure in your religion, but is a living, loving Personality, who is able to make you afraid of outraging holiness and love. Be glad that you still fear the all-piercing and reproachful gaze of the tender, pitiful, loving eyes of Christ. Your fear will only be transitory. "Perfect love casteth out fear." You will hear the words which He spake to them of old :

"Fear not little flock."

"Lo, it is I, be not afraid."

JOY AND SACRIFICE

BY THE VERY REV. W. R. INGE, C.V.O., D.D.
Dean of St. Paul's

“Looking unto Jesus, the Captain and Perfecter of faith, who for the joy that was set before Him endured the Cross, despising the shame, and hath sat down at the right hand of the throne of God.”
—Heb. xii. 2.

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“For the joy that was set before Him.” This verse stands alone in the New Testament. At first sight it seems to attribute self-regarding motives to the supreme act of pure self-sacrificing love. Surely, we may protest, our Blessed Lord was not thinking of Himself when He hung upon the Cross. He did not console Himself by thinking of His return to Heaven in triumph. He drank the bitter cup to the dregs in pure love for mankind, for us men and for our salvation. No vision of the coming glory was suffered to come between Him and the one perfect and sufficient sacrifice which He was offering. He bore it all, as if there were nothing to follow. Not for joy, but for love, did He endure the Cross, despising the shame.

Yes, that is true. But in the Epistle to the Hebrews, above all others, we need never be afraid that the note of heroism will be lowered. There is much more in this mention of “joy” than meets the eye. I will ask you to consider with me what the inspired writer meant when he

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speaks of joy as the motive of the Passion of Christ.

The great Indian poet and prophet, Tagore, whose writings are an inspiration to thousands in this country, speaks of joy—God's own joy—as the motive and cause of the creation of the world. Joy, he says, belongs inseparably to the act of creation. It is at once the motive of creation and the experience which accompanies every creative act. This seems to me profoundly true. Joy, for us, is the sense of active co-operation with the laws of God's world. It is, always, the glad feeling that we are, for the time at least, in harmony with the mind of God, that we are, in however small a degree, thinking God's thoughts after Him, and doing what He wishes to see being done. Joy is the spontaneous elevation of mind which rewards all good work. The poet feels joy when he has translated a beautiful idea into beautiful language; the artist feels joy when he has reproduced on canvas some lovely vision that floats before his mind's eye; the man of science when he has discovered some long-hidden secret of nature's laws; the craftsman when he contemplates a piece of skilful and honest work that he has turned out; and we all feel it when we have faithfully obeyed the voice of conscience and done

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an action with which we hope that God will be pleased. In every case, it is as creators of something that we feel joy. It is the satisfaction of the deepest need of our nature, that of doing or making something that is intrinsically right and good, which gives us joy.

And are we to suppose that the most glorious of all achievements, the redemption of mankind by the perfect Man, who alone could redeem it, gave no joy to its author? Must it not have been a joy transcending all other joys when our Redeemer felt that He could say to His Father, "I have finished the work that Thou gavest Me to do," or when at the moment of death He uttered the single triumphant word *τετέλεσται*, "It is finished"? The joy of the young mother "that a man is born into the world" must be a pale shadow of the joy which Christ felt at His "new creation" then safely delivered in pain and sorrow—the new dispensation, the new "order of love," the new covenant between God and man sealed with His blood.

Nothing is done perfectly till it is done with joy. Christianity does not agree with that morose philosophy which identifies God with law or duty. Not law and duty, but love and blessedness, are the ideals which move the Christian. In the free service which God

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requires of us there must be enough love to make the sacrifice joyous, enough joy to assure us that we are doing what we were meant to do. The joy of worthy achievement is not the motive of our striving, but it is its proper accompaniment and reward. Our Maker, in His kindness to us, has ordained that we cannot perform successfully any difficult task without a thrill of happiness which is far deeper than pleasure.

It is indeed very different from pleasure. If you look at the passage from which my text is taken, you will see that Christ is there spoken of as the example of perfect faith ; He is the Beginner and the Perfecter of faith; and His perfect faith is shown in perfect endurance. The writer has before his eyes the picture of a long-distance foot-race. The heroes of old, of whom he has been speaking, have run their race, but they look to us, from the spectators' seats, to show the same endurance. Not without us can they be made perfect; their work is incomplete unless we carry it on. Therefore, he says, let us not disappoint them, but let us cast off the wraps in which we wait the signal to start, and let us run our race with enduring courage. For, see ! There is Jesus, who ran the course before us, visible in glory at the goal. He endured to the end, for the joy that was set

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before Him—the joy of the deed, the joy of painful endurance, for the sake of a victory that was worth all the pain.

Such a joy is far indeed from what we call pleasure. But is it not the truth that every really creative act, every worthy achievement, brings us as much pain as pleasure? We hear many pretty things said about the pleasure of work; but I doubt whether those who utter them have had much experience of what hard work means. In hard physical exertion the muscles are weary, the lungs pant, the heart labours. We know the condition of a group of runners coming in at the end of a mile race, of a crew of oarsmen at the end of a boat-race. And if our work is intellectual, what pleasure is there in feeling all our nerves on edge, with waves of irritation and depression surging through us? What pleasure is there in throbbing brows and broken nights? But no great work can be done without paying this price. No, let us get rid of cant. Nine-tenths of all work is drudgery, and if we want to bring any pure gold to God's temple, we must coin it out of our own heart's blood. And still the joy is there—joy that makes all worth while.

Let me remind you of a fine passage at the end of the novel *Romola*. "We can only

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have the highest happiness, such as goes along with being a great man, by having wide thoughts and much feeling for the rest of the world; and this sort of happiness often brings so much pain with it that we can only tell it from pain by its being what we would choose before everything else, because our souls see it is good."

Christian joy is not, as one of our hymns says, the pleasure that banishes pain. It is an experience of higher rank than pleasure; it includes pleasure, no doubt, but it can also take up and accept, and in so accepting it can transmute and overcome, pain. There is no lesson which needs to be emphasized more strongly than this. We are, or were till lately, losing our Christianity mainly because Christianity is a creed for heroes, and we were harmless, good-natured little people who wanted to have a good time. If the Cross were not a pretty ornament we should have discarded it long ago.

Perhaps the deepest lesson of the Passion is that the acceptance of pain enters into the experience of God Himself. Homer spoke of his gods as "they who lead an easy life"; we know that God does not lead an easy life. The harmony of the Divine life is a harmony which has overcome the harshest discords. The greater the work the greater the pain, and the greater

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the joy. If we can once get this truth firmly into our minds, that the perfect spiritual life is an experience in which pleasure and pain are both included, and taken up together into a higher realization, that which we call joy, it will alter our whole attitude towards the troubles of this world. There is no other way of understanding them; there is no other way of conquering them; and there is no other way of helping others to bear them. Hear the words which follow in this chapter. "All chastening seemeth for the present to be not joyous but grievous; yet afterward it yieldeth peaceable fruit unto them that have been exercised thereby, even the fruit of righteousness. Wherefore lift up the hands that hang down, and the palsied knees; and make straight paths for your feet, that that which is lame be not turned out of the way, but rather be healed."

For every true disciple, and much more for our Divine Captain Himself, the bitterest sorrow—that which is hardest to transmute into joy—is the sin and folly of mankind. This is indicated in the verse which follows my text, but it is unfortunately mistranslated in the Authorized Version. If you look at the Revised Version you will read, "Consider him that hath endured such gainsaying of sinners against

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themselves," not "against himself." The contradiction, the gainsaying of sinners against their own souls, was the bitterest grief that Christ had to endure. For He was their true Self; their true life was His own; they were made to reflect some hue of His Divine beauty, to imitate some fragment of His Divine goodness. He was their true self; He is our true self; and He suffers, is crucified, and put to shame, when men and women are false to themselves, and turn the light that is in them to darkness.

This is a thought to touch the conscience of the most hardened sinner. It is also a strengthening thought when we are tempted to be "weary and faint in our minds" at the desperate wickedness and folly which we see going on around us. The Cross of Christ can bear even that burden. Sin is sin, and for ever hateful; the wicked, when they die, will go to their own place, like Judas; but for those that love God, all things, even the crimes of the wicked, will work together for good; and those who have run their race with patience, sorrowful, yet always rejoicing, looking unto Jesus, the Captain and Perfecter of faith, will enter into the joy of their Lord, in whose presence is the fullness of joy. "These things have I spoken unto you (our Lord said), that My joy might remain in you, and that your joy might be full."

THE ATONEMENT

BY THE VERY REV. W. FOXLEY NORRIS, D.D.
Dean of Westminster

"We preach Christ crucified, unto the Jews a stumbling block, and unto the Greeks foolishness: but unto them which are called . . . the power of God."—I Cor. i. 23, 24.

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LENT brings us once more face to face with the Cross. For what does the Cross mean? It means that sin is a terribly real thing; that sin deserves punishment; that punishment is inevitable and essential. That is what the Cross means.

But "we preach Christ crucified," and that is more than the Cross. It is Christ upon the Cross. And what does that mean? It means that all the sin of the world gathered up and concentrated on one Person has been borne once for all on our behalf. He suffered on our behalf, not instead of us. "He bore our sins" in this sense, "in His own Body on the Tree." He who was Himself without sin "was made sin for us" that we might be freed from sin. "He died that we might be forgiven."

(1) Now all this, about sin and punishment, is not popular to-day. People do not like to dwell upon it. To the "Jews" it is a stumbling block, as it was at first. Religious people would rather dwell on the joyous side of their religion. Sacrifice and discipline, and all the things that

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belong to the sterner side of religion are a stumbling block. Easter—yes; Lent—no! A Messiah—yes; a crucified Saviour—no! So it was to the Jews, so it is now, so it probably will always be—except to them that are called.

And to the Greeks it is foolishness. To those who approach religion from the intellectual point of view without faith, what good can the death of one man do to others? And surely there is enough suffering in the world without manufacturing more!

(2) But, nevertheless, it is “the wisdom of God.” The sense of sin is a real thing, and has to be dealt with.

There is an interesting passage in one of F. D. Maurice’s books in which he enlarges upon the universality of the consciousness of sin in every individual soul. In every age men try to belittle sin. Some will boldly assert that there is no such thing as sin: that there never was what we call “the Fall”: others that what we call sin is merely the failure of a man to attain the highest, or that it is at worst imperfection: others again that it is all misfortune, that we are as we are born or as our surroundings make us, and that we are not personally responsible. But it won’t do. It is all of no avail. Each one of us knows in his inmost consciousness that

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ne has sinned and that there is no chance of peace or happiness here or hereafter without real effective forgiveness. And then come two hopeless feelings. First that nothing we can now do can possibly atone for the wrong we have done : that we cannot win forgiveness for ourselves. In short, we know that the words are true that when we have done all that is required of us we are still "unprofitable servants." That first : and secondly, that whatever the blessings of this life may be and whatever the joy of some future remote Heaven may be, yet these blessings and this joy are not for us unless, somehow, we can be cleansed, forgiven, absolved. A child with a guilty conscience does not really enjoy his birthday party : riches are nothing to a rich man if his mind is not at ease. People may call it what they like, but there is an innate longing in the human soul for an atonement, and an inevitable consciousness that there can be no rest or happiness without it. St. Paul's description of his own state of mind is universally true : " Oh, wretched man that I am ! who shall deliver me out of the body of this death ! "

And it is a remarkable thing that Christianity is the one and only religion that offers an atonement, and meets therefore the real need of man.

(3) But an atonement must commend itself

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as real and fair—a fiction will not do. Vicarious punishment will not satisfy. I cannot in my heart believe that I can be forgiven through the sufferings of another man punished in my stead. Atonement involves suffering, but it must be *my* suffering. Atonement involves punishment, but it must be punishment of *me*.

During the South African War a company of Bechuana troops was marching past a village where a missionary had put up outside the little church a roughly fashioned crucifix. It was the work of a born artist and told its tale. As the men marched by a lad who was a Christian suddenly broke from the ranks, and stretching out his arms towards the crucifix cried out, "*Come down, Jesus, from that Cross. That is my place, not yours.*" That was a true instinct. Very likely he had never seen a crucifix before, but he knew what it meant. He had the root of the matter in him. "That is my place, not yours," expresses our side of the doctrine of the Atonement.

(4) Now in answer to all this we preach "Christ crucified . . . the power of God." On the hill of Calvary my Saviour hung upon the Cross, suffering the supreme punishment for sin. "Thus it must be." There could be no salvation without it. He knew that it must be so.

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Let us recall and sum up our belief. "He hung and suffered there" for me : that is, on my behalf : that through His death I might be saved from death.

And here comes in our faith. We are justified by faith—not by imputed righteousness, but by claiming with the help of God's grace and taking our share in the death of the second Adam by faith in Him. This is where our personal effort comes in. We accept Him as the Saviour of mankind. By faith we take our sins and realise that they are included in what He bore because we have been made members of Him. But this implies that we are dead to sin. The test of our faith lies in our present refusal to sin. "Go and sin no more." To lie at the foot of the Cross for an hour and to "feel" forgiven, and to go out and indulge ourselves again—this is a mockery . . . the kind of cant that sickens the world. No, we leave the Cross to begin the stern fight, and the difference in us is that we find that now we can conquer, because we have the "Power of God." "To the Jews a stumbling block, to the Greeks foolishness, but unto them which are called . . . Christ the power of God and the wisdom of God."

The Atonement is a great mystery, but it is also a blessed and practical truth. Without it

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we are without hope in the world. But we are not without it : " as in Adam all die, even so in Christ shall all be made alive." " He died that we might be forgiven."

And the Atonement is the final expression of God's Love. The ultimate inducement against sin is the realization of that love. " The love of Christ constraineth us."

Against the old nursery idea which so many of us imbibed as children from well-meaning, ignorant women—that somewhere, always watching us, was an awful, angry Being, who would " visit our offences with the rod," there has been in these modern days a recoil, which is inducing a great many people to go to the other extreme and present to us an amiable God, who will overlook our imperfections. That is equally untrue. The truth is quite unlike either of these imaginings. It is simply that " God is love," and that " He so loved the world that He gave His only begotten Son."

A child who loves his father and knows that his father loves him tries to do what his father wishes and not to do things that displease him—not because he thinks his father is waiting to punish him, but just simply because he has learned by experience that it hurts and grieves his father to see disobedience, disloyalty, ingratitude.

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As with the child and his father so with myself and my God. Here is the real guilt of sin and the real incentive to fight against it.

The sting of sin is that it hurts that great Love which is beyond our comprehension in its fullness. There will be no real fight against sin till we appreciate that. Let the appeal of that Love sink into our hearts to-day and draw us up to God.

GRACE

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"The Grace of God."—1 Cor. i. 4.

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IN the word "Grace," I think, we have an instance of the proverbial truth that "familiarity breeds contempt." It has become such a stock word of religion that we hear and use it without pausing to think what it means. I had the curiosity to look it up in the Concordance; and I find that it occurs, in the New Testament, more than ninety times. No doubt that is why, in our language, it has become—in a sense—naturalized out of its meaning. Somehow it has come to sound tame, and vague, and dreamy; at best, indefinitely gentle and soothing and sweet.

But I do assure you that it means something tremendously awful and powerful; something the world depends on for its safety every moment; something you and I cannot afford to do without, if our eternal future is to be anything worthy of the call and election of God in Christ. I think it may be worth while for us to spend a few minutes in trying to find out what this word really does mean. There are a good many words commonly used in the parlance of religion, which have this kind of narcotic effect upon us.

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We are excellent hypnotic subjects, where eternal things are concerned. As God said to Ezekiel: "Thou art unto them a very lovely song of one that hath a pleasant voice, and can play well on an instrument." And in this word "Grace" there seems to be the very spirit of lullaby.

Well, words are like people. If you want to come at any real knowledge about them, you look up their ancestry. Let us make some enquiry into the pedigree of this word, "Grace." The Greek word for it, "Charis," is a very old word indeed. At first it seems to have meant just "beauty," in persons first, and secondarily in things; a "grace," as we say, of form or manner, which gave the beholder pleasure. Then it came to mean a beautiful act, showing beauty of character, loveliness of heart. And as the loveliest thing we can do is to give, the act of Grace took on a "gratuitous" sense, meaning generally some kindness undeserved, or done for nothing; as to this day we talk about "doing me a favour," which is really the same word.

Now many of the distinctively Christian words, used by our Lord and His Apostles, were just old words which came into the New Testament from the Septuagint; a Greek translation of the Old Testament, made at Alexandria about 284 B.C. These were old classical Greek

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words—such as Love, Hope, Faith—into which our Lord in His wonderful way breathed new and beautiful meanings without changing or misusing them; as He always beautifies and turns to gold everything He touches, blessed be His Name.

In the Septuagint, then, we find this word *Charis* used for the most part in that old primary sense, beauty of form or manner, or sometimes of conduct or demeanour. It is not till we arrive at the Proverbs and the Prophets that there creeps into it the idea of favour on God's part to man. And in its last occurrence, in Zechariah, we find for the first time the dawn of the Christian meaning; "I will pour upon the House of David the spirit of Grace, and they shall look on Me whom they have pierced."

But in the New Testament we get the full brightness of the Gospel meaning shining out of the word; and it takes its place at last as a jewel in the golden treasury of Christian language, which has ever since enriched the world. It is the gem shining in Mary's hair when she first appears before us, "*Ave Maria, Gratia plena.*" It ushers in the Birth of God—"And we beheld His Glory, full of Grace and truth."

Grace, beloved, on a Christian's lips, whether he know it or not, means this : "beautiful gratuitous Favour," given to the world of men by

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God, through the only means by which He ever deals with the world, Jesus Christ—the Incarnate Word of the Father. It is called Grace, because it is the full and final expression of all the infinite Beauty of God's Character, in that it bestows upon creatures, who deserved destruction, the ineffable privilege of union with God.

And moreover it is "gratuitous," because it does this at the price of God's own Life. For, to make it possible, He stepped down into our strait and misery, and identified Himself with our creature-nature, and underwent our due penalty that we might, without deserving, identify ourselves with His meritorious Purity and so qualify for a share in His Glory.

And so Grace is no vague subjectivity. It is the most dynamic and beautiful thing that is to be had in this world. The most beautiful, because its sire is Love and its mother is Sacrifice. The most powerful, because it confers upon defiled and moribund man the power and the right to share, yes, and even to deserve—and that is more wonderful still—the Glory of God.

Grace is the medicine of character, and the food of the soul. It is omnipotent, like its Giver. It can turn a churl into a gentleman, and a fool into a sage. There is no case too hopeless for it. I am not giving you pulpit cant; I know

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what I am speaking about, for I have seen the working of Grace on many souls; and when I see a thing, I know that I see it. A priest is not a mere official of the State paid to read prayers. He is, under God, through the Sacrament of Penance, a physician of souls; and if in the course of this business, with God's help, he gains no experience of life and knowledge of character, he is not worthy of his name and calling.

You who complain that your temper is hopeless, that your pride is too deep of root for you ever to conquer it; that you are sure you can never get over your jealousy, or subdue your lust! Either you are in bad faith, which in Christ's regard puts you out of court; or you are in the wrong path, the path of effort instead of the path of dependence—and that, until you turn and retrace your steps, is hopeless. Let me say at once and frankly: human evil, by human effort, is unconquerable. You may have a will like toughened steel; original sin—the power of it, that is—will get the better of you. But Grace will do it. It may take a lifetime, and the campaign may not be finished when you come to die. The stump of the cancer may have to be cauterised by experience after death. But Grace will do it. What is the reason?

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This. All human work upon character is by its nature negative; but the work of Grace is positive. Excision is excellent; without creation it is useless. Self-repression, self-restraint, good and needful things in their way and place, in themselves aim only at the removal of the evil thing. They may succeed; in which case you will probably cut out more than you want. Every sin is a bad growth which has fastened upon some natural function or quality, good and harmless in itself. Slashing away at the sin may be an excellent thing; but you have got to consider whether you wish to cut out a part of the organ it grows upon.

It is better to enter into life maimed—we know the rest. But it is best of all to enter—yourself, perfected and sanctified. The ideal of salvation is not to be a *tabula rasa*, a house empty and swept, a soul qualified for salvation at the expense of every function and faculty that makes for individuality and personal distinctiveness in a man. Even so, one would be the gainer, no doubt. But surely our Lord's idea is that you should get all your faculties, all your aptitudes and passions, purged and sublimated into virtues. God wants them all in the economy of His Kingdom, I am sure. And so we do not want to kill them, but to purify them and adapt them to service.

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Now self-discipline, alone, cannot do this. But Grace can, and does, do it. For Grace works, not negatively, but positively. Grace does not aim only at the excision of the bad thing. It puts in the good thing, which grows and grows until there is no room left for the bad thing, so that at last it is pushed out. Salvation is not a negation. It is not merely being free from sin; it is being full of Light. It is not like the call of the mother to the little girl in the street, "Go and see what Tommy is doing, and tell him he mustn't." Into the swept and garnished soul came seven other demons, worse than the first; for it was not furnished.

It is sin that is the negation of virtue; virtue is the positive thing. If I am proud, I do not want merely to get rid of my pride; I want to get Humility. If I am unchaste, I do not want just to stop being so; I want to get Purity; which is not the negation of the sexual passion, but the consecration and sublimation of it.

And Grace puts in these things; because it puts in Jesus Christ; and the good thing gradually chokes the bad thing and crowds it out. I know no better theology than is contained in that line of the simple hymn, "And our sins shall drop off in His tender embrace." That is Salvation. And this is the mistake made by so

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many good religious people; they wonder why they make no progress; it is because they have been going on chopping away at the sin, whereas they ought to have been praying for, and practising, the virtue.

You see, if I am to give up my sins, I have a sort of right to demand something that will compensate me for them. Sin is pleasant, is it not? It is all around me, it is easy and exciting, there is every inducement to it. It is not likely that I am going to give up doing what really brings me pleasure for the time, unless I am offered something beautiful which will make it worth my while to turn to it instead. It is all very well promising me eternal life after death; I want something on account, some earnest or instalment which I can hold by now, and by which I can assure myself that religion is real and beautiful—and so climb up by degrees.

Well, Grace gives you this. It educates; it instructs; it informs; it upbuilds. In a word, it creates. It slowly spreads through the system of your soul and tinges it with a new quality, a new relation to all the world of things; so that by imperceptible degrees you grow conscious of an altered sense of values; a better taste comes, a more sublimed ideal, a sense that the knowledge of being clean and true and good—even with

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all the cost to animal self-love—is better than the old corruption and more worth having.

And so, slowly—yes, but surely—you come to look back with real distaste on the old ideals and standards of life and conduct, and when temptation comes (for be sure the powers of evil will not easily surrender you) though your first thought may be “How pleasant it would be to yield!” your second is this: “No—I don’t really want it. It isn’t good enough.” This plane of development, if you can rise into it, is Salvation in process and in being.

Do not imagine for a moment that this work of Grace upon the soul involves depletion of character, or loss of individuality. On the contrary, its sure end and aim is the development of Personality in its true perfection. Only by its means can man, as a Person, ever come to his true focus. A Christian’s Ideal Self lies potentially reserved for him in the New Humanity, which is the Christ. “We have a house not made with hands, eternal, in the heavens.” “We are being kept by the power of God through faith unto a Salvation ready to be revealed”; “begotten again to an Inheritance incorruptible and undefiled, reserved in heaven for us.” We are “growing up into Him in all things, which is the Head.”

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This "growing up" like a plant into the Christ-Perfection; this building up, like a pyramid to its apex; it is the slow attainment, here, of the true and proper Self—the ideal Person of every man and woman, as God sees them; the perfect Image which still sleeps in me, as the pure golden circlet in the drossy ore, the gracious angel in the quarried block of marble. Much smelting in the painful furnace, "many a blow and biting sculpture" may be needed, before the lovely thing can be revealed. But the creative action of the goldsmith and the sculptor, the living genius passing from the Artist and materializing in the lines of form and beauty; this is Grace : and by its work upon our yet infra-human roughness and deformity, we "come to ourselves"—and are, in very truth, "made man."

And then, Grace does another wonderful thing. Even suppose, by any means, your own efforts could make you good. Then, at the best, you would be unworthy and incapable of that union with God which is your destiny. Unqualified by any part or share in the God-Man who is the only Medium between flesh and Deity, the objective taint of fallen and unatoned humanity would still exclude you from all vital relation with the unapproachable Purity of God. No degree of natural virtue can lift man into

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contact with the footpace of God's Throne ; much less into the heaven of His Heart.

But even this miracle is possible to Grace. For it does not merely concede, or pronounce, man worthy of union with God. It makes him so. There is no putative compromise about it; it is qualification pure and simple. It does not merely impute to man, but actually imparts to him, the Merit by which his Pioneer has opened the way to God. So that, when man—the process of his redemption perfected—attains his eternal destiny, he enters on his rights. For He passes into Christ's Kingdom as part of Christ. The 'deserts and merits of that Body, whose organic member he is, have passed into him and become his own.

You, who have been trying and trying to be "good"—and after all, that is the Ideal in one simple word—by the efforts of your own unaided will, and have so blankly failed; or you, who have been using Grace fitfully or faithlessly and cannot conquer self and lust and pride : begin and try again, but in a new and different way. Stop paltering this time, and surrender yourself. Go to the means of Grace, to your Confessions and Communions, with a firm and dogged resolve that you will tighten your nerveless fingers and really take hold of the Hand held out to you from heaven.

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For remember, there is no question of "putting the Sacraments in the place of Christ." That foolish and terrible conception is the fallacy of sloth-bound ignorance. The Sacraments *are* Christ. In them the Christ-life organically passes into our soul-substance and builds up its growth, as the blood passes from the heart to permeate and vitalize the members, as the sap rises from root and stem into the branches and leaves of a tree.

Cease playing at religion as a cult or hobby, and throw into it your heart and soul. Mean it, live it, make it yours. And after you have received the Grace of God, do not be like the man who beheld his natural face in a glass and went away and straightway forgot what manner of man he was. Remember, realize, and respond to the power that has been planted within you; be receptive, sensitive, expectant; and when temptation comes, claim boldly the interior, hearted Life. You will feel a vigour springing up in your spiritual nerves, a dynamic current flowing out into your feeble will; appropriate it ere it sink back inoperative, wield its holy energy, strike your blow in the name of Christ and freedom. And, even should you be worsted, do not lie sullenly calling God to witness that your cause is hopeless—which is really telling Him that His

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Grace is unavailing—but resort again to the cleansing Blood, the empowering Food, and “live to fight another day.”

We sing these spirited and heroic hymns, “Fight the good fight with all thy might, Christ is thy Strength, and Christ thy Right”—and when He accords us the honourable assay of Temptation, we do not even call upon Him, but go down like a stone; and then we complain to our clergyman that the Sacraments do not help us. What do shield and sword avail, if we are too idle to wield them? “I am so weak,” you say. Then, all the better; so much the easier to be humble—which is half the battle. If indeed you are weak, you should be easily led; then let Christ lead you, Christ whose help awaits your lightest cry, and, when it comes, is always just enough; Christ who said, “My Grace is sufficient for thee; for My strength is made perfect in weakness.”

We have entered on the holy Season of Lent. The name comes from an old Anglo-Saxon word, *lencten*, which means spring; I suppose because Lent is in the spring of the year. But there is a deeper fitness in the name, and a mystical. For Lent is, or should be, the time of the new life of the soul; the yearly Spring in which she so renews her dispositions that the

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Life of God creeps up with new vigour into her veins, and she puts forth fresh shoots of holiness.

But this spiritual Spring differs from the ordinary spring of nature in that there is, or should be, a greater luxuriance, every year, of leaf and flower and fruit. Making full allowance for that backsliding which, alas, is inseparable from our earthly efforts towards God, the record of the Book of Life ought to find us, Lent over, nearer to God than we were a year ago. I do not mean definitely that every Easter should acclaim some specific sin conquered, some particular grace acquired; though God grant it may be so. I mean that every Lent, year by year, ought to achieve something towards raising the whole tone and quality of the soul.

Now you know as well as I do what is the chief cause that hinders this ideal. You know it is Sloth; the subtlest and deadliest enemy of the Christian; the ugly, negative thing that scarcely seems a sin, whereas it comes to us with all the sins in the universe hidden in its knapsack. Sloth is the last and most insidious of all the Capital Sins, because it deters and separates us from the only remedy for sin—the use of Grace.

It is commonly said that Satan tempts us to sin; but he has a labour-saving device more effective than a hundred sins; he tempts us to

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Sloth. All the sins in the world cannot hurt or hinder us when once God's Grace has cancelled them; the tactic of the enemy is therefore directed against Grace. If he can succeed in deterring us from Grace, he has us fairly. He can then turn to higher game, and leave us to tempt ourselves; for if we neglect Grace we are ruined. And the sin by which he inoculates us against Grace, and so lays us at the mercy of all the poisons flesh is heir to, is Sloth.

Now there is only one effectual antidote of Sloth; and that is Love. No other power can touch or stir it. The laziest person in the world will rouse himself to action for the sake or favour of one he truly loves. Seeing then that the love of Christ is itself a Grace, or gift given by Him; and that this love is the only force which can galvanize the self-loving sluggish soul into the active practice of "the means of grace, and the hope of glory": I beseech you to implore the Holy Spirit for the gift of Love, that the animal inertia, which makes men and women careless of the call of the Physician, may be counteracted by the enchanting vision of His Beauty.

Thus alone shall you be secured against that most frequent menace to the blessing of this holy time; a falling-off from Communion, from Eucharistic worship, and from prayer, towards

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the middle of Lent. It is the rock upon which Catholic Christians make shipwreck most of all. My experience is that Ash Wednesday is most generally a day of promise and resolution, of burdens laid at the foot of the Cross, of renewed and sincere self-hallowing in the Name that saves us. It is about Lætare Sunday, when he ought to be rejoicing in his "children walking in truth," that the priest begins to be a little sad and anxious.

"In Holy Week," subconsciously we tell ourselves, "I will make good." So we pledge our days, before they dawn; and draw, without security, our overdraft on God's long-suffering: an ironic parody of faith! Life is fleeting by, and neither length of days, nor the lease of his own "accepted time," are things foregone—to him that loves and fears.

Sustained spiritual effort, constancy to vision, and to purpose framed in vision's light: these are the Christian's crying need to-day. Form your Rule, and find your pride in its observance. That is the cant of sloth and coldness, which pretends to belittle the outward forms and practices of religion, as though they were in some sense alternative to the interior allegiance of the heart. It is easy for self-pleasers to find fault with formalism; I am for the good formalist;

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he gives proof at least of will and conscience, and I think there is much hope of him; he is trying to please his Lord, and to entrench himself against the easy laxity of a sensual age, which finds a fine excuse in big talking about "the heart."

You will take heed that no man deceive you. You will sustain your Communions, your efforts at grace-given self-control, your Church-going, your Meditations, and your prayers. You will be ambitious that Holy Week and Easter shall not find you scrambling to "make good" lost ground—for none but God can "make good," or make you good; but advanced a little closer to the Standard of Calvary, grown somewhat higher in the stature that is Jesus, a little nearer to His Heart. For the soul of salvation is reliance upon grace; and Final Perseverance is the high road to the Crown.

POISE AND BALANCE

BY THE REV. CANON T. GUY ROGERS, M.C., B.D.
Rector of Birmingham, Chaplain to the King

“They that wait upon the Lord shall renew their strength; they shall mount up with wings as eagles; they shall run, and not be weary; and they shall walk, and not faint.”—Isaiah xl. 31.

Poise and Balance

ONE of the earliest problems to which we are introduced by the educative process of Nature is the problem of keeping our balance. The early efforts of the child to walk across the room without falling on his face are symbolic of his future career. He is always wrestling with this problem of poise. To mastery over his own limbs succeeds mastery over his machine. Most of us have forgotten the ecstasy of our first experience, after many bruises, of preserving intact our balance on a bicycle, but the experience of the perfect swing of the golf club, even if rare, is not so remote. Wherever man betakes himself—to the sea or to the air, whatever weapon or tool he fashions for his use—he can neither enter his kingdom nor fulfil his desire without the mastery of balance.

It is the same in the region of character. What early struggles we have had to learn that we cannot always have the thing we want at the moment when we want it. Childhood, far from being gentle and persuasive, is really raw and violent. Sweet reasonableness is still

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far ahead and the problem of balance lies between. To take and to hold, to grasp and to keep, is the child's first instinct, and the disciplining of self-love is the work of years, often weary years, of buffeting and defeat. The trouble is that so many of us, in spite of all the educative process, insist on growing up a prey to gusty passions and to the tyranny of an unbalanced egotism. Hence come lust and hate, jealousy and despotism and all else that destroys fellowship amongst men.

It is the same, too, in what I might define roughly as the region of good taste and culture. It is the lack of balance that produces the snob, the crank and the pedant. It was said of Francis of Assisi that he always lived his life in the presence of his Superior. His adoring attitude to Jesus robbed him of every vestige of pride. He knew his place and kept it to the end—that of the Bedesman of Christ. There was no spiritual danger to him in associating with his inferiors; his Superior was much more real to him. That kept the balance true. Snobbery arises from “one-sided” comparison. It withers in the presence of the Great Superior of us all.

The whole purpose of culture is to take away from us this one-sidedness. Perhaps the only

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way we can be sure that we are getting the genuine thing, and not some horrible imitation of it, is when we become conscious of spiritual poise in ourselves. The universe, as we know, is full of it. "Dost thou know the balancings of the clouds, the wondrous works of Him which is perfect in knowledge?" exclaims one of the speakers in the Book of Job. Yes, we do—and we know, too, the perfect poise of a single daffodil nodding on its stem, or a host of them "tossing and dancing in the breeze." We have added vastly to our knowledge of poise in the universe since the ancients began their study of God's ways. But it is only when we become conscious of it in ourselves that the educative process, to which we have so long submitted, begins to bear its perfect fruit. It is a happy moment when there begins to emerge in the course of discarding prejudices and assimilating ideas some guiding principle which gives us a sense of spiritual well-being. It is a happy experience when we begin to co-ordinate humour with seriousness, imagination with purpose, and love with business. To escape from sentimentalism and cynicism is the beginning of wisdom. To possess an organized self no longer at the mercy of crude thinking or untutored feeling is to be far advanced in wisdom's way. To relate the organized self

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to the highest end and the greatest good is to achieve the very goal and end of life. This is nothing else than the perfect mastery of poise.

I am concerned with setting out that this idea of poise is one proper to the Christian view of life. There is an idea that the Christian is a left-handed man in a world adapted to right-handed men. Granted the value of fanaticism, he may be a useful fanatic. Granted that an Anti-Something Society is needed, he will be a valuable President. Granted that self-denial is called for, he is the man from whom it may be expected. But a robust, interesting, many-sided life is not what we ordinarily associate with Christianity, and therein lies the misconception which I would seek to remove.

Take, for example, the most highly specialized form of Christian life as it appears to the outsider—the life of a clergyman. The idea that it is necessarily a narrow one is pure delusion. He can practise his profession in relation to any class of persons in any part of the world. He can find his adventures in the mission-field, or in the heart of a great industrial parish if he feels cramped in vegetable surroundings. The World Call provides him with no lack of geographical scope. But his scale of values will more naturally be qualitative rather than quantitative, and the

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fact that his profession is intimately concerned with Goodness, Truth and Beauty redeems it for ever from the charge of narrowness. Its direct relation to helping people in the moral struggle does not in the least disturb its claim to balance or proportion. For what is the moral struggle? It is the effort to achieve real goodness—a perfectly balanced character.

But I am concerned with the ordinary Christian who has an uncomfortable feeling that if he is to be a devoted follower of Christ he must close his eyes to things which other people see, and warp his judgment in obedience to his faith. I want him to see that it is the Christian who is trying to take notice of all the facts and to make the fuller synthesis.

Let me take an example from our Lord's teaching which will illustrate this. He sums up for us the Christian view of life: "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, with all thy soul, and with all thy mind, and thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself." Notice that here is no condemnation of self-love, but it is set forth in its right relationship to love of God and love of our neighbour. The basis of self-love which is essential to the preservation of the race is frankly admitted. Our Lord says quite plainly, "Thou shalt love thyself." But He

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says equally plainly, "Thou shalt love God first and thou shalt love thy neighbour *as* thyself. Here is a perfect example of what I mean by poise and balance. It is right and fitting that a man should care for his body and his home, his family and his friends. Self-interest cannot be eradicated. Much that is healthy and beautiful in human life depends upon it, but if the principle is pursued in isolation it may have disastrous results. That is the way in which greedy, lustful, avaricious and snobbish people are produced. It is essential that the principle should be related to the loyalty which we owe to God, and to the welfare of the whole community. That is the meaning of the primary emphasis on love to God, and the command to regulate the excesses of self-love by the claims of the human beings amongst whom we live.

The same point might be made with regard to our Lord's revelation of Himself as the Way. He offers to rescue life from fruitless wanderings, to provide it with a sense of direction, and to create for it a goal. He meets us at the moment when we are tempted to dissipate our energies in the pursuit of some will-of-the-wisp created by our imagination or the reactions of our emotional life. He recalls us from the marsh or the bog, and sets our feet on solid ground.

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There is a fine passage which illustrates this doctrine of the balanced way in a book now but little read, which goes very deep into the heart of religion—Hort's Hulsean Lectures in 1871 on Christ as The Way, The Truth and The Life. Speaking of the early years of young manhood, he writes :

“ We stand in the interval of freedom between the personal subjection of childhood, and the fateful bondage of middle life. . . . The leading-strings have been severed. A wide and various world lies before us with a seeming power in ourselves to turn whithersoever we will. At such a time the new sense of liberty well-nigh revolts at the idea of a Way. The delightfulness of the opening world depends in no small measure on its semblance of Waylessness. To stray deviously at will over hill and dale, sipping of every fountain, is the almost acknowledged ideal to which we rejoice to be able to approximate.

“ But in due time we find the choice given to us is not between wandering and journeying, but between journeying this way or journeying that. This is the true meaning and purpose of our temporary freedom which is no delusion but a happy reality. What we have to choose in the days of choice is nothing less than the character of the bond which is to make our actions coherent. To everyone whose thoughts of life are not wholly unworthy it is evident that some ways are hateful and that others are noble. But on the actual

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surface of things the forms of nobleness and hatefulness are easily lost to view in the mixed or neutral mass. Here Christ meets us with His inexhaustible answer: "I am the Way." And the answer, if it gives food for lifelong meditation, gives also sufficient light for immediate action. Much remains dark to us ; but the purposes of life receive a clear and powerful direction the moment we believe the one supreme Way of Life is Jesus Christ, God's Son, our Lord."

This last illustration will help to make plain the dynamic character of the Christian doctrine of balance. It consists not only of poise, but also of momentum. Properly understood, poise includes momentum. The most perfect interpretation of what the word stands for is to be found in Victor Hugo's picture of the bird poised for flight.

" Be like a bird which for a moment may
Rest on frail bough, yet all untroubled sings.
Nor checks its song to heed the bending spray,
Calm in the quiet consciousness of wings."

The Christian doctrine is no dull standing pat, nor is it any *via media* of safety unrelated to the goal of ultimate truth. It is nothing less than the organization of the whole self in pursuit of the whole end of life. It is as far removed from pose or speculative diletantism as the life of Jesus was from that of Beau Nash. It is the

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recognition that there are two worlds, not one, to which we belong—the world of spirit as well as matter; that there are always two persons, not one, to be considered, yourself and your neighbour; that there are always two forces, not one, at work in the world—both goodness and evil. But it is an instantaneous recognition that may be compared to the poise of an eagle before its flight. To spiritual discernment succeeds moral action. The whole personality moves courageously forward in obedience to the vision. It is not content with saying this is the right thing to do, but does it. It is not content with definition, but proceeds to practice. It throws its whole weight upon the side of goodness. It fights with its whole strength against evil. It moves, always preserving its spiritual poise, but sometimes “terrible as an army with banners”—gathering momentum on its way.

The two keywords of the Christian life are poise and momentum. They represent the qualities which give uniqueness to the life of Jesus. We speak of His spiritual insight, His unfaltering faith, His sure touch upon human life, the naturalness and spontaneity of His relationships with men and women, His quickness in emergency, the underlying unity of His life. All this may be summed up by affirming His

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spiritual poise. The one incident recorded of His childhood suggests His possession of it from the start. He recognized even while learning His trade as a carpenter that He must be about His Father's business. The severe experience of temptation, at the beginning of His ministry, left Him poised upon a higher plane, master of Himself, conscious of His mission and deliberately shaping His life towards its achievement. He had mounted up with eagle's wings, and, consequently, He could run and not be weary, He could walk and not faint. We can see Him reaching a higher poise as the end draws near. The story of the Transfiguration seems to suggest something of the kind. The decease which He is about to accomplish at Jerusalem is visualized. Calvary and the Cross are seen not only in their naked human horror, but in the whitelight of eternity. Once again He mounts up with eagle's wings, and, consequently, He can climb even up Calvary's hill and endure the Cross without fainting. He achieves poise and momentum follows. "I have a baptism to be baptized with, and how am I straitened till it be accomplished. The cup which My Father hath given Me to drink, shall I not drink it? Father, I have finished the work which Thou gavest Me to do."

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These same keywords explain the triumphant rise of the Christian Church. The early disciples, poised upon the Resurrection, looked out upon the world with a joyousness which amazed Greeks and Barbarians alike. The courage, the audacity, the certainty—the unique bond of fellowship which united them, took the world by storm. In a society restless and feverish, hag-ridden by superstition or cynically sceptical, the appearance of the Christian radiant with life in Christ marked a new epoch. His poise was altogether different from that of the stoic. It was joyous and spontaneous. The life it produced was an uncalculated expression of inner peace and joy, an untrammelled manifestation of practical goodwill. It had something of the exaltation of the eagle's flight and the directness of the eagle's swoop. There was in it no trace of artificiality, of a pose maintained by assiduous discipline. It was a life, made free by the Cross and raised to power by the Resurrection, which gathered momentum on its way.

The Church needs to recover this Christian doctrine of balance if it is to run without weariness and to walk without faintness. There is danger of arrested progress. It is easy for life to be strangled by organization or for enthusiasm to be killed by compromise. It is quite possible

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for the Church to become thoroughly representative of the vested interests of the day. The things which are seen may weigh more with us than the things which are not seen. The temporal may mean more to us than the eternal. The highly industrialized West with its inordinate pursuit of material efficiency threatens at every point the life of the Spirit. We need to recover consciousness of Jesus who has ascended above all things for the one purpose "that He may fill all things." We can re-establish our poise by contact with Him who is still the Way, the Truth, the Life. Thus only can we hope to survive the perils of modern industrialism. When we see life through His eyes, when we live with His sense of values, when, in other words, we seek the Kingdom and His righteousness, we make our own social salvation possible. To recover our faith in the living Jesus, not only as the dominant Figure in past history, but as the most immediately effective Personality in human life to-day, is the great need of the Church. That is the only thing that can save us from the disintegrating effects of our particular "ism"—hedonism, ecclesiasticism, industrialism or nationalism. Contact with the living Jesus will release the springs of power and kindle anew the zeal of love which carried

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the Church of the first century so joyously on its way.

It is to Jesus, too, that the individual must go if he is to secure the poise that will enable him to sustain life joyously and courageously on the highest level. I do not deny that life may be organized on lower levels than that of Jesus, and that a satisfactory life, as far as the individual is concerned, may be achieved in relation to the lower end in view. But if it is to be a choice of the highest and the best, of courage matched with gentleness, discipline with freedom, service with enjoyment—if it is to be a life where self-love is transmuted into a glorious life of fellowship with God and man, it is to Jesus he must go. There are many ways to lower ends, but only one way to the highest. That is why Jesus is the Way. He it is who leads us out of our native selfishness into the world of loving relationships, enriching our lives through each new circle into which He draws us. The deepest and most satisfying experience—the biggest circle of all—is fellowship with the Father.

It is a real Gospel for those who are conscious of divided and distracted personalities—that poise may be found in Jesus. Careers and, what is perhaps more serious, homes have often been wrecked by violent temper. Vacilla-

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tion and cowardice have deprived good people of their self-respect. For many, through bad manners or bad habits, life is something of a misfit. Moral confidence is shaken, the soul sags heavily, life comes to a standstill. Salvation for such people consists not merely in confession of failure, or assurance of forgiveness, but in recovery of poise. In Jesus it is possible to see life sanely and to see it whole. In Him the things that are worth while stand out from the things that do not matter, and once the difference is perceived the cause of a thousand petty irritations dies away. In Him appears the unifying principle of love which interprets life as service and chastens the purely personal ambition. Contact with Him produces an infectious courage which expels the spirit of fear. In Him as the ever living focus of the divine love and energy in the world of men the words of the prophet find a satisfying fulfilment. "They that wait upon the Lord shall renew their strength, they shall mount up with wings as eagles, they shall run and not be weary; they shall walk and not faint."

FEARING BUT FOLLOWING

BY THE REV. HUBERT L. SIMPSON, M.A.
Glasgow

“Jesus was going before them: and as they followed, they were afraid.”—St. Mark x. 32.

Fearing but Following

THIS is St. Mark at his most graphic, etching with a phrase or two a scene that bites sharp and black into the imagination. We see that lone Figure striding on a little ahead of the others, with tense, drawn face, walking in silence, and an indescribable something about His bearing which caused a nameless uneasiness to those who loved Him and were determined to be with Him to the end. The writer makes you feel the sense of agitation in the ragged group of whispering followers, makes you feel it as he himself had felt it when St. Peter told him of it first of all. You feel the oppressive sultriness of the atmosphere; you catch the rumble of thunder among the Judæan hills on the dim and shadowy horizon; the dust of the Jerusalem high road rises choking in your throat. Something is going to happen, something dreadful. "They were in the way up to Jerusalem, Jesus walking in front of them: and they were sick with misgiving; and as they followed, they were afraid."

It seems all wrong. "Jesus was going before them." Isn't that all right? And as they

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followed they rejoiced with exceeding great joy. You would have expected something like that, would you not? Oh, this upsetting Book! You really never know what it is going to say next.

“ If I find Him, if I follow,
What His guerdon here ? ”

He must surely make it worth while. He must at least make it attractive. Some of our daily journals, having done their best to debauch the public taste by an endless serving up of the unsavouries of the table of life—murders, divorces, inane ongoings in high society, sordid details in low society, prize fights, racing and gambling, are now setting their readers to say why they do not go to church. That question is answered in every issue. You really cannot keep on poisoning the wells of life and thought, and then feign an infinite surprise that sweet water no longer bubbles therefrom. And the utter futility of enquiries conducted along such lines is shown in what is urged as the reason for empty churches—lack of attractiveness. It is not attractiveness that is ever going to fill the churches. It was not exactly the attractiveness of the outlook which crowded the recruiting offices with every man worth his salt. It was not attractiveness which made these men follow in the way going

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up to Jerusalem. The sincere soul knows full well the nature of the guerdon:

“Many a sorrow, many a labour,
Many a tear.”

St. Mark is here telling in strict detail the story of the soul's pilgrimage. “Jesus was going before them: and as they followed they were afraid.” It is not attractiveness, in the ordinary understanding of the word, that will fill up the gaps among the followers of Jesus. There is one thing, and one thing alone, which can do that, and that is the conviction that the following is going to take them somewhere; that although there be fear, there will also be a future, that though there be tears, there will in the end be triumph.

I think that it is not difficult for us to understand the fear of those who followed. It was fear of the unknown, fear of the future, fear of the untried. It would have been so much easier and pleasanter for them all if they had not taken that hard Jerusalem road. Why leave the silver shores of Galilee, full of association, crowded with memories, rich in blessing? Why take the road of risk and the highway of fear?

1. To those who followed that day there was only one answer to that question:

“It is the way the Master went,
Should not the servant tread it still?”

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The way of progress, the road of redemption, ever calls for the endurance of some misgiving on the part of those who follow. If we are not to spend all our days in the insufficient shallows and low mud-flats, we must take the tide at the flood. But none has ever taken it without a mixture of misgiving to temper his exultation. We are all explorers of our destiny, soldiers of fortune, ready, at least in the clean abandon of youth, to follow the Gleam: yet none has ever followed altogether without fear.

“ My purpose holds
To sail beyond the sunset, and the baths
Of all the western stars, until I die.
It may be that the gulfs will wash us down :
It may be we shall touch the Happy Isles,
And see the great Achilles, whom we knew.”

All the fulfilment of life depends upon our being ready to follow, even with the convoy of fear. But most assuredly Christ goes before everyone who is putting life to the touch in the great adventure, thinking more of the prize than of a base prudence.

2. But the people who followed Jesus that day knew that they were not only leaving youth and Galilee days behind them. He was leading them on to a new and untried state of existence. The whole social stability seemed to be imperilled.

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And I think that it is this nameless kind of fear of things which oppresses consciously or unconsciously the spirits of every one of us. We know that the events of the past few years have effected a radical change in the whole social, political, and international outlook. It is particularly hard for the older among us to adjust themselves to altered conditions and changed standards of life. It would be unnatural if a certain misgiving did not at times cloud our spirits. Yet we must beware of ever letting our natural foreboding give the impression that we fear that God has abandoned the rudder of the universe. We must believe that it is not for nothing that we are leaving Galilee behind, every step we take. Indeed, part of the weakness of the Church to-day in the world is due to the fact that she has got the reputation of having consistently opposed much social advance. Of course it is not true, as the countrymen of Knox and Melville, Henderson and Buchanan, of all men, should never forget. But there has been too much which has tended to give some colour to the charge. "In the dealings of man with man, in the order of society, in politics, every kind of false bias tugs at the human mind. Insidious are the whispers of self-interest, commanding is the voice of prejudice, custom,

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tradition, partisanship. How few can purge their hearts of these obstructions, and look facts squarely in the face, with single-minded resolve to find the right ! The moral progress of humanity has not been a fight with conscious wickedness, but with outworn customs, illusions, stupidity, wrong-headedness, blindness. How senseless, how perverse, seem to-day so many of the things that were once accepted without question by the wisest and the best ! The divine right of kings, the infallibility of priests, slavery, the stake for witches, the gallows for petty theft, to mention one or two of the thousand oppressions, stupidities, cruelties, that have held the world in thrall. Doubtless many of the things we would die for to-day are equally delusions. The comfort is that they will not be able to withstand the single eye, the pure heart. Thought and reason, truth and goodness, to them is the victory, though the war is never-ending." We are all in the way going up to Jerusalem, not knowing the things which shall befall us there: but the royal Master goes before, and the chief fear in our hearts should be lest we do not follow with all the eagerness and confidence with which we should.

3. But perhaps the fear which weighs most heavily of all with some of those who are following is that which is due to the religious changes

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which are sure to come. In Galilee the healed and happy people had waited on Jesus, eager to make Him king. Why leave all that behind? It was precisely in that moment of their foreboding that Jesus took the Twelve, and, so far from dispelling, more than justified their gravest fears. "He took again the twelve, and began to tell them the things that were to happen unto him, saying, Behold, we go up to Jerusalem; and the Son of Man shall be delivered unto the chief priests and the scribes; and they shall condemn him to death, and shall deliver him unto the Gentiles: and they shall mock him, and shall spit upon him, and shall scourge him, and shall kill him; and after three days he shall rise again." The disciples were so appalled by what they heard that they seem to have missed the last and most important word of all. They were so stunned by the horror and the shame that they did not have ears for the promise of the glory that should follow.

And I can always understand, even if I do not always share, the fear for what they affectionately call "the old-time religion" of those who are perturbed by the trend of present thought, and wonder where it is all going to land us. And yet if we keep following that silent Figure who ever goes ahead, moving on through endless change to ends which we but dimly comprehend,

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all must be well. The only danger is lest the fear should ever make us cease to follow. Those who followed faithfully in spite of their fears came back again to Galilee and all its old raptures and simplicities, came back with a new understanding of their Lord, came back to a Galilee redeemed and transformed.

And that is the upshot of all change. We may not like it; we may fail to comprehend it; we may openly and frankly fear it. And yet we must never imagine that safety lies in holding back. They are objects of an infinite pity who keep a pathetic watch over religious forms and theological phrases which have lost their meaning for most people to-day, and are consequently dead—keeping watch over them as Rizpah watched over her dead, to scare away the vulture and jackal that would devour all that was left to her of motherhood. No mort-safe can ever guard the vital secret of religion. The Song of Moses and of the Lamb is not a lykewake dirge; it is the marching song of an ever onward-sweeping army. Faith does not mean that we cease from asking questions; it means that we ask and keep on asking until some satisfying answer comes. “This is my rest, here will I stay, for I do like it well.”

The Christ who goes before us in the way

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calls us to a courage which bids us give up, not only the fleshly indulgences which Lent forbids, but that spiritual sluggishness and mental sloth which guard the pet infallibilities in which we could for ever take our ease and cease to think, in perfect peace. We are afraid—of course we are afraid. “If these things are not true,” we say, “where am I? How can I be sure of anything? If the Bible is not literally true, word for word, if the picture of God on which he fathers fed their faith is not accurate, where am I? What is there settled?”

The answer is that we are not meant to be settled, but to keep following. “Then shall we know, if we follow on to know.” I fear as I leave old familiar ground. But the answer to all my questions, the ground of all my assurance, the Saviour of my soul, the real Christ, is out there on the hard high road, moving steadily on; and if I am to know the truth I must at least try to keep up. The Church is not a Rizpah, keeping a forlorn watch over dead hopes and decaying creeds and the slaughtered sons of her womb, but a Naomi, cherishing in her warm bosom the child of even an alien mother, not deeming it incredible that of the lineage of Moab the Saviour of the world, the long-looked-for Messiah, may come.

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Our need to-day is for men like the writer of the Epistle to the Hebrews, who can show us how to face a time of change and a period of transition; who can show us how "He taketh away the first that He may establish the second." What we need is a closer walk with Him who ever draws nigh to those who are sad only because they love Him, not because any of their cherished theories have been demolished; and to such He opens the Scriptures until their hearts burn, showing them that it behoved Christ to endure these things and to enter into His glory. The living word of God's truth is never going to suffer because a few irresponsible sciolists think they will demonstrate their superiority by speaking disrespectfully of the pole-star, but only if Christians show a base spirit of panic and a cowardly fear of light. The world will never heed a Rizpah Church which is content to remain in lonely isolation on the heights, hugging her private grief and keeping a selfish watch over her own dead offspring. Let her go down and join the reapers in the fields below, bearing the burden and heat of the day, that men's souls may be satisfied with bread; and then they will recognize her as the foster-mother of them all, the nursing mother of their new-born faith.

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It is life that ever interests and grips. And life keeps breaking the old moulds and running into new ones; but it is ever the same gold of Ophir which stands the assay of time. All around us we are conscious of the dead pull of gravity; yet upon every hillside thousands of tons are being lifted up against that downward drag of gravity, being lifted up by the power of growth and life. All that is needed to perform the miracle is a love of the sunlight and a yearning to reach towards it. All that is needed is response to the invitation of the spring.

The only way to counteract the downward drag of the perpetual presence of evil, of which we are so conscious all around us to-day, is by the planting and nurturing of more lives that lift sunward, lives quick with the impulse and power of growth, spirits that catch the breath of the living Spirit of God, and grow from strength to strength. So shall the brown fields of this our chastening Lent grow quick with the living green of the soul's recurring spring-time, and in the later days, resplendent with the golden glory of God's appearing.

"Onward, then, and fear not,
Children of the day,
For His word shall never,
Never pass away."

PROPITIATION

BY THE REV. W. J. SPARROW SIMPSON, D.D.
Hon. Canon of Chelmsford

"Christ gave Himself up for us, an offering and a sacrifice to God."—Ephes. v. 2.

Propitiation

It has been affirmed by certain writers in recent years that the Teaching of Christ and the Teaching of His Apostles do not agree about the conditions upon which God forgives.

According to the Teaching of the Apostles, God forgives our sins in virtue of the Death of Christ. That is clearly the teaching of St. Paul. Our Lord's Death was "an offering and a sacrifice to God" (Ephes. v. 2). According to the Fourth Evangelist, "He is the propitiation for our sins; and not for our sins only, but also for the whole world" (1 St. John ii. 2). St. Paul had already written, "Whom God set forth to be a propitiation." And if St. Paul had been asked the question—Who is propitiated? there can be little doubt that he would have answered that it was the Father. Thus unmistakably the Death of Christ is represented in Scripture as an offering presented to the Father, in consequence of which mankind is to be forgiven. As Harnack says, "they placed it somehow under the aspect of a sacrifice to God."

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According to the Teaching of Christ, Divine forgiveness depends upon no condition whatever but repentance and amendment, which is the necessary consequence of sincere repentance. Forgiveness bestowed by God is similar to forgiveness bestowed by men. Just as it is a human duty to forgive when men repent, so it is with God. And if men are ready to bestow their forgiveness on others, God is ready to bestow His forgiveness upon them. If a man is unwilling to forgive the repentant, there is something seriously wrong in his moral state. He must be deficient in the love for others which exists perfectly in God. No such reluctance is conceivable on the part of God. Forgiveness is a necessary result of His Fatherly love. We are to be merciful as our heavenly Father is merciful. And He who commands us to forgive will not be inferior to His creatures in fulfilling what He bids them to do. The way of Divine forgiveness is shown in the Parable of the Prodigal Son, in which not a hint is given of Mediators or propitiation by a third person. As soon as the son repents he is at once received back and forgiven.

Between these two theories of Divine forgiveness of sin there is, it has been said, an absolute contradiction. If God is a loving Father Who

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pardons sin upon the sole condition of true repentance, then it cannot be true that He had to be propitiated by the sacrifice of Christ. The Death of Christ can have no reconciling effect on God at all. It can only have an effect on men. It may be a manward appeal, but a heavenward appeal it cannot be. It can operate on men by producing in them the repentance without which they cannot be forgiven, but it does nothing whatever in enabling God to forgive. It has accordingly been argued that :

“ No doctrine of the Atonement can be a legitimate development of our Lord’s teaching which contradicts a feature of that teaching so fundamental as the truth that God is a loving Father who will pardon sin upon the sole condition of repentance.”

What, therefore, the Apostles have done is this: they made use of Jewish ideas to explain Christ’s Death: namely, such Jewish ideas as sacrifice and propitiation. They borrowed the terminology of the Hebrew Religion. But this terminology is inapplicable: because it involves ideas which belong to an inferior stage of religious development, but are quite inconsistent with the level to which religion was raised by Jesus Christ.

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Accordingly, we are told that what the modern mind must do is to go back from the Teaching of the Apostles to the Teaching of Christ. The Christian of to-day is recommended by writers of this School to eliminate from the apostolic teaching the doctrine of propitiation, on the ground that this doctrine is inconsistent with the fundamental principles of forgiveness as expounded by Christ Himself.

I

Before, however, accepting this advice to remove all ideas of propitiation and Godward offering from our conception of atonement, it will be advisable to reflect on the conditions under which the Teaching of Christ was given.

It is obvious to any reader of the Gospels that Christ's Teaching was restricted by the capacity of His hearers. Almost every page of the Gospel proves that Our Lord had the greatest difficulty in enabling His hearers to understand. Everybody knows how constantly they placed wrong constructions upon His utterances. He was compelled reproachfully to ask, "How is it that ye do not understand?" Consequently, all His teaching was restricted by their limitations. He taught "as they were able to bear it." Of no subject is that more true than the subject

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of His Death: for the simple reason that the Death of the Messiah was absolutely irreconcilable with their expectations, and on that matter they were hopelessly unteachable. Their unreceptiveness imposed a barrier on His instructions.

According to the Fourth Evangelist, our Lord Himself expressly drew the Apostles' attention in the very last of His discourses to the fact that the instructions which He had given them contained only a portion of the truths which He wanted to impart, and that completer instruction had been prevented, and was still prevented by their incapacity to receive. "I have many things to say unto you, but ye cannot bear them now."

But Christ was also restricted by the fact that, whatever the meaning of His Death might be, He spoke *before the event*, and not after it. Now even if His Disciples had been exceedingly penetrating and receptive, still it was not possible that the meaning of the Passion should be made intelligible before it had taken place. When they could look back upon the Cross in the light of the Resurrection, then an apprehension of its meaning and value would be natural. But it was more than could be fairly expected of human nature, confused and bewildered

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by uncertain anticipations, to study the Cross and understand it while it lay in the future still unrealized.

Contrast with all this the circumstances in which the Apostles were placed as Teachers.

They taught *after the Event*. They were able to look back on the life and work of Christ as a finished whole. The entire course of His words and His actions lay before them. They could better appreciate His character. His place in bringing mankind to the Father would now naturally become clear as it never was before. It is not too much to say that what were mere hints and suggestions, capable it may be of more interpretations than one, now became luminous and unmistakable, because the facts of the Passion and Resurrection had cleared the mists away, and what were formerly mere points, now became as stars.

For ourselves, as members of His Church, it is natural to say that the Apostolic writers were our Lord's authorized exponents, and were also under the guidance of His Spirit. That is undoubtedly the primitive Christian belief. Their interpretation of His Person and of His work was not the mere product of unassisted human ingenuity. It was the product of reflection guided by supernatural enlightenment. In the

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very passage where Christ drew their attention to the fact that He had many things to teach which they were at the time unable to receive, He went on at once to assure them that further understanding of His principles would be subsequently divinely given. "Howbeit when He, the Spirit of Truth, is come He will guide you into all the Truth." That belief in Apostolic enlightenment by Christ's Spirit is not confined to the Fourth Evangelist. It was shared by St. Paul, who firmly believed himself to possess the mind of Christ. It is difficult to avoid the impression that this primitive belief rests ultimately on an assurance which our Lord had given.

The conclusion from all these facts seems clear. We are not intended to look for Christianity exclusively in the Teaching of Jesus. He stood in a period of transition when the Old was passing and the New was yet to become. The meaning of His Person and His Work must in the very nature of the case be drawn out by others rather than by Himself.

Against all this, however, it is contended that while no doubt Apostolic teaching may rightly add what is not actually contained in the teaching of Christ, it cannot rightly add what contradicts that teaching. And it is objected that the doctrine of a propitiation offered to the Father

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is nothing less than a contradiction to Christ's doctrine of Divine forgiveness granted on the sole condition of repentance.

Certainly a contradiction to Christ's teaching cannot be a true development of that teaching. But is there really a contradiction at all between these two ideas ?

II

Let us, then, now inquire what Propitiation is. Certainly if Propitiation means an attempt to pacify a vindictive Deity, Who could not be induced to forgive except by the agonies and slaughter of the innocent, then indeed it would be true that this conception could neither be reconciled with Fatherhood, nor with Love. And, no doubt, in primitive Religions, something like this is what Propitiation meant. But it is also true that this crude idea became moralized and refined in the later Religion of the chosen race. The meaning of Propitiation depends on our idea of Deity. Where thoughts of God are poor and low, propitiation may mean no more than pacifying the revengeful. Where thoughts of God become uplifted, propitiation will take a correspondingly sublimer meaning. When Isaiah spoke of making intercession for the transgressors, he taught propitiation, but it was a propitiation

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corresponding to his lofty conception of the Deity. And when the Apostles adopted that Jewish expression they surely raised its meaning higher still: just as they did with other Jewish terms, such as Messiah and Son of God. When St. John declared that Christ "is the propitiation for our sins," he never meant that Christ soothed an infuriated Deity. For the same Apostle teaches that Propitiation is a product of the Father's Love. "God so loved the world that He gave His Only Son." God Himself provided this Propitiation.

Clearly, then, the Christian meaning of Propitiation is not pacifying the vindictive. None the less it is a godward offering: "An offering and a sacrifice to God." It is an act of reparation to God for the wrong inflicted on His Holiness. It is an effort to make amendment for sin. It is an attempt, so far as that is possible, to neutralize the evil which has been committed; to pass the same judgment upon it which God must pass. Propitiation may assume many forms. But that is its underlying spirit. It is nothing else than making Reparation. It is not pacifying a person so much as rectifying a wrong. But it is a godward rectification. It is doing homage before the injured ideal of goodness and truth, or rather before Him in whom that ideal is realized.

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It is not an attempt to induce the Holy One to change His Mind. Rather it is an identification of man's mind with the mind of the Holy One.

Now, if Propitiation is essentially such as has been described, it is certainly impossible to get rid of it from the Christian Religion. It is useless to say, Repentance is necessary, Propitiation is not. For Repentance is nothing else than a form of Propitiation. He who prays "against Thee only have I sinned and done this evil in Thy sight" is making Propitiation. He is making such reparation to the ideal as lies within his power.

Let any man, conscious of his sin, make what propitiation he can, in order by his repentance to reconcile himself with God. But who that scrutinizes his own repentance with anything like impartiality can induce himself to think his godward offering adequate or complete? The attempt to isolate and individualize the penitent, on the principle of every man his own redeemer, is one of the falsest notions that ever deluded the human mind. We are social beings, and repentance is corporate as well as personal. And it is a constant law of human life that the godward offering made for sin by those who did not commit it is one of the most powerful agents in the sinner's recovery. Sins are not only the

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concern of the sinner: they are also the concern of the family, and the concern of the Nation, and the concern of the race.

When Christ upon the Cross exclaimed, "Father, forgive them for they know not what they do," He was "making intercession for the transgressors." He offered to the Father a plea on the sinner's behalf. What else is this than propitiation? that is "a sacrifice and an offering to God," made in the sinner's behalf, and in order to secure the reconciliation of God with the sinful prior to the reconciliation of the sinful with God. No one for a moment dreams that this propitiating of the Father implies reluctance on the part of the Father to forgive. Surely it is the homage of a perfect sorrow which the sinner ought to make but cannot, presented by the perfect Man to the Father's Holiness.

The Apostolic doctrine of Propitiation must never be separated from the entire circle of Apostolic belief. When they taught that Christ is the Propitiation for our sins, and an offering and a sacrifice to God, they could not have supposed that anyone would imagine that God was first induced to love mankind through Christ's Propitiation. For they were profoundly convinced that Christ was Himself divine. They were certain that the judgment of Christ on human

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sin was the same as that of the Father, and that the Father's love for man was the same as that of the Son.

But the grandeur of Christ's Propitiation lay in this, that in Him humanity appeared in its right mind, presenting before the Father the offering of its sorrow which its sin demanded, an offering and a sacrifice to God.

THE VALLEY OF DECISION

BY THE REV. V. F. STORR, M.A.
Canon of Westminster

*“Multitudes, multitudes in the valley of decision ;
for the day of the Lord is near in the valley of
decision.”—Joel iii. 14.*

The Valley of Decision

THIS is a striking picture which the prophet Joel draws. He sees the nations of the world gathering in the valley of decision, mustering their forces for the great, final battle against God. They have long been oppressing Israel, but now the tide has turned. God Himself is about to fight for His people. It is the Day of the Lord, that day of judgment and decision, so often mentioned in the prophets, the day when God's cause will be vindicated and the supremacy of righteousness established. The picture is painted in lurid colours. Nature feels the tremendousness of the issue. The sun and moon are darkened, the stars withdraw their shining, and deep gloom fills the valley. But as to the result of the fight there is no doubt in the prophet's mind. God must win. The oppressors of Israel will be destroyed. Once again the land will grow fertile when the invaders have been expelled. The vine will clothe the mountain side, the dried-up brooks will be musical with running water. God will be a

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refuge for His people, and will make His dwelling-place in Zion.

Let us take the prophet's picture and apply it to ourselves. We shall discover in his teaching truths of permanent value. Herein lies the inspiration of the prophets, that though they spoke primarily to the men of their own time, they were taught of God to elucidate moral and religious principles of abiding significance. There is about their writings a modern note which is remarkable. There are many lessons for us in this thought of the valley of decision.

Every day we are in the valley of decision; we are part of that great multitude which God saw in the valley. Every day we make choices, and choices go to form character. We are perpetually being called on to decide between alternatives. Let us then think about decision as an all-important factor in human life.

Need I seek to prove that we possess the power of choice, that God has given us a measure of freedom, and that we can select between good and evil? The final argument for the reality of human freedom is that we know that we are free. It may be difficult to refute logically the arguments of the determinist, but, when I do wrong, I can never really satisfy my conscience by

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pleading that circumstances, or my training, or my inherited disposition were the cause of my sinning. No; there is something within me which tells me that I need not have done what I did, that I am responsible, that of my own free will I chose the worse course. My remorse is due just to this fact that I am aware that I possess this power of decision, and chose wrongly. Morality becomes meaningless if its imperious "I ought" is not matched by an "I can" and "I will."

It is true, however, that this power of free choice, which belongs to us all, is not equally developed in everyone. It is, in fact, something which is not so much a ready-made and realized possession, as a capacity which we have to expand by exercise and training. We have to struggle to win our true freedom. Take the case of the young child. It clearly has some freedom. It is not a machine, but its life is largely governed by impulse, and it is very impressionable and easily ruled by the suggestions of others. It is also extraordinarily imitative, and copies its elders. We cannot feel that its freedom is anything very formed or mature. Its will-power is in the making; there are as yet no settled choices in its life. Or take the case of the child born and bred in a city slum, coming of

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a criminal stock, and surrounded by an atmosphere of vice and squalor. The scales are heavily weighted against that child. The power of choosing the good is there, but the inducements to evil are so strong that we feel that the child is handicapped from the start in the race of life. In this matter of freedom, then, we do not all enter upon existence at the same level, and in none of us is the will fully formed at the beginning. Hence only God can pass a completely fair judgment on a human character. When the Psalmist said, "let my judgment come forth from thy presence," he felt how impossible it was for any man to be sure that in judging his neighbour he was judging right. Only God, who sees all and knows all, all the struggles and temptations, all the handicaps due to heredity and circumstances—only God could really weigh the man's life. So he prays that his own sentence may come from God, who has the necessary insight and knowledge to judge with unerring fairness.

This thought of freedom as something which we have to struggle to win, and of the will as in the making, rather than ready-made, is of special importance to-day, when psychology is making such advances, and when we hear so much about the power of suggestion. M. Coué's Law of

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Reversed Effort has attracted much attention. He has stated that in the case of a conflict between the imagination and the will, the former always conquers. A drunkard, for example, resolves to make a strenuous effort to snap the chain which binds him. He summons up all his will-power, and says, "I will never touch drink again." We are told that he is certain to fall, that he is doing the very thing which will lead to disaster. Before the imagination with its alluring picture of the bottle the will is bound to prove powerless. What the drunkard should have done is to make no effort to use his will, but to suggest to his imagination that he will conquer. Hence we find in books dealing with treatment by suggestion the advice that the patient should be as passive as possible and allow the suggestion, made either by himself or others, to work unconsciously in his mind.

Now is it true that the imagination always conquers the will? Everything depends on what you mean by will. The imagination does not conquer the fully-formed will. That is supreme, and rules a man's life. But the unformed will, which should properly be called wish rather than will, is no doubt often too weak to have the mastery. The will, we must remember, is not a special faculty superadded

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to the other parts of a man's nature. It is the whole man acting, the personality expressing itself with purpose and conscious self-determination. The drunkard in the illustration just given was not a whole. He made his tremendous effort just because he was afraid of failure. He was over-anxious. Before his imagination no doubt would come later the alluring vision of the bottle; but another vision was present at the time when he made his decision, the vision of himself miserably failing again as he had so often failed in the past, and this paralysed his will. Suggestion is enormously valuable for us all in our moral struggles, because it helps to implant in us new imaginations, pictures of good instead of pictures of evil. It creates an atmosphere, in which the allurements of evil lose their power, and the will to good has a chance to develop. There is profound psychological truth in St. Paul's advice, "Whatsoever things are true, whatsoever things are honourable . . . whatsoever things are pure . . . think on these things."

All important, then, is it that we do not deny to the will its sovereignty over human life. Much psychological teaching to-day places the emphasis on the power of inherited tendencies and impulses, on the part played by the sub-

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conscious, and tends to make man the plaything of forces over which he has no real control. But the will is the citadel of personality; and, if there is any moral purpose at all in the universe, that purpose is to be found in the training of ourselves to make open-eyed decisions in life, to form noble characters, to be whole instead of a patchwork of fragments. To decide, and to decide strongly in that to which God calls us all.

How solemn is this thought of the valley of decision ! Each of us is responsible to God for the choices which he makes. None can avoid the responsibility. No one else can choose for us. And all our life long we are in the valley, choosing daily, hourly. And imperceptibly, but surely, the choices add themselves together and form the settled habit and temper. Every day on the loom of our life the pattern of character is being woven. Every day we are fashioning for ourselves our destiny, and proving the truth of the statement that what a man sows that shall he reap. Perhaps there are some who have never really faced what this great fact of human freedom means. Let them do so now. Do not allow circumstances to mould you. Do not take your tone from the society round you. Dare to stand alone; call that will into play and

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learn to decide. Then your manhood will have a chance to develop as God means it to develop. Then you will tread your Father's house as a son rejoicing in the "law of perfect liberty." So much is at stake. Everything which is really worth having is at stake, manhood, character, truth, eternity. Your very self is at stake, that self which has no parallel in all the universe, that self in which God has set His divine image. The things of time fade, and the fashion of the world perishes. But God abides, and the eternal values abide, and the souls whose task it is to realize those values in themselves. The call comes to us to-day to range ourselves on the side of those eternal things, to be men and women of decision, to choose the good and learn to love it.

The valley of decision ! There are only two ways out of any valley. One leads up and the other down. You may follow down the valley to where the plain begins, and the path is easy and there is no uphill work. But it brings you out to the region of the towns, where the air is thick with smoke, and the stream is stained with sewage, and where the keen mountain breezes never come. Or you may climb up. The track is rough. The ascent is steep, and at times mist may obscure the path. But follow up.

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It will bring you to the mountain top. There is the cradle of the stream with its untainted waters. There around you are the giant peaks. They are the first to catch the sunrise; and when the snow falls, they keep it white and pure. Thence you may obtain visions of your distant goal, that far-shining, spiritual city which is your eternal home.

We can see what the picture means. We may go down the valley by the easy road, and choose a life of sin or pleasure and idleness, and breathe a stifling atmosphere, and lose sight of the vision of God. Or we may climb to the spiritual heights of life, where truth and love and honour dwell; nay, where God dwells, and Christ—Christ who waits to crown with eternal life each strenuous climber, as the dawn crowns the mountain summits with its circle of rose. There are only two roads out of the valley of decision. Which road are you and I going to take?

But someone may say, "You tell us to decide, and to strengthen our wills; but how can I fight, alone and unaided, all my temptations?" We have not to fight alone. Let us remember the secret of the prophet's confidence. He knew which way the fight in the valley was going, because he knew that God was on the side of His people. His strength was their strength.

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All the resources of His power were at their disposal. Has God changed? Does He leave us to-day to fight unaided? Why the very heart of the message of Christianity is that Christ can give us power. Christianity is a religion of life and power; that is its very essence. And so, as we seek to train our wills, let us not forget that the Holy Spirit, who is the Spirit of the Living Christ, is waiting to reinforce any efforts we may make. Think what suggestion does. You open your minds to receive new influences. New thoughts, new ideals are suggested to you; and gradually, as you yield yourself to them, you are transformed. Your natural power of resistance to evil is strengthened, and your will has a chance to assert itself.

If human agency can do that, are we going to say that the creative, life-giving Spirit of God cannot do infinitely more? Never think of God as remote in some distant heaven. God is Spirit, and is not confined by any limits of space. God is round about us always, nay, within us. His Spirit is perpetually exercising pressure on us, seeking to break down the barriers which keep Him away, seeking to make us better instruments of His purpose. God desires above all things to make human personality the vehicle of His abounding life.

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Let him, then, who would strengthen his will, who would pass through the valley of decision master of himself and of the fight, seek the aid of the Spirit of God. Have we tried what prayer can achieve; I mean real prayer, not the formal, mechanical exercise, which so often passes under that name? When we really pray, we put ourselves into that attitude of quiet expectancy and waiting upon God, which provides the very condition for the Spirit to do His work. When the passions of the heart and the voices of the world are stilled, then God can speak. When the soul is expectant, then God can give us His power.

Here, then, I leave the matter, bidding you ponder over these two great facts, bidding you learn by experience to relate them, the one to the other. First, your power of choice and decision, the reality of it, the grave import of it. Second, the power of God which can enter into you and reinforce your will. "Work out your own salvation . . . for it is God which worketh in you." Human life turns on these two pivots. By these two fixed stars we have to steer our course. We are all in the valley of decision, and we all have to fight. But God fights with us, and that makes the whole difference. Faint-hearts take new courage, waverers learn to

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stand firm, when they see the Captain of their salvation near them; and the misty gloom of the valley grows bright with the sunlight of His presence.

School of Theology
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Plato (1950—1957)

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By

Harold Cherniss in Princeton/N.J./USA.

" 1904 -

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I. Comprehensive Expositions

Among the comprehensive expositions and interpretations originally published between 1930 and 1949¹⁾ the following are especially notable either because of their abiding usefulness or because of the influence which they have had upon subsequent studies:

- ✓ 1. Paul Friedländer, *Platon I: Eidos, Paideia, Dialogos*, Berlin-Leipzig 1928, II: *Die platonischen Schriften*, Berlin/Leipzig 1930.
- ✓ 2. J. Geffcken, *Griechische Literaturgeschichte*, Zweiter Band, Heidelberg 1934, pp. 35—188, and *Anmerkungen*, pp. 25—161.
- ✓ 3. G. M. A. Grube, *Plato's thought*, London 1935.
- ✓ 4. Werner Jaeger, *Paideia: Die Formung des griechischen Menschen*, Zweiter Band, Berlin 1944, pp. 130ff., Dritter Band, Berlin 1947, pp. 1—344. An English translation of these two volumes made from the German manuscript by Gilbert Highet had already been published by the Oxford University Press, New York 1943 and 1944.
- 2 5. Joseph Moreau, *La construction de l'idéalisme platonicien*, Paris 1939, supplemented by pp. 1—106 of his *L'Ame du Monde de Platon aux Stoiciens*, Paris 1939.
6. Hugo Perls, *Platon, Sa conception du Kosmos*, 2 vols., New York 1945.
- ✓ 7. Léon Robin, *Platon*, Paris 1935.
- ✓ 8. Paul Shorey, *What Plato said*, Chicago 1933.
- ✓ 9. Luigi Stefanini, *Platone I*, Padova 1932, II, Padova 1935.

¹⁾ Here as throughout I take account of editions subsequent to the original publication only if they are substantial revisions or expansions of the work. So, for example, Jaeger's *Paideia*, vols. II and III, is a work published before 1950, for the „zweite Auflage“ (Berlin, 1954 and 1955) does not differ from the first German edition of 1944—1947; and A. E. Taylor's *Plato, The Man and His Work*, is a publication earlier than 1930, though it was reissued in 1937, 1948, and 1949, for the last issue of it that could seriously be called “revised” is that of 1929. I use the same criterion for the dates of articles and essays which after their original publication were reprinted as parts of a collection; but in all cases I shall relax the rule if its rigid application would deprive the reader of pertinent and useful information.

the most extensive bibliographical compilation of recent Platonic literature that I have seen. It is, moreover, intelligently arranged and liberally cross-indexed; and it contains succinct critical remarks on a good many of the works listed.

It is improbable that any one person, however erudite, alert, and devoted, could read even cursorily, not to say critically, all the books, articles, section of books, and reviews concerned with Plato which have been published during the last decade. Certainly I have failed in the attempt to do so, have failed even to get physical access to some of this literature to which I have seen references, and am sure that there must be much more the very existence of which remains unknown to me. The omission of a title in the following pages, therefore, does not necessarily mean that I have purposely disregarded the work. It may as well mean only that I am ignorant of its existence. It is my purpose, however, at least to list all those works on Plato published between 1950 and 1957 inclusive with which I have been able to gain some acquaintance and to refer in addition to a few of those published during the preceding twenty years or during 1958 and the early months of 1959 when these seem to me to bear significantly upon the publications of the period which it is my primary duty to report.

The space at my disposal does not suffice for a fair analysis and critical treatment even of those publications belonging to this period which I have been able to study carefully. Where these have been critically reviewed, I shall simply refer to such reviews; otherwise, save where in my opinion a warning is clearly called for, I shall refrain from passing unsubstantiated judgments and shall confine myself to brief indications of the content or tendency of the publications. I shall in any case refer more liberally than is common to reviews of books, since this sector of the scholarly literature tends to be neglected or forgotten, although it often contains material at least as important as the books that call it forth.

The classification and arrangement that I have adopted is an arbitrary one. In defence of it I can say only that it has proved to be useful to me in my own studies. Those whose interests are different would undoubtedly find some other arrangement more suitable; but, in any case, in the study of Plato no neat classification corresponds to the subject-matter, for the treatment of any aspect of Plato's thought or expression is likely to depend upon the interpretation of many other aspects and to affect all these others in turn. It is only by elaborate cross-references, therefore, that the applications and implications even of essays and notes with deceptively specific titles can be adequately indexed; and even the most elaborate index of this kind is no substitute for a subtle, responsive, and tenacious memory.

The last account in 'Bursian' of literature dealing with Plato was published by C. Ritter in 1929 and 1930: vol. 220, 37—108 and vol. 225, 121—168. Among the many reports of current Platonic literature published since that time the following should be noticed especially¹):

É. de Strycker, *Vingt ans d'études platoniciennes*, *Études Classiques* 4, 1935, 219—236 and *Chronique platonicienne* (1929—1934), *Antiquité Classique* 4, 1935, 227—243.

A. Capizzi, *Studi su Platone dal 1940 ad oggi*, *Rassegna di Filosofia* 2, 1953, 225—238 and 313—338. This is useful for many titles of works, especially Italian, published during the second World War; but it is disfigured by erroneous references and misprints and is often misleading with respect to the contents of books, articles, and reviews. In *Sophia* 25, 1957, 199—207 Capizzi has a good bibliography raisonné of the Socratic problem, ending with a review of the two books by V. de Magalhães-Vilhena on this question²).

P.-M. Schuhl, *État présent des études platoniciennes*, Assoc. G. Budé, Congrès de Strasbourg 20—22 Avril 1938: *Actes du Congrès*, 213—232 (republished with additions in Schuhl's *Études sur la fabulation platonicienne*, Paris 1947, 3—25) and *Platon* (quinze années d'études platoniciennes), Assoc. G. Budé, Congrès de Tours et Poitiers 3—9 Septembre 1953: *Actes du Congrès*, 149—169.

Reports and analyses of Platonic literature by J. Dubois and H. D. Saffrey in *Rev. des Sciences Philos. et Théol.* 34, 1950, 128—160; 35, 1951, 662—670; 37, 1953, 322—331; 39, 1955, 244—265³); 42, 1958, 84—92.

T. G. Rosenmeyer, *Platonic Scholarship: 1945—1955*, *Classical Weekly* 50, 1957, 173—182. 185—196. 197—201. 209—211. This is

¹) There are, of course, many more than I list here. I do not mention accounts of the work on ancient philosophy generally in which some Platonic literature is dealt with in passing, composite reviews of a few books dealing with Plato (some of these will be referred to below in the appropriate places), or bibliographical lists appended to books on Plato, though some these are very extensive. Three general bibliographies of Platonic material published during this period but not restricted to current material and not professing to be exhaustive are deserving of notice here, however: É. de Strycker's *Bibliotheca Graeca: Platon*, *Études Classiques* 7, 1938, 409—422; M. F. Sciacca's *Platone*, *Guide Bibliografiche II: Filosofia*, Fasc. 5 (Milano 1945); O. Gigon's *Platon*, *Bibliographische Einführungen in das Studium der Philosophie*, Fasc. 12 (Bern 1950).

²) See the section on Plato and Socrates *infra* for these books and for Capizzi's article, *La testimonianza platonica*, *Rassegna di Filosofia* 6, 1957, 205—221 and 309—337, the first part of which is a review of earlier theories.

³) On pp. 238—244 of this issue J. Dubois has a report of publications dealing with the Socratic problem.

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(Continuation in Lustrum 5)

Of these the work of Perls (6) is probably least widely known. It is a strictly Kantian reconstruction of Plato and a good example of what can be read into his writings by a clever and wilful interpreter who is unhampered by philological inhibitions (cf. Hoffleit, *Philos Rev* 55, 1946, 590—593). Moreau (5) presents an 'idealistic' interpretation in a more sober and scholarly fashion (cf. Cherniss, *AJPh* 68, 1947, 113—124). Robin in his book (7), the synthesis of his many special studies of Platonism, gives a distinctly Neo-Platonic cast to Plato's philosophy (cf. Morrow, *Philos Rev* 45, 1936, 616—619), which is absent from Grube's treatment (3, cf. Cherniss, *AJPh* 57, 1936, 480—483), a systematic presentation contemporary with Robin's and an excellent counterweight to it. The works of Friedländer (1), Shorey (8), and Stefanini (9), each an exhaustive interpretation of Plato's life and work by an eminently erudite and responsible scholar of distinctive personality, taken together constitute the standard of the Platonic scholarship of this period. Jaeger's treatment of Plato (4) in the context of his larger work, illuminating as it is in detail, is restricted by the point of view of his general thesis 'paideia' (cf. Grube, *AJPh* 68, 1947, 209—214; Manasse, *Philos Rundschau* 5, Beiheft 1, 1957, 6—11)¹). Geffcken's section on Plato in his history of Greek literature (2) is not only a masterly critical survey of Platonic scholarship down to the time of its composition, though with a disproportionate emphasis on German work, but is important as an original monograph on the subject in its own right²).

Friedländer's work, which belongs chronologically at the very beginning of this earlier group—and in part even before the beginning of it — merits another place, or rather two places, among the comprehensive works published after 1949.

¹) An interpretation from a restricted point of view the opposite to that of Jaeger's is Gerhard Krüger's *Einsicht und Leidenschaft: Das Wesen des platonischen Denkens*, Frankfurt a. M. 1939 (reprinted 1948), on which cf. Manasse, loc. cit. 27—32.

²) Four 'introductions to Plato' or surveys published during this period deserve mention here, for, modest in their professions as they are, they are based upon serious and independent research and are more helpful and illuminating than are many more pretentious works:

10a) A. Diès, *Platon*, Paris 1930.

10b) A. Koyré, *Introduction à la lecture de Platon*, New York, 1945 (translated into English as: *Discovering Plato*, New York 1945).

10c) G. C. Field, *The philosophy of Plato*, Oxford University Press 1949 (Home University Library).

10d) R. S. Bluck, *Plato's life and thought with a translation of the Seventh Letter*, London 1949 (cf. Skemp, *Cl Rev N.S.* 1, 1951, 86—88).

11a) A substantial revision and expansion of the work was begun with the publication of *Platon I: Seinswahrheit und Lebenswirklichkeit*, Berlin 1954 (cf. Manasse, *Philos Rundschau* 5, Beiheft 1, 1957, 11—16); and the first part of this revised second edition of *Band II, Die platonischen Schriften*, appeared in Berlin 1957. Although the remainder of the original second volume in this revised edition has not yet appeared, there has already been published:

11b) An English translation of the first volume, *Plato I: An introduction*, New York 1958, which is a revision throughout and an expansion of the second revised German edition. This English translation and revision when completed will presumably be in the author's intention the definitive version of his interpretation.

Of other comprehensive treatments published after 1949 I have seen the following:

12. Bela Brandenstein, *Platon: Eine Einführung in sein Werk und sein Denken*, Saarbrücken 1951.

13. C. Carbonara, *La filosofia greca*, Napoli 1951, Parte II, pp. 71—203: Platone.

14. J. Chevalier, *Histoire de la pensée I: La pensée antique*, Paris 1955, pp. 189—267 and pp. 632—656: Platon.

15. R. E. Cushman, *Therapeia: Plato's conception of philosophy*, Chapel Hill, North Carolina (U.S.A.) 1958.

16. J. Derbolav, *Erkenntnis und Entscheidung: Philosophie der geistigen Aneignung in ihrem Ursprung bei Platon*, Wien/Stuttgart 1954.

17. G. J. de Vries, *Inleiding tot het denken van Plato*, Assen/Amsterdam 1952.

18. Dario Galli, *Il pensiero greco*, Padova 1954, pp. 124—201: Platone.

19. Gallo Galli, *Da Talete al 'Menone' di Platone*, Torino 1956, pp. 88—135: I dialoghi antisofistici di Platone.

20. H. Gauß, *Philosophischer Handkommentar zu den Dialogen Platos*: 1. Teil, 1. Hälfte: *Allgemeine Einleitung in die platonische Philosophie*, Bern 1952; 1. Teil, 2. Hälfte: *Die Frühdialoge*, Bern 1954; 2. Teil, 1. Hälfte: *Die Dialoge der Übergangszeit*, Bern 1956; 2. Teil, 2. Hälfte: *Die Dialoge der literarischen Meisterschaft*, Bern 1958.

21. W. K. C. Guthrie, *The Greek philosophers from Thales to Aristotle*, London 1950, pp. 81—121: Plato.

22. E. Hoffmann, *Platon*, Zürich 1950.

23. K. Jaspers, *Die großen Philosophen I*, München 1937, pp. 234—318: Plato.

24. W. Kranz, *Die griechische Philosophie*, Wiesbaden 1950, pp. 138—211: Platon.

25. R. Kroner, *Speculation in pre-christian philosophy*, Philadelphia 1956, pp. 152—182: 'The Cosmos of the ideas'.

26. H. Leisegang, *Platon*, R.-E. I 20, 2 (1950), cols. 2342—2537.

27. A. Lesky, *Geschichte der griechischen Literatur*, Bern 1957/58, pp. 477—508: 'Platon und die Akademie'.

28. R. B. Levinson, *In defense of Plato*, Cambridge (Mass., U.S.A.) 1953.

29. C. Librizzi, *I problemi fondamentali della filosofia di Platone*, Padova 1950.

30. R. C. Lodge, *The philosophy of Plato*, London 1956.

31. A. Manno, *Il teismo di Platone*, Napoli 1955.

32. G. Méautis, *Platon vivant*, Paris 1950.

33. M. Pohlenz, *Gestalten aus Hellas*, München 1950, pp. 382—426: Plato.

34. A. Rigobello, *L'intellettualismo in Platone*, Padova 1958.

35. P.-M. Schuhl, *L'œuvre de Platon*, Paris 1954.

36. E. Voegelin, *Order and history*, Vol. III, Louisiana State Univ. Press 1957, pp. 1—268: Plato.

37. H. M. Wolff, *Plato: Der Kampf ums Sein*, Bern/Berkeley (California) 1957 (Univ. of California Publications in Philosophy Vol. 30).

Two anthologies published during this period provide or imply comprehensive treatments of Plato also:

38. C. J. de Vogel, *Greek philosophy: A collection of texts selected and supplied with some notes and explanations*, Vol. 1, Leiden 1950, pp. 170—299: Plato¹).

39. *Grande Antologia Filosofica* diretta da U.A. Padovani, Parte 1: *Il pensiero classico*, Vols. 1 and 2, Milan 1954. This contains selected

¹) For Miss de Vogel's interpretation see besides her earlier writings referred to in this work:

38a) *Plato en het moderne Denken*, *Tijdschrift voor Philosophie* 12, 1950, 453—476.

38b) *Examen critique de l'interprétation traditionnelle du platonisme*, *Rev Metaph et Morale* 56, 1951, 249—268.

excerpts in Italian translation with introductory essays and explanatory comment varying greatly from section to section in extent and in importance (cf. Giannantoni, *Rass. di Filos.* 4, 1955, 368—376). The following are the sections that deal with Plato:

39a) L. Stefanini, *Platone*, Vol. 1, pp. 223—321.

39b) G. Capone Braga, *La religione*, Vol. 2, pp. 18—20 and pp. 81—101.

39c) C. Mazzantini, *L'estetica*, Vol. 2, pp. 149—183.

39d) C. Diano, *Il concetto della storia*, Vol. 2, pp. 292—347 and pp. 368—386. The former section amounts to an interpretation of the whole of Plato's philosophy, highly imaginative and allusive, not to say fanciful, and with but little relation to its title.

39e) F. Albèrgamo, *La scienza*, Vol. 2, pp. 410—411 and pp. 438—451.

39f) G. Flores d'Arcais, *La pedagogia*, Vol. 2, pp. 522—543.

39g) B. Brunello, *Politica e diritto*, Vol. 2, pp. 615—621 and pp. 677—686.

39h) G. Barbieri, *Le dottrine economiche*, Vol. 2, pp. 827—885. The treatment of Plato is not here separated from that of other writers.

Of the works listed above that of Méautis (32) is 'haute vulgarisation' in the best French manner. Those of Brandenstein (12),

38c) On the Neoplatonic character of Platonism and the Platonic character of Neoplatonism, *Mind* N.S. 62, 1953, 43—64.

38d) Het christelijk scheppingsbegrip en de antieke wijsbegeerte, *Tijdschrift voor Philosophie* 15, 1953, 409—425.

38e) Platon a-t-il ou n'a-t-il pas introduit le mouvement dans son monde intelligible?, *Actes du XIème Congrès International de Philosophie*, Vol. 12, Amsterdam/Louvain 1953, 61—67.

38f) A la recherche des étapes précises entre Platon et le néoplatonisme, *Mnem* IV 7, 1954, 111—122.

The titles of items 38c and f indicate the nature of Miss de Vogel's interpretation. Adopting Robin's interpretation of the relation of numbers and ideas (cf. her article in *Studia Varia* C. G. Vollgraff . . . Oblata, Amsterdam 1948, 165—178) she ascribes to Plato after the 'crisis' marked by the *Parmenides* a doctrine in all essentials Neo-Platonic: a hierarchy of being derived from the One, the intelligible world a living organism endowed with soul and mind 'containing' the ideas, soul somehow identical with 'intermediate mathematical'; and in 38d she argues against Gilson that Plato agrees more closely with the Christian doctrine than does Aristotle (see in connection with this the item 50 *infra*).

de Vries (17), Guthrie (21), Kranz (24), and Pohlenz (33) are all professedly concise, popular introductions, while Lesky's chapter (27) and Schuhl's book (35), though works of orientation, are written on a higher scholarly level and direct attention to specific problems of interpretation. Of the chapters in the histories by Carbonara (13), Chevalier (14), and Dario Galli (18) that by Chevalier is most notable for the appendix (pp. 632—656) containing notes of 'justification', each a miniature thesis on a special topic with useful references to modern literature. Kroner's work (25) looks back on Plato from the point of view of Christian revelation¹. The chapter in the book of Jaspers (23) is important chiefly because of his influence upon many modern philosophical writers. He combines great enthusiasm for Plato's 'philosophizing' with little concern for the contents of his philosophy, his knowledge of which appears to be drawn entirely from German interpreters; but for all that many of his remarks are worth reading and pondering². Gallo Galli (19) treats only the 'minor Socratic dialogues', which he characterizes as the tangent of the personalities of Socrates and Plato, and the *Gorgias* and *Meno*, connecting these closely with the preceding *Protagoras* and holding that in the *Meno* Plato is still a Socratic but stands on the threshold of the theory of ideas³. Hoffmann's book (22), though professing not to be a 'compendious description', conveniently synthesizes this veteran scholar's earlier interpretations of Platonism and thereby reveals more clearly both their strong points and their weaknesses and confusions (cf. Ackrill. *Mind* 60, 1951, 129—132; Manasse, *Philos Rundschau* 5, Beiheft 1, 1957, 16—20; Cherniss, *Cl Phil* 47, 1952, 259—260). Leisegang's article in R.-E. (26) is unfortunately parochial, antiquated, and unreliable, for the author appears to have been unaware that much of what he was presenting as the established results of research had already been seriously impugned or clearly refuted⁴. The books of Derbolav (16) and Lodge (30) are attempts

¹ Cf. J. Hessen, *Platonismus und Prophetismus*, first published in 1939 and reissued with minor changes, München/Basel 1955, reviewed by Hempel, *Gnomon* 30, 1958, 59—60.

² Chapter XII of the new editions of P. Friedländer's first volume (11a and 11b) is entitled *Dialogue and Existence: A question addressed to Karl Jaspers*.

³ A similar interpretation of the *Meno* was proposed by Klara Buchmann, *Die Stellung des Menon in der platonischen Philosophie*, Leipzig 1936, on which cf. Cherniss, *AJPh* 58, 1937, 497—500.

⁴ Leisegang's spirited monograph, *Die Platondeutung der Gegenwart*, Karlsruhe 1929, has recently been bitterly attacked by O. Wichmann, *Kant-Studien* 49, 1957/58, 401—422, who in discussing modern interpreters of Plato never mentions a single non-German work, apparently assuming that Platonic interpretation is a German monopoly.

not really to discover and present Plato's own meaning but by selection and manipulation to elicit from his words suggestions and support of the widely different philosophical attitudes of these two authors themselves¹). The distinction of having concocted the most irresponsibly perverse exegesis of Plato's life and thought during the current decade, however, certainly belongs to Wolff (37)²), whose method of interpretation is adequately exemplified by his reading of the *Phaedrus* as an ironical renunciation of the theory of ideas and all metaphysics, of the *Politicus* as Plato's satire on all his early convictions and concerns, and of the final pages of the *Laws* as added by Plato for the purpose of deceiving his readers and associates by concealing from them his complete philosophical scepticism (cf. Boas, *Journal of the History of Ideas* 19, 1958, 571—574; de Vries, *Gnomon* 31, 1959, 481—487). Librizzi's book (29) consists of ten rather disconnected chapters ranging from the personality of Plato through the problem of 'free will' to the problem of art and is concluded by a few pages on Plato as the educator of humanity and the precursor of Jesus (cf. Incardona, *Giornale di Metafisica* 8, 1953, 127—129). This tendency to interpret Plato from an essentially religious point of view dominates several of the works listed above. Manno's book (31) despite its title is a systematic interpretation of all Plato's philosophy as the culmination of earlier Greek philosophy and religion; but the title indicates its direction, and for Manno not only is the idea of good Plato's god but the ideas are the actuality of the divine will and the Platonic logos is the Word, the precursor of Christian charity (cf. Picard, *Sophia* 25, 1957, 298—300). Of Gauß's philosophical commentary (20) the last two volumes, which are to deal with the late dialogues, have not yet been published; the volumes which have appeared attempt to support in detail the interpretation

¹) On Derbolav's book, which leans heavily on his monograph (349 *infra*), *Der Dialog 'Kratylos' im Rahmen der platonischen Sprach- und Erkenntnisphilosophie*, Saarbrücken 1953, cf. especially Levinson, *Cl Phil* 51, 1956, 259—260, and Manasse, *Philos Rundschau* 5, Beiheft 1, 1957, 41—46; on this book by Lodge, who had already published books entitled *Plato's theory of ethics*, London 1928, *Plato's theory of education*, London 1947, *Plato's theory of art*, London 1953, cf. especially Tate, *JHS* 77 Part 1, 1957, 167—168; Gulley, *Philosophy* 32, 1957, 367—369; Trevaskis, *Cl Rev N.S.* 7, 1957, 209—211; and de Vries, *No Ab-dication*, *Free University Quarterly* 4 No. 3, 1956, 153—158.

²) Such modern Neo-Pythagorean fantasies as E. Wortmann's apocalyptic Platons göttliche Harmonie, Bad Godesberg 1957, are, of course, hors concours; nor need any account be taken of such well-meant but frankly derivative attempts as that of F. Lion, *Platon von Hellas aus gesehen*, Stuttgart 1952, for which cf. de Vries, *Erasmus* 6, 1953, 490—493.

developed in the general introduction that Plato is a philosopher of 'value' rather than of 'being' and that his doctrine, when its faults and fallacies are cured by being Christianized, is the best basis for the truly modern religion, which to Gauß means Anglicanism (cf. Schaerer, *Studia Philosophica* 13, 1953, 212—218; Tate, *Erasmus* 8, 1955, 454—458). Cushman (15) maintains that Plato's ontology is 'basically theomorphic' and tries to justify as the correct interpretation of his whole philosophy what Augustine said of Socrates, that he held the causes of things to be reducible to the will of the supreme God and therefore to be comprehensible only by a purified mind (cf. Boas, *Journal of the History of Ideas* 19, 1958, 574—577)¹. Rigo bello, on the other hand, in his concise monograph (34) reasserts the essential intellectualism of Plato's thought in all its complex phases and manifestations, while Voegelin (36), avowedly unconcerned with 'Platonic philosophy' interprets Plato's work as resistance to the disorder of the society about him and an effort to restore the order of Hellenic civilization. Plato's work interpreted in such a political sense has in recent years less frequently been an object of the admiration which Voegelin expresses for it than of violent and even vituperative condemnation, and it is against the authors of such attacks that Levinson has undertaken to defend Plato in a book (28) so comprehensive that it is itself a positive interpretation of his life and thought (cf. *Rev Metaph et Morale* 59, 1954, 79—80). Many of the modern opponents of Plato, though concerned chiefly with his political philosophy and that usually as they see it in relation to current political programmes and tendencies, have attacked at the same time his ethical and metaphysical theories, his attitude towards scientific activities as well as towards social relations, and his personal life, character, and morals. In doing so they frequently imply and sometimes assert that by their analyses, even when these are explicitly concerned only with certain aspects of his activity, they are revealing the central motivation and real significance of his entire philosophy. Consequently I list together here these critiques of Plato and the literature that they have called forth in opposition, even though much of all this belongs also in the sections on politics, law, and ethics and on the *Republic* and the *Laws* in particular.

¹) For Plato's use of the notion of purification, on which Cushman lays such stress, cf. L. Moulinier, *Le pur et l'impur dans la pensée des Grecs*, Paris 1952, pp. 323—410 and 419—422. Cushman appears to have been strongly influenced by J. Wild's book, *Plato's Theory of Man*, Cambridge (Mass.) 1946, on which cf. Vlastos, *Philos Rev* 56, 1947, 184—193; Cherniss, *AJPh* 68, 1947, 259—265; and Strauß, *Social Research* 13, 1946, 326—367.

I A. Accusations of Plato and Responses

40. J. J. Chapman, *Lucian, Plato and Greek morals*, Boston 1931.
 41. W. Fite, *The Platonic legend*, New York 1934.
 42. H. Kelsen, *Platonic love*, *The American Imago* 3, April 1942, 3—110.
 43. R. H. S. Crossman, *Plato today*, New York 1937.
 44. A. D. Winspear, *The genesis of Plato's thought*, New York 1940¹).
 45. B. Russell, *A history of western philosophy*, New York 1945, pp. 104—149: Plato.
 46. K. R. Popper, *The open society and its enemies*, Revised Edition, Princeton 1950, pp. 21—195 and 474—612 (Notes): Plato²).
- All of these as well as most of the literature in connection with them published before 1953 Levinson has dealt with extensively and critically in his book (28). The following list is meant, therefore, to be taken only as a supplement to his bibliography.
47. G. J. D. Aalders, *Totalitarian tendencies in Ancient Greece*, *Free University Quarterly* 3, 1954, 12—25. A study of the 'totalitarian' nature of the Greek *polis* in general and the bearing of this fact upon Plato's political theory and the modern indictments of it.
 48. R. S. Bluck, *Is Plato's republic a theocracy?*, *Philos Quart* 5, 1955, 69—73.
 49. F. M. Cornford, *The Marxist view of Ancient Philosophy*, *The unwritten Philosophy and other Essays*, Cambridge 1950, pp. 117—137. An examination of the interpretations of Farrington, G. Thomson, and Crossman.

50. C. J. de Vogel, *Het totalitarisme van Plato's Staat en het totalitarisme van de Katholieke Kerk*, *Annalen van het Thijmgenoot-*

¹ In the second edition, New York 1956, nothing has been changed, but there is a new chapter (303—339) on the Academy and the later dialogues. On the first edition cf. the review by Havelock, *The Canadian Forum*, April 1941, 15—19.

² On the relation of this edition to the first, London 1945, cf. Levinson (28), 21, n. 17. My references are to the edition of 1950. A third edition, London 1957, in two volumes differs from this chiefly in having an Index of Subjects and an Index of Platonic passages.

schap 40, 1952, 173—197. A reply to Popper on the nature of Plato's 'totalitarianism', which Miss de Vogel interprets as realized in the community of the Roman Catholic Church.

51. G. J. de Vries, *Antisthenes Redivivus: Popper's attack on Plato*, Amsterdam 1952 (cf. J. Moreau, *Rev Et Anciennes* 55, 1953, 431—434).

52. J. A. Faris, Is Plato's a caste state based on racial differences?, *Cl Quart* 44, 1950, 38—43. Against Popper's interpretation of the *Republic* in this matter.

53. B. Farrington, *Democritus, Plato and Epicurus, Philosophy for the Future*, edited by R. W. Sellars et al., New York 1949, 1—12¹).

54. M. B. Foster, Plato's conception of Justice in the *Republic*, *Philos Quart* 1, 1950/51, 206—217. Written against Popper's interpretation; cf. Bluck (48 *supra*).

55. V. Goldschmidt, La théorie platonicienne de la dénonciation, *Rev Metaph et Morale* 58, 1953, 352—375. In opposition to such critics as Crossman, Russell, and Popper he undertakes to explain the provisions concerning delation in the *Laws*.

56. W. C. Greene, *Platonism and its critics*, *Harvard Studies in Class Phil* 61, 1953, 39—71.

57. R. Jordan, *The Revolt against Philosophy: The Spell of Popper, The Return to Reason* edited by J. Wild, Chicago 1953, 259—292.

58. R. C. Lodge, *Plato and Freedom*, *Memoires of the Royal Society of Canada* 43, 1949, 87—101. A reply to the charge of 'totalitarianism'; see also *Plato and Recent Criticism*, the appendix (pp. 313—332) of Lodge's book (30 *supra*).

¹) See also Farrington's earlier works, to none of which Levinson (28) refers:

53a) *Science in Antiquity*, London 1936, pp. 112—139.

53b) *Science and politics in the Ancient World*, London 1939 (second corrected impression 1946), especially pp. 87—147.

53c) *Greek science*, Penguin Books 1944, Vol. 1, pp. 88—109 and 140—145.

On Farrington's interpretation cf., besides Cornford (49 *supra*) and G. C. Field, *Philosophy* 19, 1944, 49—62, L. Edelstein, *Journal of the History of Ideas* 13, 1952, 579—596.

59. G. R. Morrow, Plato's conception of Persuasion, *Philos Rev* 62, 1953, 234—250. Morrow holds that Plato's legislation is one vast system of total persuasion. He agrees with Popper that Plato's doctrine is dangerous but rejects Popper's interpretation of Plato's motives. According to Morrow the tragedy of Plato is the conflict between his desire for the moral health of men and his love of critical reason, in his devotion to both of which objects he produced a synthesis that really means the victory of morality and the suppression of reason.

✓ 60. J. Plamenatz, The Open Society and its enemies, *British Journal of Sociology* 3, 1952, 264—273. A criticism of Popper, to which there is a violent rejoinder by E. H. Gombrich, *ibid.* 358ff.

61. M. F. Sciacca, 2300 ans après sa mort, *Etudes Philosoph N.S.* 8, 1953, 247—255. A 'memorial' to Plato against his modern detractors.

✓ 62. Marguerite Tête, Le totalitarisme de Platon, *Bull Assoc Budé 4ème série*, Juin 1954, 46—59. Against Unger and de Vries she contends that Plato's city is the prototype of all totalitarian states past and future even though its principle of unity differs from that of modern totalitarianisms; her case is based upon the *Laws* alone, since what is true of the *Laws* is a fortiori true of the *Republic*.

63. G. Thomson, *Studies in Ancient Greek Society II, The First Philosophers*, London 1955, pp. 318—328¹).

64. E. Unger, Contemporary Anti-Platonism, *Cambridge Journal* 2, Aug. 1949, 643—659.

65. W. J. Verdenius, Plato *Rep.* 433 A—E, *Mnem IV* 8, 1955, 193—195. Against Popper's interpretation of this passage and the use that he makes of it.

66. J. Wild, Plato's modern enemies and the Theory of Natural Law, Chicago 1953 (cf. Allan, *Cl Rev N.S.* 5, 1955, 53—56; and Strang, *Philos Quart* 5, 1955, 353—358).

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¹) These pages concisely summarize the author's avowedly Marxist-Leninist interpretation of Plato's philosophy as expressing 'the reactionary outlook of a selfish oligarchy clinging blindly to its privileges' (cf. Herbert, *Cl Journ* 52, Oct. 1956, 41—43 and on Thomson's earlier expression of his views Cornford, item 49 *supra*). The opposite extreme is represented by C. Bello, *Communisme platonicien et Marxisme*, Paris 1950 (cf. Salin, *Erasmus* 5, 1952, 277—278), for whom Plato's work is an 'evangel', an instrument forged expressly for the purpose of combatting the 'bastard philosophers', Marx and Lenin.

Whether explicitly or implicitly, the authors of most of the works thus far listed merely assume as justified or justifiable the various methods or 'approaches' that they have each adopted in their interpretations of Plato's writings and do not study this matter of method as a problem in itself¹). Some few special studies published after 1949 have, however, put their primary emphasis upon one aspect or another of this problem.

I B. Platonic Interpretation in General

67. V. Goldschmidt, Sur le problème du "Système de Platon", Riv Crit Storia Filos 5, 1950, 169—178.

68. D. Faucci, Morale e politica in Platone, Giorn Crit Filosof Ital 3 Ser 6, 1952, 129—161. This is especially relevant to the political interpretations listed in I A *supra*.

69. G. Semerari, Filosofia ed esistenza umana in Platone, Riv Internaz Filos Diritto 31, 1954, 670—711. With special reference to the problem as discussed by Faucci (68).

70. W. J. Verdenius, Christianiserende en historische Plato-Interpretatie, Nederland Theolog Tijdsch 8, 1954, 129—143.

71. J. Pieper, Über den Philosophie-Begriff Platons, Arbeitsgemeinschaft für Forschung des Landes Nordrhein-Westfalen, Jahresfeier 1955, 19—33 (cf. Kuhn, Gnomon 28, 1956, 224—225)²).

¹) This is not to say that they are all unaware of it. Rigobello (34 *supra*), to take but one example, in proposing to give an 'organic synthesis' of Plato's thought (pp. 9—10) explicitly takes the risk of which Diès had spoken and makes a clean distinction (p. 121) between philosophy and biography in the interpretation of Plato.

²) See also the later essay on the same subject:

71a) J. Pieper, Was versteht Platon unter 'Philosophie', in: Vom Menschen in der Antike, hrsg. von F. Hörmann, München 1957, pp. 129—142,

and with these articles of Pieper's cf. the earlier essay:

71b) E. von Ivanka, Zur Motivanalyse des Platonismus, Zeitschr philos Forsch 4, 1949, 385—392.

I cannot refrain from mentioning here an essay which, though it does not profess to advance Platonic scholarship, could be read with profit by most professional Platonists:

71c) E. Haag, Zu welchem Ende lesen wir heute Platon in der Schule?, Gymnasium 63, 1956, 233—244.

Of the recent works that deal with the problems of the history of philosophy generally the following devote a good deal of attention to the specific questions of Platonic interpretation:

72. R. Mondolfo, *Problemas y metodos de la investigacion en Historia de la Filosofia*, Tucuman (Argentina) 1949 = *Problemi e Metodi di Ricerca nella Storia della Filosofia*, Firenze 1952.

73. W. Goldschmidt, *Los quehaceres del Historiador de la Filosofia*, *Estudios de Historia de la Filosofia en homenaje al Prof. R. Mondolfo I*, Tucuman 1957, 11—50.

II. Plato's Life and His Relations to Others

Most of the general works listed above give some account of Plato's life. Not infrequently such biographical data, substantiated or conjectural, has been employed throughout as a means of interpreting Plato's philosophy; and by some authors his writings have been treated primarily as additional evidence for the reconstruction of his biography, a method that predominates in the 'political' and 'psycho-analytical' interpretations and is exploited to the full by the Platonic detractors. Among the works listed in I *supra* the following may be especially mentioned as providing, though from different points of view, important critical accounts of the material available for Plato's biography in all its various aspects: Geffcken (2), especially the notes, Anmerkungen, pp. 29—33, 54—63, 73; Shorey (8), pp. 1—57, 447—451; Leisegang (26), cols. 2342—2361; Lesky (27), pp. 478—483; Levinson (28), pp. 41—44, 483—495.

Among works published in the period between 1930 and 1949 dealing exclusively with Plato's life and his relations to others must be mentioned here:

74. G. C. Field, *Plato and his contemporaries*, New York 1930 (reprinted London 1948).

Two dissertations of this period which deal with the life of Plato by Diogenes Laertius are still so far as I know unpublished:

75. G. Kuehhas, *Die Platonvita des Diogenes Laertios*, Diss. Graz 1947 (available in microfilm).

76. H. Verbeke, *Het Leven van Plato bij Diogenes Laertius: Commentaar en Bronnenstudie*, Thèse Gand (cf. *Rev Belge Philol* 25, 1946/47, 939).

Two biographical details are dealt with in important published articles of the period:

77. J. A. Notopoulos, *The name of Plato*, *Cl Phil* 34, 1939, 135—145.

78. J. A. Notopoulos, *Plato's Epitaph*, *AJPh* 63, 1942, 272—293.

It is rather the impression made by Plato and the resulting legend than his biography that is the subject of Leisegang's study, in which Empedocles, Plato, Moses, and Jesus are taken as manifestations of a type:

79. H. Leisegang, *Der Gottmensch als Archetypus*, *Eranos-Jahrbuch* 18 [1949], 1950, 9—45.

Those who undertake to write Plato's biography rely largely upon the Platonic *Epistles* and especially upon VII and VIII. Contributions to the debate on the authenticity of these compositions will be listed in the section devoted to the *Epistles* themselves; but it should be noticed here that the use of these writings and of some other materials as trustworthy evidence for the biography of Plato was directly impugned just before the beginning of our period:

80. G. Boas, Fact and legend in the Biography of Plato, *Philos Rev* 57, 1948, 439—457¹).

This challenge was immediately answered by a defence of the biographers:

81. R. S. Bluck, Plato's Biography: The Seventh Letter, *Philos Rev* 58, 1949, 503—509 (see also 10d *supra*: R. S. Bluck, Plato's life and thought, London 1949).

Some outstanding examples of the express exploitation of *Epistle* VII as the chief means of reconstructing Plato's biography and psychology are:

82. J. H. Thiel, Oude geschiedenis en historische kritiek, voorheen en thans, *Med Nederland Ak Wet, Afd Letter N.R.* 15 Nr. 6, 1952, 191—211²).

83. G. Rudberg, Plato in the first person, *Platonica Selecta*, Stockholm 1956, pp. 72—108. He treats *Epistle* VII as revealing the various facets of Plato's personality.

Rudberg himself believed that a good deal of Plato's personal experience can be traced in several of his works and that in some

¹) See also:

80a) G. Boas, Ancient testimony to secret doctrines, *Philos Rev* 62, 1953, 79—92 (especially 85ff. on Plato).

²) See Thiel's earlier work based upon *Epistles* VII and VIII:

82a) Rond het syracuseaanische experiment, *ibid.* N. R. 4 Nr. 5, 1941, 135—170.

few of them he makes fairly direct references to himself and his associates:

84. G. Rudberg, *The Phaedrus Period*, *Platonica Selecta*, Stockholm 1956, 27—50¹).

85. G. Rudberg, *Das wir in der großen Phaidros-Rede*, *Miscellanea E. Hjärne*, *K Human Vet-Sam Uppsala Årsbok* 1952, 93—97.

Still more recently it has been asserted that the dialogues are full of recognizable references to individual associates of Plato's in the Academy:

86. E. Salin, *Platon, Dion, Aristoteles*, Robert Boehringer: *Eine Freundesgabe*, Tübingen 1957, pp. 525—542. According to Salin Plato gave to the characters in his dialogues the traits of his students in the Academy, to whom he refers by puns on their names or nick-names; so the *Phaedrus* puns not only on the name of Dion but also on that of Aristotle, as a warning to whom the *Sophist* was written, while the *Politicus* was written for Dion with references to his friend, Speusippus.

The quarry in this game of hide-and-seek used to be Antisthenes, but one name will do as well as another. Of an entirely different character are the studies of references or possible references to Plato and the Academy in the contemporary theatre:

87. R. Cadiou, *Le Philèbe et le théâtre*, *Rev Ét Grecques* 65, 1952, 302—311.

88. T. B. L. Webster, *Chronological notes on Middle Comedy*, *Cl Quart N.S.* 2, 1952, 13—26: pp. 16—19 and 21 on Plato.

89. T. B. L. Webster, *Studies in Later Greek Comedy*, Manchester 1953, pp. 53—56 (see also *General Index: Academy, Plato*). See also G. J. de Vries, *Hermeneus* 27, 1955/56, 2—9.

II A. Plato and Syracuse: Dion, Dionysius I, and Dionysius II

All biographical studies of Plato dwell upon his relations to the court of Syracuse and his involvement in Syracusan politics; and, as is the case in many of the works just mentioned, an attempt is often made to exploit this aspect of his biography for the interpretation of

¹) In this paper Rudberg gives a revised résumé of the arguments in so far as he still subscribed to them which he had developed in his book, *Kring Platons Phaidros*, Göteborg 1924.

his philosophical works. The following, however, are especially concerned with this part of his life or with some episode in it:

90. H. Berve, Dion, Akad Wiss Lit Mainz Abhand geistes- u sozialwiss Kl 1956 Nr 10, Wiesbaden 1957.

91. H. Berve, Dion: Der Versuch der Verwirklichung platonischer Staatsgedanken, Hist Zeitschr 184, 1957, 1—18. This article presents a concise summary of the monograph just mentioned (90)¹).

92. G. R. Levy, Plato in Sicily, London 1956. An avowedly imaginative reconstruction of Plato's life from the time that he first visited Sicily.

93. W. H. Porter, Plato and Dion of Syracuse, Proc Cl Assoc 48, London 1951, 34—36²).

94. K. F. Stroheker, Platon und Dionysios I. von Syrakus, Hist Zeitschr 173, 1952, 225—229.

95. K. F. Stroheker, Dionysios I.: Gestalt und Geschichte des Tyrannen von Syrakus, Wiesbaden 1958.

96. L. Vogt, Zur Dion-Vita, Historia 3, 1954/55, 171—192.

97. H. D. Westlake, The Sicilian books of Theopompus' *Philippica*, Historia 2, 1953/54, 288—307³).

98. L. Wickert, Platon und Syrakus, Rhein Mus 93, 1950, 27—53.

¹) With Berve's conclusions concerning Plato's attitude and activity cf. Levinson's section, The Sicilian Venture, in his book, In defense of Plato (28 *supra*), pp. 369—394. Two earlier works of a different temper should also be mentioned here:

91a) N. di Fede, Dionigi il Giovane, Catanzaro 1949 (cf. Stroheker, Gnomon 26, 1954, 134—135). This is an attempt to rehabilitate Dionysius II.

91b) L. Marcuse, Plato and Dionysius, A double biography, New York 1947. On this semi-fictional, moralizing account cf. the remarks of Levinson (28 *supra*), p. 373, n. 304.

²) See also by the same author:

93a) Plutarch: Life of Dion with introduction and notes by W. H. Porter, London 1952 (cf. Walbank, Cl Rev N.S. 4, 1954, 18—20).

93b) W. H. Porter, The sequel to Plato's first visit to Italy, *Hermathena* 61, 1943, 46—55. He holds that Plato was captured on his way home and sold in Aegina but without the complicity of Dionysius; cf. Porter's note in 93a *supra*, pp. 52—54. Against the authenticity of the whole story see:

93c) U. Kahrstedt, Platons Verkauf in die Sklaverei, Würzburger Jahrb 2, 1947, 295—300.

³) See also the earlier essay:

97a) H. D. Westlake, Dion: A study in liberation: Durham Univ Journ N.S. 7, 1945/46, 37—44.

II B. Plato's Activity in the Academy

Plato's relations to Syracuse and his political projects or intentions have by some scholars been treated in close connection with his founding of the Academy and his activity there, while others have emphasized rather the more strictly pedagogical, philosophical, or scientific nature of this activity. Investigation of this latter kind involves the question of Plato's reputed oral teaching and in this connection the problem of the apparent indications especially in Aristotle's texts of Platonic doctrines that are not readily identifiable in Plato's written works. The serious treatments of this problem turn upon the interpretation of the works of Aristotle, the Aristotelian commentators and other post-Platonic texts, and the fragmentary remains of such authors as Speusippus and Xenocrates. An account of them belongs rather in a survey of Aristotelian and Academic studies than in one of the works of Plato himself; and no such account will be given here, as none will be of works dealing with Plato's influence on later writers or with their criticism of Plato's thought and writings. Nevertheless, just as in many of the works on Plato's dialectic and theory of ideas which I shall later list the authors make sporadic use of Aristotelian passages in developing their own interpretations of Plato's text, so in dealing with Plato's life in the Academy scholars usually have some discussion of his "unwritten teaching"; and consequently I survey in the present section the recent literature that professes to explain this activity.

99. C. B. Armstrong, Plato's Academy, *Proc Leeds Philos Soc* 7 Part 2, 1953, 89—106.

100. I. Düring, Aristotle the scholar, *Arctos* N.S. 1, 1954, 61—77. On the Academy during Aristotle's connection with it and the relation between Aristotle and Plato.

101. I. Düring, Aristotle and Plato in the mid-fourth century, *Eranos* 54, 1956, 109—120. Here Düring connects Aristotle's *De Ideis* with the *Parmenides*, his *De Philosophia* with the *Timaeus*, his notes on Plato's lecture (*De Bono*) with the *Sophist*, his *Protrepticus* with the *Politicus* written in that order as part of the activity in the Academy.

102. I. Düring, Aristotle in the ancient biographical tradition, Göteborg 1957, pp. 315—336 on Aristotle and Plato, pp. 355—361 on the Academy and Plato's "oral teaching".

103. H. Herter, *Platons Akademie*, 2. Auflage, Bonn 1952¹).

104. Margherita Isnardi, *Teoria e prassi nel pensiero dell'Accademia Antica*, *Parola Pass* 11, 1956, 401—433. Holding that the programme for the guardians in the *Republic* is the programme of the Academy she stresses the connection of the practical and the theoretical in Plato's conception of philosophy, and then traces the gradual elimination of the practical from the conception of the philosophic life as it developed in the Academy after his death.

105. J. S. Morrison, *Greek Philosopher Statesmen*, *Proc Cl Assoc* 54, London 1957, 26—27. Influence of Plato's trip to Sicily and the Pythagorean intervention in politics upon his rejection of the Socratic separation of philosophy from politics and upon his institution of the Academy²).

106. O. Seel, *Die Platonische Akademie*, Stuttgart 1953. A lecture followed by a polemic against J. Piepers' conception of the meaning of 'academic'.

In concluding this list of publications that deal with the general nature of the Academy the treatment of the subject in two of the books already mentioned should be added:

Friedländer's *Plato I* (11a and 11b *supra*), Chap. 4: The Academy, and Winspear's *The genesis of Plato's thought* (44 *supra*), pp. 303—339: The Academy and the later dialogues. Both insist upon the political orientation of the Academy, but each does so in a very different sense and temper.

Among the recent studies of the nature of Plato's supposed oral teaching and its philosophical content, which means primarily the

¹) On the first edition, Bonn 1946, cf. Cherniss, *Cl Phil* 43, 1948, 130—132. I believe that the criticisms there made apply as well to the second edition, in which, p. 26, they are dismissed without discussion on the ground that they arise from the interpretation developed by the reviewer in an earlier work which the author rejects. This being the case, I may mention that earlier work even though it antedates the period of research here covered:

103a) H. Cherniss, *The Riddle of the Early Academy*, Berkeley/Los Angeles 1945. This work has been bitterly criticized, most recently by A. Mansion, *Med K Vlaamse Acad Wet*, *Kl Letter* 16 Nr. 3, 1954, 14—18 and earlier by G. R. Morrow, *Philos Rev* 55, 1946, 190—199 and by D. J. Allan, *Philos Quart* 1, 1950/51, 63—64.

²) Now published in full, *The origins of Plato's Philosopher-Statesman*, *Cl Quart N.S.* 8, 1958, 198—218. In connection with this I call attention to another essay on the political aspect of the Academy, published before 1950:

195a) P.-M. Schuhl, *Platon et l'activité politique de l'Académie*, *Rev Ét Grecques* 59/60, 1946/47, 46—53. This article is reprinted in Schuhl's book, *Le merveilleux, la pensée et l'action*, Paris 1952, 155—162.

notorious lecture on the Good and the problematical theory of idea-numbers, are two brief treatments in works already mentioned, those of Leisegang (26 *supra*), cols. 2520—2522 and of Schuhl (35 *supra*), pp. 195—207. The latter does at least refer to the more modern literature on the subject, of which Leisegang takes no notice whatever. Shortly before 1950 there appeared several special studies which cannot be passed over here in listing the later publications:

107. W. Bröcker, *Plato über das Gute*, Lexis 2, 1949, 47—66.

108. C. J. de Vogel, *La dernière phase du platonisme et l'interprétation de M. Robin*, *Studia Varia* C. G. Vollgraff ... oblata, Amsterdam 1948, 165—178.

109. C. J. de Vogel, *Problems concerning later Platonism*, *Mnem* IV 2, 1949, 197—216 and 299—318¹).

110. G. Junge, *Platos Ideen-Zahlen*, *Class et Med* 10, 1948, 10—38.

111. P. Wilpert, *Zwei aristotelische Frühschriften über die Ideenlehre*, Regensburg 1949, especially pp. 119—211: *Περὶ τῶν ἀριθμῶν*. Wilpert here argues at length that Sextus Empiricus, *Adv. Math.* X 248—284 contains a detailed résumé of Aristotle's *De Bono* and is a faithful account of Plato's lecture on the Good, on the basis of which Wilpert then undertakes to reconstruct and interpret Plato's oral teaching and ultimate doctrine. Wilpert's thesis concerning the passage of Sextus has been very widely—and very uncritically—accepted; but cf. for some of the critical objections to it: Jaeger, *Gnomon* 23, 1951, 250—251; Ackrill, *Mind* 61, 1952, 110—113; P. Merlan, *From Platonism to Neoplatonism*, The Hague 1953, 174—176.

112. P. Wilpert, *Platons Altersvorlesung über das Gute*, *Philos Jahrbuch* 59, 1949, 1—13 (see also 176 *infra*).

One other work as well, though it was published at the beginning of the last decade, deserves special attention:

113. W. van der Wielen, *De ideegetallen van Plato*, Amsterdam 1941 (cf. Wilpert, *Gnomon* 19, 1943, 294—299; A. Mansion, *Tijdsch Philos* 6, 1944, 377—387; Cherniss, *AJPh* 68, 1947, 235—251).

The works published after 1949 which are primarily or extensively concerned with this subject are the following:

114. O. Becker, *Zwei Untersuchungen zur antiken Logik*, Wiesbaden 1957, pp. 1—22: *Zum Problem der platonischen Idealzahlen*.

¹) See also Miss de Vogel's later articles, items 38b, 38c, and 38f, listed in note 1 on p. 13.

Becker here attempts to defend his old interpretation in: *Die diairetische Erzeugung der platonischen Idealzahlen*, *Quellen u Stud Gesch Math B* 1, 1931, 464—501, which, though often sharply criticized, is adopted by Leisegang (26 *supra*), cols. 2521—2522.

Philos 115. E. W. Beth, The prehistory of research into foundations, *British Journ Hist Science* 3, 1952/53, 58—81: pp. 68—75 on Plato's theory of ideas and the 'new theory' presented in the lecture on the Good, which, following Wilpert (cf. item 111 *supra*), he takes to be represented by the passage of Sextus¹).

116. A. J. Festugière, *La révélation d'Hermès Trismégiste IV: Le Dieu Inconnu et la Gnose*, Paris 1954, pp. 307—314 with pp. 25—31, 49—53, and especially 79—91.

117. P. Kucharski, *La musique et la conception du réel dans le 'Philebe'*, *Rev Philosophique* 141, 1951, 39—60: especially pp. 47—59.

118. Z. Marcovic, *La théorie de Platon sur l'un et la dyade indéfinie . . .*, *Rev Hist Sciences et Applications* 8, 1955, 289—297. See also *Proc Int Congress of Math*, Amsterdam 1954, Vol. 2, 423—424.

119. G. Martin, *Platons Lehre von der Zahl und ihre Darstellung durch Aristoteles*, *Zeitschr philos Forsch* 7, 1953, 191—203. He holds that the essentials of Aristotle's report are to be found in Plato's dialogues, but he considers only the 'intermediate mathematical' and the limitation of ideal numbers to ten.

120. G. Martin, *Klassische Ontologie der Zahl*, Köln 1956, pp. 17—41 (cf. Becker, *Gnomon* 29, 1957, 442—444).

121. P. Merlan, *From Platonism to Neoplatonism*, The Hague 1953, especially pp. 30—52, 166—177, 186, and 191—192 on Plato himself, the soul and 'intermediate mathematical', and Plato's theory as a 'derivation-system' close to Neoplatonism²).

¹) See also the earlier article:

115a) E. W. Beth, *Les relations de la dialectique et la logique*, *Dialectica* 2, 1948, 109—119.

²) Vigorously attacked by A. Mansion, *Med K Vlaamse Acad Wet*, *Kl Letter* 16 Nr 3, 1954, 33—44 and defended against this attack by Merlan, *JHS* 77 Part 1, 1957, 87—92. For other important reviews of the book cf. *Rev Metaph et Morale* 59, 1954, 211—212; Kerferd, *Cl Rev N.S.* 5, 1955, 58—60; Kohnke, *Gnomon* 27, 1955, 157—164; Dörrie, *Philos. Rundschau* 3, 1955, 14—25; Moreau, *Rev Belge Philol* 34, 1956, 1164—1167; de Strycker, *Ant Cl* 25, 1956, 528—529; de Santillana, *Isis* 48, 1957, 360—362; Loenen, *Mnem* IV 10, 1957, 80—82.

122. H. D. Saffrey, *Le Περὶ φιλοσοφίας d'Aristote et la théorie platonicienne des idées-nombres*, Leiden 1955, especially pp. 19—23 and 47—50. According to Saffrey Plato's lecture was an interpretation of the *Timaeus* in the light of his later theory of idea-numbers; the lecture was summarized in the *De Philosophia*, which is cited in the *De Anima* 404 B 18—24 (cf. Cherniss, *Gnomon* 31, 1959, 36—51).

123. A. Wedberg, *Plato's philosophy of mathematics*, Stockholm 1955. An attempt to find in Plato's dialogues certain aspects of the theory referred to by Aristotle, e. g. the 'intermediate mathematics' (cf. Becker, *Gnomon* 28, 1956, 340—343; Lemmon, *Mind* 66, 1957, 570—571).

124. P. Wilpert, *Die aristotelische Schrift 'Über die Philosophie'*, *Autour d'Aristote: Recueil . . . A. Mansion*, Louvain 1955, 99—116, especially 108—110 where Wilpert discusses the four fragments which he asserts give an almost complete account of Plato's theory of principles and idea-numbers.

The most extensive recent discussion of the subject and of earlier treatments of it is contained in Sir David Ross's book, *Plato's theory of ideas*, Oxford 1951, pp. 142—224 and pp. 242—245; but, since the greater part of this book is concerned with the theory as it appears in Plato's writings, it will be dealt with in the section *infra* (V B) on the Theory of Ideas.

II C. The Relation of Plato to the Influence of Others

The general question of Plato's reaction to his predecessors has been treated as such but rather slightly in one book on philosophical historiography published during our period:

125. M. dal Pra, *La storiografia filosofica antica*, Milano 1950, pp. 57—63¹⁾.

a) Socrates

The written works of Plato have themselves suggested the generally accepted proposition that the most important single influence upon Plato's life and thought, more important perhaps than all others

¹⁾ Cf. also Cherniss, *Estudios de historia de la filosofía en homenaje al Prof. R. Mondolfo I*, Tucuman 1957, pp. 102—107; and the perceptive remarks of A. Lanzalaco, *Acme* 8 Fasc. 1, 1955, 207 (paragraph 2).

together, was that exercised by Socrates; but the character and extent of this influence, what parts and aspects of Platonic thought are Socratic—or reactions to Socrates—and how much of the Platonic Socrates is Plato, continue as always to be subjects of investigation, conjecture, and debate. The 'Socratic Problem' as such has a proliferating literature of its own which cannot be included in this survey and is here indicated only in so far as it has important direct bearing upon the specific question of Plato's relation to Socrates. The problem in all its aspects both relevant to this survey and peripheral to it has been treated in two complementary volumes published near the beginning of our period:

126 V. de Magalhães-Vilhena, *Le problème de Socrate: Le Socrate historique et le Socrate de Platon*, Paris 1952.

127. V. de Magalhães-Vilhena, *Socrate et la légende platonicienne*, Paris 1952.

These two large volumes, in which the author discusses much of the earlier literature and mentions still more of it, much more than he has well digested, have been reviewed and criticized at length and in detail, especially by Trouillard, *Rev Philos Louvain* 52, 1954, 279—288; de Vogel, *Phronesis* 1, 1955/56, 26—35; Tate, *Cl Rev N.S.* 5, 1955, 56—58; Gigon, *Gnomon* 27, 1955, 259—266; Merlan, *Philos Rundschau* 4, 1956, 212—216. Combined with a review of these two volumes there is another bibliography raisonné of the Socratic Problem:

128. A. Capizzi, *Il problema socratico*, *Sophia* 25, 1957, 199—207; and this same author has another, longer essay in which, after reviewing earlier theories and attitudes, he proposes a criterion by which to distinguish in the text of Plato the opinions of the historical Socrates from the Platonic notions and elaborations which Socrates is made to express:

129. A. Capizzi, *La testimonianza platonica: Contributa alla ricerca di una determinazione dell' elemento socratico nei dialoghi*, *Rass Filos* 6, 1957, 205—221 and 309—337.

Another recent book, which revives the extreme historical scepticism concerning Socrates, though concerned explicitly with Xenophons *Socratica*, argues a good deal in passing about the Socratic dialogues of Plato in this connection:

130. A.-H. Chroust, *Socrates: Man and Myth*, London 1957. Chroust concludes that the whole ancient literary tradition about

Socrates was meant to create a legend rather than to report historical facts and that, although Socrates could have been no insignificant person, we can no longer ascertain the reasons why he should have been made the hero of this great literary legend¹).

Quite a different conclusion from this is reached in two studies of the biographical elements in Plato's treatment of Socrates:

131. É. de Strycker, *Les témoignages historiques sur Socrate*, *Mélanges Henri Grégoire* 2, Bruxelles 1950, 199—230²).

132. A. Dihle, *Studien zur griechischen Biographie*, Göttingen 1956 (Abhandl Gött, phil hist Kl 3. Folge Nr 37), pp. 13—34: Die Bedeutung der Gestalt des Sokrates für die Entstehung der Biographie. Here Plato's *Apology* is studied and compared with earlier forms of biography and with Xenophon's *Socratica* (cf. von Fritz, *Gnomon* 28, 1956, 328—329).

Almost every one of the following recent publications proposes a different estimate and interpretation of the Socratic element in Plato's writings and of Plato's reaction to the influence of Socrates:

133. V. de Caprariis, *Umanesimo e politica di Socrate*, *Parola Pass* 8, 1953, 264—302.

134. A. Delatte, *La figure de Socrate dans l'Apologie de Platon*, *Bull Lettres Acad Belgique* 36, 1950, 213—226. He tries to find a Pythagorean model for the vocation of Socrates.

135. F. Egermann, *Vom attischen Menschenbild*, München 1952, pp. 34—48: Sokrates und das platonische Menschenbild.

136. G. Giannantoni, *Il primo libro della Repubblica di Platone*, *Riv Crit Storia Filos* 12, 1957, 123—145. He argues that the 'Socraticism' of *Republic* I is intended to show the insufficiency of Socrates' method and indicates the distance that Plato had gone from his attitude towards Socrates in the earlier dialogues; hence Plato's implicit and ironical criticism at the beginning of Book II, where the

¹) This conclusion is similar to that which was reached in a volume published ten years earlier:

130a) O. Gigon, *Sokrates, Sein Bild in Dichtung und Geschichte*, Bern 1947. On this book cf. Tate, *Cl Rev* 63, 1949, 18—19; Patočka, *Rev Philosophique* 139, 1949, 186—213; de Vogel, *Mnem* IV 4, 1951, 30—39; Alfonsi, *Paideia* 6, 1951, 250—254.

²) See also his article:

131a) É. de Strycker, *Socrate et l'au delà d'après l'Apologie platonicienne*, *Études Cl* 18, 1950, 269—284.

constructive examination begins to which Book I must have been written expressly as an introduction.

137. N. Gulley, *Ethical analysis in Plato's earlier dialogues*, *Cl Quart N.S.* 2, 1952, 74—82. Argues that the 'hesitations' in the early dialogues represent Plato's own uncertainties and are not meant as part of a realistic portraiture of Socrates.

138. H. Gundert, *Platon und das Daimonion des Sokrates*, *Gymnasium* 61, 1954, 513—531.

139. M. Landmann, *Elenktik und Maieutik*, Bonn 1950, pp. 7—89. These pages contain two essays, the first with two excursus, in which Landmann tries to establish a parallel between Socratic elenchus and psychoanalytic method and then contends that with the purely rationalistic teachings of Socrates Plato's irrationalistic identification of philosophy with 'eros' was in ever growing conflict. Cf. Tate, *Cl Rev N.S.* 2, 1952, 78—79.

140. F. Lombardi, *Il discorso socratico*, *Riv Filos* 45, 1954, 271—290. The relation of Platonic 'essentialism' to Socratic method of 'dialogue' and hesitation to generalize prematurely.

141. J. W. Miller, *The development of the philosophy of Socrates*, *Rev Metaphysics* 6, 1952/53, 551—561. Adopting the Burnet-Taylor theory, he traces Socrates' development from the dramatic dates of the dialogues. Cf. Scoon, *ibid.* 7, 1953/54, 125—128 and the reply of Miller, *ibid.* 7, 1953/54, 128—131.

142. H. Raeder, *Platonische Stadier*, *K Danske Vid Sel, Filos Med 2 Nr 5*, Copenhagen 1950. On the basis of the *Epistles* he argues that there is a break between the dialogues in which Socrates leads the discussion and those in which he does not and that this marks a stage in Plato's philosophic development¹).

143. G. Rudberg, *Plato the disciple of Socrates*, *Platonica Selecta*, Stockholm 1956, pp. 7—26. This is an expanded translation of his earlier paper, *Sokrateslärjungen Platon*, *Theoria* 1, 1935, 193—202.

¹) Raeder gives a summary of the chief literature on the 'Socratic Problem' through the Burnet-Taylor theory and the criticism of it. For a more extensive consideration of this debate through 1950 with special consideration of the earlier interpretations of Hegel, Kierkegaard, and Nietzsche see:

142a) P. Rossi, *Per una storia della storiografia socratica*, *Problemi di Storiografia Filosofica* a cura di A. Banfi, Milano 1951, pp. 85—140.

144. G. Semerari, Il principio del dialogo in Socrate, *Giorn Crit Filos Ital* 3 Ser 7, 1953, 437—456. The method of 'dialogue' as the essence of Socratism with the relation to the sophists on the one hand and to Plato on the other. With this cf. Lombardi (140 *supra*).

145. L. Sichirolo, *Antropologia e dialettica nella filosofia di Platone*, Milano 1957. An essay, avowedly inspired by the Hegelian attitude, on the significance of 'Socraticism' for Plato, whose philosophy, an attempt to solve the problem posed by Socrates' philosophizing and consequent death, involves a negation of that philosophizing. The essay is based upon interpretation of the *Meno*, *Republic*, and *Epistle VII*, which are taken to be 'Wendepunkte' in the evolution of Plato's philosophy (dialectic) in its foundation (anthropology)¹.

146. U. Tavianini, L'oggettivarsi del concetto socratico nella speculazione platonica, *Sophia* 20, 1952, 253—258²).

147. G. Vlastos, The paradox of Socrates, *Queen's Quart (Kings-ton, Ontario)*, 64, 1957/58, 496—516.

148. H. von den Steinen, Sokrates und Platon, *Neue Rundschau* 64, 1953, 248—275.

b) The Sophists

The complement to Socrates' influence upon Plato is Plato's reaction to the sophists. It is natural therefore that these two matters have often been treated together (e. g. Semerari's article, 144 *supra*). Works dealing with Plato's relation to individual sophists will be listed under the relevant names *infra*. Here I give only those which deal with Plato and the sophists generally, including a few significant items published before 1950.

149. Maria T. Antonelli, *Figure di Sofisti in Platone* (Bibl *Giorn Metafisica* 2), Torino 1948.

150. M. Buccellato, La retorica sofistica negli scritti di Platone, *Milano* 1953 (cf. Geymonat, *Riv Filos* 45, 1954, 228—231). The

¹) The essay itself is followed by translations of two older essays by J. Stenzel and A. Kojève on Hegel and Greek philosophy and finally by Sichirolo's essay (pp. 161—177), *Lecture di Platone nella 'Storia della Filosofia' Hegeliana*.

²) Here Tavianini argues that beginning with the *Phaedrus* Plato tends more and more to 'objectify' the Socratic concepts. As a companion-piece of this essay see:

146a) U. Tavianini, Il misticismo platonico nelle opere anteriori al *Timeo*, *Sophia* 20, 1952, 90—94.

chapters of this book appeared separately from 1946 to 1953 in *Sophia*, *Riv Crit Storia Filos*, *Arch Filosofia*, and *Studi di Filosofia Greca* a cura di V. E. Alfieri e M. Untersteiner, Bari 1950.

151. E. Dupréel, *Les Sophistes*, Neuchatel 1948. This is an extension in the same spirit of Dupréel's earlier work, *La Légende Socratique et les Sources de Platon*, Bruxelles 1922. According to Dupréel Plato was an irresponsible composer of literary pastiches, pillaging the philosophies of Protagoras, Gorgias, Prodicus, and Hippias for fragments which he put together to suit his whim and ascribed without consistency to his lay-figure, Socrates. Cf. Lana, *Riv Filolog* N.S. 28, 1950, 354—362; Cherniss, *AJPh* 73, 1952, 199—207.

152. E. A. Havelock, *The liberal temper in Greek politics*, New Haven 1957. In the course of reconstructing the 'liberal' anthropology, sociology, and political theory of the sophists Havelock argues that Plato deforms and misrepresents their position in the interest of his own conservative and regressive view of history.

153. W. Hoendervanger, *Proeve van onderzoek naar Platoon's opvatting van de Sophistiek*, Zutphen 1938.

154. G. B. Kerferd, *Plato's Noble Art of Sophistry*, *Cl Quart* N.S. 4, 1954, 84—90. He argues that in *Sophist* 226 A—231 B Plato refers to the sophists, one aspect of whose activity he recognizes as a necessary preliminary to his own philosophy¹).

155. K. F. Stroheker, *Zu den Anfängen der monarchischen Theorie in der Sophistik*, *Historia* 2, 1953/54, 381—412. Plato's attitude towards the problem of tyranny and monarchy as a reaction to the sophistic handling of this theme.

156. F. Wehrli, *Der Arztvergleich bei Platon*, *Mus Helvet* 8, 1951, 177—184. The manner in which Plato appropriated and developed in his own fashion this sophistic theme of comparison.

The other Greek writers whose influence upon Plato and his reactions to whom have recently been the subjects of special study I list here in alphabetical order:

¹) Against this interpretation of Kerferd's see:

154a) N. B. Booth, *Plato, Sophist* 231 a etc., *Cl Quart* N.S. 6, 1956, 89—90.

154b) J. R. Trevaskis, *The Sophistry of Noble Lineage*, *Phronesis* 1, 1955/56, 36—49.

c) Aeschylus

157. H. Lloyd-Jones, Zeus in Aeschylus, JHS 76, 1956, 55—67. Pp. 64—65 on Plato's attitude towards Aeschylus and a justification of it against modern attempts to make Aeschylus an 'advanced' ethical or religious thinker.

d) Antimachus

158. M. Gigante, Catullo, Cicerone e Antimaco, Riv Filolog 32, 1954, 67—73. He discusses Plato's praise of Antimachus (T 1—3 Wyss) and the ancient polemic against it¹).

e) Antisthenes

159. G. M. A. Grube, Antisthenes was no logician, Trans Am Philol Assoc 81, 1950, 16—27. See especially pp. 19 and 25 on Antisthenes and Plato. There is one important earlier article of which Grube appears to take no account:

160. A.-J. Festugière, Antisthenica, Rev Sc Philos Théol 21, 1932, 345—376.

f) Aristippus

161. R. Mondolfo, I Cirenaici e i 'raffinati' del *Teeteto* platonico, Riv Filos 44, 1953, 127—136. In this article, which appears in Spanish in Mondolfo's book, La comprensión del sujeto humano en la cultura antigua, Buenos Aires 1955, pp. 255—266, a new attempt is made to identify the κομψότεροι of *Theaetetus* 156 A with Aristippus and his school.

162. G. Giannantoni, I Cirenaici, Firenze 1958. In a long study of the evidence and arguments, pp. 116—165, he concludes that except in *Phaedo* 59 C Plato nowhere refers to Aristippus; but the 'uncertain references' to him in the dialogues are printed and translated on pp. 364—417.

g) Cratylus

163. G. S. Kirk, The problem of Cratylus, AJPh 72, 1951, 225—253. He contends that Cratylus is not depicted by Plato as a convinced Heraclitean and so does not accord with the depiction of Aristotle.

¹) Cf. the remarks of E. Howald and E. Staiger in their *Kallimachos: Dichtungen*, Zürich 1955, p. 10, and the criticism of G. J. de Vries, *Mnem* IV 10, 1957, 262.

164. D. J. Allan, The problem of Cratylus, *AJPh* 75, 1954, 271—287. He argues that Kirk's problem (163 *supra*) is unreal because the truth about the personality of Cratylus and his influence is different from that assumed by Kirk (cf. Cherniss, *AJPh* 76, 1955, 184—186).

165. R. Mondolfo, Il problema di Cratilo e l'interpretazione di Eraclito, *Riv Crit Storia Filos* 9, 1954, 221—231. This article is also a reply to Kirk (163 *supra*) but on a different basis from that of Allan's (164 *supra*)¹.

See also Sir David Ross, Plato's theory of ideas, Oxford 1951, pp. 155—157 and *Rev Intern Philos* 9, 1955, 193—195 and the sections *infra* on Heraclitus (items 191—198) and on the dialogue *Cratylus*.

h) Damon

166. H. Ryffel, Eukosmia: Ein Beitrag zur Wiederherstellung des Areopagitikos des Damon, *Mus Helvet* 4, 1947, 23—38. Here an attempt is made to establish the influence of Damon on Plato's *Republic*. Damon's decisive influence upon Plato is asserted also by F. Lasserre:

167. Plutarque, De la musique: Texte, traduction, commentaire précédés d'une étude sur l'éducation musicale dans la Grèce antique par F. Lasserre, Olten/Lausanne 1954, especially pp. 80, 89—90 (cf. on this Düring, *Gnomon* 27, 1955, 432—433). In the same year there appeared a still more strenuous attempt to reconstruct and interpret in detail Damon's influence upon Plato:

168. H. Koller, Die Mimesis in der Antike, Bern 1954: On Plato and Damon see e. g. pp. 15—36. 63—68. 175. 212. On the thesis of this book in general and its interpretation of Plato in particular cf. Moraux, *Études Cl* 23, 1955, 3—13; Diller, *Hermes* 83, 1955, 180—181; Lesky, *Gymnasium* 63, 1956, 442—444; Verdenius, *Mnem* IV 10, 1957, 254—258; Rosenmeyer, *Erasmus* 10, 1957, 293—296; Else, *Cl Phil* 53, 1958, 83—87. Two years later Ernst Koller also dwelt heavily on the influence of Damon upon Plato in his article dealing primarily with *μουσική* in Aristotle's *Politics*:

¹ A Spanish version of this paper has an Apostilla on Allan's article (164 *supra*):

165a) R. Mondolfo, El problema de Cratilo y la interpretacion de Heraclito, *Anales Filol Cl* 6, Buenos Aires 1954, 157—174.

169. E. Koller, *Muße und musische Paideia*, *Mus Helvet* 13, 1956, 1—37 and 94—124.

Quite a different attitude is taken in another study which, while recognizing the importance of Damon's influence, puts a definite limit to it and vindicates Plato's independence in developing musico-ethical theory:

170. W. D. Anderson, The importance of Damonian theory in Plato's thought, *Trans Am Philol Assoc* 86, 1955, 88—102.

On the period of Damon's activity and the possibility of Plato's personal acquaintance with him see:

171. A. E. Raubitschek, Damon, *Class et Med* 16, 1955, 78—83. This article appears to have been overlooked by J. S. Morrison in his treatment of the subject, *Cl Quart N.S.* 8, 1958, 204—207.

i) Democritus

Shorey (8 *supra*, p. 345) asserted that the influence of Democritus is felt all the more strongly throughout Plato because he is never named; and a glance at Schuhl's *L'Oeuvre de Platon* (35 *supra*, pp. 40. 123. 144. 158) will show the extent to which that influence is taken for granted by most recent writers. They find it and Plato's reaction to it not only in the *Timaeus* but in the *Ion* and the *Cratylus* and in the *Theaetetus*, *Sophist*, *Politicus*, *Philebus*, and the *Laws* as well; and remarks on this subject or incidental discussions of it will be found in many of the works listed under those dialogues. I shall not try to collect here the passing remarks and references made in all those works but shall list only the few which bear more generally upon the question:

172. V. E. Alfieri, *Per la cronologia della scuola di Abdera*, *Riv Crit Storia Filos* 7, 1952, 488—501¹).

173. H. Flashar, *Der Dialog Ion als Zeugnis platonischer Philosophie*, Berlin 1958, pp. 53. 55—58. 64²).

174. W. Kranz, *Die Entstehung des Atomismus, Convivium...* Festgabe für Konrat Ziegler, Stuttgart 1954, pp. 14—40, especially

¹) This article was later published as chapter II (pp. 11—29) of Alfieri's book, *Atomos Idea*, Firenze 1953, and republished again in *Estudios de Historia de la Filosofía en homenaje al Prof. R. Mondolfo I*, Tucuman 1957, 149—167.

²) See also H. Koller, *Mimesis in der Antike* (168 *supra*), pp. 145—151 on Democritus and Plato.

pp. 29ff. Kranz argues that Plato 'pythagorizes' in the *Timaeus* but that he was deeply influenced by Democritus and that the theory of atomic elements here was his own synthesis of 'Atomistik und Ideenlehre'.

175. K. R. Popper, The nature of philosophical problems . . . : Plato and the crisis in early Greek Atomism, *British Journ Philos of Science* 3, 1952/53, 134—152. Popper contends that Plato's theory of ideas was, like his theory of matter, a restatement of the theories of the Pythagoreans and Democritus in the light of his realisation that the existence of irrationals demanded the emancipation of geometry from arithmetic.

176. P. Wilpert, Die Elementenlehre des Platon und Demokrit, *Natur Geist Geschichte: Festschrift für Aloys Wenzl, München 1950*, 49—66. This interpretation of the *Timaeus* and Plato's 'later' theory as a reaction to the influence of Democritus is based upon Wilpert's assumption that he has correctly identified Sextus, *Adv. Math.* X, 248—284 as a résumé of Plato's lecture on the Good (see items 111 and 112 *supra*).

All these and many more represent the influence of Democritus on Plato as highly significant. Friedländer, while not denying such influence¹), still in comparison with most other recent interpreters minimizes its extent and importance (11a *supra*, vol. 2, p. 297, n. 7 and p. 314, n. 26) as he did before (1 *supra*, vol. 2, p. 605, n. 1). A voice from the past has recently made itself heard again in opposition to the recent tendency:

177. H. Diels, Ein Brief an W. Capelle, *Gymnasium* 63, 1956, 81.

Against the current tendency there is also at least one modern protest to record:

178. A. Ahlvers, *Zahl und Klang bei Platon*, Bern/Stuttgart 1952, especially pp. 63—67. He denies the assumption of Democritean influence even on the *Timaeus*, the sources for which he argues are purely Pythagorean.

j) Empedocles

179. F. Solmsen, Tissues and the soul, *Philos Rev* 59, 1950, 435—468, especially 445—459 on Plato's adaptation of Empedoclean theories in the *Timaeus*.

¹) See, e. g., his statement (11b *supra*, p. 253 = 11a, p. 290): 'Plato radically transformed this atomism of the Abderites.'

k) Epicharmus

180. M. Gigante, *Epicarino, Pseud-Epicarino e Platone*, Parola Pass 8, 1953, 161—175. He argues that Plato knew the genuine Epicharmus, that the fragments collected by Alcimus were genuine, and that Alcimus wrote to Amyntas not a polemic against Plato but a documentation of Plato's debt to Epicharmus¹).

l) Eudoxus

The relation of Plato to Eudoxus is often touched upon in works that deal with Plato's mathematics and astronomy, with the question of possible Oriental influence upon him, or with the Academy in general or the discussions there concerning the theory of ideas and the relation of pleasure to the Good as these are thought to be reflected in the *Parmenides* and the *Philebus*. Among such works already listed see: Geffcken (2 *supra*), pp. 179—180 and Anmerkungen, pp. 153—154; Friedländer (11a *supra*), I, p. 331, n. 15 = (11b *supra*), I, p. 353, n. 15; Armstrong (99 *supra*), pp. 98—100; Düring (100 *supra*), pp. 62—63. The work of J. Bidez, *Eos*, of which Chap. IV (pp. 24—37) is devoted to Eudoxus will be listed *infra* (241) under Oriental Influence, as will the articles of Alfonsi (248) and Carratelli (251) and the books of Kerschenshteiner (242) and of Koster (256). On the question of the possible connection of Eudoxus with the *Philebus* see among the publications on that dialogue A. Diès in the Notice, pp. LIIIff., of his Budé edition, *Philèbe*, Paris 1941, and G. Giannantoni, *I Cirenaici* (162 *supra*), pp. 146—164. Of other works on Eudoxus published in the '30s which concern his relations to Plato see especially:

181. K. von Fritz, *Die Lebenszeit des Eudoxos von Knidos*, *Philologus* 85, 1930, 478—481.

182. H. Karpp, *Untersuchungen zur Philosophie des Eudoxos von Knidos*, Würzburg-Aumühle 1933 (cf. von Fritz, *Gnomon* 11, 1935, 407—416; Philippson, *Phil Woch* 56, 1936, 1073—1080).

183. O. Becker, *Eudoxos-Studien V, Quellen u Studien Gesch Math B* 3, 1936, 389—410²).

The precise nature of the relation between Plato and Eudoxus is an important part of the discussion in two more recently published articles, though both are concerned primarily with other matters:

¹ On Alcimus cf. F. Jacoby, *F Gr Hist III B* 560 F 6 (pp. 571—573); *II B*, 1955, Kommentar, p. 518 and Noten, p. 306.

² On this and on Karpp's interpretation cf. also Cherniss, *Aristotle's criticism of Plato and the Academy I*, Baltimore 1944, pp. 525—539.

184. W. Schadewaldt, Eudoxos von Knidos und die Lehre vom unbewegten Beweger, *Satura* ... Otto Weinreich ... dargebracht, Baden-Baden 1952, pp. 103—129, = *Hellas und Hesperien*, Zürich 1960, 451—471 (571).

185. E. Frank, Die Begründung der mathematischen Naturwissenschaft durch Eudoxos, Wissen, Wollen, Glauben: Gesammelte Aufsätze, Zürich/Stuttgart 1955, 134—157. This was delivered as a lecture in 1932 but not published until 1955.

Much of the reconstruction of the relations of Plato and Eudoxus depends upon the chronology of the latter's life and works, and the most important recent study of this subject is an article published in 1949, though dated nine years earlier, but still apparently unknown to many Platonic scholars:

395 1
186. G. de Santillana, Eudoxus and Plato: A study in Chronology, *Isis* 32 Part 2, 1940 (published 1949), 248—262. He brings new evidence to support the dating of Eudoxus' birth in 390 and to date the Egyptian and Athenian visits anew¹).

m) Euripides

187. H. Grégoire, Euripide Tome V: Hélène, Paris 1950, Notice, pp. 41—46. He contends that Theone (*Helen* 998—1016) was the inspiration of Plato's 'Diotima' and of his doctrine of the immortality of the soul²).

188. Σ. Κορρέ, *Η ἐπὶ τὸν Πλάτωνα ἐπίδρασις τοῦ Εὐριπίδου*, *Πλάτων* 7, 1955, 6—12.

n) Gorgias

189. L. Bianchi, A proposito del giudizio di Platone su Gorgia, *Maia* N.S. 6, 1953, 272—282. The Gorgianic judgment of rhetoric represented differently according to the situation and as formulated

¹) This implies that Eudoxus did not predecease Plato but outlived him, as is indicated also by Pliny, *Nat. Hist.* 30, 3—4, a passage which de Santillana does not use and which W. Spierri, *Rev Philolog* 3 Ser 31, 215—218, apparently without knowledge of de Santillana's article and on the widely accepted but entirely unfounded assumption that Plato must have outlived Eudoxus (p. 229, n. 87), attempts to discredit.

²) Cf. also his earlier article:

187a) H. Grégoire, Comment Athènes retrouva la croyance à l'immortalité de l'âme, *Bull Lettres Acad Belgique* 5. Ser 34, 1948, 243—267.

by Gorgias or by his followers; Plato's motive was to show what implications for oratory and for politics are drawn from Gorgias' divorcing rhetoric as an art from morality.

190. G. Calogero, Gorgias and the Socratic Principle *Nemo sua sponte peccat*, JHS 77 Part 1, 1957, 12—17. Gorgias and not Prodicus is the forerunner of Socrates in this ethical principle and in the latter's conception of 'dialogue' as a check on the tyranny of persuasion; influence of Gorgias in the Platonic dialogues and upon the *Apologies* of Plato and of Xenophon.

o) Heraclitus

The question of Plato's relation to Heraclitus and Heracliteanism, with which is involved that of his relation to Cratylus, has most frequently been treated in connection with the *Cratylus*, the *Theaetetus*, and *Sophist* 242 D—E. See the titles listed under those dialogues *infra* and 163—165 *supra* under *Cratylus*. On the general subject there are a few publications that should be mentioned although they antedate this decade:

191. E. Weerts, Plato und der Heraklitismus (Philologus, Suppl. 23, 1), Leipzig 1931 (cf. von Fritz, Gnomon 9, 1933, 525—532; Cherniss, Aristotle's criticism of Plato ... I, Baltimore 1944, pp. 218—219).

192. H. Diller, Weltbild und Sprache im Heraclitismus, Neues Bild der Antike 1, 1942, 303—316. A comparison of Plato's exposition in the *Cratylus* and *Theaetetus* with the genuine doctrine of Heraclitus.

193. P. Schmitt, Geist und Seele: Studie über Logos, Nous und Psyche bei Heraklit und Platon, Eranos-Jahrbuch 13, 1945 [1946], 133—185.

Studies published in this decade that concern themselves with the subject as such are:

194. N. Boussoulas, Essai sur la structure du mélange dans la pensée présocratique: Héraclite, Rev Métaph et Morale 60, 1955, 287—298. This is an uncritical and historically naive article.

195. H. Fränkel, Wege und Formen frühgriechischen Denkens, München 1955, pp. 244—246; pp. 255—257; pp. 281—282¹). He in-

¹) The passages referred to are here published in revised and expanded forms of articles which were originally published in Trans Am Philol Assoc 69, 1938, 230—244 (Heraclitus on God and the phenomenal world) and in AJPh 59, 1938, 309—337 (A thought pattern in Heraclitus).

sists upon the great extent and profundity of Heraclitus' influence on Plato.

196. G. S. Kirk, *Heraclitus: The cosmic fragments*, Cambridge 1954, pp. 13—16; pp. 336—337; p. 364; pp. 369—378. In the first passage here cited Kirk collects Plato's references to Heraclitus; in the others—and throughout the book—he analyses the nature and reliability of Plato's interpretation¹).

197. R. Mondolfo, *Dos textos de Platon sobre Heráclito*, *Notas y Estudios de Filosofía* (Tucuman) 4, 1953, 233—244. Detailed interpretation of *Cratylus* 412C—413C and *Theaetetus* 152D—153D with general conclusions concerning Plato's knowledge of the rôles of fire and the law of flux in the writings of Heraclitus and the Heraclitean school.

198. R. Mondolfo, Evidence of Plato and Aristotle relating to the *Ekpyrosis* in Heraclitus, *Phronesis* 3, 1958, 75—82. On *Cratylus* 413 B—C and *Sophist* 242 D—E with Aristotelian evidence from which he tries to elicit recognition of an 'ecpyrosis'. Against this see now G. S. Kirk, *Phronesis* 4, 1959, 73—76.

p) Hippocrates

See the sections *infra* on Biology and Medicine and on the dialogues *Phaedrus* (270Bff.) and *Timaeus*.

q) Homer

Plato's criticism of Homer, which is the exclusive or primary interest of almost all the work on his relation to the poet and is closely connected with his critiques of poetry and art in general, will be treated in the section on Aesthetics *infra*. Besides the works to be listed there, however, there are two recent studies that deal more especially with Plato's extensive citations of Homer and use of Homeric language and themes:

199. J. Labarbe, *L'Homère de Platon*, Liège 1950 (cf. Merkelbach, *Gnomon* 23, 1951, 375—379; Tate, *Cl Rev N.S.* 2, 1952, 162—163; Martinazzoli, *Parola Pass* 7, 1952, 222—240; Irigoin, *Rev Philol* 27, 1953, 212—214; Pertusi, *Aevum* 24, 1950, 498—502). Labarbe is concerned with the way in which Plato quotes, cites, and refers to Homer and with the sources of the disparities between his text and that of our MSS.

¹) See also his earlier paper:

196a) G. S. Kirk, *Natural change in Heraclitus*, *Mind* 60, 1951, 35—42.

200. F. Buffière, *Les mythes d'Homère et la pensée grecque*, Paris 1956. Along with much else including Plato's condemnation of Homer this book discusses his interpretations and adaptations of Homeric texts: see the Indices, pp. 628—629 and p. 664 (cf. Tate, *Cl Rev N.S.* 8, 1958, 26—28; Stanford, *Gnomon* 30, 1958, 11—15).

r) Isocrates

The discussion of Plato's relation to Isocrates has been less lively during this decade than it was in earlier years. In Platonic literature it occurs now most frequently in connection with *Phaedrus* 278 E—279 B and *Euthydemus* 304 Dff., with attempts to date certain dialogues, and with the activity of the early Academy. For general discussion of the question see among the works already listed especially Shorey (8 *supra*), pp. 32—35 and 167—168; Jaeger (4 *supra*), vol. III, pp. 115—130, pp. 204—225, and pp. 257—259; and among others:

201. H.-I. Marrou, *Histoire de l'éducation dans l'Antiquité*, Paris 1948, pp. 126—136 and pp. 492—493¹⁾.

202. W. Steidle, *Redekunst und Bildung bei Isokrates*, *Hermes* 80, 1952, 257—296 (especially 285—296).

203. G. J. de Vries, *Isocrates' reaction to the Phaedrus*, *Mnem IV* 6, 1953, 39—45.

204. P. Merlan, *Isocrates, Aristotle and Alexander the Great*, *Historia* 3, 1954/55, 60—81. This essay contains a discussion of Isocrates' relations to Plato and the Academy and some observations on Plato's relations to Dion and Dionysius II as well.

205. E. Mikkola, *Isokrates: Seine Anschauungen im Lichte seiner Schriften* (*Annales Acad Scient Fennicae B* 89), Helsinki 1954 (cf. Gigante, *Parola Pass* 10, 1955, 230—234; Buchner, *Gnomon* 28, 1956, 353—355; Plebe, *Filosofia* 7, 1956, 368—371). Throughout this book there is constant comparison with Plato and discussion of his relation to Isocrates' 'philosophy'. This subject is now discussed without reference to Mikkola's treatment by J. S. Morrison, *Cl Quart N.S.* 8, 1958, 216—218.

206. H. Raeder, *Platon und die Rhetoren*, *K. Danske Vid Sel, Filos Med* 2 No 6, Copenhagen 1956.

¹⁾ In the English translation made from the 3rd edition by G. Lamb, London 1956, the pages are 82—91 and 378. There is a 4th edition of this book, 'revised and enlarged', Paris 1958.

s) Orphics

For this subject see also the Pythagoreans (227—235 *infra*) and the section on Plato's Religion. Of the publications earlier than 1950 devoted specifically to this subject attention should be given to:

207. B. A. M. Naaijkens, *Platoons leer over de ziel vergeleken met orphische of z. g. orphische opvattingen*, Tilberg 1938. Little attention has apparently been paid to this study, in which the author argues that Plato adopted from the Orphics the doctrine of metempsychosis¹⁾ but otherwise was scarcely influenced by them.

208. P. Boyancé, *Platon et les cathartes orphiques*, *Rev Ét Grecques* 55, 1942, 217—235. He argues in support of his earlier thesis²⁾ that Plato was influenced by Orphism, which he connected with Eleusis.

209. F. Pfister, *Die Autorität der göttlichen Offenbarung, Glauben und Wissen bei Platon*, *Würzburger Jahrb* 2, 1947, 176—188. Though he objected to Boyancé's conception of Orphism, he here holds that in decisive questions Plato appealed to Orphic literature as to the authority of divine revelation. No account is here taken of Linforth's extensive and critical examination of all the Platonic passages supposedly referring to such Orphic literature, although this had already put in serious question such theses as that of Pfister's:

210. I. M. Linforth, *The arts of Orpheus*, Berkeley/Los Angeles 1941³⁾. In spite of Linforth's critical scepticism Guthrie at the beginning of this decade reaffirmed his earlier contention that Orphism had had an important influence upon Plato:

¹⁾ That Plato had even so much from the Orphics was denied in the same year by H.W. Thomas, *EΠΕΚΕΙΝΑ* (227 *infra*), pp. 25—59, against whose denial of Orphic influence on Plato K. Ziegler polemized, *Orphische Dichtung*, *R.-E.* I 18, 2, 1942, 1373—1386.

²⁾ 208a) P. Boyancé, *Le culte des Muses chez les philosophes grecs*, Paris 1937 (cf. Festugière, *Rev Ét Grecques* 51, 1938, 195—199; della Corte, *Riv Filolog Cl N.S.* 16, 1938, 395—402; Pfister, *Phil Woch* 60, 1940, 542—546).

208b) P. Boyancé, *Le salut selon l'orphisme*, *Rev Ét Anciennes* 43, 1941, 166—171.

³⁾ See also his later article:

210a) I. M. Linforth, *Soul and sieve in Plato's Gorgias*, *Univ California Pub Cl Philol* 12 No. 17, 1944, 295—314.

211. W. K. C. Guthrie, *The Greeks and their Gods*, London 1950, especially pp. 311—324 and pp. 345—353¹⁾.

The two opposite attitudes towards the problem of Orphism in classical times and the question of its influence upon Plato are clearly reflected in recent publications by Méautis and Moulinier respectively:

212. G. Méautis, *L'Orphisme dans l'Eudème d'Aristote*, *Rev Ét Anciennes* 57, 1955, 254—266. He contends that Plato's doctrine from the point of view of religion was avowedly Orphic²⁾ and that this is faithfully reflected in the Orphic beliefs in the *Eudemus*, i. e. that the body is the tomb of the soul and death its return to its celestial home.

213. L. Moulinier, *Orphée et l'Orphisme à l'époque classique*, Paris 1955. His examination of the Platonic texts and others, though less thorough than Linforth's (210 *supra*), leads him to deny the existence of a distinctive Orphic doctrine that could have influenced Plato³⁾.

t) Parmenides

In many of the publications that deal primarily with the dialogues *Parmenides* and *Sophist* the influence of Parmenides and Plato's reaction to it are incidentally discussed, as they frequently are also

¹⁾ See also his earlier works:

211a) W. K. C. Guthrie, *Orpheus and Greek Religion*, London 1935 (2nd edition, 1952), especially pp. 156—171 and pp. 238—244. Here he asserts that Plato regarded the speculations of the Orphic theologians with respect akin to reverence and that they must have powerfully affected the form which his own religion took.

211b) W. K. C. Guthrie, *Who were the Orphics?*, *Scientia* 61, 1937, 110—120.

For a different response from Guthrie's to such critical studies of Orphism as that of Linforth's see E. R. Dodds, *The Greeks and the Irrational*, Berkeley/Los Angeles 1951, pp. 147—149 and pp. 168—171 (item 230 *infra*).

²⁾ This, he contends, is solemnly affirmed by Plato in *Epistle VII* 334 E — 335 C. See also:

212a) G. Méautis, *Mélanges Gustave Glotz*, Paris 1932, II, pp. 584—585.

212b) G. Méautis, *Le mythe de Timarque*, *Rev Ét Anciennes* 52, 1950, pp. 201—211 (especially pp. 201—204).

³⁾ See also his earlier book, *Le pur et l'impur dans la pensée des Grecs*, Paris 1952, pp. 138—140, 238—242, 344—350, 365—367; and the criticisms of Nilsson, *Gnomon* 28, 1956, 17—22 and of Guthrie, *Cl Rev N.S.* 6, 1956, 262—264, both of whom have long been committed to the opposite camp in this controversy.

in works dealing with the Platonic dialectic and the theory of ideas. The following are only those recent studies in which special emphasis is put upon this relation of Plato to Parmenides:

214. T. Ballauff, *Die Idee der Paideia: Eine Studie zu Platons 'Höhlengleichnis' und Parmenides' 'Lehrgedicht'*, Meisenheim/Glan 1952. This is an unfortunate attempt in emulation of Heidegger's style and method to connect Plato's 'Cave' with the 'ascension' and 'revelation' in Parmenides' poem.

215. H.-G. Gadamer, *Zur Vorgeschichte der Metaphysik, Anteile: Martin Heidegger zum 60. Geburtstag*, Frankfurt a.M. 1950, 51—79. Dialectic and the theory of ideas are here interpreted as Plato's positive reflex to the Parmenidean logic of Being.

216. A. Levi, *Parmenide, Platone, la scienza moderna e il problema dell'intelligibilità dell'esperienza*, *Scientia* 42, 1948, 79—82. He interprets Plato as polemizing not only against the monism of Parmenides but also from the *Phaedo* to the *Philebus* and *Timaeus* against his conception of *δόξα* in respect of the existence and intelligibility of the physical world.

217. B. Liebrucks, *Platons Entwicklung zur Dialektik: Untersuchungen zum Problem des Eleatismus*, Frankfurt a. M. 1949. By interpreting the *Phaedo*, *Republic*, *Theaetetus*, *Sophist*, and *Parmenides* (which without argument he assumes to be later than the *Sophist*) he professes to show that Plato, having under the shock of Socrates' death reverted to Eleaticism (the roots of which he finds even in the *Crito*), in the *Sophist* passed beyond the Sophistic and Eleaticism to a new ontology, the 'dialectical' nature of which is finally revealed in the *Parmenides* where the earlier Eleatic position is refuted. The particular interpretations on which this thesis depends themselves depend for the most part upon misunderstanding and misapplication of the Platonic texts: cf. Reich, *Gnomon* 24, 1952, 12—16; Soreth, *Archiv Philos* 4, 1952, 403—415; J. Robinson, *Philos Rev* 62, 1953, 290—293.

218. L. Lugarini, *Il principio logico in Platone*, *Atti del XVI Cong Naz di Filos*, Bologna 1953, 1—7. On the multiplicity and intercommunion of the ideas vis à vis the logical and ontological principles of Parmenides, and Plato's revision of the latter as a completion, not a rejection of Parmenides' thought.

219. J. S. Morrison, *Parmenides and Er*, *JHS* 75, 1955, 59—68. He argues that certain portions of Parmenides' poem, especially the system of *στεφάναι*, explain elements of the Myth of Er and the model of the universe there.

220. E. Pomilio, *La fortuna di Parmenide dall' antichità ad oggi*, Maia 6, 1953, 125—147, especially 134ff. (cf. Schwabl, *Anz Altertum* 10, 1957, 218). ✓

221. A. Szabo, *Eleatica*, *Acta Antiqua* 3, 1955, 67—102 (especially pp. 98—102). He contends that the Platonic theory of the relation of knowledge to being and of the position of *δόξα* between knowledge and ignorance is only a development of Eleatic doctrine¹).

See also among the titles already listed especially C. Librizzi (29 *supra*), pp. 40—80, where it is maintained that Plato was deeply influenced by Parmenides both directly and indirectly through Eleatic influence upon Socrates.

u) Pindar

222. É. des Places, *Pindare et Platon*, Paris 1949. The first section of this book is devoted to Pindar, the second (pp. 79—185) to Plato. There is a chapter on Plato's express citations of Pindar (pp. 169—179); but the author's main purpose is not to prove that Plato's philosophy owes much to Pindar but that there was a strong affinity of attitude, temperament, and genius between the two writers.

223. H. Fränkel, *Dichtung und Philosophie des frühen Griechentums*, New York 1951, pp. 618—622. He goes so far as to see in Pindar an anticipation of 'Platons Ideendenken'.

v) Protagoras

224. A. Capizzi, *Protagora: Le testimonianze e i frammenti*, Firenze 1955, pp. 25—69: Platone. An examination of the Platonic passages that have to do with Protagoras and a separation of those that Capizzi thinks really 'testimonies' to Protagoras' writings from those that are merely 'stylistic imitations' or that have no worth as evidence. The earlier literature on the subject is here critically examined.

225. G. B. Kerferd, *Plato's account of the relativism of Protagoras*, *Durham Univ Journ N.S.* 11, 1949/50, 20—26. Capizzi seems to have missed this publication.

¹) Cf. also Szabo, *Acta Antiqua* 1, 1952, 399—404 and 2, 1953, 50—54: the Platonic dialectic is only a further development of Eleatic dialectic; and Plato consciously revised Parmenides' ontology, thereby making it the starting-point of the doctrine of the logical proposition.

226. K. von Fritz, *Protagoras*, R.-E. I 23, 1957, 908—921.

See also the items 149—153 *supra* in the section on the Sophists in general and the sections *infra* on the dialogues *Protagoras* and *Theaetetus*.

w) Pythagoreans

The question of Plato's relation to the Pythagoreans in so far as it concerns his religious conceptions and his theory of the soul is frequently involved in the question of his relation to the Orphics, for which see the items 207—213 *supra* and the work mentioned in note 1 on p. 46:

227. H. W. Thomas, *ΕΠΙΕΚΕΙΝΑ*: Untersuchungen über das Überlieferungsgut in den Jenseitsmythen Platons, Würzburg 1938 (Diss. München). Thomas in the course of emphasizing extensive Pythagorean influence argues against the existence of Orphic influence¹).

Metempsychosis, anamnesis, the tripartition of the soul with the related notion of the three types of life, all have been ascribed to Pythagorean influence; and so have many of Plato's mathematical, astronomical, and musical theories, his conception of the universe, the theory of ideas, and even his political views. In special works on any of these subjects, the question of Pythagoreanism is likely to be raised; and it is a special favorite with most authors who deal with the *Timaeus*. It is treated as a matter of importance in many of the works that discuss the theory of idea-numbers (items 107—124 *supra*) and in the following publications also that have already been listed: Ahlvers (178); Koller (168), p. 84 and p. 221, n. 48; Kranz (174); Morrison (105); Popper (175). Other works published in this decade in which it is a matter of primary concern are:

¹) See also the following works published before 1950:

227a) A. Cameron, The Pythagorean background of the theory of recollection, *Menasha* (Wisconsin) 1938 (cf. Cherniss, *AJPh* 61, 1940, 359—365).

227b) H. S. Long, A study of the doctrine of Metempsychosis in Greece from Pythagoras to Plato, Princeton 1948 (cf. Kraus, *Anz Altertum* 10, 1957, 230—231).

227c) H. S. Long, Plato's doctrine of Metempsychosis and its source, *CI Weekly* 41, 1947/48, 149—155.

228. P. Boyancé, *La religion astrale de Platon à Cicéron*, *Rev Ét Grecques* 65, 1952, 312—350¹).

229. G. de Santillana and W. Pitts, *Philolaus in Limbo or what happened to the Pythagoreans*, *Isis* 42, 1951, 112—120. This is an attack upon Erich Frank's thesis in which the authors insist upon the authenticity of the Philolaic fragments and maintain that Plato in writing the *Timaeus* did make use of a book of Philolaus. See the objections of L. Edelstein and the rejoinder of the authors in *Isis* 43, 1952, 119—123.

230. E. R. Dodds, *The Greeks and the irrational*, Berkeley/Los Angeles, 1951: pp. 207—235: Plato, the Irrational Soul, and the Inherited Conglomerate, see especially pp. 209 ff. on the Pythagoreans as the decisive influence upon Plato's 'transcendental psychology'.

231. H. Dörrie, *Ammonios, der Lehrer Plotins*, *Hermes* 83, 1955, 439—478. This article (see especially pp. 444—447 and pp. 464—465) is important for pre-Platonic Pythagoreanism in Plato and the concern of the early Academy with Pythagoreanism as well as for the influence of Platonism on Neo-Pythagoreanism and the reflex of the latter on the interpretation of Plato; cf. also H. Dörrie, *Philos Rundschau* 3, 1955, 14—25.

232. R. Joly, *Le thème philosophique des genres de vie dans l'antiquité classique*, Bruxelles 1956, especially pp. 69—104 and p. 188 on the relation of 'three lives' and 'tripartition' of the soul in Plato to Pythagorean influence (cf. Spoerri, *Gnomon* 30, 1958, 186—192).

233. A. Maddalena, *I Pitagorici*, Bari 1954, pp. 317—364: *Pitagorismo, Orfismo, Platonismo*. He distinguishes between Orphism and Pythagoreanism and traces the later confusion of the two with each other and of both with Platonism, arguing that Plato's thought is neither Orphic nor Pythagorean.

234. A. Olerud, *L'idée de macrocosmos et de microcosmos dans le Timée de Platon*, Uppsala 1951. It is the thesis of this 'Étude de mythologie comparée' to establish the pervasive influence on Plato of Pythagoreanism and through it as intermediary of Orphic and

¹) See also his earlier book, *Le culte des Muses . . .* (208a *supra*) and his articles:

228a) P. Boyancé, *La doctrine d'Euthyphron dans le Cratyle*, *Rev Ét Grecques* 54, 1941, 141—175. He argues that Socrates presents a system of Euthyphro's and that this was a Pythagorean doctrine.

228b) P. Boyancé, *Les Muses et l'harmonie des sphères*, *Mélanges . . . Félix Grat I*, Paris 1946, 3—16.

Oriental doctrines. For Olerud Xenophanes, Parmenides, and Empedocles are essentially Pythagoreans.

235. B. L. van der Waerden, *Die Astronomie der Pythagoreer*, *Nederland Akad Wet, Afd Natuurkunde, Verhandel* 1. Reeks 20 No 1, Amsterdam 1951, especially pp. 15—29, 37—49, and 57 on Plato, whose cosmological system he believes included epicycles and was in all essentials Pythagorean¹).

x) Thucydides

It has in recent years been reasserted that Plato, though he never mentions Thucydides, must have been acquainted with him and his work and must have been deeply influenced by him:

236. Wilh. Schmid, *Geschichte der griechischen Literatur von W. Schmid und O. Stählin*, 1. Teil, 5. Band, 1948, p. 126²).

237. K. Nawratil, *Anz Altertum* 6, 1953, 128.

238. F. M. Wassermann, *Cl Weekly* 50, 1956/57, 99.

It has been as vigorously denied, however, that Plato knew the work of Thucydides at all:

239. Jacqueline de Romilly, *Thucydide et l'Imperialisme Athénien*, Paris 1947, pp. 301—304.

In reaching her conclusion this scholar gives full weight to the internal kinship between the political analyses of Thucydides and Plato. Thucydides and Plato have been treated side by side in another work which interprets them as complementary portrayers

¹) See also:

235a) B. L. van der Waerden, *Das große Jahr und die ewige Wiederkehr*, *Hermes* 80, 1952, 129—155, especially 129—132.

235b) B. L. van der Waerden, *Das große Jahr des Orpheus*, *Hermes* 81, 1953, 481—483.

On the Pythagorean 'harmony of the spheres' in Plato see also the earlier article:

235c) G. Junge, *Die Sphären-Harmonie und die pythagoreisch-platonische Zahlenlehre*, *Class et Med* 9, 1947, 183—194.

²) In the same year the question was discussed in detail from the point of view of Plato's critique of Pericles:

236a) E. Bayer, *Thukydides und Perikles*, *Würzburger Jahrb* 3, 1948, 1—57, see especially 30—36 and 56. Bayer gives no explicit answer to the question, however.

and critics of the political life and morality of the fifth century without considering the question of any possible influence of one upon the other:

240. D. Grene, *Man in his pride: A study in the political philosophy of Thucydides and Plato*, Chicago 1950 (cf. Gomme, *Cl Rev* N.S. 2, 1952, 73—75)¹).

y) Oriental Influence

Some of those who maintain that Plato was influenced by Oriental thought suppose that this influence was mediated to him by way of Orphism, Pythagoreanism, or some combination of the two, e. g. Olerud (234 *supra*). Others contend that he had become more directly acquainted with Oriental speculations in his own travels or from the reports of Eudoxus or of Oriental visitors to the Academy and profess to find the profound influence of this knowledge in the religious, cosmological, and astronomical doctrines of the *Timaeus*, the *Laus*, and the *Epinomis*, in the speech of Aristophanes in the *Symposium*, and generally in the myths but especially in those of *Republic X*, of the *Phaedrus*, and of the *Politicus*. In a single year not long before 1950 there were published two books in which the authors examined in detail the evidence and earlier literature bearing on the question but drew quite different conclusions:

241. J. Bidez, *Eos ou Platon et l'Orient*, Bruxelles 1945²). Though with somewhat more moderation than earlier enthusiasts Bidez argues in favor of Oriental influence upon Plato and of the important rôle played by Eudoxus in this relation.

242. Julia Kerschensteiner *Platon und der Orient*, Stuttgart 1945. She came to the conclusion contrary to that of Bidez, of whose preliminary publications on the subject she took account, that there had been no direct Oriental influence upon Plato at all.

¹) Even the comparison of Thucydides and Plato in essentials is here only implicit at best. One may contrast the brief statement of O. Regenbogen in his *Thukydides: Politische Reden*, Leipzig 1949, p. 72, where, dismissing the question of Plato's acquaintance with Thucydides, he asserts: 'der letzte Sinn des Thukydideischen Werkes heißt Platon'.

²) The material in this book had been presented by Bidez in his Gifford Lectures in 1939. Much of it had already been published in *Bull Lettres Acad Belgique* 5 Sér 19, 1933, 195—218 and 273—319; 20, 1934, 101—126; 21, 1935, 257—277; see also *ibid.* 24, 1938, 512—516 (*Platon et l'Orient*) and *Univ Libre de Bruxelles, Annuaire de l'Institut de Philologie et d'Histoire Orientales* 3, 1935, 41—89 (*Les écoles chaldéennes sous Alexandre et les Séleucides*), especially 57—60.

These two books were reviewed together by R. Solmi, *Parola Pass* 5, 1950, 83—90, who despite disagreement with some particular interpretations declared the validity of Miss Kerschensteiner's conclusion to have been established. A similar verdict was reached in important separate reviews of Miss Kerschensteiner's work by V. Stegemann in *Zeitschr philos Forsch* 2, 1947, 429—434, by Festugière in *Rev Philol 3 Sér* 24, 1950, 107—109, and by Reich, *Gnomon* 22, 1950, 65—70, although the last of these especially criticized sharply some of her interpretations of Platonic texts. Bidez's book is the subject of a separate critique by Boyancé in *Rev Ét Anciennes* 49, 1947, 187—192 (see also Boyancé's later article 228 *supra*) and inspired Festugière to publish an important article on the subject:

243. A. J. Festugière, *Platon et l'Orient*, *Rev Philol 3 Sér* 21, 1947, 5—45. He here admits that Plato knew Iranian dualism and even borrowed some external traits of it in the *Politicus* but that it played no real rôle in his philosophical thought¹). Of publications between this time and 1950 the following should be mentioned:

244. Simone Pétrement, *Le dualisme chez Platon, les Gnostiques et les Manichéens*, Paris 1947. The first part of this book, pp. 11—125, is devoted to Plato, to whom the authoress ascribes a 'transcendental dualism'²) different both from Pythagoreanism and from the naïve mazdaism, which, if he knew it at all, he rejected and which could have influenced at most the form or expression of his own doctrine (pp. 120—125).

245. L. Troje, *Zum Begriff ἀτακτος κίνησις bei Platon und Mani*, *Mus Helvet* 5, 1948, 96—115. Combining the precosmical chaos of the *Timaeus* with the myth of the *Politicus* Troje contends that Plato

¹) See also his later book, *La Révélation d'Hermès Trismégiste II: Le Dieu Cosmique*, Paris 1949, p. 127, n. 2, and his earlier article:

243a) A. J. Festugière, *Grecs et sages orientaux*, *Rev Hist Religions* 130, 1945, 19—41.

In that year also Dodds before he had seen the books of Bidez and Kerschensteiner came to the conclusion that Oriental influence upon Plato was 'not proven':

243b) E. R. Dodds, *Plato and the Irrational*, *J. H. S.* 65, 1945, 16—25, especially 24—25. See his later book, *The Greeks and the Irrational* (230 *supra*), p. 228, n. 33.

²) See also her introductory volume:

244a) Simone Pétrement, *Le dualisme dans l'histoire de la philosophie et des religions*, Paris 1946.

borrowed and transformed an Oriental tradition of orderly and disorderly motions connected with a 'jeweilige Urmenschepiphanie' and that Mani preserved this tradition in its original form.

246. J. Filliozat, *La doctrine classique de la médecine indienne*, Paris 1949 (cf. Müller, *Centaurus* 2, 1951, 90—91). He tries to establish parallels between Hindu classical medicine and conceptions in the *Timaeus* and argues that Plato may have been acquainted with Hindu medical theories (pp. 191—198 and pp. 208—211).

247. H. van den Steinen, The symbolism of the Initial Hint in Plato's Dialogues, *Bull Fac Arts Cairo*, Fouad I Univ, 11, 2, 1949, 29—62. He holds that Plato's symbols were inspired by Egyptian transcendentalism. See also his article, *Plato in Egypt*, *ibid.* 13, 1, 1951, 107—127.

During the present decade the question has continued to be a subject of lively interest which is too often unaccompanied by critical acumen:

248. L. Alfonsi, *Talete e l'Egizio*, *Riv Filolog Cl N.S.* 28, 1950, 204—222. He contends that Eudoxus introduced into the Academy from Egypt much of what was the basis of his astronomy and Plato's.

249. Alda Barbieri, *Infussi orientali sul pensiero di Platone e dell' antica Accademia*, *Sophia* 19, 1951, 63—70. This is a derivative and uncritical presentation of the thesis that Plato and his associates absorbed Oriental science and philosophy and fructified it with Greek spirit.

250. W. Brandenstein, *Iranische Einflüsse bei Platon*, *Miscellanea Giovanni Galbiati* 3 (*Fontes Ambrosiani* 27), Milan 1951, 83—88. It was from an Iranian guest in the Academy that Plato became acquainted with many of the cosmological doctrines that appear in the *Timaeus* and the *Critias*.

251. G. P. Carratelli, *Europa ed Asia nella storia del mondo antico*, *Parola Pass* 10, 1955, 5—19. He considers it indisputable that Plato and the Academy were influenced by Iranian eschatology and astronomy and Zoroastrian religion through the agency of Eudoxus and of Magi in the Academy.

252. J. Duchesne-Guillemin, *The Western Response to Zoroaster*, Oxford 1958, especially pp. 70—85. His review of earlier literature and rejection of the theories of Iranian influence on Plato

are the more important since they are based upon professional knowledge of the Iranian sources¹).

253. R. Godel, *Platon à Héliopolis d'Égypte*, Paris 1956 (cf. van de Walle, *Rev Belge Philol* 35, 1957, 153—154). This is a fanciful account of the profound influence on Plato's philosophy of his residence in Egypt which Godel supposes lasted three years²). In two earlier monographs Godel had similarly 'reconstructed' Hindu influence:

254. R. Godel, *Socrate et le sage indien*, Paris 1953 (cf. Dienelt, *Gymnasium* 63, 1956, 144—146).

255. R. Godel, *Socrate et Diotime*, Paris 1955.

256. W. J. W. Koster, *Le Mythe de Platon, de Zarathoustra et des Chaldéens* (Mnemosyne Supp 3), Leiden 1951. In this monograph the author, who had not yet seen the work of Miss Kerschensteiner, examines minutely the evidence adduced in favor of Oriental influence and concludes that if there was any such influence on Plato at all it was only in the sense that Greek civilization as a whole had undergone some such influence from the earliest times.

257. A. Laumonier, *Yoga hellénique*, Ann Fac Lettres Toulouse 2, Juin 1952, 17—37. He asserts that Socrates and Plato conducted esoteric schools in which was practised a cathartic yoga derived through Orphic-Pythagorean tradition from Crete and Thrace and nurtured by direct Oriental influences, especially Iranian and Chaldean.

258. J. Pirenne, *Religion égyptienne et philosophie grecque*, Journ Jur Pap 4, 1950, 63—76. He magnifies the influence of Egyptian thought on pre-Platonic philosophy and argues that Plato, having been initiated into the Egyptian mysteries, simply took over and

¹) See also his earlier book:

252a) J. Duchesne-Guillemin, *Ormazd et Ahriman: L'aventure dualiste dans l'antiquité*, Paris 1953, 56—57 and 97—103 (cf. Nilsson, *Ant Cl* 22, 1953, 533—534).

²) With this compare Pirenne (258 *infra*) and contrast Svoboda (260 *infra*). In contrast to Godel's construction see also an earlier monograph which stresses the differences between Plato's philosophy and Egyptian thought:

253a) A. M. Frenkian, *L'Orient et les origines de l'idéalisme subjectif dans la pensée européenne*, Paris 1946 (cf. Gilbert, *Chronique d'Égypte* 23, 1948, 92—94).

For supposed indirect Egyptian influence on Plato's theory of immortality see Grégoire, items 187 and 187a *supra*.

transposed into a Greek setting the Heliopolitan theology and the humanistic ethics and solar religion of Egypt. With this compare H. van den Steinen (247 *supra*) and R. Godel (253 *supra*) and contrast A. M. Frenkian (253a *supra*) and K. Svoboda (260 *infra*).

259. W. Spoerri, *Encore Platon et l'Orient*, *Rev Philol* 3 Sér 31, 1957, 209—233. Primarily against Jaeger but with full consideration of later literature also he argues that Plato was not influenced by Iranian theology and that his doctrine was not connected with Zoroastrianism by the members of the early Academy¹).

260. K. Svoboda, *Platon et l'Égypte*, *Archiv Orient* 20, 1952, 28—38. He concludes that Plato did visit Egypt at some time between 398 and 395 but that, while he was impressed by Egyptian stability, Egyptian thought had no significant influence upon him. Cf. F. Zucker in: *Aus Antike und Orient*, *Festschrift Wilhelm Schubart*, Leipzig 1950, pp. 157—159.

For the notion that Plato under Oriental influence espoused the doctrine of a 'great year' and 'endless recurrence' see also van der Waerden, items 235 a and 235 b *supra*, and:

261. M. Eliade, *The myth of the eternal return* (Bollingen Series 46), New York 1954, especially pp. 120—123 and p. 132²).

262. B. Sticker, *Weltzeitalter und astronomische Perioden*, *Saeculum* 4, 1953, 241—249.

¹) On the latter point and the tradition of Oriental influence generally see also his articles:

259a) W. Spoerri, *A propos d'un texte d'Hippolyte*, *Rev Ét Anciennes* 57, 1955, 267—290.

259b) W. Spoerri, *Quelques remarques au sujet d'un fragment d'Aristoxène*, *Festschrift Bruno Snell*, München 1956, 251—257.

²) This is an English translation 'revised and enlarged' of the book entitled *Le Mythe de l'éternel retour: Archétypes et répétition*, Paris 1949. A German translation, *Der Mythos der ewigen Wiederkehr*, was published in 1953.

III. The Platonic Corpus

III A. Transmission of the Text and Indirect Tradition

Early in the decade preceding 1950 the generally accepted opinion that there had existed an Academic tetralogic edition of the corpus and that the recovery of the readings of this ultimate archetype is the goal of Platonic textual criticism was attacked by Jachmann, who contended that the Alexandrian editors had no better authority for their readings than heavily interpolated recensions which had been made for the book-trade and that the restoration of Plato's text must depend upon critical 'divination':

263. G. Jachmann, *Der Platontext*, *Nachricht Gött*, phil-hist Kl 1941 Nr 11 (Fachgr 1 N.F. 4 Nr 7), 1942, 225—389.

This thesis and programme were promptly counter-attacked by Bickel:

264. E. Bickel, *Das platonische Schriftenkorpus der 9 Tetralogien und die Interpolation im Platontext*, *Rhein Mus N. F.* 92, 1944, 94—96.

265. E. Bickel, *Geschichte und Recensio des Platontextes*, *Rhein Mus N. F.* 92, 1944, 97—159.

The present state of the controversy is well summed up and adjudged by Lesky (item 27 *supra*), p. 506, who refers to H. Langerbeck's well weighed critique of Jachmann's monograph in *Gnomon* 22, 1950, 375—380¹⁾ and to Pohlenz's treatment of the subject:

¹⁾ Cf. also de Strycker, *Ant Cl* 13, 1944, 145—147. Langerbeck gives due attention, as Jachmann did not, to the important section devoted to the subject by Pasquali in the first edition of his book:

265a) G. Pasquali, *Storia della tradizione e critica del testo*, Firenze 1934. This section is reprinted, 247—269, without change in the second edition, Firenze 1952, which contains a new preface (see p. XXII for reference to Jachmann) and three new appendices.

Jachmann's thesis has encouraged some critics to purge the text of interpolations which they 'divine', so for example P. von der Mühl, *Mus Helvet* 9, 1952, 58—59, and G. Giangrande, *Rend Accad Lincei, Cl Scienze Mor* 8 Ser 5, 1950, 333—338; *Parola Pass* 6, 1951, 439—448 and 9, 1954, 296—300. Cf. on the other side Verdenius, *Mnem* IV 8, 1955, 267 on 229 A 4 and 229 B 5.

266. M. Pohlenz, Aristophanes' Ritter, *Nachricht Gött*, phil-hist Kl 1952 Nr 5, pp. 98—102 on Platonic MS tradition.

During this decade there have been published also the following studies of special problems in the history of the Platonic text:

267. J. Andrieu, *Le dialogue antique: Structure et présentation*, Paris 1954. This study of the problem of ancient dialogue generally, both dramatic and philosophical, has sections devoted to the mechanical aspect of the presentation in the Platonic corpus (pp. 284—297) and (pp. 304—308, 316—319, 323—324) to the special stylistic techniques of Plato's dialogic form (cf. Goldschmidt, *Rev Philosophique* 146, 1956, 152—155).

268. É. des Places, *Les 'Lois' de Platon et la 'Préparation Évangélique' d'Eusèbe de Césarée*, *Aegyptus* 22, 1952, 223—231.

269. É. des Places, *Un pseudo-témoin des Lois de Platon*, *Rev Philol* 29, 1955, 45—46. The MS of Ravenna referred to by Martin and Bernicoli as containing a book of the *Laws* (Rav 380—381, olim 39, 6 G et H) contains no Plato at all.

270. É. des Places, *Le Platon de Théodore: les citations des Lois et de l'Epinomis*, *Rev Ét Grecques* 68, 1955, 171—184.

271. É. des Places, *Le Platon de Théodore: les citations du Phédon, de la République et du Timée*, *Studi in Onore di A. Calderini e R. Paribeni* I, 1956, 325—336.

272. É. des Places, *Deux témoins du texte des Lois de Platon: Eusèbe . . . Aréthas . . .*, *Wiener Studien* 70, 1957, 254—259¹).

273. A. Diller, *The scholia on Strabo*, *Traditio* 10, 1954, 29—50. This includes a discussion of the Platonic scholia of the Paris group and argues that this group of codices including the lost archetype Σ of the scholia on Strabo was 'virtually the work of Photius'.

274. E. R. Dodds, *Notes on some MSS of Plato*, *JHS* 77 Part 1, 1957, 24—30. Based upon collations made for an edition of the *Gorgias*, this is a study of Vindobonensis F and 'a Byzantine recension of the T text' and concludes that Florent. x is derived from F after it was corrected by f, that F is directly descended from an uncial papyrus codex of the third century A. D., a 'cheap commercial

¹) See also the earlier articles:

272a) É. des Places, *La tradition indirecte des Lois de Platon* (Livres I—VI), *Mélanges J. Saunier*, Lyon 1944, 27—40.

272b) É. des Places, *Le texte des Lois de Platon*, *Rev Philol* 20, 1946, 22—28.

text', and that M and Flor derive from Paris. 1808 and through it from T.

275. R. G. Hoerber, *Thrasylus' Platonic Canon and the double titles*, *Phronesis* 2, 1957, 10—20. He argues that the second titles of the dialogues originated in the 4th century B. C. possibly with Plato himself¹), that the philosophical distribution of the dialogues is older than Thrasylus, and that only the division into tetralogies is the work of Thrasylus.

For the study of the history of the text and its transmission the following recent works are also important:

276. R. Poncelet, *Cicéron traducteur de Platon*, Paris 1957²).

277. (Alcibiades I) Proclus *Diadochus: Commentary on the First Alcibiades of Plato*, Critical Text and Indices by L. G. Westerink, Amsterdam 1954 (cf. Dodds, *Gnomon* 27, 1955, 164—167).

278. (Alcibiades I) Olympiodorus: *Commentary on the First Alcibiades of Plato*, Critical Text and Indices by L. G. Westerink, Amsterdam 1956 (cf. Dodds, *Gnomon* 29, 1957, 356—359).

279. (Laws) Alfarabius: *Compendium Legum Platonis edidit et latine vertit F. Gabrieli (Plato Arabus III)*, London 1952 (cf. Langerbeck, *Gnomon* 27, 1955, 106—107)³).

¹) This is on the basis of *Epistile* XIII (363 A), which he takes to be genuine.

²) See also his earlier articles:

276a) R. Poncelet, *Cicéron traducteur de Platon*, *Rev Ét Lat* 25, 1947, 178—196.

276b) R. Poncelet, *Cicéron et Chalcidius traducteurs du Phèdre* 245 C, *Rev Ét Lat* 28, 1950, 145—167.

For discussion of Cicero's testimony to the text and interpretation of Plato and a résumé of earlier work on this subject see also:

276c) P. Boyancé, *Le Platonisme à Rome: Platon et Cicéron*, Assoc G. Budé, Congrès de Tours et Poitiers 1953 Actes, Paris 1954, 195—222, especially 202—206.

There are also a later sketch of the subject by Gigon and a somewhat earlier but more important study of the ancient commentaries on Plato's works and introductions to them by Plezia:

276d) O. Gigon, *Die Erneuerung der Philosophie in der Zeit Ciceros*, *Entretiens sur l'antiquité classique* III, Vandoeuvres-Genève 1955 (published 1957), 23—61, especially 45—47.

276e) M. Plezia, *De commentariis isagogicis* (*Archiwum Filologiczne* Nr 23), Kraków 1949, especially 81—105.

³) See also his earlier articles:

279a) F. Gabrieli, *Uno compendio arabo delle Leggi di Platone*, *Riv Studi Class* (Torino) 24, 1949, 20—24.

279b) F. Gabrieli, *Le citazioni delle Leggi platoniche in Al-Biruni*, *Parola Pass* 2, 1947, 309—313.

280. (Parmenides) *Parmenides usque ad finem primae hypothesis nec non Procli Commentarium in Parmenidem pars ultima adhuc inedita interprete Guillelmo de Moerbeka ediderunt praefatione et adnotationibus instruxerunt R. Klibansky et C. Labowsky (Plato Latinus III), London 1953 (cf. Langerbeck, Gnomon 27, 1955, 101—106; Kristeller, Journ Philos 53, 1956, 198—200; Kluxen, — Philos Rundschau 4, 1956, 217—228).*

281. (Phaedo) *Phaedo interprete Henrico Aristippo edidit et praefatione instruxit L. Minio-Paluello adiuvante H. J. Drossaart Lulofs (Plato Latinus II), London 1950 (cf. de Strycker, Ant Cl 20, 1951, 468—471; Jaeger, Speculum 29, 1954, 155—159)¹.*

282. (Republic) *Averroes' Commentary on Plato's Republic edited with an Introduction, Translation and Notes by E. I. J. Rosenthal, Cambridge 1956.*

283. (Timaeus) *Galenus Compendium Timaei Platonis aliorumque dialogorum synopsis quae extant fragmenta ediderunt P. Kraus et R. Walzer (Plato Arabus I), London 1951².*

A list of the Platonic papyri is given by Pack:

284. R. A. Pack, *The Greek and Latin literary texts from Greco-Roman Egypt*, Ann Arbor 1952, pp. 50—51.

¹ See also the earlier article:

281a) H. Klos and L. Minio-Paluello, *The Text of the Phaedo in W and in Henricus Aristippus' Translation*, Cl Quart 43, 1949, 126—129 (cf. Lorimer, *ibid.* 44, 1950, 106).

² Besides the important reviews of this volume by Levi della Vida, *Oriens* 5, 1952, 109—112 and by Langerbeck, *Gnomon* 25, 1953, 263—266 see Festugière's study:

283a) A. J. Festugière, *Le Compendium Timaei de Galien*, *Rev Ét Grecques* 65, 1952, 97—118 (116—118 contain a note by R. M. Tonneau on the Arabic text).

In this connection it may be well to remind the reader of a much earlier publication:

283b) *Galenus in Platonis Timaeum Commentarii Fragmenta collegit disposuit explicavit H. O. Schröder, appendicem Arabicam addidit P. Kahle (CMG Suppl 1), Leipzig/Berlin 1934.* On the 'misleading title' of this work see R. Klibansky, *The continuity of the Platonic tradition*, London 1939, p. 41.

The *Corpus Platonicum Medii Aevi* (Plato Arabus and Plato Latinus), to which the above book of Klibansky's is an introductory outline, was described by P. Wilpert in *Zeitschr philos Forsch* 7, 1953, 585—591. For later reports of progress see *Proc British Acad* 39, 1953, 10—11; 40, 1954, 9—10; 41, 1955, 11—12; 42, 1956, 13—14; 43, 1957, 11—12.

III B. Authenticity and Chronology

In recent years serious debate on the question of authenticity has been largely confined to the following writings: *Alcibiades I*, *Epinomis*, *Epistles*, *Hippias Major*, *Ion*, *Menexenus*, *Theages*; and under each of these titles *infra* the publications relevant to this question will be listed¹). There has been one eccentric attack, however, upon the authenticity of the whole corpus:

285. J. Zürcher, *Das Corpus Academicum in neuer Auffassung dargestellt*, Paderborn 1954. He contends that the entire corpus is the work of Polemon, who in writing—or rewriting—it often used material left by older Academics, Plato included, but even then gave that material a contemporary twist. So, to give a few specific examples of the application of this weird thesis: the *Apology* is basically a work of Aristotle's which Polemon had obtained from Xenocrates; the *Parmenides* was written against Zeno the Stoic, the *Philebus* against Epicurus, the *Theaetetus* against both Epicurus and the Stoa; "Theaetetus" is a pseudonym for Euclid, "Diotima" for Leontion, the female friend of Epicurus, "Damon" for Aristoxenus; and so on through the whole corpus²).

In an article published in 1945 Simeterre gave a résumé of the work that up to that time had been done on the relative chronology of Plato's writings:

286. R. Simeterre, *La chronologie des œuvres de Platon*, *Rev Ét Grecques* 58, 1945, 146—162³).

¹) The questions of authenticity and chronology are also treated, of course, in many of the comprehensive expositions listed above (I *supra*), among which see especially Geffcken (2); Robin (7); Shorey (8); Stefanini (9); Hoffmann (22), pp. 126—148; Leisegang (26). See also Field (74 *supra*), pp. 49—76, and the chapter of Friedländer's (I *supra*), II, pp. 682—690, 'Rechenschaft über die Anordnung', the revised version of which has not yet appeared in the new editions (IIa and IIb).

²) Zürcher, who tried to prove that the Aristotelian corpus is in similar fashion and degree the work of Theophrastus (Aristoteles' *Werk und Geist*, Paderborn 1952), had already argued that the *Timaeus* and *Philebus* in their extant state have been largely reworked by Speusippus and Xenocrates:

285a) J. Zürcher, 'Über die Abfassungszeit des "Timaios" und "Philebos"', *Philos Jahrbuch* 61, 1951, 481—498. His interpretations and inferences here and in the later book (285 *supra*) are often incompatible and are generally similar only in being equally misguided and fantastic.

³) This article was republished three years later without substantial change as chapter II of the book:

286a) R. Simeterre, *Introduction à l'étude de Platon*, Paris 1948. The first chapter contains a few pages (11—14) on the question of authen-

Since this article was published there have appeared the following studies addressed to this subject in its entirety or concerned primarily with some significant part of it:

287. Yvonne Vanachter, *Un aspect du style de Platon: Essai d'une interprétation chronologique et psychologique*, *Ant Cl* 15, 1946, 83—95. A study of the varying proportions of substantives, adjectives, verbs, adverbs, and conjunctions employed in the *Charmides*, *Philebus*, and *Laws* from which the author believes that the results of stylometry are confirmed and that certain conclusions concerning the psychological and stylistic development of Plato are justified. The significance of the statistics as they are presented is dubious.

288. A. J. Festugière, *Sur un passage difficile du Protagoras*, *Bull Corr Hell* 70, 1946 (published 1947), 179—186. Interpreting Protagoras 349E—350C and the purpose which it serves in the dialogue, he argues against Friedländer that the *Laches* is probably earlier than the *Protagoras*.

289. M. Wundt, *Die Zeitfolge der platonischen Gespräche*, *Zeitschr philos Forsch* 4, 1949, 29—56. He argues that the *Charmides*, *Laches*, *Lysis*, *Hippias*, *Ion*, *Protagoras*, *Euthydemus*, and *Cratylus* were written in this order and all before the death of Socrates. For the rest his conclusion differ from those of C. Ritter¹⁾ chiefly in

ticity, and the subsequent chapters give analyses of the 'early dialogues': *Hippias Minor*, *Charmides*, *Laches*, *Protagoras*, *Apology*, *Crito*, *Gorgias*, and a note on the *Euthyphro* (cf. Moreau, *Rev Philosophique* 141, 1951, 415—416). Some additional critical material on the relative chronology is to be found in note 1 on p. 45; but even so Simeterre seems to have overlooked a number of publications which are earlier than his article and bear upon the question of chronology, e. g. the article by J. Bidez and G. Leboucq in *Rev Ét Grecques* 57, 1944, 7—40 (especially p. 17) and C. Ritter in his review of Shorey, *Phil Woch* 55, 1935, 1028—1035. To some of these which were published between 1930 and 1945 references will be given *infra*. On the book by P. Brommer, *EIAOE et IAEA*, Assen 1940, which Simeterre lists without comment, see Cherniss, *AJPh* 68, 1947, 126—133.

¹⁾ As given in: *Die Kerngedanken der platonischen Philosophie*, München 1931, p. 7, his final summary of the subject save for the article:

289a) C. Ritter, *Unterabteilungen innerhalb der zeitlich ersten Gruppe platonischer Schriften*, *Hermes* 70, 1935, 1—30. Here Ritter concluded that before the *Apology* Plato had written in the following order the *Hippias Minor*, *Charmides*, *Laches*, *Protagoras*, and *Euthyphro*. See Simeterre (286a *supra*), p. 39 and p. 45, n. 1; Simeterre does not mention:

289b) H. Schmalenbach, *Macht und Recht: Platons Absage an die Politik (zugleich zur Entstehungsgeschichte der Apologie und des Kriton)*, *Natur und Geist: Fritz Medicus zum 70. Geburtstag*, Erlenbach-Zürich

that he omits the *Menexenus*, includes *Alcibiades I*, which he places just before the *Republic* and after the *Symposium*, itself taken to be later than the *Phaedo*, and assumes an original *Phaedrus* written in 387—385 just before the *Symposium* and recast into its present form after the *Sophist* and before the *Politicus*.

290. O. Regenbogen, *Bemerkungen zur Deutung des platonischen Phaidros*, *Miscellanea Academica Berolinensia* 2/1, 1950, 198—219. By analysis of the content and method of the *Phaedrus* and comparison of them with those of the dialogues assigned through stylistic research to the middle and to the latest groups Regenbogen argues a close affinity between the *Phaedrus* and the *Philebus* and concludes that as complementary works they were both written after the *Sophist* and *Politicus* and before the *Timaeus* and the *Laws*.

This conclusion is appealed to by F. Scheidweiler (*Hermes* 83, 1955, 122) to support the chronological possibility of his emendation of *Phaedrus* 274 D where he sees a reference to the king who ruled in Egypt in 362/61. Without referring to Regenbogen's article both D. J. Allan and G. J. de Vries argued independently in 1953 that the dialogue must be dated later than it was by Hackforth, who, also apparently unaware of Regenbogen's article concluded (*Plato's Phaedrus*, Cambridge 1952, pp. 3—7) that it belongs with the dialogues composed after the *Republic* but before the *Sophist* and was written in 370 or thereabouts. Allen, reviewing Hackforth (*Philosophy* 28, 1953, 365) argues in part like Regenbogen that the *Phaedrus* presupposes the *Sophist*, an argument which is without cogency as used by either scholar. De Vries (203 *supra*) infers from the reaction of Isocrates in the *Antidosis* that the *Phaedrus* could

1946, 183—209. He attempts a motivated chronology of Plato's early writings: a group from *Ion* to *Protagoras* written before Socrates' death; then *Laches*, *Charmides*, *Lysis* in that order; several years after Socrates' death the *Euthyphro* followed by *Apology*, *Thrasymachus*, and *Gorgias*; then the Sicilian journey and after Plato's return to Athens the *Menexenus*, *Meno* und *Crito*, his final rebuff to the attempts of his aristocratic friends to involve him in active politics.

K. von Fritz and E. Kapp in their book, *Aristotle's Constitution of Athens and Related Texts*, New York 1950, 218—219, state flatly that only the *Apology*, *Crito*, and *Gorgias* can be ascribed with practical certainty to the time before 387 B. C. Yet whether any of the dialogues antedate the death of Socrates and whether the *Apology* itself was written soon after that event or not are both questions to which contrary answers are still given with equal assurance: see e. g. on the one hand G. Galli (19 *supra*), pp. 89—90 and Gauß (20 *supra*) I/2, pp. 9—19 and on the other Friedländer (11 *a supra*) II, p. 302, n. 4. Still more recently Flashar (173 *supra*), pp. 100—105 has maintained that Plato wrote no dialogue before 394 B. C., the terminus post quem of the *Ion*.

not have been written very long before 353. The *Phaedrus* of Alexis, which may owe its name to Plato's dialogue, is dated 370—360 by Webster (88 *supra*, p. 16 and 89 *supra*, pp. 55 and 239) but without solid, independent evidence.

Regenbogen, adopting Stenzel's highly questionable thesis concerning the development of Plato's conception of self-motion, holds (pp. 205—206) that the *Phaedrus* must have been written while Plato was working on the *Laws*, especially *Laws X*, and can therefore belong only to his latest period. In this connection it is amusing to observe the recent assertions that many parts of the *Laws* should be dated much earlier and that *Laws X* itself was conceived if not actually drafted in its original form before the *Republic* was composed: M. Vanhoutte, *La philosophie politique de Platon dans les 'Lois'*, Louvain 1954, p. 14, n. 1; R. Muth, *Wiener Studien* 69, 1956, 144; L. A. Post, *AJPh* 75, 1954, 95 and 202; and see the earlier statement of Friedländer (1 *supra*) II, p. 672, n. 1. G. R. Morrow (Proc and Addresses Am Philos Assoc 27, 1954, 21, n. 8) suggested that the Platonic work on 'laws' criticized by Aristotle is an earlier version and not the text that we have.

291. E. Turolla, Il posto del 'Critone' nello svolgimento del pensiero platonico e nella cronologia dei dialoghi, *Riv Rosminiana* 4, 1950, 241—255 (see Introduzione al Critone in his *Platone: I Dialoghi*, Milano/Roma 1953, III, pp. 181—196). He contends that the *Crito* is unthinkable as early as the *Republic* and that dialectically and chronologically it belongs with the *Laws* and *Epistles VII* and *VIII*.

292. J. Humbert, Remarques sur la structure de la phrase de Platon, Assoc G. Budé, Congrès de Tours et Poitiers 1953 Actes, Paris 1954, 189—192. This is a résumé of a study of the use of $\omega\varsigma$ and $\delta\tau\iota$, $\delta\pi\omega\varsigma$ and $\iota\upsilon\alpha$ in Plato's works from which the author concludes that in the course of Plato's long productivity there are indications of increasing 'malaise' in the expression of grammatical subordination.

293. G. Rudberg, Protagoras-Gorgias-Menon: eine platonische Übergangszeit, *Symbol Osl* 30, 1953, 30—41. He argues here that the *Gorgias* represents the transition from the 'historical' Socrates in the *Protagoras* to the 'Platonic' Socrates in the *Meno*. See also his article, The *Phaedrus* Period (84 *supra*), in which he contends that the *Theaetetus*, *Phaedrus*, and *Parmenides* were written in that order.

294. G. E. L. Owen, The place of the *Timaeus* in Plato's dialogues, *Cl Quart N.S.* 3, 1953, 79—95. He argues that the *Timaeus* and *Critias* were designed as 'the crowning work of the *Republic* group'

and that they antedate the *Parmenides*, *Theaetetus*, *Sophist*, *Politicus*, and *Philebus* and are earlier even than the *Cratylus* and the *Phaedrus*. See in opposition to this article: G. C. Field, *Proc Cl Assoc* 51, London 1954, 52; G. Vlastos, *Philos Rev* 63, 1954, 334, n. 20 and 335, n. 29; Dorothy Tarrant, *Cl Quart N.S.* 5, 1955, 224; H. Cherniss, *AJPh* 75, 1954, 129—130 and 78, 1957, 225—266 (300 *infra*) and *JHS* 77 Part 1, 1957, 18—23¹).

295. P. Wilpert, *Die Stellung des Timaios im platonischen Korpus*, *Actes du XIème Congrès International de Philosophie*, Vol. XII, Amsterdam/Louvain 1953, 71—76. A rather nebulous article with the suggestion that the *Timaeus* may have been written after the *Theaetetus* but before the *Sophist* and *Politicus*.

296. M. S. Ruipérez, *Sobre la cronologia del Ion de Platon*, *Aegyptus* 33, 1953, 241—246. The references in *Ion* 530 A—B indicate that the dialogue must be dated between 394 and 391²).

297. Sir David Ross, *The date of Plato's Cratylus*, *Rev Intern Philos* 9, 1955, 187—196. He concludes that the *Cratylus* was written about 388 and belongs with the *Meno*, *Phaedo*, and *Euthydemus*. He supports von Arnim for the most part and argues against the theses of Warburg, Weerts and Haag; but he does not mention that of Owen (294 *supra*). In his book, *Plato's Theory of Ideas*, Oxford 1951, pp. 10 and 229, he had given the relative chronology

¹ J. B. Skemp (*Plato's Statesman*, London 1952, 237—239) criticized Owen's arguments before their publication but became persuaded himself that the *Timaeus* had been composed 'alongside the *Sophist* and *Politicus* and perhaps a little earlier than the latter'. I. Düring's statement in *Gnomon* 27, 1955, 156, 'the *Timaeus* must be later than the *Protrepticus*, i. e. it must have been published about 350', in the next year became (*Gnomon* 28, 1956, 208) 'it is likely that the *Timaeus* was written in the 350's'; and that same year in *Eranos* 54, 1956, 109—120 (101 *supra*) Düring concluded that the *Parmenides*, *Timaeus*, *Sophist*, and *Politicus* were written in this order and all before 354, the date assigned to the *Protrepticus*, although in *Gymnasium* 63, 1956, 149 he again stated that 'the *Timaeus* is perhaps later than the *Protrepticus*'. G. Vlastos again (*Philos Rev* 66, 1957, 234—238) with a glance at Owen's thesis argued that the attitude towards politics and the phenomenal world in the *Timaeus* proves it to have been written after the *Politicus* and not long before the *Laws*, and in quite another context G. Calogero argued (*Giorn Crit Filos Ital* 3 Ser 11, 1957, 362—364) that the development of Plato's 'gnoseologico-metaphysical' reflections follows the order: *Theaetetus*, *Sophist*, *Philebus*, *Timaeus*.

² The most recent study of the question is that by Flashar (173 *supra*), where see especially pp. 96—105: „Die Abfassungszeit des *Ion*“. According to Flashar the *Ion*, written in 394 or shortly thereafter, is the earliest of Plato's writings.

of the dialogues in question as: *Lysis*, *Euthydemus*, *Meno*, First Visit to Sicily 389—388, *Cratylus* (?), *Symposium* (385 or later), *Phaedo*. V. Goldschmidt (Essai sur le 'Cratyle', Paris 1940) had also dated the *Cratylus* with the *Euthydemus* 'before the period that opens with the *Phaedo* and the *Symposium*', and in the year in which Ross's article appeared G. Fano declared it certain that the *Cratylus* was written after the *Euthydemus* and before the *Parmenides* and *Theaetetus* (Giorn Metafisica 10, 1955, 307, n. 2); but in that same year also A. Lanza (Acme 8 fasc 1, 1955, 239—248) argued anew that the *Cratylus*, which he interpreted as a 'turning-point' in Plato's development, belongs rather with the *Theaetetus*.

298. M. Soreth, Zur relativen Chronologie von *Menon* und *Euthydem*, *Hermes* 83, 1955, 377—379. Here it is argued that the *Euthydemus* must be earlier than the *Meno* on the ground that in the latter a suggestion made in the former is rejected and $\delta\rho\theta\eta\ \delta\acute{o}\xi\alpha$ is introduced as a new notion¹).

299. L. Brandwood, Analysing Plato's style with an electronic computer, *Bull Inst Class Studies Univ London* 3, 1956, 45—54. The author here outlines a programme for coördinating by machine analyses of Plato's lexicography, rhythm, and syntax in order to establish a chronology of the writings.

300. H. Cherniss, The relation of the *Timaeus* to Plato's Later Dialogues, *AJPh* 78, 1957, 225—266. This is an attempt to prove against Owen's thesis (294 *supra*) that the *Cratylus*, *Parmenides*, and *Theaetetus* all antedate the *Timaeus*, that the *Timaeus* is most probably later than the *Sophist* and *Politicus* also and certainly belongs to the latest group of dialogues, and that the philosophical doctrine of the *Timaeus* is not at variance with that expressed in any of this latest group and is not repudiated, abandoned, or in any essential point modified in any of them. See also Cherniss, *JHS* 77, Part 1, 1957, 18—23.

301. K. D. Georgoulis, 'Η ἐν τῷ Πρωταγόρᾳ τοῦ Πλάτωνος ἐρμηνεία τοῦ Σιμωνιδείου εἰς τὸν Σκόπαν ἔσματος, *Πλάτων* 9, 1957, 203—255. He contends that the *Protagoras* is not early, as is generally

¹ More recently J. S. Morrison (*Cl Quart N.S.* 8, 1958, 199 and 208—210) has on other grounds dated the *Euthydemus* ca. 390 before the *Gorgias*. Despite the attempt of G. Mathieu in 1932 (*Mélanges Gustave Glotz* II, pp. 555—564) to prove that the *Euthydemus* could not have been written before 380, H. de Strycker (*Ant Cl* 4, 1935, 239) had insisted that it was written soon after 387.

supposed, but belongs to the period of Plato's maturity and was written just before the *Republic*¹).

302. H. B. Mattingly, The date of Plato's *Symposium*, *Phronesis* 3, 1958, 31—39. Contending that Wilamowitz was right in taking 193 A as a reference to 418 B. C. rather than to 385 B. C., he argues further that this passage could have been written with topicality at any time from 393/92 B. C. onwards and that therefore the passage cannot be used to date the dialogue, as many scholars have used it²).

303. J. S. Morrison, The date of the *Phaedo*, *Cl. Quart.* N. S. 8, 1958, 212—213. In this appendix to his article, The origins of Plato's Philosopher-Statesman, he argues that the *Phaedo* belongs with the *Gorgias* in the period before Plato's visit to Magna Graecia. See, besides R. Hackforth, *Plato's Phaedo*, Cambridge 1955, pp. 3—11 against which Morrison argues, R. S. Bluck, *Plato's Phaedo*, London 1955, pp. 144—145.

III C. Editions, Commentaries, Interpretations of the Writings Themselves

a) No new edition of the whole Platonic corpus has been published within the last three decades, but with the publication in 1951 and 1956 of the volumes containing the *Laws* and the *Epinomis* the 'Budé edition', which was begun in 1920, has finally been completed.

¹ The argument of A. E. Raubitschek, *Class. et Med.* 16, 1955, 78—79 (171 *supra*) would imply that the *Protagoras* followed the publication of Polycrates' *Accusation of Socrates*, which he thinks may have been published in reply to Plato's *Apology* though composed before it.

² So among recent writers, besides R. Hackforth (*Plato's Phaedo*, Cambridge 1955, p. 7) to whom Mattingly refers, R. S. Bluck, *Plato's Phaedo*, London 1955, p. 144. Cf. e. g. also the earlier article:

302a) F. Dornseiff, *Zeitbestimmung von Platons Symposion durch Xenophon*, *Hermes* 77, 1942, 112.

On the relative dating of the *Symposia* of Plato and Xenophon with a résumé of earlier work on the subject cf. W. Wimmel, *Gymnasium* 64, 1957, 248—250 (see 931 *infra*).

It is worth noticing at least as a curiosity the somewhat earlier article in which Lönnberg, connecting the *Phaedrus* closely with *Epistle VII*, argued that the *Symposium* is still later and contains that innermost part of Plato's philosophy which had not yet been committed to writing when *Epistle VII* was composed:

302b) S. Lönnberg, The chronology of the Platonic Dialogues, *Theoria* 5, 1939, 141—160.

Specific references to the recently published volumes of this edition will be given under the relevant dialogues *infra*¹).

Since 1940 there have been published two noteworthy translations of all the Platonic writings with some exegetical notes and in one case substantial introductory essays:

304. Platon Oeuvres Complètes: Traduction nouvelle et notes par Léon Robin, 2 vols., Paris 1940—1942. The translation and annotation of the *Parmenides* and the *Timaeus* are by J. Moreau.

305. Platone, I Dialoghi, l'Apologia e le Epistole: Versione e interpretazione di Enrico Turolla, 3 vols., Milano/Roma 1953 (cf. Montuori, Giorn Crit Filos Ital 3 Ser 8, 1954, 539—549). Turolla in his notes and introductory essays interprets Plato in Neo-Platonic fashion as he had done in his earlier *Vita di Platone* (Milano 1939) and *Il Parmenide tradotto e commentato* (Milano 1942).

One older translation which is still widely used has been so extensively revised that some information concerning this new edition must be given:

306. The Dialogues of Plato translated into English with Analyses and Introduction by B. Jowett, Fourth edition Revised, 4 vols., Oxford 1953. D. J. Allan and H. E. Dale were the general editors responsible for the form of this edition. They have corrected the translation extensively and have added brief footnotes, have omitted the *Eryxias* and *Alcibiades II* and have added a new translation of the *Hippias Major*, have omitted irrelevant material from the Introductions and have dropped the marginal analytical notes, and they have rearranged the dialogues 'in an order approximating to the probable order of composition'. Cf. on this edition De Lacy, *Cl Phil* 49, 1954, 262—265.

Several other translations of the entire corpus have been begun during the last two decades but have not yet been completed²), and

¹) The whole (Platon, Oeuvres Complètes) consists of 13 volumes in 25 parts published in the Collection des Universités de France by the Société d'Édition 'Les Belles Lettres' in Paris.

²) So, for example:

306a) Platone: Dialoghi, Bari 1947—. To be in eight volumes by M. Valgimigli, A. Zadro, P. Pucci, F. Zambaldi, F. Sartori, C. Giarratano, and A. Maddalena. All but volumes 3 and 4 by Pucci and Zambaldi have been published. Vol. 8 by A. Maddalena (1948) will be mentioned *infra* under the *Epistles*. On vol. 2, *Parmenide, Sofista, Politico, Filebo* by A. Zadro (1957) cf. Giannantoni, *Rass Filos* 7, 1958, 97—98.

306b) J. D. Garcia Bacca, Obras Completas de Platon, Mexico Universidad. Of this, so far as I know, there have appeared only three

there have also been many recent translations of selected writings. Those among them that have special scholarly significance, but only those, will be referred to *infra* under the relevant dialogues. Here, however, I mention two such collections which are significant for their introductory essays:

307. Die Werke des Aufstiegs (*Euthyphron*, *Apologie*, *Kriton*, *Gorgias*, *Menon*) neu übertragen von R. Rufener; Einleitung von G. Krüger, Zürich/Stuttgart 1948.

308. Meisterdialoge (*Phaidon*, *Symposion*, *Phaidros*) übersetzt von R. Rufener; eingeleitet von O. Gigon, Zürich/Stuttgart 1958.

Among recent 'anthologies' of Platonic passages there is one that deserves serious attention:

309. A. Plebe, *Antologia di critica letteraria di Platone*, Città di Castello 1955. This is an introductory essay and a collection of the texts with commentary on poetic interpretation, classification of literary genres, and aesthetic judgment.

Other recent anthologies known to me are popular presentations of no scholarly pretensions or significance¹).

b) Under each of the individual writings listed alphabetically by title without regard to authenticity or spuriousness I give in what

volumes, published in 1944—45 and containing the *Apology*, *Euthyphro*, *Crito*, *Symposium*, *Ion*, and *Hippias Major* with important interpretative introductions.

306c) *Plató Diálegs*. The Greek text with Catalan translation, exegetical notes, and introductions: the first three volumes by J. Crexells appeared posthumously, Barcelona 1928, edited by J. S. Hunter and C. Riba; the work is being carried on by J. O. Canals, who in 1952 and 1956 published vols. 4 and 5 containing respectively the *Cratylus* and *Menexenus* and the *Meno* and *Alcibiades I*.

306d) *Platon, Dialoge*, übertragen und eingeleitet von Edgar Salin, Basel 1945—. So far as I know there have appeared only: *Apologie*, *Kriton*, *Phaidon* (1945); *Theaitet* (1946); *Euthyphron*, *Laches*, *Charmides*, *Lysis* (1950); *Gastmahl*, *Phaidros* (1952).

¹) Such are, for example:

309a) F. Adorno, *Il pensiero politico di Platone*, Torino 1957. A collection of passages in translation with a brief introduction.

309b) A. Gustarelli, *Socrate e Platone*, Milano 1953. Brief surveys of Socrates and Plato and of the *Apology*, *Crito*, *Euthyphro*, *Gorgias*, *Phaedrus*, *Phaedo*, and *Republic I*.

309c) H. L. Drake, *The People's Plato*, New York 1958. This 're-organization', paraphrase, and digest of Plato's writings is a work of sincere devotion misguided and derivative.

follows first (α) editions, scholarly translations, and commentaries of the whole work; then (β) articles or books devoted to that work; and finally (γ) consecutively by the Stephanus pagination (as given in Burnet's text) such individual notes or articles as have been published on that particular passage.

Alcibiades I

α

See the new editions by Westerink of the commentaries of Proclus (277 *supra*) and of Olympiodorus (278 *supra*) on this dialogue.

β

310. C. Vink, *Plato's Eerste Alcibiades: een onderzoek naar zijn authenticiteit*, Amsterdam 1939. He argued for the authenticity of the dialogue, which he placed after the *Charmides*, *Euthyphro*, and *Protagoras* and before the *Gorgias* and *Meno*.

311. É. de Strycker, *L'authenticité du Premier Alcibiade*, *Études Cl* 11, 1942, 135—151. This article is reprinted with slight revisions in Bidez's book, *Eos* (241 *supra*), pp. 101—122. It argues that the dialogue, though possibly revised by Plato himself, was written by a pupil of his about the time when the *Laws* was being composed.

312. P. Friedländer, *Socrates enters Rome*; *AJPh* 66, 1945, 337—351. The first three sections of this article (337—348) are reprinted in Friedländer (11a *supra*) I, pp. 306—316 and (11b *supra*), pp. 323—332. There he argues that Polybius was deeply influenced by the dialogue and probably read it as Plato's; in the fourth section of the paper (348—351) he argues that Aristotle in his *Eroticus* drew upon *Alcibiades* I. See also Friedländer (11a *supra*) II, pp. 213—225 and 317—320 for his renewed defence of the dialogue's authenticity¹).

313. R. S. Bluck, *The origin of the Greater Alcibiades*, *Cl Quart N.S.* 3, 1953, 46—52. He dates the dialogue 'about 343/2 B.C.' and tries to connect it in theme with Aristotle's early works.

¹) Friedländer here considers most of the modern literature. See in addition to his citations, however, G. Müller, *Gnomon* 14, 1938, 662 and H. Gundert, *Gymnasium* 61, 1954, 530, n. 16, both of whom offer arguments against him to prove the dialogue spurious.

314. Pamela M. Clark, *The Greater Alcibiades*, CI Quart N.S. 5, 1955, 231—240. She contends that the first two thirds (down to 126 or thereabouts) were written by a pupil of Plato's who died leaving his work unfinished and that Plato completed it in his 'middle period' at some time after the *Republic*.

γ

315. On 112 C: D. W. Reece, JHS 70, 1950, 75—76.

316. On 112 C 4: E. R. Dodds, Gnomon 27, 1955, 166, n. 2.

317. On 132 E 7—133 A 7: P. M. Schuhl, Remarques sur le regard, le merveilleux, la pensée et l'action, Paris 1952, pp. 201—213 (reprinted here from Journal de Psychologie, 1948, 184 ff.).

Amatores or Anterastae

See *Erastae infra*

Apology

β

Articles and sections of books on the *Apology* to which reference has already been made *supra* are: Schmalenbach (289b), de Strycker (131a), Delatte (134), Dihle (132), Chroust (130), and Calogero (190). Others published during the current decade and some important earlier publications on this work are:

318. R. Hackforth, *The composition of Plato's Apology*, Cambridge 1933 (cf. Hackforth, JHS 55, 1935, 83—84 in reply to his critic, *ibid.* 54, 1934, 225; Diès, *Rev Ét Grecques* 48, 1935, 610—611).

319. R. Guardini, *Der Tod des Sokrates: eine Interpretation der platonischen Schriften Euthyphron, Apologie, Kriton und Phaidon*, Bern 1945 (4. erweiterte Auflage, Düsseldorf/München 1952). This is an existentialist interpretation of the four writings treated as a unit for their philosophical content, though the author does not believe that they were planned or written as a unit.

320. G. Galli, *L'Apologia di Socrate*, Paideia 2, 1947, 273—292. A revised form of this article is printed in his book, *Socrate ed alcuni dialoghi platonici*, Torino 1958, pp. 81—109. See also 19 *supra*.

321. A. E. Havelock, Why was Socrates tried?, Phoenix Suppl. 1 (Studies in honour of Gilbert Norwood), 1952, 95—108. Havelock contends that Plato purposely conceals the real issue and dishonestly converts Socrates' dialectical profession of ignorance into a denial of his revolutionary educational purpose and its professional and technical standards.

322. E. Wolf, Griechisches Rechtsdenken III 1, Frankfurt a. M. 1954, pp. 38—69: Der sokratische Rechtsgedanke in Platons 'Apolo-
gie', ... in Platons 'Kritik'.

323. M. Fox, The trials of Socrates: An Interpretation of the First Tetralogy, Archiv Philos 6, 1956, 226—261. Fox contends that, whatever may have been the time and order of composition, the *Euthyphro*, *Apology*, *Crito*, and *Phaedo* were intended by Plato to be read together and in this order. The last three represent the trial of Socrates on three 'levels': 1) before the masses, 2) before Crito, and 3) before the philosophical friends of Socrates; and each is a trial of Socrates before himself on three different 'levels'. The *Euthyphro* is a foil for the other three, setting off Socrates by characterizing his complete opposite, and is at the same time a 'map', showing the reader what to observe in the three works that follow it.

γ

324. On 23 B 7: E. Skard, Symbol Osl 24, 1945, 151—153.

325. On 24 B 9—C 1 and 26 B—27 E: J. Tate, Greek for 'Atheism', Cl Rev 50, 1936, 3—5. See also J. Tate, Cl Quart 30, 1936, 142—145; R. Stark, Ann Univ Saraviensis 1, 1952, 145—147; B. Snell, Die Entdeckung des Geistes, Hamburg 1955, pp. 46—47.

326. On 32 B—C: J. Hatzfeld, Socrate au procès des Arginusés, Rev Ét Anciennes 42, 1940, 165—171.

327. On 32 E 2—33 A 1: W. H. Alexander, 'Nor any other man either', Trans R Soc Canada 39, 1946, 1—29.

328. On 38 C—39 B: I. Düring, Socrates' valedictory words to his judges, Eranos 44, 1946, 90—104.

329. On 39 B 3: W. C. Helmbold, Mnem IV 5, 1952, 225—226.

330. On 40 B—41 C: W. Schubart, Ein Platon-Papyrus, Journ Jur Pap 4, 1950, 83—87. Pap. Berol. 13291.

Axiochus

 β

331. L. Alfonsi, *L'Assioco* pseudoplatonico: ricerca sulle fonti, Studi di Filosofia Greca in onore di R. Mondolfo a cura di V.E. Alfieri e M. Untersteiner, Bari 1950, pp. 245—275. Alfonsi, who can find traces of Aristotle's lost works anywhere, argues that the predominant influence in the *Axiochus* also is that of the 'early Aristotle'.

332. A. Belli, Ps. Platonis *Axiocchi* lectiones in Cod. Paris. Gr. 2110 servatae, *Aevum* 27, 1953, 556—559.

333. A. Belli, Le versione umanistiche dell' *Assioco* pseudoplatonico, *Parola Pass* 9, 1954, 442—467. He here gives the Greek readings followed by 15th century translators and the Latin text of Cod. Vat. Lat. 3441, ff. 121r—128v.

 γ

334. On 371 D—E: F. R. Walton, 'Kinsman of the Gods?', *Cl Phil* 48, 1953, 24—28 (especially pp. 26—28).

Charmides

 β

Of special studies of this dialogue published in the years before 1950 I mention one which seems to have been unduly neglected:

335. A. van Bilsen, Plato's *Charmides* en de Sophrosynè, *Philolog Studiën* 8, 1936/37, 190—206; Het onderwerp van het tweede deel . . . (165—172), *ibid.* 9, 1937/38, 15—31; De kennis en het geluk (173—175), *ibid.* 9, 1937/38, 90—97; De betsekenis van de sophrosynè . . ., *ibid.* 9, 1937/38, 172—181. This is an analysis of the whole dialogue with careful critical consideration of earlier interpretations.

At the beginning of the present decade three independent studies of the dialogue were published:

336. A. Masaracchia, Il '*Carmide*' di Platone, *Maia* 3, 1950, 161—180. The dialogue is here interpreted as showing Plato's transition from Socrates' philosophy to his own.

337. G. M. Sciacca, Il '*Carmide*' e la ricerca d'un oggetto per la filosofia, *Riv Crit Storia Filos* 5, 1950, 103—123. Arguing that the *Charmides* makes manifest the essence of Plato's dialectic, Sciacca

devotes the second half of this article to what he considers the intention and import of Plato's philosophizing.

338. T. G. Tuckey, Plato's '*Charmides*', Cambridge 1951 (cf. Ackrill, *Philos Quart* 2, 1952, 370—372; Tate, *Cl Rev N.S.* 3, 1953, 18—20; and Luce, *Hermathena* 79, 1952, 98—100 who suggests a date 'much nearer that of the *Republic* than is usually assigned to it'). In this monograph Tuckey, adopting a 'strictly historical approach', gives what amounts to a running commentary on the whole dialogue with special attention, however, to 165—176; but his interpretation is hobbled throughout by the unfounded assumption that all conceptions of 'metaphysics' must be disregarded, 'since it is generally agreed that the dialogue belongs to Plato's early period before he had elaborated the Theory of Ideas'¹).

γ

339. On 157E4—158A2: C. A. Trypanis, *Cl Quart N.S.* 1, 1951, 32.

340. On 166A5—7: É. de Strycker, *Rev Ét Grecques* 63, 1950, 51—54.

341. On 167C4—169E8: T. G. Rosenmeyer, *Trans Am Philol Assoc* 88, 1957, 88—94.

Cratylus

α

342. Platone: *Cratilo*, trad., introd. e note di M. Buccellato, Torino 1958. An Italian translation based upon Méridier's text preceded by a substantial introductory essay on the dialogue.

β

Articles and sections of books concerned with this dialogue to which references have already been given *supra* are: P. Boyancé (228a), Diller (192), G. S. Kirk (163), D. J. Allan (164), R. Mondolfo (161, 165, 165a), H. Koller (168 [pp. 48—57: *Der platonische Kratylus*]), Ross (297). Besides these there are the following publications of this decade and some of the more important ones of the preceding few years:

343. V. Goldschmidt, *Essai sur le 'Cratyle': Contribution à l'histoire de la pensée de Platon*, Paris 1940. From his detailed analysis

¹ The contrary is asserted by Stefanini, for example, in his *Platone* (9 *supra*) I, p. 194, n. 1 (on p. 195).

of the *Cratylus* and its relation to the other works of Plato Goldschmidt concludes that the dialogue is a 'turning-point' marking Plato's definite break with the doctrine of his first teacher, whose teaching, however, still makes itself felt in the later dialogues. See also Goldschmidt's later book, *Les Dialogues de Platon*, Paris 1947, pp. 112—117.

344. A. Nehring, Plato and the theory of language, *Traditio* 3, 1945, 13—48. Arguing that the *Cratylus* is throughout a consistent study of the sign-function of words, in which a double kind of *δήλωμα* is recognized, the author goes on to consider Plato's position in regard to language here and in other writings vis à vis pre-Platonic notions about language and the post-Platonic development down to modern times.

345. P. R. Hofstätter, Vom Leben des Wortes: Das Problem an Platons Dialog 'Kratylos' dargestellt, Wien 1949. Here a psychologist, taking the etymologies to be seriously meant, insists that their purpose is 'psychagogic' and that they provide a primary source for the understanding of Plato's psychology, that of *ἀνθρώπου* revealing the fundamental motivation of Platonic thought. As an interpretation of the *Cratylus* this monograph is significant only because it has been taken seriously by some later writers on the dialogue.

346. S. Ferri, Binomi obbligati nella critica d'arte degli antichi, *Miscellanea Giovanni Galbiati*, Milano 1951, Vol. I, pp. 151—158. The relation of 424Bff. to the Greek attitude towards artistic creativity and artistic criticism generally.

347. A. Pagliaro, Il *Cratilo* di Platone, *Dionisio* N.S. 15, 1952, 178—198¹) (cf. Plebe, *Filosofia* 8, 1957, 747). This is one of the soundest and most perceptive of studies written on the dialogue in recent times, and a wider knowledge of it should dispel the confusion about the dialogue and about Plato's attitude towards language which so many interpreters have only worse confounded.

348. M. Buccellato, Il *Cratilo* e l'interesse dottrinale della questione onomatologica, *Riv Crit Storia Filos* 8, 1953, 14—35.

¹) This article is reprinted with the title, *Struttura e pensiero del Cratilo di Platone*, in Pagliaro's book, *Nuovi saggi di critica semantica*, Messina/Firenze 1956, pp. 47—76. See also his earlier article:

347a) A. Pagliaro, *Logica e grammatica: Eraclito B 1*, *Ricerche Linguistiche* 1, 1950, pp. 1—57. In this article the *Cratylus* is discussed chiefly on pp. 4—5 and 48—53, the latter pages being part of the Appendix (pp. 39—57), which is reprinted with the title, *Eraclito e il logos (Frag. B 1)*, in Pagliaro's book, *Saggi di critica semantica*, Messina/Firenze 1953, pp. 131—157 (pp. 145—152 on the *Cratylus*).

Reprinted as chapter 7 (pp. 137—158) of his book, *La retorica sofistica . . .* (150 *supra*). He tries to establish a close thematic connection between the *Cratylus* and the *Sophist* and asserts the inseparability in Platonic thought of the triplet, *δν—νόημα—ῥομα*.

349. J. Derbolav, Der Dialog 'Kratylos' im Rahmen der platonischen Sprach- und Erkenntnisphilosophie, Saarbrücken 1953 (cf. Lohmann, *Gnomon* 26, 1954, 449—453; Tate, *Cl Rev N.S.* 5, 1955, 105—106; V. Goldschmidt, *Rev Philosophique* 146, 1956, 145—147; Manasse, *Philos Rundschau* 5 Beiheft 1, 1957, 41—46). With the excuse that this is a 'philosophical interpretation' of the dialogue Derbolav, here involves Plato in a series of variations on the theme of his own 'Sprachphilosophie', manhandling Plato's Greek in the interest of this higher purpose.

350. F. Sontag, The Platonist's conception of language, *Journ Philos* 51, 1954, 823—830. This is not so much an interpretation of the *Cratylus* as a defence of the Platonic attitude towards the status of language against the contemporary view of the autonomy of linguistic analysis.

351. G. J. de Vries, Notes on some passages of the *Cratylus*, *Mnem* IV 8, 1955, 290—297. Textual and exegetical notes on more than forty passages, many of which are important both for Plato's language and for the more general interpretation of the dialogue.

352. G. Fano, Il problema dell' origine e della natura del linguaggio nel 'Cratilo' platonico, *Giorn Metafisica* 10, 1955, 307—320. He argues that the dialogue, though authentic, is prolix, full of interpolations, derangements, and original defects, and below Plato's ordinary standard but in substance one of the most important of Plato's minor works.

353. A. Lanzalaco, Il convenzionalismo platonico del *Cratilo*, *Acme* 8 Fasc 1, 1955, 205—248. Here it is argued that Plato assumes a 'conventionalist' position, at the same time establishing the 'naturalistic' requirement of a real reference for names and rejecting a necessary connection between conventionalism and Protagorean subjectivism. Lanzalaco concludes that the dialogue is a criticism of Plato's own early theory of ideas and of his own Heraclitean background and that it marks a 'turning-point' in his development.

354. R. Robinson, The theory of names in Plato's *Cratylus*, *Rev Intern Philos* 9, 1955, 221—236. He asserts that the dialogue deals solely with the relation of names to things (and not with that of words to thoughts) and that it is occupied almost entirely with a

discussion of the nature-theory of names; he then analyses what this 'nature-theory' does and does not entail.

355. R. Robinson, A criticism of Plato's *Cratylus*, *Philos Rev* 65, 1956, 324—341. He contends that Plato, while he may have entertained the 'nature-theory' of names favorably before he wrote the *Cratylus* and even while writing it, soon saw that it had no practical use and finally adopted the 'convention-theory' implied in *Epistle VII*; Robinson then considers the arguments in the *Cratylus* in favor of the 'nature-theory' and finally criticizes Plato for never having understood that a name or word 'refers to something' and is simply a tool of communication¹).

356. E. Amado-Lévy-Valensi, Le problème du 'Cratyle', *Rev Philosophique* 146, 1956, 16—27. This article is more 'impressionistic' than illuminating. See also 1099 *infra*.

357. J. Danielou, Eunome l'Arien et l'exégèse néo-platonicienne du *Cratyle*, *Rev Ét Grecques* 69, 1956, 412—432.

358. A. Guzzo, La problematica del 'Cratilo', *Filosofia* 7, 1956, 609—666. This sober and detailed analysis of the dialogue lays special stress upon the relation of Plato's criticism to the various contemporary and earlier speculations concerning language and their implications and upon Plato's conception of language as at once an art and a technique of expression.

359. K. Barwick, Probleme der stoischen Sprachlehre und Rhetorik, *Abhandl Leipzig, phil-hist Kl* 49/3, 1957, 70—79: Platons *Kratylos* und die stoische Sprachschöpfungslehre und Etymologie. Besides showing how the Stoics adopted and developed certain positions of the *Cratylus* and deviated from others, this article contains a clear and concise analysis of the dialogue showing that Plato's purpose is to deny the significance of investigating words for acquiring essential knowledge of objects.

360. R. B. Levinson, Language and the *Cratylus*: Four questions, *Rev Metaphysics* 11, 1957/58, 29—34. Levinson argues that *Cratylus* in the dialogue is made to express theories of the historical *Cratylus* but with a focus to suit Plato's purpose, that through the etymologies Plato intends to cast doubt on the methods of etymologists and to demote words to their human status as artifacts, and that for Plato

¹ See in contrast to these two articles of Robinson's (354 and 355) especially those of Nehring (344 *supra*) and Pagliaro (347 *supra*) and that of Levinson (360 *infra*).

language is something with which and not from which knowledge accrues; in asserting this third point he criticizes Robinson's articles (354 and 355 *supra*) and in the fourth part of the article criticizes various lines of interpretation of the dialogue in connection with modern theories of language.

361. R. Brumbaugh, Plato's *Cratylus*: The order of etymologies, *Rev Metaphysics* 11, 1957/58, 502—510). In response to the second part of Levinson's article (360 *supra*) Brumbaugh maintains that the etymologies are meant to be 'an orderly dialectical sampling of the total cosmological range' with the intention of showing that the issue of rest versus motion 'cannot be resolved by allocating some sorts of word to one orientation and others to another'.

γ

See especially the Notes of G. J. de Vries (351 *supra*).

362. On 387C—388C: J. Lohmann, *Gnomon* 25, 1953, 295—296.

363. On 396E1—397A1: J. R. Trevaskis, *Phronesis* 1, 1955/56, 43—44.

364. On 398C—E: G. B. Hussey, *Cl Phil* 35, 1940, 424—425.

365. On 400B9—C9: M. P. Nilsson, *Gnomon* 28, 1956, 18 with references. See also G. Méautis (212 *supra*).

366. On 404E—406A: P. Boyancé, *Ant Cl* 20, 1951, 422—423.

— On 412C—413C see the articles of Mondolfo (197 and 198 *supra*).

367. On 416B6—8: J. C. Opstelten, *Mnem* IV 6, 1953, 313; and against Opstelten: C. J. de Vries, *ibid.*, 317 and later on 416B6—D11 in *Mnem* IV 8, 1955, 296.

Critias

β

Of studies dealing with the *Critias* published before 1950, most of which, as has always been the case, are concerned with Atlantis, I include here only a few of the latest.

368. E. Gegenschatz, *Platons Atlantis*, Zürich 1943 (cf. Cherniss, *AJPh* 68, 1947, 251—257).

369. H. Herter, *Altes und Neues zu Platons Kritias*, *Rhein Mus* N.F. 92, 1944, 236—265. Besides a critical résumé of earlier theories

concerning Atlantis this article contains important textual and exegetical discussions of a dozen difficult passages in the *Critias*.

370. R. Hackforth, The story of Atlantis: Its purpose and its moral, *Cl Rev* 58, 1944, 7—9.

371. H. S. Bellamy, The Atlantis Myth, London 1948. Bellamy is one of those who believe that the story of Atlantis could not have been invented by Plato but must be 'an essentially factual report' of a geophysical event.

372. R. S. Brumbaugh, Note on the numbers in Plato's *Critias*, *Cl Phil* 43, 1948, 40—42. This article is reprinted as the first part (pp. 47—51) of a section in Brumbaugh's book, *Plato's Mathematical Imagination*, Bloomington (Indiana) 1954, pp. 47—59, which is entitled Atlantis and its institutions. Brumbaugh argues that Plato's 'statistics' of Atlantis are meant to reflect the mathematical and philosophical confusion of the Atlantean rulers (cf. Friedländer [11a *supra*] I, p. 367, n. 1).

373. T. G. Rosenmeyer, The numbers in Plato's *Critias*: A reply, *Cl Phil* 44, 1949, 117—120. This is an attack upon Brumbaugh's specific thesis (372 *supra*) and upon the assumptions that Atlantis is meant to be a state of disorder and the *Critias* to have a serious philosophical purpose.

374. T. G. Rosenmeyer, The family of *Critias*, *AJPh* 70, 1949, 404—410. He argues against Burnet that the *Critias* of the *Timaeus* and the *Critias* is the *Critias* of the 'Thirty' and not his grandfather. His arguments have received scant notice, and Burnet's identification continues to be generally accepted; cf. C. A. Trypanis, *Cl Quart* N.S. 1, 1951, 32 and Friedländer (11b *supra*), I, pp. 202 and 372, n. 33¹).

375. R. L. Scranton, Lost Atlantis found again?, *Archaeology* 2, 1949, 159—162. He suggests that the germ of Plato's Atlantis was a tradition of prehistoric conditions in the Copaic basin of Boeotia.

¹) Rosenmeyer's rejection of Burnet's identification is connected with the contention that Atlantis represents the political dream of *Critias* the 'tyrant' and the ideal of Plato's own youth; this interpretation of Atlantis, some parts of which have been reworked by Rosenmeyer in his later papers (e. g. 388 *infra*), was developed in its entirety in a dissertation of which a résumé only has been published:

374a) T. G. Rosenmeyer, The Isle of *Critias*, *Harvard Studies in Class Phil* 60, 1951, 302—304.

376. W. Brandenstein, Studien zu Platons Atlantiserzählung, Archiv Orient 17 Pars 1, 1949, 69—84. This article deals with the name, Atlantis, with the 'Urgeschichte von Atlantis', with the meaning of *ὀρεῖχαιλος*, with the characteristics of the Atlanteans (120 Eff.), and with 'das große Staatsopfer' (119 D—120 D).

377. S. Marinatos, *Περὶ τὸν θρῦλον τῆς Ἀτλαντίδος*, ΚΡΗΤΙΚΑ ΧΡΟΝΙΚΑ 4, 1950, 195—213. He argues that the story was in fact an Egyptian tradition in which originally the cataclysmic destruction of Thera ca. 1500 B. C. was extended to Crete¹), the site of the great island later being transferred to the Atlantic under the influence of the Phoenician voyages to West Africa.

378. A. Schulten, Tartessos, Hamburg 1950. In this second edition chapter 10 (pp. 94—109), Atlantis, is a revised version of Schulten's article, Rhein Mus N.F. 88, 1939, 326—346. He maintains his identification of Atlantis with Tartessus.

379. W. Brandenstein, Atlantis: Größe und Untergang eines geheimnisvollen Inselreiches, Wien 1951. Plato's story is a saga, the historical foundation of which is the relation between Athens and Minoan Crete. This is essentially the thesis which K. T. Frost defended in 1909 and 1913; see also S. Marinatos (377 *supra*). On Brandenstein's argument cf. Barker, CI Rev N.S. 3, 1953, 56; Rosenmeyer, Erasmus 6, 1953, 799—802; Thomson, JHS 73, 1953, 199²).

380. V. Cicchiti, Données ethnologiques de Platon sur le substrat méditerranéen, Actes Congrès Internat Ét Class, Paris 1951, 62—73. He contends that transatlantic archaeological and ethnological data corroborate the historicity of Plato's account of Atlantis.

381. M. Pallottino, Atlantide, Archeol Class 4, 1952, 229—240. He holds that the saga of Atlantis was a fusion of three traditions (a Mediterranean tradition reflected in the Homeric Scheria, that of the relation between Athens and Minoan Crete, and the oriental tradition of great invasions from the west) and that this combined tradition was in Plato's mind colored by the nature of the Carthaginian empire and the Greco-Punic combats of the 5th and 4th centuries.

¹) See also the earlier article:

377a) S. Marinatos, The volcanic destruction of Minoan Crete, Antiquity 13, 1939, 425—439.

²) See further the last reviewer's pages on Atlantis in his book:

379a) J. O. Thomson, History of Ancient Geography, Cambridge 1948, pp. 90—93.

382. H. Herter, Die Rundform in Platons Atlantis und ihre Nachwirkung in der Villa Hadriani, Rhein Mus N.F. 96, 1953, 1—20 (cf. Friedländer [11b *supra*], I, pp. 321—322).

383. L. Saint-Michel, Aux sources de l'Atlantide: État actuel de la question atlantéenne avec la traduction des textes platoniciens, Bourges 1953. This author is as much concerned with the attraction of Atlantis as a symbol as he is with the question of its physical existence and identification; and he insists that the Platonic Atlantis, whether historical or mythical, is 'le drame essentiel de la Dèmesure'.

384. J. Spanuth, Das enträtselte Atlantis, Stuttgart 1953. This is an elaborate attempt to prove that Plato gives an historical account of the invasion of the Mediterranean ca. 1200 B. C. by northern 'sea-folk' whose capital, Atlantis, lay between Heligoland and the western coast of Schleswig-Holstein. The thesis, method, and reasoning of this work are examined and condemned in a collection of articles by sixteen specialists in various fields ranging from philology to geography and geology:

385. Atlantis enträtselt? Wissenschaftler nehmen Stellung zu Jürgen Spanuths Atlantis-Hypothese, herausgegeben von Prof. Dr. R. Weyl, Kiel 1953.

Against his critics and particularly in reply to a review by Tackenberg (Gymnasium 63, 1956, 130—131) Spanuth has recently tried to defend his thesis again:

386. J. Spanuth, Atlantis enträtselt, Gymnasium 65, 1958, 313—320.

387. C. Corbato, In margine alla questione Atlantidea e Cartagine, Archeol Class 5, 1953, 232—237 (with an additional note by M. Pallottino, 237—238). In connection with Pallottino's thesis (381 *supra*) he seeks in the Platonic *Epistles* VII and VIII support for tracing the color and certain particulars of the myth of Atlantis to the impression made upon Plato in Sicily by the Greco-Punic antagonism there.

388. T. G. Rosenmeyer, Plato's Atlantis Myth: *Timaeus* or *Critias*?, Phoenix 10, 1956, 163—172. He argues that Plato first began the *Critias* but interrupted it to write the *Timaeus*, to which he transferred as an introduction the first part of the Atlantis myth from the *Critias*. A similar hypothesis had been proposed by Wilamowitz, in rebuttal of which see Friedländer (1 *supra*), II, p. 602.

389. A. Rousseau-Liessens, Les Colonnes d'Hercule et l'Atlantide, Bruxelles 1956. Atlantis is here supposed to have occupied the

area of what is now southern Spain, the Straits of Gibraltar, and North Africa as far as Algeria.

390. G. Rudberg, *Atlantis, Platonica Selecta*, Stockholm 1956, pp. 51—71. This article is meant to replace his *Atlantis och Syrakusai*, *Eranos* 17, 1919, 1—80. Plato's memories of Syracuse greatly influenced his description of Atlantis.

391. E. D. Phillips, *Atlantis*, *Proc Cl Assoc* 55, London 1958, 28—29. In this résumé the author appears to accept the hypothesis of Frost, Marinatos, and Brandenstein (see 377 and 379 *supra*).

γ

See the articles *supra* by H. Herter (369) and W. Brandenstein (376).

392. On 111E—112E: O. Broneer, Plato's description of early Athens and the origin of Metageitnia, *Hesperia Suppl.* 8, 1949, 47—59. See also H. Herter (369 *supra*), pp. 257—263 and O. Broneer, Athens in the Bronze Age, *Antiquity* 30, 1956, 9—18.

393. On 114E 3—6 (and 116C 1—2): H. Michell, *Oreichalkos*, *Cl Rev N.S.* 5, 1955, 21—22. See also W. Brandenstein (376 *supra*), p. 79.

394. On 115B: W. Brandenstein, *Das Klima von Atlantis*, *Anz Altertum* 2, 1949, 32.

395. On 119C—120C: A. Vincent, *Essai sur le sacrifice de communion des rois atlantes*, *Mémorial Lagrange*, Paris 1940, pp. 81—96. See W. Brandenstein (376 *supra*), pp. 82—84¹).

Crito

α

The annotated editions and translations of this dialogue published since 1950 are designed for use in schools. Of those published between 1930 and 1949 the following are scholarly productions of some significance:

396. *Platons Kriton* von R. Harder, Berlin 1934. Besides text and translation this contains a 'Nachwort' of 30 pages in which Harder gives an interpretation of the work.

¹) See also the earlier article on this passage:

395a) C. Picard, Une source possible de Platon pour le jugement des rois de l'Atlantide, *L'Acropole* 8, 1933, 3—13.

397. Il *Critone* con note di U. E. Paoli, Firenze 1934. The commentary of this work draws largely upon Paoli's article, *Problemi di diritto pubblico nel 'Critone' platonico*, republished as chapter 5 of his book, *Studi sul processo attico*, Padova 1933.

398. Il *Critone* con introduzione e commento di G. Calogero, Firenze 1937 (republished many times).

β

The following publications dealing with this dialogue have already been listed *supra*: H. Schmalenbach (289b), E. Turolla (291), R. Guardini (319), E. Wolf (322), M. Fox (323). In addition to these see:

399. P. Piovani, *Per una interpretazione unitaria del 'Critone'*, Roma 1947. Piovani shows that Socrates' determination to obey the laws even when they are unjust is not in conflict with the principles of his philosophy but in accord with them.

400. E. Marcellusi, *Critone e l'angelo del Signore*, Chieti 1953 (cf. Capone Braga, *Sophia* 22, 1954, 344—345). The attitudes of Socrates and of Peter compared in an attempt to 'reconcile' and justify both.

401. N. Basilopoulos, *Ἑρμηνευτικά εἰς Πλάτωνος Κρίτωνα*, ΠΛΑΤΩΝ 5, 1953, 226—239 and 6, 1954, 315—321.

See also M. Gigante in his book, *NOMOS ΒΑΣΙΛΕΥΣ*, Napoli 1956, pp. 164—167 and pp. 290—291.

De Iusto (Περὶ Δικαίου)

β

402. H. Schmeken, *Eine Schülerarbeit aus der mittleren Akademie*, *Philos Jahrbuch* 60, 1950, 20—30. He argues that the *De Iusto* was written in the Academy of Arcesilaus, in whose time the *Corpus Platonicum* was compiled.

Demodocus

β

403. Margherita Isnardi, *Sugli apocrifi platonici 'Demodoco' e 'Sisifo'*, *Parola Pass* 9, 1954, 425—431. She stresses the importance of the two writings for the light they shed upon the political thought of Athenian intellectual circles in the time of Antipater and Phocion.

Epigrams

 α

404. *Anthologia Lyrica Graeca* edidit E. Diehl †, Fasc. 1: *Poetae Elegiaci*, Editio Tertia, Leipzig 1949, pp. 102—110.

 β

405. C. M. Bowra, Plato's epigram on Dion's death, *AJPh* 59, 1938, 394—404. This is reprinted in his book, *Problems in Greek Poetry*, Oxford 1953, pp. 126-137 (cf. Lloyd-Jones, *JHS* 75, 1955, 159).

406. H. Herter, Platons Dionepegamm, *Rhein Mus N. F.* 92, 1944, 290—302.

407. V. Pisani, Su un epigramma attribuito a Platone, *Paideia* 6, 1951, 297—300. On A. P. 7, 670 = 5 (Diehl), which he thinks may be by Plato but was either written for a portrait of Ion the tragedian who died when Plato was five years old or else was simply a literary exercise.

Epinomis

 α

408. *Epinomis*: Texte établi et traduit par É. des Places = Platon, *Oeuvres Complètes XII*, 2e partie, pp. 91—161, Paris 1956 (cf. Post, *AJPh* 79, 1958, 288—290 and especially Einarson, *Cl Phil* 53, 1958, 91—99, a review-article of independent importance for the study of this dialogue).

409. Plato, *Philebus* and *Epinomis*: Translation and Introduction by A. E. Taylor edited by R. Klibansky with the co-operation of G. Calogero and A. C. Lloyd, London/Edinburgh 1956. The *Epinomis* is edited with an introduction by A. C. Lloyd. On the edition and publication of this posthumous work of Taylor's cf. des Places, *Rev Ét Grecques* 69, 1956, 480—481.

The authenticity of the *Epinomis* has often been defended by des Places and by Taylor. The latter's editor, Lloyd, suspends judgment on the question. In the reviews of des Place's edition cited *supra* Post declares himself for Plato's authorship, and Einarson argues strongly against it (cf. also Cherniss, *Gnomon* 25, 1953, 371—375).

β

The scholarship done on the *Epinomis* before 1938 is soberly and critically appraised by von Fritz in his article on Philip of Opus:

410. K. von Fritz, R.-E. I 19, 2, 1938, 2360—2366.

In that year Raeder published a new defence of the dialogue's authenticity which called forth several important reviews on either side:

411. H. Raeder, Platons *Epinomis*, K. Danske Vid Sel, Hist-Fil Med 26/1, København 1938 (cf. Müller, Gnomon 16, 1940, 289—307; Einarson, AJPh 61, 1940, 365—369; Steiner, Phil Woch 60, 1940, 136—139; des Places, Ant Cl 11, 1942, 97—102).

The following later publications dealing with this dialogue have already been listed *supra*: J. Moreau, L'Ame du Monde..., pp. 85—114 (5); J. Bidez, Eos..., pp. 93—100 (241); J. Kerschesteiner, pp. 196—202 (242); P. Boyancé (228); É. des Places (270); M. Isnardi, Teoria e prassi..., pp. 407—411, 416, 420 (104). In addition to these see:

412. É. des Places, Les dernières années de Platon, Ant Cl 7, 1938, 169—200. This account is based upon the *Epinomis* and the *Epistles* which he regards as authentic¹).

413. A. J. Festugière, L'*Epinomis* et l'introduction des cultes étrangers à Athènes, Conjectanea Neotest 11, 1947, 66—74. He argues here that the cult introduced is consonant with Platonic authorship.

414. A. J. Festugière, La religion de Platon dans l'*Epinomis*, Bull Soc Française Philos 42, 1948, 33—48¹).

415. C. Mugler, La philosophie physique et biologique de l'*Epinomis*, Rev Ét Grecques 62, 1949, 31—79. He assumes the authenticity of the dialogue and thinks that his analysis contributes to the establishment of this thesis; in the introduction of a 'fifth element',

¹) See also his earlier articles in defence of the authenticity of the *Epinomis*: Rev Ét Grecques 44, 1931, 153—166 and 50, 1937, 321—328; Mélanges Franz Cumont, Bruxelles 1936, 1, pp. 129—142.

²) See also the section on the *Epinomis* in his book, La Révélation d'Hermès Trismégiste II: Le Dieu Cosmique, Paris 1949, pp. 196—218 (cf. Cherniss, Gnomon 22, 1950, 211—212). Still later in his book, Personal Religion Among the Greeks, Berkeley/Los Angeles 1954, pp. 49—50 he treats the *Epinomis* as 'a genuine unfinished work of Plato'.

the independent astral intelligences, and the function of the 'daimones' the *Epinomis* represents Plato's revision and perfection of the cosmology of the *Timaeus*.

Two books listed *infra* under the *Laws*, to which they are primarily devoted, must be mentioned here as well for their treatments of the *Epinomis*. They are O. Reverdin's *La religion de la cité platonicienne*, Paris 1945 (especially pp. 42—46), and G. Müller's *Studien zu den platonischen Nomoi*, München 1951. Reverdin holds that the dialogue was written not by Plato but by a pupil of his who used notes which the master had left. G. Müller argues that the *Epinomis* is in style and content homogeneous with the *Laws*, of which it is the promised continuation; but he does so not to defend the authenticity of the *Epinomis* but to cast doubt upon that of the *Laws*.

γ

See throughout the reviews of the Places (408 *supra*) by Post and Einarson.

416. On 976B5—C6: F. Dirlmeier, *Wiener Studien* 69, 1956, 167.

417. On 990C5—991A4: P.-H. Michel, *De Pythagore à Euclide*, Paris 1950, pp. 505—508. This relies entirely upon the earlier article by des Places in *Rev Ét Grecques* 48, 1935, 540—550.

418. On 990C5—991B4: B. L. van der Waerden, *Ontwakende Wetenschap*, Groningen 1950, pp. 154—156 and pp. 175—179¹).

419. On 990C—992A: P. Kucharski, *Étude sur la doctrine pythagoricienne de la tétrade*, Paris 1952, pp. 67—68.

420. On 990C5—991B4 (and 991D8—992A3): A. R. Lacey, *Phronesis* 1, 1956, 81—104: In this discussion of the text, which he translates and interprets in detail, he gives critical consideration to most of the earlier scholarship on the question, such as that of Stenzel, Taylor, des Places, Toeplitz, and van der Waerden, whose latest treatment of the passage (418 *supra*), however, he does not mention as he does not mention either the most important earlier article, that by R. M. Jones in *AJPh* 53, 1932, 61—66.

¹) In the English translation, *Science Awakening*, Groningen 1954, pp. 139—141 and pp. 155—159; in the German translation, *Erwachende Wissenschaft*, Basel/Stuttgart 1956, pp. 230—233 and pp. 256—262. See also his earlier remarks on 990 E 1—991 B 4 in *Hermes* 78, 1943, 185—187; and on 991 A 1—B 4 see H. Koller, *Mus Helvet* 16, 1959, 242—243.

421. On 990C5—991B4: O. Becker, *Zwei Untersuchungen* . . . (114 *supra*), pp. 7—8, 17—18, 23. On p. 23 he proposes a supplement to the text of 991A7—B1. In the earlier pages he argues that the passage supports his theory of the generation of idea-numbers and tries to apply it to the scheme of van der Wielen (113 *supra*), who on pp. 226—230 and pp. 249—255 of his book had himself discussed this passage of the *Epinomis*.

422. On 990C5—991B4: N. B. Booth, *Phronesis* 2, 1957, 160—161. He criticizes the translation of 990C6—8 and 990E1—991A3 by Lacey (420 *supra*) and suggests a different interpretation.

423. On 990C—991A: F. Novotny, *De Platonis miraculo geometrico*, *Listy Filolog* 5 R 80, 1957, 14—20. Refuting the interpretations of Reuther, Stenzel, Taylor, Toeplitz, des Places, and Raeder and confirming that of R. M. Jones (*AJPh* 53, 1932, 61—66), Novotny proceeds to exemplify the procedure of $\tau\omega\nu$. . . ἀριθμῶν ἀμολῶσις. This concise article is of primary importance.

Epistles

(General)

α

We must go back to 1930 for a full text and commentary of the *Epistles* in the traditional style:

424. F. Novotny, *Platonis Epistulae commentariis illustratae*, Brno 1930 (cf. Gallavotti, *Boll Filol Cl N.S.* 1, 1930/31, 212—214; Eggermann, *Gnomon* 9, 1933, 628—638; Diès, *Suppl Crit Bull Assoc Budé* 4, 1932, 91—98). Novotny's purpose was to prove authentic all the letters excepting the first; but, though he did not achieve this, he wrote what is still the most useful commentary on the language of the *Epistles*.

Along with this text and commentary should be recalled two complete translations and commentaries published in the 'thirties:

425. The Platonic Epistles translated with Introduction and Notes by J. Harward, Cambridge 1932 (cf. Pohlenz, *Gnomon* 9, 1933, 126—134; Cherniss, *AJPh* 54, 1933, 178—184). Harward too contends that all the letters but the first are authentic.

426. G. R. Morrow, *Studies in the Platonic Epistles with a Translation and Notes*, Urbana 1935 (cf. Theiler, *Gnomon* 14, 1938,

625—632; Schiller, *Mind* 45, 1936, 106—108; Post, *AJPh* 57, 1936, 205—207). Morrow rejects as spurious I, II, IX, XI, and XII; he considers III, V, and XIII doubtful but accepts as genuine IV, VI, VII, VIII, and X.

More recently there have been published the following editions or translations, complete or partial, with exegetical notes or essays:

427. Platon, *Die Briefe übersetzt und eingeleitet* von H. Weinstock, Stuttgart 1947. He rejects as spurious I, XII and XIII.

428. Plato's Seventh and Eighth Letters edited with Introduction and Notes by R. S. Bluck, Cambridge 1947 (cf. Tate, *Cl Rev* 62, 1948, 130—131). See also Bluck's book, *Plato's Life and Thought*, pp. 46—53 and pp. 152—189 (10d *supra*)¹.

429. Platone: *Lettere a cura di A. Maddalena*, Bari 1948 (cf. Sainati, *Giorn Metafisica* 5, 1950, 542—545). Besides a translation of the *Epistles* with a few notes, there is here an elaborate examination of each letter, 270 pages out of 330 being devoted to VII alone, leading to the conclusion that none of the *Epistles* is authentic.

430. *Die echten Briefe Platons, Griechisch und Deutsch, übertragen und eingeleitet* von E. Howald, Zürich 1951. Besides the text and translation of *Epistles* VI, VII, and VIII, which alone are considered to be genuine, and an introduction to them, Howald gives the text and a translation of II as 'Probe eines unechten Briefes'.

431. *Cartas*, ed. bilingüe y prologo por M. Toranzo, rev. por J. Pabón, Madrid 1954.

β

Of publications already mentioned *supra* which are concerned with the *Epistles* generally see G. Boas (80 and 80a), R. S. Bluck (81), L. Wickert (98), J. H. Thiel (82), G. Rudberg (83), P. Friedländer (11a and 11b), I, chap. 13.

A good résumé of the history of critical work on the *Epistles* down to 1932 will be found in the following composite review:

432. A. Diès, *Quelques études récentes sur les Lettres de Platon*, *Rev Philol* 3 Sér 9, 1935, 371—388.

¹ Here may be mentioned also the translation of *Epistle* VII, 323 D — 327 B, with notes and introduction by K. von Fritz and E. Kapp in their book, *Aristotle's Constitution of Athens and Related Texts*, New York 1950, pp. 218—224.

Subsequently to the works covered by Diès in this article and besides the others already listed *supra* there were published the following general treatments of the *Epistles*:

433. G. Hell, Untersuchungen und Beobachtungen zu den platonischen Briefen, Diss. Berlin 1932¹). He does not investigate *Epistles* IX—XIII; of the rest he holds only VI, VII, and VIII to be authentic.

434. G. Pasquali, Le *Lettere* di Platone, Firenze 1938 (cf. Theiler, Gnomon 14, 1938, 625—632; des Places, Rev Philol 3 Sér 14, 1940, 127—135). He concludes that VI, VII, and VIII are authentic and that XI is probably so; of X he is doubtful, but all the rest he rejects as spurious. See his later 'Poscritto', Studi Ital Filol Cl N.S. 18, 1941/42, 151—159, in which he replies to critics of his book, adds further notes, and reanalyses *Epistle* VII. In a note in Studi Ital Filol Cl N.S. 22, 1947, 261 he expresses the belief that several others of the *Epistles* are authentic.

435. F. Dornseiff, Echtheitsfragen antik-griechischer Literatur, Berlin 1939, pp. 31—36. He tries here to defend his thesis that the thirteen letters are an epistolary novel written by some member of the Academy about the end of the 4th century B. C.¹).

436. P. Merlan, Form and content in Plato's philosophy, Journ Hist Ideas 8, 1947, 406—430. This is a revision and expansion of his paper, Platons Form der philosophischen Mitteilung, Leopoli 1939 (= Hermaion, fasc. 10). The *Epistles* are here interpreted as illuminating Plato's notion of his philosophy and his manner of giving it expression.

437. Margherita Isnardi, L'Accademia e le *Lettere* platoniche, Parola Pass 10, 1955, 241—273. She defends the authenticity of *Epistles* VI, VII, and VIII, chiefly against Maddalena (429 *supra*), and discusses III, IV, and V as writings composed in the Academy shortly after Plato's death in the circle of Speusippus; concerning the authenticity of XI she is hesitant. See also her essay, Teoria e prassi... (104 *supra*).

¹) See also his article:

433a) G. Hell, Zur Datierung des siebenten und achten platonischen Briefes, Hermes 67, 1932, 295—302.

²) In an earlier article he had contended that the epistolary novel was the work of Plato himself:

435a) F. Dornseiff, Platons Buch 'Briefe', Hermes 69, 1934, 223—226.

γ

There have been three recent articles by Giangrande, in each of which the text of passages in various *Epistles* is emended, mainly in accordance with Jachmann's programme of excising interpolations. I give here after the titles of these articles a list of the chief passages with which they deal:

438. G. Giangrande, Osservazioni sul testo delle *Epistole* platoniche, Rend Accad Lincei, Cl Scienze Mor 8 Ser 5, 1950, 333—338.

439. G. Giangrande, Nuove osservazioni sul testo delle *Epistole* platoniche, Parola Pass 6, 1951, 439—448.

440. G. Giangrande, Emendamenti al testo delle *Epistole* platoniche, Parola Pass 9, 1954, 296—300.

I, 309C—D: 438 *supra*.

II, 313B4—C1: 439 *supra*.

III, 318A1—2: 440 *supra*; 319A4—6: 439 *supra*.

VI, 323B4—C3: 439 *supra*.

VII, 325D5—6: 439 *supra*; 327A—B: 438 *supra*; 329C 8ff.: 438 *supra*; 330A ff.: 438 *supra*; 333B5—C1: 440 *supra*; 335B: 439 *supra*; 337C5—D4: 440 *supra*; 338E3—4: 440 *supra*; 339C: 439 *supra*; 340B4—7: 440 *supra*; 343C: 439 *supra*; 347D5—6: 439 *supra*; 350A: 438 *supra*; 351A: 438 *supra*; 351D—E: 438 *supra*.

VIII, 354D—E: 438 and 439 *supra*; 356D: 438 *supra*.

XIII, 361B: 439 *supra*; 361D: 439 *supra*.

Epistle I

 β

441. G. Giangrande, La *Epistola* platonica I, Riv Filolog Cl N.S. 32, 1954, 353—371. He holds that it is a fairly early forgery written with the intention of attribution to Plato, who was thus to be relieved of any responsibility for the tyranny of Dionysius. The writer is held to have used *Epistle* III.

Epistle III

 β

442. L. Wickert, Zur Frage der Echtheit des dritten platonischen Briefes, Rhein Mus N.F. 93, 1950, 383—384. He briefly argues in support of the authenticity which he assumed in his essay, Platon und Syrakus (98 *supra*). See also in agreement P. Merlan, Historia 3, 1954/55, 75.

Epistle VI

 β

443. R. Stark, *Aristotelesstudien*, München 1954, pp. 20—26: Die politische Aufgabe der Philosophie nach dem sechsten Platonbrief (cf. Dirlmeier, *Gnomon* 28, 1956, 345—346; Defradas, *Rev Philol* 3 Sér 31, 1957, 123). He assumes authenticity, argues that there is no discrepancy between this letter and Strabo's account of Hermias, and opposes Jaeger's emendation and interpretation of 322 D.

Epistle VII

 β

Many of the discussions of *Epistle VII* include some discussion of *VIII* as well. Among publications already listed which are predominantly concerned with *VII* see: W. Jaeger, *Paideia III*, pp. 271—288 (4 *supra*); G. Boas (80 *supra*); R. S. Bluck (81 *supra*); J. H. Thiel (82 *supra*); G. Rudberg (83 *supra*); H. Berve (90 and 91 *supra*); W. H. Porter (93 *supra*); K. F. Stroheker (94 and 95 *supra*); L. Wickert (98 *supra*); A. J. Festugière, *La Révélation... IV*, pp. 82—84 and 86—91 (116 *supra*)¹. In addition to these see:

444. G. Misch, *Geschichte der Autobiographie*, 3te stark vermehrte Auflage, Bern 1949, I/1, pp. 114—158 = *A History of Autobiography in Antiquity*, London 1950, I, pp. 110—154. This section on *Epistle VII* was composed for the English edition, which contains at least one important note (p. 150) that is lacking from the German edition. Misch concludes his detailed and acute analysis with the verdict that the letter was written not by Plato but by a member of the Academy. His arguments are questioned by B. Snell, *Archiv Philos* 4, 1952, 182—183 and rejected by P. Friedländer (11a *supra*), I, pp. 251—254 = (11b *supra*), I, pp. 238—241 but remain impressive despite this criticism.

445. G. Müller, *Die Philosophie im pseudoplatonischen 7. Brief*, *Archiv Philos* 3, 1949, 251—276. He argues that the philosophy of the letter is incompatible with Platonic authorship. The many eccentricities, not to say obvious errors, of Müller's interpretation by obscuring the cogent arguments at his disposal have made this article appear

¹ Cf. on pp. 88—91 of Festugière's interpretation the divergent interpretation of 341 B 7 — D 2 by H. J. Rose in his review, *Cl Rev N.S.* 5, 1955, 277—278.

easier to refute than it need have been (cf. 446 and 447 *infra* and P. Friedländer [11a], I, p. 354, n. 3 = [11b], I, p. 377, n. 3).

446. Bertha Stenzel, Is Plato's *Seventh Epistle* spurious?, *AJPh* 74, 1953, 383—397. She defends the authenticity of the letter, contending that G. Müller's arguments (445 *supra*) depend upon 'incorrect interpretations and sweeping statements' and so do not suffice to prove it spurious.

447. H. Patzer, *Mittelbarkeit der Erkenntnis und Philosophenregiment im 7. Platobrief*, *Archiv Philos* 5, 1954, 19—36. In this interpretation of the letter Patzer argues that the genuine difficulties which it contains are to be ascribed to Plato's old age and do not justify the conclusion of G. Müller (445 *supra*).

448. P. Mazon, *Sur une lettre de Platon*, *Mélanges Auguste Diès*, Paris 1956, pp. 169—180. He argues for the authenticity of *Epistle VII*, including the 'philosophical digression', and tries especially to explain 341B7—342A1. This is essentially the same as the paper of Mazon's, *De l'authenticité de la VII^{me} Lettre de Platon*, *CR Acad Inscrit et BL*, 1930, 299 ff.

γ

See the passages of *Epistle VII* treated in the three articles of G. Giangrande (438, 439, and 440 *supra*).

449. On 332A7—B1: I. Lévy, *Rev Ét Anciennes* 42, 1940, 234—236. Lévy argues from comparison with *Laws* 695B6—7 that the letter must be at least in part spurious. The rest of the article (pp. 236—241) is concerned with the passage of the *Laws*.

450. On 332C6—E3 and 335A7—C1: R. S. Bluck, *Cl Rev* 60, 1946, 7—8.

— On 341A8—345C3, the 'philosophical digression' (342A—344D) with its introduction and conclusion, most of the studies of *Epistle VII* have laid special stress: see among the publications listed *supra* especially Morrow (426), pp. 61—79; Maddalena (429), pp. 277—335; Pasquali (434), pp. 77—114, Isnardi (437), pp. 254—260; G. Müller (445), pp. 252—267; Patzer (447), pp. 20—31. In addition to these the following publications are concerned with the whole or a large part of this passage:

451. On 342A—344D: R. Hönigswald, *Vom Erkenntnisbegriff des VII. platonischen Briefes*, *Mnem III* 8, 1940, 21—44.

452. On 341C—344E: U. Galli, Il problema di linguaggio secondo la *VIIa epistola* platonica, Mem Accad Lincei, CI Sc Mor Stor 8 Ser. 1, 1948, 69—90. The passage is here used in an attempt to reconstruct the evolution of Plato's theory of language. For treatment of the passage from this point of view in connection with the *Cratylus* see also V. Goldschmidt (343 *supra*), pp. 194—196¹); A. Nehring (344 *supra*), pp. 29—30; Derbolav (349 *supra*), pp. 74—79 and 87—89²).

453. On 341B—345C: M. Untersteiner, Polemica contro Ippia nella settima epistola di Platone, Riv Storia Filos 3, 1948, 101—119. He contends that in the 'philosophical digression' Plato is combatting point by point the doctrine of Hippias which Dionysius had followed in his writing.

454. On 341B—344C: J. Sulliger, Platon et le problème de la communication de la philosophie, Studia Philos 11, 1951, 155—175. From this passage, which is here held to be in accord with Plato's earlier convictions, are elicited his conception of philosophy, his attitude towards oral and written teaching, and the reason why the dialogue was the only literary genre acceptable to him. Compare and contrast Merlan (436 *supra*), of whose interpretation Sulliger makes no mention.

Epistle X

β

455. G. Giangrande, L'epistola platonica X, Studi Ital Filol CI N.S. 24, 1950, 181—186. This letter, connected with the Isocratean *Epistle* V, is a post-Platonic Academic polemic against Isocrates.

¹) Goldschmidt in his book, *Les Dialogues de Platon*, Paris 1947, pp. 3—12, on the other hand, treats 342A—344D and the texts of *Republic* VI—VII together as complementary presentations of Plato's dialectical methodology. M. W. Isenberg in *CI Phil* 46, 1951, 201—211 tries to use this passage of *Epistle* VII as the key to the dialectical structure of the *Sophist*, as had been done earlier with the *Politicus* by Margarete Schröder (737 *infra*).

²) See also Derbolav, *Erkenntnis und Erscheinung* (16 *supra*), pp. 212—213, 239—244, 270—274, and 382—387. Lohmann in his review of Derbolav's monograph on the *Cratylus* (*Gnomon* 26, 1954, 451 and 453) insists that the attitude towards language in this passage of *Epistle* VII is enough to prove the letter Hellenistic and not Platonic.

Erastae

 β

456. Margherita Isnardi, Note al dialogo pseudoplatonico *Anterastai*, Parola Pass 9, 1954, 137—143. A discussion of the philosophical tendency and possible milieu of the dialogue. She tends to place it in the Academy at the end of the 4th century and suggests that it may be an anti-Peripatetic polemic.

Eryxias

 β

457. G. Gartmann, Der pseudoplatonische Dialog *Eryxias*, Diss. Bonn 1949. He concludes that the dialogue was written in the Academy of Arcesilaus. See, however, the much earlier article on the dialogue:

458. D. E. Eichholz, The Pseudo-Platonic dialogue *Eryxias*, Cl Quart 29, 1935, 129—149. He gives a careful analysis of the dialogue from which it appears that the author probably wrote it in the Academy in the first quarter of the third century before Arcesilaus assumed the presidency.

Euthydemus

 α

459. Plato, Euthydemus met een inleiding en aantekeningen uitgegeven door Dr. G. J. de Vries, Groningen 1951. This is professedly an edition for use in schools, as is also the text with translation into modern Greek and a few notes by P. Papanikolaos, Athens 1952.

 β

See M. Soreth (298 *supra*) and the references in note 1 on p. 67 on that article.

460. G. Hinrichs, The Euthydemus as a locus of the Socratic Elenchus, New Scholast 25, 1951, 178—183. This interpretation is directed primarily against that of R. Robinson's in his book, Plato's Earlier Dialectic, Ithaca 1941.

461. M. Buccellato, La polemica anti-sofistica dell' *Eutidemo* e il suo interesse dottrinale, Riv Crit Storia Filos 7, 1952, 81—103. Reprinted as chapter 5 of 150 *supra*.

Euthyphro

 α

462. Platone: Eutifrone, traduzione a cura di Beatrice Mazzantini, introduzione e commento a cura di C. Mazzantini, Torino 1945. The introductory essay of 30 pages seeks to establish the essential agreement of the doctrine of the *Euthyphro* with that of Catholicism.

463. Eutifrone, introduzione, trad. e note di P. Rossi, Milano 1951.

 β

See the book of R. Guardini (319 *supra*) and the article of M. Fox (323 *supra*).

464. A. H. Weston, The Question of Plato's *Euthyphro*, Cl Bull 27, 1951, 57—58.

465. V. Guarrella, Intorno al rapporto tra morale greca e morale cristiana, Sophia 20, 1952, 251—253.

466. A. L. Hammond, *Euthyphro*, Mill, and Mr. Lewis, Journ Philos 49, 1952, 377—392. In this essay the logical basis of the *Euthyphro* is applied in criticism of the ethics of Mill, Dewey, and Lewis.

467. R. Stark, Platons Dialog 'Euthyphron', Ann Univ Saraviensis 1, 1952, 144—159. Stark holds that the dialogue is later than both the *Protagoras* and the *Gorgias* and that it assumes the theory of ideas. Plato here gives at once a clear sketch of Socrates' critique of religion and states the premises of his own religiosity, exhibiting as the foundation of it the discovery of the 'metaphysical'.

468. J. Wytzes, Nieuwlichterij in Athene, Hermeneus 24, 1953, 205—209; see *contra* J. M. Kramer, Hermeneus 26, 1955, 144—146.

469. O. Gigon, Platons *Euthyphron*, Westöstliche Abhandlungen Rudolf Tschudi zum 70. Geburtstag, Wiesbaden 1954, pp. 6—38. Gigon applies here the 'analytical' method that he has also used on the *Protagoras* to similar effect. Plato, he concludes, constructed the *Euthyphro* by inserting an investigation of *δσιον* into 'scenery' borrowed from a different ethical discussion, which Gigon calls 'die Frage nach dem ethischen Rang der Gerechtigkeit'. Cf. his analysis of *Laws* 624A—632D (544 *infra*).

470. G. Galli, Saggio sull' *Eutifrone* di Platone, Estudios de Historia de la Filosofía en homenaje al Prof. R. Mondolfo, Fasc. 1,

Tucuman 1957, pp. 169—189. Plato is here represented as oscillating between the Socratic aspect and the original or Platonic aspect of his own philosophy, and this situation is supposed to explain what Galli thinks the special way in which the dialogue is concluded¹).

471. R. G. Hoerber, Plato's *Euthyphro*, *Phronesis* 3, 1958, 95—107. He stresses the connection of the *Euthyphro* with the *Theaetetus* and the *Apology*. With this compare and contrast the treatment by M. Fox (323 *supra*) and by J. Xenakis, *Phronesis* 1, 1955/56, 50, who sees in the *Philebus* an attempt to carry out a programme suggested in the *Euthyphro*.

472. W. G. Rabinowitz, Platonic piety: An essay towards the solution of an enigma, *Phronesis* 3, 1958, 108—120. In putting the question shirked by *Euthyphro* and in emphasizing its significance Plato intended to point to the answer later given in his identification of deity and *νοῦς*, its function in relation to the ideas, and the nature of genuine piety as philosophy.

γ

473. On 4 C—D and 9 A (τοῦ ἐξηγητοῦ and τῶν ἐξηγητῶν): H. Bloch, *AJPh* 74, 1953, 413; J. H. Oliver, *AJPh* 75, 1954, 163—164 (reply to Bloch); H. Bloch, *Harvard Studies in Class Phil* 62, 1957, 40—41 (rejoinder to Oliver). See 556—559a *infra* on *Laws* 759 C 6—E 3.

474. On 12 D 7—10: É. de Strycker, Les nombres scalènes et isocèles, *Rev Ét Grecques* 63, 1950, 44—49.

Gorgias

α

475. *Platonis Gorgias* edidit Willy Theiler, Bern 1943. Text, Appendix Critica, and Index locorum a Platone designatorum.

476. *Platoon, Gorgias* vertaald, ingeleid en verklaard door R. van Pottelbergh, Amsterdam/Antwerpen 1948.

477. *Platone, Gorgia* a cura di N. Sabbatucci, 3a edizione rivenduta, Bari 1956. Italian translation with introduction and exegetical notes.

¹) See also *Il Saggiatore* 3, 1953, 150—160 and Galli's book, *Da Talete al 'Menone' di Platone* (19 *supra*), pp. 97—99. The article in the volume for Prof. Mondolfo is now reprinted in Galli's book, *Socrate ed alcuni dialoghi platonici*, Torino 1958, pp. 183—203.

β

See the articles already mentioned *supra* by L. Bianchi (189), G. Rudberg (293), and G. Calogero (190).

478. A. Rivier, Les horizons métaphysiques du '*Gorgias*' de Platon, Lausanne 1948 (cf. Masarachia, *Maia* 1, 1948, 313—317).

479. E. Voegelin, The Philosophy of Existence: Plato's *Gorgias*, *Rev Politics* 11, 1949, 477—498. This essay is now incorporated in his book, *Order and History*, Vol. III (36 *supra*).

480. F. Robert, Sur trois dialogues de Platon (*Protagoras*, *Gorgias*, *Phèdre*), *L'Information Littéraire* 4, 1952, 15—18. He contends that Calicles is a mask for Plato himself and that the dialogue depicts the shock which the young Plato received from his meeting with Socrates whom he approached with the ideas of Calicles and the intentions of the young Hippocrates in the *Protagoras*. Cf. Méautis, *Platon Vivant*, pp. 194—195 (32 *supra*).

481. V. de Magalhães-Vilhena, Le Socrate de '*Gorgias*' et l'action politique, *L'Information Littéraire* 6, 1954, 109—113. This is the second part of his article, *La pensée et l'action*; here the *Gorgias* is treated as evidence for the thesis that Plato was always fundamentally a politician for whom philosophy was 'the continuation of politics by other means'.

482. M. Vanhoutte, La notion de la liberté dans le '*Gorgias*' de Platon, Leopoldville 1957. This 'existentialist' interpretation concludes that according to the *Gorgias* 'liberty has its origin only in the domain of belief and faith when direct recourse to reason is excluded for the time being'.

A protest against such interpretations as have culminated in 481 *supra* is to be found in the second chapter of M. Pavan's book:

483. M. Pavan, La grecità politica da Tucidide ad Aristotele, Roma 1958, pp. 37—66: Il '*Gorgia*' di Platone e i '*Memorabili di Socrate*' di Senofonte. Pavan denies that the dialogue is merely Plato's reaction against the Athenian democracy of his own time or against the pamphlet of Polycrates¹) and maintains that it expresses

¹) For the latest interpretation of the *Gorgias* as a reply to Polycrates see A.-H. Chroust, *Socrates: Man and myth*, pp. 69, 98, 200—202, and note 597 (130 *supra*); and for a bitter attack upon the *Gorgias* as falsifying the pragmatic 'liberal' politics of the sophists see E. A. Have-lock, *The liberal temper . . .*, pp. 245—249 (152 *supra*).

instead the judgment of philosophy upon all practical politics, the sovereignty of individual morality over historical expediency, a judgment from which Plato never swerved or deviated.

γ

484. On 451 A 7—C 5: É. de Strycker, *Rev Ét Grecques* 63, 1950, 49—54.

485. On 455 C and 456 D: W. C. Helmbold, *Mnem* IV 5, 1952, 226.

486. On 464 A—466 A: F. Wehrli, *Mus Helvet* 8, 1951, 182—184. See on this passage also the earlier article by P.-M. Schuhl reprinted in his book, *Études sur la fabulation platonicienne*, Paris 1947, pp. 41—44.

487. On 474 C—475 E: H. Reiner, *Unrecht tun ist schlimmer als Unrecht leiden*, *Zeitschr philos Forsch* 11, 1957, 548—555. After having identified what he considers to be the logical error in this proof, he considers the relation between the good and pleasure which according to him Plato failed to judge 'positively' until he came to write the *Philebus*.

488. On 484 A—C: M. Gigante, *NOMOS BASILAEYS*, Napoli 1956, especially pp. 149—157 and 172—176. See also É. des Places, *Pindare et Platon*, pp. 171—175 (222 *supra*); S. Gennaro, *Siculorum Gymnas* 4, 1951, 103—108; G. Müller, *Studien zu den platonischen Nomoi*, München 1951, pp. 167—168; A.-H. Chroust, *Class et Med* 16, 1955, 41—43. For the fragment of Pindar itself and a full apparatus cf. A. Turyn, *Pindari Carmina cum Fragmentis*, Cracoviae 1948, pp. 350—352.

— On 492 D—493 C: I. M. Linforth (210a *supra*) and *contra* E. R. Dodds, *The Greeks and the Irrational*, p. 225, n. 5 (230 *supra*).

489. On 521 D 6—8: H. F. Tecoz, *L'arte regia* di Socrate, *Riv Filos* 44, 1953, 416—423.

Hipparchus

α

490. Platone: L'Ipparco o l'avidità di guadagno con introduzione e commento di G. Calogero, Firenze 1938. This is the most recent text and commentary of the dialogue. The introductory essay, in which Calogero argues for the authenticity of the work, was separately published under the title, *L'autenticità dell' 'Ipparco' platonico*, *Ann Scuol Norm Sup Pisa, Lettere* 2 Ser 7, 1938, 13—27.

Hippias Major

 β

491. Marion Soreth, *Der platonische Dialog Hippias Major*, München 1953 (cf. Moreau, *Rev Ét Anciennes* 56, 1954, 191—192¹); de Strycker, *Ant Cl* 23, 1954, 472—473; Goldschmidt, *Rev Ét Grecques* 68, 1955, 374—375; Tarrant, *Cl Rev N.S.* 5, 1955, 52—53; Gigon, *Gnomon* 27, 1955, 14—20). She argues that the dialogue is authentic and that it must have been written before the *Phaedo*, which could not have been understood by the public of the early 4th century without the decisive link in the explication of the theory of ideas provided, as she maintains, by the *Hippias Major*. The weakness of this theory has been remarked even by those reviewers who agree with the thesis that the dialogue is authentic.

492. R. G. Hoerber, *Plato's Hippias Major*, *Cl Journ* 50, 1954/55 183—186. This is an elementary analysis of the argument, assuming the authenticity of the dialogue.

493. Annemarie Capelle, *Platonisches im Größeren Hippias*, *Rhein Mus N.F.* 99, 1956, 178—190. This is in large part a discussion of Miss Soreth's monograph (491 *supra*), criticizing it in detail and arguing that the *Hippias* must be later than the *Phaedo*.

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494. On 288 C 10—D 5: P. Chantraine, *Rev Philol* 21, 1947, 46—48. He argues that Xenophon, *Oeconomicus* VIII, 19 alludes to this passage.

495. On 301 B (and 301 E3—4): H. Cherniss, *AJPh* 73, 1952, 200 n. 3; M. Untersteiner, *Sofisti: Testimonianze e Frammenti*, fasc. 3, Firenze 1954, pp. 106—109.

496. On 303 B: P.-H. Michel, *De Pythagore à Euclide*, Paris 1950, pp. 500—504. Cf. É. de Strycker, *Ant Cl* 21, 1952, 531 and his earlier article, *De irrationalen in den Hippias Major*, *Ant Cl* 10, 1941, 25—36.

¹) See also his earlier article, of which Miss Soreth takes no account:

491a) J. Moreau, *Le platonisme de l'«Hippias Majeur»*, *Rev Ét Grecques* 54, 1941, 19—42. He here contends that, while the content of the dialogue is Platonic, the dialogue could not have been written by Plato. In the same year Pavlu published an attack on the authenticity of the dialogue:

491b) J. Pavlu, *Der pseudoplatonische Größere Hippias*, *Wiener Studien* 59, 1941, 35—60.

Hippias Minor

 α

497. Platone: *L'Ippia Minore* con introduzione e commento di G. Calogero, Firenze 1948.

 β

498. G. M. Sciacca, *Ippia Minore* 376 B, Giorn Metafisica 8, 1953, 670—680. This is an interpretation not of the passage mentioned in the title but of the whole dialogue and in a sense of Plato's whole philosophical procedure as self-criticism for the purpose of self-knowledge and not merely of knowledge. *Hippias Minor* 376 B 8—C 3 is taken as the leitmotif of this interpretation, which is cast into the form of an address by Socrates to Hippias.

Ion

 α

499. Platone: *Ione* a cura di U. Albin, Firenze 1954. (cf. de Vries, Mnem IV 9, 1956, 63—64). This contains the text, a commentary, and a good concise introduction in which the problems of the dialogue are well presented.

 β

Among the studies of the dialogue already mentioned see M. S. Ruipérez (296 *supra*) on the dating; H. Koller, *Die Mimesis* . . . , pp. 148—151 (168 *supra* and the reviews there listed); and especially H. Flashar, *Der Dialog Ion als Zeugnis platonischer Philosophie* (173 *supra*). In this most recent monograph on the subject Flashar argues that the *Ion* is the earliest of Plato's works, that it was written shortly after 394 B.C., and that it contains as it were in germ the leading motifs of his philosophy, which were then organically articulated in the later dialogues. The manner in which these various Platonic themes are employed in the composition of the dialogue had led Moreau to deny its authenticity and to suggest that its author was a disciple of Plato's:

500. J. Moreau, *Les thèmes platoniciens de l' 'Ion'*, Rev Ét Grecques 52, 1939, 419—428. In reply to Moreau's argument here Verdenius then undertook to reestablish the authenticity of the dialogue and to determine Plato's intention in writing it:

501. W. J. Verdenius, *L'Ion* de Platon, Mnem III 11, 1943, 233—262. Verdenius stresses the moral authority of Homer claimed

by the rhapsodic exegetes and the duty felt by Plato to show the danger inherent in this pedagogical pretention deriving from irrational knowledge. This irrational 'enthusiasm' or divine possession, however, as the explanation of artistic creation continued to be taken by others to be the central theme of the dialogue. By Grassi it was held to mean that poets and even proper interpreters of poetry have a kind of super-rational power of communion with objective verity:

502. E. Grassi, *Von der Dichtung im platonischen Dialog 'Ion'*, *Verteidigung des individuellen Lebens*, Bern 1946, pp. 45—56¹).

503. F. Wehrli, *Der erhabene und der schlichte Stil . . .*, *Phyllobolia für Peter von der Mühl*, Basel 1946, pp. 9—34 (cf. Cherniss, *AJPh* 71, 1950, 83—84). He argues that the inspirational theory is Democritean though mixed with Gorgianic elements and that in the *Ion* Plato allows it a limited validity but gives the thinker priority over the poet²).

504. L. Roussel, *Pan! Sur l'Ion de Platon*, Paris 1949 (cf. Tate, *Cl Rev N.S.* 2, 1952, 47). This is an indictment of the *Ion* as 'a monument of ignorance, of error, and of treason', which is proved genuine by exhibiting these characteristic Platonic vices. The monograph is a curiosity even in the literature of anti-Platonism.

505. C. La Drière, *The Problem of Plato's Ion*, *Journ Aesthetics and Art Criticism* 10, 1951, 26—34. The problem of the dialogue is here asserted to be the criticism of poetry as practiced by Ion and by implication such criticism of all similar art; and, rejecting Ion's procedure as merely 'impressionistic', Plato undertakes to prove that no art-criticism of scientific value does exist or in the nature of things can exist³).

506. H. Diller, *Probleme des platonischen Ion*, *Hermes* 83, 1955, 171—187. After analysing the difficulties of the dialogue and the

¹ H. Gundert (*Lexis* 2, fasc. 1, 1949, 27—30) tends in a similar direction, although he is aware of Plato's irony and tries to reconcile it with his interpretation. See on the other hand the incisive paragraph by F. Mehmel (*Antike und Abendland* 4, 1954, 33), according to whom the result of the dialogue is that the wisdom which Ion finds in Homer is ignorance, mere subjective, untechnical play, and truth is not to be achieved on the basis of Homer, poetry, or tradition but only by immediate perception of the ideas.

² Cf. A. Delatte, *Les conceptions de l'enthousiasme chez les philosophes présocratiques*, Paris 1934, pp. 57—59.

³ See the interesting remarks of a modern literary critic, A. Pagliaro, *Saggi di critica semantica*, Messina/Firenze 1953, pp. VIII—XI. He approves Plato's critique in the *Ion* but contends that it is possible to practice literary criticism such as Plato postulated.

various hypotheses concerning it (including Flashar's work [173 *supra*], which he had seen before its publication), Diller returns to Schleiermacher's theory that it is the edition of an early and unfinished sketch of Plato's by a pupil who inserted into it reminiscences of later dialogues.

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507. On 530C—534C: A. A. Roig, L'allégorisme de Platon d'après un passage de l'*Ion* 530C—534C, Assoc G. Budé, Congrès de Tours et Poitiers 1953 Actes, Paris 1954, 171—176.

Laches

β

See A. J. Festugière (288 *supra*) on the relation of the *Laches* to the *Protagoras* and especially on *Laches* 192 E.

508. W. Steidle, Der Dialog *Laches* und Platons Verhältnis zu Athen in den Frühdialogen, Mus Helvet 7, 1950, 129—146. Taking the *Laches* as the first of the early dialogues, he argues that with the *Apology* and *Crito* it was written while Plato still despite the execution of Socrates thought Athens was curable by education and before he had decided that the laws of all states were hopelessly corrupt. From this he goes on to show the relation of the Socratic λόγος as depicted in the early dialogues to the concrete facts of communal life in the πόλις.

509. G. Galli, Sul *Lachete* di Platone, Il Saggiatore 3, 1953, 62—82. A revised version is printed in his book, Socrate ed alcuni dialoghi platonici, Torino 1958, pp. 153—182.

510. P. Grenet, Note sur la structure du *Lachès*, Mélanges Auguste Diès, Paris 1956, pp. 121—128. A study of the 'regressions' in the dialogue and their relation to the dialectical structure and of the implications of ἀρχή, ἐξ ἀρχῆς for the dialectical situation in different kinds of Platonic dialogues.

Laws

α

511. Les Lois: Texte établi et traduit par É. des Places (Livres I—VI) et A. Diès (Livres VII—XII), Introduction de A. Diès et L. Gernet, 4 volumes = Platon, Oeuvres Complètes XI, 1re et 2e parties, Paris 1951; XII, 1re et 2e parties, Paris 1956 (cf. Post, AJPh 75, 1954, 201—206 and 79, 1958, 286—288; Einarson, Cl Phil 52, 1957, 271—274 and 53, 1958, 97—98).

See also on the text and indirect tradition of the *Laws* the articles by des Places listed *supra* (268, 269, 270, 272) and Gabrieli's edition and translation of the *Compendium* of Alfarabius (279 *supra*) and his article on Al-Biruni's citations (279b *supra*).

β

Discussion of the *Laws* plays an important rôle in many of the works which, dealing more generally with the political, legal, ethical, and religious theories of Plato, will be found listed *infra* under the subjects Politics-Economics-Law, Ethics, and Religion. The work is also drawn upon heavily by most of the anti-Platonists and so is necessarily discussed also by those who have written in response to these accusers (see AI, 40—66 *supra*). Among these see on the *Laws* especially V. Goldschmidt (55 *supra*), G. R. Morrow (59 *supra*), Marguerite Tête (62 *supra*); and of other books already listed see W. Jaeger, *Paideia* III, pp. 289—344 (4 *supra*) and E. R. Dodds, *The Greeks and the Irrational*, pp. 207—235 (230 *supra*). In the following list of additional studies devoted specifically to the *Laws* I prefix a few of the more important earlier publications:

512. W. G. Becker, *Platons Gesetze und das griechische Familienrecht*, München 1932. The author's professional knowledge of jurisprudence lends this study special importance which is limited, however, by a corresponding weakness in knowledge of Greek.

513. A. H. Chase, *The influence of Athenian Institutions upon the Laws of Plato*, *Harvard Studies in Class Phil* 44, 1933, 131—192.

514. F. Guglielmino, *Il codice penale di Platone e l'involontarietà del male = Preconcetti teorici e realismo in Platone*, Catania 1936, pp. 33—81.

515. R. G. Bury, *The Theory of education in Plato's Laws*, *Rev Ét Grecques* 50, 1937, 304—320.

516. F. Pfister, *Die Prooimia der platonischen Gesetze*, *Mélanges Émile Boisacq* 2, Bruxelles 1938, pp. 173—179. He argues that Plato was unjustified in claiming originality for the prefixing of persuasive prooemia to his laws, for in this he was following a tradition attaching to Charondas and Zaleucus¹).

¹ On the prooemia ascribed to them and against Delatte's interpretation, to which Pfister refers, see W. Kraus, *Anz Altertum* 10, 1957, 129—130. Cf. H. Koller (554 *infra*). A neglected attempt to reconcile the truth of Plato's assertion in *Laws* 722 E with the authenticity of the prooemia of Charondas and Zaleucus was made by R. Düll, *Studi in memoria di Emilio Albertario*, Milano 1953, I, pp. 315—333 (especially pp. 320—322).

517. G. R. Morrow, Plato's law of slavery in its relation to Greek law, *Urbana* 1939 (cf. Gomme, *Cl Rev* 54, 1940, 204—205).

518. A. Meremetis, *Verbrecher und Verbrechen: Untersuchungen zum Strafrecht in Platons 'Gesetzen'*, Borna/Leipzig 1940.

519. G. R. Morrow, On the tribal courts in Plato's *Laws*, *AJPh* 62, 1941, 314—321.

520. G. R. Morrow, Plato and the rule of law, *Philos Rev* 50, 1941, 105—126. This is a study of the judicial system of the *Laws* and especially of the functions assigned to the popular courts; underlying this Morrow sees a basic alteration of Plato's attitude from that manifested in the *Republic*. See 527 *infra*.

521. G. R. Morrow, The status of the alien in Plato's *Laws*, *Scientia* 70, 1941, 38—43.

522. O. Reverdin, *La religion de la cité platonicienne*, Paris 1945 (cf. Boyancé, *Rev Ét Anciennes* 49, 1947, 178—187; Goldschmidt, *Rev Hist Religions* 136, 1949, 240—244). This is a detailed study of all the religious aspects of the *Laws*: first the doctrine regarding the soul, theology, and theodicy and then at greater length the public cults, funerary regulations and cults of the dead, and the penal regulations to safeguard the religion of the state. Discussion of the cult of the dead causes the author to investigate the demonology of Plato himself and of his disciples in the Academy.

523. J. Aerts, *Staatsburgerlijke opvoeding, onderwijs en schoolboeken in de 'Wetten' van Platoon*, *Miscellanea J. Gessler*, Deurne-Anvers 1948, pp. 105—111.

524. H. van Effenterre, *La Crète et le monde grec de Platon à Polybe*, Paris 1948, pp. 45—74. He argues that contrary to the general opinion the *Laws* show much specific knowledge of Crete and Cretan laws and customs which Plato must have gained by personal investigation. See the article by Vourveris (531 *infra*).

525. P. Haliste, *Zwei Fragen zum Katasterwesen in Platons 'Gesetzen'*, *Eranos* 48, 1950, 93—106. He tries to determine the value of the *κλήροι* and the origin of the sacral sanction for inviolability of boundaries in the *Laws*; and from both he concludes that Plato had thought through the whole project of the *Laws* within the realm of the real possibilities known to him. See also his article on 844A1—D3 (565 *infra*).

526. Maria Maykowska, La composition des *Lois*, Meander 5, 1950, 140—157¹).

527. G. R. Morrow, Popular courts in Plato's *Laws*, Scientia 45, 1951, 145—150. See 520 *supra*.

528. G. Müller, Studien zu den platonischen *Nomoi*, München 1951 (cf. des Places, Ant Cl 21, 1952, 376—383; Maddalena, Riv Filolog Cl N.S. 30, 1952, 246—257; Cherniss, Gnomon 25, 1953, 367—379; Aalders, Tijdsch Philos 15, 1953, 607—636; Manasse, Philos Rundschau 5, Beiheft 1, 1957, 52—61). He argues that the *Laws* (with the *Epinomis*) is separated from all the other works of Plato by a philosophical and stylistic gulf that can neither be spanned nor explained away; but for the evidence of Aristotle he would declare the *Laws* to be spurious, for otherwise Plato must be regarded as having produced in it an unintelligent caricature of his own philosophy²).

529. T. A. Sinclair, Myth and politics in the 'Laws' of Plato, Actes Congrès Internat Ét Class, Paris 1951, 273—278. He maintains that in the *Laws* there is no 'Myth of the State' and despite the Nocturnal Council 'in fact in the end neither *μῦθος* nor *λόγος* about the knowability of God', which must really be the basis of this state; and he holds that Plato at the end of his work was in doubt whether his proper task was to build a city in this world or in some other, as in the *Republic*. See also the chapter on the *Laws* in Sinclair's book, A History of Greek political thought, London 1951 (1952), pp. 186—208.

530. W. Theiler, Die bewahrenden Kräfte im Gesetzesstaat Platos, Heimat und Humanität: Festschrift für Karl Meuli = Schweiz Archiv für Volkskunde 47, 1951, 192—202. See especially pp. 200—202

¹) This article, written in Polish, is unavailable to me. The meaning attached to *νόμοι* by Plato in relation to other Greek attitudes towards them, the purpose of his doctrine in the *Laws*, and its difference from that of the *Republic* and *Politicus*, these were discussed by the same author in a pamphlet published in 1949:

526a) Maria Maykowska, Quaestiones Platonicae selectae (Soc Scient Varsoviensis Sectio I), Varsoviae 1949. She clings to Lutoslawski's notions of the change of Plato's theory and mistakenly supposes that in the *Laws* the ideas are said to exist in the minds of the gods (p. 17).

²) In his earlier dissertation Müller had tried to demonstrate the compositional unity of the *Laws* and in so doing had felt constrained to condemn 732 D 8—734 E 2 as an interpolation:

528a) G. Müller, Der Aufbau der Bücher II und VII von Platons *Gesetzen*, Diss Königsberg, Weida i. Thür. 1935.

on the Nocturnal Council, the theory of ideas, and the misunderstanding of the final pages of the *Laws* by the author of the *Epinomis*.

531. K. J. Vourveris, *Πλάτων καὶ Κρήτη, Κρητικά Χρονικά* 7, 1953, 323—336. See van Effenterre's book (524 *supra*).

532. R. Schaerer, L'itinéraire dialectique des *Lois* de Platon et sa signification philosophique, *Rev Philosophique* 143, 1953, 379—412. He attempts here by analysis of the whole work to reduce it to the sort of 'dialectical curve' which he traced in his earlier book, *Dieu, l'homme et la vie d'après Platon*, Neuchâtel 1944, pp. 106—132. See also on the *Laws* Schaerer's still earlier work, *La question platonicienne*, Neuchâtel 1938, pp. 64—65 and 152—155.

533. M. Vanhoutte, La réalisation d'un plan politique selon Platon, *Actes du XIème Congrès Internationale de Philosophie*, Vol. XII, Amsterdam/Louvain 1953, 77—82. Although in the *Laws* Plato has a clearer conception than in the *Republic* with regard to the realization of a political plan, he is by his own admission even here far from having developed the plan to the point at which it could be put into action. See Vanhoutte's book, 538 *infra*.

534. K. J. Vourveris, *θεῖος φόβος, Ἐπιστημονική Ἐπετηρὶς τῆς φιλοσοφικῆς σχολῆς τοῦ πανεπιστημίου Ἀθηνῶν*, 1953/54, 122—132. An investigation of this notion in the *Laws* and in the *Oresteia* of Aeschylus. See in this connection also É. de Strycker's article (545 *infra*).

535. C. J. Alsina, Platon y la vejez, *Helmantica* 5, 1954, 61—69. Plato's notions concerning old age especially as expressed in the *Laws*.

536. G. Barraud, La puériculture et l'eugénisme chez les Grecs, *Bull Assoc Budé*, § Ser, Mars 1954, 70—76. Discussing the provisions for marriage and eugenics in the *Republic* and the *Laws*, he maintains that in the latter Plato had achieved a conception less abstract and more understanding of human nature than he had in the former. See also his book, *Clio en Epidaure: La médecine de l'humanisme chez les anciens*, Paris 1954. 4/

537. G. R. Morrow, The Demiurge in politics: The *Timaeus* and the *Laws*, *Proc and Addresses Am Philos Assoc* 27, 1954, 5—23. The *Laws* is, he thinks, a deliberate effort to show how a philosopher-legislator would proceed, using the materials at his disposal in Greek life. In the *Laws* Plato puts into determinate form the political ideal of the *Republic*, which is independent of geography and history, just as in the *Timaeus* the demiurge has to use the material available to him. Most striking—and improbable—is Morrow's contention that

the work on 'laws' which Aristotle criticizes is not the text which we have but an earlier version.

538. M. Vanhoutte, La philosophie politique de Platon dans les 'Lois', Louvain 1954 (cf. Annamaria Marietti, *Filosofia* 5, 1954, 494—498; Aalders, *Mnem* IV 8, 1955, 316—317; Morrow, *AJPh* 76, 1955, 425—429; Schaerer, *Studia Philos* 15, 1955, 216—218; de Strycker, *Ant Cl* 25, 1956, 174—176). This interpretation, Neo-Hegelian and existentialist, proceeding from the assumption that the *Laws* is an unfinished work, is more concerned with the 'latent' doctrine than with a close interpretation of the text as it stands. See Vanhoutte's article, 533 *supra*.

part/

539. L. T. J. M. Gubbels, De Godsdienst in de Staat van Plato's *Wetten*, Nijmegen 1955. This is a sober but pedantic analysis of the rôle of religion in the state of the *Laws*, for the most following Mermetis (518 *supra*) and Reverdin (522 *supra*) and providing no new insight into the philosophical problems presented by the work.

540. E. Koller, Muße und musische Paideia, *Mus Helvet* 13, 1956, 4—28 and 115—120 (= 169 *supra*). On Plato's attitude towards music in the *Republic* and the *Laws*, the rôle of music in the education and life of the citizens, and the difference between the states in the two works.

541. C. B. Welles, The Greek city, *Studi in Onore di A. Calderini e R. Paribeni* Vol. 1, Milano 1956, 81—99. On pp. 87—95 he argues that the city of the *Laws* was based upon the practical experience of the Greeks and that the work was well known to the urbanizing Hellenistic kings and their advisers, and he sketches the provisions of the *Laws* in order to show that its institutions served as a sort of model for their cities.

542. J. Boisset, La Genève de Calvin et l'État des Lois, *Rev Philosophique* 147, 1957, 365—369. Parallels between Calvin's Geneva and Plato's *Laws* and the contention that the latter exercised a direct influence on Calvin.

γ

For discussion of the text and interpretation of many passages of the *Laws* see the reviews of Post and Einarson listed in 511 *supra*, the monograph of G. Müller (which is equipped with an Index Locorum) and the reviews of it (528 *supra*), and the earlier article of Post's:

543. L. A. Post, Notes on Plato's *Laws*, *AJPh* 60, 1939, 93—105. Emendations and interpretations of 80 passages from 746 D3—5 to 969 C3, that part of the text in O that is copied from A, roughly Books VI—XII.

544. On I 624 A 1—632 D 7: O. Gigon, *Das Einleitungsgespräch der Gesetze Platons*, *Mus Helvet* 11, 1954, 201—230. From his analysis of the text Gigon concludes that the relation of the argument to the *mise en scène* is highly obscure and that from 628 C 9 onwards we have either a clumsily abbreviated edition or a combination of several earlier texts or sketches. For other examples of this kind of analysis see 469 *supra*.

545. On I 646 E—647 B: É. de Strycker, *Vrees als principe van staatsburgerlijke tucht in de democratie volgens Thucydides en volgens Plato*, *Zuidnederlandse Maatschappij voor Taal- en Letterkunde*, *Handelingen* 9, 1955, 51—64. Beginning with Thucydides II, 37, 3 he interprets this passage of the *Laws* and 698 A—C, 699 B—D to show how *δέος* and *φόβος* could be used in a sense approaching that of *αἰδώς*; and, citing Herodotus, the tragedians, and others, he argues that 'fear' in this sense of 'shame' was stressed by democratic theory in its defence against oligarchic criticism, in this connection making some illuminating observations on the *Menexenus* (pp. 57—58)¹.

546. On I, 647 E—649 A: P.-M. Schuhl, *Platon et l'idée d'exploration pharmaco-dynamique*, *Journ Psychol Norm et Path* 43, 1950, 279—281. This brief essay is reprinted in Schuhl's book, *Le merveilleux, la pensée et l'action*, Paris 1952, pp. 150—154.

547. On Book III (676 A—702 E): G. J. D. Aalders, *Het derde boek van Plato's Leges I—Prolegomena*, Amsterdam 1943. This substantial study of the third book and of its relation to the *Laws* as a whole, to Plato's political thought generally, and to other historical passages in his writings was to have been followed by a commentary on the book which, so far as I know, has not yet been published.

548. On Books III and IV: H. Ryffel, *METABOLAI ΠΟΛΙΤΕΙΩΝ*, Bern 1949, pp. 110—135: Formen der 'Metabolé' im III. und IV. Buch der 'Gesetze'.

¹ See on *φόβος* the article by Vourveris (584 *supra*) and that of J. de Romilly, *La crainte dans l'oeuvre de Thucydide*, *Class et Med* 17, 1956, 119—127 (especially 126—127), which was written apparently without knowledge of de Strycker's article.

549. On III 676A—683C: Maria Maykowska, *Meander* 3, 1948, 230—245. See also L. Ferrari, *Laval Théol Philos* 12, 1956, 145—152.

550. On III 692D and 698E: W. P. Wallace, *JHS* 74, 1954, 32—35. He gives arguments to support the accuracy of these references to an otherwise unreported war of Sparta against Messene in 490 B.C.

— On III 695B 6—8: See the article of I. Lévy (449 *supra*).

— On III 698A 9—C 3: See É. de Strycker (545 *supra*).

551. On III 698C 7—D 7: G. C. Whittick, *Ant Cl* 22, 1953, 27—31; A. E. Raubitschek, *Charites: Studien zur Altertumswissenschaft (Festschrift Langlotz)*, Bonn 1957, 234—242; K. Meuli, *Westöstliche Abhandlungen Rudolf Tschudi ... überreicht*, Wiesbaden 1954, pp. 63—68.

— On III 699B 3—D 2: See É. de Strycker (545 *supra*).

552. On III 700A 9—C 1: A. E. Harvey, *Cl Quart N.S.* 5, 1955, 165—175.

— On Book IV: See H. Ryffel (548 *supra*).

553. On IV 720A—E: T. A. Sinclair, *Bull Hist Medicine* 25, 1951, 386—387; F. Wehrli, *Mus Helvet* 8, 1951, 178—181 (156 *supra*).

554. On IV 722D—723D: H. Koller, *Philologus* 100, 1956, 188—192. Cf. 516 *supra*.

555. On VI 756B 7—C 2: N. G. L. Hammond, *Cl Quart N.S.* 2, 1952, 7—8. An emendation and interpretation of the text.

556. On VI 759C 6—E 3: F. Jacoby, *Atthis*, Oxford 1949, pp. 248—250, note 53.

557. On VI 759C 6—E 3: J. H. Oliver, *The Athenian expounders of the sacred and ancestral law*, Baltimore 1950, pp. 53—72.

558. On VI 759C 6—E 3: N. G. L. Hammond, *The Exegetai in Plato's Laws*, *Cl Quart N.S.* 2, 1952, 4—12.

559. On VI 759C 6—E 3: J. H. Oliver, *On the Exegetes and the Mantic or Manic Chresmologians*, *AJPh* 73, 1952, 406—413. Here Oliver defends his book (557 *supra*) against its critics and on pp.

411—413 attacks Hammond's treatment (558 *supra*) of this passage of the *Laws*¹).

560. On VI 778 D—779 B: M. Andronikos, Le problème des remparts chez Platon, Studies Presented to David M. Robinson II, St. Louis 1953, pp. 583—592. Plato's conception is moral in purpose and so quite different from the Spartan. See, however, for a factual parallel W. Eden, Annual British School Athens 45, 1950, 16—20.

561. On VII 810 D—812 A: J. Barns, Cl Quart N.S. 1, 1951, 5—8.

562. On VII 819 D—820 B: P.-H. Michel, De Pythagore à Euclide, Paris 1950, pp. 508—511 (see 417 *supra*). Einarson's note on 819 D 5—E 11 in Cl Phil 53, 1958, 98 ought to put an end to the persistent misinterpretation of this passage.

563. On VII 822 A—C: Maria Timpanaro Cardini, Parola Pass 10, 1955, 35—40. She argues again after Schiaparelli that axial rotation of the earth and immobility of the celestial sphere are assumed in this passage and stated openly in *Epinomis* 987 B. She neglects the more recent literature on the subject and is certainly mistaken in her interpretation. Cf. G. L. Andrissi, Atti secondo Cong Unione Matematica Ital, Roma 1942, 913—917; H. Cherniss, Aristotle's criticism of Plato I, Baltimore 1944, pp. 550—551 and pp. 561—562.

564. On VIII 843 C—E: P. Haliste, Zur *ἐνεργασία*, Apophoreta Tartuensia, Stockholm 1949, 21—29. On the difference of meaning in the term as used here and as used in 'international law' (e.g. Xenophon, *Cyropaedia* III, 2, 23)

565. On VIII 844 A 1—D 3: P. Haliste, Die Servitut der Wasserleitung in Platons 'Gesetzen', Eranos 48, 1950, 142—149 (cf. A. W. Gomme, Cl Quart N.S. 4, 1954, 52).

566. On VIII 844 A—D and 845 D—E: C. E. N. Bromehead, Plato and the law of water-supply, Geographical Journal 108, 1946, 123—125. The principles of the British Water Act of 1945 anticipated by Plato in these passages.

¹ In the subsequent controversy the *Euthyphro* (see 478 *supra*) is involved as much as is this passage of the *Laws*, and consideration of both is only incidental to the historical question of the Attic exegetes:

559a) H. Bloch, AJPh 74, 1953, 407—418; J. H. Oliver, AJPh 75, 1954, 160—174 (a reply to Bloch and an attack upon Jacoby's treatment [556 *supra*]); F. Jacoby, F Gr Hist III b, Supplement II, pp. 535—536 (reply to Oliver); H. Bloch, Harvard Studies in Class Phil 62, 1957, 37—49 (rejoinder to Oliver).

— On IX 857 C—D: T. A. Sinclair (553 *supra*).

567. On IX 860 B—864 C: A. Jagu, *Mélanges Auguste Diès*, Paris 1956, pp. 133—134¹).

568. On IX 863 E 5—864 B 7: M. O'Brien, *Plato and the 'Good Conscience'*, *Trans Am Philol Assoc* 88, 1957, 81—87. He interprets the passage not as introducing a new internal standard of justice²) but as reiterating the earlier Platonic doctrine that to be just is to be wise.

569. On Book X (884 A—910 E): V. Martin, *Sur la condamnation des athées par Platon au Xe Livre des Lois*, *Studia Philos* 11, 1951, 103—154. This is a perceptive and well balanced study not only of Book X and of its relation to the social and intellectual crisis of Plato's time and its analogy with the modern situation but also of Plato's doctrine of the soul and 'the divine' as expressed in the *Timaeus* and other writings besides the *Laws*.

570. On X 885 B 2—899 D 3: R. Muth, *Wiener Studien* 69, 1956, 140—153. An analysis of this section which attempts to suggest that in whole or in part it was originally composed for a different context; like so many other such 'analytical' essays it is wholly unconvincing (cf. E. A. Wyller, 575 *infra*).

571. On X 888 E—890 A: S. Zeppi, *Un passo delle Leggi e la filosofia di Prodicò*, *Riv Crit Storia Filos* 10, 1955, 213—222. He argues that in 888 E—889 E Plato gives a résumé of the doctrine of Prodicus, while 890 A refers to that of Callicles. In this latter point he follows M. Untersteiner, who had ascribed the doctrine of 888 E—889 E, however, to Antiphon (I *Sofisti*, Torino 1949, pp. 297—303³).

¹) According to Jagu the passage implies that psychologically evil is always an error but metaphysically it is a fault. Cf. the article by R. Schaerer in *Proc Tenth Internat Cong Philosophy I Fasc. 2*, Amsterdam 1949, 1081—1083.

²) Cf. D. A. Rees, *JHS* 77, Part 1, 1957, 115—116.

³) Untersteiner here tries to answer Bignone, who had already argued against referring the passage to Antiphon and had taken it as referring to Critias instead; and he also argues against taking it as the doctrine of Protagoras, as Nestle had done (e. g. in his *Vom Mythos zum Logos*, Stuttgart 1942, p. 281; *Phil Woch* 52, 1932, 1360—1361), the interpretation adopted more recently by G. B. Kerferd (*JHS* 73, 1953, 43, n. 8). F. Heinimann (*Nomos und Physis*, Basel 1945, p. 119, n. 24) takes the theory of *δίκαιον* in 889 E to be Protagorean but says that the distinction between *νόμος* and *φύσις* here is not and that the following sentence in 890 A clearly refers to the theories of Callicles; against this

— On X 893 B—894 C: F. M. Cornford, *Plato and Parmenides*, London 1939, pp. 14—15 and pp. 197—199 (cf. Tate, *Cl Rev* 55, 1941, 77); J. B. Skemp, *The theory of motion in Plato's later dialogues*, Cambridge 1942, 96—107 (cf. Post, *AJPh* 65, 1944, 299—301 and 79, 1958, 287). On 894 A alone: P. Kucharski, *Étude sur la doctrine pythagoricienne de la tétrade* (419 *supra*), pp. 71—74; H. Cherniss, *AJPh* 78, 1957, 240, n. 44.

— On X 896 C—896 C: For discussion of this widely debated passage I list here only the most recent publications, some of which contain ample bibliographies of the earlier literature: Reich, *Gnomon* 22, 1950, 66—67; W. J. W. Koster (256 *supra*), pp. 59—65; G. Müller (528 *supra*), pp. 87—92; J. H. M. M. Loenen, *De Nous en het systeem van Plato's filosofie*, Amsterdam 1951, pp. 239—251 (cf. Tate, *Cl Rev* N.S. 3, 1953, 157); H. Cherniss, *Proc Am Philos Soc* 98, 1954, 26—27; P. J. G. M. van Litsenburg, *God en het goddelijke en de dialogen van Plato*, Nijmegen 1955, pp. 89—98 (on 884—910 and 966—967 treated together); W. Spoerri (259 *supra*), pp. 210—214; H. Herter, *Rhein Mus N.F.* 100, 1957, 334—336. See also *Entretiens Ant Cl* 3, *Vandoeuvres-Genève* 1957, 15—17 (Guthrie on 896 E 8—897 B 4) and 72—73 (W. Theiler).

572. On X 903 B—905 D: P. Kucharski, *Observations sur le mythe des Lois*, 903b—905d, *Bull Assoc Budé* 13, 4 (*Lettres d'Humanité*), 1954, 31—51. Kucharski's article was written in response to a briefer one on a single paragraph of this 'myth':

573. On X 903 E—904 A: P.-M. Schuhl, *Un cauchemar de Platon?*, *Rev Philosophique* 143, 1953, 420—422.

R. Muth (570 *supra*, p. 146) protests, holding that Plato here selects certain theses from a widespread materialistic 'koiné' consisting of Sophistic doctrines into which had been incorporated theories of Empedocles and the Atomists. J. Tate, who had argued that Plato had in mind Archelaus and his followers (*Cl Quart* 30, 1936, 48—54), has recently reaffirmed this position and rejected all reference to Atomism here (*Cl Rev* N.S. 1, 1951, 157); cf. the newly published letter of H. Diels (177 *supra*). F. Solmsen had criticized the earlier statement of Tate's interpretation (*Trans Am Philol Assoc* 67, 1936, 209, n. 5); and so later did G. Vlastos (*Cl Phil* 42, 1947, 176, n. 177), who contended that Plato here had in mind 'the most mature physical systems including atomism' (cf. G. R. Morrow, *Essays in Political Theory Presented to George H. Sabine*, Ithaca 1948, 33—35). I. Düring has taken an entirely different approach, maintaining that in 888 Eff. Plato gives a commentary on Aristotle's *Protrepticus* or on his lectures (*Autour d'Aristote: Recueil . . . offert à A. Mansion*, Louvain 1955, p. 84 and *Gymnasium* 63, 1956, 149).

574. On X 904 B—E: É. Magotteux, *Ant Cl* 24, 1955, 349—351. In this passage the doctrine of the Myth of Er is resumed though in less spectacular form.

575. On X 907 D—909 D: E. A. Wyller, *Platos Gesetz gegen die Gottesleugner*, *Hermes* 85, 1957, 292—314. This is a strict interpretation of the text to show that its content and its method are purely Platonic and that the passage is a genuine and essential constituent of the *Laws*.

576. On XI 915 D 6—916 D 1: A. Ravà, *Le origini dell'azione rebitoria e la filosofia greca*, *Rend Accad Lincei, Cl Scienze Mor* 8 Ser 6, 1951, 126—132.

Lysis

β

577. G. Galli, *Due studi di filosofia greca*, Torino 1950, pp. 99—109 (= *Univ. Torino, Scritti Vari* 1). The *Lysis* is here treated in an appendix as a prefiguration of the *Symposium*. A revised version of this appendix is printed in Galli's book, *Socrate ed alcuni dialoghi platonici*, Torino 1958, pp. 205—218.

578. A. Levi, *La teoria della φίλια nel Liside*, *Giorn Metafisica* 5, 1950, 285—296. He holds that Plato when he wrote the *Lysis* had probably formulated the position of the *Symposium* but had probably not achieved the more profound doctrine of the *Republic*, an exposition of which would have been required for a complete solution of the difficulties raised in the *Lysis*. In an added note Levi tries to distinguish some of the Platonic and Socratic elements in the *Lysis*.

579. T. Davis, *Platonic sources of Aristotelian στέρησις*, *Mélanges Joseph Maréchal*, Bruxelles/Paris 1950, II, pp. 235—244. The *Lysis* (especially 221 D—222 A with 216 C—D, 218 B—C, 219 A—B) is one of the chief sources of Aristotle's principle of privation, which Aristotle criticizes Plato for neglecting.

Menexenus

β

See Leisegang (26 *supra*), cols. 2417—2419; Levinson (28 *supra*), pp. 335—339, 344—347, and 609—611; Pavan (483 *supra*), pp. 67—77; É. de Strycker (545 *supra*); and G. J. de Vries, *Spel bij Plato*, Amsterdam 1949, pp. 256—265.

580. G. M. Lattanzi, *Il significato e l'autenticità del Menesseno*, Parola Pass 8, 1953, 303—306. He undertakes here to defend again his earlier thesis (*Mondo Class* 5, 1935, 355—360) that the *Menexenus* is a reply to the *Epitaphius* of Lysias, the authenticity of which he had also defended.

581. K. Meuli, *Westöstliche Abhandlungen Rudolf Tschudi* . . . überreicht, Wiesbaden 1954, pp. 64—66. Some interesting remarks on the purposeful historical misrepresentation in the *Menexenus*.

582. Pamela M. Huby, *The Menexenus reconsidered*, *Phronesis* 2, 1957, 104—11. She argues that it is a political pamphlet written by Plato about 386 B.C. to arouse the Athenians against a proposal to economize in their provisions for the dependents of those who had fallen in war. This hypothesis is as unconvincing if not quite so absurd as is that of Wolff's (37 *supra*, pp. 84—85), namely that the *Menexenus* in its original form was an abject attempt to persuade the accusers of Socrates to drop the case against him.

γ

— On 240 B—C: See 551 *supra* on *Laws* III 698 C 7—D 7.

Meno

β

See Jaeger (4 *supra*) II, pp. 228—243; Koyré (10b *supra*), pp. 7—17; G. Galli (19 *supra*), pp. 116—135; Buccellato (150 *supra*), pp. 159—180 (reprinted from *Arch Filosofia: Il Solipsismo*, Padova 1950, 68—93); Bianchi 189 *supra*); Rudberg (293 *supra*); Soreth (298 *supra*).

583. Klara Buchmann, *Die Stellung des Menon in der platonischen Philosophie*, Leipzig 1936 (cf. Cherniss, *AJPh* 58, 1937, 497—500; Eibl, *Philos Jahrbuch* 54, 1941, 503—504). Despite criticism such as that in the reviews here mentioned, some of the most infelicitous interpretations in this monograph have been adopted in recent works, e. g. by G. Galli (19 *supra*) and by C. Mugler in his book, *Platon et la recherche mathématique de son époque*, Strasbourg 1948, pp. 359—409, against which cf. H. Cherniss, *Rev Metaphysics* 4, 1951, 420—422 and N. Gulley, *Cl Quart N.S.* 4, 1954, 194—197, who in this connection rightly criticizes the similar inter-

pretation by Sir David Ross, *Plato's theory of ideas*, Oxford 1951, p. 18.

584. B. Phillips, The significance of *Meno's* paradox, *Cl Weekly* 42, 1948/49, 87—91. He rejects earlier interpretations such as that of Koyré's (10b *supra*) and argues that the paradox was meant as the expression of nominalistic empiricism which the theory of ideas was designed to meet.

585. R. J. Bastian, The mental character of *Meno*, *Cl Bull* 27, 1951, 40—43.

586. C. H. Giblin, *Meno's* fundamental weakness, *Cl Journ* 48, 1952/53, 201—207.

587. K. Demetriopoulos, *Τὸ περιεχόμενον τοῦ ἐπίστου ἀγαθοῦ*, *ΠΛΑΤΩΝ* 8, 1956, 100—104.

588. W. J. Verdenius, Notes on Plato's *Meno*, *Mnem* IV 10, 1957, 289—299. Notes, textual and exegetical, on more than sixty passages in the dialogue; for corrections of some of Verdenius' ascriptions cf. *Cl Rev* N.S. 8, 1958, 194.

On the dramatic date of the dialogue, the family of *Meno*, and the reference in 90 A 3—5 to the acquisition 'just recently by Ismenias of the money of Polycrates' see:

589. J. S. Morrison, *Meno* of Pharsalus, Polycrates, and Ismenias, *Cl Quart* 36, 1942, 57—78, especially pp. 57—58 and 76—78; cf. A. E. Raubitschek, *Hesperia* 24, 1955, 289, n. 14.

γ

See the notes by W. J. Verdenius (588 *supra*).

590. On 76 C—77 A: E. Grimal, Une définition 'tragique' de la couleur, *Rev Ét Grecques* 55, 1942, 1—13. See also C. Mugler, *Rev Philol* 3; Sér 25, 1951, 58—60; and on *τραγική* (76 E) T. G. Rosenmeyer, *AJPh* 76, 1955, 226—227.

591. On 79 A 9—10: R. S. Bluck, *Cl Rev* N.S. 8, 1958, 108—109. On the text of Aristippus' translation of this passage.

592. On 80 D—81 A: S. Nacht, *Maia* 1, 1948, 198—199. He holds that here the historical Socrates is replaced by the Platonic Socrates.

593. On 81 B—C: H. S. Long (227 b *supra*), pp. 38—42; W. Kraus, *Anz Altertum* 10, 1957, 231; K. von Fritz, *Phronesis* 2, 1957, 85—89; R. S. Bluck, *AJPh* 79, 1958, 161—163 and 405—414.

594. On 82 B—85 B: D. A. Tsiribas, *Ἐπιστημονικὴ Ἐπετηρὶς τῆς φιλοσοφικῆς σχολῆς τοῦ Πανεπιστημίου Ἀθηνῶν* 2 Ser 5, 1954/55, 377—399. See also R. S. Brumbaugh, *Plato's mathematical imagination*, Bloomington 1954, pp. 21—32; and on C. Mugler's treatment of the passage in his *Platon et la recherche mathématique* (see 583 *supra*), pp. 241f., 257f., 388ff. cf. Cherniss, *Rev Metaphysics* 4, 1951, 406, n. 32.

595. On 86 D—87 B: A. Frajese, *Riv Filolog Cl N.S.* 22/23, 1944/45, 100—111; Maria Timpanaro Cardini, *Parola Pass* 6, 1951, 401—409; E. Stamatis, *ΠΛΑΤΩΝ* 3, 1951, 218—227. See also R. Robinson, *Plato's earlier Dialectic*, 2nd edition, Oxford 1953, pp. 114—122; and R. S. Brumbaugh, *Plato's mathematical imagination*, Bloomington 1954, pp. 32—38 (cf. Becker, *Gnomon* 28, 1956, 225; Taliaferro, *New Scholast* 31, 1957, 255—256). The latest studies of the mathematical problem itself are those by A. Heijboer, *Mnem* IV 8, 1955, 89—122 (a posthumous work in which the latest literature consulted is that published in 1938) and by O. Becker, *Das mathematische Denken der Antike*, Göttingen 1957, pp. 85—86. The passage is studied in its context in the unpublished dissertation of H.-P. Stahl, *Interpretationen zu Platons Hypothesis-Verfahren*, Diss. Kiel 1956, pp. 6—19.

— On 90 A 3—5: See J. S. Morrison (589 *supra*).

596. On 96 E—100 C: H. W. Meyer, *Archiv Philos* 6, 1956, 263—264. Sensible remarks on *ὁρθὴ δόξα*.

Minos

α

597. Platone, *Minosse* a cura di G. Orsini, Roma 1956 (cf. d'Agostino, *Riv Studi Class* [Torino] 4, 1956, 265—266).

β

598. Margherita Isnardi, Una nota al '*Minosse*' pseudoplatonico, *Parola Pass* 9, 1954, 45—53. She concludes that the *Minos* was written in the Academy before the presidency of Xenocrates and probably by one of the circle of Speusippus.

Parmenides

 α

599. F. M. Cornford, *Plato and Parmenides: Parmenides' Way of Truth* and *Plato's Parmenides* translated with an Introduction and a running Commentary, London 1939 (cf. Ryle, *Mind* 48, 1939, 536—543; Tate, *Cl Rev* 55, 1941, 76—78; Bröcker, *Gnomon* 25, 1953, 278—280). This is the most scholarly and most useful modern commentary on the *Parmenides*, no matter what may be thought of the introductory section on Pythagoreanism and Eleaticism or even of Cornford's interpretation of the purpose and general meaning of the dialogue.

600. E. Turolla, *Il Parmenide tradotto e commentato*, Milano 1942. This is equipped with a fuller commentary and introduction than is the translation published in 1953 in his *Platone, I Dialoghi . . .*, Vol. 3, pp. 1027—1107 (see 305 *supra*).

See also the translations with briefer annotations by J. Moreau (304 *supra*) and by A. Zadro (306a *supra*), and especially the edition by Klibansky and Labowsky of part of the dialogue and Proclus's commentary upon it in the version of William of Moerbeke (280 *supra*). The reëdition of an older Italian translation also deserves mention for the sake of the new introductory essay written for it by Sciacca: *Il Parmenide*, traduzione di F. Aciri, introduzione e noti di M. F. Sciacca, Napoli 1942.

 β

See *Leisegang* (26 *supra*), cols. 2479—2487; *Rigobello* (34 *supra*), pp. 45—62; *Festugière* (116 *supra*), pp. 79—91; *Liebrucks* (217 *supra*)¹. None of these betrays any knowledge of the important earlier article by Robinson:

601. R. Robinson, *Plato's Parmenides*, *Cl Phil* 37, 1942, 51—76 and 159—186. This with some revision was reprinted in the second edition of Robinson's book, *Plato's Earlier Dialectic*, Oxford 1953, pp. 223—280. Robinson contends that Plato thought the objections to the theory of ideas in the first part of the dialogue serious but not fatal, that nowhere in his writings does he answer them, and that he

¹) Liebrucks gave a preliminary report of this book, the last third of which is a detailed analysis of the *Parmenides*, in his article, *Zur Dialektik des Einen und Seienden in Platons Parmenides*, *Zeitschr philos Forsch* 2, 1947, 244—258.

meant the second part of the dialogue to be neither a direct nor an indirect statement either of doctrine or of method but merely an exercise or gymnastic¹). The article is avowedly a reaffirmation of Grote's interpretation, which is adopted and defended again by Sir David Ross in his book, *Plato's Theory of Ideas*, Oxford 1951, pp. 83—101. See against this interpretation D. J. Allan, *Philos Quart* 2, 1952, 370 and 4, 1954, 373—374 and F. E. Sparshott *Phoenix* 9, 1955, 87—88; it has recently been approved by W. Bröcker, *Gnomon* 30, 1958, 517—519, but otherwise it appears to have had no effect upon subsequent interpreters of the dialogue.

602. R. Scoon, *Plato's Parmenides*, *Mind* 51, 1942, 115—133. For him the dialogue is a critical examination of the rôle of reason in knowledge. He thinks that in the second part Plato indicates his rejection of the manipulation of abstract, non-empirical concepts and in subsequent dialogues alters the theory of ideas in an attempt to meet the objections raised in the first part of the *Parmenides*.

603. F. La Touche Godfrey, *Plato's doctrine of participation*, *Hermathena* 59, 1942, 6—19 and 63, 1944, 1—10. To him the dialogue is a disproof of the transcendent One and is meant to assert 'objective idealism', i. e. that the world of thinking subjects and definite objects is the result of an intelligible formative factor immanent in indeterminate chaos, the second part of the dialogue being a metaphysical examination intended to confirm this doctrine of 'participation'.

604. Chung-Hwan Chen, *On the Parmenides of Plato*, *Cl Quart* 38, 1944, 101—114. He too holds that the second part of the dialogue resolves the difficulties urged against the theory of ideas in the first part and does so by proposing a new conception of the ideas, in which the problem of 'chorismos' vanishes or is reduced to that of the connection of ideas with one another, since existent things are themselves complexes of ideas. This article gives a more detailed analysis than 603 *supra* but resembles it closely in the essentials of its interpretation²).

¹) See also the résumé of Robinson's later paper:

601a) R. Robinson, *The two senses of εἰ ἐν ἐστὶ in Plato's Parmenides*, *Assoc G Budé, Congrès de Tours et Poitiers 1953 Actes*, Paris 1954, 170—171.

²) The article published in *Cl Quart* is an English translation of a German original later made available by Dr. Chen under the title, *Über Platons Dialog Parmenides*, Formosa 1954. It is discussed by R. Kroner (25 *supra*), pp. 181—182, who himself argues for a Neo-Platonic interpretation of the *Parmenides*.

605. J. Moreau, Sur la signification du '*Parménide*', *Rev Philosophique* 134, 1944, 97—131. He regards the dialogue as a manual of idealism, a warning against materialistic interpretations of participation and an introduction to the 'finalistic ontology' of the subsequent dialogues. See also his later presentation in his small book, *Réalisme et Idéalisme chez Platon*, Paris 1951, especially pp. 100—118.

606. M. Beck, Plato's problem in the *Parmenides*, *Journ Hist Ideas* 8, 1947, 232—236. The purpose of the dialogue is to show that the theory of 'methexis' presents no real problem because the ideas have an 'a-numeral and even a-singular existence'.

607. A.-H. Chroust, The problem of Plato's *Parmenides*, *New Scholast* 21, 1947, 371—418. This is a farrago of interpretations, good, bad, and indifferent, presented as if they were both original and consistent, though they are neither, and culminating in the amazing assertion that the real message of the *Parmenides* is this: we should abandon the notion that commonly accepted and rationally acceptable knowledge and truth can be gained only on the level of 'scientific' experience and logical or analytical process, for the ideas hold good no matter what experience and logic may prove.

608. E. Karlin, The method of ambiguity, *New Scholast* 21, 1947, 154—191. The problem of the *Parmenides* is here declared to be the Eleatic logic of identity on which the Megarian paradoxes were based; the presupposition of this logic, that 'one' and 'many' are two separate atomic meanings, is here unmasked by Plato and proved to be impossible, the relations of 'one' and 'many' being analysed as internal. Karlin, avowedly following Cornford, goes on to explain Plato's application of his 'discovery of internal relations' to the problems in the *Theaetetus* and the *Sophist*.

609. J. R. Sepich, Notas histórico-exegéticas sobre el *Parmenides* de Platón, *Rev Estudios Cl* 3, 1948, 17—151. A schematic article purporting to prove that the dialogue was written against 'Eleaticizing Megarians' who had opposed the 'dynamism' of the Platonic ideas, which Sepich interprets as 'instruments wherewith the intelligence comprehends the living reality of existence'.

610. A. Speiser, On Plato's *Parmenides*, *Proc Tenth Internat Cong Philosophy* 1, Fasc 2, Amsterdam 1949, 1088—1089. He holds that the second half of the dialogue is the 'short guide' to Plato's true system, which he thinks is referred to in *Epistle* VII 341 E. See also Speiser's later book, *Elemente der Philosophie und der Mathematik*, Basel 1952, pp. 25—27. The details of his interpretation,

which is at once mathematical in the modern sense and frankly Neo-Platonic, are to be found in his earlier monograph, *Ein Parmenides-kommentar: Studien zur platonischen Dialektik*, Leipzig 1937 (cf. Bröcker, *Gnomon* 14, 1938, 633—635; E. Bréhier, *Les études de philosophie antique*, Paris 1939, 25—28)¹).

611. G. Colli, *Il 'Parmenide' platonico* (Lezioni 1949—50), Pisa 1950. The second part of the dialogue, he contends, confirms the criticism of the first and was intended to show that the theory of ideas fails not for any peculiar insufficiency but because of the generally destructive power of reason which not even the apparently sound doctrine of Parmenides can withstand; it is a personal confession of Plato's desperation resulting from the collapse of his highest aspiration.

612. G. Huber, *Platons dialektische Ideenlehre nach dem zweiten Teil des 'Parmenides'*, Wien 1951. On this 'ontological' version of the Neo-Platonic interpretation see V. Goldschmidt, *Rev Philosophique* 143, 1953, 460—461 and C. J. de Vogel, *Mnem* IV 10, 1957, 166—169. Miss de Vogel's protests are the more interesting because she herself believes that the Neo-Platonic hierarchy of being is professed by Plato at least from the time of the *Republic*; see e. g. her article in *Mind* 62, 1953, 43—64 (38c *supra*) and pp. 58—59 there on the *Parmenides*²).

613. L. Lugarini, *L'unità dell' idea nel Parmenide*, *Acme* 4, 1951, 347—439. See also Lugarini's articles, *Il principio logico in Platone* (218 *supra*) and *Il problema delle categorie in Aristotele*, *Acme* 8, 1955, 3—107 (especially 45, n. 66 and 88—89). Lugarini argues that the second part of the *Parmenides* is devoted to establishing the necessary multiplicity of unity with special reference to the problems raised in the first part concerning the ideas and that in so doing it

¹) The Neo-Platonic interpretation of the *Parmenides* had been defended in another monograph two years earlier:

610a) M. Wundt, *Platons Parmenides*, Stuttgart 1935 (cf. Dodds, *Gnomon* 12, 1936, 116—118).

A year after this Hardie in England tried to defend against Taylor a similar interpretation, and it is with his presentation of it that Robinson and Ross deal (601 *supra*):

610b) W. F. R. Hardie, *A study in Plato*, Oxford 1936 (cf. Taylor, *Mind* 46, 1937, 222—232).

²) The 'turning-point' to which the title of her earlier work refers is, of course, the *Parmenides*:

612a) C. J. de Vogel, *Een keerpunt in Plato's Denken*, Amsterdam 1936 (cf. Cherniss, *AJPh* 59, 1938, 237—340).

lays the basis for the development in the *Sophist*, *Philebus*, and *Timaeus* of doctrines which in the *Phaedo* and *Republic* appear, if at all, merely as postulates.

614. F. Gonzalez Cordero, El diálogo *Parménides* dentro de la sistematización filosófica de Platón, *Helmantica* 3, 1952, 305—317. He tries to show that in the *Sophist* Plato purposely corrects the logical inconsistencies of the *Parmenides*.

615. A. L. Peck, Plato's *Parmenides*: Some suggestions for its interpretation, *Cl Quart N. S.* 3, 1953, 126—150 and *N. S.* 4, 1954, 31—45. According to Peck the first part of the dialogue is meant to show the impossible results following from either of Parmenides' erroneous constructions of the doctrine of ideas and the second part those following from the assumption either of a One isolated from Being or of a One which 'partakes' of a Being separate from it. Peck believes that Plato admitted no idea 'One' or 'Being', that both in the *Parmenides* and in the *Sophist* he attacks the error of positing ideas on the basis of mere verbal usage, and that in the second part of the *Parmenides* his purpose was to show that this sort of manipulation of words is an abuse of them.

616. L. J. Eslick, The Platonic dialectic of Non-Being, *New Scholast* 29, 1955, 33—49. This is one of the class of interpretations in which it is assumed that the *Parmenides* must signalize a revolution in Plato's conception of the ideas; cf. A. C. in *Rass Filos* 4, 1955, 292. See also Eslick's article in *Modern Schoolman* 31, 1953/54, 11—18 (The dyadic character of Being in Plato).

617. D. W. Hamlyn, The communion of forms and the development of Plato's logic, *Philos Quart* 5, 1955, 289—302. This is largely concerned with the *Parmenides*, the first part of which, according to Hamlyn, is meant to show that a pluralism without communion of ideas leads to a position akin to that of Antisthenes and the second part that there are similar dangers in the Eleatic position. The rest of the article deals with the question of 'predication' and intercommunion in the *Theaetetus* and *Sophist*.

618. R. Schaerer, La structure des dialogues métaphysiques, *Rev Intern Philos* 9, 1955, 197—220. The *Parmenides*, *Theaetetus*, *Sophist*, and *Politicus* are here treated as a tetralogy in which the negative results of the first two and the positive results of the last two are related to the 'descending' and 'ascending' dialectical movements that Schaerer believes they are meant to exemplify. The *Parmenides* typifies mathematical, discursive procedure; it is a

logical treatment of a metaphysical and even theological subject and as such performs a useful 'nettoyage' as does the *Theaetetus* but like it and unlike the other two dialogues is made to fail of positive results by neglecting to recognize the hierarchical distinction and connection of the two realms of value, human and divine. See also Schaerer's earlier book, *La question platonicienne*, Neuchâtel 1938, pp. 112—116 and his article on the dialectical procedure of the *Laws* (532 *supra*).

619. M. Untersteiner, L'essere di Parmenide è *οἶλον*, non *ἐν*, Riv Crit Storia Filos 10, 1955, 5—23. For Plato's 'interpretation' or 'misrepresentation' of Parmenides' hypothesis and its bearing on the dialogue see pp. 9—17 (= pp. XXXII—XLIII of Untersteiner's book, *Parmenide: Testimonianze e frammenti*, Firenze 1958). On this subject see also the earlier interpretation of K. Riezler, *Parmenides*, Frankfurt am Main 1934, pp. 89—93 and the quite different interpretation of G. di Napoli in his book, *La concezione dell'essere nella filosofia greca*, Milano 1953, pp. 127—135 (n. b.: ... 'Platone combatte Parmenide, ma si tratta di un Parmenide zenonico ...').

620. A. Capizzi, L'uno e i molti nel pensiero di Platone: Contributo ad un' interpretazione del '*Parmenide*', Giorn Metafisica 11, 1956, 86—120. The conclusion of the *Parmenides*, he argues, is that Being is one *and* many and any attempt to posit it as absolutely one or absolutely many is bound to fail; the world of ideas is thus shown to be an organic hierarchy, and this he holds explains the 'idea-numbers' in Aristotle's account, which conception does not involve any change in Plato's theory but is the aspect of the ideas revealed as limited multiplicity when 'seen from above', i. e. from the unity of the idea of good.

621. K. F. Johansen, The One and the Many: Some remarks concerning Plato's *Parmenides* and the method of collection and division, Class et Med 18, 1957, 1—35. He argues that the two parts of the *Parmenides* have 'important internal connections', that the second part gives a clue to the 'new theory' of relation between the one Idea and the many other ideas and between the one Idea and the many particulars, and that this is the basis for Plato's 'later ontology' in the *Sophist*, *Politicus*, and *Philebus*, the 'peras' and 'apeiron' of which he connects with diaeresis (taken to be equivalent to the hierarchical structure of the world of ideas) and with the 'indefinite dyad' of Aristotle's report.

622. N.-I. Boussoulas, Essai sur la structure de la mixis platonicienne: être et non-être chez Platon, Riv Crit Storia Filos 13, 1958, 131—147. Here the One of the *Parmenides* is identified with absolute

Non-Being, with the fourth class of the *Philebus*, and with the idea of Beauty in the *Symposium* all at once and is furthermore said to be the source of the 'relative Non-Being' of the *Sophist*, which is in turn identified with the 'space-matter' of the *Timaeus*¹). Thus are repeated, combined, and compounded misinterpretations which apparently neither author nor editor knew had been separately refuted half a century and more ago.

Incidental discussion or exploitation of the *Parmenides* is to be found in almost every book or article that deals with Plato's philosophy in general and more especially in those that are concerned with his supposed development, with his theories of ideas and of dialectic, or with the dialectical structure of his writings, their logic, and their irony. Attention is here called to some discussions of this kind in recent publications not hitherto mentioned which will be listed again later in the sections appropriate to their more general purport: V. Goldschmidt, *Les dialogues de Platon*, Paris 1947, pp. 143—152, and *Le paradigme dans la dialectique platonicienne*, Paris 1947, pp. 40—45; P. Grenet, *Les origines de l'analogie philosophique dans les dialogues de Platon*, Paris 1948, pp. 260—266; G. E. Bariè, *L'esigenza dell' unità da Talete a Platone*, Acme 2, Fasc 1/2, 1949, 25—86 especially pp. 59—71; G. J. de Vries, *Spel bij Plato*, Amsterdam 1949, pp. 88—90 and 146—152; P. Kucharski, *Les chemins du savoir dans les derniers dialogues de Platon*, Paris 1949, pp. 285—324, 335—339, and 382; K. Reidemeister, *Das exakte Denken der Griechen*, Hamburg 1949, pp. 57—65; G. K. Plochmann, *Cl. Phil* 49, 1954, 223—231 (especially pp. 225—227); R. Loriaux, *L'être et la forme selon Platon*, Paris/Bruxelles 1955, pp. 109—142; M. Vanhoutte, *La méthode ontologique de Platon*, Louvain/Paris 1956, especially pp. 86—90 and 103—108; L. Robin, *Les rapports de l'être et de la connaissance d'après Platon*, Paris 1957, pp. 36—46, 89—101, and 122—124.

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623. On 127 D—128 E: N. B. Booth, *Were Zeno's arguments a reply to attacks upon Parmenides?*, *Phronesis* 2, 1957, 1—9. See also Booth, *JHS* 77 Part 2, 1957, 197; H. Fränkel, *AJPh* 63, 1942, 202—206 (revised in 195 *supra*, pp. 232—236); J. Zafiropulo, *L'école Éléate*, Paris 1950, pp. 169—173; J. Mau, *Zum Problem des*

¹) See also his book, *L'être et la composition des mixtes* (714 *infra*), especially pp. 75—104, where, among other such supposedly profound indentifications, the eternity of the *Timaeus* is identified with the One of the first hypothesis in the *Parmenides*.

Infinitesimalen bei den antiken Atomisten, Berlin 1954, pp. 12—19; and W. Kullmann, *Hermes* 86, 1958, 157—172 (especially pp. 164—166 and p. 172, n. 2).

624. On 132 A—B and 132 D—133 A: L. Lugarini, *L'argomento del 'terzo uomo' e la critica di Aristotele a Platone*, *Acme* 7, 1954, 3—72. See also 613 *supra* and especially *Acme* 8, 1955, 45, n. 66 on 131 A—E, the difficulty of which he thinks is resolved by 142 B—143 A.

625. On 132 A—B and 132 D—133 A (with supplementary discussion of the whole section, 130 E—134 E): G. Vlastos, *The Third Man argument in the Parmenides*, *Philos Rev* 63, 1954, 319—349. Vlastos argues that both versions of the regress are in fact invalid but Plato, being unable to explicate the hidden assumptions, was never sure whether they were valid or not and therefore never attempted to refute the arguments and, moreover, that, if Plato had ever explicated the hidden premises of the regress, he would have seen that his theory of separate ideas is 'logically moribund'.

626. On 132 A—B (and incidentally the whole of 130 E—134 E): W. Sellars, Vlastos and 'The Third Man', *Philos Rev* 64, 1955, 405—437. Sellars here criticizes Vlastos' analysis and reconstruction of the regress and his conception of the 'self-predicational' nature of the Platonic ideas, contending instead that the first part of the *Parmenides* is a deliberate and sustained critique of self-predicational interpretations of the ideas. To this article Vlastos replied in *Philos Rev* 64, 1955, 438—448.

627. On 132 A—B and 133 C—E: P. T. Geach, *The Third Man* again, *Philos Rev* 65, 1956, 72—82. He agrees with Vlastos (625 *supra*) that the regress is a record of Plato's honest perplexity and that one of its tacit assumptions is self-predication; but he denies that Vlastos rightly located the inconsistency in the premises of the argument, and, objecting to the implications of his formula, 'F-ness', for an idea, he argues that Plato regarded the ideas as 'standards' of which is predicated 'analogously' the same predicate that is asserted of the objects of which they are standards. To this article Vlastos replied in *Philos Rev* 65, 1956, 83—94; he maintains his original position but is influenced by Geach to the extent of saying that Plato 'wants his Forms to be both attributes and standard objects'.

628. On 132 A—B (and the whole section, 130 B—134 E): R. S. Bluck, *The Parmenides and the 'Third Man'*, *Cl Quart N. S.* 6, 1956 29—37. Primarily a reply to Vlastos (625 *supra*), this article explains all the objections to the ideas in the first part of the *Par-*

menides as comments on misapprehensions of the theory arising from Plato's earlier presentations of it. Bluck contends that 'self-predication' does not constitute the substance of any objection here made to the theory, that the 'non-identity' assumed in the 'third man' is not involved in Plato's own theory, and that contrary to Vlastos' supposition Plato was well aware of the flaw in the regress. Bluck had finished this article before seeing those by Sellars (626 *supra*) and by Geach (627 *supra*) with Vlastos' replies to them. These and especially the latter by Geach he then criticized in a new article:

629. On 132 A—B (and the whole section, 130 B—134 E): R. S. Bluck, *Forms as standards*, *Phronesis* 2, 1957, 115—127. With special reference to the analysis by Geach (627 *supra*) he reasserts his thesis (628 *supra*) that the fallacy of the regress as a criticism of Plato's theory lies solely in the assumption of 'non-identity', which Plato never himself made and which he purposely inserted here into the 'third man'. Bluck here allows the analogy between ideas and 'standards', which Geach adopted from Wittgenstein, but with important reservations consequent upon their being supra-sensible 'standards'.

—. On 132 A—B and 132 D—133 A: H. Cherniss, *AJPh* 78, 1957, 247—263 (= 300 *supra*). It is here argued against Owen (294 *supra*) that both versions of the regress are invalid arguments and against Vlastos (625 *supra*) that Plato, when he put them into Parmenides' mouth, believed them to be invalid for reasons which he felt had been satisfactorily indicated by what he had already said concerning the nature of the ideas.

630. On 132 A—133 A: N. B. Booth, *Assumptions involved in the Third Man argument*, *Phronesis* 3, 1958, 146—149. Disregarding the immediately preceding article, Booth adds two more hidden assumptions in the regress to those which had been identified by Vlastos (625 *supra*), and against Bluck (628 and 629 *supra*) he reverts to Vlastos' theory of Plato's 'unresolved puzzlement' in the face of the 'third man' argument.

631. On 137 E 3—4: C. Mugler, *Rev Ét Grecques* 69, 1956, 20—28. He argues that *ἐπιπροσθεῖν* should be changed to *ἐπιπροσθέειν* and that Plato should thus have restored to him the title to the invention of the rigorous definition of straight line cited by Aristotle. See also Mugler, *Ant Cl* 26, 1957, 331—345.

632. On 162 A—B: F. W. Kohnke, *Plato's conception of τὸ οὐκ ὄντως οὐκ ὄν*, *Phronesis* 2, 1957, 32—40. Defending against the changes

of Burnet and others the traditional text of this passage and of *Sophist* 240 A 7—C 5, he argues that Plato formulated the conception in the latter on the basis of *Parmenides* 162 A—B to establish the relation between 'model' and 'likeness' and that from this passage of the *Parmenides* the Neo-Platonists got the terminology of their fourfold scale of being according to which they interpreted the *Sophist* and *Timaeus*.

Phaedo

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633. Platon, *Phaidon* griechisch und deutsch herausgegeben von F. Dirlmeier, München 1949. An independent text and translation followed by an interpretative essay and textual and exegetical notes, concise but of primary importance.

634. Platon, *Phédon* ou l'immortalité de l'âme, traduit avec prolegomènes et notes par M. Meunier, nouvelle édition entièrement revue, Paris 1952. The translation and commentary of the first edition, Paris 1922, are here revised in the light of later scholarly publications.

635. Platone, *Il Fedone*, introduzione, traduzione e commento di M. Faggella, 3a edizione, Roma 1954. Faggella in the introduction to this revision of his annotated translation now interprets all the essentials of Plato's philosophy as misinterpretations of his Hindu sources.

636. Platone, *Il Fedone*, traduzione, introduzione e commento a cura di G. Capone Braga, Firenze 1955. This is in fact a new edition of a work which was first published in 1941 and had its second edition five years later, Padova 1946. On the most recent edition see J. Meunier, *Ant Cl* 25, 1956, 169—170 and on the first edition U. Galli, *Boll Filol Cl N. S.* 13, 1941/42, 53—66.

637. Plato's *Phaedo*, A Translation with Introduction, Notes and Appendices by R. S. Bluck, London 1955 (cf. Cross, *Philos Rev* 65, 1956, 403—407; Rosenmeyer, *AJPh* 77, 1956, 310—314; Tate, *Cl Rev N. S.* 6, 1956, 221—223; Tredennick, *Gnomon* 28, 1956, 228—229; Lemmon, *Mind* 66, 1957, 113—114).

638. Plato's *Phaedo* Translated with Introduction and Commentary by R. Hackforth, Cambridge 1955 (cf. Rosenmeyer, *AJPh* 78, 1957, 321—325; Tate, *Cl Rev N. S.* 7, 1957, 26—29). Hackforth's book had gone to press when Bluck's (637 *supra*) was pub-

lished. The two are entirely independent of each other; and, since their introductions and running commentaries are similarly elaborate and detailed, it is especially instructive and fruitful to use them together in studying the dialogue both in itself and in its bearing upon Plato's philosophy and writing generally. On both books see W. J. Verdenius (643 *infra*).

See also the edition by Minio-Paluello and Drossaart Lulofs of the Latin translation by Henricus Aristippus (281 *supra*).

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See among the publications already listed: H. Klos and L. Minio-Paluello (281a *supra*); J. S. Morrison (303 *supra*); R. Guardini (319 *supra*); M. Fox (323 *supra*).

639. B. H. Bal, Plato's *ascese* in de *Phaedo*, Weert 1950 (cf. de Strycker, *Ant Cl* 22, 1953, 161—163). This monograph contains much more than its title may at a glance suggest. It is a thorough and critical analysis of the whole dialogue in all its aspects and in its relation to Plato's other writings, its main thesis being that the philosophy of the *Phaedo* is not a thoroughgoing 'ascese' which Plato overcame or abandoned in his later works. Bal takes critical account of the most important earlier works devoted to the *Phaedo*, and I refer to his bibliography (pp. 165—170) for those published between 1930 and 1950¹.

640. R. Hope, Plato's *Phaedo* on deathlessness, *Personalist* 32, 1951, 19—25. This is an amateurish article.

641. Dorothy Tarrant, Metaphors of death in the *Phaedo*, *Cl Rev N. S.* 2, 1952, 64—66.

642. G. E. Mueller, The unity of the *Phaidon*, *Cl Journ* 48, 1952/53, 129—139. The interpretation or misinterpretation on which this article is based is clearly indicated by such assertions as: 'the soul "sees" such ideas because she produces them herself' and 'the soul reconstructs itself from its own a priori projections' (see 686 *infra*).

¹ The article by R. Schaerer is misdated in this bibliography; it should be: La composition du '*Phédon*', *Rev Ét Greques* 53, 1940, 1—50. I give here several others from this period which Bal does not mention:

639a) G. Rolla, Saggio critico sul '*Fedone*', Firenze 1938.

639b) A. Speiser, Der Unsterblichkeitsbeweis im *Phaidon*, *Studia Philos* 2, 1942, 127—137.

639c) P.-M. Schuhl, Remarques sur la technique de la répétition dans le '*Phédon*', *Rev Ét Grecques* 61, 1948, 373—380.

643. W. J. Verdenius, Notes on Plato's *Phaedo*, Mnem IV 11, 1958, 193—243. This article consists of textual, grammatical, and exegetical notes on some 300 passages of the *Phaedo*. It is an essential supplement to the translations and commentaries of Bluck and Hackforth (637 and 638 *supra*), of whose treatment it is in part a critical review, although it is much more than that, for it takes into account the chief reviews of Bluck and Hackforth, many earlier translations and commentaries, and most of the recent periodical literature on the dialogue.

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See the article by É. des Places (271 *supra*), the reviews of Bluck and Hackforth (637 and 638 *supra*), and the notes by W. J. Verdenius (643 *supra*).

644. On 62 A 2—7: H. M. Currie, *Hermes* 86, 1958, 124—125.

645. On 66 B 4: W. J. Verdenius, Mnem IV 6, 1953, 92 and IV 8, 1955, 282.

646. On 67 C 5—6: J. V. Luce, *Cl Rev N. S.* 1, 1951, 66—67.

647. On 69 A 6—B 8: R. S. Bluck, *Cl Rev N. S.* 2, 1952, 4—6 (reprinted in 637 *supra*, pp. 154—156); cf. Tredennik, *Gnomon* 28, 1956, 229, and Verdenius, 643 *supra*, p. 205.

648. On 70 B 10—C 2: A. Witlox, *Hermeneus* 22, 1951, 141.

649. On 72 E—76 E: H. D. Rankin, Immediate cognition of the Forms in the *Phaedo*?, *Dialectica* 12, 1958, 81—86. He argues that this passage does not envisage 'immediate transition from sensible to intelligible' or reliance on sensory perception but entails and exemplifies a dialectical method of several stages with critical reflection on the *sensa* which assist the process of 'recollection'. Rankin writes in refutation of N. Gulley's interpretation, *Cl Quart N. S.* 4, 1954, 197—200 (in his article, Plato's theory of recollection) and of F. M. Cornford's in his book, *Principium Sapientiae*, Cambridge 1952, pp. 51—52.

650. On 74 A—B: Dorothy Tarrant, *JHS* 77 Part 1, 1957, 124—126. Concerned with the expression *ἀντὰ τὰ ἴσα* and its implication for the theory of ideas, she discusses besides earlier interpretations those of N. R. Murphy, Hackforth, and Ross; she denies that there is a reference to 'intermediate mathematical', and she concludes that 'equality' as an idea holds a place only in the 'early phase of the theory' and a baffling and precarious place even there.

651. On 74 B 7—C 6: K. W. Mills, *Phronesis* 2, 1957, 128—147 and 3, 1958, 40—58. This study, an elaboration of a paper summarized in *Proc Cl Assoc* 53, London 1956, 29, is concerned with the problems more briefly treated in 650 *supra*. It discusses in detail the interpretations of Murphy, Hackforth, Ross, Bluck, and Cornford; and it adopts in despite of Blucks' criticism (629 *supra*) the view of Geach (627 *supra*)¹) that 'the Form of the Equal is a set of Equals', setting aside the attempt of G. E. L. Owen to refute this (*JHS* 77 Part 1, 1957, 108, n 32 and 110). The note on this passage by J. L. Ackrill (*Philos Rev* 67, 1958, 106—109) was written before the publication of this article by Mills. See most recently Verdenius (643 *supra*), pp. 209—210; and R. S. Bluck's reply to Mills in *Phronesis* 4, 1959, 5—11.

652. On 75 A: J. R. Buisman, *Hermeneus* 25, 1954, 93—99.

653. On 77 E: C. F. Williger, *Il παις di Cebes nel Φαίδων di Platone*, *Giorn Metafisica* 1, 1946, 103—113. He argues that the 'child' is not a symbol of the irrational soul but of the rational soul that has its doubts and demands further proof, and this leads him to characterize the Platonic λόγοι as rational magic or incantation with the double purpose of assuaging the soul's doubts and of stimulating its search for truth. The thesis is opposed by G. Capone Braga, *Giorn Metafisica* 2, 1947, 60—62 and defended against this attack by Williger, *ibid.* 2, 1947, 262—264. See now on the theme of ἐπὶ ᾧ in Plato the article by P. Lain-Entralgo, *Hermes* 86, 1958, 298—323.

654. On 79 D 1—7: H. Dörrie, *Akad Wiss Lit Mainz, Abhand geistes- u. soz. Kl.* 1956 Nr. 5, 333—334.

655. On 93 A 11—94 B 3: W. F. Hicken, *Cl Quart N. S.* 4, 1954, 16—22 (cf. Verdenius, 643 *supra*, pp. 227—228).

656. On 99 C 8—101 E 3: M. D. C. Tait, A problem in the method of hypothesis in the *Phaedo*, *Studies in Honour of Gilbert Norwood* = *Phoenix Suppl.* 1, 1952, 110—115. This is primarily concerned with the interpretation of ἕως ἐπὶ τι ἰκανόν (101 E 1), which he takes closely with the δεύτερος πλοῦς and interprets by a *via media* between those of R. Robinson in his *Plato's Earlier Dialectic* (Ithaca 1941)

¹) Mills says that Vlastos 'accepted Geach's view on these matters' and dubs it 'the Geach-Vlastos interpretation' without mentioning the reservations which Vlastos makes (*Philos Rev* 65, 1956, 91—92).

and of his critics. Tait's interpretation is adopted by H.-P. Stahl, who in his unpublished dissertation, *Interpretationen zu Platons Hypothesis-Verfahren* (Kiel 1956), pp. 31—71 gives an elaborate analysis of 96 A—102 A and of its relation to the whole of the *Phaedo* with special attention to Robinson's book. The earlier literature on the subject is carefully considered by Stahl, who took into account even Hackforth's recently published commentary (638 *supra*) but apparently did not know Bluck's (637 *supra*).

657. On 99 C 8—101 E 3: R. S. Bluck, *ὑποθέσεις* in the *Phaedo* and Platonic dialectic, *Phronesis* 2, 1957, 21—31. With minor corrections of emphasis Bluck here undertakes to supplement and reinforce the interpretation given in his commentary (637 *supra*, pp. 160—173 and 198—202). In the course of doing this he criticizes especially Hackforth's interpretation (638 *supra*) and Robinson's in the second edition of his *Plato's Earlier Dialectic* (Oxford 1953). He does not mention Tait's article or Stahl's dissertation (656 *supra*), nor does he refer to R. Robinson's article, *L'emploi des hypothèses selon Platon*, *Rev Métaph et Morale* 59, 1954, 253—268. J. L. Ackrill, to whose criticism (*Philos Quart* 6, 1956, 179) Bluck does refer, has now returned to the question (*Philos Rev* 67, 1958, 109—110) in a review of Hackforth. See also Pamela Huby, *Phronesis* 4, 1959, 12—14, who denies that the passage is meant to say anything of profound importance about logical method.

658. On 100 B—107 B: J. Moreau, *L'argument ontologique* dans le *Phédon*, *Rev Philosophique* 137, 1947, 320—343.

659. On 102 B—103 D: R. Demos, *Philos and Phenom Research* 8, 1947/48, 456—460. This passage, he argues, proves that Plato intentionally and consistently posited two categories of 'absolute forms', one transcendent and 'ideal' and the other immanent and 'phenomenal' and that Aristotle simply suppressed the former category of this 'two-fold realm'. See on the passage also R. S. Bluck, 628 *supra*, pp. 33—34 and 629 *supra*, p. 123; K. W. Mills, 651 *supra*, pp. 139—147; Verdenius, 643 *supra*, pp. 232—233.

660. On 108 D—113 C: T. G. Rosenmeyer, *Cl Quart N. S.* 6, 1956, 193—197. He argues that 108 E—109 A with 110 B 5 ff. do not imply that Plato at this time thought the earth spherical and that, even if he did, 111 C 4—113 C 8 is intelligible only on the assumption that the earth is flat; of the latter passage he gives a translation and commentary, which in some important details are criticized by Verdenius, 643 *supra*, pp. 237—240. Rosenmeyer's thesis, which

had been briefly announced five years earlier (347 a *supra*), is succinctly refuted on both scores by Calder:

661. On 108 D—113 C: W. M. Calder III, The spherical earth in Plato's *Phaedo*, *Phronesis* 3, 1958, 121—125. Calder incidentally points out that Morisson, to whose article in *JHS* 75, 1955, 59—68 Rosenmeyer refers for support, recognizes (pp. 64—65) that in the *Phaedo* the earth is held to be spherical. So also did E. Frank in his last remarks on the subject (185 *supra*, pp. 138—141), though he clung to his earlier and mistaken notion that it is the sphericity that is here presented as a new doctrine. Rosenmeyer attempts a rejoinder to Calder's refutation in *Phronesis* 4, 1959, 71—72. As he goes to one extreme, so W. Kranz goes to the other and suggests that Plato when he wrote this passage himself believed in axial rotation of the central earth (*Rhein Mus N.F.* 100, 1957, 116—117). J. S. Morrison now argues (*Phronesis* 4, 1959, 101—119) that in the *Phaedo* the whole earth is hemispherical.

662. On 115 A: F. Martinazzoli, *Alceste e Socrate*, *Dionisio* 12, 1949, 56—62. He argues that Plato had in mind Euripides' *Alceste* 158 ff.

663. On 115 D: Dorothy Tarrant, *Cl Rev* 63, 1949, 44—45. She argues that 115 D 4 is ironical in tone and *μαζάρων εὐδαιμονίας* semi-proverbial.

664. On 118 A 3: S. Eitrem, *Symbol Osl* 28, 1950, 114—115; but see Verdenius, 643 *supra*, p. 243.

665. On 118 A 5—8: Emma J. and Ludwig Edelstein, *Asclepius*, Baltimore 1945, II, pp. 130—131; S. Eitrem, *Symbol Osl* 28, 1950, 113—114; Pamela M. Clark, *Cl Rev N. S.* 2, 1952, 146. Against Miss Clark's tasteless 'solution' that the sacrifice is to be made for the cure of Plato's illness as well as against the literalism of Wilamowitz (which was Grote's before him) R. Del Re protested in *Il gallo dovuto da Socrate ad Esculapio*, *Atene e Roma fasc.* 14—16, 1954, 85—86. R. Gautier (*Les dernières paroles de Socrate*, *Rev Universitaire* 64, 1955, 274—275) revived the 'scientific' thesis that Socrates spoke in a moment of mental aberration brought on by the hemlock. Michele Del Re, pointing out that the poison does not have such an effect, nevertheless rejected the traditional 'allegorical' interpretation in favor of another, more subtle but most improbable (*Sophia* 25, 1957, 290—294): the cure to which Socrates alludes is death, to be sure, but death as a catharsis of the status of injustice which the law had denounced in him by his conviction.

Phaedrus

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666. J. N. Theodorakopoulos, *Πλάτωνος Φαῖδρος: Εισαγωγή, ἀρχαῖο καὶ νέο κείμενο μὲ σχόλια*, Athens 1948 (cf. Anton, *Journ Philos* 51, 1954, 278—284)¹).

667. Platone, *Fedro*: Introduzione, traduzione e commento a cura di G. Galli, Bari 1949 (cf. Verbeke, *Rev Philos Louvain* 54, 1956, 293—295).

668. Plato's *Phaedrus* Translated with Introduction and Commentary by R. Hackforth, Cambridge 1952 (cf. Anderson, *Journ Philos* 49, 1952, 532—536; Philip, *Phoenix* 7, 1953, 151—154; Tate, *Cl Rev N. S.* 5, 1955, 157—159; and especially Verdenius, *Mnem IV* 8, 1955, 265—289 [683 *infra*]).

669. Platons *Phaidros* übertragen und eingeleitet von K. Hildebrandt, Kiel 1953. In the exegetical notes and the long introductory essay Hildebrandt interprets the *Phaedrus* as an expression of that 'struggle of the spirit for power' which in an earlier book²) he had sought to make the central motive of Plato's philosophical activity.

670. Platone, *Fedro*. Introduzione, traduzione e commento di M. Bernabei Marinucci, Roma 1954.

 β

See among the publications already listed: W. Jaeger, *Paideia*, III, pp. 255—270 (4 *supra*); D. Grene (240 *supra*), pp. 140—146; E. Hoffmann (22 *supra*), pp. 176—189; O. Regenbogen (290 *supra*) with the other publications referred to under that number;

¹) There is also a separately published critique of this edition which I have been unable to procure:

666a) S. Manginas, *ὁ Πλατωνικὸς Φαῖδρος καὶ ἡ ἐκδοσις τοῦ I. Θεοδωρακοπούλου I*, Athens 1948.

Anton with his review of this edition mentioned *supra* combines a review of the author's Introduction to Plato:

666b) J. N. Theodorakopoulos, *Εισαγωγή στὸν Πλάτωνα*, 2nd revised and augmented edition, Athens 1947. The substance of this general interpretation is given again in the long introduction (293 pages) to the edition of the *Phaedrus*.

²) Of this earlier book, *Platon: Der Kampf des Geistes um die Macht* (Berlin 1933), of which Hoffmann said all that is necessary in his review (*Gnomon* 15, 1939, 482—486), a new edition has recently appeared, unchanged except for the subtitle, a few annotations, and a long 'Nachwort' of self-justification:

669a) *Platon: Logos und Mythos*, Berlin 1959.

F. Robert (480 *supra*); W. Steidle (202 *supra*); H. Reader (206 *supra*); G. Rudberg (84 and 85 *supra*); E. Salin (86 *supra*)¹; H. Flashar, *Der Dialog Ion* . . . , pp. 121—139 (173 *supra*).

671. J. Hatzfeld, *Du nouveau sur Phèdre*, *Rev Ét Anciennes* 41, 1939, 313—318. For the text of the Attic stele that was the occasion of this article see now W. K. Pritchett, *Hesperia* 22, 1953, 230—231 and 273 (Stele VI, 112—115).

672. C. Murley, *Plato's Phaedrus and Theocritean Pastoral*, *Trans Am Philol Assoc* 71, 1940, 281—295. He contends that in the *Phaedrus*, which he thinks may have been written in Sicily, Plato plays upon the fashions of early Sicilian pastoral that were later used by Theocritus, who may also have been directly influenced by their elaboration in this dialogue²).

673. F. Lasserre, *Ἐρωτικοὶ λόγοι*, *Mus Helvet* 1, 1944, 169—178. While the speeches in the *Symposium* are Platonic inventions, *Phaedrus* 230 E 6—234 C 5 was copied literally, he insists, from the works of Lysias, the only remaining example from the 5th century of a genre of which there must have been many examples earlier than the dramatic dates of the *Symposia* of Plato and of Xenophon; and he tries to identify the form and characteristics of this genre and maintains that many of the elements of Plato's myths in the *Phaedrus* and *Symposium* are elaborations of commonplaces used in that type of composition.

674. F. Pfister, *Der Begriff des Schönen und das Ebenmaß*, *Würzburger Jahrb* 1, 1946, 341—358. On pp. 347—348 he argues that the dialogue has an articulated structure conforming to the criterion enunciated in 264 C.

675. H. Gundert, *Enthusiasmos und Logos bei Platon*, *Lexis* 2, 1, 1949, 25—46. Taking the *Phaedrus* as certainly one of the late dialogues, he interprets it as expressing Plato's conviction that philosophy is essentially enthusiasm, i. e. a divine 'possession', manifested in a 'logos' that reaches beyond its own assertion and at the same time 'ironically' withdraws from its own reach. See on this interpretation H. W. Meyer (685 *infra*) and the pages of Flashar there referred to.

¹ On this article of Salin's cf. K. Hildebrandt (669a *supra*), pp. 382—383 and p. 388, note 18.

² Murley's article is unaccountably unnoticed in a recent paper where it is argued that in the *Phaedrus* Plato was the originator of pastoral:

672a) A. Parry, *Landscape in Greek poetry*, *Yale Class Studies* 15, 1957, 3—29.

676. E. Paci, *Sul Fedro*, Studi di filosofia antica e moderna, Torino 1950, pp. 56—70. He analyses the dialogue as being primarily intended to unmask the rhetorician who plays upon the passions as the sophist does with dialectical processes and to replace him by the ideal educator who leads the soul up to the ideas. Paci is concerned to locate the dialectic of the *Phaedrus* within Plato's development; see on this now his article in *Riv Filos* 49, 1958, 137 and 152 and cf. his earlier book, *Il significato del Parmenide . . .*, Messina/Milano 1938, pp. 50—67.

677. W. C. Helmbold and W. B. Holther, The unity of the '*Phaedrus*', *Univ California Pub Class Philol* 14, 1952, 387—417. The authors seek to show that the unity is achieved mainly by two devices, the structural employment of dialectic in the exposition of dialectic and the stylistic devices which contribute to the prevailing tone of light irony.

678. G. A. Levi, *Il bello nel Fedro platonico*, Humanitas (Brescia) 7, 1952, 479—485. Levi lays special stress upon the analogies between Kant's theory of aesthetic judgment and Plato's notion of beauty as that which recalls the mind to the ideas.

679. F. Ruiloba Palazuélos, *Epilogo al Fedro*, *Publ Fac Filos y Let Univ La Laguna* 1952. Problems suggested by the *Phaedrus* are here explicated in an extension of the dialogue.

680. P. Von der Mühl, *Platonica*, *Mus Helvet* 9, 1952, 58—59. Notes on *Phaedrus* 229 C, 248 C, 250 B 7 and 252 C, and a list of interpolations in the text of the dialogue.

681. W. Kirk, *Protagoras and Phaedrus: Literary techniques*, *Studies Presented to David Moore Robinson II*, St. Louis 1953, pp. 593—601. In both dialogues, Kirk argues, the dramatic setting is employed as a support for the central theme, which in both is the attack upon sophistic rhetoric as a method of education.

682. H. L. Hudson-Williams, *Three systems of education: Some reflections on the implications of Plato's Phaedrus* (Inaug. Lecture, King's College, Newcastle, 14 Dec. 1953), Oxford 1954. The false sophisticated rhetoric is here confronted with the formalistically good, 'humanistic' rhetoric of Isocrates, and this in turn with Plato's own educational ideal of scientific culture. See also his article, *Political Speeches in Athens*, *Cl Quart N. S.* 1, 1951, 68—73 (especially pp. 69—70 and 73 on the *Phaedrus*).

683. W. J. Verdenius, Notes on Plato's *Phaedrus*, *Mnem* IV 8, 1955, 265—289. By way of reviewing Hackforth's translation and commentary (668 *supra*) Verdenius here gives textual, grammatical, and exegetical notes on more than 150 passages, taking into account most of the modern scholarly literature relevant to them.

684. L. Gil, Notas al '*Fedro*', *Emerita* 24, 1956, 311—330. Critical and exegetical notes on ten passages, six of which are discussed by Verdenius (683 *supra*) also, whose article Gil did not know.

685. H. W. Meyer, Das Verhältnis von Enthusiasmus und Philosophie bei Platon im Hinblick auf seinen *Phaidros*, *Archiv Philos* 6, 1956, 262—277. This article is directed against the thesis of H. Gundert (675 *supra*), and Meyer makes many important positive points in his interpretation of the *Phaedrus* and of Plato's sober conception of responsible philosophy. Both Gundert and Meyer are criticized by H. Flashar, who reinterprets the *Phaedrus* from the point of view of 'the philosopher's enthusiasm' in his book, *Der Dialog Ion* . . . , pp. 121—139 (173 *supra*).

686. B. E. Mueller, Unity of the *Phaedrus*, *Cl Bull* 33, 1956/57, 50—53 and 63—65. He asserts that the real theme is the question as to the nature of man implied by Socrates in 230 A and that Lysias stands for the natural, unsure man, *Phaedrus* for the man of aesthetic feeling and enthusiasm misled by sophistic rhetoric, Socrates for Platonic philosophy in person. Mueller persists in his misinterpretation of the ideas as 'functions or activities of the soul' (see 642 *supra*). See also 688 *infra*.

687. R. G. Hoerber, Love or rhetoric in Plato's *Phaedrus*, *Cl Bull* 34, 1957/58, 33. Dissenting from 686 *supra*, he maintains that the dialogue dramatically portrays the unity of philosophical love and dialectic, distinguishing this from love in the common sense of erotic passion to which the inferior discourse, rhetoric, is suitable. See Hoerber's remarks in *Phronesis* 4, 1959, 27—28.

688. G. E. Mueller, The unity of the *Phaidros*, *Sophia* 26, 1958, 25—34. This is in fact the same article as 686 *supra*.

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See the articles by Von der Mühll (680 *supra*) and Gil (684 *supra*) and especially that by Verdenius (683 *supra*).

689. On 229 C 2: P. Chantraine, *Class et Med* 17, 1956, 1—4 and especially p. 3, n. 2 against Verdenius (683 *supra*) *ad loc.*

690. On 230 E 6—234 C 5: G. E. Dimock Jr., *Ἀλλὰ* in Lysias and Plato's *Phaedrus*, *AJPh* 73, 1952, 381—396. Dimock shows that Plato is here parodying Lysias by caricaturing the uses of *ἄλλὰ* that he affected and that in the following speech and remarks of Socrates (235 A, 237 B—241 D, 241 E) there is subtle criticism of these very tricks of style and their larger implications. Both Hackforth (668 *supra*) and H. W. Meyer (685 *supra*), neither of whom knew Dimock's article, believe this 'speech of Lysias' to be a Platonic parody; Lasserre (673 *supra*) insisted that it is 'a genuine work of Lysias'; and Helmbold and Holther (677 *supra*) make the curiously cryptic assertion that it 'cannot possibly be by Lysias or conceivably by Plato'.

691. On 244 D 5—245 A 1: I. M. Linforth, Telestic madness in Plato, *Phaedrus* 244 DE, *Univ California Pub Cl Philol* 13, 1946, 163—172. See also F. Pfister (209 *supra*), pp. 187—188 and especially E. R. Dodds, *The Greeks and the Irrational* (230 *supra*), pp. 64—101, and F. M. Cornford, *Principium Sapientiae*, Cambridge 1952, pp. 75—76 and in general pp. 66—87 on the *Phaedrus* interpreted in the light of the four species of *μανία* (244 A ff.).

692. On 245 C 5—246 A 2: W. E. Blake, Maximus Planudes and Plato, *Phaedrus* 245 C—246 A, *Cl Phil* 28, 1933, 130; on the translations by Cicero and Chalcidius see: K. Mras, *Sitzungsber Preuss Akad Wiss Phil-Hist Kl*, Berlin 1933, 274—275 and *Wiener Studien* 51, 1933, 147—148; R. Poncelet (276b *supra*).

693. On 245 C 5—246 A 2 (the logic of the argument and the text of C 5—7): C. Diano, *Parola Pass* 2, 1947, 189—192; P. Courcelle, *Les lettres grecques en Occident*, Paris 1948, p. 231, n. 7; G. Müller (528 *supra*), p. 85, n. 2 and against him É. des Places, *Ant Cl* 21, 1952, 382, who appeals to Festugière in *Rev Ét Grecques* 59/60, 1946/47, 496; J. L. Ackrill, *Mind* 62, 1953, 278; A. C. Lloyd, *Philos Quart* 4, 1954, 374—375; J. Tate, *Cl Rev N S.* 5, 1955, 158; W. J. Verdenius (683 *supra*), p. 276; P. Maas, *Textkritik*, Leipzig 1957 (3. Auflage), pp. 23—24. Of these only Müller and Ackrill argue for *αὐτοκίνητον* in C 5, the reading adopted by Sir David Ross, *Plato's Theory of Ideas*, Oxford 1951, p. 236 and rejected by Hackforth (668 *supra*), pp. 65—68.

—. On 246 A—249 B: W. K. C. Guthrie, *Entretiens Ant Cl* 3, *Vandoeuvres-Genève* 1957, 9—15 in his article, Plato's views on the nature of the soul.

694. On 246 E 4—247 C 2: A. von Salis, *Jahrbuch Deutschen Arch Instituts* 55, 1940, 160—167. He argues that the motif here is

not astronomical or cosmological but was inspired by the shield of the Athena Parthenos. Cf. B. Schweitzer, *Platon und die bildende Kunst der Griechen*, Tübingen 1953, pp. 61—66, who agrees with von Salis, and P. Friedländer (11b *supra*), p. 372, n. 23, who voices some objections. The astrological interpretation is followed and developed by B. L. van der Waerden (235b *supra*). W. J. W. Koster (256 *supra*), pp. 4—11, who argued against a strictly astrological interpretation and against Oriental influence, was apparently unaware of von Salis's article, as were also Julia Kerschensteiner (242 *supra*), pp. 184—187 and A.-J. Festugière (243 *supra*), pp. 24—29; so also apparently was P. M. Schuhl when he proposed his interpretation of Hestia (247 A) in *Rev Archéologique* 6 Ser 31/32, 1949, 965—967. P. Boyancé in his article (228 *supra*), especially pp. 321—341, is primarily concerned with the tendency of later 'astral mysticism' to connect with the myth of the *Phaedrus* the ascent of the soul to the heavens.

—. On 247 D 4: H. Dörrie (654 *supra*), p. 311, n. 3 and pp. 333—334.

695. On 248 A—249 D (with 256 E 4—257 A 2): R. S. Bluck, *The Phaedrus and Reincarnation*, *AJPh* 79, 1958, 156—164. He argues that the 'falls' in the *Phaedrus* are not 'original', that there is no 'original fall' in Plato, and that the cycle of 10,000 years is not necessarily the whole of the soul's 'wandering', for it may fall again after having returned to the celestial region. See also Bluck, *AJPh* 79, 1958, 405—414 in reply to K. von Fritz, *Phronesis* 2, 1957, 85—89.

—. On 248 D—E: R. S. Brumbaugh, *Cl Journ* 46, 1950/51, 345—348. The order of lives given here connected with the computation in *Republic* 587 A—588 A. See *infra* on the latter passage.

—. On 249 B—250 D: N. Gulley, *Cl Quart N. S.* 4, 1954, 200—209 in his article, Plato's theory of recollection (see also 583 and 649 *supra*).

—. On 250 B—253 A: For conjectures concerning Plato's references here to himself and his contemporaries see Rudberg (85 *supra*); Salin (86 *supra*), on which see K. Hildebrandt (669a *supra*), pp. 382—383; Von der Mühl (680 *supra*), no. 9.

696. On 250 D: M. B. Trías, *Nota sobre la belleza como transcendental*, *Actas Primer Cong Nac Filos*, Mendoza 1949, III, pp. 1559—1564. Trías argues that, as is recognized here and in *Symposium*

211 A—E, beauty is preëminently a 'transcendental intelligible' and notably different from the transcendentals, good and truth.

697. On 252 C—253 C: Hazel Barnes, *Cl Weekly* 40, 1946/47, 34—35. Comparison of the theory here with Jung's theory of the 'anima'.

698. On 254 D 4: W. C. Helmbold, *Mnem* IV 5, 1952, 226. He would excise *ἐλκων*.

— On 256 E 4—257 A 2: See 695 *supra*.

699. On 257 D 9—E 2: B. Marzullo, *Γλωττὸς ἀγκών*, *Studi Ital Filol* Cl 27/28, 1956, 255—271. He contends that the phrase is not a proverb but a 'gallant exclamation' from the amatory vocabulary, and he tries to trace the history of its misinterpretation and of the consequent corruption of the text in this passage.

700. On 265 E—266 B: J. L. Ackrill, *Mind* 62, 1953, 278—279. He shows that contrary to what Hackforth says (668 *supra*, pp. 133—136) there is no conflict between the procedure here described and that followed in the earlier part of the dialogue nor any reason to regard the 'programme' here as more primitive than the method of the later dialogues. Cf. also Tate, *Cl Rev* N. S. 5, 1955, 159.

701. On 269 D—270 E: A.—J. Festugière, *Hippocrate: L'Antienne Médecine*, Paris 1948, pp. 62—65 (cf. Erna Lesky, *Anz Altertum* 3, 1950, 100—102). Festugière insists that τοῦ ὅλου in 270 C 2 means 'the universe' and that the point of view of Plato and of 'the Platonic Hippocrates' here is the very opposite to that of the empirical physician of *Ancient Medicine*. To the other literature on the subject which he lists on pp. 62—63 and 72 (Addenda) add the following titles published before 1948: P. Kucharski, *Rev Ét Grecques* 52, 1939, 301—357 (cf. his later book, *Les chemins du savoir dans les premiers dialogues de Platon*, Paris 1949, pp. 131—142); L. Edelstein, *AJPh* 61, 1940, 226—229; A. M. Frenkian, *La méthode hippocratique dans le Phèdre de Platon*, Bucarest 1941; W. Kranz, *Philologus* 96, 1944, 193—200. It is a pity that little attention has been paid to this article of Kranz's, which strongly supports Edelstein's demonstration (followed also by F. Steckerl, *Cl Phil* 40, 1945, 166—180) that τοῦ ὅλου in 270 C 2 does *not* mean 'the universe'. It is not mentioned in the treatments of the passage at the beginning of this decade by O. Regenbogen (290 *supra*, pp. 212—213) and F. Wehrli (156 *supra*, pp. 181—182) or even by Hackforth (668 *supra*, pp. 149—151), although Hackforth too argues that there is

here no reference to 'the universe' or 'cosmology'¹). F. Robert (480 *supra*) interpreted the passage on the assumption that it is certainly a reference to the *Περὶ ἀέρος*. In the same year H. Diller tried to prove that *Ancient Medicine* cannot be used in any way to identify the Hippocratic doctrine to which Plato refers, because it is to this passage of the *Phaedrus* that chap. 20 of *Ancient Medicine* refers, the treatise being not pre-Platonic but the composition of a critic who was thoroughly acquainted with Platonic and Academic doctrine (Hermes 80, 1952, 385—409)²). The following year without knowledge of Diller's article but like him taking τοῦ ὅλου to mean 'the universe' L. Bourgey maintained that the passage of the *Phaedrus* refers to no single treatise but is in accord with many that can reasonably be ascribed to Hippocrates (including *Ancient Medicine*) and represents the general teaching of Hippocrates as it was commonly known in Plato's time (Observation et expérience chez les médecins de la Collection Hippocratique, Paris 1953, pp. 88—97 and p. 196, n. 1). There follow three more substantial treatments of the passage, all very different from one another:

702. On 269 D—270 E: P. Mesnard, La rencontre de Platon avec Hippocrate et les prémices de la méthode expérimentale, Rev Thomiste 54, 1954, 139—147³). According to this the passage marks a turning-point in Plato's epistemology, for it shows that he got from Hippocrates the dialectical method whereby in his later work he sought to achieve a concrete knowledge of nature. Mesnard thinks that the passage refers to the spirit of the whole Hippocratic Corpus, but he then tries to find scattered in different treatises one or another of the 'three main points' of the supposed Hippocratic method.

703. On 269 D—270 E: R. Joly, Rev Ét Anciennes 58, 1956, 204—210. Insisting once more that τοῦ ὅλου means 'the universe',

¹) Hackforth says that of scholars known to him only G. M. A. Grube (3 *supra*, p. 213) had seen that τοῦ ὅλου does not mean 'the universe'. This is an amazing confession, since even H. N. Fowler in his Loeb Library edition (1914) had taken it to mean 'the whole man'. W. J. Verdenius (688 *supra*, p. 286), agreeing with Hackforth's interpretation, points out that it had been proposed by Edelstein in 1931, by A. Rey in 1939, and by F. Steckerl in 1945; but he does not mention Kranz's article either. Cf. most recently J. S. Morrison, Cl Quart N. S. 8, 1958, 216.

²) Against Diller's thesis see J.-H. Kühn (704 *infra*, pp. 46—56). Ermerins and after him Poschenrieder had in the last century contended that *Ancient Medicine* is post-Platonic (cf. H. Wanner, Studien zu *Περὶ ἀρχαίας ἱερτικῆς*, Zürich 1939, p. 102, n. 9).

³) Cf. also Actes du Deuxième Congrès Internat de l'Union Internat de Philosophie des Sciences, Zürich 1954, Vol. IV, Neuchâtel 1955, 101—108.

Joly maintains that the doctrine which this implies was mistakenly ascribed to Hippocrates by Plato, who either misinterpreted some such passage as chapters 2 and 8 of *Περὶ ἀέρος* or was misled by remembering isolated passages out of context.

704. On 269 D—272 B: J.-H. Kühn, *System- und Methodenprobleme im Corpus Hippocraticum*, Wiesbaden 1956, pp. 84—97 (cf. Tate, *Cl Rev N. S.* 7, 1957, 255). Kühn's analysis of the whole passage develops decisive arguments against taking *τοῦ ὅλου* to mean 'the universe'; but, because he dare not accept the implications of this conclusion, he loses himself in a welter of hypotheses based upon the opposite interpretation and ending in what he has himself to admit is sheer conjecture.

705. On 274 B—278 B: C. Mazzantini, *Il 'discorso non scritto' nel Fedro di Platone*, Assoc Filosofica Ligure: Relazioni e Discussioni 1951—52, Milano 1953, 67—87. He shows that to take over seriously this indictment of written discourse is in contradiction with the passage itself and with Plato's conception of philosophical irony and *paideia*, of which Mazzantini here gives a penetrating analysis. See also W. C. Greene, *Harvard Studies in Class Phil* 60, 1951, 23—59; D. J. Allan, *Philosophy* 28, 1953, 366 on Hackforth (668 *supra*), p. 163; Maria Rezzani, *Note e ricerche intorno al linguaggio di Platone*, Padova 1959, pp. 21—23.

706. On 274 D, 277 D 7—8, and 277 E 8—9: F. Scheidweiler, *Hermes* 83, 1955, 122—124. On these suggestions cf. W. J. Verdenius (683 *supra*), pp. 287—288.

—. On 278 E—279 B: W. Steidle (202 *supra*), pp. 258—259 and 285—296; G. J. de Vries (203 *supra*); H. Raeder (206 *supra*), pp. 14—17. Cf. also R. L. Howland, *Cl Quart* 31, 1937, 151—159; R. Schaerer, *La Question Platonicienne*, Neuchâtel 1938, pp. 178—181; J. S. Morrison, *Cl Quart N. S.* 8, 1958, 216—217.

—. On 279 A 3: G. J. de Vries (351 *supra*), p. 295 on *Cratylus* 404 A 3.

Philebus

α

707. *Philèbe*: Texte établi et traduit par A. Diès = *Platon, Œuvres Complètes IX*, 2e partie, Paris 1941 (cf. Hackforth, *Cl Rev* 59, 1945, 57—59; Cherniss, *AJPh* 68, 1947, 225—234).

708. Plato's Examination of Pleasure: A Translation of the *Philebus*, with Introduction and Commentary by R. Hackforth, Cambridge 1945 (cf. Luce, *Hermathena* 66, 1945, 117—122; Post, *AJPh* 67, 1946, 378—380; Tate, *Cl Rev* 60, 1946, 29—30).

709. Plato, *Philebus* and *Epinomis*: Translation and Introduction by A. E. Taylor . . . , London/Edinburgh 1956 (see 409 *supra*). The translation of the *Philebus* and Taylor's long introduction to it (pp. 9—99) are here edited with additional notes by G. Calogero and R. Klubansky (cf. Tate, *Cl Rev* N. S. 7, 1957, 211—213; Hackforth, *JHS* 77 Part 2, 1957, 331).

For A. Zadro's translation, Bari 1957, see 306a *supra*.

β

See among the publications already listed: J. Zürcher (285a *supra*); P. Kucharski (117 *supra*)¹; R. Cadiou (87 *supra*); K. F. Johansen (621 *supra*); G. Giannantoni (162 *supra*), pp. 145—164.

710. W. Szilasi, *Macht und Ohnmacht des Geistes*, Bern 1946, pp. 19—106. On this interpretation of the *Philebus* see the critique by E. M. Manasse, *Philos Rundschau* 5, Beiheft 1, 1957, 36—38²).

711. A. Tovar, *Observationes aliquot in Platonis Philebum*. *Orientalia Christ Period* 13, 1947, 656—668. In support of his earlier emendation of 66 A 8, which he calls the key to the whole dialogue,

¹ See also Kucharski's earlier book. *Les chemins du savoir . . .*, mentioned in 701 *supra*; about a third of it is devoted to the *Philebus*, in which Kucharski contends the earlier theory of ideas has been abandoned.

² Manasse rightly compares Szilasi's work unfavorably with the much earlier analysis of the *Philebus* by Gadamer:

710a) H.-G. Gadamer, *Platos dialektische Ethik*, Leipzig 1931. More than half of this book (pp. 81—175) is given over to a careful analysis of the *Philebus* which is valuable, whatever one may think of its avowedly 'phenomenological' point of view; and this is preceded (pp. 13—80) by an essay on Platonic dialectic in the other dialogues which is based upon the interpretation of the *Philebus*. Of other publications on the *Philebus* between those of Gadamer and of Szilasi I mention only two:

710b) N. R. Murphy, 'The 'Comparison of Lives' in Plato's *Philebus*, *Cl Quart* 32, 1938, 116—124.

710c) M. W. Isenberg, 'The Unity of Plato's *Philebus*, *Cl Phil* 35, 1940, 154—179.

he discusses the nature, meaning, and origin of Plato's doctrine of pleasure in the *Philebus* and the Academic differences on the subject.

712. K. Reich, *Gnomon* 22, 1950, 69—70. On the four γένη and νοῦς in the *Philebus* in his review of the interpretation of Julia Kerschenshteiner (242 *supra*, pp. 105—107).

713. H. J. M. Broos, *Plato and Art: A new analysis of the 'Philebus'*, *Mnem* IV 4, 1951, 113—128. From the inner coherence of the dialogue, he argues, there emerge at once the answer to the problems posed in 15 B—C and the rational basis of Plato's critical attitude towards art.

714. N.-I. Boussoulas, *L'être et la composition des mixtes dans le 'Philèbe' de Platon*, Paris 1952, What has already been said of Boussoulas' more recent article (622 *supra*) is equally applicable to this book. Here the four 'classes' of the *Philebus* are wildly identified with every sort of classification, real or imagined, in the other dialogues; and from all this is concocted for Plato in a manner worthy of Proclus an ontological hierarchy of 'mixtes' of diminishing perfection and concomitantly increasing complication as in them the ineffable and transcendent One manifests itself less and less purely¹).

715. J. H. M. M. Loenen, *De ontwikkeling van Plato's teleologische natuurbeschouwing*, *Tijdsch Philos* 15, 1953, 179—194. This article summarizes the argument of Loenen's book, *De Nous in het systeem van Plato's filosofie* (Amsterdam 1951), where the *Philebus* is dealt with on pp. 179—216; but the article brings out even more sharply the importance of the *Philebus* as the full expression of what Loenen argues is Plato's 'new doctrine'. See 1233 *infra*.

716. P. Wilpert, *Eine Elementenlehre im platonischen Philebos*, *Studies Presented to David Moore Robinson II*, St. Louis 1953, pp. 573—582. Frankly puzzled by the absence in the *Philebus* of what he had maintained was the fundamental division of Being in Plato's later doctrine, Wilpert nevertheless tries to connect the πέρας — ἀπειρον of this dialogue with the distinction of substantial and relative Being and with the Aristotelian report of the Platonic theory of principles as he had reconstructed it (see 111, 112, 124, and 176 *supra*).

¹ The method and in part the conclusions of this book are criticized by J. Moreau, *Rev Philosophique* 143, 1953, 462—463; but both are reported with uncritical complacency and apparently with approval by J. Trouillard (*L'ontogénie du 'Philèbe'*, *Rev Philos Louvain* 51, 1953, 101—107) and by J. Pépin (*Recherches de Philosophie* 1, 1955, 210—211).

717. G. E. Mueller, The unity of Plato's *Philebus*, *Cl Journ* 50, 1954/55, 21—27. He represents the dialogue as presenting in its second part the rise of the individual soul through philosophy to participation in the absolute reality which in the ontology of the first part is the highest of four 'concentric levels', 'the absolute idea of a self-sufficient whole . . . containing the lower or outer levels as distinctions of itself within itself'¹).

718. J. Xenakis, Plato on ethical disagreement, *Phronesis* 1, 1955/56, 50—57. He argues that the *Philebus* presents the programme desiderated in the *Euthyphro* for resolving issues in value-disputes and that in *Philebus* 20 D and 65 A ff. Plato is not 'defining' anything but 'is engaged in a grading enterprise'.

719. M. Vanhoutte, La genèse du plaisir dans le '*Philèbe*', *Mélanges Auguste Diès*, Paris 1956, pp. 235—243. The professed purpose of this article is to examine certain elementary psychological notions which figure in 31 B 2—36 C 1. In fact, Vanhoutte is concerned with *πέρας*, *ἄπειρον*, *μικτόν* as fundamental kinds or classes. He concludes that the psychology of the dialogue is strongly influenced by its ontology and that the 'origin of pleasure' shows the intellectualism that inspired Plato's psychology. See also his book, *La méthode ontologique de Platon*, Paris/Louvain 1956, pp. 137—157 and pp. 168—171 on the *Philebus*.

720. J. C. Kamerbeek, Notes sur quelques passages du *Philèbe*, *Mnem* IV 10, 1957, 226—231. On the text and interpretation of 12 D 7—E 2, 13 D 7—8, 14 B 1—4, 15 B 1—8, and 15 D 4—6.

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See J. C. Kamerbeek's notes (720 *supra*); with his note on 12 D 7—E 2 cf. that of J. V. Luce, *Hermathena* 66, 1945, 119—120 and with his note on 15 B 1—8 cf. Cherniss, *AJPh* 68, 1947, 230, notes 61 and 62.

— On 14 D—15 C: D. W. Hamlyn, *Philos Quart* 5, 1955, 292—295 (617 *supra*), and on this cf. R. S. Bluck, *JHS* 77, Part 2, 1957,

¹) This 'levelled and dialectical metaphysics', moreover, provides, according to Mueller, the background and the unity of what he holds to be Aristotle's 'earlier *Metaphysics*' and which in an earlier article he characterized as 'an existential and dialectical movement of the whole soul towards the whole of reality within that whole':

717a) G. E. Mueller, The Platonic Aristotle, *Actas Primer Cong Nac Filos*, Mendoza 1949, III, pp. 2005—2013.

181; R. Loriaux, *L'être et la forme selon Platon*, Bruges 1955, pp. 154—156; M. Vanhoutte, *La méthode ontologique ...* (719 *supra*), pp. 139—140.

721. On 15 A 4—7: B. S. Page, *Cl Rev* 61, 1947, 8.

722. On 16 C—17 A: A. C. Lloyd, *Cl Quart N. S.* 2, 1952, 106—110 (in his article, *Plato's description of division*, *ibid.*, 105—112); D. W. Hamlyn, *Philos Quart* 5, 1955, 292—295 (617 *supra*); M. Vanhoutte, *La méthode ontologique ...* (719 *supra*), pp. 141—150; K. F. Johansen (621 *supra*), pp. 30—31 and 34. See also J. E. Raven (725 *infra*), pp. 180—181.

723. On 17 A 8—18 D 2: H. Koller, *Glotta* 34, 1955, 164—169 (in his article, *Stoicheion*, *ibid.*, pp. 161—174); M. Vanhoutte, *La méthode ontologique ...* (719 *supra*), pp. 150—156; H. Koller, *Glotta* 38, 1959, 63—64.

724. On 20 B 9—C 2: R. Cadiou, *Rev Ét Grecques* 65, 1952, xiv.

725. On 23 C—27 C: J. E. Raven, *Pythagoreans and Eleatics*, Cambridge 1948, pp. 180—187; Sir David Ross, *Plato's theory of ideas*, Oxford 1951, pp. 132—138; Cherniss, *AJPh* 78, 1957, 240—242 (300 *supra*).

726. On 28 D—30 E: J.-G. Préaux, *Rev Belge Philol* 35, 1957, 345—348. The influence of this passage on the later interpretation of Plato's theology (in his article, *Deus Socratis*, *ibid.*, pp. 332—355).

— On 31 B 2—36 C 1: See 719 *supra*.

727. On 36 D 6—7: D. J. Allan, *Cl Rev* 63, 1949, 43—44. The main argument was anticipated by P. Shorey, *Cl Phil* 12, 1917, 436.

728. On 38 C 2—E 4: G. Calogero, *Giorn Crit Filos Ital* 3. Ser. 11, 1957, 362—364.

729. On 63 C 1—3: B. S. Page, *Cl Rev* 61, 1947, 8.

— On 66 A 4—8: A. Tovar (711 *supra*) and his earlier articles in *Emerita* 7, 1939, 146—155; 9, 1941, 190—195; 10, 1942, 174—175 (in his review of Diès [707 *supra*]); J. V. Luce, *Hermathena* 66, 1945, 121—122 (in his review of Hackforth [708 *supra*]).

730. On 66 C 8—10: P. Lévêque, *Rev Ét Anciennes* 57, 1955, 41—45; M. P. Nilsson, *Gnomon* 28, 1956, 19 on Moulinier (213 *supra*).

[Philosophus]

 β

Although it is uncertain that Plato even intended to write this dialogue, those who believe that he did do not hesitate to explain why his intention was not fulfilled and even to outline the form and content of the unwritten work.

731. H. Raeder, *Platons planlagte Dialog Philosophos*, København 1948.

See also J. B. Skemp, *Plato's Statesman*, London 1952, pp. 17, 20, 25, and 80; Maria Rezzani, *Sophia* 21, 1953, 26 and her monograph, *Note e ricerche intorno al linguaggio di Platone*, Padova 1959, pp. 23—24; G. K. Plochmann, *Cl Phil* 49, 1954, 228—229. E. Salin (86 *supra*) has the wild notion that, since Aristotle took to heart the warning given him in the *Sophist*, there was no longer any necessity for Plato to write the *Philosophus*.

Politicus

 α

732. *Plato's Statesman*, A Translation of the *Politicus* of Plato with Introductory Essays and Footnotes by J. B. Skemp, London 1952 (cf. Owen, *Mind* 62, 1953, 271—173; Tate, *Cl Rev N. S.* 4, 1954, 115—117)¹.

733. Platone, *Il Politico*: traduzione, introduzione e commento a cura di G. A. Roggerone, Torino 1953.

734. Platón, *El Politico*: introducción, texto critico, traducción y notas de A. González Laso, Madrid 1955.

For A. Zadro's translation, Bari 1957, see 306 a *supra*.

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See among the publications already listed: R. Schaerer (618 *supra*)², K. F. Johansen (621 *supra*), E. Salin (86 *supra*).

¹) Skemp's translation with some alterations and with his notes abridged, altered, and in some cases supplemented has been republished with a new introduction by M. Ostwald in *The Library of Liberal Arts*, New York 1957.

²) Compare with this essay on the structure of the metaphysical dialogues V. Goldschmidt's book, *Les Dialogues de Platon*, Paris 1947, pp. 256—273 on the *Politicus*, and that of P. Kucharski, *Les chemins du savoir . . .* (see 701 *supra*), pp. 147—273: 'La méthodologie dans le *Sophiste* et dans le *Politique*'.

735. G. A. Roggerone, La funzione del 'politico' nella dottrina platonica dello stato, *Sophia* 18, 1950, 239—246. Here, he maintains, philosophical statesmanship in the sense of the *Republic* being recognized as unrealizable in the concrete is properly put upon the deontological level and its validity in this sense is preserved even for the programme of necessarily imperfect actualization in the *Laws*; and so the original Socratic thesis is deepened rather than abandoned or merely resumed, its optimism being thus tempered and reconciled with Plato's pessimistic knowledge of human impotence to dominate matter and so to realize the perfect state.

736. P.-M. Schuhl, Remarques sur Platon et la technologie, *Rev Ét Grecques* 66, 1953, 465—472 (reprinted in *Estudios de Historia de la Filosofía en homenaje al Prof. R. Mondolfo*, Fasc 1, Tucuman 1957, pp. 227—233). On the classifications and divisions in the *Politicus* and the *Sophist* as testimony to Plato's interest in technology as such.

Attention should be called also to three earlier dissertations on the *Politicus* and to an earlier monograph on the *Politicus* and *Sophist*:

737. Margarete Schröder, Zum Aufbau des platonischen *Politikos*, Jena 1935 (cf. von Fritz, *Gnomon* 12, 1936, 120—128).

738. E. M. Manasse, Platons *Sophistes* und *Politikos*, Das Problem der Wahrheit, Berlin 1937 (*Bull Assoc Budé*, Suppl Crit 9, 1938, 34—40; Mazzantini, *Mondo Class* 9, 1939, 141—145).

739. H. Zeise, Der Staatsmann: Ein Beitrag zur Interpretation des platonischen *Politikos*, Leipzig 1938, = *Philologus*, Suppl 31, 3 (Allan, *Cl Rev* 53, 1939, 178—179; de Strycker, *Études Cl* 8, 1939, 570).

740. Annemarie Capelle, Platos Dialog *Politikos*, Hamburg 1939.

The most important of these four works is that of Manasse's (738 *supra*). Miss Schröder's is useful for its résumé and critique of earlier treatments of the myth and interesting for its interpretation of the function of the myth in the dialogue as a whole, but she has been misled by the attempt to read into the dialogue in systematic fashion the five 'Erkenntnisstufen' of *Epistle VII* (cf. Zeise, 739 *supra*, pp. 104—112)¹.

¹ Cf. M. W. Isenberg's attempt to interpret the *Sophist* on the same basis, *Cl Phil* 46, 1951, 201—211.

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741. On 263 B 7—10: L. Lugarini, *Acme* 8 fasc. 1, 1955, 45—46 (see 613 *supra*).

742. On 266 A 1—D 2: G. Roggerone, *Riv Filolog Cl N. S.* 31, 1953, 62—66. He argues that the animal meant must be the tortoise, unaware apparently of Shorey's note on the passage and on the meaning of *ἐνχερής* in *Cl Phil* 12, 1917, 308—310. Cf. R. S. Brumbaugh, *Plato's mathematical imagination*, Bloomington 1954, pp. 257—259.

743. On 268 E—274 E: P.-M. Schuhl, *Sur le mythe du Politique*, *Rev Métaph et Morale* 39, 1932, 47—58 (reprinted in his book, *Études sur la fabulation platonicienne*, Paris 1947, pp. 89—104); J. B. Skemp, *The theory of motion in Plato's later dialogues*, Cambridge 1942, pp. 21—27; J. Bidez (241 *supra*, pp. 66—77 and pp. 175—178); Julia Kerschensteiner (242 *supra*, pp. 101—105); A. J. Festugière (243 *supra*, pp. 37—44); L. Troje (245 *supra*); W. J. W. Koster (256 *supra*, pp. 39—47); J. H. M. M. Loenen, *De Nous in het systeem van Plato's filosofie*, pp. 158—178 (see 715 *supra*); R. Schaerer, *Diogenes* 11, 1955, 52—54; P. J. G. M. van Litsenburg, *God en het goddelijke in de dialogen van Plato*, Nijmegen 1955, pp. 43—52; J. Gould, *The development of Plato's ethics*, Cambridge 1955, pp. 206—209 (pp. 204—216 on the *Politicus* as a whole), cf. Vlastos, *Philos Rev* 66, 1957, 235, n. 22; J. van Camp et P. Canart, *Le sens du mot ΘΕΙΟΣ chez Platon*, Louvain 1956, pp. 214—229; E. A. Havelock (152 *supra*, pp. 40—44 and pp. 47—48). See also 737, 739, and 740 *supra*, and Manasse (738 *supra*, pp. 194—198).

744. On 271 D 3—6: G. A. Roggerone, *Riv Filolog Cl N. S.* 31, 1953, 66—67. He defends and interprets the MS tradition of D 4.

745. On 272 E 2—3: C. Mugler, *Ant Cl* 25, 1956, 20—21 and 26, 1957, 346.

746. On 273 D 5—E 1: E. Gilson, *Mediaeval Studies* (Toronto) 9, 1947, 108—130; J. Pépin, *Assoc G. Budé, Congrès de Tours et Poitiers 1953 Actes*, Paris 1954, 257—259; É. des Places, *Archives de Philos* 19 cahier 4, 1956, 120—122.

747. On 275 D 5—6: J. B. Skemp, *Cl Rev N. S.* 3, 1953, 156.

— On 277 D—278 E and 285 D—286 B: N. Gulley, *Cl Quart N. S.* 4, 1954, 202—204 and 208—209 (see *supra Phaedrus γ* on 249 B—250 D); J. Gould, *The development of Plato's ethics*, pp. 210—211

(see 743 *supra*); E. de Strycker, Estudios de historia de la filosofía, en homenaje al Prof. R. Mondolfo, Fasc 1, Tucuman 1957. pp. 218—220; H. Cherniss AJPh 78, 1957, 248—249.

— On 287 C 3—5: A. C. Lloyd, Cl Quart N. S. 2, 1952, 111—112 (see 722 *supra*).

748. On 294 A—299 E: R. Mondolfo, Platon y el concepto unitario de cultura humana, Humanitas (Tucumán) 1, 1, 1953, 15—24 (pp. 21—24 on this passage). An Italian version of the article is published in Scritti di sociologia e politica in onore di Luigi Sturzo, II, Bologna 1953. See also Mondolfo's book, La comprensión del sujeto humana en la cultura antigua, Buenos Aires 1955, pp. 554—556.

749. On 301 C 6—E 4: G. Vlastos, Philos Rev 66, 1957, 235—237 in his review of J. Gould (see 743 *supra*) entitled Socratic knowledge and Platonic pessimism, *ibid.*, 226—238.

Protagoras

α

Not since 1931, when Nestle's thorough revision of the Cron-Deuschle edition was published, has any really scholarly text and commentary of this dialogue appeared, although Calogero's, despite its being avowedly an edition for schools, is always competent and often illuminating:

750. *Protagoras*, 7. gänzlich neu bearbeitete Auflage von W. Nestle, Leipzig 1931.

751. Platone, Il *Protagora* con introduzione e commento di G. Calogero, Firenze 1937 (reprinted 1948 and 1958 [3a edizione riveduta]).

Faggin's annotated translation with a long introduction, originally published in 1937 also, has recently been reprinted in a somewhat revised form by a different publisher; and even more recently there has appeared a new revision of Apelt's translation in the Philosophische Bibliothek:

752. *Protagora*, traduzione, introduzione e note a cura di G. Faggin, Torino 1952.

753. *Protagoras* übersetzt und erläutert von O. Apelt, 3. neu bearbeitete Auflage von A. Mauersberger und A. Capelle, Hamburg 1956.

Of the many other recent translations the following are of some interest chiefly because of their introductory essays:

754. *Protagora*, traduzione di R. Catena con introduzione di A. Pasa, Treviso 1953.

755. *Protagora*, introduzione, traduzione e note a cura di A. d'Ari, Bologna 1955.

756. Plato's *Protagoras*: B. Jowett's translation extensively revised by M. Ostwald edited, with an Introduction, by G. Vlastos, New York 1956. This publication in the Library of Liberal Arts is noteworthy because of the introductory essay by Vlastos, for some criticism of which cf. Levinson, *Journ Philos* 54, 1957, 816—818, and especially J. Tate, *Cl Rev N. S.* 8, 1958, 35—37, who compares it with the briefer introduction by W. K. C. Guthrie to his translation of the *Protagoras* and *Meno* in the Penguin Classics, 1956.

β

See among the publications already listed: J. Moreau, *La construction . . .* (5 *supra*), pp. 34—100; W. Jaeger, *Paideia II* (4 *supra*), pp. 165—187; A. Koyré (10b *supra*), pp. 17—33; Maria T. Antonelli (149 *supra*), pp. 25—31; G. B. Kerferd (225 *supra*); E. R. Dodds (230 *supra*), pp. 184—186 and 197—199; F. Robert (480 *supra*); W. Kirk (681 *supra*); G. Rudberg (293 *supra*); A. Capizzi (224 *supra*), pp. 61—68; K. D. Georgoulis (301 *supra*); K. von Fritz (226 *supra*); A. E. Havelock (152 *supra*), pp. 87—94, 163—230, and 407—409.

757. H. Langerbeck, *Δόξαι ἐπινοουμένη*: Studien zu Demokrits Ethik und Erkenntnislehre, Berlin 1935. Of this work pp. 27—35 deal with 'die Protagorasabschnitte des Protagoras' (chiefly 316B8—351D) and pp. 14—26 (see also pp. 40—44) with 'die Protagorasabschnitte des Theaetet' (chiefly 151E—183C, on which cf. Kapp, *Gnomon* 12, 1936, 69—73 in his long review of Langerbeck's monograph *ibid.*, 65—77 and 158—169). See also Langerbeck, *Gnomon* 21, 1949, 111—112.

758. J. S. Morrison, The place of Protagoras in Athenian public life, *Cl Quart* 35, 1941, 1—16. The dramatic date of the dialogue is discussed on pp. 2—3, and the nature of Protagoras' theory as presented in this dialogue and the *Theaetetus* on pp. 7—11 and 15—16. See also Morrison's later article, An Introductory Chapter in the History of Greek Education, *Durham Univ Journ* 41, 1949, 55—63 and his remarks in *Cl Quart N. S.* 8, 1958, 203; and further J. A. Davison, *Trans Am Philol Assoc* 80, 1949, 73—77 and *Cl Quart*

N. S. 3, 1953, 37—38. Cf. Capizzi (224 *supra*), pp. 219—223 and his references there.

759. O. Gigon, *Studien zu Platons Protagoras*, Phyllobolia für Peter von der Mühl, Basel 1946, pp. 91—152. On the 'analysis', which suggests that Plato was not the author of the dialogue, see Cherniss, *AJPh* 71, 1950, 85—88 and cf. Gigon's similar essays on the *Euthyphro* and the *Laws* (469 and 544 *supra*)¹. Cf. with this method of Gigon's the dissection of the *Protagoras* by H. Koller in his dissertation on the *Symposium* (918 *infra*).

760. F. Cappelleri, *Socrate e Ippocrate nel 'Protagora' di Platone*, Locri 1947. This is an essay, more edifying than illuminating, upon the significance of the introductory dialogue, a subject more adequately treated by Zenoni Politeo:

761. P. Zenoni Politeo, *Intorno al significato del 'Protagora' platonico*, *Sophia* 16, 1948, 362—372. Stressing the importance of 311 B—314 C as the key to all that follows, he argues that the dialogue is primarily an anti-sophistic polemic in which Plato is concerned not so much with the nature of virtue or its teachability as to prove that the pedagogy of Protagoras is inconsistent and that he cannot teach what he professes.

762. L. Alfonsi, *Sul proemio del Brutus e sulla fortuna del Protagora tra i Latini*, *Rhein Mus N. F.* 94, 1951, 88—94.

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—. On 316 D—E: A. E. Raubitschek, *Class et Med* 16, 1955, 79 with his reference to H. Ryffel (548 *supra*), p. 29, n. 88.

763. On 320 C—328 D: M. Untersteiner, *Sofisti: testimonianze e frammenti*, Fasc. 1, Firenze 1949, pp. 96—112 (text, translation and commentary) and *I Sofisti*, Torino 1949, pp. 75—85, where the myth is declared to be in substance authentically Protagorean 'as the majority of critics today maintain'. See to the contrary, however: G. Pfligersdorfer, *Wiener Studien* 61/62, 1943/47, 35—39; H. Langerbeck, *Gnomon* 21, 1949, 111—112 on F. Heinimann, *Nomos und Physis*, Basel 1945, pp. 115—119; G. J. de Vries, *Spel bij Plato*, Amsterdam 1949, pp. 286—288; F. Robert (480 *supra*),

¹) Gigon apparently did not know Grube's sane and penetrating earlier article on the subject:

759a) G. M. A. Grube, *The structural unity of the Protagoras*, *Cl Quart* 27, 1933, 203—207. See also his book (3 *supra*), pp. 58—62, 84—85, and 220—221.

p. 16; A. Capizzi (224 *supra*), pp. 62—66; M. Gigante (488 *supra*), p. 241; P. Friedländer (11b *supra*), p. 368, n. 7. V. de Caprariis, on the other hand, holds (133 *supra*, pp. 292—295 and 298) that the myth is not only essentially Protagorean but also the point from which the political thought of the historical Socrates took its departure.

764. On 320 C—328 D: I. Lana, Le dottrine di Protagora e di Democrito all' origine dello stato, Rend Accad Lincei, Cl Scienze Mor 8 Ser 5, 1950, 184—211. See also his monograph, Protagora, Torino 1950 (Pubblicazioni Fac Lettere e Filos 2, Fasc. 4), especially pp. 18—21 (cf. W. Kraus, Anz Altertum 10, 1957, 127—130). He takes the myth to be an authentic expression of the doctrine of Protagoras which he divides into exoteric and esoteric teachings; and he seeks to establish the priority of Protagoras' account of the origins of society to that of Democritus, which, following Reinhardt, he believes to be represented by Diodorus, I, 7—8.

765. On 320 C—324 C: J.-P. Vernant, Prométhée et la fonction technique, Journ Psychol Norm et Path 45, 1952, 419—429. See especially pp. 424—427 on the myth, in which Vernant professes to recognize the three classes of the *Republic* and a Platonic conception of technique as a social function, although neglect of the psychological aspects kept Plato from assigning any positive virtue to the technical function or to the class of workers.

766. On 320 C—328 D: G. B. Kerferd, Protagoras' doctrine of justice and virtue in the '*Protagoras*' of Plato, JHS 73, 1953, 42—45. An attempt to prove against modern critics that Protagoras' reply to Socrates is consistent throughout. This article is in the main followed with some slight criticism and expansion by W. K. C. Guthrie in his book, In the Beginning, Ithaca 1957, pp. 84—93 and 140—142; Guthrie asserts that the myth is certainly not in Plato's style and that it may safely be taken as an authentic representation of Protagoras' views. Cf. G. M. Sciacca, Gli dèi in Protagora (Palermo 1958), pp. 100—101 and 112—116, who seems not to have known Kerferd's article.

767. On 325 B 3—4: J. Jackson, Marginalia Scaenica, Oxford 1955, 85.

768. On 327 E 3: E. R. Dodds, Gnomon 27, 1955, 167.

769. On 337 C 6—338 B 1: M. Untersteiner, Sofisti: testimonianze e frammenti, Fasc. 3, Firenze 1954, pp. 104—107 (text, translation, and commentary); M. Durić, Die rechtsphilosophischen Anschauungen des Hippas von Elis, Ziva Antika (Skoplje) 2, 1952 162—183 (résumé in German); M. Gigante (488 *supra*), pp. 146—151.

770. On 339 A—347 A: J. G. Clapp, Some notes on Plato's *Protagoras*, *Philos and Phenom Research* 10, 1949/50, 486—499; H. Gundert, Die Simonides-Interpretation in Platons *Protagoras*, *ΕΡΜΗΝΕΙΑ*: Festschrift Otto Regenbogen, Heidelberg 1952, pp. 71—93; L. Woodbury, Simonides on 'Αρετή', *Trans Am Philol Assoc* 84, 1953, 135—163; K. D. Georgoulis (301 *supra*); and, more for the poem of Simonides itself than for Plato's interpretation of it and its function in the dialogue, H. Fränkel (223 *supra*), pp. 396—404.

— On 349 E—350 C: A. J. Festugière (288 *supra*).

— On 357 E 5: J. Jackson (767 *supra*), pp. 84—85.

Republic

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The *Republic* of the 'Budé edition' (Tomes VI and VII, 1re et 2me Parties) with text and translation by É. Chambry and a long and important introduction by A. Diès was published in 1932, 1933, and 1934; and that of the Loeb Classical Library with text, translation, introduction, and exegetical notes by P. Shorey was published in two volumes in 1930 and 1935. In 1932 there was published in Florence under the editorship of P. Ubaldi the translation with briefer introduction and notes that G. Fraccaroli had left unpublished at his death in 1918. In 1941 Cornford published a version of the dialogue intended to convey to the English reader the thought of the *Republic* 'in the most convenient and least misleading form'; and, though to this end he often compressed questions and answers into continuous exposition and even excised some passages altogether, the translation itself, the analyses prefixed to the sections into which he divided it, and his explanatory notes and introduction are often useful to the scholar who deals with the original text:

771. The *Republic* of Plato translated with Introduction and Notes by F. M. Cornford, Oxford 1941¹).

¹) Compare with this the later translation published in The Penguin Classics by Lee, who, while eschewing Cornford's method of compression and excision, aims at his mark of going 'behind what Plato said' to render the meaning in modern idiom:

771a) Plato, The *Republic* translated with an Introduction by H. D. P. Lee, Harmondsworth 1955. Lee's introduction lays special stress upon the political and social significance of the *Republic* in a way to which the interpretation of Krüger (774 *infra*) is strongly opposed.

Of the editions or annotated translations later than this publication of Cornford's the following are worthy of notice:

772. Platon, *La Repubblica*: Edición bilingüe, traducción, notas y estudio preliminar por J. M. Pabon y M. F. Galiano, Madrid 1949, 3 volumes (cf. Cataudella, *Sophia* 21 fasc. 3—4, 1953, 76—78; *É. de Strycker*, *Ant Cl* 20, 1951, 184—185).

773. Platone, *La Repubblica*: versione di F. Gabrieli, Firenze 1950. This contains the Greek text (that of Burnet with few exceptions), an Italian translation with scanty notes, and a modest introduction.

774. Platon: *Der Staat*. Über das Gerechte. Eingeführt von G. Krüger, übertragen von R. Rufener, Zürich 1950 (cf. Herter, *Gnomon* 24, 1952, 436—437; Vretska, *Gymnasium* 60, 1953, 81—83¹); and see 307 *supra* by the same two authors). The central thesis of the substantial introduction is indicated by the sub-title of the translation, which is concisely annotated and provided with an unusually good index.

Sartori's annotated translation, Bari 1956, is published in volume 5 of 306a *supra* (cf. Bruneau, *Rev Ét Grecques* 69, 1956, 479—480). For Averroes' Commentary on the *Republic* see 282 *supra*.

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Discussion of the *Republic* as of the *Laws* figures largely in most works which, dealing more generally with Plato's political, ethical, and religious theories, will be found listed *infra* under the subjects Politics-Economics-Law, Ethics, and Religion. Like the *Laws* it plays an important rôle in many of the publications already listed under the rubric, Accusations of Plato and Responses (IA, 40—66 *supra*); but the *Republic* is furthermore a primary subject of consideration in many of the studies which will be found listed *infra* under the subjects Dialectic, The Theory of Ideas, Psychology, and Aesthetics.

Among works already mentioned which deal with the *Republic* see especially: J. Moreau, *La Construction . . .* (5 *supra*), pp. 204—270 and pp. 298—365; W. Jaeger (4 *supra*) II, pp. 270—360 and III, pp. 1—104; A. Koyré (10b *supra*), pp. 56—111; H. Ryffel

¹) Vretska has recently published in the popular Reclam series his own translation:

774a) Platon, *Der Staat*, neu übertragen von K. Vretska mit einer Einleitung, Kommentar, Namen- und Sachregister, Stuttgart, 1958.

(166 *supra*); H. Leisegang (26 *supra*), cols. 2450, 51—2473, 13; J. A. Faris (52 *supra*); M. B. Foster (54 *supra*); G. A. Roggerone (735 *supra*); G. Müller (528 *supra*), pp. 139—154; D. Faucci (68 *supra*) and in connection with this G. Semerari (69 *supra*); J.-P. Vernant (765 *supra*); R. B. Levinson (28 *supra*); M. Vanhoutte (533 *supra*); G. Barraud (536 *supra*); R. S. Bluck (48 *supra*); Margherita Isnardi (104 *supra*); E. Koller (540 *supra*); E. Voegelin (36 *supra*), pp. 46—134; H. Gauss (20 *supra*), II/2, pp. 118—238 and I/2, pp. 117—131 for Book I which Gauss treats separately as an early dialogue, '*Thrasymachus*'. In the following list of additional studies devoted to the *Republic* I prefix to those published since 1950 only a few which appeared in the preceding two decades:

775. H. Kelsen, Justice platonicienne, *Rev Philosophique* 114, 1932, 364—396. Versions of this influential article were later published in *Kantstudien* 38, 1933, 91—117 and in *Ethics* 48, 1937/38, 367—400. See also Kelsen's later attack upon Plato's character and intentions (42 *supra*).

776. B. M. Laing, The problem of justice in Plato's *Republic*, *Philosophy* 8, 1933, 412—421.

777. C. R. Morris, Plato's theory of the Good Man's motive, *Proc Aristotelian Soc N. S.* 34, 1933/34, 129—142. He argues that in the *Republic* the good man is shown to be rational in a sense different from that in which the timocratic and oligarchic men may be said to be so and that Plato's view is therefore not open to the Kantian objection.

778. J. D. Mabbott, Is Plato's *Republic* utilitarian?, *Mind N. S.* 46, 1937, 468—474. Against Prichard's thesis that for Plato an action is really just only if it is for the advantage of the agent and against M. B. Foster's (*Mind*, *ibid.*, 386—393 [see 817 *infra*]) who, seeing that 357 A—358 A is inconsistent with this utilitarian interpretation, argues that Plato confused the real issue of the *Republic* by inserting the threefold division of goods there. See Foster's rejoinder in *Mind N. S.* 47, 1938, 226—232 and also 787b *infra* for Foster's controversy with Joseph.

779. K. Marc-Wogau, Der Staat und der Begriff des Guten in Platons *Politeia*, *Theoria* 7, 1941, 20—45. Arguing that the ideal state was held by Plato like an organic entity to be 'good' both in itself and as the means of its own unaltered continuation, Marc-Wogau attempts to support this by interpreting *Republic* 508 E—509 B to mean similarly that the goodness of the ideas is the ground

of their being uniquely determined and that this entails their continuous and unalterable self-identity, a capacity for resistance to external influence which he thinks justifies ascribing 'life' to them also.

780. H.-G. Gadamer, *Platos Staat der Erziehung, Das Neue Bild der Antike* hrsg. von H. Berve, Leipzig 1942, I, pp. 317—333. This is an exposition of the relation of justice as health of the state to justice as health of the soul and of the consequent unity of the *Republic* as a treatise establishing the necessity of philosophical education for the realization and maintenance of political virtue.

781. R. G. Hoerber, *The theme of Plato's Republic*, St. Louis 1944 (cf. Notopoulos, *Cl Phil* 40, 1945, 192—194; Nahm, *Philos Rev* 54, 1945, 181—184). Hoerber contends that the *Republic* is concerned exclusively with the effect of justice and injustice in the soul of the individual, the outline of the state being intended only to illustrate the individual soul and not to have any practical political significance. The reviewers have adequately dealt with the fundamental misconception underlying this thesis, which might have been avoided by due consideration of such studies as that by Gadamer (780 *supra*)¹.

782. G. Brown, *The alleged metaphysics in the Republic*, Aristotelian Soc, Suppl Vol 19, 1945, 165—192. He argues that the theory of ideas in the *Republic* is not a theory of 'two worlds' but that the distinction between being and becoming is merely the contrast between knowledge and opinion and that the 'supreme good' is the supreme ethical concept, not the supreme metaphysical entity of a world of ideas. This is the first in a Symposium of three papers on this subject, the next two being critical responses to Brown's thesis:

783. G. C. Field, *ibid.* 193—206. Field here argues against Brown (782 *supra*) on all essential points.

784. S. S. Orr, *ibid.* pp. 207—229. He agrees with Field (783 *supra*) against Brown (782 *supra*) concerning the real status of ideas but insists that the dependence of sensibles upon the ideas means that the 'two worlds' are not separate, the ideas being both 'immanent' and 'transcendent'; and he contends that the idea of the good, under this name or others, is the supreme metaphysical principle which unifies the ideas not only in the *Republic*, as Field suggests, but in all the stages of Plato's thought.

¹ See also in this connection Schneider's earlier article, also apparently unknown to Hoerber:

781a) A. Schneider, *Die Einheit von Politik und Ethik in den Lehren der Sophisten und in Platos 'Staat'*, *Philos Jahrbuch* 53, 1940, 314—323.

785. M. Croiset, *La République de Platon: Étude et Analyse*, Paris 1946. This posthumous work, written between 1933 and 1935, is interesting chiefly as the last book of a great Hellenist.

786. Dorothy Tarrant, *Imagery in Plato's Republic*, *Cl Quart* 40, 1946, 27—34.

787. H. W. B. Joseph, *Knowledge and the Good in Plato's Republic*, Oxford 1948 (cf. W. Wick, *Ethics* 59, 1948/49, 225—226; D. J. Allan, *Cl Rev* 63, 1949, 19—21; R. Robinson, *Mind N. S.* 58, 1949, 104—107). This posthumous monograph, composed in 1925 for a course of lectures, deals mainly with the Sun, the Line, and the Cave, interpreting these in their context in the dialogue and ending with a section on the doctrine of ideas and the relation of ideas to one another. It supplements the essays published in 1935, which were also based upon Joseph's course of lectures on the *Republic*¹).

788. G. F. Hourani, *The education of the Third Class in Plato's Republic*, *Cl Quart* 43, 1949, 58—60.

789. E. Paci, *Lo stato come idea dell' uomo nella 'Repubblica' di Platone*, *Studi di filosofia antica e moderna* (676 *supra*), pp. 71—99. This is an elaboration of Stenzel's interpretation according to which the *Republic* represents the state as the manifestation in each citizen of the idea of justice, the mediator between being and becoming, and that through which alone the individual realizes his ideality and individuality.

790. I. Lana, *Protagora*, Torino 1950 (see 764 *supra*), pp. 11—31: *Il pensiero politico di Protagora in rapporto alla Repubblica di Platone e alle teorie oligarchiche di Trasimaco* (cf. A. Capizzi [224 *supra*], pp. 239—241; Kraus, *Anz Altertum* 10, 1957, 127—128).

¹) 787a) H. W. B. Joseph, *Essays in ancient and modern philosophy*, Oxford 1935, pp. 1—155. These pages contain five essays: *The Argument with Polemarchus*, *The Argument with Thrasymachus*, *The Nature of the Soul*, *The Comparison between the Soul and the State*, *The Proof that the Most Just Man is the Happiest*. These are followed (pp. 156—177) by a sixth, *Aristotle's Definition of Moral Virtue and Plato's Account of Justice in the Soul*, reprinted from *Philosophy* 9, 1934, 1934, 168—181, which overlaps the third. In a note at the end of the fourth essay (pp. 114—121) Joseph criticized the interpretation put forward by Foster in his recently published book:

787b) M. B. Foster, *The political philosophies of Plato and Hegel*, Oxford 1935 (cf. Gadamer, *Gnomon* 12, 1936, 331—332).

Foster replied to Joseph's criticism in *Mind* 45, 1936, 350—354; and to this reply Joseph published a rejoinder in *Mind* 45, 1936, 489—491. See also 778 *supra* for the controversy between Foster and Mabbott.

791. N. R. Murphy, The interpretation of Plato's *Republic*, Oxford 1951 (cf. Hackforth, *Cl Rev* N. S. 2, 1952, 158—160; Cumming, *Journ Philos* 49, 1952, 595—600; Kuhn, *Gnomon* 24, 1952, 293—294; Phillipa Foot, *Mind* N. S. 63, 1954, 270—274; Tate, *JHS* 74, 1954, 200—201). This is a philosophical commentary of the *Republic* arranged in chapters dealing with selected topics, an arrangement which of itself emphasizes the slight regard that Murphy has for the dialectical structure of the work. The heaviest stress is laid upon the ethical and psychological aspects of the *Republic*, the metaphysical doctrine being minimized or interpreted away after the fashion of G. Brown (782 *supra*), though Murphy does not mention either him or his critics (783 and 784 *supra*).

792. D. R. Grey, Art in the *Republic*, *Philosophy* 27, 1952, 291—310. This is an important analysis of the complication of factors in Plato's own philosophy—primarily his theories of *ἐπιστήμη* and of *τέχνη*—and in the aesthetic conceptions of his contemporaries, the interplay of which accounts for the treatment of 'art' in the *Republic* and in the other dialogues also. It is incomparably more profound and illuminating than the chapter on the same subject in Murphy's book (791 *supra*, pp. 224—237).

793. A. R. Henderickx, Staatsleer of staatsbeeld in de *Politeia* van Platoon, *Handelingen 22ste Nederlands Philologen-Congres*, Groningen 1952, pp. 86—88¹).

794. H. Karpp, Die Philosophenkönige bei Platon und bei Kant, *Gymnasium* 60, 1953, 334—338.

795. K. Vretska, *Platonica*, *Wiener Studien* 66, 1953, 76—91. The twelve passages of the *Republic* here discussed are entered in *γ infra*.

795a. K. Vretska, *Platonica* III, *Wiener Studien* 71, 1958, 30—54. The eight passages here discussed are also entered in *γ infra*; for the first part of the article, Das Thrasymachos-Problem, see 812 *infra*.

796. P. Piovani, L'antinomia della città platonica, *Giorn Crit Filos Ital* 3 Ser. 8, 1954, 481—508. He finds a fundamental antinomy in Plato's politics arising from confusion of 'unity' and 'uniformity' of the state. The cause of this, he holds, was Plato's notion that diversity is a derogation from the ideal, i. e. from the unique idea, and his

¹) See also his earlier article:

793a) A. R. Henderickx, De rechtvaardigheid in de *Staat* van Platoon, *Tijdsch Philos* 4, 1942, 523—546; 5, 1943, 365—408; 6, 1944, 81—134.

failure to posit the idea of good as the truly supreme idea and so to eliminate the ideality of the other ideas which is a constant threat to the ideality and unity of the idea of good.

797. J. Last, *Stichtte Plato de republiek Tenganan*, *Hermeneus* 26, 1954/55, 83—95. In this chapter of his book, *Bali in de kentering*, Last asserts that the social conditions of Plato's ideal city are to be found in a village community in Bali; and he thinks that this proves Plato to have been merely idealizing and systematizing persisting memories of an older Greek society¹).

798. H. G. Wolz, *The Republic in the light of the Socratic Method*, *Modern Schoolman* 32, 1954/55, 115—142. Having argued that the Socraticism of the early dialogues is maintained in the *Politicus* and the *Laws*, he tries to show that it is not altered or abandoned in the *Republic*, which to this end he interprets as at once an 'illustration' of the Socratic method of the earlier dialogues and related to the *Politicus* and *Laws* as an intentionally hyperbolic hypothesis is to a carefully analysed and thoroughly tested theory²).

799. R. Demos, A note on *σωφροσύνη* in Plato's *Republic*, *Philos and Phenom Research* 17, 1956/57, 399—403. He admits his inability to discover the difference between 'justice' and 'sophrosyne' and then attempts to explain why there is no *ἀρετή* of 'appetite', the third part of the soul. See Marc-Wogau (779 *supra*), p. 33 and the references s. v. *σωφροσύνη* in *Terminology infra*.

800. R. Demos, Paradoxes in Plato's doctrine of the Ideal State, *Cl Quart N. S.* 7, 1957, 164—174. This deals exclusively with the *Republic* and with the apparent difficulty that 'the just city would seem to eliminate the just individual and the just individual . . . make the just city dispensable.' See in connection with this 807 *infra*.

801. E. G. Ballard, Plato's movement from an ethics of the individual to a science of particulars, *Tulane Studies in Philosophy* 6,

¹) Cf. the similar conclusion arrived at for different reasons by Bréhier:

797a) E. Bréhier, *Les trois classes de la cité platonicienne*, *Rev Philosophique* 132/133, 7—9, 1942/43, 84 and reprinted in his *Études de philosophie antique*, Paris 1955, pp. 54—55. Bréhier refers to a conjecture of Dumézil's; see now G. Dumézil, *L'idéologie tripartite des Indo-Européens*, Bruxelles 1958, p. 16.

²) The thesis that Plato did not in the *Republic* or in the later dialogues abandon his earlier devotion to the Socratic elenchus and the principle that the unexamined life is unlivable had been defended by Hackforth without the extravagant interpretation of the *Republic* upon which Wolz relies:

798a) R. Hackforth, *The ἀνεξέταστος βίος* in Plato, *Cl Rev* 59, 1945, 1—4.

1957, 5—41. This is largely concerned with the *Republic*, the unsolved problems of which are supposed to have led to the development of a new dialectic in the later dialogues, whereby Plato moved from a predominantly ethical interest in the individual through a series of paradoxes to a theory of knowledge and a method which render possible the sciences of the world that are ethically serviceable only in 'a second best degree'. Ballard seems to presume that Plato began by hoping to make the individual fully intelligible and was in the end constrained to regard him as 'partly the victim of the irrational receptacle wherein he was begotten'. He argues that the state and the soul are analogous because both are 'functional wholes', that Plato uses the political art only as an example of human activity generally, which is his primary concern, and that it was the difficulty of determining 'the first ordering principle (*ἀντιόθετον*)' that led to the dialectic of the *Sophist* and the theory of material participation in the *Timaeus*.

802. P. Fireman, *Justice in Plato's Republic*, New York 1957. This curiosity is a brief socialistic eulogy of Plato's conception of justice on the ground that Plato anticipated the Marxian theory of surplus-value.

803. J. Llambías de Azevedo, *Platón: La teoría del estado justo*, Diánoia (Mexico) 3, 1957, 232—258.

804. D. Pesce, *Città terrena e città celeste nel pensiero antico*, Firenze 1957, pp. 11—81: *La società dei filosofi (La Repubblica di Platone)*. An essay to show that contrary to *Popper's* assertion (46 *supra*) Plato's intention in the *Republic* is not to enslave but to liberate men and that his scheme falls so far short of his intention simply because of its extreme intellectualism. See also Pesce's review-article, *Alcune recenti interpretazioni della 'Repubblica' platonica*, *Atene e Roma N. S.* 1956, 1, 65—79, a comparative critique of the interpretations by Popper (46 *supra*), Faucci (68 *supra*), Hildebrandt (669a *supra*), Piovani (796 *supra*), and several others.

805. Sister M. R. Ojeman, *Assent in Plato's Respublica*, *Cl Bull* 34, 1957/58, 57. In 47 pages of the Oxford text of Book III there are 86 different ways of expressing agreement or corroboration.

806. W. C. Greene, *The paradoxes of the Republic*, *Harvard Studies in Class Phil* 63, 1958, 199—216. An inquiry into the form more than the content of the *Republic*, in which Greene has many perceptive comments on the structure, style, logic, 'vision', and the intentional paradoxicality of the work.

807. R. Demos, A note on Plato's *Republic*, *Rev Metaphysics* 12, 1958/59, 300—307. Examining the characteristics of a 'model', Demos rejects the hypothesis that Plato meant the ideal state to be only a model or instructional device for presenting his account of the just man.

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See É. des Places (271 *supra*), pp. 330—334 for the passages of the *Republic* cited by Theodoret.

808. On Book I (327 A—354 C): M. F. Sciacca, *Studi sulla filosofia antica*, Napoli 1935, pp. 95—130: Il problema della giustizia nel libro Primo della '*Repubblica*' di Platone. Sciacca analyses the first book as a complete and independent early dialogue containing the nucleus of Socrates' doctrine.

809. On Book I (327 A—354 C): R. Preiswerk, *Neue philologische Untersuchungen zum 1. Buch des platonischen Staates*, Freiburg (Schweiz) 1939. This is an attempt to prove that the original text of the first book as an independent early dialogue intended merely to keep alive the memory of the historical Socrates can be almost completely recovered by identifying and eliminating the passages which Plato must have added later when he decided to use it as an introduction to the *Republic*.

810. On Book I (327 A—354 C): F. Dornseiff, *Hermes* 76, 1941, 111—112. Without mention of Preiswerk's arguments (809 *supra*) he protests against the tendency, by this time fashionable, to treat the first book as originally an independent early dialogue. The 'hitherto unnoticed argument' which he adduces against this treatment had already been alluded to by Diès in his introduction to the Budé edition of the *Republic*, p. XIX.

811. On Book I (327 A—354 C): G. Rudberg, *Zum platonischen Thrasy machos*, *Symbol Osl* 23, 1944, 1—6. He argued that the '*Thrasy machos*' was never a finished work but was rather a sketch which Plato set aside to write the more embittered *Gorgias* but later used as the basis for *Republic I* and also for part of II.

812. On Book I (327 A—354 C): A. R. Henderickx, *Eerste boek van Platoons Staat of dialoog Thrasy machos*, *Rev Belge Philol* 24, 1945, 5—46. He comes directly to grips with the arguments of Preiswerk (809 *supra*) and undertakes to show that Book I looks forward to the following books in too many respects to have been written as anything but an introduction to the *Republic* as it stands. Independ-

ently of Henderickx the same conclusion as his was reached by V. Goldschmidt in his book, *Les Dialogues de Platon* (Paris 1947), pp. 129—135. In the present decade Friedländer (11a *supra*, II, pp. 45 and 283) has reaffirmed his belief in the independent origin of Book I, and this position in one form or another has been taken by W. Theiler (*Mus Helvet* 9, 1952, 68, n. 11), H. Gauss (20 *supra*, I/2, pp. 117—131), and G. Galli (19 *supra*, pp. 95—97). The history of this hypothesis and the debate over it has been retraced by G. Giannantoni (136 *supra*), who emphatically rejects it and insists that Book I could have been written only as an express introduction to the following books (cf. Greene [806 *supra*, p. 200]; J. Gould, *The development of Plato's ethics*, Cambridge 1955, pp. 142—146 and 180—181; and especially K. Vretska, *Wiener Studien* 71, 1958, 30—45 [795a *supra*], whose refutation of von Arnim's arguments are particularly important).

813. On I 327 A—331 D 9: Platon erklärt von K. Witte, I. Band: *Politeia* I, II, Erlangen 1949 (cf. Theiler, *Gnomon* 23, 1951, 286—287). The author, who had planned a complete edition of Plato, died in the year following the publication of this first fascicle. This contains besides text, translation, and commentary of the section indicated an introduction of 94 pages in which, citing as examples many other passages, Witte propounds his theory of Plato's style as an instrument devised for the purpose of producing complicated ambiguities for the mystification of his audience.

814. On I 328 B 8—331 D 9: J. T. Kakridis, The part of Cephalus in Plato's *Republic*, *Eranos* 46, 1948, 35—41. On the function of the scene with Cephalus in the dramatic structure of the whole of the *Republic*.

—. On I 331 D 4—336 A 8: H. W. B. Joseph (787a *supra*), pp. 1—14; J. Gould, *The development of Plato's ethics*, Cambridge 1955, pp. 44—46.

—. On I 333 E 6—7: K. Vretska (795 *supra*), pp. 76—77.

—. On I 334 E 2: K. Vretska (795 *supra*), pp. 77—78.

815. On I 336 B—354 C: G. B. Kerferd, The doctrine of Thrasy-machus in Plato's *Republic*, *Durham Univ Journ N. S.* 9, 1947/48, 19—27; Sp. Ch. Manginas, *Ὁ ῥήτωρ Θρασύμαχος καὶ ἡ θέσις αὐτοῦ ἐν τῇ Πλατωνικῇ Πολιτείᾳ*, Athens 1951 (especially pp. 64—80); M. S. Shellens, *Gerechtigkeitsbegriff des Thrasy-machos*, *Zeitschr philos Forsch* 7, 1953, 481—492; J. F. A. Taylor, *Journ Philos* 54, 1957, 525—528; and see H. W. B. Joseph (787a *supra*) pp. 15—40.

816. On I 343 A 10: A. Kuenzi, *Festschrift für Edouard Tièche*, Bern 1947, pp. 61—70; F. Dornseiff, *Mus Helvet* 6, 1949, 175—176. On this form of interrogation.

— On I 343 C 1—2: K. Vretska (795 *supra*), p. 78.

— On I 349 A 7: K. Vretska (795 *supra*), p. 78.

817. On II 357 A—358 A: M. B. Foster, A mistake of Plato's in the *Republic*, *Mind* 46, 1937, 386—393. See 778 *supra* for Mabbott's reply to this article and Foster's rejoinder.

818. On II 358 B—362 C: L. W. Beale, On appearing just and being unjust, *Journ Philos* 49, 1952, 607—614. A criticism of Glaucon's argument and of Plato's ethical attitude in the face of such a formulation. See the reply to this article by Edith W. Schipper, *ibid.* 732—734. 5/

819. On II 359 B 6—360 D 7: P. Vicaire, Sur le mythe de Gygès, *L'Information Littéraire* 7, 1955, 81—84; O. Seel, *Lydiaka*, *Wiener Studien* 69, 1956, 212—236 and his article in *Navicula Chiloniensis*, *Studia Philologica* F. Jacoby . . . oblata, Leiden 1956, pp. 37—65; see also H. Diller in *Navicula Chiloniensis*, pp. 66—78.

820. On II 361 D—362 A: E. Benz, Der gekreuzigte Gerechte bei Plato, im Neuen Testament und in der alten Kirche, *Akad Wiss Lit Mainz*, *Abhand Geistes- u Soz Kl*, 1950, Nr. 12, 1031—1074; H. Hommel, Die Satorformel und ihr Ursprung, Berlin 1953 (*Sonderausgabe aus Theologia Viatorum* 4, 1952), pp. 23—32: Der gekreuzigte Gerechte (reprinted in Hommel's book, *Schöpfer und Erhalter*, Berlin 1956); J. Rouet, De lijdende rechtvaardige bij Plato, *Studia Catholica* (Nijmegen), 30, 1955, 105—118. Rouet analyses the passage in its whole context and in relation to other passages and gives a sound critique of Benz's interpretation, on which cf. also A. Oepke, *Theolog Literaturzeit* 78, 1953, 639 and A. Alföldi, *Scientiis Artibusque* 1, 1958, 17—19.

— On II 362 E—367 E: F. Pfister (209 *supra*), pp. 185—188; I. M. Linforth (210 *supra*), pp. 75—97; cf. G. Vlastos, *Philos Quart* 2, 1952, 106, n. 45.

— On II 363 A 1—5: K. Vretska (795 *supra*), pp. 78—80.

— On II 368 A 1—2: See 727 *supra*.

821. On II 369 A—374 E: L. Ferrari, The origin of the state according to Plato, *Laval Théol Philos* 12, 1956, 145—152; H. Koller (168 *supra*), pp. 146—148; E. A. Havelock (152 *supra*), pp. 94—101.

822. On II 372 A—D: P. H. De Lacy, Pigs and Epicureans, *Cl Bull* 34, 1957/58, 55—56. Relation of this passage to the later characterization of the Epicureans, and on the characteristics ascribed to the pig in antiquity.

823. On II 375 A—376 C: M. D. C. Tait, Spirit, gentleness and the philosophic nature in the *Republic*, *Trans Am Philol Assoc* 80, 1949, 203—211. This article was written in opposition to the note on the passage by T. A. Sinclair, Plato's philosophic dog, *Cl Rev* 62, 1948, 61—62.

824. On II 378 A—C: F. Vian, *Rev Ét Grecques* 65, 1952, 5—6. Here in his article, *La guerre des géants devant les penseurs de l'antiquité*, he treats this passage in connection with *Euthyphro* 6 B—C and *Sophist* 246 A—B.

825. On II 379 A: V. Goldschmidt, *Théologia*, *Rev Ét Grecques* 63, 1950, 20—42. Against W. Jaeger, *The Theology of the Early Greek Philosophers* (Oxford 1947), p. 4 and p. 194, n. 13 Goldschmidt argues that the text here does not imply the introduction of a new doctrine supported by a new term coined *ad hoc*; he analyses 379 A—383 C to show that *θεολογία* as used here is a species of *μυθολογία*, and he adduces earlier evidence to make it plausible that the classification implied and probably the word itself also antedate Plato's use of it here. See also G. Vlastos, *Philos Quart* 2, 1952, 102, note 22; A.-J. Festugière, *La Révélation d'Hermès Trismégiste II* (Paris 1949), pp. 598—605: Pour l'histoire du mot *θεολογία*.

826. On II 379 E 5—380 A 1: W. Kullmann, *Philologus* 99, 1955, 181; but see Labarbe (199 *supra*), pp. 366—369.

— On III 400 A 4—7: A. Ahlvers (178 *supra*), pp. 30—31; I. Düring, *Gnomon* 27, 1955, 433 on F. Lasserre (167 *supra*), p. 59; H. Koller, *Mus Helvet* 16, 1959, 243.

827. On III 400 B—C: W. J. W. Koster, *Mnem* III 12, 1945, 161—166; C. del Grande, *Giorn Ital Filol* 1, 1948, 6—14; W. D. Anderson (170 *supra*), p. 90 and n. 8.

— On III 407 E 4—408 A 2: K. Vretska (795 *supra*), p. 80.

— On III 410 D 6—E 3: K. Vretska (795 *supra*), pp. 80—84.

828. On III 414 B—415 D: R. Eisler, Metallurgical anthropology in Hesiod and Plato and the date of a 'Phoenician Lie', *Isis* 40, 1949, 108—112; and over against this kind of 'anthropological' interpretation see H. C. Baldry, *Cl Quart N. S.* 2, 1952, 87. The most

sensible and instructive of the many recent comments on this notorious passage is the article by R. K. Richardson, *History and Plato's medicinal lie*, *Trans Wisconsin Acad Arts and Letters* 40 Part 2, 1951, 67—76. See also B. E. Carter, *The function of the Myth of the Earthborn in the Republic*, *Cl Journ* 48, 1952/53, 297—302; R. Jordan (57 *supra*), pp. 283—284; R. B. Levinson (28 *supra*), pp. 424—431 and 536—540; M. Djuric, *Was Plato a Machiavellian?*, *Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie* 44, 1958, 79—93.

829. On 419 A 1—421 C 6: Aristoteles, *Nikomachische Ethik* übersetzt von F. Dirlmeier, Darmstadt 1956, pp. 566—567 (cf. Düring, *Gnomon* 29, 1957, 183—184).

— On IV 421 A 8—B 3: K. Vretska (795 *supra*), pp. 84—85.

— On IV 424 A—425 D: R. Mondolfo (748 *supra*), pp. 17—19 on this passage (in the original version in *Humanitas* 1, 1, 1953).

830. On IV 430 D—435 B: C. W. R. Larson, *The Platonic synonyms, δικαιοσύνη and σωφροσύνη*, *AJPh* 72, 1951, 395—414. This important paper is mentioned here because this passage and 441 C—444 A have in Larson's opinion blinded most interpreters to the facts that Plato's intention was by association and careful definition to bring the two terms together, that at their most important level the two represent for him the same ideal, and that this rapprochement is part of his attack on ethical and political relativism and the means by which he tries to establish the unity of virtue and to give content to the formal ultimate called the idea of good.

— On IV 433 A—E: W. J. Verdenius (65 *supra*). Verdenius, analysing the passage to show that Popper misuses it, criticizes the interpretation of justice in relation to the other virtues given in this connection by Murphy (791 *supra*) and incidentally the interpretations of others; but he appears to have missed the article by Larson (830 *supra*), with which his own interpretation of justice is at odds. On 433 D see also C. J. Despotopoulos, *Πρακτικὰ τῆς Ἀκαδημίας Ἀθηνῶν* 27, 1952, 203—211.

— On IV 440 C 7—D 2: K. Vretska (795 *supra*), pp. 85—86.

— On IV 443 C 9—444 A 2: C. W. R. Larson (830 *supra*), pp. 405—407; R. Hackforth (798a *supra*), p. 3.

831. On V 450 B 3—4: A. D. Winspear, *Cl Phil* 30, 1935, 347—349.

— On V 451 A 5—7: K. Vretska (795 *supra*), pp. 86—89.

— On V 452 D 6—E 2: K. Vretska (795 *supra*), pp. 89—91.

832. On V 465 B: M. Hadas, *Cl Phil* 30, 1935, 120—121 in his article, Utopian sources in Herodotus, *ibid.*, 113—121.

833. On V 465 D 2—7: S. Dow, *Cl Weekly* 37, 1943/44, 130—132.

834. On V 466 C 6—D 5: W. Theiler, *Mus Helvet* 9, 1952, 69, n. 16.

835. On V 469 B—471 B: M. Mühl, *Philol Woch* 61, 1941, 429—431 (especially on 470 E—471 A) and *Anz Altertum* 6, 1953, 191—192 (on 470 C 9); A. W. Gomme, *The Greek attitude to poetry and history*, Berkeley/Los Angeles 1954, p. 160, n. 9. See also s. v. *πόλεμος* in the section, Terminology, *infra*.

—. On V 473 D 3—5: K. Vretska (795 *supra*), p. 91; cf. G. Müller (528 *supra*), p. 143, n. 1.

—. On V 474 B—480 A: N. R. Murphy (791 *supra*), pp. 100—129, an elaboration of his earlier article, *Cl Quart* 31, 1937, 74—78, with which cf. G. Brown (782 *supra*), pp. 169—174; W. F. R. Hardie (610b *supra*), pp. 26—34; J. Moreau, *La construction . . .* (5 *supra*), pp. 299—312; J. Gould, *The development of Plato's ethics*, Cambridge 1955, pp. 156—164; A. Szabo (221 *supra*), pp. 98—102. See also R. S. Bluck (629 *supra*), pp. 122—123 and F. W. Kohnke (632 *supra*), pp. 38—39.

836. On IV 486 C 7—8: J. C. Maxwell, *Eranos* 51, 1953, 155.

—. On VI 488 D 8—E 3: K. Vretska (795a *supra*), pp. 45—46.

837. On VI 490 D 5—7: W. C. Greene, *Cl Weekly* 47, 1953/54, 158 (referring to his earlier article in *Cl Phil* 22, 1927, 220—221).

838. On VI 491 B 7—C 4: H. Kuhn, *Gnomon* 28, 1956, 224 (col. 2).

839. On VI 496 B: A. E. Taylor, *Ann Scuol Norm Sup Pisa, Lettere* 2 Ser 4, 1935, 153—154.

840. On VI 498 A 6—B 1: K. Reinhardt, *Hermes* 77, 1942, 237—238; G. S. Kirk, *Heraclitus: The cosmic fragments*, Cambridge 1954, 267—269.

—. On VI 503 C 2—5: K. Vretska (795a *supra*), pp. 46—48.

841. On VI—VII 504 A—541 B (especially on the Sun, the Line, and the Cave [507 B—521 C]): F. M. Cornford, *Mathematics and dialectic in the Republic VI-VII*, *Mind* N. S. 41, 1932, 37—52 and 173—190. The interpretation given in this influential paper was adopted by H. D. P. Lee, *Geometrical method and Aristotle's account of first principles*, *Cl Quart* 29, 1935, 113—124 (see especially

pp. 118—124, where it is argued that there is a close similarity between Plato's dialectic and Aristotle's view of the logical procedure of science); but it seems not to have been considered at all by W. F. R. Hardie (610b *supra*) in his treatment of the passage (pp. 49—69, 117—119, 127—129). In the same year in which Hardie's book appeared A. J. Festugière gave a similar interpretation in his book, *Contemplation et vie contemplative selon Platon*, Paris 1936, pp. 167—209 and 402—407. Entirely different approaches are represented by the interpretations of E. M. Manasse (738 *supra*), pp. 213—224, and of J. Moreau, *La Construction . . .* (5 *supra*), pp. 326—357 (cf. his *Réalisme et idéalisme chez Platon*, Paris 1951, pp. 69—96) and by the extensive logical analysis of R. Robinson, Plato's earlier dialectic, Ithaca 1941, pp. 152—213 (= pp. 147—201 of the 2nd edition, Oxford 1953)¹). These were apparently unknown to R. Hackforth when, in opposing Hardie's interpretation of the third segment of the Line, he reinterpreted the intent of the whole account of dialectic in his important article, Plato's Divided Line and dialectic, *Cl Quart* 36, 1942, 1—9. The background of the symbolism used by Plato and the interrelation of Sun, Line, and Cave in a 'ternary structure' were stressed by J. A. Notopoulos, The Symbolism of the Sun and Light in the *Republic* of Plato, *Cl Phil* 39 1944, 163—172 and 223—240, an essay in which are integrated several of the author's earlier articles on the passage²). G. Brown devoted much

¹) On the treatment of this passage in the first edition cf. Friedländer, *Cl Phil* 40, 1945, 256—259, and Cherniss, *AJPh* 68, 1947, 142—145; and on the alteration in the second edition cf. Kerferd, *Cl Rev N. S.* 5, 1955, 50—52 (especially p. 52). See also the earlier article:

841a) R. Robinson, The discourse on method in *Republic* (510—511), *Travaux IX^e Congrès Int Philos V*, 2, Paris 1937, 108—113. With this compare the essay in the same volume:

841b) Anna Tumarkin, Die Methode und die Grenze der Methode bei Plato: Die *ἐνόθεσις* und das *ἀννέθητον*, *Travaux IX^e Congrès Int Philos V*, 2, Paris 1937, 101—107.

²) Of these the most infelicitous is that in which he most clearly stated that Plato defined Being as *ὄντως* and therefore must have intended even the highest level of the Line to be interpreted as 'movement':

841c) J. A. Notopoulos, Movement in the Divided Line of Plato's *Republic*, *Harvard Studies in Class Phil* 47, 1936, 57—83. Movement or 'process' was the key used with somewhat more plausibility in his earlier essay:

841d) J. A. Notopoulos, The meaning of *εἰκασία* in the Divided Line of Plato's *Republic*, *Harvard Studies in Class Phil* 44, 1933, 193—203. Cf. now D. W. Hamlyn, *Philos Quart* 8, 1958, 14—23.

The title of his article, The Divided Line of the Platonic tradition, *Journ Philos* 32, 1935, 57—66 is misleading, for the article has nothing to do

of his paper (782 *supra*, pp. 179—192) to arguing against all metaphysical interpretation of the passage, a position which both G. C. Field (783 *supra*, pp. 204—205 [see also 10c *supra*, pp. 56—62]) and S. S. Orr (784 *supra*, pp. 213—218) vigorously opposed. The extent to which misinterpretation of the text in the opposite direction could be carried was shown the very next year by Szilasi (710 *supra*, pp. 169—208), who treated the Sun and the Line in isolation as a representation of the transcendental human personality (cf. Manasse, *Philos Rundschau* 5 Beiheft 1, 1957, 35—36). Joseph's monograph (787 *supra*), which deals almost exclusively with this passage, though published later than all these interpretations, was done much earlier than any of them. At the beginning of this decade E. Hoffmann devoted to the Sun, Line, and Cave two chapters of his *Platon* (22 *supra*, pp. 65—87), in which he restated in systematic fashion the peculiar theory of parallelism in the Line and the Cave combined with the theistic interpretation which he had earlier espoused (see *Archiv Gesch Philos* 40, 1931, 47—57 and against this see T. Nissen, *Philologus* 91, 1936/37, 270—277); and A. S. Ferguson, who had written three earlier articles on the subject (*Cl Quart* 15, 1921, 131—152; 16, 1922, 15—28; 28, 1934, 190—210), the third in reply to N. R. Murphy's criticism of the first two (*Cl Quart* 26, 1932, 93—102; see also *Cl Quart* 28, 1934, 211—213), returned to the attack upon 'the object theory in the quaternary form', impressively reformulating his interpretation of the passage and its bearing upon the whole dialogue in *The Platonic choice of lives*, *Philos Quart* 1, 1950/51, 5—34 (especially pp. 13—32 for this passage). N. R. Murphy, in turn, in the book (791 *supra*) which appeared almost simultaneously with this article of Ferguson's, expanded his own interpretation (pp. 152—206), which is based upon the notion of 'three levels', denial of the very existence of a 'divided line', and a muting of the metaphysical implications of Books V—VII. At about the same time Sir David

with this passage of the *Republic* or with the tradition of its interpretation. In another article, however, he studied the symbolism of the sun as developed by Plato and tried to connect it with 'a significance that issued from Socrates' own life':

841e) J. A. Notopoulos, *Socrates and the Sun*, *Cl Journ* 37, 1941/42, 260—274.

On the symbolism of light in this passage of the *Republic* see also R. Bultmann, *Philologus* 97, 1948, 19—23; H. Blumenberg, *Stud Gen* 10, 1957, 433—434 and 437; W. Beierwaltes, *Lux Intelligibilis: Untersuchung zur Lichtmetaphysik der Griechen*, München 1957, pp. 37—79. Beierwaltes in fact goes so far as to assert that light is for Plato here not merely a symbol or a metaphor but constitutes the essence of the ideas and *is* Being and the Good.

Ross in his *Plato's theory of ideas*, Oxford 1951, devoted to the passage a substantial section (pp. 39—77), which is unfortunately marred by omissions and self-contradictions (cf. Hackforth, *Philosophy* 27, 1952, 185; Ackrill, *Mind* N. S. 62, 1953, 553—554; Tate, *Cl Rev* N. S. 3, 1953, 94). The passage received only partial study from J. H. M. M. Loenen, *De Nous in het systeem van Plato's philosophie* (see 715 *supra*), pp. 106—119 and pp. 79—90, who sought to use it for the identification of the ineffable idea of good with Plato's god. The Neo-Platonic interpretation, complete even to an esoteric mysticism, was defended by E. Turolla, *Il problema fondamentale del Platonismo e il 'mito solare' nel VI della *Politica**, *Giorn Metafisica* 8, 1953, 241—259 (reprinted as *Conclusione Generale* of his translation of the corpus [305 *supra*], III, pp. 857—878). Almost at the same time the presence in the passage of mysticism, Oriental influence, and the identification of the idea of good with God were denied by Dorothy Tarrant, *The Cave and the Sun*, *Hibbert Journ* 52, 1953/54, 360—367. Meanwhile J. E. Raven, *Sun, Divided Line, and Cave*, *Cl Quart* N. S. 3, 1953, 22—32, had undertaken to show that the three figures must be treated as interrelated and complementary parts of a single whole and in so doing to defend once more the 'quadripartite' interpretation of Line and Cave. This interpretation was followed by J. Gould, *The development of Plato's ethics*, Cambridge 1955, pp. 165—181; but Gould gives an 'ethical' emphasis to the whole passage, which he moreover takes to be meant as a schematic summary of the *Republic's* 'plot'. The 'quadripartite' interpretation and the strict correspondence of Cave with Line were defended once more by V. Goldschmidt, *La Ligne de la République et la classification des sciences*, *Rev Intern Philos* 9, 1955, 237—255. In this same year R. Loriaux in his book, *L'être et la forme selon Platon* Bruges 1955, treated the passage at length (pp. 54—100 and pp. 206—210) as Plato's demonstration that the good is the supreme existent, absolute and transcendent, and at the same time the supreme object of intelligence as defined in the *Symposium*¹) (cf. J. Moreau, *Rev Philosophique* 146, 1956, 141; Mills, *Gnomon* 29, 1957, 327). It is only as evidence for the nature of the idea of good and its possible identification with God that the passage was studied by P. J. G. M. van Litsenburg, *God en het goddelijke in de dialogen van Plato*, Nijmegen 1955, pp. 10—21 and pp. 192—199. The next year M. Vanhoutte in his book, *La méthode ontologique de Platon* (see

¹) Of this book pages 13—69 repeat, for the most part *verbatim*, the earlier article:

841 f) R. Loriaux, *L'être et l'idée selon Platon*, *Rev Philos Louvain* 50, 1952, 5—55.

719 *supra*), pp. 54—66 and pp. 69—85, contended that in this passage Plato made a supreme effort to shore up his theory of intuition but mistakenly undertook to do so by an analysis which resulted only in a wretched schematism without effective bearing on reality¹). Much more serious than this treatment is the careful analysis by H. P. Stahl in his *Interpretationen zu Platons Hypothesis-Verfahren*, Diss. Kiel 1956, pp. 75—98²). Interpretation of many parts of the passage is involved even in the treatment of the special problem by É. de Strycker, *La distinction entre l'entendement (dianoia) et l'intellect (nous) dans la République de Platon*, *Estudios de Historia de la Filosofía en homenaje al Prof. R. Mondolfo*, Fasc 1, Tucuman 1957, pp. 209—226; and D. W. Hamlyn, *Eikasia in Plato's Republic*, *Philos Quart* 8, 1958, 14—23. See also on the passage: P. M. Schuhl, *Études sur la fabulation platonicienne*, Paris 1947, pp. 41—74: *Mythe et proportion*³); P. Grenet, *Les origines de l'analogie philosophique dans les dialogues de Platon*, Paris 1948, pp. 120—123 and pp. 172—174; B. Liebrucks (217 *supra*), pp. 82—96; C. Librizzzi (29 *supra*), pp. 62—66; R. S. Bluck (657 *supra*), pp. 24—30; L. Robin, *Les rapports de l'être et de la connaissance d'après Platon*, Paris 1957, pp. 10—33 (see 7 *supra*, p. 110—117); H. Gauss (20 *supra*), II/2, pp. 171—211.

842. On VI 506 E—509 D: P. M. Schuhl, *Le joug du Bien, les liens de la Nécessité, et la fonction d'Hestia*, *Rev Archéologique* 6 Ser. 31/32, 1949, 958—967 (reprinted in his collection, *Le merveilleux la pensée et l'action*, Paris 1952, pp. 129—140). See also W. Bröcker (107 *supra*), who tries to connect this passage with the reports of Plato's lecture on the Good.

—. On VI 508 E 3—6: K. Vretska (795a *supra*), pp. 48—49.

843. On VI 509 B: L. Robin, *Platon et la philosophie des valeurs*, *Études Métaph et Morale* 1 (= *Rev Métaph et Morale* 49), 1944, 1—21. See also most of the titles referred to in 841 *supra* and besides

¹) Much of this section (especially pp. 70—85) had already been developed more fully in an earlier article:

841 g) M. Vanhoutte, *La méthode intuitive dans les dialogues de la maturité de Platon*, *Rev Philos Louvain* 47, 1949, 301—333 (especially pp. 308—333).

²) Stahl refers frequently to another unpublished dissertation, which I have not myself seen:

841 h) E. Schütt, *Interpretationen zu Platons Politeia Buch 6/7*, Diss. Heidelberg 1954.

³) Of this pp. 41—44 originally appeared in *Rev Ét Grecques* 52, 1939, 19—22; summaries and résumés of parts of the remainder were published in at least three places between 1938 and 1943.

them: F. M. Cornford (599 *supra*), p. 132; J. Hirschberger, *Philos Jahrbuch* 53, 1940, 298—301; K. Marc-Wogau (779 *supra*); P. Merlan (121 *supra*), pp. 91—92 and in connection with this H. Dörrie, *Philos Rundschau* 3, 1955, 20 and A. Mansion, *Med K Vlaamse Acad Wet, Kl Letter* 16 Nr 3, 1954, 42—44; A. J. Festugière (116 *supra*), p. 89; Ch. Axelos, *ΠΛΑΤΩΝ* 8, 1956, 95—99 (850 *infra*).

844. On VI 509 D—511 D: R. S. Brumbaugh, *Plato's Divided Line*, *Rev Metaphysics* 5, 1951/52, 529—534. See also his book, *Plato's mathematical imagination*, Bloomington 1954, pp. 91—107. Part of Brumbaugh's interpretation depends upon the false assumption that *De Anima* 404 B 18—27 refers to Plato, whereas it has nothing to do with Plato and still less with the 'divided line'.

845. On VI 510 B 4—D 3: K. D. Georgoulis, *Der Begriff (ἡ ἔννοια τῆς ἀναρέσεως τῶν ὑποθέσεων παρὰ Πλάτωνι)*, *ΠΛΑΤΩΝ* 7, 1955, 179—182 (German summary: 182—183) = *Le sens de la réfutation, 'anaireses', des hypothèses chez Platon*, *Entretiens Philosophiques d'Athènes* 2—6 avril 1955 ('Dialogue et Dialectique'), *Institut International de Philosophie* 1956, 75—78.

846. On VI 510 C—511 B: K. von Fritz, *Archiv für Begriffsgeschichte* 1, 1955, 38—42 and *ibid.* 4, 1959, 80—81; A. Szabó, *Studi Ital Filol* Cl 30, 1958, 9—12. On 510 C see the earlier interpretation of A. E. Taylor in *Mind* N. S. 43, 1934, 81—84 and Ann Scoul Norm Pisa, *Lettere* 2 Ser. 4, 1935, 149—153 and on this Sir David Ross, *Plato's theory of ideas*, Oxford 1951, pp. 55—57.

847. On VII 514 A—518 D: L. Przyluski, *Le théâtre d'ombres et la caverne de Platon*, *Byzantion* 13, 1938, 595—603; J. R. Buisman, *Der philosophische Hintergrund des platonischen Höhlengleichnisses*, *Mnem* III 7, 1939, 49—62; M. Heidegger, *Platons Lehre von der Wahrheit*, Bern 1947 and (2. Auflage) 1954 (cf. G. Krüger, *Studia Philos* 9, 1949, 93—129; P. Friedländer [11a *supra*, I, pp. 233—242 = 11b *supra*, pp. 221—229]; E. M. Manasse, *Philos Rundschau* 5 Beiheft 1, 1957, 21—27); G. Ralfs, *Gymnasium* 58, 1951, 90—91; T. Ballauff (214 *supra*; pp. 11—36 = *Zeitschr philos Forsch* 6, 1951/52, 175—199 [cf. Verdenius, *Mnem* IV 8, 1955, 154—155]); M. Zepf, *Der Mensch in der Höhle and das Pantheon*, *Gymnasium* 65, 1958, 355—382 (especially pp. 359—364). See on this passage also the titles referred to in 841 *supra*¹).

¹) The following publication I have not been able to obtain or to verify:

847a. M. Saldida, *A alegoria da caverna*, *Filosofia* (Lisboa) 1 Nr. 2, 1954, 38—50 and 2, 1955, 117—123.

848. On VII 514 B 4—6: W. Kranz, *Philologus* 94, 1940/41, 333—334.

849. On VII 514 B 8—515 A 1: O. Becker, *Rhein Mus N. F.* 99, 1956, 201—205. By changing *τε* to *ye* in 514 C 1 he holds that strict parallelism between the 'line' and the 'cave' is established.

—. On VII 515 C 4—6: K. Vretska (795a *supra*), pp. 49—50.

850. On VII 516 C 8—D 7: Ch. Axelos, *Das Einsehen und das Voraussehen im platonischen Höhlengleichnis, ΠΛΑΤΩΝ* 8, 1956, 95—99. He treats this passage in connection with VI 509 B (see 843 *supra*).

851. On VII 516 D 2—E 2: Dorothy Tarrant, *Cl Rev* 57, 1943, 7—8.

852. On VII 517 B 8—C 5: H. Fränkel, *AJPh* 59, 1938, 320, n. 24; 223 *supra*, p. 621; and 195 *supra*, p. 264, n. 2.

853. On VII 520 D 6—521 A 2: M. B. Foster, *Philosophy* 11, 1936, 301—308. On the implications of this passage, which he thinks transcend the normal limits of Greek thought, for the meaning or meanings of 'justice' in the *Republic*. See 787b *supra* and Foster's more recent essay, Plato's conception of justice in the *Republic* (54 *supra*).

854. On VII 525 D—526 A and 527 A—B: A. Szabó, *Maia N. S.* 10, 1958, 123—124 and *Studi Ital Filol Cl* 30, 1958, 21—28; G. Junge, *Class et Med* 19, 1958, 70—71; cf. B. L. van der Waerden, *Mathematische Annalen* 120, 1947/49, 144—145.

855. On VII 528 B—C: A. E. Taylor, *Ann Scuol Norm Sup Pisa, Lettere* 2 Ser 4, 1935, 154—155.

856. On VII 530 E 7—531 A 3: B. L. van der Waerden, *Hermes* 78, 1943, 176—177.

857. On VII 531 A 4—7: H. L. Tracy, *Cl Weekly* 49, 1955/56, 194—195; A. Ahlvers (178 *supra*), p. 51, n. 1.

858. On VII 532 C 1: J. A. Notopoulos, *Cl Phil* 33, 1938, 99—100; J. van Camp et P. Canart, *Le sens du mot θείος chez Platon*, Louvain 1956, pp. 150—152.

—. On VII 533 C 7—E 2: K. D. Georgoulis (845 *supra*), and on C 7—D 1 see R. Hackforth, *Cl Quart* 36, 1942, 8; H. Cherniss, *AJPh* 68, 1947, 143; H. W. B. Joseph (787 *supra*), pp. 53—54; N. R.

Murphy (791 *supra*), pp. 176—178 and 195; Sir David Ross, *Plato's theory of ideas*, Oxford 1951, pp. 55—58; N. Gully, *Cl Quart N. S.* 2, 1952, 81, n. 1; and most of the other titles cited in 841 *supra*.

— On VII 533 D 1—3: H. Fränkel (195 *supra*), pp. 255—256 and 281—282, a revised and expanded version of *AJPh* 59, 1938, 311—312 (cf. J. Tate, *Cl Rev N. S.*, 6, 1956, 203; G. S. Kirk, *Heraclitus: The cosmic fragments* [840 *supra*], p. 79).

— On VII 533 E 7—534 A 8: R. S. Brumbaugh (844 *supra*); see also the titles cited in 841 *supra*.

859. On VII 540 D 1—541 B 5: K. Vretska, *Wiener Studien* 69, 1956, 154—161. This is an analysis of the passage in refutation of its condemnation as an interpolation by G. Müller (528 *supra*, pp. 149—152 and 445 *supra*, p. 274, n. 48).

— On VIII—IX (543 A—592 B): H. Ryffel (548 *supra*), pp. 88—110: Eine Metabolé-Reihe von Verfassungen besonderer Art im 'Staat'; R. Joly (232 *supra*), pp. 76—87: Les genres de vie aux livres VIII et IX.

860. On VIII—IX, 3 (543 A—576 B): K. Vretska, *Typische und polare Darstellung bei Platon*, *Symbol Osl* 30, 1953, 42—55. The apparent inconsistencies in Plato's representations of the oligarchic and democratic man are explained by the literary and philosophical motivations of this section of the *Republic*. See also 861 and 865 *infra*.

861. On VIII—IX, 3 (543 A—576 B): K. Vretska, *Platonica*, *Gymnasium* 63, 1956, 406—420. In the first part of this article, *Zum Kompositionsprinzip der Mitte bei Platon*, this section of the *Republic* is analysed as an example of the way in which Plato's composition of each section of a work and of the work as a whole is a conscious imitation of the tympanum of a temple, with special meaning given to the middle of each section large and small; in the second part, *Zum Gebrauch des Bildes bei Platon*, Vretska is concerned chiefly with the nature and effect of the figures used in this section and especially in the chapter on the democratic man. See also 860 *supra* and 865 *infra*.

862. On VIII 545 D—569 C: A. E. Taylor, *The decline and fall of the state in Republic VIII*, *Mind N. S.* 48, 1939, 23—38. This lucid essay has been unduly neglected by later interpreters.

863. On VIII 546 B—D: A. Diès, *Le Nombre de Platon*, *Extrait des Mémoires présentés ... à l'Académie des Inscriptions et Belles-Lettres* 14, Paris 1936 (a preliminary report was published in the

Comptes Rendus, Acad Inscriptions et B—L, 1933, 228—235); É. de Strycker, *Rev Ét Grecques* 63, 1950, 54—57; A. Ahlvers (178 *supra*), pp. 11—20 (cf. Trevaskis, *Cl Rev N. S.* 7, 1957, 31); R. S. Brumbaugh, *Plato's mathematical imagination*, Bloomington 1954, pp. 107—150 (cf. Becker, *Gnomon* 28, 1956, 226; Taliaferro, *New Scholasticism* 31, 1957, 261)¹); M. Denkinger, *L'énigme du Nombre de Platon et la loi des dispositifs de M. Diès*, *Rev Ét Grecques* 63, 1955, 38—76.

864. On VIII—IX (552 C—577 E): A. Pelletier, *L'image du 'frelon' dans la République de Platon*, *Rev Philol* 3 Sér 22, 1948, 131—146; K. Vretska (861 *supra*), pp. 418—419.

— On VIII 558 A 4—8: K. Vretska (795a *supra*), pp. 50—51.

— On VIII 559 A 4: K. Vretska (795a *supra*), p. 51.

865. On VIII 559 D—562 A: K. Vretska, *Platons Demokratenkapitel: Untersuchung seiner Form*, *Gymnasium* 62, 1955, 407—428. See also 860 and 861 *supra*.

— On VIII 563 D 2: G. J. de Vries, *Mnem* IV 8, 1955, 297 (351 *supra*).

— On VIII 568 D 7—9: K. Vretska (795a *supra*), pp. 51—52.

866. On 580 C 9—583 A 11: A. J. Festugière, *Les trois vies*, *Acta Congressus Madvigianae Hafniae* 1954, Vol. 2, 1958, 131—170. On pp. 140—143 Festugière treats this passage as the most important text for the connection of the hierarchy of the three lives with the doctrine of the tripartite soul and for the enunciation of the primacy of the contemplative life. Cf. R. Joly (232 *supra*), pp. 84—86.

— On IX 585 C 7—8: K. Vretska (795a *supra*), pp. 52—54.

867. On IX 587 A—588 A: R. S. Brumbaugh, *Cl Phil* 44, 1949, 197—199. This note is expanded in Brumbaugh's book, *Plato's mathematical imagination*, Bloomington 1954, pp. 151—160; its

¹) See also on this passage Becker's earlier note:

863a) O. Becker, *Die große Platonische Zahl und die Paramekepipeden*, *Quellen u. Studien Gesch Math B* 4, 1937/38, 185—192.

Brumbaugh also has two slight earlier articles which deal with the passage:

863b) R. S. Brumbaugh, *Teaching Plato's Republic VIII*, *Cl Journ* 46, 1950/51, 343—345.

863c) R. S. Brumbaugh, *Genetic theory in the Pythagorean School*, *Journ of Heredity* 43, 1952, 86—88.

substance was given in another version with the title, Teaching Plato's *Republic* IX, in *Cl Journ* 46, 1950/51, 345—348. See also G. Junge, *Class et Med* 19, 1958, 71.

868. On IX 590 A 5—B 2: W. Jaeger, A new Greek word in Plato's *Republic*: The medical origin of the theory of the *θυμοειδές*, *Eranos* 44, 1946, 123—130. Emending *οφεῶδες* in B 1 to *οργῶδες*, which he takes to be a synonym for *θυμοειδές*, Jaeger argues that Plato's source for the latter was Hippocratic medicine, in which *οργή* is a characteristic symptom of *τὸ θυμοειδές*. Against this theory of the medical origin of *τὸ θυμοειδές* in Plato's tripartition of the soul see E. L. Harrison, The origin of *θυμοειδής*, *Cl Rev N.S.* 3, 1953, 138—140. Cf. also M. D. C. Tait (823 *supra*), pp. 209—211.

—. On X 595 A—608 B: N. R. Murphy (791 *supra*), pp. 224—243; H. Koller (168 *supra*), pp. 63—68 (cf. Diller, *Hermes* 83, 1955, 180—181; Tate, *Cl Rev N.S.* 5, 1955, 259; Verdenius, *Mnem* IV 10, 1957, 256—257); H. Blumenberg, *Studium Generale* 10, 1957, 270—273; F. Wehrli, *Mus Helvet* 14, 1957, 44—46; H. Flashar (173 *supra*), pp. 107—111.

869. On X 596 C—D: I. Hedenius, *Theoria* 17, 1951, 57—60.

—. On X 597 B—D (concerning god as *φντουργός* of the ideas): E. Hoffmann (22 *supra*), pp. 203—204; Sir David Ross, Plato's theory of ideas, Oxford 1951, pp. 78—79 and 235—236; J. Moreau, *Réalisme et idéalisme chez Platon*, Paris 1951, pp. 91—92, an interpretation which Moreau had developed at greater length in (5 *supra*) *La construction . . .*, pp. 477—479 and *L'Ame du Monde . . .*, p. 44 (cf. Cherniss, *AJPh* 68, 1947, 120—121¹); J. H. M. M. Loenen, *De Nous* in het systeem van Plato's filosofie, pp. 116—118 and p. 219; W. J. Verdenius, *Entretiens Ant Cl* 1, Vandoeuvres-Genève 1954, 273; P. J. G. M. van Litsenburg, *God en het goddelijke in de dialoogen van Plato*, Nijmegen 1955, pp. 25—29; A. Manno (31 *supra*), pp. 230 and 290²); J. Pépin, *Rev Philosophique* 146, 1956, 42—44 (an interpretation similar to Manno's and with an explicit appeal to Moreau as authority); G. François, *Le polythéisme et l'emploi au singulier des mots θεός, δαίμων*, Paris 1957, pp. 281 and 299;

¹ The opinion of J. Tate referred to here is repeated by him in *Cl Rev N.S.* 3, 1953, 93—94, where he criticizes Ross's treatment of the passage.

² Replying to G. Reale's criticism of this book (*Riv Filos Neoscolastica* 48, 1956, 193—230), Manno in *Sul rapporto tra le idee e Dio in Platone*, Napoli 1958, pp. 89—91 argues from this passage again that Plato meant the ideas to be the eternal thought of the divine mind.

L. Robin, *Les rapports de l'être et de la connaissance d'après Platon*, Paris 1957, pp. 32, 45, 138—139, 151 (see 7 *supra*, p. 250; and on Robin's identification of the *πρωτογενός* with the idea of good cf. Scimonelli, *Rass Filos* 7, 1958, 86—89).

—. On X 597 C 1—D 3: Sir David Ross, *Plato's theory of ideas*, Oxford 1951, pp. 87 and 230—231 (praised by G. Vlastos, *Philos Rev* 63, 1954, 348, n. 51); G. E. L. Owen, *Cl Quart N. S.* 3, 1953, 83 (294 *supra*); L. Lugarini, *Acme* 7, 1954, 43—45; H. Cherniss, *AJPh* 78, 1957, 259—262 (300 *supra*).

—. On X 607 A 3—5: H. Koller (168 *supra*), pp. 177—179.

870. On X 608 C—612 A: É. des Places, *Les derniers thèmes de la République de Platon*, *Archives de Philos* 19 cahier 4, 1956, 115—122. An attempt to show that in this passage Plato before beginning the myth of Er combines and harmonizes all the preceding themes of the *Republic* and gives a résumé of his conception of the human soul. On the argument for immortality itself see J. Moreau, *La construction . . .* (5 *supra*), pp. 256—262; R. R. Hartford, *Plato and immortality*, *Hermathena* 64, 1944, 1—18; W. K. C. Guthrie, *Entretiens Ant Cl* 3, *Vandoeuvres-Genève* 1957, 6—7.

871. On X 614 A—621 B: Il mito di Er con introduzione e commento di L. Giovannacci, Firenze 1952.

—. On X 614 A—621 B: J. Bidez (241 *supra*), pp. 43—51 and Appendice I; Julia Kerschensteiner (242 *supra*), pp. 137—155; W. J. W. Koster (256 *supra*), pp. 66—81; A. S. Ferguson, *Philos Quart* 1, 1950/51, pp. 19—20 and 32—34 (in his article, *The Platonic choice of lives*); R. S. Brumbaugh, *Plato's mathematical imagination*, Bloomington 1954, pp. 161—208: *The Myth of Er*¹); J. S. Morrison (219 *supra*), pp. 65—68; R. Schaerer, *Diogenes* 11, 1955, 57—61; F. Buffière (200 *supra*), pp. 442—444, 450—453, 474, 508—509, 579—582; G. Funke, *Archiv für Begriffsgeschichte* 3, 1958, 32—37.

872. On X 616 B—617 D: R. B. Onians, *The origins of European thought about the Body, the Mind, the Soul, the World, Time and Fate*, Cambridge 1951 (2nd edition 1954), pp. 306—308, 332, and 403;

¹) Of this section pp. 183—187 are a revision (see p. 290, n. 18) of Brumbaugh's article, *Colors of the hemispheres in Plato's Myth of Er*, *Cl Phil* 46, 1951, 173—176; and pp. 198—202 a revised version of his note, *Plato Republic* 616 E: *The final 'Law of Nines'*, *Cl Phil* 49, 1954, 33—34. On these pages of Brumbaugh's book cf. B. Einarson, *Cl Phil* 50, 1955, 199—200.

B. L. van der Waerden (235 *supra*), pp. 42—44 (cf. O. Becker, *Gnomon* 25, 1953, 39); H. D. P. Lee (771a *supra*), pp. 402—405: The Spindle of Necessity.

873. On X 616 B 4—6: E. Tièche, *Mus Helvet* 2, 1945, 80—84.

— On X 616 C: P.-M. Schuhl (842 *supra*); O. Klima, *Archiv Orient* 18, 1—2 (1950) 315.

— On X 617 B 4—7: P. Boyancé (228b *supra*); G. Junge (235c *supra*), pp. 192—194; G. J. de Vries, *Mnem* IV 8, 1955, 294 (on *Cratylus* 403 D 8).

— On X 617 C 5—D 1: B. Einarson, *Cl Phil* 53, 1958, 98, n. 4.

— On X 617 D—621 B: É. Magotteaux, *Manes Virgiliens et Démon Platonicien*, *Ant Cl* 24, 1955, 341—351 (especially pp. 346—349 [see 574 *supra*]).

— On X 617 E 1—3: R. B. Onians (872 *supra*), p. 403; cf. W. C. Greene, *Moirai: Fate, Good, and Evil in Greek Thought*, Cambridge, Mass. 1944, pp. 421—422.

874. On X 618 B 2—4: F. H. Sandbach, *Cl Rev* 57, 1943, 101.

— On X 620 D 6—E 4: R. B. Onians (872 *supra*), pp. 403—404.

875. On X 621 A 2—3: D. E. Eichholz, *Cl Rev* 54, 1940, 182.

Rivales

See *Erastae supra*

Sisyphus

β

— Margherita Isnardi (403 *supra*).

Sophist

α

876. Plato's theory of knowledge: The *Theaetetus* and the *Sophist* of Plato translated with a running commentary by F. M. Cornford, London 1935 (cf. Stocks, *Mind* N. S. 44, 1935, 526—528; Robinson, *Philos Rev* 45, 1936, 314—317). This is the most important translation and commentary of the *Theaetetus* (pp. 15—163) and the

Sophist (pp. 165—332) published since the appearance of Diès's edition and translation of these dialogues in the 'Budé edition' (VIII 2 and 3, 1924 and 1925).

877. Platone, *Il Sofista* a cura di V. Arangio-Ruiz, Bari 1951 (cf. E. De Mas, *Giorn Crit Filos Ital* 3 Ser. 7, 1953, 113—116; I. Mancini, *Giorn Metafisica* 8, 1953, 319—322; E. Paci, *Riv Filos* 49, 1958, 148—153). This is a translation with an introduction and a substantial commentary in which Arangio-Ruiz argues that the *Sophist*, if not spurious, would have to be later than the *Laws*, for he contends that its doctrine contradicts everything in Plato's genuine works.

See also the translation with briefer notes by A. Zadro (306a *supra*).

β

See among the publications already listed: E. M. Manasse (738 *supra*); E. Karlin (608 *supra*), pp. 181—191; B. Liebrucks (217 *supra*), pp. 123—169; H. G. Gadamer (215 *supra*), pp. 68—77 and his earlier work (710a *supra*), pp. 73—80; F. Gonzales Cordero (614 *supra*); L. Lugarini (218 *supra* [cf. also 613 *supra*]); P.-M. Schuhl (736 *supra*); D. J. Allan (164 *supra*), pp. 284—287; D. W. Hamlyn (617 *supra*); R. Schaerer (618 *supra*)¹; E. G. Ballard (801 *supra*), pp. 26—34; K. F. Johansen (621 *supra*); E. Salin (86 *supra*); A. Rigobello (34 *supra*), pp. 62—80.

878. K. Dürr, *Moderne Darstellung der platonischen Logik: Ein Beitrag zur Erklärung des Dialoges 'Sophistes'*, *Mus Helvet* 2, 1945, 166—194. After distinguishing the 'outer' and 'inner' parts of the *Sophist*, discussing their relation to each other, and further distinguishing the subsections of the 'inner' part (236 D—264 B), Dürr analyses in terms of the logic of Whitehead-Russell and Carnap the basic arguments of 251 C—263 D.

879. R. Hackforth, *False statement in Plato's Sophist*, *Cl Quart* 39, 1945, 56—58. Against Cornford's interpretation of 259 D—263 D (876 *supra*, pp. 298—317); cf. R. S. Bluck (895 *infra*).

880. R. Robinson, *Forms and Error in Plato's Theaetetus*, *Philos Rev* 59, 1950, 3—30. Robinson here disputes Cornford's inter-

¹ Compare with the analysis of the *Sophist* here (pp. 206—210 and 218—220) V. Goldschmidt, *Les Dialogues de Platon*, Paris 1947, pp. 165—183 and P. Kucharski, *Les chemins du savoir ...* (see 701 *supra*), pp. 147—273 and pp. 325—341.

pretation (876 *supra*) of the explanation of error given in the *Sophist* as well as his interpretation of the intention of the *Theaetetus*; he contends that the theory of ideas is not involved in the explanation of error in the *Sophist*, that it is entirely absent from the *Theaetetus* because Plato had here turned his attention away from it as irrelevant, and furthermore that the tendencies of the definition of thought in the two dialogues are not the same but opposite. On this thesis concerning the *Theaetetus* see R. Hackforth, *Cl Quart N. S.* 7, 1957, 53—58 (958 *infra*); and Winifred Hicken, *JHS* 77 Part 1, 1957, 48—53 (960 *infra*); and on the explanation of error in the *Sophist* R. S. Bluck, *JHS* 77 Part 2, 1957, 181—186 (895 *infra*).

881. M. W. Isenberg, Plato's *Sophist* and the Five Stages of Knowing, *Cl Phil* 46, 1951, 201—211. This is an abortive attempt 'to show that the movement of thought in the *Sophist* follows closely the description of method in *Epistle VII* 342 A ff.' Cf. the similar attempt of Margarete Schröder (737 *supra*) to read the five 'Erkenntnisstufen' into the *Politicus*.

882. M. Buccellato, La "retorica" sofistica negli scritti di Platone: II "*Sofista*", *Riv Crit Storia Filos* 7, 1952, 351—377. This article was republished as chapter IV, pp. 71—97, of Buccellato's book (150 *supra*).

883. A. L. Peck, Plato and the μέγιστα γένη of the *Sophist*: A reinterpretation, *Cl Quart N. S.* 2, 1952, 32—56. Peck here contends that the γένη of the *Sophist* are not Platonic ideas (specifically that Plato could not have held Being, Identity, and Difference to be ideas) and that Plato is not in this dialogue concerned with his own doctrine of ideas at all except in so far as the vulnerability of it in its verbal expression is shown to depend upon assumptions and methods of argument the invalidity of which is exposed here and in the *Parmenides*. See also *Cl Quart N. S.* 3, 1953, 146—149 and *N. S.* 4, 1954, 32—42 (615 *supra*); and against Peck's thesis see A. R. Lacey (902 *infra*).

884. K. Riezler, Das Nichts und das Andere, das Sein und das Seiende, *Varia Variorum: Festgabe für Karl Reinhardt*, Münster/Köln 1952, pp. 82—103. The treatment of being and non-being in the *Sophist* is here made the occasion for an impressionistic essay on the motive that induced the Greeks to distinguish 'das Sein als Eines von dem Seienden als Vielen' with a long digression on the shortcomings of the existentialist attitude towards 'being' and 'otherness'.

885. Maria Rezzani, I problemi fondamentali del "*Sofista*" di Platone, *Sophia* 20, 1952, 298—309. The dialectic of the *Sophist*, the

import of the passages on *δύναμις*, the *πατελῶς ὄν*, and the 'materialists and friends of the ideas', and the general significance of the dialogue—in discussing all these problems Dr. Rezzani tends to 'reconcile' divergent interpretations by ascribing to Plato a 'double dialectic' (cf. 894 *infra*) and a principle of purposeful ambiguity¹).

886. Maria Rezzani, Note marginali al "*Sofista*" di Platone, *Sophia* 21, 1953, 22—28. Of the eight notes given here those which deal with specific passages will be listed in the relevant places in *γ infra*; there are in addition brief discussions of the 'paradigm' of the dichotomies, the relation of the thought to the literary form in the *Sophist*, the order intended by Plato for the dialectical dialogues, and Heidegger and the *Sophist*. Some of these matters, already touched upon in 885 *supra*, are treated again by Dr. Rezzani in her monograph, *Note e ricerche intorno al linguaggio di Platone*, Padova 1959, much of which has to do with the *Sophist*.

887. A. C. Lloyd, Falsehood and Significance according to Plato, *Proc XIth Internat Cong Philosophy* 12, Amsterdam/Louvain 1953, 68—70. The *Sophist*, he contends, is the answer not to the *Theaetetus* but to the *Euthydemus*; and it involves a representational theory of thinking, which there is independent evidence to show Plato held.

888. L. J. Eslick, The dyadic character of Being in Plato, *Modern Schoolman* 31, 1953/54, 11—18. He analyses the *Sophist* to produce the conclusion that each idea is a reflection of the one in the material principle which, called 'the other' in the *Sophist*, is 'the unlimited' of the *Philebus*, 'the receptacle' of the *Timaeus*, and the 'indeterminate dyad' of Plato's 'oral discourses'. See also Eslick's article, The Platonic dialectic of Non-Being (616 *supra*). These are attempts to find in the *Sophist* the theory ascribed to Plato by Aristotle; the identification of 'the other' of the *Sophist* and 'the receptacle' of the *Timaeus* is by itself enough to prove them misconceived.

889. H. C. de Lima Vaz, A dialéctica das ideias no *Sofista*, *Rev Portuguesa di Filos* 10, 1954, 122—163. I have not been able to procure a copy of this article.

¹) A résumé of this paper with a brief discussion of it is published in *Associazione Filosofica Ligure* (Università di Genova): *Relazioni e Discussioni* (1951/52), Milano/Roma 1953, pp. 123—126. This stimulated the paper by E. Maggioni, which with the discussion of it by Mazzantini and Rezzani is published in the same volume (pp. 127—138): *Discussione sul tema 'Eternità e storicità del dialogo'*. On pp. 134—135 of this paper Maggioni addresses himself to the dialectic of the ideas as given in the *Sophist*.

890. K. Nawratil, *Platons Dialog vom Sophisten im Lichte der Philosophie Robert Reiningers*, Wiener Zeitsch für Philos Psych Pädag 5, 1954/55, 165—173. The *Sophist* is here declared to be the second 'crystallization-point' of Plato's thought, his disavowal of the metaphysics and the epistemology of the classical theory of ideas and his assertion of a new conception of Being as comprehensive rather than transcendent and merely ostensible rather than conceptually deducible. Nawratil supposes 247 E to involve the denial that static ideas can be the object or foundation of knowledge, the intercommunion of the five γένη to involve denial of hypostatized ideas, and the passage on the 'friends of the ideas' (248 A) to be a recantation of the notions expressed by Socrates in the *Symposium*, *Phaedo*, and *Republic*. Of these suppositions the third is questionable and has long been questioned, the second is a *non sequitur*, and the first is flatly contradicted by 249 B—C. For the *Symposium* as the first 'crystallization-point' of Plato's thought see 924 *infra*.

891. J. Ackrill, *Συμπλοκή εἰδῶν*, Bull Inst Class Studies Univ London 2, 1955, 31—35. An interpretation of 259 E 4—6 in opposition to the treatment of the passage by Cornford and Ross and based upon analysis of 251 D—252 E, where 252 B 5 is taken to mean 'they would make no genuine statement at all'; Ackrill then tries to show how 259 E 4—6 is in accord with the examples used in 263 A—B, and from this he proceeds to speak of the dialectic described in 253 D—E and *practised* in 254 B ff.¹) as involving what Plato may have felt to be a revised version of the theory of ideas but what is in fact a theory of concepts instead of the ideas criticized in the *Parmenides*. On Ackrill's treatment cf. R. S. Bluck (895 *infra*).

892. M. Untersteiner, Riv Crit Storia Filos 10, 1955, 13—17 (in his article, L'essere di Parmenide è ΟΥΛΟΝ, non ΕΝ, *ibid.* 5—23), reprinted in his *Parmenide: Testimonianze e Frammenti*, Firenze 1958, pp. XXXVII—XLIII. Untersteiner contends that the polemic of the *Sophist* is addressed to the Megarian Eleaticism, which posited Being as 'one' (as Untersteiner thinks Parmenides did not).

893. Geneviève Rodis-Lewis, Note sur les définitions du "Sophiste", Rev Philosophique 146, 1956, 88—94. She denies that the detours in the hunting down of the sophist are merely an envelope for the central argument concerning non-being, and she tries to find the unity of the dialogue throughout the seven definitions—and Pythagorean symbolism in the fact that there are precisely seven.

¹) A. L. Peck (883 *supra*, p. 56) had denied that the argument of 254 Bff. is an illustration of the business of the true philosopher as described in 253 D—E.

894. Marisa Grondona, La dialettica nel *Sofista* di Platone, Atti Accad Scienze Torino II, Cl Scienze Mor Stor Filol 91, 1956/57, 261—319. Holding that there is for Plato both a divine dialectic eternally inherent in the intelligible world and a human dialectic which is the dialogue of a man with himself or others (cf. Maria Rezzani, 885 *supra*), she argues that the *Sophist* undertakes to save the latter by defining Being as the comprehensive dynamic system of the former and by establishing the relations of this system as constitutive of thought, which is capable of truth because the ideas, though being 'in and for themselves', are also really 'in us'.

895. R. S. Bluck, False statement in the *Sophist*, JHS 77 Part 2, 1957, 181—186. The problem is here studied with special reference to the treatments of it by Cornford (876 *supra*), Hackforth (879 *supra*), Robinson (880 *supra*), Hamlyn (617 *supra*), and Ackrill (891 *supra*). This paper is important both for its interpretation of the specific passages dealing with false statement and the *συμπλοκή εἰδῶν* and also for its more general bearing upon Plato's theory of knowledge.

896. A. de Muralt, De la participation dans le *Sophiste* de Platon, Studia Philos 17, 1957, 101—120. The *Sophist* is interpreted as presenting a complete theory of participation 'structured and coordinated by means of the general notion of *δύναμις*'. Both *δύναμις* and *κίνησις* are interpreted as participation, the intelligible *κίνησις* being the idea of participation, by participating in which the ideas participate in one another. Despite this erroneous identification, another manifestation of the apparently ineradicable compulsion to make the idea of motion some sort of 'dialectical motion among the ideas' and despite most of what is here presented as a 'derivation' of the five *γένη* in two stages, this article contains many sound and interesting remarks, such as those on 248 E—249 A and those on the 'materialists and the friends of the ideas'.

897. A. Tovar, El sofista y el filosofo en Platón, Estudios Clás 4, 1957, 86—87 (résumé).

898. J. Xenakis, Plato on statement and truth-value, Mind N. S. 66, 1957, 165—172. Xenakis maintains that 261 E—263 B is misinterpreted by Cornford (876 *supra*, pp. 303—317) and by anyone who supposes a connection with the theory of ideas, which he says Plato had in the *Parmenides* 'just about reduced to an absurdity' and in *Sophist* 248 A 'ascribed to others—probably some youngsters in the Academy'; and then interpreting this passage in isolation he finds in it reason for ascribing to Plato a theory that he calls 'the

Subject-Matter Elucidation of Truth-Value.' This attempt has been adequately dealt with by Moravcsik:

899. J. M. E. Moravcsik, Mr. Xenakis on Truth and Meaning, *Mind* N. S. 67, 1958, 533—537. He shows both that Xenakis' theory is objectionable and that there is no reason to foist it upon Plato.

900. L. Malverne, Remarques sur le "*Sophiste*", *Rev Métaph et Morale*, 63, 1958, 149—166. The *Sophist*, Malverne argues, does not succeed in producing a cogent reply to the Megarian Neo-Eleatics, who denied the possibility of error on the ground that it is ontologically impossible to express non-being, for Plato's relative non-being is not justifiable without explication of the absolute non-being that he tries to set aside as irrelevant. At the end of the article Malverne asserts that the concrete truth of Plato's *θάτερον* rests in Sartre's identification of it with self-consciousness.

901. J. Xenakis, Plato's *Sophist*: A defense of negative expressions and a doctrine of sense and of truth, *Phronesis* 4, 1959, 29—43. Here Xenakis again attacks Cornford's interpretation (876 *supra*), again tries to eliminate the theory of ideas from the *Sophist*, and persists in foisting upon Plato his theory of 'Truth-Value' (898 *supra*) without noticing the objections to this already advanced by Moravcsik (899 *supra*).

902. A. R. Lacey, Plato's *Sophist* and the Forms, *Cl Quart* N. S. 9, 1959, 43—52. A refutation of the thesis of A. L. Peck (883 *supra*) concluding with a discussion of the question of 'self-predication' and Plato's conception of the ideas.

The *Sophist* is discussed or used in almost all the more general treatments of Plato's dialectic, of his theory of ideas, and of his supposed development. Among recent publications of this kind, which will be listed later in the sections devoted to these special topics, see especially; G. E. Bariè, *Acme* 2, Fasc. 1/2, 1949, 69—72; K. Schilling, *Zeitschr philos Forsch* 5, 1950/51, 204—208 (see also his earlier book, *Platon: Einführung in seine Philosophie*, Wurzach 1948, pp. 252—267); J. Moreau, *Réalisme et idéalisme chez Platon*, Paris 1951, pp. 27—52; Sir David Ross, *Plato's theory of ideas*, Oxford 1951, pp. 104—116; A. Szabó, *Acta Antiqua* 2, 1953/54, 50—54; G. Capone Braga, *Giorn Metafisica* 9, 1954, 38—43; G. K. Plochmann, *Cl Phil* 49, 1954, 227—228; R. Loriaux, *L'être et la forme selon Platon*, Bruges 1955, pp. 157—173; D. Dubarle, *Recherches Philos* 2 (Aspects de la Dialectique), Paris 1956, 148—162; M. Vanhoutte, *La méthode ontologique de Platon* (see 719 *supra*), pp. 99—102, 110—128, and

160—167; F. Adorno, *Accad Toscana* . . . 'La Colombaria', *Atti e Mem* 29, 1955 (Firenze 1956), 99—100 and 119—132; L. Robin, *Les rapports de l'être et de la connaissance d'après Platon*, Paris 1957, pp. 101—133; E. Paci, *Riv Filos* 49, 1958, 134—153.

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903. On 216 A 5—B 3: W. J. Verdenius, *Mnemosyne* 4 Ser. 8, 1955, 33. See also J. Labarbe (199 *supra*), pp. 296—297.

—. On 218 A 1 (*ἀγχιον*): W. J. Verdenius, *Mnem* IV 8, 1955, 285 (683 *supra*) on *Phaedrus* 268 E 1 against Cornford's emendation here (876 *supra*, p. 167, n. 2).

—. On 218 D 8—219 A 2: Maria Rezzani (886 *supra*), p. 22.

904. On 223 E 4—224 B 3: E. G. Turner, *Rhein Mus* N. F. 98, 1955, 97—98. The text of 223 E 4—224 A 2 and 224 B 1—3 in Pap. Hibeh II, 1 No. 228 (270—230 B. C.) offers no support to any of the emendations of nineteenth century editors.

—. On 226 A—232 B: G. B. Kerferd (154 *supra*) and against his interpretation N. B. Booth (154a *supra*) and J. R. Trevaskis (154b *supra*).

—. On 232 C 1—6: Maria Rezzani (886 *supra*), p. 23; P.-M. Schuhl, *Ann Fac Lettres Toulouse*, *Homo: Et Philos* 1, Mai 1953, 88; J. van Camp et P. Canart (see 858 *supra*), pp. 196—198.

905. On 233 D 3—236 C 7: R. Bianchi Bandinelli, *Studi in Onore di Ugo Enrico Paoli*, Firenze 1956, pp. 81—95. He contends that 235 E 5—236 C 7 properly interpreted (see pp. 85—87) shows that Plato in this whole section is talking about 'illusionistic painting', i. e. the extension of perspective painting from the theatre to painting generally. This question of 'perspective' he then connects with the modern question of 'realism' and 'abstractionism', and he argues that Plato's criticism of 'representational art' is to be fully understood only in its pertinence to the analogous cultural significance of the changing artistic attitude of his time.

906. On 235 A 6—7: W. J. Verdenius, *Mnem* IV 1, 1948, 105—106.

—. On 235 B 9—C 2: See the articles by G. C. Whittick, A. E. Raubitschek, and K. Meuli referred to in 551 *supra* on *Laws* III 698 C 7—D 7.

—. On 238 A 5—9: Maria Rezzani (886 *supra*), p. 23.

— On 240 A 7—C 5: A. L. Peck, *Cl Quart N. S.* 2, 1952, 36—39 (883 *supra*); F. W. Kohnke, *Phronesis* 2, 1957, 35—40 (632 *supra*); H. Cherniss, *AJPh* 78, 1957, 263—266 (300 *supra*).

— On 242 D 6—243 A 1: R. Mondolfo (198 *supra*), pp. 76—77. An unconvincing attempt to eliminate from this passage the distinction between the doctrines of Heraclitus and Empedocles as seen in it, e. g. by K. Reinhardt (*Hermes* 77, 1942, 18, n. 1 and 238—244) and G. S. Kirk (*Heraclitus: The cosmic fragments*, Cambridge 1954, pp. 321, 324, 336—337). See now G. S. Kirk, *Phronesis* 4, 1959, 73—76.

907. On 244 B 6—245 E 7: R. Demos, *Types of unity according to Plato and Aristotle*, *Philos and Phenom Research* 6, 1945/46, 534—545. This paper professes to be 'concerned principally with Plato's critique of Eleatic monism in the *Sophist* (244—246) and with Aristotle's similar critique in the *Physics* (Bk I, chaps. 2—3)'; but what it has to say specifically of this passage of the *Sophist* is scanty and is only incidental to its apparent thesis that for both Plato and Aristotle the universe has a relational unity in which the independent reality of the terms related is not abrogated.

— On 246 A 4—249 D 8: For the figure of the gigantomachy with which the passage begins (246 A—B) see F. Vian (824 *supra*). The old differences concerning the significance of this section of the dialogue in relation to the theory of ideas continue to revolve mainly about three points: the identification of the *εἰδῶν φίλοι* (248 A 4) and the meaning of the pronouncements concerning *δύναμις* (247 D 8—E 4, 248 C 4—5) and *τὸ παντελῶς ὄν* (248 E 6—249 A 2). See J. Chevalier (14 *supra*), pp. 633—634 and 647—648 (Appendice 89 and 113) and, among publications anterior to 1950 unnoticed by him, see besides Cornford (876 *supra*, pp. 228—248) especially G. M. A. Grube (3 *supra*), pp. 295—297; E. M. Manasse (738 *supra*), pp. 12—15 and 29—31; J. B. Skemp, *The theory of motion in Plato's later dialogues*, Cambridge 1942, pp. 15—21 and p. 112; F. Solmsen, *Plato's Theology*, Ithaca 1942, pp. 78—82 (cf. E. Frank, *AJPh* 66, 1945, 95 and É. de Strycker, *Ant Cl* 16, 1947, 149—150); V. Goldschmidt, *Le paradigme dans la dialectique platonicienne*, Paris 1947, pp. 74—76 and *Les Dialogues de Platon*, Paris 1947, pp. 172—177; G. E. Bariè, *Acme* 2, Fasc. 1/2, 1949, 69—70. Sir David Ross (*Plato's theory of ideas*, Oxford 1951, pp. 102—103, 105—111, 133, 237) argues that Plato is here criticizing his own earlier attitude but only in so far as it failed to treat life and soul as completely real and not in respect to its view of the ideas as immutable real entities. In

the same year N. R. Murphy (791 *supra*, p. 149), contending that Plato never questioned the complete reality of physical things, saw support in this passage for his thesis that the only 'efficacy' which Plato ever ascribed to the ideas is that of affecting the mind and so being known, the only 'independent existence' that of being permanent and necessary ingredients in any account that we can give of things; and the at same time in J. H. M. M. Loenen's book, *De Nous en het systeem van Plato's filosofie*, pp. 131—148 (see 715 *supra* for this and his later article summarizing the book), the passage was declared to be the manifesto of a new dynamic theory of *νοῦς* with the extension of the notion of Being to a category of thought and a concomitant reduction in the number of ideas, in short the decisive turning-point of Plato's theory. Against these diverse treatments of the passage Miss de Vogel, who had been citing it as evidence that Plato meant the world of ideas to be a 'living being' with soul or consciousness and mind or thought (109 *supra*, p. 302, n. 49; 38 a and 38 b *supra*), now attempted to defend her interpretation (38 c *supra*; see also 38 c *supra*, pp. 56—57 and 38 f *supra*, p. 114 and pp. 117—118), which frankly identifies in all but terminology Plato's intention and the express Neo-Platonic doctrine¹). Plotinus's own interpretation of the passage was discussed meanwhile by J. Moreau, *Giorn Metafisica* 8, 1953, 326—328; for the presumable use of it by later Neo-Platonists see J. Pépin, *Recherches Philos* 1 (*Histoire de la Philos et Métaphysique*), Paris 1955, 235—236. About half of Maria Rezzani's article on the fundamental problems of the *Sophist* (885 *supra*) consists of systematically inconclusive discussions of the three points at issue in this passage, and in 886 *supra* (pp. 24—25) she has a note on the implications of 249 D 2—4. In studying Plato's use of *δύναμις* as the background of Aristotle's conception A. Smeets discusses this passage in his monograph, *Act en Potentie in de Metaphysica van Aristoteles*, Louvain 1952, pp. 64—65. His interpretation is in accord with that of Diès, whereas the common notion that the passage is an attempt on Plato's part 'to overcome the abstract dualism of his early doctrine of ideas' is asserted again by M. Wundt in his *Untersuchungen zur Metaphysik des Aristoteles*, Stuttgart 1953, pp. 79—80. The stubborn persistence of the assumption that the passage is meant 'to reduce the gap' between the worlds of ideas

¹) See the whole of 38 c and 38 f *supra* and the résumé of the latter article in Assoc G. Budé, *Congrès de Tours et Poitiers 1953 Actes*, Paris 1954, 193—194. Miss de Vogel denied (38 e *supra*, p. 66) that by her interpretation the individual ideas become themselves living beings, which is precisely what K. Marc-Wogau (779 *supra*, p. 44, n. 1) took the passage to mean them to be.

and phenomena is exemplified by R. S. Bluck's remarks in 628 *supra*, p. 35. A. Manno, who read the passage as Plato's assertion that the ideas are identical with the thought and will of a personal and transcendent God who is perfect Being (31 *supra*, pp. 272—274), has recently in response to the criticism of his interpretation by G. Reale (Riv Filos Neoscolastica 48, 1956, 193—230 [especially pp. 214—219]) tried to defend it in more detail (Sul rapporto tra le idee e Dio in Platone, Napoli 1959, pp. 99—104). Reale himself appears to believe that by τῷ παντελῶς ὄντι (248 E 7—249 A 1) Plato meant God. So had many earlier interpreters; but P. J. G. M. van Litsenburg, after having studied the whole passage (God en het goddelijke in de dialogen van Plato, Nijmegen 1955, pp. 29—39, p. 140, and p. 197), confesses that, while he believes this identification not incompatible with Plato's doctrine, it is nowhere stated by Plato himself and is not implied in the context here, which is not theological at all. Van Litsenburg held that Plato here fashioned a new ontology and laid the foundation for Aristotle's doctrine of actuality-potency. The study of van Litsenburg was not yet known to M. Vanhoutte when he interpreted the passage in his book, La méthode ontologique de Platon, Paris/Louvain 1956, pp. 116—120. In interpreting τὸ παντελῶς ὄν Vanhoutte criticizes both Loenen and Miss de Vogel and supports Diès, Cornford, and Ross; and he holds that the passage merely renews the older doctrine of the *Phaedo*. Incidentally he criticizes Miss Rezzani (885 *supra*) for her notion of a 'double dialectic' in the *Sophist*, a notion which almost while he was criticizing it was being further developed by Marisa Grondona in close connection with the interpretation of the present passage (894 *supra*, pp. 275—286, p. 291, and p. 312). R. C. Taliaferro has an obscurely compact page on the passage as the expression of Plato's 'transcendent dynamism' (New Scholast 31, 1957, 260). It is the subject of the first and better half of the essay by A. de Muralt (896 *supra*, pp. 101—111), whose interpretation avoids the more common irrelevances and errs chiefly in its treatment of 'intelligible motion'. For this and its bearing on the argument of the whole passage see H. Cherniss, AJPh 68, 1957, 238—239. Rigobello in his otherwise reasonable treatment of the passage (34 *supra*, pp. 68—72) mistakenly supposes like many others that in 249 A there is introduced non-physical motion which consists of the intercommunion of the ideas with one another. R. G. Turnbull (Philos Quart 8, 1958, 139) contends that in this passage Plato is being faithful to the account in the *Phaedo* and that therefore Cornford and others are wrong in supposing the Socrates of that dialogue to be included among the εἰδῶν φίλοι here.

908. On 251 C 8—259 E 7: J. L. Ackrill, *Plato and the copula: Sophist* 251—259, *JHS* 77 Part 1, 1957, 1—6. Ackrill argues that Plato brings out and meant to bring out the differences of the copula, the identity-sign, and the existential *ἔστιν*, that the rôle of the copula in ordinary language is filled in Plato's philosophical language by *μετέχειν* and its variants, and that Cornford was mistaken in restricting the relation among ideas that combine with one another to the symmetrical one of 'blending'. See also Ackrill's article, *Συμπλοκή εἰδῶν* (891 *supra*).

909. On 253 D—E: M. Vanhoutte, *Note sur la communauté des genres dans le "Sophiste"*, *Rev Philos Louvain* 46, 1948, 177—187. Rejecting all such interpretations as those of Rodier, Diès, Fraccaroli, Festugière, Apelt, and Ritter, he contends that 253 D 5—E 2 is not a description of dialectic at all but a résumé of the positions taken by Plato himself, by the pluralists, by the *εἰδῶν φίλοι*, and by Parmenides with regard to the nature of the *γένη* and their relations. See his later book, *La méthode ontologique de Platon*, Louvain/Paris 1956, p. 121. The passage is interpreted, on the other hand, as the specific programme for the subsequent passage on the five *γένη* by V. Arangio-Ruiz, *Le operazione della dialettica nel "Sofista"* di Platone (*Studi di Filosofia Greca in onore di R. Mondolfo a cura di V. E. Alfieri e M. Untersteiner*, Bari 1950, pp. 231—244), and the long note in his translation of the *Sophist* (877 *supra*), pp. 164—165. This interpretation is criticized by E. Paci, *Riv Filos* 49, 1958, 148—153, who defends against the objections of Arangio-Ruiz Stenzel's earlier treatment of the passage as Plato's definition of dialectic as the technique of diaeresis¹). To G. Huber (612 *supra*, pp. 106—108) the passage represents Plato's formulation of the 'eidetic cosmos', the *eidos* being viewed first in its generic aspect and then in its aspect as species. N. R. Murphy (791 *supra*, p. 175), connecting the passage with *Republic* 511 B 3—C 2, holds that the second pair of clauses in 253 D 5—9 is only reassurance of what is already implied by the first pair; but according to A. C. Lloyd (*Cl Quart N. S.* 2, 1952 110—111) the emphasis in this 'first pair' is on Collection and in the second on Division and the language of the passage is to be explained by assuming that Plato had in mind a 'divided line'. According to Dr. Rezzani (885 *supra*, pp. 307—309

¹) As has already been mentioned, J. Ackrill (891 *supra*) asserts that the dialectic described in 253 D—E is that which is practised in 254 B ff., whereas this had been denied by A. L. Peck (*Cl Quart N. S.* 2, 1952, 56 [883 *supra*]), who thought it surprising that this view had ever been entertained.

and 886 *supra*, pp. 25—26)¹) and Dr. Grondona (894 *supra*, pp. 295—303) the passage is to be interpreted as an expression of Plato's 'double dialectic'; but according to K. F. Johansen (621 *supra*) it sets forth a scheme of diaeresis that confirms the hierarchical structure of the world of ideas, which is precisely what it does not point to according to Sir David Ross, Plato's theory of ideas, Oxford 1951, pp. 113 and 117. See on the passage also P. Kucharski, *Les chemins du savoir* . . . (see 701 *supra*), pp. 191—197 and 265—266; J. Chevalier (14 *supra*), p. 649, Appendice 118; L. Robin, *Les rapports de l'être et de la connaissance d'après Platon*, Paris 1957, pp. 113—118.

— On 263 D 2: G. J. de Vries, *Mnem* IV 8, 1955, 291 (351 *supra* on *Cratylus* 384 C 4).

— On 263 E—264 A: G. Calogero, *Giorn Crit Filos Ital* 3 Ser. 11, 1957, 362—364 (728 *supra*).

— On 265 B—266 D: J. H. M. M. Loenen, *De Nous en het systeem van Plato's filosofie* (see 715 *supra*) pp. 148—158; R. Muth, *Natalicium Carolo Jax . . . oblatum* 1 (*Innsbrucker Beiträge zur Kulturwiss* 3), Innsbruck 1955, pp. 120—122²); P. J. G. M. van Litsenburg, *God en het goddelijke in de dialogen van Plato*, Nijmegen 1955, pp. 39—43; J. van Camp et P. Canart, *Le sens du mot ΘΕΙΟΣ* . . . (see 858 *supra*), pp. 201—213.

Symposium

α

The most recent editions of the *Symposium* worthy of serious attention are two which were first published in the middle 'thirties:

910. Πλάτωνος Συμπόσιον: Κείμενον, μετάφρασις καὶ ἐρμηνεία ὑπὸ I. Συκουτρῆς, Ἀθήναι 1934 (cf. Galli, *Boll Filol Cl N. S.* 6, 1934/35, 128—133; Mathieu, *Rev Ét Anciennes* 37, 1935, 270—271). A second edition with slight corrections was published in 1949.

911. Platone, *Il Simposio* con introduzione e commento di U. Galli, Torino 1935 (cf. Guglielmino, *Boll Filol Cl N. S.* 7, 1935/36, 267—272; Tarrant, *Cl Rev* 50, 1936, 198—199). A second edition was published in 1944.

¹) These two passages are combined in Dr. Rezzani's monograph, *Note e ricerche intorno al linguaggio di Platone*, Padova 1959, pp. 24—29.

²) See also on 265 C 7—9 R. Muth, *Wiener Studien* 64, 1949 (published 1950), 55 (cf. Herter, *Anz Altertum* 6, 1953, 17).

Both of these print their own texts, relying for their information, however, chiefly upon the reports of Burnet and Robin; both have elaborate introductions and full commentaries; and Sykutris gives a translation into modern Greek as well.

Since 1950 there has been published about a dozen new translations of the dialogue into modern European languages, all of them equipped with the usual introduction and most of them with some explanatory notes addressed rather to the general reader than to scholars. The most interesting or provocative of them are two which have already been mentioned, the translation and the introduction by Salin (306d *supra*) and the translation by Rufener with introduction by Gigon (308 *supra*).

It may not be inappropriate here to take note of the new edition and translation with a long introductory study of Ficino's *Commentarium in Convivium Platonis*:

912. Marcile Ficin, Commentaire sur le Banquet de Platon, Texte du manuscrit autographe présenté et traduit par R. Marcel, Paris 1956¹).

β

See among the publications already listed: J. Moreau, La construction . . . (5 *supra*), pp. 270—298, pp. 448—449, and pp. 453—459; W. Jaeger, Paideia (4 *supra*), II, pp. 244—269; F. Lasserre (673 *supra*); R. B. Levinson (28 *supra*), pp. 30—34, pp. 91—94, pp. 120—122, and pp. 127—128; H. Gauss (20 *supra*), II/2, pp. 81—117; A. Rigobello (34 *supra*), pp. 98—104; H. B. Mattingly (302 *supra*) with F. Dornseiff (302a *supra*) and S. Lönborg (302b *supra*).

913. G. Krüger, Einsicht und Leidenschaft: Das Wesen des platonischen Denkens, Frankfurt am Main 1939. The book is unchanged in the 'revised edition' of 1948 except for format, pagination, and a few minor additions in the 'Anhang'. It is a detailed analysis and extreme interpretation of the *Symposium* as being the most faithful revelation of the theory of 'eros', which according to Krüger is the essence of Plato's philosophy (cf. Manasse, Philos Rundschau 5, Beiheft 1, 1957, 27—32).

¹ See p. 48 of Marcel's introduction and P. O. Kristeller, Journ Philos 42, 1945, 586—588 on the last preceding edition of this work:

912a) Marsilio Ficino's Commentary on Plato's *Symposium*, The Text and Translation with an Introduction by S. R. Jayne, Columbia 1944 (Univ. of Missouri Studies 19, no. 1).

914. M. W. Isenberg, *The order of the discourses in Plato's Symposium*, Chicago 1940. The thesis here presented in a far-fetched argument is that of the seven discourses the first four constitute one group on the level of Becoming and those of Agathon, Socrates, and Alcibiades another on the level of Being, those of Aristophanes and Alcibiades being parallel to each other on these two different levels.

915. E. Hoffmann, *Über Platons Symposium*, Neue Heidelberger Jahrb N. F. 1941, 36—58 and republished separately Heidelberg 1947 (cf. Schilling, *Zeitschr philos Forsch* 2, 1947, 193—194). Hoffmann too divides the seven speeches into two groups, a prior tetrad consisting of two pairs, however, and a triad in which Agathon's speech presents ideal Beauty, that of Diotima-Socrates absolute Truth, and that of Alcibiades the ideal Good. Schilling's concise arguments against such a division and his remarks on the numerological implications which Hoffmann sees in it are compelling¹).

916. G. Daux, *Sur quelques passages du "Banquet" de Platon*, *Rev Ét Grecques*, 55, 1942, 236—271. In the first section of this article (pp. 237—258) Daux undertakes to prove that the *Symposium* reflects no rancour or malice against Aristophanes. The rest of the article deals with seven passages and under these in *γ infra* the pertinent references will be given.

917. L. Edelstein, *The rôle of Eryximachus in Plato's Symposium*, *Trans Am Philol Assoc* 76, 1945, 85—103. Plato, it is here argued, did not intend a caricature of the physician; to the contrary, as an exemplar of the authority that exercises persuasive power the physician has dominant significance for the frame of the whole dialogue and for the nature of its singular content and method. The article contains some important pages also on Plato's attitude to medicine generally and his use of medical similes and metaphors (pp. 97—101), with which cf. F. Wehrli, 156 *supra*.

918. H. Koller, *Die Komposition des platonischen Symposions*, Zürich 1948 (cf. Hackforth, *Cl Rev* 64, 1950, 19—20; von Ivanka, *Anz Altertum* 5, 1952, 155—156). Koller contends that Plato must

¹) Cf. Schilling's analysis of the dialogue in his book, *Platon: Einführung in seine Philosophie*, Wurzach 1948, pp. 169—183. For a 'dialectical' approach to the relation of Socrates' speech to the rest of the dialogue see the analysis of V. Goldschmidt, *Les Dialogues de Platon*, Paris 1947, pp. 222—235. A useful antidote for all over-solemn analyses of the *Symposium* is provided by the many penetrating observations on the dialogue in the book by G. J. de Vries, *Spel bij Plato*, Amsterdam 1949, especially pp. 98—100, 114—116, 168—171, 274—277, 298—303, 337—340, and 364—366.

have produced this work by putting the frame of a symposium around several fragmentary compositions which had originally been sketched out independently of one another and of which he failed to make a consistent unity (cf. M. Landmann, 928 *infra* and W. Wimmel, 931 *infra*). In an appendix Koller performs a similar operation of dissection upon the *Protagoras*, which is reminiscent of the article by O. Gigon (759 *supra*).

919. A. Levi, La teoria dell' *ἔργον* nel *Simposio* di Platone, Giorn Metafisica 4, 1949, 290—297. This study, published posthumously, was probably left incomplete by the author, for in it the dialogue is analysed only through the speech of Aristophanes. It may be partially supplemented by pp. 121—122 and 127 of the author's article, Sulla demonologia platonica, in Athenaeum N. S. 24, 1946.

920. F. M. Cornford, The doctrine of Eros in Plato's *Symposium*, The Unwritten Philosophy and Other Essays, Cambridge 1950, pp. 68—80. This essay, though published for the first time in this posthumous collection, was written in 1937. See also Cornford's posthumous book, *Principium Sapientiae*, Cambridge 1952, pp. 82—87, p. 125, p. 208, and p. 75, n. 2.

921. G. Galli, Saggio sul *Convito* di Platone, Due studi di filosofia greca, Torino 1950, pp. 58—98 (see 577 *supra*). This essay has been reprinted with some slight changes in Galli's book, *Socrate ed alcuni dialoghi platonici*, Torino 1958, pp. 111—151.

922. R. Hackforth, Immortality in Plato's *Symposium*, *Cl Rev* 64, 1950, 43—45. Hackforth here argues that Plato when he wrote the *Symposium* had come to doubt the validity of the argument for immortality which in the *Phaedo* had been represented as alone decisive and that he had therefore relapsed into temporary scepticism. See the reply to this by J. V. Luce, *Cl Rev* N. S. 2, 1952, 137—141; the comment on Hackforth's thesis and Luce's article by H. Cherniss and Luce's remarks on this comment in *Cl Rev* N. S. 3, 1953, 131; and R. S. Bluck's discussion in 637 *supra*, pp. 27—28 and especially p. 28, n. 1. Hackforth in the face of criticism reiterates the thesis of his article but with a shift of emphasis that is significant in 638 *supra*, p. 21 (cf. Tate, *Cl Rev* N.S. 7, 1957, 27).

923. M. Landmann, Erkenntnis und Erlebnis: Phänomenologische Studien, Berlin 1951, pp. 194—199 in the essay, Suchen und Haben. On Plato's treatment of *ἔργον* in the *Symposium* (see 139 *supra*), which is here assumed to be the "reworked" form of an earlier sketch, a notion later developed by Landmann in 928 *infra*.

924. K. Nawratil, Zur Komposition des platonischen *Symposiums*, *Anz Altertum* 7, 1954, 61—62. In the speeches of this composition, Nawratil maintains, Plato meant to give an idealized history of Greek thought from its pre-philosophical and mythical stage (the speech of Phaedrus) through his own doctrine (the sermon of Diotima) in which the Socratic method is completed and superseded. Nawratil asserts that the doctrine of ideas is brought fully to light for the first time here, in what is the first 'crystallization-point' of Plato's thought as the *Sophist* is the second (see 890 *supra*); he does not mention the speech of Alcibiades, and this silence by itself betrays the artificiality of his interpretation.

925. A. Valensin, Platon et la théorie de l'amour, *Études* 281, 1954, 32—45. This essay is devoted almost entirely to an analysis of the *Symposium*.

926. R. A. Markus, The dialectic of Eros in Plato's *Symposium*, *Downside Rev* 73, 1955, 219—230. Quite apart from the avowed purpose to determine the features in Plato's dialectic of love that have recommended it to Christian thinkers, this paper gives a subtle and interesting analysis of the relations of the speeches in the *Symposium* to one another. They are constructed, Markus holds, so as to make Plato's view of love emerge from their sequence 'dialectically', the subject constantly outgrowing the vocabulary used of it, for in ἔρως Plato saw such a three-fold aspect as the English term 'love' has and wanted to keep the word to indicate what is at bottom common to all these aspects, though in the 'higher mysteries' ἔρως becomes desire to give rather than desire to receive or to possess.

927. H. C. de Lima Vaz, A ascensão dialéctica no *Banquete* de Platão, *Kriterion* 9, 1956, 17—40; Amor e conhecimento: sobre a ascensão dialéctica no *Banquete*, *Rev Portuguesa di Filos* 12, 1956, 225—242. I have been unable to procure a copy of either of these articles.

928. M. Landmann, Platons Traktat von den drei Unsterblichkeiten: die Urzelle von *Conv.* 207a—212a, *Zeitschr philos Forsch* 10, 1956, 161—190. This is the elaboration of Landmann's assumption that the *Symposium* is the reworked form of an earlier sketch (see 923 *supra*). He argues that chapters 26, 27, and 28—29 must have represented three stages of the longing for immortality in an earlier tractate which Plato recast into the present form when he decided to write a work on 'the three kinds of eros'; but he was unable to make the synthesis a smooth one, and this accounts for the anomalies which Landmann finds in the speech of Diotima. There is no evidence to make this hypothesis of Landmann's even plausible.

929. R. Hornsby, Significant action in the *Symposium*, *Cl Journ* 52, 1956/57, 37—40. He stresses the significance of the quadruple frame of the dialogue and of the many figures of movement used in it.

930. R. G. Hoerber, More on "action" in Plato's *Symposium*, *Cl Journ* 52, 1956/57, 220—221. Apropos of 929 *supra* Hoerber tries to establish in a fashion reminiscent of the far-fetched Neo-Platonic commentaries a 'parallelism of levels' for the reporters, the speakers at the banquet, and the planes of beauty and knowledge in Diotima's speech.

931. W. Wimmel, Zum Verhältnis einiger Stellen des xenophontischen und des platonischen *Symposions*, *Gymnasium* 64, 1957, 230—250. He argues that 208 B—209 E, which Koller (918 *supra*) thought a later interpolation by Plato, contains delicate play upon Xenophon's *Symposium*, that for the speech of Phaedrus (178 A—180 B) Plato used Xenophon, viii and for that of Pausanias (180 C—185 B) the apologia by Pausanias to which Xenophon refers in viii, 32, and that such far-flung conjectures as Koller's become unnecessary as soon as Plato's procedure in using the Xenophontic themes is appreciated. Wimmel, who argues that Xenophon may have written his *Symposium* as early as 386/385, gives a good résumé of earlier arguments and hypotheses concerning the relative dating of the *Symposia* of Xenophon and Plato, though he confines his consideration to the German literature for the most part¹).

932. W. Kranz, *Platonica*, *Philologus* 102, 1958, 74—83. In the first of these two notes (pp. 74—80) the subject is what Kranz holds to be the two different but related doctrines of the nature of the cosmos in the speeches of Eryximachus and Diotima. In the second there are some remarks (p. 81) on the relation of the theme of the *Symposium* to the Academy itself.

933. Helen H. Bacon, Socrates crowned, *Virginia Quart Rev* 35, 1959, 415—430. Beginning with the problem posed by the final scene this perceptive essay, having discussed Plato's use of dramatic dialogue as an 'oblique approach to truth', analyses the *Symposium* to show how in it this and other devices for achieving such 'obliquity' are employed and how the whole is meant to culminate in the victory of Socrates-Eros, who wins from tragedian and comedian at once the crown of Dionysus.

¹) See among recent publications dealing with this subject: V. de Magalhães-Vilhena (126 *supra*), p. 226, n. 4; J. Luccioni, *Xénophon et le Socratisme*, Paris 1953, pp. 120—127; E. Delebecque, *Essai sur la vie de Xénophon*, Paris, 1957, pp. 344—359. Delebecque argues that Xenophon wrote his *Symposium* between 365 and 362 with the intention of criticizing and 'rectifying' the work of Plato.

γ

— On 172 A 6—7: G. Daux (916 *supra*), pp. 265—266. The passage is erroneously referred to here as 172 c.

— On 173 D 5—7: G. Daux (916 *supra*), pp. 266—267.

934. On 175 C 6—E 10: Dorothy Tarrant, *The touch of Socrates*, Cl Quart N. S. 8, 1958, 95—98. A study of this passage to show how the writer of the *Theages* perverted its tone and exaggerated it in order to invest Socrates with the miraculous power that is ascribed to him in 130 E 1—4 of that dialogue.

— On 178 A 6—180 B 8: W. Wimmel (931 *supra*), especially pp. 242—243.

935. On 180 C—185 C: J. S. Morrison, Cl Rev N. S. 5, 1955, 11—12 in his article, *Socrates and Antiphon*, *ibid.* 8—12 (this analysis of the speech of Pausanias occasioned by the remarks of E. R. Dodds, Cl Rev N. S. 4, 1954, 95 on 182 D—184 E); W. Wimmel (931 *supra*), especially pp. 243—245.

— On 182 A 7—B 6: G. Daux (916 *supra*), pp. 258—265. He defends the text of the MSS as 'neither incorrect nor improbable' against emendation, transposition, and excision.

— On 185 E 6—188 E 4: L. Edelstein (917 *supra*); W. Kranz (932 *supra*).

— On 187 A 1—C 2: F. M. Cornford, *Principium Sapientiae* (see 920 *supra*), p. 116, n. 1; G. S. Kirk, *Heraclitus: The cosmic fragments* (see 840 *supra*), pp. 15 and 204—205.

— On 189 C 2—193 E 2: J. Bidez (241 *supra*), pp. 38—42; Julia Kerschensteiner (242 *supra*), pp. 157—161; W. J. W. Koster (256 *supra*), pp. 32—35. See also E. Vandvik, *De mytho Aristophaneo in Platonis Symposio*, Symbol Osl 23, 1944, 102—103; R. S. Brumbaugh, *Journal of Heredity* 40, 1949, 50 and his book, *Plato's mathematical imagination*, Bloomington 1954, pp. 256—257 (cf. (Herter, *Anz Altertum* 7, 1954, 14, n. 2).

— On 193 A 1—3: H. B. Mattingly (302 *supra*).

936. On 194 B: P. W. Harsh, *Plato Symposium* 194 B and a Raised Position in the Theater, Cl Phil 44, 1949, 116—117.

937. On 195 D 2—E 4: D. S. Robertson, Cl Rev N. S. 8, 1958, 221. He suggests that E 2 should read . . . οὐδέ γ' ἐπὶ κρᾶνιν.

— On 196 C 4—8: G. Daux (916 *supra*), pp. 267—268.

938. On 197 E 2: A. von Blumenthal, *Hermes* 75, 1940, 428. *κόσμος* in the sense of *κοσμητής* a tragic and dithyrambic usage and so appropriate to Agathon.

939. On 199 C 3—212 C 4: M. F. Sciacca, *Il discorso di Socrate nel Convito platonico: interpretazione e spunti di estetica*, Humanitas (Brescia) 7, 1952, 132—145. The article is published also in *Estudios de Historia de la filosofía en homenaje al Prof. R. Mondolfo*, Fasc 1, Tucuman 1957, pp. 191—208. It is largely a running paraphrase of the passage in the *Symposium*, on the basis of which together with the 'palinode' in the *Phaedrus Republic X* according to Sciacca should be understood as a condemnation not of art and poetry generally but only of certain kinds of art. Sciacca seems to think that Plato's 'aesthetics' has hitherto been mistakenly interpreted only or primarily on the basis of *Republic X*; but he does little in this article himself to explain what he conceives to be the relation of that book of the *Republic* to this passage of the *Symposium* as he interprets it. Contemporary with the first publication of Sciacca's article is the quite different treatment of the passage by R. Loriaux in his article (841f *supra*, pp. 31—39 and pp. 52—54), later absorbed in his book, *L'être et la forme selon Platon*, Bruges 1955 (see especially pp. 41—53, 66, and 71 on this passage).

940. On 201 D—212 C: K. Kerényi, *Der große Daimon des Symposion*, Amsterdam/Leipzig 1942; H. Grégoire (187 and 187a *supra*); L. Quattrocchi, *L'idea di bello nel pensiero di Platone*, Roma 1953, pp. 68—80 and p. 96; R. Godel (255 *supra*); M. Vanhoutte, *La méthode ontologique de Platon* (see 719 *supra*), pp. 22—23, pp. 48—54, and pp. 76—79; W. Kranz (932 *supra*). On 202 E—203 A see A. D. Nock, *Gnomon* 31, 1959, 221 criticizing H. Wey, *Die Funktionen der bösen Geister . . .*, Winterthur 1957, p. 142.

941. On 203 B—E: A. Vanhoye, *Deux pages poétiques de Platon*, *Études* Cl 20, 1952, 3—21; T. Davis (579 *supra*), who interprets this passage along with passages in the *Lysis* as an anticipation and source of Aristotle's principle of privation.

On 203 D 6: W. Kranz (932 *supra*), p. 81.

—. On 207 A—212 A: M. Landmann (928 *supra*); H. Flashar (173 *supra*), pp. 127—130.

—. On 207 C—208 B: See the articles of R. Hackforth and J. V. Luce with the other references in 922 *supra*; L. Deubner, *Philo-*

logus 94, 1940/41, 231—232; P. Merlan, *Journ Hist Ideas* 8, 1947, 423—424 (in 436 *supra*).

— On 208 B—209 E: W. Wimmel (931 *supra*), especially pp. 230—241 and pp. 245—248.

— On 209 E—212 A: P. J. G. M. van Litsenburg, *God en het goddelijke in de dialogen van Plato*, Nijmegen 1955, pp. 21—25; H. C. de Lima Vaz (927 *supra*).

942. On 210 B 2: O. Longo, *Maia* 9, 1957, 284—287. On ἐπ' εἶδει which he thinks corrupt, perhaps a falsely interpreted repetition of the preceding εἰ δέ.

943. On 210 C—212 A: M. Caster, *Les deux derniers degrés de l'initiation philosophique dans le "Banquet" de Platon*, *Mélanges Soc Toulousaine d'Études Class* 1, 1946, 63—69.

— On 210 E 2—211 B 5: A. J. Festugière (116 *supra*), pp. 79—91 and especially pp. 79—84 and p. 85 on this passage. He tries to reaffirm against criticism in the interim the interpretation given in his earlier book, *Contemplation et vie contemplative selon Platon*, Paris 1936, pp. 228—231. That his interpretation of 211 A 7 is in error, an error committed also by R. C. Cross (*Mind* N. S. 63, 1954, 442—443), is pointed out by J. L. Ackrill, *Mind* N. S. 66, 1957, 572—573.

— On 211 A—E: M. B. Trias (696 *supra*).

— On 211 C 6—8: J. Tate, *Cl Rev* N. S. 6, 1956, 303. On the faulty text printed by Burnet.

— On 213 E 11—214 A 1: G. Daux (916 *supra*), pp. 268—269.

— On 214 B 1—2: G. Daux (916 *supra*), p. 267.

— On 214 E 6—11: G. Daux (916 *supra*), pp. 269—271.

944. On 215 C 6—D 1: R. G. Hoerber, *Cl Bull* 29, 1952/53, 9. He contends that in this passage φιλοῖς λόγοις means 'prose' as contrasted to 'poetry'. See, however, J. Barns, *Cl Quart* N. S. 1, 1951, 6.

945. On 216 A 7: W. B. Stanford, *Alcibiades' Lisp*, *Cl Rev* 56, 1942, 72. In Alcibiades' mouth Σειρήνων would sound like Σειληνῶν, suggesting the σιληνοῖς of 215 A 7.

946. On 219 C 5: F. Scheidweiler, *Hermes* 83, 1955, 222—223. He defends καίπερ of the MSS against the papyrus and emendations.

— On 222 B 4—7: H. Dörrie, *Akad Wiss Lit Mainz, Abhand Geistes- u. Soz Kl* 1956 Nr. 5 (654 *supra*), pp. 314—317.

— On 223 C—D: Helen H. Bacon (933 *supra*).

Theaetetus

 α

The most important translation and commentary of the *Theaetetus* later than the edition and translation by Diès in the 'Budé edition' are contained in F. M. Cornford's volume, *Plato's theory of knowledge* (876 *supra*). E. Salin's translation with introduction was published in 1946 (see 306d *supra*). Subsequent to this there were published two Italian translations of the dialogue with substantial introductions and some exegetical notes:

947. Platone, *Teeteto*: Introduzione e versione italiana di G. Zannoni, Firenze 1948.

948. Platone, *Teeteto*: Introduzione, traduzione e commento di A. Russo, Milano 1955.

 β

See among the publications already listed: E. Weerts (191 *supra*); H. Langerbeck (757 *supra*), pp. 14—26 and pp. 40—44 (cf. Kapp, *Gnomon* 12, 1936, 69—73); W. F. R. Hardie (610b *supra*), pp. 14—26; E. M. Manasse (738 *supra*), pp. 225—231; H. Diller (192 *supra*); A. Koyré (10b *supra*), pp. 33—52; E. Karlin (608 *supra*); B. Liebrucks (217 *supra*), pp. 97—123; G. B. Kerferd (225 *supra*); E. Hoffmann (22 *supra*), pp. 138—142; C. Librizzi (29 *supra*), pp. 46—57; R. Robinson (880 *supra* with the references there to R. Hackforth and Winifred Hicken); A. Capizzi (224 *supra*), pp. 29—61; D. W. Hamlyn (617 *supra*), pp. 300—301 (see also Hamlyn, *Mind* N. S. 66, 1957, 547 in reply to R. S. Bluck, *Mind* N. S. 65, 1956, pp. 522 and 526—528, who there is himself replying to R. C. Cross, *Mind* N. S. 63, 1954, 433—450); R. Schaerer (618 *supra*); G. Rudberg (84 *supra*), especially pp. 43—45, 47, and 49—50; G. Giannantoni (162 *supra*), pp. 129—145.

949. M. Dercsényi, *Exegetische Bemerkungen zu Platons Theaetetus*, *Hermes* 70, 1935, 404—423. The passages discussed in this article will be noted in the relevant places in γ *infra*.

950. E. Grassi, *Vom Vorrang des Logos*, München 1939, pp. 69—142. An interpretation of Plato's epistemology in the form of an analysis of the *Theaetetus*, much as his earlier book, *Il problema della metafisica platonica*, Bari 1932, was based upon an analysis of the *Meno*. To this latter work Grassi here in fact refers (pp. 136—141) as substantiation of his interpretation of the *Theaetetus*, a summary of

which is to be found on p. 136 and the point of departure for which is avowedly Heidegger's 'Begriff des Grundes'.

951. J. W. Yolton, The ontological status of sense—data in Plato's theory of perception, *Rev Metaphysics* 3, 1949/50, 21—58. Interpreting the first part of the *Theaetetus* with the aid of parts of the *Timaeus* Yolton attempts to reconstruct as distinct from a genuine Protagorean theory Plato's theory of perception as a 'multiple location theory' and of sense-data as resultants of the three causal factors: 'physical objects', intelligible ideas, and the human observer.

952. B. Noll, Die Zeitstruktur im platonischen Dialog *Theätet*, *Zeitschr philos Forsch* 5, 1950/51, 47—61. He holds that the *Theaetetus* represents Plato's altered attitude towards the theory of ideas: the relation of sensibilia to ideas is no longer one of participation, the nature of knowledge is recognized to be unknowable, and in 186 A 8—B 1 'temporal structure' appears as the primary and original categorical principle. This rather nebulous conclusion is reached by systematically exploiting the misinterpretation of a few passages and the misunderstanding of their contexts without regard to Plato's express statements elsewhere.

953. M. Buccellato, Il "Teeteto" e la dottrina protagorea del 'pant' alethé, *Riv Crit Storia Filos* 7, 1952, 431—446. Reprinted as chapter 6 of 150 *supra*.

954. A. Guzzo, Il concetto di "scienza" e il "Teeteto" platonico, *Filosofia* 5, 1954, 562—592. The *Theaetetus*, which is here considered in relation to the *Meno*, *Phaedo*, and *Phaedrus* on the one hand and to the *Sophist* and *Timaeus* on the other, is interpreted as an epistemological essay systematically restricted to the level of sensibilia in order to subject to critical examination the implications of theories other than Plato's and so to prove their inadequacy. See Guzzo's book, *La Scienza*, Torino 1955, pp. LXVII—CXLII and especially pp. LXXX—XCIV.

955. J. Moreau, Platon et le phénoménisme, *Rev Intern Philos* 9, 1955, 256—275. The bulk of this article is a paraphrase of *Theaetetus* 151 E—183 C intended to show that the discussion leads implicitly to recognition of the necessity of the theory of ideas, thus confirming Aristotle's assertion that Plato, subscribing to the perpetual flux of sensibles, thought it necessary to posit as objects of knowledge permanent realities distinct from sensibles; but Moreau, faithful to his Neo-Kantian interpretation of the Platonic ideas¹),

¹) See Moreau, *La construction . . .* (5 *supra*); *Réalisme et idéalisme chez Platon*, Paris 1951, pp. 1—22 and 27—35; *Mélanges Auguste Diès*, Paris 1956, pp. 191—207.

maintains that Plato here frees himself from phenomenalism without setting up again 'things in themselves'.

956. G. Nakhnikian, Plato's theory of sensation, *Rev Metaphysics* 9, 1955/56, 129—148 and 306—327; A note on Plato's theory of sensation, *ibid.* 10, 1965/57, 355—356. He gives a detailed exposition of the theory of sensation in the *Theaetetus* (151 E—187 A) and then argues that as developed in 153 D—154 A, 156 A—157 C, 182 A—D it is Plato's own doctrine held by him to be true. In the subsequent note he admits the invalidity of his earlier assurance concerning the lexicography of the terms in 153 E—154 A but tries to defend his interpretation as a possible one.

957. D. W. Hamlyn, Forms and knowledge in Plato's *Theaetetus*: A Reply to Mr. Bluck, *Mind* N. S. 66, 1957, 547. Hamlyn at the end of his earlier article, The communion of forms and the development of Plato's logic (617 *supra*, pp. 300—301), had rejected Cornford's view of the purpose of the *Theaetetus* and had maintained that according to Plato's argument here knowledge cannot be by 'acquaintance', so that postulating ideas would not suffice to explain it. In a note at the end of that article (p. 302, n. 16) Hamlyn had also rejected the proposal by R. C. Cross in his article, Logos and forms in Plato, *Mind* N. S. 63, 1954, 433—450, where, beginning (pp. 433—439) with the 'problem' of the *Theaetetus* (especially 201 D—206 B), he concluded that the ideas were for Plato not 'substantial entities' but 'logical predicates displayed in logoi'. To this article of Cross's R. S. Bluck replied in his Logos and forms in Plato: A reply to Professor Cross, *Mind* N. S. 65, 1956, 522—529. Since Bluck's treatment of the *Theaetetus* there (pp. 522 and 526—528) by implication refutes the position taken by Hamlyn in his earlier article (617 *supra*), Hamlyn replied with this note in which he contends that in the *Theaetetus* Plato could not have meant to suggest an explanation of ἐπιστήμη as knowledge by direct acquaintance. Hamlyn reiterates his interpretation of the dialogue in *Philos Quart* 8, 1958, 15 and 21—22.

958. R. Hackforth, Platonic forms in the *Theaetetus*, *Cl Quart* N. S. 7, 1957, 53—58. Hackforth here defends against Robinson's attack (880 *supra*) Cornford's interpretation of Plato's purpose in the *Theaetetus*. He does not mention the rejection of Cornford's interpretation by Hamlyn (617 *supra*) or any of the articles by Cross, Bluck, and Hamlyn mentioned in 957 *supra*; and he presumably composed this defence of Cornford without knowledge of them.

959. R. Hackforth, Notes on Plato's *Theaetetus*, Mnem IV 10, 1957, 128—140. Notes on 22 passages, reference to which will be made in the relevant places in γ *infra*.

960. Winifred F. Hicken, Knowledge and Forms in Plato's *Theaetetus*, JHS 77 Part 1, 1957, 48—53. Writing without knowledge of 958 *supra* Miss Hicken here rejects both Cornford's and Robinson's interpretations and that of Stenzel as well and contends that the dialogue expresses the genuine bewilderment of Plato who, while still convinced that the most illuminating knowledge is knowledge of the ideas and that knowledge in itself is direct intuition of reality, can find no way to distinguish this kind of knowledge from true opinion and who in the final discussion (201 C 8—210 D 4) can only show that those who limit knowledge to the particular are still further from solving the problem than are those who posit ideas. Much of this paper deals with the 'final discussion' in the dialogue, concerning which Miss Hicken has published another article also, Phronesis 3, 1958, 126—145 (974 *infra*).

See also for discussion of the *Theaetetus* in works which will be listed later in the sections devoted to the special topics with which they deal: V. Goldschmidt, Les Dialogues de Platon, Paris 1947, pp. 81—90; P. Kucharski, Les chemins du savoir dans les derniers dialogues de Platon, Paris 1949, pp. 232—247 and 365—370; G. J. de Vries, Spel bij Plato, Amsterdam 1949, pp. 73—74, 109—111, 157—158, 267—268, 271—272, 340—348, and 351—353; Sir David Ross, Plato's theory of ideas, Oxford 1951, pp. 101—103 and 156—157; R. Loriaux, L'être et la forme selon Platon, Bruges 1955, pp. 146—154 and pp. 168, 169, and 172; M. Vanhoutte, La méthode ontologique de Platon, pp. 36—38, 108—110, and 159.

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— On 145 D 7—E 9: R. Hackforth (959 *supra*), p. 128.

961. On 147 D 2—148 B 4: G. H. Hardy and E. M. Wright, An introduction to the theory of number, Oxford 1938, pp. 42—43 (an important and neglected commentary, critical of Zeuthen and Heath, whose treatment of the passage is still influential); J. H. Anderhub, Ioco-Seria aus den Papieren eines reisenden Kaufmanns, Wiesbaden/Biëbrich 1941, pp. 159—222: Genetrix irrationalium (cf. Köhm, Phil Woch 62, 1942, 289—293; J. E. Hofmann, Deutsche Mathematik 7, 1942, 117—120); C. Mugler, Platon et la recherche mathématique de son époque, Strasbourg/Zürich 1948, pp. 191—249 (cf. Cherniss, Rev Metaphysics 4, 1951, 407—408 and

410—414); B. L. van der Waerden, *Mathematische Annalen* 120, 1949, 676—700 and his book, *Ontwakende Wetenschap* (418 *supra*), pp. 156—161 (cf. K. von Fritz, *Archiv für Begriffsgeschichte* 1, 1955, 84, n. 159 on p. 85); P.-H. Michel, *De Pythagore à Euclide*, Paris 1950, pp. 455—481 (professedly a critical account of the scholarship of the question through 1946 but apparently without knowledge of Hardy and Wright or of Anderhub); M. Pihl, *Theodoros-stedet i Platons "Theaitetos" og de irrationale tals første historie*, *Matematisk Tidsskrift A*, 1951, 19—38; J. Bousquet, *Le trésor de Cyrène (Fouilles de Delphes, II: Topographie et Architecture)*, Paris 1952, pp. 79—97 and 103—104 (a fantastic attempt to connect with this passage the architecture of the Treasury, a thesis treated seriously by P.-M. Schuhl, *Rev Philosophique* 142, 1952, 453—454 and by P.-H. Michel, *Rev Ét Grecques* 67, 1954, 259—262 but with sober scepticism by R. Martin, *Rev Ét Grecques* 67, 1954, 273—278); R. S. Brumbaugh, *Plato's mathematical imagination*, Bloomington 1954, pp. 38—44 and 268—269 (cf. R. C. Taliaferro, *New Scholast* 31, 1957, 256—260, who sees in the passage a profound philosophical significance in the light of which he analyses the whole dialogue); E. Stamatis, *Ἐπὶ τοῦ μαθηματικοῦ χωρίου τοῦ Θεαιτήτου τοῦ Πλάτωνος, Πρακτικὰ Ἀκαδ Ἀθηνῶν* 31, 1956, 10—16 and in *ΠΛΑΤΩΝ* 9, 1957, 61—68 (rejecting Anderhub's solution and holding that Plato had Theodorus stop at $\sqrt{17}$ because of the sanctity that 17 had for the Pythagoreans and because of its arithmological importance)¹); S. Heller, *Ein Beitrag zur Deutung der Theodoros-Stelle in Platons Dialog "Theaitet"*, *Centaurus* 5, 1956, 1—58 (rejecting the solutions of Zeuthen, Anderhub, and van der Waerden and proposing for Theodorus a geometrical construction that dispenses with the use of proportion); G. Junge, *Class et Med* 19, 1958, 46—50; A. Wasserstein, *Theaitetus and the History of the Theory of numbers*, *Cl Quart N. S.* 8, 1958, 165—179 (written against Zeuthen and Heath without reference to any of the recent literature mentioned *supra* except Hardy and Wright but containing an interesting appendix on Proclus, *In Timaeum*, pp. 179, 9—180, 5 [Diehl] and the *Anonymer Kommentar zu Platons Theaitet*, cols 28, 37—29, 1 and 34, 36—35, 12).

— On 147 D 6: R. Hackforth (959 *supra*), p. 128. He points out that *ἐνέσχετο* means not 'stopped', as most modern editors and translators assume, but 'was entangled by the difficulty of . . .'.

¹) See also Stamatis, *Πρακτικὰ Ἀκαδ Ἀθηνῶν* 30, 1955, 267 in his article on the geometrical algebra of the Pythagoreans, *ibid.* pp. 262—282.

— On 149 A—151 D: R. Hackforth (959 *supra*), pp. 128—130. Against Cornford on the significance of this section concerning the midwifery of Socrates.

962. On 151 E 8—152 C 10: A. Neumann, *Die Problematik des Homo-Mensura Satzes*, *Cl Phil* 33, 1938, 368—379; H. D. Lewis, *Naive realism and a passage in the Theaetetus*, *Mind N. S.* 47, 1938, 351—356 (defending against Cornford Taylor's interpretation of 'the theory of Protagoras' as presented here and in 152 D—154 B); A. Levi, *The Man-Measure principle: Its meaning and applications*, *Philosophy* 15, 1940, 147—167 (on this passage and 152 D—154 B especially pp. 148—154 and p. 160, n. 2); M. Untersteiner, *I Sofisti*, Torino 1949, pp. 55—56 and 96—113 (cf. R. F. Holland, *Cl Quart N. S.* 6, 1956, 215—220); K. Marc-Wogau, *Om Protagoras' homo-mensura-sats i Platons Teaitetos*, *Miscellanea E. Hjärne*, K. Human Vet-Sam Uppsala Årsbok 1952, 207—228; A. Capizzi (224 *supra*), pp. 29—40 and 104—140; R. Mondolfo, *La comprensión del sujeto humano en la cultura antigua*, Buenos Aires 1955, pp. 211—223; K. von Fritz (226 *supra*), cols 913, 63—917, 31 and his earlier account in *Cl Phil* 41, 1946, 22—24; G. M. Sciacca, *Gli dèi in Protagora*, Palermo 1958, pp. 61—64 and 103—106.

— On 152 C 8—168 C 5: I. Lana, *Protagora* (790 *supra*), pp. 64—91: *Opere esoteriche ed essoteriche di Protagora* (cf. Maria Timpanaro Cardini, *Paideia* 7, 1952, 106—111; W. Kraus, *Anz Altertums* 10, 1957, 127—130; A. Capizzi [224 *supra*], pp. 276 and 373).

— On 152 D 2: M. Deresényi (949 *supra*), p. 404.

— On 152 E 1—153 D 7: R. Mondolfo (197 *supra*).

— On 153 A 5—7: M. Deresényi (949 *supra*), pp. 405—407.

— On 154 B 3—6: R. Hackforth (959 *supra*), p. 130.

— On 155 B 4—5: R. Hackforth (959 *supra*), pp. 130—131.

— On 155 D 5—7: M. Deresényi (949 *supra*), pp. 407—410.

— On 156 A—160 C: A. Levi, *Philosophy* 15, 1940, 154—162 (see 962 *supra*); R. Mondolfo (161 *supra*); J. Moreau (955 *supra*), pp. 265—267; H. W. Miller, *Trans Am Philol Assoc* 88, 1957, 103—104 and 112—113 (1025 *infra*); G. Giannantoni (162 *supra*), pp. 132—145.

— On 157 A 3—4: R. Hackforth (959 *supra*), p. 131.

- . On 157 B 4: R. Hackforth (1959 *supra*), p. 131.
- . On 160 B 5—C 2: M. Dercsényi (1949 *supra*), pp. 410—413.
- . On 161 C 3—D 2: M. Dercsényi (1949 *supra*), pp. 413—416.
- . On 165 A 6—7: R. Hackforth (1959 *supra*), pp. 131—132.
- . On 166 A—168 C: A. Levi, *Philosophy* 15, 1940, 163—166 (see 962 *supra*) and *Mind* N. S. 49, 1940, 302; M. Untersteiner, *I Sofisti*, Torino 1949, pp. 66—75; A. Capizzi (224 *supra*), pp. 40—50 and p. 244; E. A. Havelock (152 *supra*), pp. 249—254.
- . On 166 E 4—167 A 1: R. Hackforth (1959 *supra*), p. 132.
- . On 172 B 2—7: R. Hackforth (1959 *supra*), pp. 132—133.
- 963. On 172 B 7—177 C 5: E. Siegmann, *Antike und Abendland* 3, 1948, 272—276, a translation of the passage.
- 964. On 172 B 8—D 8: H. Bischoff, *Die drei λόγοι des Theaitet*, *Hermes* 74, 1939, 104—108. An attempt to identify the two λόγοι in B 8 and the third mentioned in D 6, written apparently without knowledge of P. Shorey, *Cl Phil* 16, 1921, 166—168.
- 965. On 172 C—177 C: E. Åkesson, *Episoden i Theaitetos*, Göteborg 1933 (cf. Raeder, *Gnomon* 9, 1933, 539—542).
- 966. On 172 C 1—176 A 2: J. Koller, *Glotta* 34, 1955, 176—180 in his article, *Ἐγκύκλιος παιδεία*, *ibid.* 174—189.
- 967. On 174 A 4—8: M. Landmann and J. O. Fleckenstein, *Tagesbeobachtungen von Sternen im Altertum: eine philologisch-astronomiegeschichtliche Rekonstruktion der Thalesanekdote*, *Theaet.* 174 A, *Vierteljahresschrift der naturforsch. Gesellschaft in Zürich* 88, 1943, 98ff. (inaccessible to me); L. Alfonsi (248 *supra*); S. Oświecinski, *Charisteria Thaddaeo Sinko . . . oblata*, Warszawa/Wrocław 1951, p. 231 in his article, *Thales—The Ancient Ideal of a Scientist*, *ibid.* pp. 229—253; G. S. Kirk and J. E. Raven, *The Presocratic Philosophers*, Cambridge 1957, pp. 78—79.
- 968. On 176 A 5—C 5: C. G. Rutenber, *The doctrine of the imitation of God in Plato*, New York 1946 (cf. Hackforth, *Cl Rev* 62, 1948, 129—130; Kristeller, *Journ Philos* 46, 1949, 873—874); P. Grenet, *Les origines de l'analogie philosophique dans les dialogues de Platon*, Paris 1948, pp. 205—209; H. Merki, *Ὁμοίωσις θεῷ: Von der platonischen Angleichung an Gott zur Gottähnlichkeit bei Gregor von Nyssa*, Freiburg i. d. Schweiz 1952, pp. 1—35 and 126—128 (cf.

Waszink, *Vig Christ* 8, 1954, 254—256; Jaeger, *Gnomon* 27, 1955, 573—581; H. Cherniss, *Proc Am Philos Soc* 98, 1954, p. 24 and n. 7; J. H. Waszink, *Entretiens Ant Cl* 3, *Vandoeuvres-Genève* 1957, 164—173; G. B. Ladner, *Dumbarton Oaks Papers* 12, 1958, 65. On the question of oriental influence here see Julia Kerschensteiner (242 *supra*), pp. 94—96; Simone Pétrement (244 *supra*), pp. 39—40; W. J. W. Koster (256 *supra*), pp. 36—38.

— On 177 D 5—6: R. Hackforth (959 *supra*), pp. 133—134.

— On 179 A 10—B 5: R. Hackforth (959 *supra*), p. 134.

— On 179 B 6—9: M. Dercsényi (949 *supra*), pp. 416—417.

969. On 180 D 7—E 4: L. Woodbury, *Harvard Studies in Class Phil* 63, 1958, 148—149 and 153—155.

— On 183 B 4—5: R. Hackforth (959 *supra*), p. 134.

970. On 184 A 1: F. Zucker, *Philologus* 93, 1938, 53.

— On 185 B 6: R. Hackforth (959 *supra*), p. 134 (with a suggestion concerning the implication of B 4—5).

971. On 185 C 4—186 E 10: J. Xenakis, *Essence, Being and Fact in Plato: An analysis of one of Theaetetus' 'Koina'*, *Kant-Studien* 49, 1957/58, 167—181. Attempting to answer the criticism that Bertrand Russell based upon this passage, Xenakis denies that *οὐσία* here can mean 'existence' and proposes several other interpretations among which he is himself in the end unable to choose. The paper contains some promising collections of the occurrence of *οὐσία* etc. with different meanings and makes several starts at a determination of the conditions which Plato thought *ἐπιστήμη* must satisfy, but these are abortive and the whole discussion is peculiarly indecisive and confused.

— On 185 C 4—5: R. Hackforth (959 *supra*), p. 135.

— On 188 D—189 B: M. Dercsényi (949 *supra*), pp. 417—419 (especially on 189 A 10—13); H. Cherniss, *JHS* 77, Part 1, 1957, 18—20.

— On 188 D 3: R. Hackforth (959 *supra*), p. 135.

— On 189 B 10—190 E 4: R. Hackforth (959 *supra*), pp. 135—136.

— On 189 E 6—190 A 6: G. Calogero, *Giorn Crit Filos Ital* 3 Ser. 11, 1957, 362—364 (728 *supra*).

972. On 192 A—195 B: P. Cosenza, L'inizio e lo sviluppo della conoscenza sensibile in Aristotele, Napoli 1958, pp. 13—14 and 90—95.

—. On 192 B 2—194 B 6: M. Dercsényi (949 *supra*), pp. 420—422. Analysis of the argument with special regard to the meaning of 193 D 10—E 6.

—. On 197 A 3: R. Hackforth (959 *supra*), p. 136.

973. On 197 C 1—200 C 7: R. Hackforth, The Aviary Theory in the *Theaetetus*, Cl Quart 32, 1938, 27—29; H. D. P. Lee, The Aviary Simile in the *Theaetetus*, Cl Quart 33, 1939, 208—211 (in criticism of Hackforth's article and of Cornford's comments criticized by Hackforth); Hackforth (959 *supra*), pp. 137—139 (an attempt to defend his earlier article against Lee's criticism).

—. On 197 C 7—8: R. Hackforth (959 *supra*), p. 136.

—. On 197 D 7—8: R. Hackforth (959 *supra*), pp. 136—137. Against Cornford and Diès he contends that the classification here is 'neither logical nor ontological but psychological'.

974. On 201 C 8—210 B 3: Winifred Hicken, The character and provenance of Socrates' 'dream' in the *Theaetetus*, Phronesis 3, 1958, 126—145. She argues that the 'dream' was not a theory of Antisthenes or a fragment of some contemporary system of philosophy but a suggestion that had been put forward in the Academy and which interested Plato because he found its grammatical analogy fruitful and its errors revelatory of the 'structural' elements of thought. See also 960 *supra*.

975. On 201 C 8—210 B 3: H. Meyerhoff, Socrates' 'dream' in the *Theaetetus*, Cl Quart N. S. 8, 1958, 131—138. He argues a close connection between the 'dream' and the earlier analysis of perception in 156 A ff., denies that Plato believed in 'indubitable perceptual premisses', and contends that Plato meant to show the inadequacy of a theory of knowledge in which the primitive terms designate unanalysable perceptual data, the 'letters' of the 'dream' which are quite different from the 'letters' of the analogy when it is used in the context of his own theory of ideas. Meyerhoff begins, as does Miss Hicken (974 *supra*), by referring to an unpublished paper of Prof. G. Ryle's, certain remarks in which were also made the occasion of the paper by R. C. Cross, Logos and forms in Plato (see 957 *supra*), who begins by discussing the 'dream' in the *Theaetetus* (Mind N. S. 63, 1954, 433—439).

— On 201 D 8—202 C 5: G. M. A. Grube (159 *supra*), p. 25, n. 25; A.-J. Festugière (160 *supra*), pp. 366—373. Both argue that the theory of the 'dream' is not to be ascribed to Antisthenes; see also Winifred Hicken (974 *supra*), pp. 133—139. It is still sometimes assumed that Plato here refers to Democritus: e. g. G. de Santillana, *Thalès* 2, 1935, 191; F. Enriques and G. de Santillana, *Histoire de la pensée scientifique IV: Le problème de la connaissance*, Paris 1937, 48—50; P. M. Schuhl (35 *supra*), 123; H. Koller, *Glotta* 38, 1959, 61—74.

— On 201 D 6—7: R. Hackforth (959 *supra*), pp. 139—140.

— On 205 D 1—2: M. Dercsényi (949 *supra*), pp. 422—423.

Theages

α

976. Platone, *Teage*: Introduzione e commento di G. Carugno, 2a edizione riveduta, Napoli 1952 (cf. Martano, *Giorn Ital Filol* 6, 1953, 369).

977. Platone, *Teage* a cura di G. Amplo, Roma 1957.

β

See H. Gauss (20 *supra*), I/2, pp. 208—209 (rejecting the dialogue as 'ein elendes Machwerk') and against him P. Friedländer (11a *supra*), II, pp. 135—142 and 299—302 (attempting in additional notes to defend against later critics his own earlier championship of the dialogue's authenticity); H. Gundert (138 *supra*), p. 530, n. 16 (denying Platonic authorship on the basis of 128 D and 129 E ff.); Dorothy Tarrant (934 *supra*)¹.

978. G. Krüger, *Der Dialog Theages*, Greifswald 1935 (cf. Pavlu, *Phil Woch* 59, 1939, 593—597; Carugno [976 *supra*] p. 13). He argues that the dialogue was written by a pupil of Plato's during the latter's life-time but after 368 B. C.

979. H. Gomperz, *Plato on personality*, *The Personalist* 22, 1941/42, 28—32. Reprinted in his *Philosophical Studies*, Boston 1953, pp. 125—128. An expression of Plato's interpretation of the great personality as supernatural, which was probably the view of Socrates himself.

¹ See also Miss Tarrant's earlier remarks in *Cl Quart* 32, 1938, 171—172 in her article, *The Pseudo-Platonic Socrates*, *ibid.* pp. 167—173.

980. K. J. Vourveris, *Ἡ ἀνθρωπιστικὴ ἐρμηνεία τῶν κλασσικῶν: ὁ Πλατωνικὸς διάλογος "Θεάγης"*, ΠΛΑΤΩΝ 2 fasc 2, 1950, 108—123. He follows Friedländer closely in saying that the dialogue breathes the true Platonic spirit and is connected with the works of Plato's earliest period, but he is interested in it chiefly as a model of the Socratic humanistic educational method.

See also G. François, *Le polythéisme et l'emploi au singulier des mots θεός, δαίμων*, Paris 1957, pp. 251—252, 285, 288, and 344.

Timaeus

α

981. Plato's cosmology: The *Timaeus* of Plato translated with a running commentary by F. M. Cornford, London 1937 (cf. A. E. Taylor, *Cl Rev* 51, 1937, 219—220; D. J. Allan, *Mind* N. S. 47, 1938, 73—80). This is the most important interpretation of the whole *Timaeus* published since the appearance in 1928 of A. E. Taylor's *Commentary*, with which it frequently takes issue. See the exchange between Taylor and Cornford (988 *infra*).

982. Platone, *Il Timeo*: traduzione di C. Giarratano, introduzione e commento di G. Manacorda, Bari 1950. The brief introduction and exegetical notes by Manacorda are new; but the translation is that which, first published in 1918, was reissued for the third time in vol. 6 of 306a *supra*.

983. Platons *Timaios* oder Die Schrift über die Natur übersetzt und erläutert von R. Kapferer in Zusammenarbeit mit A. Fingerle, Stuttgart 1952 (cf. F. Solmsen, *Bull Hist Medicine* 27, 1953, 579—580; R. Stark, *Gymnasium* 63, 1956, 146).

See also the translation with brief annotations by J. Moreau (304 *supra*), the works on Cicero's translation (276, 276a, 276c *supra*), and Galen's *Compendium Timaei* (283 *supra*) and 'Commentary' (283b *supra*) with Festugière's study of the former (283a *supra*). The text of an hitherto unknown Latin commentary in a 13th century MS has been published by T. Schmid:

984. T. Schmid, *Ein Timaioskommentar* in Sigtuna, *Class et Med* 10, 1948, 220—266.

β

Among the publications already listed see especially the following: J. Moreau, *L'Ame du Monde* . . . (5 *supra*), pp. 3—55; J. Bidez (241 *supra*), pp. 78—92 and 178—183; Julia Kerschensteiner

(242 *supra*), pp. 77—84; C. G. Rutenber (968 *supra*), chap. 4; E. R. Dodds (243b *supra*), pp. 19—24; A. Levi (216 *supra*); L. Troje (245 *supra*); J. Filliozat (246 *supra*), pp. 191—198 and 208—211; T. G. Rosenmeyer (374 and 388 *supra*), J. W. Yolton (951 *supra*); P. Wilpert (112, 176, and 295 *supra*); E. Hoffmann (22 *supra*), pp. 176—189; C. Librizzi (29 *supra*), pp. 19—39; K. R. Popper (46 *supra* [pp. 478—481, pp. 483—484, pp. 527—531, pp. 617—619] and 175 *supra* [pp. 149—152]¹); F. Solmsen (179 *supra*); V. Cicchiti (380 *supra*); W. J. W. Koster (256 *supra*), pp. 48—58; V. Martin (569 *supra*), especially pp. 124—138; A. Olerud (234 *supra*) and on this cf. Koster, *Mnem* IV 6, 1953, 246—247; B. L. van der Waerden (235 *supra*); J. Zürcher (285a and 285 [pp. 136—154]); A. Ahlvers (178 *supra*); N.-I. Boussoulas (714 *supra*), pp. 52—58 and 97—104 (see also 622 *supra*); C. J. de Vogel (38d with 38e and 38f *supra*); G. E. L. Owen (294 *supra* with the references there to Skemp, Field, Vlastos, Tarrant, Cherniss, Düring, and Calogero); W. Kranz (174 *supra*); G. R. Morrow (537 *supra*); W. J. Verdenius (70 *supra*); A. Manno (31 *supra* with his later monograph, *Sul rapporto tra le idee e Dio in Platone*, Napoli 1958, pp. 39—43, 79—80, 83—89, and 111—112); H. Diels (177 *supra*); E. G. Ballard (801 *supra*), pp. 34—41; H. Cherniss (300 *supra*); W. Spoerri (259 *supra*), especially pp. 209 and 212—214; A. Rigobello (34 *supra*), pp. 110—114.

985. W. Schmid, *Epikurs Kritik der platonischen Elementenlehre*, Leipzig 1936. See also Schmid, *Rhein Mus* N. F. 92, 1944, 44—50.

986. W. Jaeger, *Diokles von Karystos*, Berlin 1938, pp. 7—15 and 211—216. The espousal in the *Timaeus* of Philistion's medical theories is a modernization which vindicates Cornford's view of the dialogue against Taylor's thesis concerning its historicity. On Jaeger's redating of Diocles from which this conclusion is said to follow cf. L. Edelstein, *AJPh* 61, 1940, 483—489; F. Heinimann, *Mus Helvet* 12, 1955, 158—172. See also J. Bidez and G. Leboucq (994 *infra*) for the relation of the *Timaeus* to Philistion.

987. M. S. Sciacca, *La metafisica di Platone*, 1: *Il problema cosmologico*, Roma 1938 (cf. Stefanini, *Logos* 21, 1938, 435—439; del Re, *Mondo Class* 12, 1942, 7—10). Primarily an interpretation of the *Timaeus* in which all the other dialogues are drawn upon for support of the thesis that Plato failed to solve the problem of becoming

¹ See also the Addendum in Vol. I, p. 319 of the third edition of 46 *supra* (London 1957).

and of the sensible world because his conception of god was inadequate, i. e. not Christian.

988. A. E. Taylor, The polytheism of Plato: An apologia, *Mind* N. S. 47, 1938, 180—199. Taylor here tried to defend his interpretation against the criticism of it by Cornford (981 *supra*), to which Cornford replied in *Mind* N. S. 47, 1938, 321—330.

989. P. Thévenaz, L'âme du monde, le devenir et la matière chez Plutarque, Paris 1938. In this study of Plutarch's *De Animae Procreatione in Timaeo*¹) Thévenaz devotes pp. 37—42 to the text and interpretation of *Timaeus* 35 A 1—B 4, pp. 42—54 to Plato's conception of the world-soul, pp. 54—89 to Plutarch's interpretation of 35 A—35 B, and pp. 91—123 to his interpretation of creation, time, becoming, and matter in the *Timaeus*. On Thévenaz's conclusions cf. M. Untersteiner, *Riv Filolog* Cl N. S. 17, 1939, 276—280; and Dubarle, *Rev Ét Grecques* 52, 1939, 556—557; and R. Schaerer, *Sur l'origine de l'âme et le problème du mal dans le platonisme*, *Rev Théologie et Philosophie* N. S. 27, 1939, 62—72.

990. G. Vlastos, The disorderly motion in the *Timaeus*, *Cl Quart* 33, 1939, 71—83. On this article cf. H. Cherniss, Aristotle's criticism of Plato and the Academy I, *Baltimore* 1944, notes 362, 364, 365, 366, 385, 392.

991. T. Negro, La concezione platonica della scienza, Milano 1940. This is essentially an interpretation of the *Timaeus* in its relation to the epistemology and metaphysics of *Republic* VII, Negro's thesis being that the aim of the *Timaeus* is to establish the principles of knowledge as the laws which constitute reality and that science for Plato is distinguished from the modern conception by being based upon metaphysical principles and expressed symbolically.

992. N. Almqvist, Platons världssjäl och Aristoteles' gudsbegrepp: Studier i platonsk naturfilosofi och astralteologi, Lund 1941 (cf. Dahl, *Theoria* 7, 1941, 268—270; Rudberg, *Lychnos*, 1941, 337—338). The *Timaeus* is the primary subject of pp. 1—274, *Laws* X of pp. 274—299; the interpretation of *Timaeus* 35 A 1—37 C 5 and a full review of earlier treatments of the passage occupy pp. 118—183.

993. H. J. Pos, De Kosmologie in Plato's *Timaios*, *Antieke en Moderne Kosmologie* door W. B. Kristensen, H. J. Pos, et al.,

¹) See on this also the dissertation published in the preceding year:

989a. J. Helmer, Zu Plutarchs 'De animae procreatione in Timaeo' (Diss. München), Würzburg 1937.

Arnhem 1941, pp. 29—45. He stresses the aesthetic and especially the ethical intention of Plato's cosmology.

994. J. Bidez and G. Leboucq, Une anatomie antique du coeur humaine: Philistion de Locres et le "*Timée*" de Platon, *Rev Ét Grecques* 57, 1944, 7—40. Adopting the conclusions of Jaeger (1986 *supra*), they study the Hippocratic *Περὶ καρδίας* as an example of the work of Philistion which Plato in writing the *Timaeus* 'accepted en bloc' save where it touched upon questions of psychology, concerning which he had formed his own theories under the influence of Alcmaeon.

995. R. Hackforth, Notes on some passages of Plato's *Timaeus*, *Cl Quart* 38, 1944, 33—40. The passages here discussed will be noted in the relevant places in *γ infra*.

996. R. G. Collingwood, The idea of nature, Oxford 1945, pp. 72—79: *Plato's cosmology: The Timaeus*. This section is preceded (pp. 55—72) by *Plato: The theory of forms*.

997. A.-H. Chroust, The meaning of time in the Ancient World, *New Scholast* 21, 1947, 1—70. On pp. 15—28 he discusses Plato's various statements concerning time and what he takes to be their implications; the questions of time, eternity, and 'creation' in the *Timaeus* are treated on pp. 21—28.

998. P. Boyancé, Xénocrate et les Orphiques, *Rev Ét Anciennes* 50, 1948, 218—231. Important for Xenocrates' interpretation of the *Timaeus* and connection of it with other Platonic dialogues by means of exegesis and adaptation of the Orphic myth of Dionysus. See also H. Dörrie, *Hermes* 82, 1954, 336—337.

999. J. F. Callahan, Four views of time in Ancient Philosophy, Cambridge, Mass. 1948, pp. 3—37: Plato (cf. Hackforth, *Cl Rev* 64, 1950, 22—23). This includes a general discussion of the cosmogony, the world-soul, the theory of rational and subsidiary causes, and the relation of time, space, and motion; see also pp. 188—193 and 197—198 of Callahan's Conclusion.

1000. A. J. Festugière, La Révélation d'Hermès Trismégiste II: Le Dieu Cosmique, Paris 1949, pp. 92—152 and 158—160 (cf. H. Cherniss, *Gnomon* 22, 1950, 207—210 and Festugière's reply in *La Révélation . . .* III: Les doctrines de l'âme, Paris 1953, pp. XII—XIV; Cherniss, *Proc Am Philos Soc* 98, 1954, 25—28; H. Herter, *Rhein Mus N. F.* 100, 1957, 327—347 [1024 *infra*]).

1001. P. Friedländer, Structure and destruction of the atom according to Plato's *Timaeus*, *Univ California Pub Philosophy* 16, 1949, 225—240. A revised version of this article is printed in Fried-

länder (11a *supra*) I, pp. 284—299 and 362—367 = (11b *supra*) I, pp. 246—260 and 380—385.

1002. E. J. Dijksterhuis, *De mechanisering van het wereldbeeld*, Amsterdam 1950, pp. 14—18. Plato is here represented as being an extreme exponent of the Pythagorean tendency to reduce natural science to mathematics and the *Timaeus* as being the product of this tendency, forever teetering on the line that divides mathematics and physics, myth and empirical reality, fantasy and fact and dominated by a spirit the exact contrary to that which inspired the Atomists. (There is a German translation of this book, *Die Mechanisierung des Weltbildes*, Berlin/Göttingen/Heidelberg 1956).

1003. Erna Lesky, *Die Zeugungs- und Vererbungslehren der Antike und ihr Nachwirken* (Akad Wiss Lit Mainz, Abhand Geistes- u Soz Kl 1950, Nr. 19, 1227—1425), Wiesbaden 1951, pp. 18—20 (= 1242—1244) and 30 (= 1254). On the theory of sex, reproduction, and heredity in the *Timaeus* (cf. M. Pohlenz, *Hermes* 81, 1953, 436—437 and on Lesky's book as a whole O. Temkin, *Gnomon* 27, 1955, 115—119). In this connection see also R. B. Onians (872 *supra*), pp. 118—120 on the relation of $\psi\upsilon\chi\eta$ to seed, marrow, and brain in the *Timaeus*.

1004. O. Miró Quesada, *La trascendencia y la objetividad de la materia en Platón*, Arch Soc Peruana de Filosofia 3, 1950, 99—112. I have been unable to procure a copy of this article.

1005. G. R. Morrow, *Necessity and persuasion in Plato's Timaeus*, *Philos Rev* 59, 1950, 147—163. He argues that 'necessity' means the dependable natures at the disposal of the Demiurge, that the disorderly motions upon which intelligence works are due to the irrational parts of the world-soul, and that the actual world of becoming is not a contravention of the works of necessity but the result of selecting from among the various possible collocations of causes those that will most readily serve intelligent purpose (cf. Cherniss, *Proc Am Philos Soc* 98, 1954, 26, n. 28 and 28, n. 40). See also Morrow (537 *supra*) and *Essays in Political Theory Presented to George H. Sabine*, Ithaca 1948, 35—37.

1006. K. Schlechta, *Hirnforschung und philosophische Spekulation im griechischen Altertum*, *Centaurus* 1, 1950/51, 334—355. On the *Timaeus* and on the influence of Alcmaeon see especially pp. 343—348.

1007. E. M. Bruins, *La chimie du Timée*, *Rev Métaph et Morale* 56, 1951, 269—282. Contending that the theory of decomposition and

reformation of corpuscles leads to flagrant contradictions when interpreted according to the 'Pythagorean principle' based solely on the relations among the numbers of faces of the polyhedra, he analyses it by distinguishing the reactions between isolated particles from those between corpuscular systems and applying the principle of 'economy of cuts' resulting in the maximum conservation of the initial structure.

1008. M. K. Munitz, One universe or many?, *Journ Hist Ideas* 12, 1951, 231—255. On pp. 232—239 he discusses Plato's attitude in the *Timaeus* and that of Aristotle as opposed to that of the Atomists¹).

1009. P.-M. Schuhl, Les premières étapes de la philosophie biologique, *Rev Hist Sciences et Applications* 5, 1952, 197—221. A rapid review of the subject containing derivative remarks on Plato's use mostly in the *Timaeus* of the biological and medical theories of Empedocles, Alcmaeon, and Philistion and on parallels with Hindu medicine (see 179, 246, 986, and 994 *supra*).

1010. Alice F. Braunlich, Plato on twentieth century physics, *Studies Presented to David Moore Robinson II*, St. Louis 1953, 1072—1076. Imaginary comments of Plato on the resemblance and differences between his theories in the *Timaeus* and contemporary physics especially in regard to 'matter', space, time, action at a distance, teleology, and the mathematical aspect of physics²).

1011. W. Heisenberg, Platons Vorstellungen von den kleinsten Bausteinen der Materie und die Elementarteilchen der modernen Physik, *Im Umkreis der Kunst: Eine Festschrift für Emil Preetorius*, Wiesbaden 1953, pp. 137—140. The elementary particles of modern physics, though dynamic and not geometrical forms like those of the *Timaeus*, resemble Plato's in that in both cases the 'particles' change into one another (unlike ancient 'atoms') and in both cases are purely mathematical structure without 'substantial content'.

¹) The *Timaeus* is treated also in his later book:

1008a) M. K. Munitz, *Theories of the Universe*, Glenco, Illinois 1957, pp. 61—88. Of this section pp. 61—66 contain a brief introduction to the selections from the *Timaeus* in Cornford's version printed with interspersed paraphrases and a few notes on pp. 67—88.

²) See in connection with this the article by Joad, which is not so much restricted to the *Timaeus* in its treatment of Plato:

1010a) C. E. M. Joad, The world of physics and of Plato, *Hibbert Journ* 49, 1950/51, 159—164. With this see also his much earlier article:

1010b) C. E. M. Joad, Plato's theory of forms and modern physics, *Philosophy* 8, 1933, 142—154.

1012. J. Moreau, L'idée d'univers dans la pensée antique, *Giorn Metafisica* 8, 1953, 88—112 and 324—343. The general interpretation of the *Timaeus* is given on pp. 91—92 and 95—97; but particular passages and aspects are discussed throughout the article in connection with the interpretation of the *Timaeus* and the reactions to it by Aristotle, the Stoics, and Plotinus. See also Moreau's monograph, *Réalisme et idéalisme chez Platon*, Paris 1951, pp. 52—58 and 84—92 as well as pp. 119—135 (Plotin et la théorie platonicienne de la matière) and his earlier book, *L'Âme du Monde . . .* (5 *supra*), pp. 3—55.

1013. C. Mugler, Deux thèmes de la cosmologie grecque: devenir cyclique et pluralité des mondes, Paris 1953, pp. 85—143: La crise de la pensée cosmologique et la solution de Platon (cf. J. Moreau, *Rev Ét Grecques* 68, 1955, 363—366; Guthrie, *Cl Rev N. S.* 5, 1955, 46—48; Loenen, *Mnem IV* 8, 1955, 58—60). Mugler takes no account of the important article by Bruins (1007 *supra*) or even of Cornford's fundamental work (981 *supra*) and he seems to be unaware of most of the modern scholarship on the *Timaeus*. His treatment of evidence is highly selective, and his interpretation of it dubious, to say the least, especially when he takes for granted the erroneous conclusions reached in his earlier work on Plato's mathematics¹). See also on cycles in the *Timaeus* the later article of Mugler's (1028 *infra*).

1014. C. Mugler, Les dimensions de l'univers platonicien d'après *Timée* 32 B, *Rev Ét Grecques* 66, 1953, 56—88. Combining the continuous proportion in 32 B with the figures given in 56 D ff. for the transformation of the particles of fire, air, and water, he argues that Plato's universe had a radius of 18 terrestrial radii, the relative thickness of the concentric layers of earth, water, air, and fire being respectively 1, 2, 5, 10 and the distances of the planets in terrestrial radii being Moon 8, Sun $8\frac{5}{27}$, Mercury $8\frac{5}{9}$, Venus $9\frac{1}{3}$, Mars $9\frac{23}{27}$, Jupiter $11\frac{1}{6}$, Saturn 13. The assumptions upon which all this is based are highly dubious, and Mugler is hard put to it to evade even so much of the evidence as he admits to be incompatible with his conclusions.

1015. C. Mugler, Sur quelques particularités de l'atomisme ancien, *Rev Philol* 3 Sér. 27, 1953, 141—174. A comparison of the atomistic

¹) In this book, *Platon et la recherche mathématique de son époque*, Strasbourg/Zürich 1948, mentioned for its treatment of the *Meno* in 588 *supra* and of the *Theaetetus* in 961 *supra*, the *Timaeus* is the subject of discussion chiefly on pp. 78—103. 111—133, 142—181, 236—238, and 275—283 (cf. Cherniss, *Rev Metaphysics* 4, 1950/51, 401—410).

systems of Democritus, Plato, and Epicurus purporting to show that what Epicurus took from Democritus he modified under the influence of Plato. The cosmologies of Democritus and of Plato are represented as opposed to each other in general plan, each self-consistent, and both reactions against the old theory of endless return (the main thesis of Mugler in 1013 *supra*).

1016. G. S. Claghorn, Aristotle's criticism of Plato's 'Timaeus', The Hague 1954 (cf. Düring, *Gnomon* 27, 1955, 154—157; Viano, *Riv Filos* 45, 1955, 342—344; Kerferd, *Cl Rev N. S.* 6, 1956, 71; Gulley, *Philosophy* 32, 1957, 84—85).

1017. Hedwig Conrad-Martius, *Die Zeit*, München 1954, pp. 95—135: *Die platonische Weltuhr*, *Timäus* (see also p. 237). This is a 'philosophical' interpretation of the *Timaeus* as a whole written from the single point of view of 37 C—39 E and without concern for philological niceties or knowledge of modern critical research into the text and its accurate interpretation. See also her later book, *Der Raum*, München 1958, p. 225, n. 12; there save for this note and pp. 140—141 Plato and the *Timaeus* receive no attention, although many pages are devoted to Aristotle.

1018. W. Kranz, *Kosmos*, *Archiv für Begriffsgeschichte* 2, 1, 1955, 5—113. On pp. 44—53 he analyses the *Timaeus* as primarily intended to vindicate against the purely mechanistic theory of the Atomists the old Hellenic reverence for the cosmos that is 'filled with gods'. See also Kranz (174 *supra*).

1019. F. Solmsen, Antecedents of Aristotle's psychology and scale of beings, *AJPh* 76, 1955, 148—164. Solmsen here treats the biological functions of the soul and 'parts of the soul' and indications of a 'scale of beings' in the *Timaeus*. See also 179 *supra*.

1020. A. Rivaud, *Espace et changement dans le Timée de Platon*, *Mélanges Auguste Diès*, Paris 1956, pp. 209—214. Thirty years after having edited and translated the *Timaeus* for the 'Budé edition' Rivaud examines the dialogue again for its treatment of the unity of the world and the problem of space. Plato, inspired by the Atomists but with the determination of annihilating their principles, eliminates matter on the one hand and the void on the other, identifies space with the body of the world, and tends to obliterate the limits between mechanism and mind.

1021. K. Abel, *Plato und die Medizin seiner Zeit*, *Gesnerus* 14, 1957, 94—118. This is a survey which without particular novelty or originality attempts to determine Plato's relation to the medicine

of his time by comparing the theories in the *Timaeus* concerning the localization of psychological functions, respiration, digestion, disease, and death with those of Alcmaeon, Empedocles, the Hippocratic Corpus, and Philistion on the one hand and those of Aristotle, the Alexandrian physicians, and Galen on the other.

1022. E. Fink, Zur ontologischen Frühgeschichte von Raum-Zeit-Bewegung, Den Haag 1957 (cf. G. Guzzoni, *Pensiero* 3, 1958, 309—329; J. Wahl, *Rev Métaph et Morale* 63, 1958, 483—488). Plato's conception of space, time and motion—and this means his whole philosophy in terms of the *Timaeus*—is here interpreted (pp. 163—193) as orientation of Aristotle's approach to the problem in what Fink himself calls more truly than he probably intended a 'flüchtiger Hinblick'.

1023. W. K. C. Guthrie, *In the Beginning*, Ithaca 1957, pp. 104—109 (see also pp. 67—68). Plato's purpose in the *Timaeus* was to demonstrate that the universe works in accordance with a rational and moral law and that men by manifesting the same law in terms of human life will be fulfilling themselves as parts of nature and not acting contrary to nature as the Sophists thought.

1024. H. Herter, *Bewegung der Materie bei Platon*, Rhein Mus N. F. 100, 1957, 327—347. Herter argues that Plato does ascribe to 'chaotic matter' (*Timaeus* 30 A 2—6 and 52 D 4—53 C 1) motion that is not ultimately caused by soul, though this is in contradiction to the fundamental doctrine that in the last instance all motion is of psychical origin. In different writings, Herter contends, Plato tends to 'overillustrate' now one and now the other factor without any sharp contradiction. For the controversy involved see 1000 *supra*.

1025. H. W. Miller, The flux of the body in Plato's *Timaeus*, *Trans Am Philol Assoc* 88, 1957, 103—113. He analyses in detail the manner in which the principle developed in *Theaetetus* 156 A—157 C is applied in the *Timaeus*, where Plato literally and consistently represents the body as a perpetual process of flux, a conception vital to his explanation of physiological phenomena.

1026. W. Schadewaldt, Das Welt-Modell der Griechen, *Neue Rundschau* 68, 1957, 187—213. The cosmological model of the *Timaeus* is dealt with on pp. 194—203; and then on pp. 204—206 Plato's psychology is treated as 'Menschenmodell', a microcosm built on the three levels of the soul and, as a model for this perfected social being and corresponding to its interrelated three levels, the model of Plato's perfect state. So Schadewaldt finds a unifying

pattern of Plato's cosmology, ethics, and politics; but it is the more curious that he does not mention Plato when in pp. 208—211 he deals with the Greek 'model' of divinity.

1027. F. M. Brignoli, Problemi di fisica celeste nel 'Timeo' di Platone, *Giorn Ital Filol* 11, 1958, 97—110. Brignoli is concerned chiefly with *Timeaus* 36 C 5—7 and 36 D 4—7, but on pp. 106—110 he deals more generally with Plato's attitude towards astronomy and argues correctly (p. 107) that there is in Plato no reference either to epicycles or to the Eudoxian homocentric spheres. In *Giorn Ital Filol* 11, 1958, 246—260 he discusses *Timaeus* 40 B 8—C 3¹).

1028. C. Mugler, Alcéméon et les cycles physiologiques de Platon, *Rev Ét Grecques* 71, 1958, 42—50. He here argues that the physiological and cosmic cycles of the *Timaeus* were influenced by both Alcmaeon and Empedocles, for he contends that Alcmaeon distinguished two kinds of cycles (that of the individual and of the soul-cosmos) and under the influence of Pythagoreans believed in metempsychosis.

1029. F. Solmsen, Aristotle and Presocratic cosmogony, *Harvard Studies in Class Phil* 63, 1958, 265—282. Solmsen is here much concerned with Aristotle's criticism of the cosmogony of the *Timaeus*, and with Plato's attitude as well as Aristotle's towards earlier cosmogonical notions. He appears to take it as established that Plato meant to assert a real cosmical beginning and the existence of a pre-cosmical chaos with disordered motion.

1030. G. Boas, *The Inquiring Mind*, La Salle, Illinois 1959. On pp. 139—145 the *Timaeus* is analysed as representative of a special type of teleological explanation, that type in which purpose is guided by logic rather than desire, purposive events being those which follow from the most general laws of the rational universe as distinguished from the sensible.

1031. R. Hackforth, Plato's cosmogony (*Timaeus* 27 D ff.), *Cl Quart N. S.* 9, 1959, 17—22. This is a posthumous paper in which Hackforth argues for a literal interpretation of the creation of the physical universe in the *Timaeus*, although he refuses to interpret literally the creation of the soul by the Demiurge. The paper was

¹) See the later article, which has some bearing upon the estimate of Cicero in the indirect tradition of the *Timaeus*:

1027a) F. M. Brignoli, L'oscurità del 'Timeo' platonico secondo Cicerone e Girolamo, *Giorn Ital Filol* 12, 1959, 56—63. On Cicero, *De Finibus* II, 5, 15 and St. Jerome's misinterpretation of it.

probably written long before the author died in 1957, for no account is taken in it of the literature on the subject later than 1942¹).

1032. J. B. McDiarmid, Plato in Theophrastus' *De Sensibus*, *Phronesis* 4, 1959, 59—70. He argues that Theophrastus in reporting and criticizing Plato's doctrines here used the *Timaeus* but followed Aristotle's interpretation of it even when this interpretation is clearly at variance with the *Timaeus* itself.

Scarcely any history of Greek science neglects the *Timaeus* altogether; and all special studies of such subjects as Plato's conception of the physical world, its processes, and its relation to the ideas, his psychological and psychophysical theories, his doctrine of god, his use of myth, and the development of his thought generally involve interpretations of the *Timaeus* or of substantial parts of it. Among publications of this kind, which will be listed later in the sections devoted to these topics, see especially: F. Guglielmino, *Preconcetti teorici e realismo in Platone*, Catania 1936, pp. 1—32; P. H. De Lacy, *The problem of causation in Plato's philosophy*, *Cl Phil* 34, 1939, 97—115; A. Rey, *La science dans l'antiquité 3: La maturité de la pensée scientifique en Grèce*, Paris 1939, pp. 246—266 and 277—296; J. B. Skemp, *The theory of motion in Plato's later dialogues*, Cambridge 1942, pp. 31—95; W. C. Greene, *Moirai: Fate, Good, and Evil in Greek Thought*, Cambridge, Mass. 1944, pp. 290—295 and 302—311; R. Schaerer, *Dieu, l'homme et la vie d'après Platon*, Neuchâtel 1944, pp. 18—63 (see also Schaerer, *Diogenes* 11, 1955, 49—54 and his earlier book, *La Question Platonicienne*, Neuchâtel 1938, pp. 147—150 and 82, n. 1); P. Grenet, *Les origines de l'analogie philosophique dans les dialogues de Platon*, Paris 1948, pp. 140—144, 154—163, 220—225; G. J. de Vries, *Spel bij Plato*, Amsterdam 1949, especially pp. 209—213, 325—327, 354—355; V. Goldschmidt, *La religion de Platon*, Paris 1949, pp. 43—67, 91—102, 115—120; M. Meldrum, *Plato and the ἀρχὴ κατὰ τὸν JHS* 70, 1950, 65—74; A. Millan Puelles, *La teoria del ser vivo en Platón*, *Rev Filos (Madrid)* 9, 1950, 371—408; J. H. M. M. Loenen, *De Nous en het systeem van Plato's filosofie* (see 715 *supra*), especially pp. 217—237 and pp. 57—60, 65—69, 260—267; Sir David Ross, *Plato's theory of ideas*, Oxford 1951, pp. 120—130, 136—137, 212—214, 221—224, 232—234, 237—238; H. Cherniss, *Proc Am Philos Soc* 98, 1954, 23—30 (cf. H. Herter, 1024 *supra*); D. A. Rees, *Philosophy* 29, 1954, 103—104 (see also *JHS* 77 Part 1,

¹ In view of this it may be permitted to refer to the treatment of the subject in H. Cherniss, *Aristotle's criticism of Plato and the Academy* 1, Baltimore 1944, pp. 405—457 and especially pp. 421—431.

1957, 113—114 and 116—117); J. Gould, The development of Plato's ethics, Cambridge 1955, pp. 192—203 (cf. G. Vlastos, *Philos Rev* 66, 1957, 232—238); R. Loriaux, L'être et la forme selon Platon, Bruges 1955, pp. 174—200; P. J. G. M. van Litsenburg, God en het goddelijke in de dialogen van Plato, Nijmegen 1955, pp. 61—87, 188—192, and 196—197; J. van Camp et P. Canart, Le sens du mot *θεῖος* chez Platon, Louvain 1956, pp. 247—295; L. Robin, Les rapports de l'être et de la connaissance d'après Platon, Paris 1957, pp. 48—85, 136—146, 151; L. Cencillo, Hyle: Origen, concepto y funciones de la materia en el Corpus Aristotelicum, Madrid 1958, pp. 20—31 and 72—77; H. Koller, *Mus Helvet* 16, 1959, 238 and 244—247 (in his article, Harmonie und Tetraktys, *ibid.* 238—248); K. Papaioannou, Nature and history in the Greek conception of the cosmos, *Diogenes* 25, 1959, 1—27.

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See the article by É. des Places (271 *supra*), pp. 334—336.

— On 17 A—27 C: T. G. Rosenmeyer (388 *supra*); and for the account of Atlantis (22 B—25 D) see the articles listed in *Critias* β, 368—391 *supra*.

— On 17 C—19 A: G. A. Roggerone (735 *supra*), p. 245; W. Theiler, *Mus Helvet* 9, 1952, 68; G. Vlastos, *Philos Rev* 66, 1957, 234, n. 20.

1033. On 21 E 4—6: Mariangela Vandoni, *AΘΗΝΑ Η ΚΑΙ ΟΘΗΠΙΕ*, *Acme* 7, 1954, 307—312.

1034. On 29 B 3—C 3: K.-G. Hagstroem, Les préludes antiques de la théorie des probabilités, Stockholm 1932, pp. 20—24; H. Dörrie, *Gött Gel Anz* 209, 1955, 238.

— On 30 A 2—6: H. Herter (1024 *supra*) and the references in in 1000 *supra*.

— On 32 B: C. Mugler (1014 *supra*); P. Grenet, Les origines de l'analogie philosophique dans les dialogues de Platon, Paris 1948, pp. 156—160.

1035. On 34 B 10—36 D 7: T. Gregory, Nuove note sul platonismo medievale: Dall' *anima mundi* all' idea di natura, *Giorn Crit Filos Ital* 3. Ser. 11, 1957, 37—55. This gives the text of Bibliothèque Nat. lat 8624, ff. 17 r—24 v with a discussion of this mediaeval interpretation of the psychogony in the *Timaeus*.

— On 35 A 1—37 C 5: For the passage as a whole and the history of its interpretation see P. Thévenaz (989 *supra*); J. Helmer (989a *supra*); N. Almberg (992 *supra*), pp. 118—183; P. Merlan (121 *supra*), pp. 10—52.

1036. On 35 A 1—B 1: R. Hackforth, *Cl Rev N. S.* 7, 1957, 197. The construction of the text was correctly explained by G. M. A. Grube (*Cl Phil* 27, 1932, 80—82), and after him Cornford made this correct construction the basis of his interpretation (981 *supra* [pp. 59—66]). Despite this or in ignorance of it the passage has subsequently been mauled and misconstrued and by means of such misconstructions adduced as evidence for the wildest fantasies concerning Plato's doctrine by scholars too many to be listed here. Hackforth accepts Cornford's interpretation of the text¹) but suggests that 35 A 5 should read *καὶ κατὰ ταῦτα <ταῦτο>*.

1037. On 35 B—36 B: O. Tiby, *Note musicologiche al Timeo di Platone*, *Dionisio* 12, 1949, 33—55; J. Handschin, *The Timaeus Scale*, *Musica Disciplina* 4, 1950, 3—42; A. Ahlvers (178 *supra*), pp. 21—35 (cf. Trevaskis, *Cl Rev N. S.* 7, 1957, 31; Winnington-Ingram, *Lustrum* 3, 1958, 25); R. S. Brumbaugh, *Plato's mathematical imagination*, *Bloomington* 1954, pp. 220—229; F. Lasserre (167 *supra*), pp. 167—169 (cf. Düring, *Gnomon* 27, 1955, 435); E. Moutsopoulos, *La musique dans l'oeuvre de Platon*, *Paris* 1959, pp. 363—375; B. Kytzler, *Hermes* 87, 1959, 393—414.

1038. On 36 B 6—C 2: Claire Préaux, *Chronique d'Égypte* 24, 1949, 313—316. She adduces evidence showing that Proclus was right in his interpretation of *ὅλον καὶ* and that A. E. Taylor was wrong in denying this.

1039. On 36 C 5—7: Alice F. Braunlich, *AJPh* 57, 1936, 249—255 (in her article, "To the Right" in *Homer and Attic Greek*, *ibid.*, pp. 245—260); É. des Places, *Mélanges Franz Cumont*, *Bruxelles* 1936, 1, p. 135 (cf. 408 *supra* [pp. 102—103]); J. Cuillandre, *La droite et la gauche dans les poèmes homériques . . .*, *Paris* 1944, pp. 452—454; Maria Timpanaro Cardini, *Parola Pass* 10, 1955, 30—33; F. M. Brignoli (1027 *supra*), pp. 99—104; B. Einarson,

¹) The explanation of the text and its construction as given by Grube and Cornford (and implied by both Proclus and Hermias) is certainly right; but it is still overlooked by many interpreters, who in consequence of their misconstruction of Plato's Greek ascribe to him the most fantastic theories of their own invention. See *Gnomon* 22, 1950, 208, n. 5 on *Festugièr* (1000 *supra*); the passage is misconstrued and misunderstood by Giarratano-Manacorda (982 *supra* [pp. 43—44]) and by Kapferer-Fingerle (988 *supra* [p. 38]).

CI Phil 53, 1958, 92 and 98—99, notes 4—6. The explanation given earlier by Robin (7 *supra* [pp. 210—212]) would have been not only correct, as it is, but in all points exact if he had stated that the 'manipulator of the machine' is in fact the Demiurge, to whom alone at this point in the cosmogony 'right' and 'left' can refer.

1040. On 36 D 4—7: Maria Timpanaro Cardini, *Parola Pass* 10, 1955, 33—35 (apparently without knowledge of Cornford, 981 *supra* [pp. 80—93]); F. M. Brignoli (1027 *supra*), pp. 104—110.

—. On 37 B 3—C 5: G. Calogero, *Giorn Crit Filos Ital* 3 Ser. 11, 1957, 362—364 (728 *supra*).

—. On 37 C 6—7: W. J. Verdenius, *Entretiens Ant Cl* 1, 1954, 246. Against Cornford's interpretation (981 *supra* [pp. 99—102]) of τῶν αἰδίων θεῶν . . . ἀγαλα, which E. R. Dodds also rejected (243b *supra* [p. 23, n. 76]) but which is apparently accepted by P. J. G. M. van Litsenburg, *God en het goddelijke in de dialogen van Plato*, Nijmegen 1955, pp. 70—71 and 137. With Verdenius' interpretation of the ideas as 'eternal gods' cf. that of J. H. M. M. Loenen, *De Nous en het systeem van Plato's filosofie*, Amsterdam 1951, p. 260; and among those earlier than the publication of Cornford's commentary see especially that of G. M. A. Grube (3 *supra* [p. 152, n. 2]).

1041. On 37 D 1—39 E 2: N. Abbagnano, *La nozione del tempo secondo Aristotle*, Lanciano 1933, pp. 20—32; T. Negro (991 *supra*), pp. 32—35 and 96—98; J. De la Harpe, *Le progrès de l'idée du temps dans la philosophie grecque*, Festschrift . . . Andreas Speiser, Zürich 1945, pp. 128—137 (especially pp. 129—130 and 135); A.-H. Chroust (997 *supra*); J. F. Callahan (999 *supra*), pp. 16—26 and 190—193; C. Mugler, *Platon et la recherche mathématique de son époque*, Strasbourg/Zürich 1948, pp. 149—174, pp. 236—238, and pp. 276—283 (cf. Cherniss, *Rev Metaphysics* 4, 1950/51, 407—410) and Mugler's later monograph, *Deux thèmes . . .* (1013 *supra*), pp. 92—96, pp. 103—107, and pp. 125—134; Helene Weiss, *Notes on the Greek Ideas referred to in Van Helmont, De tempore, Osiris* 8, 1948, 418—449¹); R. E. Cushman, *Greek and Christian*

¹) In this commentary upon Van Helmont's references to Plato, Aristotle, and Plotinus Miss Weiss gives her own account and interpretation of this passage of the *Timaeus*, with which she begins her article and to which she refers throughout it. See also her earlier essay:

1041a) Helene Weiss, *The Greek conceptions of time and being in the light of Heidegger's philosophy*, *Philos and Phenom Research* 2, 1941/42, 173—187.

views of time, *Journ Religion* 33, 1953, 254—265 (pp. 254—258 on Plato); Catherine Rau, *Theories of time in Ancient Philosophy*, *Philos Rev* 62, 1953, 514—525 (pp. 514—515 on this passage); G. S. Claghorn (1016 *supra*), pp. 84—92; Hedwig Conrad-Martius (1017 *supra*), pp. 125—135; R. Mondolfo, *L'infinito nel pensiero dell'antichità classica*, Firenze 1956, 93 and 101—117¹).

1042. On 37 D 1—7: A. J. Festugière, *Parola Pass* 4, 1949, 179—188 (in his article, *Le sens philosophique du mot αἰών*, *ibid.* pp. 172—189). An elaborate commentary on these lines of the *Timaeus* preceded by discussion of Proclus, *In Timaeum* 240 E—241 A (III, pp. 8, 28—9, 21 [Diehl]).

1043. On 37 E 3—38 B 5, H. Cherniss, *Timaeus* 38 A 8—B 5, *JHS* 77 Part 1, 1957, 18—23.

1044. On 38 C 7—D 6: O. Becker, *Hat Platon Epizykel für Venus und Merkur angenommen? Zur Textgestaltung von Timaeus* 38 D, *Rhein Mus N. F.* 97, 1954, 89—92. In 1951 B. L. van der Waerden (235 *supra* [pp. 45—49]) tried to read into 38 C 7—D 6 the theory that Venus and Mercury move on epicycles about the sun (see also L. A. Post, *AJPh* 65, 1944, 301), and Becker in an otherwise enthusiastic review of this monograph²) had said that this interpretation would require emendation of the text in D 1 and D 3. In this article of 1954 Becker proposes to write the theory of epicycles into the text of the *Timaeus* with an emendation of 38 D 3—4, different from that suggested in his review but equally improbable and unconvincing, and then to emend Chalcidius to support his emendation. On this passage of the *Timaeus* and the whole question of epicycles see F. M. Brignoli (1027 *supra*), especially pp. 107—110.

1045. On 38 E 6—39 B 1: R. von Erhardt and Erika von Erhardt-Siebold, *The Helix in Plato's astronomy*, *Isis* 34, 1942/43, 108—110.

—. On 39 A 6—B 1: Maria Timpanaro Cardini (1040 *supra*), p. 35; F. M. Brignoli (1027 *supra*), pp. 104—110.

¹) These passages appear on pp. 99 and 107—123 of the Spanish edition, *El infinito en el pensamiento de la antigüedad clásica*, Buenos Aires 1952, and are the same as pp. 61 and 67—81 of the original edition of Mondolfo's book, *L'infinito nel pensiero dei Greci*, Firenze 1934.

²) For a devastating critique of van der Waerden's main thesis and of his arbitrary handling of evidence in this monograph see A. Pannekoek, *The astronomical system of Herakleides*, *Proc. Nederland Akad Wet*, Ser B 55, 1952, 373—381.

— On 39 C 5—D 7: For treatment of this passage as expressing the doctrine of 'endless return' see especially J. Bidez (241 *supra*), pp. 82—85; W. Brandenstein (250 *supra*); B. L. van der Waerden (235a *supra*); M. Eliade (261 *supra*). Against this erroneous interpretation see besides Cornford (981 *supra* [p. 117]) A.-H. Chroust (997 *supra*), pp. 23—24; C. Mugler, *Platon et la recherche mathématique de son époque*, Strasbourg/Zürich 1948, 165—168 and his later monograph, *Deux thèmes . . .* (1013 *supra*), pp. 104—107; W. J. W. Koster (256 *supra*), pp. 55—58; J. Moreau (1012 *supra*), p. 106; B. Sticker (262 *supra*), p. 243.

1046. On 39 E 7—9: H.-R. Schwyzer, *Une interprétation plotinienne d'un passage du Timée (résumé)*, Assoc G Budé, Congrès de Tours et Poitiers 1953 Actes, Paris 1954, 255—256.

1047. On 40 B 8—C 3: R. Mondolfo, *El infinito en el pensamiento de la antigüedad clásica*, Buenos Aires 1952, pp. 424—426 = *L'infinito nel pensiero dell' antichità classica*, Firenze 1956, pp. 449—451¹); G. S. Claghorn (1016 *supra*, pp. 71—83), on whose confused treatment of the question cf. Düring, *Gnomon* 27, 1955, 156—157; Maria Timpanaro Cardini, *Parola Pass* 10, 1955, 20—30 (apparently without knowledge of Cornford, Cherniss, Mondolfo or any of the later literature she argues that the earth is here meant to have an apparent rotation contrary to that of the axis just because it is really stationary while the axis rotates [see 563 *supra*]); W. Kranz, *Rhein Mus N. F.* 100, 1957, 114—124 (arguing that real axial rotation, in the sense of Cornford's interpretation, is here given the earth by Plato under the influence of 'Pythagorean-Empedoclean' doctrine [see also 1018 *supra*, p. 46]); F. M. Brignoli, *La dinamica immobilità della terra nella concezione platonica dell' universo*, Giron Ital

¹) In these pages, a new appendix to the treatment in the earlier version of the book, *L'infinito nel pensiero dei Greci*, Firenze 1934, Mondolfo deals chiefly with the interpretations of Cornford (981 *supra*, pp. 120—134) and of Cherniss, Aristotle's criticism of Plato I, Baltimore 1944, pp. 545—558, the latter of which he pronounces 'sufficiently probable'. For earlier treatments see, besides those mentioned by Cherniss, *loc. cit.*, G. L. Andriassi, *Atti secondo Cong Unione Matematica Ital*, 1942, 912—920 and *Scientia* 72, 1942, 13 (denying that Plato gave the earth axial rotation); and J. B. Skemp, *The theory of motion in Plato's later dialogues*, Cambridge 1942, pp. 80—81 (interpreting the passage as referring to displacements of the earth in latitude). In 1951 B. L. van der Waerden (235 *supra*, p. 57) subscribed to Cornford's interpretation of the passage, and in 1953 C. Mugler (1013 *supra*, p. 99) insisted that it represents the earth as stationary at the centre; but neither one offers a detailed explanation of the language or the ancient interpretations of the passage.

Filol 11, 1958, 246—260 (contending that in polemic against Pythagorean theories Plato here ascribes to the earth immobility resulting from the contrary forces of the circles of the Same and the Other).

—. On 40 C 7—9 (μεθ' οὐστινάς . . . ἀναφανόμενοι): C. Mugler, Rev Ét Grecques 69, 1956, 24—27 in his note on *Parmenides* 137 E 3—4 (631 *supra*).

—. On 41 A 7: R. Hackforth (995 *supra*), pp. 33—34. He suggests *Θεοί, θεῶν ἐγὼ . . . ἔργων, ἃ δι' ἐμοῦ . . .*, a suggestion unnoticed by G. François in his note on the passage, *Le polythéisme et l'emploi au singulier des mots θεός, δαίμων*, Paris 1957, p. 273, n. 1. For parallels to *Θεοί θεῶν* see A. J. Festugière, *La Révélation d'Hermès Trismégiste I*, Paris 1944, p. 51, n. 3; and on Cicero's translation of this see Thelma B. De Graff, *CI Weekly* 35, 1941/42, 244—245.

—. On 41 B 6—42 E 4: W. J. W. Koster (256 *supra*), pp. 19 and 53—55; R. S. Bluck, *AJPh* 79, 1958, 160—164 and 413 (695 *supra*). See also A. J. Festugière (243 *supra*), p. 30, n. 3 on 41 E 2—3.

1048. On 43 B 1—5: A. Vieira Pinto, Rev Ét Grecques 65, 1952, 469—473. He argues that *πλανώμενα* agrees with *μόρια* (43 A 1) which is then the subject of *προήειν* and that the six rectilinear motions are primarily the motions of the material particles out of which the animal body is constructed. The passage, so understood and compared with 34 A, shows, he maintains, that Plato had the first intuition of the principle of inertia.

1049. On 43 C 4—7: C. Mugler, Rev Ét Grecques 69, 1956, 28—34. He contends that *αἰσθησις* was pronounced *ἔσθησις* and assimilated to *εἰσθησις*, as if it were the abstract noun corresponding to *εἰσθεῖν*, in order to emphasize the 'dynamic sense' of Plato's theory which is present in other passages of the *Timaeus* that deal with sensation. See especially on 67 C 7 *infra*.

1050. On 45 B—D: C. Mugler, Rev Philol 3 Sér 25, 1951, 54—58, in his article, *Sur quelques fragments d'Empédocle*, *ibid.* pp. 33—65 (for pp. 58—60 see 590 *supra* on *Meno* 76 C—77 A). Plato is represented as having consciously combined in a single explanation of vision what Mugler argues were by Empedocles given as two contrary processes, one for the cosmic period of Love and the other for the period of Strife. It has been denied that Empedocles ever professed the latter theory, that of the emergent visual ray (H. Cherniss, *Aristotle's criticism of Presocratic Philosophy*, Baltimore 1935, p. 317, n. 106); but Mugler does not mention either this or the quite different explanation proposed by W. J. Verdenius, Empedocles' doctrine

of sight, *Studia Varia* C. G. Vollgraff . . . oblata, Amsterdam 1948, pp. 155—164.

—. On 46 A 2—C 6: R. S. Brumbaugh, Plato's mathematical imagination, Bloomington 1954, pp. 230—237.

—. On 46 C 7—48 A 7: G. R. Morrow (1005 *supra*); J. H. M. M. Loenen, De *Nous* in het systeem van Plato's filosofie, Amsterdam 1951, pp. 223—225; R. Muth, Natalicium Carolo Jax . . . oblatum (*Innsbrucker Beiträge zur Kulturwiss* 3), Innsbruck 1955, pp. 121—122.

—. On 48 C 2—D 4: R. Hackforth (995 *supra*), pp. 34—35.

1051. On 48 E 2—52 D 1: A. Rey, *La science dans l'antiquité* 3, Paris 1939, pp. 246—266; T. Negro (991 *supra*), pp. 41—43 and 98—101; C. Mugler, *Platon et la recherche mathématique de son époque*, Strasbourg/Zürich 1948, pp. 174—181 and 275—283 (cf. Cherniss, *Rev Metaphysics* 4, 1950/51, 408—409); A. J. Festugière (1000 *supra*), pp. 113—132; J. W. Yolton (951 *supra*), pp. 49—56; T. Davis (579 *supra*); J. Moreau, *Réalisme et idéalisme chez Platon*, Paris 1951, pp. 52—58 and Moreau's earlier book, *L'Ame du Monde* . . . (5 *supra*), pp. 15—21; A. Rivaud (1020 *supra*), pp. 212—214; H. Cherniss (300 *supra*), pp. 242—247; Maria Rezzani, *Note e ricerche intorno al linguaggio di Platone*, Padova 1959, pp. 11—13. See also H. Fränkel (195 *supra*), pp. 244—246, for the argument that Heraclitus was Plato's source for some of the striking figures and phraseology in this passage (50 A 5—B 5, 50 E 4—8, 51 A 7—B 1, 52 B 7—C 1); but cf. on this G. S. Kirk, *Heraclitus: The cosmic fragments*, Cambridge 1954, p. 196.

1052. On 49 C 7—50 B 5: H. Cherniss, A much misread passage of the *Timaeus*, *AJPh* 75, 1954, 113—130. See pp. 119—124 of this article for R. Hackforth's note (995 *supra*, pp. 35—37) on 49 E 4—50 A 4.

1053. On 50 B 5—6: R. Muth, *Zum Physis-Begriff bei Platon*, *Wiener Studien* 64, 1949 (published 1950), 53—70 (cf. Herter, *Anz Altertum* 6, 1953, 17). Muth argues at length but unconvincingly that *φύσις* is here the abstract of the active *φύειν* and is meant to indicate that the 'receptacle' has productive power in reference to which *σώματα* is used in a proleptic sense.

1054. On 52 C 2—5: H. Cherniss, *Mélanges Auguste Diès*, Paris 1956, pp. 49—60. See pp. 55—56 of this article for criticism of R. Hackforth's note (995 *supra*, pp. 37—39) on this passage.

— On 52 C 5—D 1: R. Hackforth (995 *supra*), pp. 39—40; H. Cherniss (1054 *supra*), p. 60 and (300 *supra*), p. 265.

— On 52 D 4—53 C 3: H. Herter (1024 *supra*), and the references in 1000 *supra*.

— On 53 C 4—57 D 6: W. Schmid (985 *supra*); P. Friedländer (1001 *supra*); K. R. Popper (46 *supra*, pp. 527—531 [with the Addendum in Vol. I, p. 319 of the 3rd edition, 1957] and 175 *supra*, pp. 149—152); A. Ahlvers (178 *supra*), pp. 33—62 on which cf. Trevaskis, *Cl Rev N.S.* 7, 1957, 31—32 and R. P. Winnington-Ingram, *Lustrum* 3, 1958, 25; W. Heisenberg (1011 *supra*); C. Mugler (1015 *supra*)¹); W. Kranz (174 *supra*).

— On 53 C 4—55 C 6: P. Kucharski (419 *supra*), pp. 55—61; R. S. Brumbaugh, *Plato's mathematical imagination*, Bloomington 1954, pp. 238—248.

— On 53 C 5—D 2: P. Wilpert (176 *supra*), pp. 60—62.

— On 53 D 6—7: R. Hackforth (995 *supra*), p. 34 in his note on 48 C, a note that has been disregarded by those who would see in 53 D 6—7 a cryptic reference to some esoteric Platonic doctrine as do P. Kucharski (419 *supra*), pp. 58—61; W. Kranz (174 *supra*), pp. 32—33; P.-M. Schuhl (35 *supra*), p. 162, n. 1; L. Robin, *Les rapports de l'être et de la connaissance d'après Platon*, Paris 1957, p. 63.

1055. On 56 B 7—C 7: P.-M. Schuhl, *Imagination et science des cristaux ou platonisme et minéralogie*, *Journ Psychol Norm et Path* 42, 1949, 27—34 (reprinted in Schuhl's collection, *Le merveilleux, la pensée et l'action*, Paris 1952, pp. 141—149). This is rather an imaginative essay suggested by the text in question than a serious commentary upon it.

— On 56 C 8—61 C 2: E. M. Bruins (1007 *supra*).

— On 67 B 2—C 1: O. Tiby (1037 *supra*), pp. 48—50.

— On 67 C 7: C. Mugler (1049 *supra*), pp. 32—34. He translates *πρὸς αἰσθησιν* by 'afin de pouvoir y entrer' in conformity with his thesis of Plato's punning pronunciation of *αἰσθησις*. His treatment of *ὄψει* indicates that he is unaware of the contention of Verdenius

¹) See also Mugler's book, *Platon et la recherche mathématique de son époque*, Strasbourg/Zürich 1948, pp. 111—133 (cf. Cherniss, *Rev Metaphysics* 4, 1950/51, 404—405).

(Studia Vollgraff, p. 158 [see 1050 *supra*]) that this word refers not to the eye itself but to the visual ray; see also Mugler, *Ant Cl* 25, 1956, 23—24.

—. On 70 A 7—D 6: J. Bidez and G. Leboucq (994 *supra*).

1056. On 73 A: C. Mugler, *Rev Ét Grecques* 70, 1957, 82—87. He argues that *ἐξεῖ* (73 A 2) is a copyist's error for the original *ἔσει*.

—. On 73 B 5—C 6: C. Mugler, *Ant Cl* 25, 1956, 24—27. He tries to interpret this as the description of a macromolecular construction of the marrow by giving *σύμμετρα* the unique meaning, 'constituting a common limit' (i. e. being the common face of two juxtaposed polyhedra of different kinds) and by eliciting from *ταῦτα . . . ἀποκρίνων* a meaning that they surely cannot convey: 'absolving each of these triangles from its function of entering only into a single polyhedron of a single kind'.

1057. On 76 E 7—77 C 5: J. B. Skemp, *Plants in Plato's Timaeus*, *Cl Quart* 41, 1947, 53—60; F. Solmsen (1019 *supra*), pp. 160—164.

—. On 78 E 7: F. Solmsen, *Philos Rev* 59, 1950, 452, n. 72 (179 *supra*) suggests reading *εἰσελθόντα* instead of *εἰσελθὼν τά*.

1058. On 79 A 5—E 9: F. Solmsen, On Plato's account of respiration, *Studi Ital Filol Cl* 27—28, 1956, 544—548. He argues that what corresponds to *ὅταν μὲν . . . ὁρμήσῃ* (E 1) is *πάλιν ἐκείνη ῥέπον αὖ* (E 5) and that by reading *τὸ θερμὸν μᾶλλον* instead of the comparative in the latter line one eliminates all the obscurity in the description of the process. See also D. J. Furley, *JHS* 77 Part 1, 1957, 33—34 in his article, *Empedocles and the Clepsydra*, *ibid.* 30—34.

1059. On 79 E 10—80 C 8: P.-M. Schuhl, *Physique et Lumières*, *Rev Philosophique* 146, 1956, 87—88. A note asserting that the passage shows Platonic physics as an attempt not only to reduce multiplicity to unity but also to dispel the apparently miraculous. The substance of 80 A 3—B 8 is briefly discussed by O. Tiby (1037 *supra*), p. 50.

—. On 84 C 8—86 A 8: L. Edelstein, *AJPh* 61, 1940, 223—225; J. Filliozat (246 *supra*), pp. 191—198.

1060. On 89 E 3—90 C 7: Kommentar des Proklos zu Platons *Timaios* C. 43 (89 E—90 C) aus dem Cod. Arab. Agia Sophia 3725 (pgg. 214—218) übersetzt von Franz Pfaff, *Corpus Medicorum Graecorum Supplementum III*, Leipzig/Berlin 1941, pp. 53—60.

IV. Plato as Writer

The best introduction to the various aspects of this topic and, despite some disconcerting lapses, the most suggestive, clear, and illuminating treatment of many of them are provided by a book published more than twenty years ago, passing reference to which has been made several times in the preceding sections:

1061. R. Schaerer, *La Question Platonicienne: Étude sur les rapports de la pensée et de l'expression dans les dialogues*, Neuchâtel 1938 (cf. Allan, *Mind* N. S. 48, 1939, 239—242; Picard, *Rev Ét Grecques* 57, 1944, 269—272). Concerning Schaerer's point of view and method in this book see his own statement, *Studia Philos* 15, 1955, 268—269.

IV A: Language, Style, and Figures of Expression

For studies of particular words see the section *infra* on Terminology, and for those restricted to the special terminology of the theory of ideas see also the section on The Theory of Ideas. It is in the latter section that H. C. Baldry's essay belongs despite its deceptively general title, Plato's 'technical terms'.

1062. A. Frank, *Vorsicht und Behutsamkeit gegenüber Mensch und Gott in der Sprache Platons: Eine sprachpsychologische Untersuchung*, Würzburg 1937.

1063. G. Röttger, *Studien zur platonischen Substantivbildung*, Würzburg 1937 (cf. Steiner, *Phil Woch* 59, 1939, 1—4). Important for the interpretation of individual passages as well as for the subtlety of Plato's expression.

1064. K. von Fritz, *Philosophie und sprachlicher Ausdruck bei Demokrit, Plato und Aristoteles*, New York 1938 (cf. Tate, *Cl Rev* 53, 1939, 146; Galli, *Boll Filol Cl N. S.* 10, 1939, 249—253; Leisegang, *Phil Woch* 61, 1941, 337—341). The section on Plato (pp. 38—64) is concerned with *εἶδος*, *ἰδέα*, *οὐσία*, — *ία*, *τὸ* —, *ἀρχή*, and *νοεῖν*, *διανοεῖσθαι*, *διάνοια*. Von Fritz concludes that all Plato's innovations of meaning in the strict sense have to do with the theory

of ideas and that this emphasizes once more the centrality of the theory in all his philosophizing.

1065. T. B. L. Webster, A study of Greek sentence construction, *AJPh* 62, 1941, 385—415. A comparative study based upon Homer, the messenger—speeches of tragedy, Herodotus, Thucydides, Xenophon, Plato, and the orators of the fourth century. For Plato see pp. 406—408 and the table on p. 387. The statistics for Plato are based upon three passages only: *Republic* 401 B—404 D and 614 B—621 D and *Laws* 624 A—631 B. See on this subject also É. des Places (1071 *infra*).

1066. P. Louis, Les métaphores de Platon, Paris 1945 (cf. É. de Strycker, *Ant Cl* 15, 1946, 145—147; H. Cherniss, *AJPh* 68, 1947, 257—259). As a supplement to the first topic treated by Louis (pp. 21—23) see C. Murley, The didactic significance of erotic figures in Plato, *Classical Essays* presented to James A. Kleist, St. Louis 1946, pp. 61—73.

—. Dorothy Tarrant, Imagery in Plato's *Republic* (786 *supra*).

1067. Dorothy Tarrant, Colloquialisms, semi-proverbs and word-play in Plato, *Cl Quart* 40, 1946, 109—117. See also *Cl Quart N. S.* 8, 1958, 158—160 (1083 *infra*).

—. Yvonne Vanachter, Un aspect du style de Platon (287 *supra*).

1068. A. D. Nock, *Conjectanea Neotest* 11, 1947, 170—173 in his article, Word-Coinage in the Hermetic writings, *ibid.* pp. 163—178. On Plato's coinage of words and the ancient arguments about his style¹).

—. P.-M. Schuhl, Remarques sur la technique de la répétition dans le '*Phédon*' (639c *supra*). Schuhl refers to the remarks of É. des Places on the subject in his monograph of 1929 but appears to have overlooked the interesting passage on Plato's stylistic repetitions in a later article by the same author:

1068a) É. des Places, *Mélanges Bidez*, Bruxelles 1934, pp. 279—283 in his article, Style parlé et style oral chez les écrivains grecs, *ibid.* pp. 267—286.

¹) On the style of the *Epinomis* see p. 178, n. 55 (addendum to 173, n. 37). Nock refers (p. 170, n. 24) to F. Walsdorff's book published in 1927 and to the important reviews of it by W. Schmid and J. Sykutris; to these may be added the supplement by E. Orth, *Phil Woch* 53, 1933, 1020—1023.

1069. Dorothy Tarrant, *Style and thought in Plato's dialogues*, Cl Quart 42, 1948, 28—34. Suggestions are here given for ways in which the course of Plato's arguments may be elucidated (and even the stage of his own 'development' identified) by observation of changes in the tone and course of the dialogue, the presence or absence of humorous embellishment or literary allusion, and the various kinds of metaphors or similes employed in a passage. The essay is concluded by a discussion of the rôle of analogy and the 'metaphor of proportion' in the presentation of the theory of ideas¹) and the use of the two vocabularies of *μίμησις* and *μέθεξις*.

—. Platon erklärt von K. Witte, I. Band (813 *supra*), pp. 5—98.

1070. A. de Marignac, *Imagination et dialectique: Essai sur l'expression du spirituel par l'image dans les dialogues de Platon*, Paris 1951 (cf. de Strycker, Ant Cl 21, 1952, 159—160; Verdenius, Mnem IV 6, 1953, 244—246). The author first studies how figurative words, explicit similes, metaphors, extended metaphors, and myths are used by Plato to communicate his conception of ideas, space, god, and soul and then tries to determine why Plato used such images when he did. This is a selective study from which all psychical 'activities' (e.g. love, virtue, intellection) are excluded and in which interpretation of philosophical doctrine is avoided, so that much of what one might expect to find here is absent and the treatment of the material used is sometimes shallow and even naïve; but within its limits the work is useful and in its conclusions concerning Plato's skill and general purpose in the use of imagery is even illuminating.

1071. É. des Places, *Phrase et période chez Platon*, Actes Congrès Internat Ét Class, Paris 1951, 364—366. See also T. B. L. Webster (1065 *supra*), apparently unknown to des Places when he wrote this article.

1072. J. Hartland-Swann, *Plato as poet: A critical interpretation*, Philosophy 26, 1951, 3—18 and 131—141. The first part deals with the various ways in which Plato employed 'the poetic method of philosophizing'; and the second, after a critical review of the theories of Stewart, Stenzel, and Frutiger, gives a judicious appraisal of the felicitous and infelicitous results of Plato's practice.

¹) These sentences in Miss Tarrant's article call to mind a book by P. Grenet published only a few months later, *Les origines de l'analogie philosophique dans les dialogues de Platon*, Paris 1948. That book has as its subject, however, not Plato's style or expression but what its author conceives to have been the essence of his doctrine (1144 *infra*).

1073. A. Kolář, *De Platonis eurhythmia, Charisteria Thaddaeo Sinko . . . oblata*, Warszawa/Wrocław 1951, pp. 107—120. Using as examples sections of the *Menexenus*, *Phaedrus*, *Symposium*, *Republic*, and *Protagoras* he argues that for the 'demonstrativum genus dicendi' Plato purposely employed prescribed poetical rhythms and that in general he used metrical members, the so-called 'ethical character' of which corresponds to the content expressed. Kolář says nothing of the implications of his thesis for the attempts to exploit statistics of clausulae for the establishment of a relative chronology of the dialogues.

1074. Dorothy Tarrant, Plato's use of quotations and other illustrative material, *Cl Quart N.S.* 1, 1951, 59—67. This is a useful survey of Plato's quotations, chiefly poetical, and the forms in which he gives them, the use and frequency of 'conversational tags', allusions to myths, and use of illustrative anecdotes. With the remarks on Plato's inexact quotations of Homer (p. 62) cf. J. Labarbe (199 *supra*), and for a list of Plato's unascribed poetical expressions see Miss Tarrant in *Cl Quart* 40, 1946, 111—112 (1067 *supra*).

—, F. Wehrli, *Der Arztvergleich bei Platon* (156 *supra*). For Plato's use of the physician and his art in simile and metaphor see also the earlier article by L. Edelstein (917 *supra*), pp. 97—101.

1075. Julia Kerschensteiner, *Zum Gebrauch von σύν und ξύν bei Platon*, *Münchener Studien zur Sprachwiss* 1, 1952, 29—45 (revidierter Nachdruck: München, 1956, 28—41). An attempt to show that the variation in usage as preserved in the MS tradition is not accidental or arbitrary but derives from Plato himself and is a nicety of his style. The authoress does not fail to note (p. 45 = p. 41) the implied argument against Jachmann's estimate of the textual tradition (263 *supra*).

—, Dorothy Tarrant, *Metaphors of death in the Phaedo* (641 *supra*).

1076. A. N. Amman, *-ιζος bei Platon: Ableitung und Bedeutung mit Materialsammlung*, Freiburg (Schweiz), 1953 (cf. *Dover, Cl Rev N. S.* 5, 1955, 206—207; Porzig, *Gnomon* 30, 1958, 570—574). This book is important not only as a supplement to the lexica of Ast and Liddell and Scott but also as a commentary on many Platonic passages. Amman's material is used by P. Chantraine in his treatment of the suffix, *Études sur le vocabulaire grec*, Paris 1956, pp. 97—171, on which cf. E. Risch, *Gnomon* 29, 1957, 582—584 and T. A. Sinclair, *Cl Rev N. S.* 8, 1958, 140—142.

— J. Humbert, Remarques sur la structure de la phrase de Platon (292 *supra*).

— G. E. L. Owen, Cl Quart N. S. 3, 1953, 79—82 in his article, The place of the *Timaeus* in Plato's dialogues (294 *supra*). This section is concerned with stylometry and 'neutral criteria' for the relative chronology of the Platonic writings. On Owen's attack, his reliance upon Billig's statistics of clausulae, and the criterion of hiatus and its avoidance see H. Cherniss, AJPh 78, 1957, 227—233 in his article, The relation of the *Timaeus* to Plato's later dialogues (300 *supra*). On Plato's use of the article in place of a relative pronoun in order to avoid hiatus see B. Einarson, Cl Phil 53, 1958, 98, n. 3. For the proposal to use a computer for the analysis of Plato's vocabulary, syntax, and rhythm see L. Brandwood (299 *supra*).

1077. T. B. L. Webster, Personification as a mode of Greek thought, Journ Warburg and Courtauld Inst 17, 1954, 10—21. For Plato see especially pp. 12—13, 15, 18—20.

1078. W. Schmid, Parola Pass 10, 1955, 444—447 in his article, Die Netze des Seelenfängers: Zur Jagdmetaphorik im philosophischen Protreptikos des Demetrius Lacon, *ibid.* pp. 440—447. In discussing metaphors and similes drawn from the vocabulary of the hunt Schmid frequently refers to the unpublished dissertation by C. J. Classen, which I have not seen, Untersuchungen zu Platons Jagdbildern, Diss. Hamburg 1951. There is some discussion of this vocabulary by P. Chantraine, Études sur le vocabulaire grec, Paris 1956, pp. 31—96: Quelques termes du vocabulaire pastoral et du vocabulaire de la chasse (see for Plato pp. 67—68, 75, 77—79, 80, and 81).

1079. Dorothy Tarrant, Plato's use of extended *oratio obliqua*, Cl Quart N. S. 5, 1955, 222—224. She argues that as used in the *Parmenides* and *Timaeus* the device is formalistic and has lost the animation, variation and richness with which it was employed in the *Symposium*, *Phaedo*, and *Republic*.

1080. Dorothy Tarrant, Plato as Dramatist, JHS 75, 1955, 82—89. On Plato's overt and implicit references to drama, similes and metaphors drawn from it, criticisms of it, and variations in his use of dramatic form with discussion of the credibility of the length of the dialogues, the scenes, number and delineation of characters, dramatic episodes, relation between setting and content, and the symmetry or asymmetry of structure, — all this leading to the conclusion that 'in Plato's more characteristic moods the instinct for drama not only

determines the framework of his dialogues but equally operates in the development of the arguments they contain.' Compare with the conclusion here her earlier article, *Style and thought in Plato's dialogues* (1069 *supra*), pp. 28—29.

—. G. Rudberg, *Plato in the first person* (83 *supra*). The essay contains scattered remarks on questions of Plato's style: 'selfquotation' and supposed references to himself and his own experience, his 'carelessness' about terminology, his irony, satire, and skill as a 'fabulist'. See also Rudberg's article, *Das wir in der großen Phaidros-Rede* (85 *supra*).

—. K. Vretska, *Platonica* (861 *supra*), pp. 415—420. This second part of the article is concerned with the nature, extent, provenience, and implications of 'pictorial' expression especially in *Republic* 559 Dff. See also Vretska's earlier article, *Typische und polare Darstellung bei Platon* (860 *supra*).

—. A. Parry, *Landscape in Greek poetry* (672a *supra*). With this paper on Plato's presentation of idyllic nature as the origin of the attitude of Greek pastoral compare the earlier essay by C. Murley, *Plato's Phaedrus and Theocritean Pastoral* (672 *supra*).

1081. T. G. Rosenmeyer, *Plato and mass words*, *Trans Am Philol Assoc* 88, 1957, 88—102. A study of Plato's supposed difficulties with what Rosenmeyer after Jespersen calls 'mass-words' and 'nexus-substantives', a difficulty which Rosenmeyer holds to be connected with Plato's separation of the ideas and with the puzzles of self-predication.

—. E. Salin, *Platon, Dion, Aristoteles* (86 *supra*).

—. Sister M. R. Ojeman, *Assent in Plato's Respublica* (805 *supra*).

1082. G. J. de Vries, *Plato, in Is de Griekse litteratuur vertaalbaar?* door W. J. Verdenius et al., Zwolle 1958, pp. 34—41. A brief account with striking examples of the problem of rendering Plato's vocabulary and some of the niceties of his style in expressing his thought.

1083. Dorothy Tarrant, *More colloquialisms, semi-proverbs, and word-play in Plato*, *Cl Quart N. S.* 8, 1958, 158—160. A supplement to 1067 *supra*.

—. K. Vretska, *Wiener Studien* 71, 1958, 31—36 in his article, *Das Thrasymachos-Problem* (795a *supra*). He argues that Plato varies the affirmative expressions put into the mouths of his characters

to suit them and the situation and that this refutes the assumption on which von Arnim based his use of such expressions in his stylistic statistics.

1084. Maria Rezzani, *Note e ricerche intorno al linguaggio di Platone*, Padova 1959. The rhetorical language of Gorgias is here contrasted to the 'serious paidiá' and irony of Plato's expression which the authoress maintains is essentially a language of myth and of studied ambiguity and related to the 'double dialectic' that she ascribes to him. See her articles on the *Sophist* (885 and 886 *supra*) parts of which have been incorporated into this short monograph.

IV B: Dialogue: Structure, Technique and Intention

Of publications in the 'thirties and 'forties dealing with Plato's use of dialogue and its significance the following are the most important for themselves or for their later influence:

— H.-G. Gadamer, *Platos dialektische Ethik* (710a *supra*), pp. 22—52 and especially pp. 40—52: *Der sokratische Dialog*.

1085. J. Stenzel, *Zum Aufbau des platonischen Dialoges*, Festschrift für Karl Joël, Basel 1934, pp. 240—254. This article is republished on pp. 333—344 of Stenzel's *Kleine Schriften zur griechischen Philosophie*, Darmstadt 1956, in which collection on pp. 32—47 is also reprinted his earlier and still more influential article, *Literarische Form und philosophischer Gehalt des platonischen Dialoges*, originally published in 1916 and later included in his book, *Studien zur Entwicklung der platonischen Dialektik von Sokrates zu Aristoteles* (pp. 123—141 of the second edition, Leipzig/Berlin 1931). An enthusiastic appraisal of this earlier article is to be found in D. J. Allan's introduction to his translation of Stenzel's book, *Plato's method of dialectic*, Oxford 1940, pp. vii-xxi; some criticism of Stenzel's thesis in the article is made by J. Hartland-Swann (1072 *supra*), pp. 133—135.

— E. M. Manasse, *Platons Sophistes und Politikos* (738 *supra*), pp. 55—74. Manasse is especially concerned with the philosophical significance of Plato's dialogue-form and the meaning of its differences as they appear in the earlier and the later dialogues.

1086. G. Rudberg, *Das dramatische Element bei Platon*, Symbol Osl 19, 1939, 1—13. An attempt to prove with examples, which are

sometimes forced, that especially in structure and number of characters the dialogues reflect the usage of Greek drama. See also on dramatic elements in the dialogues Rudberg, *ΔΡΑΜΑ* Martino P. Nilsson . . . dedicatum, Lund 1939, pp. 423—425 in his article, Zu den literarischen Formen der Sokratiker, *ibid.* pp. 419—429.

1087. A. Levi, Questioni platoniche, *Rev Philol* 3 Sér. 14, 1940, 110—126. This is an undeservedly neglected article on the motives that impelled Plato to use dialogue-form, the function that he intended it to perform, and the significance of the rôle that he assigned to Socrates.

1088. A. Puech, Quelques remarques sur l'art de la composition dans les dialogues de Platon, *CR Acad Inscript et BL*, 1940, 319—322. The structural complication of apparent digressions from which there is an imperceptible return to the main theme is ascribed to Plato's more or less conscious imitation of Homeric composition, especially in the *Iliad*.

1089. H. Kuhn, The true tragedy: On the relationship between Greek tragedy and Plato, *Harvard Studies in Class Phil* 52, 1941, 1—40 and 53, 1942, 37—88. Arguing here that the tragedy of Aeschylus and Sophocles is the 'logical antecedent' of the philosophy of Plato, whose purpose was to substitute his own 'truest tragedy' for the faulty tragedy of the poets and whose hostility towards them was that of a competitor, Kuhn is as much concerned with the 'philosophy' of the tragedians as with Plato's 'tragic drama'; but, though the relation of this 'tragic philosophy' to Plato's thought is the primary subject, much is said throughout the widely ranging essay concerning the structure of the dialogues, its purpose and meaning, and its relation to the forms of tragedy (e. g. pp. 5—11, 13—14, and 37—39 in the first part of the essay and pp. 37—52 in the second). With this compare the chapter, Dialogue et tragédie, in R. Schaerer's book (1061 *supra*), pp. 218—234 and the articles by G. Rudberg (1086 *supra*) and Dorothy Tarrant (1080 *supra*) and contrast E. Hoffmann (1090 *infra*).

— A. Koyré, Discovering Plato (10b *supra*), pp. 1—7, 17, 32—33, 51.

— F. Pfister, Der Begriff des Schönen und das Ebenmaß (674 *supra*), pp. 347—348. On articulated structure and organic symmetry in Plato's theory and practice, especially in the *Phaedrus*. Compare with this K. Vretska (861 *supra*), pp. 406—414 and the second part of H. Kuhn's essay (1089 *supra*), pp. 37—38.

1090. E. Hoffmann, Die literarischen Voraussetzungen des Platonverständnisses, *Zeitschr philos Forsch* 2, 1947, 465—480. In this article, which is reprinted as pp. 7—28 of Hoffmann's book, *Platon* (22 *supra*), it is asserted that Plato in his writings gives not his philosophy but a philosophical pedagogy leading to philosophy¹) for which the only suitable presentation is 'closet drama in prose' and that the dialogues, from the point of view of their literary form, began as a kind of comedy and never entirely lost this connection with comedy as their character changed in the successive phases of Plato's development. Contrast H. Kuhn (1089 *supra*) and compare with both R. Schaerer (1061 *supra*), pp. 231—234.

— P. Merlan, Form and content in Plato's Philosophy (436 *supra*). He argues that the form of dialogue, permitting Plato to indicate what cannot be said directly and to prevent the reader from confusing the indication with the thing indicated, is itself with the sense of dissatisfaction that it engenders essential to the content of Plato's philosophy.

1091. V. Goldschmidt, *Les Dialogues de Platon: Structure et méthode dialectique*, Paris 1947 (cf. R. Robinson, *Mind* N. S. 58, 1949, 246—249; M. Vanhoutte, *Rev Philos Louvain* 47, 1949, 259—266; J. Tate, *Cl Rev* 64, 1950, 20—22). Excluding the *Apology*, *Menexenus*, *Timaeus*, *Critias*, and *Laws*, Goldschmidt analyses the dialogues in detail to show that the structure of all of them exemplifies wholly or in part the process of the dialectical method as he interprets Plato's formulation of it²). Since Goldschmidt addresses himself (p. VIII) to the problem posed by Schaerer (1061 *supra*), there is special interest in the latter's opinion (*Studia Philos* 10, 1950, 180—182) of this result of an investigation that he had desiderated (1061 *supra*, p. 6). With this book of Goldschmidt's belongs his 'thèse complémentaire', published in the same year, for there he applies to a special and an especially important case his general theory of the relation between the technique of Plato's dialogues and his conception of dialectical process:

¹) A variation of this fairly common interpretation of Plato's writings is that the dialogues had only the propaedeutic purpose of driving their readers to the Academy where they could be initiated into the higher 'mystery' of philosophy:

1090a. E. R. Goodenough, *Quantulacumque: Studies presented to Kirsopp Lake*, London 1937, pp. 228—234 in his article, *Literal Mystery in Hellenistic Judaism*, *ibid.* pp. 227—241.

²) For a concise statement of Goldschmidt's notion that Plato has a 'system' in each dialectical investigation which is manifest in the structure of the dialogue see his later essay, *Sur le problème du "Système de Platon"* (67 *supra*), especially pp. 175—178.

1092. V. Goldschmidt, *Le paradigme dans la dialectique platonicienne*, Paris 1947 (cf. the reviews listed in 1091 *supra*). In connection with this see also Goldschmidt's earlier article, *Le paradigme dans la théorie platonicienne de l'action* (*Rev Ét Grecques* 58, 1945, 118—145), and his later one, *Le paradigme platonicien et les "Regulae" de Descartes* (*Rev Philosophique* 141, 1951, 199—210).

— G. J. de Vries, *Spel bij Plato* (1121 *infra*), pp. 55—116.

— H. Gundert, *Enthusiasmos und Logos bei Platon* (675 *supra*), p. 45.

1093. D. Mayor, *El intelectual de hoy predibujado en Platón: los diálogos platónicos terminan insolucionados?*, *Humanidades* (Santander) 1, 1949, 227—244. After comparing the sophist as depicted by Plato with the modern sophist, he argues that the 'aporetic' dialogues are so constructed as to have implicit in them the solutions of the problems which they raise.

During the current decade the subject in one or another of its aspects has been treated in the following publications:

— M. dal Pra, *La storiografia filosofica antica* (125 *supra*), pp. 57—63.

— J. Hartland-Swann, *Plato as Poet* (1072 *supra*), especially pp. 4—10.

— J. Sulliger, *Platon et le problème de la communication de la philosophie* (454 *supra*), especially pp. 173—176, with which compare P. Merlan (436 *supra*) and A. Levi (1087 *supra*), pp. 117—118.

1094. D. Christoff, *Contemplation et création*, *Rev Théologie et Philosophie* 3 Sér 3, 1953, 108—122 (with report of discussion: 122—128). The relation of theory to activity in Plato's philosophy is the main subject of this essay, much of which, however, has to do with the significance of 'dialogue' to Plato¹). On dialogue-form and 'creation engendering contemplation' see especially pp. 111—114.

— W. Kirk, *Protagoras and Phaedrus: Literary techniques* (681 *supra*).

— J. Andrieu, *Le Dialogue Antique* (267 *supra*), especially pp. 304—308, 316—319, and 323—324.

¹) On dialogue as 'research in common' and thought as 'dialogue of the soul with itself' see the quite different opinions of M. Vanhoutte, *La méthode ontologique de Platon*, Paris/Louvain 1956, pp. 32—34, and of G. Calogero, *Giorn Crit Philos Ital* 3 Ser. 11, 1957, 362—364.

— P. Friedländer, *Platon* (11a *supra*), I, pp. 164—181 and 243—248 = *Plato* (11b *supra*), I, pp. 154—170 and 230—235; see also Friedländer, *Cl Phil* 40, 1945, 254—255.

1095. G. K. Plochmann, Socrates, the stranger from Elea, and some others. *Cl Phil* 49, 1954, 223—231. There is a 'dialectical' reason, he argues, for Plato's having assigned to the different characters their particular attitudes and ways of arguing; Socrates, Parmenides, and the Eleatic Stranger, for example, are meant to express different 'dialectics', of which there are six major kinds. The article might have been fruitful, but it is disfigured by vagueness and pretentiousness and an unusual number of glaring blunders.

1096. K. J. Vourveris, *Ο παιδείων διάλογος*, *ΠΛΑΤΩΝ* 6, 1954, 4—16. The structure of the dialogues, he believes, is determined by the pedagogical purpose in the fashion of Socrates' own conversations, the scheme being a constant 'return to the beginning' and a helical progression.

1097. C. Murley, Techniques of modern fiction in Plato, *Cl Journ* 50, 1954/55, 281—287. On Plato's use of 'external detail', picturesque descriptions and incidents, and artifices typical of fiction to create an atmosphere and to enhance and enliven situations and characters in the dialogues.

1098. C. Perelman, La méthode dialectique et le rôle de l'interlocuteur dans le dialogue, *Rev Métaph et Morale* 60, 1955, 26—31. The interlocutors in 'dialectical dialogue', as distinguished from 'eristic' and 'critical', are meant, he contends, not to defend their own peculiar point of view but to express the 'reasonable' opinion of their historical and social context. This interpretation, though Perelman does not make the comparison, is like that which has often been given of the tragic chorus.

— R. Schaerer, La structure des dialogues métaphysiques (618 *supra*).

— Dorothy Tarrant, Plato as dramatist (1080 *supra*), pp. 84—89. See also her earlier article (1069 *supra*), especially pp. 28—29.

1099. Éliane Amado-Levy-Valensi, Vérité et langage du dialogue platonicien au dialogue psychanalytique, *La Psychanalyse*, 1, 1956, 257—274. Taking the *Cratylus* to show that for Plato language is revelatory of the subject rather than the object and identifying this with the psychoanalytical theory of 'projection' (see also 356 *supra*), she argues that the essential instrument of dialectic is the

dialogue, which she interprets in terms of psychoanalytic therapy as the manipulation of language by means of analyses to lead the mind from false knowledge along the road to a 'readjusted knowledge'; but in the event this is less an interpretation of the dialogue-form as it appears in the Platonic texts than a manipulation of those texts in the service of an interpretation and defence of 'asymmetric psychoanalytic dialogue'. Cf. R. Schaerer (1061 *supra*), p. 51.

— P. Grenet, Note sur la structure du *Lachès* (510 *supra*).

1100. P. Lachière-Rey, *Réflexions sur un procédé de Platon*, *Rev Philosophique* 146, 1956, 1—8. On Plato's technique of having the interlocutor use formulae or express agreement that would seem to be in accord with Platonic doctrine whereas closer examination reveals the imprecision, incompleteness, or misconception of these expressions.

— K. Vretska, *Platonica* (861 *supra*), pp. 406—414. Vretska himself here refers to F. Pfister (674 *supra*), but not, as he might have done, to the second part of H. Kuhn's essay (1089 *supra*), pp. 37—38. See also on composition and structure Vretska's earlier articles (860 and 865 *supra*).

— R. Hornsby, Significant action in the *Symposium* (929 *supra*). Important in this connection for the technique and significance of the structural 'frame' of the dialogue. See also R. G. Hoerber's attempt (930 *supra*) to identify parallel 'levels' in the structure and dialectic of the *Symposium*.

— Helen Bacon, *Socrates Crowned* (933 *supra*).

1101. K. Gaiser, *Protreptik und Paränese bei Platon: Untersuchungen zur Form des platonischen Dialogs*, Stuttgart 1959. Gaiser tries to show that Plato in his dialogues transformed a sophistic 'protreptic discourse' into a philosophical form, where the protreptic aspect comprises within itself both exhortation and elenchus and has a philosophical content and an educational meaning at first apparently external to it. From the origins of 'Socratic discourse' he proceeds to study the early Platonic dialogues as 'protreptic discourses' in their relation to the protreptic of the Sophists and then takes up Plato's development of philosophical 'exhortation' through the *Republic*; and finally he considers briefly the protreptics of the later dialogues and the form of Aristotle's *Protrepticus*.

Many more works that deal primarily with other subjects contain some incidental discussion of Plato's use of dialogue. Among such

publications of recent date I mention the following by way of example: R. B. Levinson (28 *supra*), pp. 26—37, pp. 59—62, pp. 406—410, and pp. 437—438; J. Gould, *The development of Plato's Ethics*, Cambridge 1955, pp. 21—24; and J. Tate, *Cl Rev N. S.* 5, 1955, 157—159, who in his review of Hackforth's translation of the *Phaedrus* (668 *supra*) makes some concise remarks on the dialectical structure of the dialogues which are as valuable as many special articles on the subject.

IV C: Myth and Allegory

The most extensive and substantial work on this subject done since the appearance of Ritter's last report in 'Bursian' is a book published almost simultaneously with that report:

1102. P. Frutiger, *Les mythes de Platon: Étude philosophique et littéraire*, Paris 1930 (cf. Taylor, *Mind N. S.* 39, 1930, 492—496; Diès, *Rev Philol* 3 Sér. 8, 1934, 203—207; Hack, *Cl Phil* 30, 1935, 270—272).

The following are the chief works on the subject published after Frutiger's book had appeared and before 1950:

1103. J. R. Buisman, *Mythen en allegorieën in Plato's kennis-en zijnsleer*, Amsterdam 1932. See also his article, *Der philosophische Hintergrund des platonischen Höhlengleichnisses*, *Mnem* III 7, 1939, 49—62 (847 *supra*).

— P. Boyancé, *Le culte des muses...* (208a *supra*), pp. 155—165: *Les incantations platoniciennes*. See also his later article, *Platon et les cathartes orphiques* (208 *supra*).

1104. P. Stöcklein, *Über die philosophische Bedeutung von Platons Mythen* (*Philologus Supplement* 30, 3), Leipzig 1937 (cf. Galli, *Boll Filol Cl N. S.* 9, 1937/38, 124—133; de Strycker, *Ant Cl* 7, 1938, 451—452; Tate, *Cl Rev* 52, 1938, 13).

— H. W. Thomas, *EITIEKEINA* (227 *supra*). With this compare and contrast: M. P. Nilsson, *Die Geschichte der griechischen Religion I* (München 1941), pp. 772—776 (= pp. 820—824 of the second edition, 1955); K. Ziegler, *RE* 18, 2, 1942, 1373—1386 in his article, *Orphische Dichtung*, *ibid.* 1321—1417.

1105. A. Levi, *I miti platonici sull' anima e sui suoi destini*, *Riv Filos* 30, 1939, 137—166, See also 1107 *infra*.

1106. D. Bassi, *La mitologia in Platone*, Rend Ist Lombardo di Scienze e Lettere, Cl Lettere 73, 1939/40, 457—484. This is not a study of Plato's own mythopoeia as such. Bassi, concerned with the discrepancy between Plato's criticism of traditional mythology and his own liberal use of it¹), has here collected and classified the passages in which Plato refers without criticism to the gods and heroes of traditional mythology and apparently accepts or adapts and interprets for his own purpose them and the conventional stories about them.

1107. A. Levi, *I miti platonici*, Riv Storia Filos 1, 1946, 197—225 (see also his earlier article, 1105 *supra*). Levi here gives an analysis of Plato's myths based upon criteria different from those of Frutiger's (1102 *supra*), of whose method and classification he is critical.

1108. M. Untersteiner, *La fisiologia del mito*, Milano 1946, pp. 351—364 and pp. 375—384. Untersteiner here discusses succinctly the Socratic and Platonic criticism of traditional mythology and of 'rationalizing exegesis' and in relation to this criticism and the traditional material the nature and purpose of Plato's own myths.

1109. P.-M. Schuhl, *Études sur la fabulation platonicienne*, Paris 1947. This is a collection of articles and notes, published in different places between 1930 and 1946, of which those on pp. 27—108 have more or less to do with one aspect or another of Platonic myth, allegory, or 'fabrication'. The most important of them have already been mentioned in connection with the passages to which they are relevant (see 486, 743, and 841 *supra*). For the rest, *Les mythes de Platon* (pp. 27—31) is a review of Frutiger's book (1102 *supra*); *Science et mythe* (pp. 32—39) was published in part in *Travaux IXe Congrès Int Philos V*, 2, Paris 1937, 63—65; *Platon et le cheval de Troie* (pp. 75—81), touching on the story of Gyges, is reprinted from *Rev Archéologique* 6 Sér. 7, 1936, 183—188 and *Autour du fuseau d'Ananké* (pp. 82—88) from *Rev Archéologique* 5 Sér. 32, 1930, 58—64 (see Schuhl's later article, 842 *supra*); and *Une machine à peser les âmes* (pp. 105—108), dating from 1943, is a suggestion concerning *Laws* 903 E—904 C, with which cf. Schuhl's more recent note (573 *supra*).

¹) In an earlier article J. Tate had maintained that there is a real inconsistency in Plato's attitude towards the current mythology:

1106a) J. Tate, *Plato, Socrates and the myths*, Cl Quart 30, 1936, 142—145.

On the apparent paradox of Plato's criticism of mythology and allegory and his own use of them see M. Untersteiner (1108 *infra*); L. Edelstein (1110 *infra*), pp. 465—466; A. A. Roig (507 *supra*); F. Buffière (200 *supra*); J. Pépin (1114 *infra*).

— G. J. de Vries, *Spel bij Plato* (1121 *infra*), pp. 281—348.

1110. L. Edelstein, The function of the myth in Plato's philosophy, *Journ Hist Ideas* 10, 1949, 463—481. In this acute and lucid essay, which begins with Plato's criticism of traditional mythology and ends by explaining how his attitude towards mythology affected his judgment of poetry, Edelstein argues that for Plato myth is an integral part of philosophy, subservient to reason, and the means of reconciling the rational and irrational aspects of human nature. Distinguishing two classes of Platonic myth, the scientific-historical and eschatological-ethical, he explains the different functions of the two in conformity with the tenets of Platonic epistemology and psychology, refuting with Plato's own words the Neo-Platonic principle of allegorical interpretation and showing that the categories of Kantian and Romantic interpretation are inapplicable to the outlook of Plato, for whom myth could be neither an instrument for rousing and regulating 'transcendental feeling' nor a revelation of 'higher knowledge'¹).

The following are the publications of the 'fifties that are concerned with this subject:

— A. de Marignac, *Imagination et dialectique* (1070 *supra*).

— J. Hartland-Swann, Plato as poet (1072 *supra*), especially pp. 14—18 and 131—140.

— T. A. Sinclair, Myth and politics in the *Laws* of Plato (529 *supra*). A complaint that there is no 'Myth of the State' in the *Laws*, in fact neither *μῦθος* nor *λόγος* as the ultimate basis of the 'Law-State'.

— A. A. Roig, *L'allégorisme de Platon ...* (507 *supra*). He contends that in the period of *Republic* II Plato had adopted the theory of rationalistic allegorical interpretation of traditional myth whereas when he wrote the *Ion* he had believed in the theory of non-rational, i. e. inspired, interpretation, from which despite his later

¹) Edelstein's analysis undermines one of the assumptions essential to the argument of P. Kucharski in his book of the same year, *Les chemins du savoir dans les dernier dialogues de Platon*, Paris 1949, pp. 342—386. In that chapter (*La doctrine de la forme, le mythe et la philosophie dans les dialogues*) Kucharski argues that 'the theory of *εἶδος*', which according to him Plato later abandoned, is intimately connected with an eschatological doctrine expounded only in myth and that consequently Plato never regarded it as anything more than a probability, rationally indemonstrable though containing a germ of truth.

change he retained the religious respect for the irrational value of myth which rational allegorization had shaken.

— P. Friedländer, *Platon* (11a *supra*), I, pp. 182—221 = *Plato* (11b *supra*), I, pp. 171—210.

1111. R. Schaerer, The mythical portrayal of Evil and of the Fall of Man, *Diogenes* 11, 1955, 37—62. Plato is treated on pp. 49—62: the *Timaeus*, the myths of the *Politicus* and the *Phaedrus*, and the myth of Er. See also Schaerer's earlier books: *Dieu, l'homme et la vie d'après Platon*, Neuchâtel 1944, pp. 18—19, pp. 26—29, and pp. 149—169; *La Question Platonicienne* (1061 *supra*), p. 18, pp. 145—151, and pp. 253—254.

— F. Buffière, *Les mythes d'Homère et la pensée grecque* (200 *supra*). Important for Plato's criticism of Homeric mythology, his own adaptation and use of it, and later interpretations of his own myths as well as of Homer's in a 'Platonic' sense.

1112. H. Pfeil, *Die Weisheit der Antike und der moderne Mensch aufgezeigt an Platons Mythen in Vom Menschen in der Antike* hrsg. von F. Hörmann, München 1957, pp. 143—173. Holding that the myths are in part figurative summaries of doctrine already rationally established, in part prefigurations of doctrines still to be dialectically established, and in part presentations of what is not susceptible of exact logical formulation, Pfeil interprets the myths of *Phaedrus* 246 A—249 B and *Republic* 414 B—415 D, the speech of Diotima, the 'Cave' in the *Republic*, and the eschatological myths of the *Gorgias*, *Phaedo*, and *Republic* as Plato's doctrine of the origin, nature, and destiny of man in contrast to the modern materialistic and existentialistic conceptions.

1113. J. Chaix-Ruy, *La sagesse orientale d'Avicenne et les mythes platoniciens*, *Rev de la Méditerranée* 18, 1958, 261—307. It is the main thesis of this paper that Avicenna found in the myths the essence of Plato's 'message' and clearly discerned the difference between this and the philosophy of Aristotle, but in the development of this thesis there is involved an interpretation of the content and function of Platonic myth itself. Chaix-Ruy holds that 'the aristocratic conception of double truth' has its origin in Plato, for whom myth provides a figurative representation of what can be known only approximately, an image of transcendence all the more probable as it approaches tradition, a means by which accord is established between what tradition has transmitted and what philosophy has demonstrated.

—. H. Flashar, *Der Dialog Ion* . . . (173 *supra*), pp. 76—77.

1114. J. Pépin, *Mythe et allégorie: Les origines grecques et les contestations judéo-chrétiennes*, Paris 1958, especially pp. 112—121. On the apparent paradox of Plato's criticism of myth and allegory and his own use of them.

1115. Ilse von Loewenclau, *Mythos und Logos bei Platon*, *Stud Gen* 11, 1958, 731—741. This is an attempt to define the Platonic contexts of mythos and logos, which she maintains are not strictly antithetical or sharply distinguished terminologically by Plato. Logos itself, she argues, is always tentative and provisional, purging, the soul of false opinion and preparing it for the vision of 'the highest', some rays of which are caught and concentrated in the imagery of mythos, which thus illuminates the path of the logos¹.

For publications dealing with individual myths see also the following references in **III C b** *supra*:

Critias, The Atlantis myth: E. Gegenschatz (368 *supra*), R. Hackforth (370 *supra*), L. Saint-Michel (383 *supra*), T. G. Rosenmeyer (388 *supra*); *Gorgias* 492 D—493 C; *Laos* 903 B—905 D (572—574 *supra*); *Phaedrus* 246 A—249 D (694—695 *supra*); *Politicus* 268 E—274 E (743 *supra*); *Protagoras* 320 C—328 D (763—766 *supra*); *Republic* 359 B 6—360 D 7 (819 *supra*); *Republic* 414 B—415 D (828 *supra*); *Republic* 504 A—541 B (841, 842, 847, 849 *supra*); *Republic* 614 A—621 D (871—875 *supra*); *Symposium* 189 C 2—193 E 2.

IV D: Humor, Jest, and Irony

1116. H. L. Tracy, *Plato as satirist*, *Cl Journ* 33, 1937/38, 153—162.

1117. W. Büchner, *Über den Begriff der Eironeia*, *Hermes* 76, 1941, 339—358. There is but little here on the irony of Plato and the Platonic Socrates. See pp. 340, 343, 344—345.

1118. R. Schaerer, *Le mécanisme de l'ironie dans ses rapports avec la dialectique*, *Rev Métaph et Morale* 48, 1941, 181—209. See also Schaerer's earlier book (1061 *supra*), pp. 51—59, pp. 174—181, and pp. 231—234.

¹) This essay is one of a group originally delivered in 1953 in a symposium on 'Mythos und Logos', the results of which were summarized in an article with that title by H. Hommel in *Stud Gen* 8, 1955, 310—316

— E. Hoffmann, *Platon und die Komödie* (1090 *supra*), pp. 472—480, reprinted in his book, *Platon* (22 *supra*), pp. 17—28.

1119. L. Radermacher, *Weinen und Lachen: Studien über antikes Lebensgefühl*, Wien 1947, pp. 87—114. On the nature and rôle of *παιδιά* in the thought and the writings of Plato and the other Socratics and its presumable rôle in the life and bearing of Socrates himself.

1120. V. Arangio-Ruiz, *Gioco e serietà in Platone*, *Nuova Antologia* 447, Nov. 1949, 273—280. Plato is here represented as having always been keenly aware of *παιδιά* as the bloom of seriousness, often more serious than seriousness itself, but as having refused, perhaps for this very reason, to see in art this *παιδιά* that he so well understood in philosophy.

1121. G. J. de Vries, *Spel bij Plato*, Amsterdam 1949 (cf. J. Tate, *Cl Rev* 64, 1950, 111—112; H. J. M. Broos, *Hermeneus* 23, 1951/52, 107—115; W. J. Verdenius, *Mnem* IV 5, 1952, 256—259). Whatever answers be given to the questions raised by the reviewers here mentioned and despite the qualifications suggested by some of their objections, this book remains a work of primary importance not only for the study of all aspects of Plato's literary expression and composition but also for the philosophical significance of his 'serious playfulness' and for the interpretation of countless passages in the dialogues.

— L. Edelstein, *The function of the myth . . .* (1110 *supra*), pp. 469—471. On the cosmological and historical myths as 'play' and the ironic ambiguity of seriousness and playfulness.

— H. Gundert, *Enthusiasmos und Logos bei Platon* (675 *supra*), pp. 28—32. See H. W. Meyer (685 *supra*), pp. 266—269, pp. 273—274, and p. 277; and against Meyer see H. Flashar (173 *supra*), p. 122, n. 2 and p. 134. This controversy shows how important may be the consequences involved in the identification and interpretation of the irony and poetical playfulness of particular passages.

— M. Landmann, *Elenktik und Maieutik* (139 *supra*), pp. 18—46: *Die Sokratische Ironie*.

— H. J. M. Broos, *Plato ludens*, *Hermeneus* 23, 1951/52, 107—115. This article is in fact a review of the book by de Vries (1121 *supra*), and it has already been referred to as such.

— C. Mazzantini, *Il 'discorso non scritto' nel Fedro di Platone* (705 *supra*). Much of this article is devoted to discussion of Plato's philosophical irony and *παιδιά*.

—. Maria Rezzani, *Sophia* 21, 1953, 22 (886 *supra*); see also her later monograph, *Note e ricerche intorno al linguaggio di Platone* (1084 *supra*), pp. 17—32: L'ironia di Gorgia e di Platone, and pp. 51—53 on *εἰρωνεία*, *σπονδή*, and *παιδιά*.

—. P. Friedländer, *Platon* (11a *supra*), I, pp. 124—132 and pp. 145—163 = *Plato* (11b *supra*), I, pp. 118—125 and pp. 137—153. The first of these two sections is on the significance of *παιδιά* for Plato and his 'transposition' of it; the second is on irony.

1122. K. J. Vourveris, *Παιδιά καὶ παιδεία, Ἐπιστημονικὴ Ἐπετηρὶς τῆς Φιλοσοφικῆς Σχολῆς τοῦ Πανεπιστημίου Ἀθηνῶν* 2 Ser. 6, 1955/56, 469—526 (also published separately: Athens 1956). This is primarily concerned with the rôle of play in the educational theories of Plato and Aristotle and in the practice of Socrates, but Vourveris gives some attention also to the way in which Plato's own writings are meant to reflect his conception of *παιδιά* and its relation to *σπονδή* (see pp. 58—63 of the separate publication).

IV E: Plato's Estimate of Writing

Although it is sometimes recognized that other passages in Plato's writings are relevant to this subject, the treatment of it in the publications listed below has been mainly concerned with *Phaedrus* 274 B—278 B and *Epistle* VII, 341 B—345 C (especially 341 B—E, 343 A, and 344 C—E).

1123. A. Levi, Sull'importanza che Platone attribuiva ai propri scritti e sul valore che essi hanno come espressione del suo pensiero, *Rend Ist Lombardo di Scienze e Lettere, Cl Lettere* 69, 1936, 381—391 and 615—624 (see also 1087 *supra*, pp. 114—117). He argues that the passage of *Epistle* VII, the authenticity of which he assumes, is not in disaccord with the thought of the dialogues and is not a disavowal of them and that the condemnation of writing here and in the *Phaedrus* is not to be taken literally; and he concludes that Plato's written work does reveal all his thought and its development with the exception of the final systematization in the theory of idea-numbers.

—. G. Pasquali, *Le Lettere di Platone* (434 *supra*), pp. 86—91.

—. W. Jaeger, *Paideia* (4 *supra*), III, pp. 268—270. Cf. W. Steidle, *Hermes* 80, 1952, 289 (202 *supra*).

—. P. Merlan, Form and content in Plato's philosophy (436 *supra*), pp. 414—415 and pp. 426—428. Relying upon the passage in

Epistle VII, Merlan contends that in the matter of philosophical 'communication' Plato was as sceptical of oral expression as he was of written exposition.

— A. Maddalena, Platone: *Lettere* (429 *supra*), pp. 279—288 and pp. 341—342. He argues that the passage in *Epistle VII* is based upon misunderstanding of Plato's meaning in the *Phaedrus*, which is not a total and unqualified condemnation of writing.

— G. J. de Vries, Spel bij Plato (1121 *supra*), pp. 25—33. In accounting for Plato's attitude he criticizes acutely those interpretations that depend upon *Epistle VII*, which he regards as spurious.

— H. Gundert, Enthusiasmus und Logos bei Platon (675 *supra*), pp. 44—45.

— G. Müller, Die Philosophie im pseudoplatonischen 7. Brief (445 *supra*), pp. 264—267; and against this attempt to show that the passage in *Epistle VII* is a misunderstanding of Plato's meaning in the *Phaedrus* see H. Patzer (447 *supra*), pp. 29—30.

— D. Grene, Man in his pride (240 *supra*), pp. 110—124.

1124. W. C. Greene, The spoken and the written word, Harvard Studies in Class Phil 60, 1951, 23—59. On Plato see especially pp. 23—24 and 44—51; unfortunately no supporting argument is given for many of the statements here made that had long since been seriously challenged.

— J. Hartland-Swann, Plato as poet (1072 *supra*), pp. 5—6.

— J. Sulliger, Platon et le problème de la communication de la philosophie (454 *supra*), pp. 163—175.

— R. Hackforth, Plato's *Phaedrus* (668 *supra*), pp. 162—164.

— W. C. Helmbold and W. B. Holther, The unity of the '*Phaedrus*' (677 *supra*), pp. 407—409. The authors, who reject *Epistle VII* as spurious, have some interesting and original remarks on the irony of the criticism of writing in the *Phaedrus* and what Plato meant by it.

— W. Steidle, Redekunst und Bildung bei Isokrates (202 *supra*), pp. 288—296. On Plato's criticism of writing in its relation to earlier and contemporary treatments of the topic and especially to those of Alcidamas, Isocrates, and Gorgias. Besides the literature on this subject to which Steidle refers see also H. L. Hudson-Williams, Cl Quart N. S. 1, 1951, 68—70 and 73.

— J. Derbolav, Der Dialog 'Kratylos' . . . (349 *supra*), pp. 72—79 and pp. 84—90. He takes for granted the authenticity of *Epistle VII* and sees in the digression, which criticizes the insufficiency of language and not merely of writing, Plato's attempt by means of a psychology of philosophic endowment to elucidate the 'charismatic-esoteric' aspect of his theory. This is the kind of interpretation that is rejected by most of those who have defended the authenticity of the *Epistle* and their use of it in connection with the *Phaedrus* as an expression of Plato's attitude towards writing.

— C. Mazzantini, Il 'discorso non scritto' nel *Fedro* di Platone (705 *supra*). In connection with this article see especially Maria Rez-zani (1084 *supra*), pp. 21—24.

— P. Friedländer, Platon (11a *supra*), I, pp. 114—132 = Plato (11b *supra*), I, pp. 108—125.

— R. E. Cushman, Therapeia (15 *supra*), pp. 304—309: Plato's depreciation of the written word. Compare with this interpretation, which leans heavily upon *Epistle VII*, that of J. Gould, The development of Plato's Ethics, Cambridge 1955, pp. 21—24. Gould attempts to answer the criticism of Plato's position by R. Robinson, Plato's earlier Dialectic, Ithaca 1941, pp. 81—88 = Oxford 1953, pp. 77—84 (cf. P. Friedländer, Cl Phil 40, 1945, 254—255). Neither this defence nor Robinson's attack is mentioned by Cushman.

V. Plato's Thought

Plato's philosophy as expressed in his writings is recalcitrant to topical classification, and the subdivisions of it in this section are merely reflections of the convenience and convention apparently consulted by the authors of the publications to be listed when they isolated for their study some segment or aspect of Plato's thought. In the event they usually found it necessary to transgress the limits that they had imposed upon themselves. From interpretation of Plato's political theory, for example, all consideration of his ethics is not easily excluded or attention to his psychology from consideration of his ethics or all notice of the theory of ideas from the study of any of these, and so in a work ostensibly restricted by its title to his politics or ethics or theory of education other aspects of his philosophy will probably be treated and possibly in a way no less significant than is the topic designated in the title.

That is an unavoidable consequence of the integral nature of Plato's thought and of the form of his exposition, but another circumstance making topical division of this section uncomfortable is the consequence of a conviction held by many of his modern interpreters to a degree that determines the orientation and the avowed purpose of their studies. It is the development of some segment or aspect of Plato's thought with which they are concerned. If, as might be justified by bibliographical exactitude and current scholarly interest, there were collected under a separate rubric all the recent studies in which to judge from title or content the purpose is to establish some such development or to deny it (for some have held in special cases or generally that Plato's development is an unfounded assumption or a demonstrably erroneous hypothesis), the category so constituted would very nearly exhaust all the subdivisions of this section and so would either nullify the practical use of such subdivision or would necessitate almost total duplication. I refrain, therefore, from setting up such a separate category; but I offer here by way of guide and example a selective list of the publications that would belong to it, intending thereby to indicate how the others can be found classified in that subdivision of Plato's thought the development of which they profess to trace or under the particular writing the place

and significance of which in Plato's development they profess to identify.

There are, to begin with, the attempts to determine in Plato's writings the lower limit of his 'Socratic period' or to trace in them an increasing alienation from the attitude of Socrates. Such are the essays of M. Landmann (139 *supra*), U. Tavianini (146 *supra*), G. Rudberg (293 *supra*), and G. Giannantoni (136 *supra*). On the other hand it has been argued that throughout the early dialogues Plato expresses his own views and that his hesitations, reservations, and criticisms there are to be interpreted in the light of his own development and not as traits of the historical Socrates (N. Gulley [137 *supra*]¹); and going still further H. Flashar has maintained (173 *supra*, pp. 104—105) that the very existence of a 'Socratic period' in Plato's writing is highly dubious. The extremes of disagreement on this question are represented on the one side by J. W. Miller's attempt (141 *supra*) to revive the thesis of Burnet and of Taylor and on the other by the nihilism of E. Dupréel (151 *supra*) and of A. H. Chroust (130 *supra*), while V. de Magalhães-Vilhena (126 and 127 *supra*) teeters precariously between them.

According to Rudberg (293 *supra*) the *Gorgias* represents the transition from the historical Socrates of the *Protagoras* to the Platonic Socrates of the *Meno*; but Georgoulis has recently maintained (301 *supra*) that the *Protagoras* is intelligible only as a work of Plato's maturity, Morrison (303 *supra*) has put the *Gorgias* and the *Phaedo* together into a single period of Plato's thought, and Turolla (291 *supra*) has insisted that in the course of Plato's development the *Crito* belongs in the period of the *Laws* and *Epistles* VII and VIII²). For examples of the *Meno* itself interpreted as a transitional phase or a crucial turning-point in the development of Plato's thought see Klara Buchmann (583 *supra*), G. Galli (19 *supra*), and L. Sichirollo (145 *supra*).

¹) With this see also Gulley's later paper, Plato's theory of recollection, *Cl. Quart. N. S.* 4, 1954, 194—213. There he discusses at greater length the development of Plato's theory of anamnesis, arguing that it was not abandoned in the later dialogues.

²) For a different but equally heterodox theory concerning the place of the *Crito* in Plato's development see H. Schmalenbach (289b *supra*). Most recently R. Böhme, *Von Sokrates zur Ideenlehre*, Bern 1959, has argued that the *Crito* was written before 395 and that it presupposes the *Gorgias*, this, the *Apology*, and the *Crito* in that order being the first of Plato's works. The *Gorgias*, Böhme contends, cannot have been written between the *Protagoras* and the *Meno*; and he places the *Laches*, *Protagoras*, *Meno*, and *Phaedo* as a single cycle at the end of Plato's first period.

To the period of the *Meno* Sir David Ross in his latest study of the matter (297 *supra*) assigned the *Phaedo*, the *Euthydemus*, and the *Cratylus*, the last of which he dated about 388. Earlier attempts such as that of Ha ag's to assign it to the later period of the *Theaetetus* and the *Sophist* he rejected, but he passed over in silence Owen's more recent detachment of it from the *Euthydemus* and assignment of it to the 'critical group' subsequent to the *Parmenides* (294 *supra*). In the same year G. Fano (352 *supra*), declared that the *Cratylus* was certainly written after the *Euthydemus* and before the *Parmenides* and *Theaetetus*, and A. Lanzalaco (353 *supra*) with equal certainty assigned it to the period of the *Theaetetus* and interpreted it as the turning-point at which Plato criticizes the Heraclitean background of his earlier thought and his earlier theories of ideas and of language¹). A turning-point in Plato's development it was for V. Goldschmidt also (343 *supra*) but one of a totally different kind, for to Goldschmidt the *Cratylus* belonging with the *Euthydemus* represents Plato's definitive break with his first teacher, Cratylus, and his preliminary sketch of theories subsequently to be developed in the *Phaedo*, the *Symposium*, and later dialogues. Such an interpretation receives its extreme expression in M. Wundt's thesis (289 *supra*) that the *Euthydemus* and the *Cratylus* bring to a close the group of dialogues that he assigns to the period before the death of Socrates. In any case, the *Euthydemus* is taken by all those so far mentioned to be fairly 'early'²); but its close connection with the *Sophist* has again been asserted by A. C. Lloyd (887 *supra*), and M. Buccellato apparently taking the *Euthydemus* as well as the *Cratylus* to be later than the *Phaedo* and the *Republic* argues that the two together are more than a merely 'extrinsic prelude' to the *Theaetetus*, *Sophist*, *Politicus*, and *Philebus* (150 *supra*, pp. 23 and 148).

The dialogue most frequently adduced as evidence of a crisis, turning-point, or revolution in Plato's thought is the *Parmenides*. A crucial rôle is assigned to it in all attempts to trace or reconstruct the development of Plato's theory of ideas; and in almost all recent studies of that theory the interpretation of this dialogue and of the relation to it of the *Sophist*, *Politicus*, and *Philebus* plays an important part. Among those more specifically concerned, however, with the place of the *Parmenides* itself in the history of Plato's thought see especially: C. J. de Vogel (612a *supra*); R. Scoon (602 *supra*); Chung-Hwan Chen (604 *supra*); B. Liebrucks (217 *supra*);

¹) For the *Cratylus* and *Epistle VII* used to reconstruct the development of Plato's theory of language see also U. Galli (452 *supra*).

²) See also 298 *supra* with the note there and P. Friedländer (11a *supra*), II, p. 306. n. 3.

G. Colli (611 *supra*)¹; H. Raeder (142 *supra*); L. Lugarini (613 *supra*); L. J. Eslick (616 *supra*); K. F. Johansen (621 *supra*). Such interpretations of the significance to be read into the *Parmenides* and the whole question of Plato's development could be deeply affected by the relative position of the *Phaedrus*. Rudberg (84 *supra*) has recently reargued his case for placing this dialogue after the *Theaetetus* and before the *Parmenides*, in which period he thinks 'we can follow the crisis of Plato's old age'; E. Paci (676 *supra*) has interpreted it as proof of the 'dynamic unity' of Plato's thought and of the coherence in which the Socratic dialectic is connected with that of the *Republic* and the *Sophist*; and O. Regenbogen has maintained that it must be later than the *Sophist* and the *Politicus* and but little earlier than the *Timaeus* and the *Laws* (290 *supra* with references there). The *Timaeus* itself in this late position is a stumbling-block to interpretations of the *Parmenides* as a revolution in Plato's thought, and so G. E. L. Owen has undertaken to move it back before the *Parmenides* and before the *Cratylus* and the *Phaedrus* too (294 *supra* with the other references there; cf. P. Wilpert [295 *supra*]). Other interpreters in support of their theories of development have found it expedient to remove parts of the *Laws* in a similar fashion, in one case to make the original version of *Laws* X antedate the *Republic* itself (see 290 *supra*, *sub finem*).

The book by B. Liebrucks (217 *supra*) mentioned at the beginning of the last paragraph interprets the *Parmenides* as the culmination of Plato's development from an Eleatic position to an ontology that is essentially dialectic. With this work, however eccentric, others which profess to trace the development of Plato's dialectic and are therefore primarily relevant to that topic (VA *infra*) have this much in common: in them too the supposed development of dialectic is involved in theories about the development of Plato's epistemology and ontology or theory of ideas and often to such a degree that as distinguished from these latter topics dialectic seems to be of secondary importance and is not even mentioned in their titles. Such, for example, are the studies of G. E. Bariè, *L'esigenza dell'unità da Talete a Platone*, *Acme* 2 Fasc. 1—2, 1949, 25—86; of P. Kucharski, *Les chemins du savoir dans les derniers dialogues de Platon*, Paris 1949; of M. Vanhoutte, *La méthode ontologique de Platon*, Paris/Louvain 1956.

The development of Plato's dialectic as interpreted in all of these and especially in the last two goes hand in hand with a theory of change or development in the doctrine of ideas (VB *infra*). Kuchar-

¹ See also Colli's book, *ΦΥΣΙΣ ΚΡΥΠΤΕΣΘΑΙ ΦΙΛΕΙ*: Studi sulla filosofia greca, Milano 1948, pp. 221—237, where the interpretation of 611 *supra* is given in the context of Plato's whole development (pp. 175—242).

ski, holding that Plato's development was the result of a clash between his notions of *εἶδος* and of *φύσις*¹), argues that the later dialogues show him abandoning the former for the latter, while Vanhoutte attempts to find in these later writings an altered theory of ideas which will justify the interpretation and criticism to be found in Aristotle. For other such recent attempts to reconstruct in various ways the development of the theory in the direction of Aristotle's apparent evidence see the articles by L. J. Eslick (616 and 888 *supra*) and by K. F. Johansen (621 *supra*) and the publications numbered 107—124 *supra*, adding to those by P. Wilpert listed there (111, 112, and 124 *supra*) his articles numbered 176, 295, and 716 *supra* and to those by C. J. de Vogel (108 and 109 with 38b, 38c, and 38f *supra*) her most recent article on the subject, *La théorie de l'ἀπειρον chez Platon et dans la tradition platonicienne*, *Rev Philosophique* 149, 1959, 21—39. Kucharski also (cf. 117 *supra*) follows this trend in a recent article on the *Philebus* (*Rev Philosophique* 149, 1959, 42—47 and 68—72), but the interpretation in his earlier book of 1949 is a version of the thesis that in the later dialogues Plato abandons or radically alters and moderates the doctrine of separate paradigmatic ideas. With many variations this is the tendency of such interpretations as those of Chung-Hwan Chen (604 *supra*), B. Noll (952 *supra*), G. E. L. Owen (294 *supra*), L. Lugarini (218 and 613 *supra* [n. b. *Acme* 8, 1955, 32—33 and 45—48]), K. Nawratil (890 and 924 *supra*)²), and A. Lanzalaco (353 *supra*). Such interpretations are elaborations of the more general notion that there was a shift in Plato's interest from the ideal to the empirical with a concomitant tendency to reunite the real world and the sensible which he had previously separated. This notion of his development was succinctly set forth by J. Stenzel in his essay, *Platonismus einst und jetzt* (*Festschrift für H. Zangger*, Zürich 1935, and reprinted in Stenzel's *Kleine Schriften*, Darmstadt 1956, pp. 345—350). It was in effect admitted as correct even by R. Palas, who contended that Plato failed in his attempt to close the gap

¹) With Kucharski's procedure compare the earlier attempts to find a key to the development of Plato's doctrine in distinctions drawn between *εἶδος* and *ιδέα*: G. F. Else, *The terminology of the Ideas* (1189 *infra*), and P. Brommer, *ΕΙΔΟΣ et ΙΔΕΑ* (1203 *infra*).

²) With regard to the controversy over the earliest appearance of the theory of ideas, which Nawratil asserts is first brought fully to light in the *Symposium*, see E. Hoffmann (22 *supra*), p. 202, n. 9; R. Stark (467 *supra*), pp. 153—156; N. Gulley, *Cl Quart N. S.* 4, 1954, 195—197 (see 583 *supra*); O. Gigon, *Gnomon* 27, 1955, 16—18 (reviewing Soreth [491 *supra*]); J. Tate, *Cl Rev N. S.* 7, 1957, 27 (reviewing Hackforth [638 *supra*]).

between the ideal world and the sensible and despite his shifting interest continued in his old age to maintain the negative attitude of his youth towards the world of appearance (*Die Bewertung der Sinnenwelt bei Platon*, Helsinki 1941, pp. 36—56 and 206—209). It is so widely assumed in accounts of Plato's development that even its explicit assertion is supposed to require no supporting evidence (cf. for example G. Morrow, *Journ Philos* 48, 1951, 389—390; D. A. Rees, *Philosophy* 29, 1954, 102—105) and it is striking to find a recent interpreter who challenges it and asserts that Plato's interests developed instead in the opposite direction (D. Grene [240 *supra*], pp. 96—103). The commonly accepted notion of Plato's increasing interest in the physical world has itself been elaborated, however, not only in theories of his development away from 'transcendence'¹). It is often connected with the thesis that in his later period he came to admit into the sphere of true reality motion, life, and thought and with this developed a new doctrine of the causality of soul, which is interpreted as an encroachment upon his older theory of ideas or as altering it profoundly. As different species of this kind of interpretation see, for example: P. De Lacy, *The problem of causation in Plato's philosophy*, *Cl Phil* 34, 1939, 97—115; H. M. Conacher, *The later thought of Plato*, *Philosophy* 18, 1943, 99—113; J. H. M. M. Loenen, *De Nous in het systeem van Plato's filosofie*, Amsterdam 1951, and his later essay (715 *supra*). For all of these the 'turning-point' in the development of the doctrine of ideas is the *Sophist*; and the crucial evidence is found in *Sophist* 246 A 4—249 D 8, under which passage *supra* references are made to many other interpretations also. Among the references there see especially those to C. J. de Vogel's articles, in which the passage is adduced to support the contention that in the developed doctrine the world of ideas had come to be itself a 'living being' with soul and mind²). Marc-Wogau (779 *supra*) had asserted that even in

¹) In fact, Sir David Ross in his book, *Plato's Theory of Ideas*, Oxford 1951, though asserting (p. 237) that from the *Sophist* onwards Plato was increasingly occupied with the causation of events in the sensible world, maintained that in the development of the theory of ideas there was a general movement away from immanence towards transcendence (p. 230). More than a third of this book, in which the history of the theory is traced from the *Laches*, where Ross thinks its seeds first definitely appear, is given over to discussion of Aristotle's testimony.

²) Contrast L. Quattrocchi, *L'idea di bello nel pensiero di Platone*, Roma 1953, pp. 37—101. As he interprets the development of the doctrine (pp. 87—97 and especially p. 90), Plato here at the very point of overcoming dualism by making the supreme reality a living intellect failed to do so because he did not understand the significance of his new metaphysical insight, and in consequence his development lost its momentum.

the *Republic* the individual ideas have life of their own, whereas according to E. Fink (1022 *supra*, p. 191) it is in the final stage of the doctrine's development that the ideas become living beings encompassed by the all-embracing living being, the idea of the good. Not spiritualization or vitalization of the ideas, however, but their complete replacement by individual souls as the only real substances is the stage reached by the doctrine's development in the later dialogues according to W. Lutoslawski, who at the end of the 'forties emphatically restated this interpretation in his essay, Plato's change of mind, *Proc Tenth Internat Cong Philosophy 1, Fasc 2, Amsterdam 1949, 1076—1080* (see also Maria Maykowska [526a *supra*]). In a way quite different from such interpretations the development of the theory of soul is related to that of the doctrine of ideas by E. Hoffmann (22 *supra*, pp. 99—111); for him the development of the conception of soul as autokinesis goes hand in hand with the development of the doctrine of ideas as a logic of pure relational being, and soul thus understood far from replacing the ideas or encroaching upon their nature makes possible a development of the conception of participation in them and thus gives Plato a foundation for his new cosmological physics.

Among the works just mentioned those by Hoffmann, Loenen, and De Lacy show very clearly that interpretations of the development of the theory of ideas are often at the same time interpretations of the development of Plato's psychology and must be compared with other special studies of that topic (V C *infra*), of soul in its constitution and duration, of soul as epistemological subject, as autokinetic cause of motion and change, and as vehicle or manifestation of eros. It has been very commonly asserted that a new theory of soul developed in the *Phaedrus*, *Timaeus*, and *Laws* led Plato to a new physics and a new cosmic religion; but in the same recent collection of essays in which this proposition is restated by W. Theiler (*Entretiens Ant Cl 3, Vandoeuvres-Genève 1957, 65—66*), W. K. C. Guthrie, while subscribing to the premise that Plato's philosophy changed in obedience to its inner law of growth and in response to external stimuli, argues that from his 'purely Socratic phase' through the *Laws* his views of the constitution and the immortality of the soul remained fundamentally consistent (Plato's views on the nature of soul, *ibid.* pp. 1—19 with objections of Waszink and Theiler, pp. 20—21) and in so arguing adopts Cornford's interpretation whereby the supposedly later theory is connected with the doctrine of eros in the *Symposium* and found in the *Republic* (920 *supra*, pp. 71 and 78). H. Gauss (20 *supra*, I/1, pp. 143—158), on the other hand, represents Plato's views concerning the soul's constitution and

immortality — or the proofs of its immortality — as having undergone change and change connected with the development of the doctrine of ideas. With his notion (pp. 148—149) that the later form of this doctrine deprived of its validity in Plato's eyes the final proof of the *Phaedo* compare R. Hackforth's thesis concerning Plato's later doubts about this argument (922 *supra* with the other references there); with his contention (pp. 143—144) that Plato in the *Laws* criticizes his own earlier theory of a tripartite soul compare the thesis that in the later dialogues tripartition disappears before a theory of bipartition (D. A. Rees, JHS 77 Part 1, 1957, 112—118), and contrast J. Moreau's argument that tripartition of the soul is not inconsistent with its essential unity and cannot be invoked as evidence of Plato's development (Rev Ét Anciennes 55, 1953, 249—257). Such a connection of the tripartite psychology with the essential unity of discarnate soul in which the doctrine of anamnesis is supposed to perform a necessary function has recently been proposed by F. A. Wilford in an article, The status of reason in Plato's psychology (Phronesis 4, 1959, 54—58). It has frequently been supposed, however, in connection with theories of the development of Plato's dialectic and of change in the doctrine of ideas that the earlier conception of anamnesis was abandoned in the later dialogues or replaced by the method of diaeresis. In opposition to this O. Regenbogen has argued (290 *supra*, pp. 207—210) that anamnesis and diaeresis are complementary, though he supposes the latter to be a later methodical addition to the former, earlier conception. N. Gulley in a later article, Plato's theory of recollection (Cl Quart N. S. 4, 1954, 194—213), tracing the development of the doctrine of anamnesis, the version of which given in the *Phaedo* was according to him later abandoned (cf. on this H. D. Rankin [649 *supra*]), has also argued that anamnesis remained for Plato to the end a fundamental postulate of his theory of knowledge and that Stenzel's and Robin's theory of its disappearance depended upon their erroneous supposition of the eradication of the separation between the sensible and intelligible worlds (pp. 209—213). Gulley's conclusion has been rejected in turn, though with highly dubious arguments, and the thesis of the abandonment of anamnesis reasserted by M. Vanhoutte in his book, La méthode ontologique de Platon, Paris/Louvain 1956, pp. 36—38 and 72—85.

The assumption of Plato's growing concern with the empirical world and concomitant alteration of the doctrine of ideas and dialectic has also influenced recent attempts to reconstruct the development of his ethics (V G *infra*). This is apparent, despite the very different conclusions, both in the book by John Gould, The development of Plato's ethics, Cambridge 1955, and in E. G. Ballard's

still more recent article, the thesis of which is concisely given in its title, Plato's movement from an ethics of the individual to a science of particulars (801 *supra*). The movement traced by Gould is one which, determined by the growing insistence of Plato's 'sense of reality', runs from the personal idealism of Socrates to the abandonment of idealistic morality and thence through disillusion and despair with increasing tension and pessimism to the social ethics of the *Laws* setting 'the final seal of doom on the Socratic approach'. This interpretation of Gould's has been characterized as an 'Entwicklungsroman' by H. Kuhn (Gnomon 28, 1956, 337—339) and has been vigorously criticized by G. Vlastos in his article, Socratic knowledge and Platonic 'pessimism' (Philos Rev 66, 1957, 226—238), though Vlastos himself holds that eagerness to understand the world and to improve it so far as possible is the dominant mood of Plato's last years. Unfortunately these publications seem to have appeared too late to be considered by M. O'Brien in the essay, Modern philosophy and Platonic ethics (Journ Hist Ideas 19, 1958, 451—472), where among other modern interpretations the earlier explanations of Platonic ethics in terms of development away from intellectualism are discussed and criticized.

Ethics and politics being scarcely distinguishable as separate topics in Plato's philosophy, attempts to trace the development of one almost inevitably involve theories about the development of the other. This is true both of Gould's book and of the dissenting article by Vlastos just mentioned, which, moreover, has certain traits characteristic of the recent expositions of the development of Plato's political thought (V H *infra*). They have concentrated upon the apparent discrepancies of attitude and doctrine in the *Republic*, the *Politicus*, and the *Laws* and have interpreted these supposed alterations of outlook and of doctrine as effects of the impact made upon Plato by the personal experiences related in *Epistle* VII, which they take to be his own authentic account. This principle of interpretation is explicitly formulated by G. Colli in his article, Lo sviluppo del pensiero politico di Platone (Nuova Riv Storica 23, 1939, 169—192 and 449—476); but it is also followed, though to quite different conclusions, by D. Grene (240 *supra*, pp. 95—204), by J. B. Skemp (732 *supra*, pp. 26—66), and by J. Luccioni as well in his book, La pensée politique de Platon, Paris 1958¹). Protests against this

¹) The authenticity of *Epistle* VII 325 D—326 B being difficult to reconcile with the development of Plato's political thought before the *Republic*, Luccioni (pp. 67—68) has recourse to the solution that Plato in this passage erred about the chronology of his intellectual history. The early changes in Plato's attitude towards politics are reconstructed

way of interpreting Plato's writings as reflexes of his biography there have been, for example R. Harder's in his article, Plato und Athen (Neue Jahrb für Wiss und Jugend 10 1934, 493—500); and despite continued assertions such as G. R. Morrow's (520 and 59 *supra*) that Plato's attitudes in the *Republic* and in the *Laws* are fundamentally different and even such extreme judgments as that of G. Müller's (528 *supra*) there have been in recent years more and more attempts to establish or to reveal the unity of Plato's political philosophy in the *Republic*, the *Politicus*, and the *Laws*. Some examples of such essays are provided by G. A. Roggerone (735 *supra*) and H. G. Wolz (798 *supra*), both of whom represent the tendency to ascribe to Plato's political philosophy a 'development without alteration', whereas unity or homogeneity in a much more thorough sense is ascribed to it by C. W. R. Larson (830 *supra*), by F. Adorno in his essay, Dialektika e politica in Platone (Accad Toscana . . . 'La Colombaria', Atti e Mem 20, 1955 [Firenze 1956], 97—200), and by G. Uscatesco in his, L'utopia platonica, Humanitas (Brescia) 12, 1957, 422—430. See now also F. Egermann, Platonische Spätphilosophie und Platonismen bei Aristoteles, Hermes 87, 1959, 133—142.

One might think it a malicious parody of the multifarious theories of Plato's development to say that, whereas in his works no unity of conception can be found, a unity of evolution is clearly ascertainable; but this formulation is D. H. T. Vollenhoven's own serious conclusion concerning the nature of Plato's thought and of Aristotle's too. His unique interpretation of the 'unity of evolution' in Plato, discovered by what he calls an analysis of problems and consisting chiefly in squeezing different dialogues into idiosyncratic categories which according to their author exhaust the stages not only of Plato's thought but of all philosophical history as well, he has expounded in several recent articles:

1125. D. H. T. Vollenhoven, The course of Plato's development, Library Tenth Internat Cong Philosophy 2, Amsterdam, 1948, pp. 1—16.

1126. D. H. T. Vollenhoven, L'évolution d'Aristote: Étude d'histoire de la problématique philosophique, Proc XIth Internat Cong Philosophy 12, Amsterdam/Louvain, 1953, pp. 86—90. For Plato see especially pp. 86—87 and 90. See also pp. 24—35 in his article on this subject in Philos Reformata 16, 1951, 16—63.

quite differently by H. Schmalenbach (289b *supra*) and by J. S. Morrison (105 *supra* and Cl Quart N. S. 8, 1958, 198—218), though both adduce *Epistle* VII as evidence for their theories.

1127. D. H. T. Vollenhoven, Ennoëtisme en 'ahoristos dyas' en het praeplatonische denken, *Philos Reformata* 19, 1954, 58—86 and 145—168.

1128. D. H. T. Vollenhoven, Platoon I: De niet-realistische periode, *Philos Reformata* 21, 1956, 75—78. This is the last section of the article, De ontwikkelingsgang van Aristoteles, *ibid.* pp. 45—80. See also p. 46, n. 4 for 'corrections' of the earlier articles: the *Politicus*, formerly assigned to the 'vitalistic' period is now placed among the 'occasionalistic' works; and the *Timaeus*, formerly in the 'occasionalistic' group, is now under the influence of Owen's article (294 *supra*) placed immediately after the *Cratylus* and the *Republic*. The ease with which Vollenhoven makes this change is enough to show that his categories are spurious and his assignment of the several dialogues to them merely arbitrary.

1129. D. H. T. Vollenhoven, Het begin van Platoon's realistische jaren, *Philos Reformata* 21, 1956, 109—127. The non-realistic period (1128 *supra*), divided into a non-mathematical objectivistic phase and a mathematical objectivistic phase, the latter of which comprises individualistic and partially universalistic sub-phases, is followed by a semi-realistic period (containing only the *Symposium*), which is followed in turn by a fully realistic period, the first phase of which is purely phrenological (the *Phaedo*) and the second phrenologic-semipsychological (*Cratylus*, *Republic*, *Timaeus*).

Vollenhoven's arbitrary interpretations and the relevance of his portentous schematism apart, one wonders how Plato's writings, if they registered any such essential alterations, could be thought to represent a 'unity of evolution'. Change as such is not 'evolution' or 'development'; and there are changes by which these processes are impeded, prevented, or destroyed. 'Development' implies something which, however latent it may be at first, remains essentially identical throughout the process of being unfolded, elaborated, or more patently articulated. To those Germans at least who ascribe to Plato radical tergiversations and call these the 'Entwicklung' of his thought the lines of Goethe should have given pause:

*Und keine Zeit und keine Macht zerstückelt
Geprügte Form, die lebend sich entwickelt.*

Nevertheless, there is nothing unusual in such an argument as that of Liebrucks, who defends the case for 'Entwicklung' by asserting that the ontological and political theories of the 'middle dialogues'

are diametrically opposed to the ontology of the *Theaetetus*, *Sophist*, and *Parmenides*:

1130. B. Liebrucks, *Das Problem der Entwicklung bei Platon*, *Zeitschr Religions- und Geistesgeschichte* 1, 1948, 352—355. Liebrucks was here defending by anticipation the thesis of his own book, at that time not yet published (217 *supra*); but the article is written in criticism of the book by Schilling, who in his analysis of the dialogues emphasizes the 'unity' of their content and contends that 'sogenannte Umkippungen sind in der Entwicklung Platons von vornherein sehr unwahrscheinlich':

1131. K. Schilling, *Platon: Einführung in seine Philosophie*, Würzach 1948 (cf. W. Weisedel, *Zeitschr philos Forsch* 3, 1948, 607—612; E. M. Manasse, *Philos and Phenom Research* 11, 1950/51, 606—609).

One cannot help suspecting that the prestige of a biological analogy imprecisely used has made it seem plausible to take differences of expression or of attitude as proof straightway of a change of doctrine and change of any kind as adequately explained when called 'development', and this suspicion finds some confirmation in the assumption confidently formulated by E. R. Dodds (230 *supra*, p. 208): 'I shall treat it (scil. Plato's philosophy) as an organic thing which grew and changed, partly in obedience to its inner law of growth, but partly also in response to external stimuli'. To assume that a man's thought is itself an organism, which grows and ceases to grow and behaves like any other living thing, is itself only a version of the pathetic fallacy.

Concerning the implications of such assumptions of change and development in Plato's thought, although there have been some significant remarks made by the way such as those of R. Schaerer (1061 *supra*, pp. 76—83), P. Merlan (436 *supra*, pp. 413 and 424), B. H. Bal (639 *supra*, pp. 159—162), R. Stark (467 *supra*, pp. 153—156), and H. Herter (1024 *supra*, p. 347), there has in recent years been scarcely any systematic discussion besides that in Goldschmidt's two essays:

— V. Goldschmidt, *Sur le problème du "Système de Platon"* (67 *supra*).

1132. V. Goldschmidt, *Temps historique et temps logique dans l'interprétation des systèmes philosophiques*, *Proc XIth Internat Cong Philosophy* 12, Amsterdam/Louvain 1953, pp. 7—13.

V A: Dialectic (Logic and Method: Elenchus, Diaeresis, Synagoge)

The term 'dialectic' is employed by recent writers on Plato in at least three distinguishable senses, which, however, are not always clearly differentiated by those who use the word. It is sometimes used to mean (1) Plato's theory of the method or process of reasoning. Sometimes it means (2) Plato's theory of ontological relations, either the relations among the ideas or the relation of phenomena to the ideas—or both; and frequently this ontological theory is taken to be the basis for the theory of method. Sometimes it means (3) the course of the argument followed in the dialogues, that is the structure of the dialogues and what Plato intended by it; and it is sometimes tacitly assumed and sometimes explicitly argued that this structure was meant to follow or illustrate the theory (1), but it is sometimes asserted that to the contrary Plato's dialectical practice is unrelated to his theory of method or even in contradiction to it. Consequently among the works that profess to deal with Plato's dialectic some are scarcely distinguishable from essays on the theory of ideas and other seem to be primarily analyses of the structure of the dialogues.

It is scarcely possible to pass in review the most important works on this subject published since 1930 without mentioning at the beginning J. Stenzel's *Studien zur Entwicklung der platonischen Dialektik von Sokrates zu Aristoteles*, even though the first edition was reviewed by C. Ritter in his last survey of Platonic literature in 'Bursian' (225, 1930, 123—126). The year after Ritter's review had appeared a second enlarged edition of the book was published (Leipzig/Berlin 1931). This was later translated into English as *Plato's Method of Dialectic* (Oxford 1940) by D. J. Allan, who prefixed it to his translation and enthusiastic essay on Stenzel's interpretation. This interpretation was criticized at several crucial points in a review of Allan's translation by R. Robinson (*Philos Rev* 50, 1941, 542—544), who almost simultaneously with this review published a book on the dialectic of the 'early' and 'middle' dialogues without consideration of the theory of division and synthesis to which Stenzel had devoted so much attention:

1133. R. Robinson, *Plato's Earlier Dialectic*, Ithaca 1941 (cf. P. Friedländer, *Cl Phil* 40, 1945, 253—259; H. Cherniss, *AJPh* 68, 1947, 133—146). This book revised and with Robinson's essay on the *Parmenides* (601 *supra*) added as a final chapter was published in a second edition, Oxford 1953 (cf. Kerferd, *Cl Rev N.S.* 5, 1955, 50—52; Tate, *JHS* 75, 1955, 168—169; Sparshott, *Phoenix* 9, 1955, 86—88). The book is devoted chiefly to the elenchus, of which

Robinson expresses a low opinion, epagoge, of which he concludes Plato had no methodological consciousness, and hypothesis, which he holds is the keyword for dialectic in the 'middle' dialogues but which though recommended there as a method is not much used. With the sections on hypothesis in this book one should compare Robinson's later article on the subject (1165 *infra*) and H.-P. Stahl's dissertation (1172 *infra*). Still another article of Robinson's contemporary with that on the *Parmenides* should be mentioned in connection with his book:

1134. R. Robinson, Plato's Consciousness of Fallacy, *Mind* N.S. 51, 1942, 97—114. Here he argues that Plato thought ambiguity unimportant. Contrast the article by E. Karlin (608 *supra*).

Since Robinson in his book attempts to treat Plato's 'logic' apart from his ontology and epistemology, it is interesting to notice his enthusiastic review (*Philos Rev* 52, 1943, 505—506) of a small book published about this time and in which Aristotle's logic is closely connected with Platonic dialectic understood literally as conversation:

1135. E. Kapp, Greek foundations of traditional logic, New York 1942 (cf. *Demos, Philos and Phenom Research* 4, 1943/44, 94—101; *Morrow, Cl. Phil* 39, 1944, 198—200).

Robinson had briefly discussed the notion and the name 'dialectic' and had concluded that Plato was certainly the inventor of the first and probably of the second (1133 *supra*, pp. 92—96, somewhat changed in the second edition, pp. 88—92). Without knowledge of Robinson's discussion Muri treated the subject at greater length shortly thereafter:

1136. W. Muri, *Das Wort Dialektik bei Platon*, *Mus Helvet* 1, 1944, 152—168. Muri also concludes that Plato invented the word, but unlike Robinson he insists that it was from the beginning connected with the doctrine of ideas.

At the other extreme from Robinson's strictly 'logical' approach to Platonic dialectic is that of R. Schaerer, for whom dialectical argument involves 'the condemnation of all exclusively rectilinear logic' and who interprets the structure of the dialogue itself as the whole or a definite part of the circuitous route which is Plato's dialectical method. This interpretation was expounded by Schaerer in 1938 in his book, *La Question Platonicienne* (1061 *supra*), especially pp. 24—51 and 95—156. A special aspect of it received more detailed treatment three years later in his article, *Le mécanisme de l'ironie*

dans ses rapports avec le dialectique (1118 *supra*); and three years after this a concise schematic exposition of it was given on pp. 106—123 of his more general book, the whole of which is infused by it:

1137. R. Schaerer, Dieu, l'homme et la vie d'après Platon, Neuchâtel 1944 (cf. V. Niebergall, Zeitschr philos Forsch 4, 1949, 141—144). In more recent articles, to which reference has already been made, Schaerer has analysed according to this scheme the dialectical course or structure of the *Laws* (532 *supra*) and of the 'metaphysical dialogues' (618 *supra*)¹). He has not only tried to relate to the Platonic dialectic thus interpreted the syllogistic of Aristotle but has professed to find in Homer the sources of the dialectic, all of its elements implied in the tragic course of the *Suppliants* of Aeschylus, and running through the trilogy of the *Oresteia* a dialectical curve corresponding to that of Plato's dialogues:

1138. R. Schaerer, La dialectique platonicienne dans ses rapports avec le syllogisme et la méthode cartésienne, Rev Théologie et Philosophie N.S. 36, 1948, 24—40. Here he asserts that in Platonic dialectic the syllogism occurs in its 'purest form' and that Aristotle in modifying it to produce an objective and necessary concatenation sacrificed the fecundity of discovery inherent in dialectical discourse.

1139. R. Schaerer, Le préhistoire de la dialectique et du syllogisme d'après Homère et les *Suppliants* d'Eschyle, Rev Métaph et Morale 57, 1952, 285—312²).

1140. R. Schaerer, La composante dialectique de l'*Orestie*, Rev Métaph et Morale 58, 1953, 47—79.

About as far removed from all this as is imaginable was Dürr's analysis of the *Sophist* in terms of modern symbolic logic:

— K. Dürr, Moderne Darstellung der platonischen Logik: Ein Beitrag zur Erklärung des Dialoges „*Sophistes*“ (878 *supra*). This was followed two years later by his more general essay:

1141. K. Dürr, Die Entwicklung der Dialektik von Platon bis Hegel, Dialectica 1, 1947, 45—62. Here (pp. 47—50) he distinguishes two types of dialectic used by Plato, one represented by the *Par-*

¹) He had done a similar analysis of the *Phaedo* in an earlier article:

1137a) R. Schaerer, La composition du '*Phédon*', Rev Ét Grecques 53, 1940, 1—50.

²) For Homer and dialectic cf. C. C. van Essen, *Studia Varia* C. G. Vollgraff . . . oblata, Amsterdam 1948, pp. 25—28 in his essay, Homère, ΓΕΝΕΣΙΣ ΠΑΝΤΕΣΣΙΝ, *ibid.* pp. 22—33.

menides and the other, eristic dialectic, represented by the *Euthydemus*, the latter of which alone Aristotle had in view in the *Topics*. Then, after comparing the Megarian and the Stoic dialectic, he proceeds to discuss the dialectic of Fichte and of Hegel. This essay is criticized by P. Bernays (*Dialectica* 1, 1947, 172—175), who contends (p. 173) that Platonic dialectic is not just the art of 'Dialog-Führung' but has to do with the deduction of all entities from the one and 'indefinite duality', in the application of which latter principle lies the significance of diaeresis.

—. R. Hackforth, The ἀνεξέταστος βίος in Plato (798a *supra*). On the importance and significance of the elenchus for Plato in his latest works as in his earliest.

1142. A. Galimberti, Introduzione storica al problema delle categorie, *Riv Storia Filos* 2, 1947, 221—246. This begins with a brief section on 'la scienza dialettica di Platone', and the following section represents Aristotle's conception of categories as a criticism of Plato's method.

1143. W. A. Gerhard, Plato's Theory of Dialectic, *New Scholast* 21, 1947, 192—211. Plato's dialectic is here represented as both a methodology, i. e. a logic of synthesis and analysis, and a metaphysics, i. e. the doctrine of ideas, the former to be employed only under the guidance of the latter and the knowledge of the Good reached by means of the metaphysical function of dialectic to be used as a touchstone in establishing the place of each intelligible object in the hierarchy of being. Gerhard takes account of none of the objections that have already been raised to many of the interpretations adopted in his construction and seems to be unaware of their controversial character.

—. V. Goldschmidt, Les Dialogues de Platon: Structure et méthode dialectique (1091 *supra*). With this see also Goldschmidt's monograph, Le paradigme dans le dialectique platonicienne (1092 *supra*), and the two essays referred to under that number.

—. E. Karlin, The Method of Ambiguity (608 *supra*). With this article, the sub-title of which is 'A solution of the paradoxes, in Plato's later logic', cf. that by R. Robinson (1134 *supra*). Karlin insists that the method of ambiguity is a method of philosophical and not semantic analysis, for Plato did not acknowledge any such thing as a non-ontological logic.

—. E. W. Beth, Les relations de la dialectique et la logique (115a *supra*), pp. 113—117.

1144. P. Grenet, *Les origines de l'analogie philosophique dans les dialogues de Platon*, Paris 1948 (cf. G. Morrow, *Philos Rev* 59, 1950, 556—559; V. Goldschmidt, *Rev Ét Grecques* 63, 1950, 286—289; J. F. Anderson, *Rev Metaphysics* 4, 1950/51, 111—128; R. Robinson, *Mind N.S.* 60, 1951, 270—272). According to Grenet Plato, though he never became fully aware of the analogy of being or explicitly developed the doctrine, everywhere assumes 'the analogy of all beings'; and his use of analogy is the key to his method of demonstration and to his doctrine of existence, knowledge, and action. Plato is here represented as holding that the ideas, the soul, and god are inaccessible to knowledge and are apprehended only through conceptual analogues formed on the basis of empirical data.

1145. R. M. Agoglia, *La actualidad de la doctrina platónica del ser*, *Actas Primer Cong Nac Filos*, Mendoza 1949, II, pp. 649—654. It is here argued that Plato recognized two kinds of metaphysical investigation, one the exhaustive study of all the ideas as parts of a dialectically articulated organism and the other the study of a privileged entity that will best reveal the nature of being in general, and that for him the true procedure culminates in study of the idea of good which transcends being and confers on every entity existence, intelligibility, life, and substance. Agoglia himself recommends the advantages of the former of the two kinds of metaphysics.

1146. G. E. Bariè, *L'esigenza dell' unità da Talete a Platone*, *Acme* 2 Fasc. 1—2, 1949, 25—86. The second part of this article (pp. 50—86) is entitled 'L'uno nel sistema platonico'. According to it by developing a 'dialectic of being' in the *Parmenides* and the *Sophist* and using the dialectical premises of the former in the *Philebus* and the *Timaeus* Plato sought to overcome the dualism involved in his original theory of ideas but without modifying the doctrine even though in this dialectic of being the original ontological character of the ideas is lost.

1147. G. della Volpe, *La critica aristotelica della "diacresi" platonica*, *Actas Primer Cong Nac Filos*, Mendoza 1949, III, pp. 1944—1949. This is in fact della Volpe's own interpretation and critique of the dialectic, which he calls 'tautoeterologia', formulated in the *Sophist* and *Politicus* in the light of the 'new problem' of the *Theaetetus*, as he thinks, and with the intention of resolving the aporiae of the *Parmenides*. See also *Proc XIth Internat Cong Philosophy* 14, Amsterdam/Louvain 1953, p. 159 in della Volpe's article, *Galileo e il principio di non-contraddizione*, *ibid.* pp. 157—162.

— H. Gundert, *Enthusiasmos und Logos bei Platon* (675 *supra*), pp. 40—44.

1148. P. Kucharski, *Les chemins du savoir dans les derniers dialogues de Platon*, Paris 1949 (cf. F. Adorno, *Riv Crit Storia Filos* 6, 1951, 59—61; *É. des Places*, *Ant Cl* 20, 1951, 143—148; J. Moreau, *Rev Philosophique* 141, 1945, 421—426; R. Schacrer, *Studia Philos* 11, 1951, 201—203). The thesis here developed in detail¹) can be summed up as follows: Plato's original conception of intelligible being as an *εἶδος*, a transcendent and indivisible unity in which the multiplicity of things called by the same name participates and which is the object of an intuitive knowledge explicable only by the myth of anamnesis, was replaced after the crisis of the *Parmenides* by the conception of *ἰδέα* or *φύσις*, the generic unity of different species discoverable by the dialectic of the *Sophist* and *Politicus*, which is a strictly discursive logic, an inductive and quasi-empirical method of naturalistic inspiration in contrast to the deductive dialectic of geometrical inspiration in *Republic* VI—VII.

— B. Liebrucks, *Platons Entwicklung zur Dialektik* (217 *supra*).

1149. L. Malverne, *La condition de l'être et la mission du logos*, *Rev Métaph et Morale* 54, 1949, 41—66. The rôle of language in the doctrine of Plato and of Aristotle that Being, which for the Eleatics was strictly identity, has existence as 'otherness' also. See also Malverne's recent article, *Remarques sur le "Sophiste"* (900 *supra*).

— P. Wilpert, *Zwei aristotelische Frühschriften über die Ideenlehre* (111 *supra*), pp. 143—146 and 158—160. The diacresis of the later dialogues, arising from the attempt to clarify the relations among the ideas, leads at once, according to Wilpert, to the notion that the ideas are not units but are articulated or synthetic wholes, i. e. numbers.

1150. C. Bello, *Communisme platonicien et Marxisme*, Paris 1950 (cf. Salin, *Erasmus* 5, 1952, 277—278). The body of this book (pp. 45—191) is entitled 'La dialectique pure et la dialectique impure ou le matérialisme dialectique'. In it Bello tries to interpret Platonic dialectic as an instrument forged expressly for the refutation of the dialectical materialism of Marx and Lenin.

¹) Essential parts of it had already been presented in two earlier articles, the substance of which is incorporated in the later book:

1148a) P. Kucharski, *Forme et Nature ou les deux chemins du savoir d'après les dialogues de Platon*, *Rev Philosophie* 37, 1937, 415—449.

1148b) P. Kucharski, *La "méthode d'Hippocrate" dans le Phèdre*, *Rev Ét Grecques* 52, 1939, 301—357.

— H.-G. Gadamer, *Zur Vorgeschichte der Metaphysik* (215 *supra*). See also Gadamer's much earlier book (710a *supra*), pp. 13—80: *Zur platonischen Dialektik*.

— M. Landmann, *Elenktik und Maieutik* (139 *supra*). Compare with this the later essay by Éliane Amado-Lévy-Valensi (1099 *supra*).

— C. Librizzi, *I problemi fondamentali della filosofia di Platone* (29 *supra*), pp. 40—66: *Dall'eleatismo alla gnoseologia platonica*.

— O. Regenbogen, *Bemerkungen zur Deutung des platonischen Phaidros* (290 *supra*), especially pp. 207—210. He argues that *diaeresis* does not replace *anamnesis* but is complementary to it, though a later methodical addition.

— R. Robinson, *Forms and Error in Plato's Theaetetus* (880 *supra*). On this article see R. Hackforth (958 *supra*) and Winifred F. Hicken (960 *supra*).

1151. I. M. Bocheński, *Ancient Formal Logic*, Amsterdam 1951, pp. 14—18 (cf. J. L. Ackrill, *Mind* N.S. 62, 1953, 110—111 on Bocheński's cavalier treatment of Plato's logic here). See also the somewhat more moderate treatment in I. M. Bocheński, *Formale Logik*, Freiburg/München 1956, pp. 39—46.

1152. H. Daudin, *Les rapports de l'être et de la connaissance chez Platon et chez Aristote*, *Rev Ét Anciennes* 53, 1951, 26—41. Daudin here analyses the purpose of Platonic dialectic and its relation as a method to its ontological objects, the ideas, and then compares with it Aristotle's syllogistic as a direct but only partial answer to Plato's problem and one established on a plane inferior to that which Platonic dialectic was meant to attain.

— A. de Marignac, *Imagination et dialectique* (1070 *supra*). Despite its title this book has nothing to do with dialectic in any of the usual senses of the word.

1153. H. Gauss, *Über die Bedeutung und Grenzen des dialektischen Prinzips in der Philosophie*, *Zeitschr philos Forsch* 5, 1950/51, 321—342. Plato's dialectic, the rôle of which according to Gauss is to explain not the existing but the becoming, i. e. what in its own nature is dialectically related to ideas that in themselves exclude each other, is treated chiefly on pp. 338—342, after Gauss has distinguished between dialectical and undialectical thinking and has analysed the dialectic of Hegel and the criticism and reformations of it by Croce

and Bradley. Gauss holds one of the chief superiorities of Platonic dialectic to be its combination with a limiting undialectical mathematics, itself dependent upon logic as a higher discipline, with logic and dialectic, content and method alike, subordinated to an 'ethical certainty'. See also H. Gauss (20 *supra*), I/1, pp. 76—101, where the substance of the foregoing article is incorporated in the treatment of Plato's dialectic and logic¹).

—. G. Hinrichs, The *Euthydemus* as a locus of the Socratic Elenchus (460 *supra*). This is presented as a refutation of the interpretation and criticism of elenchus given by R. Robinson (1133 *supra*).

—. G. Huber, Platons dialektische Ideenlehre . . . (612 *supra*). See especially pp. 97—117: Das Wesen der Idee und die Dialektik.

—. M. W. Isenberg, Plato's *Sophist* and the Five Stages of Knowing (881 *supra*). On the dialectical progression of the *Sophist* as an exemplification of the method of acquiring knowledge.

1154. J. Lohmann, Vom ursprünglichen Sinn der aristotelischen Syllogistik, *Lexis* 2, Fasc. 2, 1951, 205—236. There are here scattered remarks on Platonic dialectic (e. g. pp. 208, 217—219, 227, 233), depending in part on Heidegger's theories about ἀλήθεια and in part on questionable assertions concerning the supposed doctrine of idea-numbers. Lohmann asserts that Aristotle's syllogistic was meant to be a purified and perfected form of Platonic diaeresis.

—. L. Lugarini, L'unità dell' idea nel *Parmenide* (613 *supra*), especially pp. 350—380 on Plato's dialectical method and the way in which according to Lugarini it is applied in the *Parmenides*. In connection which the remainder of the article see Lugarini, Il principio logico in Platone (218 *supra*) and his later article (1168 *infra*).

—. N. R. Murphy, The interpretation of Plato's *Republic* (791 *supra*). On dialectic, especially in the *Republic* but also in the later dialogues, see pp. 164—186 and pp. 188—200.

1155. K. Schilling, Ursprung und Bedeutung der Logik, *Zeitschr philos Forsch* 5, 1950/51, 197—219. On pp. 204—209 he argues that diaeresis for Plato had the decisive importance of a method for establishing the order and structure of the cosmos of ideas, that it

¹) See also the earlier, rather autobiographical article, in which pp. 167—176 are devoted exclusively to Plato:

1153a) H. Gauss, Von Kant über Hegel zu Plato, *Studia Philos* 7 1947, 114—176.

was the main source from which Aristotle developed his logic, and that just because the universal concepts which for Plato were so ordered were not the real objects of Aristotle's science the logic developed from diaeresis had little significance for Aristotle himself. See also the chapters on the *Parmenides* and the *Sophist* in Schilling's earlier book (1131 *supra*) which bear respectively the significant sub-titles, *Dialektik des Absoluten und der Welt* (pp. 214—240) and *Der Kosmos der Ideen zwischen dem Unbestimmten und dem Einen* (pp. 252—267).

1156. F. Solmsen, Aristotle's Syllogism and its Platonic background, *Philos Rev* 60, 1951, 563—571. This is a discussion of Aristotle's *Prior* and *Posterior Analytics*, A Revised Text with Introduction and Commentary by W. D. Ross, Oxford 1949; and Solmsen here (pp. 568—571) defends once more the connection of the Aristotelian syllogism with Platonic diaeresis against the rejection of this theory by Ross, who argues (pp. 25—27), as after Shorey he had done before, that reflection upon *Phaedo* 104—105 had led Aristotle to formulate the syllogism¹). D. J. Allan in his review of Ross (*Philos Quart* 1, 1950/51, 460) objects to minimizing the importance of diaeresis, while G. R. Morrow in his (*Journ Philos* 48, 1951, 136) takes Ross's remarks to mean that Shorey's thesis is not incompatible with derivation of the syllogism from one of the two features of diaeresis and says that these remarks 'ought to put an end to a somewhat misguided and aimless controversy'. A different and less favorable judgment is passed upon them by G. Patzig in *Gnomon* 27, 1955, 499, n. 3; see also G. Patzig, *Die aristotelische Syllogistik*, Göttingen 1959, 91—92.

1157. A. Szabó, Beiträge zur Geschichte der griechischen Dialektik, *Acta Antiqua* 1, 1951/52, 377—406. The fourth section of this article (pp. 399—406) is entitled *Platon und die Dialektik*. A

¹) See Ross's book, *Plato's theory of ideas*, Oxford 1951, p. 34. Shorey proposed and argued his theory in *Cl Phil* 19, 1924, 1—19; and in *Cl Phil* 28, 1933, 199—204 he defended it against criticism by É. de Strycker in *Rev Néoscol Philos* 34, 1932, 42—56 and 218—239. It was adopted by Ross in an article, the substance of which is incorporated in pp. 6—23 of the Introduction to his edition of the *Prior* and *Posterior Analytics*:

1156a) W. D. Ross, The discovery of the syllogism, *Philos Rev* 48, 1939, 251—272 (see also *Proc Aristotelian Soc N.S.* 40, 1939/40, vi—vii). To this article, which criticized Solmsen's theories concerning the development of Aristotle's logic and its relation to Academic thought, Solmsen replied two years later:

1156b) F. Solmsen, The discovery of the syllogism, *Philos Rev* 50, 1941, 410—421.

supplement to this is provided by Szabó's article, *Zur Geschichte der Dialektik des Denkens*, *Acta Antiqua* 2, 1953/54, 17—57, where on pp. 50—54 Plato's *Sophist* is treated. See 221 *supra* and the note there.

—. N. Gulley, Ethical analysis in Plato's earlier dialogues (137 *supra*), especially pp. 78—82 on Plato's attitude towards dialectic in ethical inquiry through the *Republic*. See also Gulley's article, Plato's theory of recollection, *Cl Quart N.S.* 4, 1954, 194—213, and especially pp. 209—213 on diaeresis and anamnesis as complementary and not later and earlier alternative theories.

1158. A. C. Lloyd, Plato's description of division, *Cl Quart N.S.* 2, 1952, 105—112. He suggests that Plato illustrated the rules of diaeresis by means of a 'divided line', and on this assumption he tries to interpret *Philebus* 16 C—17 A, *Sophist* 253 D—E and *Politicus* 287 C 3—5.

1159. S. Moser, Theorie und Erfahrung bei Platon und Aristoteles, *Dialectica* 6, 1952, 201—221. He discusses the relation of ancient dialectical thought with its theoretico-contemplativa nature and its insistence upon an ultimate ontological 'anhypotheton' to modern 'open' science with its hypothetico-deductive nature, insisting by the way that hypothesis and hypothetical method had for Plato a meaning fundamentally different from their meaning in modern science. The identification of Galileo's method and Plato's to which he objects was made by Magdalena Aebi in her book, *Kants Begründung der 'Deutschen Philosophie'* (Basel 1947), pp. 118—125.

—. Maria Rezzani, I problemi fondamentali del "*Sofista*" di Platone (885 *supra*), especially pp. 198—300 on 'dichotomy and dialectic' (see also 886 *supra*, p. 22) and pp. 307—309 on the 'double dialectic' (with 886 *supra*, pp. 25—26 reprinted in her monograph, *Note e ricerche . . .* [1084 *supra*], pp. 24—29). For this notion of a 'double dialectic' see also Marisa Grondona (894 *supra*); Dr. Rezzani's exposition of it is criticized by M. Vanhoutte in his book, *La méthode ontologique de Platon*, p. 119, for reference to which and to his own earlier article on the crucial passage, *Sophist* 253 D—E, see 909 *supra*. For E. Maggioni's brief exposition of the 'dialectic of the ideas' in his paper, *Eternità e storicità del dialogo*, and the discussion of this with Maggioni by Mazzantini and Rezzani see the note on 885 *supra*.

—. J. Derbolav, Der Dialog '*Kratylos*' . . . (349 *supra*). On dialectic see especially pp. 49—54, pp. 60—69, and notes 27, 29 and 45 (pp. 100—102 and p. 107).

— L. Lugarini, Il principio logico in Platone (218 *supra*). See also Lugarini's earlier article (613 *supra*) and his later one (1168 *infra*).

— P.-M. Schuhl, Remarques sur Platon et la technologie (736 *supra*). On the 'divisions' in the *Sophist* and the *Politicus*.

1160. W. J. Verdenius, De Socratische methode, *Hermeneus* 25, 1953, 3—8. In this defence of the elenchus as constructive weapons against facile pragmatism and nominalism Verdenius criticizes R. Robinson's interpretation (1133 *supra*) and recommends L. Nelson's application of the Socratic method.

1161. G. Capone Braga, Della Dialettica, *Giorn Metafisica* 9, 1954, 21—59. Beginning with Anaximander and ending with Proclus he here surveys 'dialectic' in what he calls its two forms, formal or abstract and objective or ontological. In the section on Plato (pp. 34—46) he discusses the dialectic of eros and the gnoseological dialectic of the relations among ideas as given in the *Sophist*, and finally the supposed doctrine of idea-numbers, which he calls a dialectical derivation of the ideal and real world from two ultimate principles.

— H. C. de Lima Vaz, A dialéctica das ideias no *Sofista* (889 *supra*). See also 927 *supra* on dialectic in the *Symposium*.

1162. J. K. Feibleman, On the Topics and Definitions of the Categories, *Philos Quart* 4, 1954, 45—59. On pp. 50—53 he discusses the Platonic methods of definition by epagoge and diaeresis and Aristotle's criticism of the latter. See also pp. 53—55 for the problem of definition in Aristotle. He asserts that diaeresis is the source of syllogism and that it is a constitutive as well as a regulative method, quantitative rather than structural, and not nearly 'primitive' enough.

1163. M. W. Heitzmann, The philosophical foundation of the Aristotelian logic and the origin of the syllogism, *Proc Am Catholic Philos Assoc* 28, 1954, 131—142. Against Jaeger and Solmsen he argues that the syllogism was not derived from Platonic diaeresis but was Aristotle's criticism of it and was his own original creation, an extension of the declarative proposition and intended as an instrument for dealing with scientific knowledge. See the reply to this article by A. Nemetz, *ibid.* pp. 142—150.

— P. Mesnard, Le rencontre de Platon avec Hippocrate ... (702 *supra*). With Mesnard's thesis here compare P. Kucharski's book (1148 *supra*), pp. 137—142 and 225—229 and Kucharski's earlier article (1148b *supra*).

1164. E.-W. Platzeck, Von der Analogie zum Syllogismus, Paderborn 1954 (cf. G. Patzig, *Gnomon* 27, 1955, 499—507; E. Manasse, *Philos Rundschau* 5, Beiheft 1, 1957, 46—52). Using *Metaphysics* 1078 B 17—32 as a key-text Platzeck undertakes to demonstrate how it was possible and necessary for Socratic analogy to be transformed into the Aristotelian syllogism by way of the typical Platonic analogy and particularly by way of Plato's doctrine of the 'Great and Small'. So this doctrine of Plato's and its elaboration in 'diaeretical demonstration', of which the Aristotelian syllogism is supposed to be a partial and impoverished form, the second section of the monograph (pp. 47—62) is especially devoted. The whole construction is built upon dubious evidence uncritically accepted and isolated passages misinterpreted or overinterpreted, often in a grotesque fashion. See Platzeck's later article (1171 *infra*).

—. G. K. Plochmann, Socrates, the Stranger from Elea, and some others (1095 *supra*).

1165. R. Robinson, L'emploi des hypothèses selon Platon, *Rev Métaph et Morale* 59, 1954, 253—268. Compare Robinson's book (1133 *supra*), pp. 93—179 of the second edition, Oxford 1953.

—. F. Sontag, The Platonist's concept of language (350 *supra*).

1166. C. A. Viano, Sillogismo ed esperienza nella logica aristotelica, *Riv Crit Storia Filos* 9, 1954, 433—455. For Aristotle's criticism of diaeresis and a comparison of diaeresis with the syllogism see pp. 436—438, reprinted as pp. 55—57 of Viano's book, *La logica di Aristotele* (Torino 1955), in which see also pp. 139—144 on Aristotle's criticism of Plato's 'logic of science' and pp. 228—237, pp. 256—261, and pp. 268—280 on Aristotle and Platonic dialectic.

—. J. Ackrill, *Συμπλοκή εἰδῶν* (891 *supra*).

—. L. J. Eslick, The Platonic dialectic of Non-Being (616 *supra*). See also Eslick's earlier article (888 *supra*).

—. D. W. Hamlyn, The communion of forms and the development of Plato's logic (617 *supra*). See also Hamlyn's later note (957 *supra*) and the contemporaneous article by R. S. Bluck (895 *supra*), against whose position in an earlier publication this note of Hamlyn's is written.

1167. R. Loriaux, L'être et la forme selon Platon: Essai sur la dialectique platonicienne, Bruges 1955 (cf. J. Moreau, *Rev Philo-*

sophique 146, 1956, 140—142; K. W. Mills, *Gnomon* 29, 1957, 325—329; M. Buccellato, *Riv Crit Storia Filos* 13, 1958, 341—344). The first part of this book is devoted to the 'ascending dialectic' whereby according to Loriaux in the *Phaedo*, *Symposium*, and *Republic* Plato proves the existence of the ideas and at their summit the existence of the Good, identical with supreme Being and at the same time the supreme object of knowledge¹). The second part is given over to the 'descending dialectic', codified according to this interpretation in the *Republic* and the *Phaedrus*, exemplified in the second part of the *Parmenides*, and applied in the subsequent 'metaphysical dialogues', the *Timaeus*, and the *Laws*. This latter dialectic does not 'derive' the ideas from higher principles but, assuming their existence which has been 'proved' by the ascending dialectic, classifies them according to their relations to one another and to the supreme Being and, in fact, extends this study of interrelated structure to the visible world as well. The extreme schematism of this construction contrains Loriaux to insist upon many implausible interpretations, as his eagerness to purge Plato of 'essentialism' involves him in mistranslation which most of his reviewers have properly criticized.

1168. L. Lugarini, *Il problema delle categorie in Aristotele*, *Acme* 8 Fasc 1, 1955, 3—107. In the first half of this paper entitled 'the derivation of Aristotle's categories from Platonic diaeresis' Lugarini argues that the formulation of the doctrine of categories grew out of Aristotle's criticism of the Platonic distinction between synonymity and homonymity and his consideration of diaeresis. For Lugarini's notion of a 'new theory of diaeresis and unity' in the later dialogues see especially pp. 32—35, pp. 45—47, and pp. 88—89; and see also his earlier papers (218 and 613 *supra*).

— R. A. Markus, *The Dialectic of Eros in Plato's Symposium* (926 *supra*).

— C. Perelman, *La méthode dialectique et le rôle de l'interlocuteur dans le dialogue* (1098 *supra*).

1169. F. Adorno, *Dialettica e politica in Platone: Saggio sul "Politico" e sulle "Leggi"*, *Accad Toscana ... 'La Colombaria'*, *Atti e Mem* 20, 1955 (Firenze 1956), 97—200. The thesis of this

¹) Three of the four chapters that make up this first part of the book had been published three years earlier as a separate article (841f *supra*).

article¹⁾ is that Plato's fundamental motives were always political and remained essentially unchanged after the *Republic*, to which the *Laws* is only the complement, the two aspects being joined in the *Politicus*, and of which the dialectical programme is worked out in greater depth and detail in the *Phaedrus*, *Parmenides*, *Theaetetus*, *Sophist*, and *Philebus*. For Adorno the world of ideas is not a cosmos of transcendent entities but one of the aspects of reality, an inner dialectical complex of ideals to be realized in this world of life and action, and the dialectic of identity and difference in the *Sophist* is only the logical elaboration of a motive implied in the myth of Er and elaborated in another of its aspects in the *Timeaus*.

— Éliane Amado-Lévy-Valensi, Vérité et langage du dialogue platonicien au dialogue psychanalytique (1099 *supra*). With this compare M. Landmann (139 *supra*).

— H. C. de Lima Vaz, A ascensão dialética no *Banquete* de Platão (927 *supra*) and Amore conhecimento (927 *supra*). See also his article on the 'dialectic of the ideas' in the *Sophist* (889 *supra*).

1170. D. Dubarle, Dialectique et ontologie chez Platon, *Recherches Philos* 2 (Aspects de la Dialectique), Paris 1956, pp. 139—165. Dubarle attempts to establish correspondences between the stages of Plato's dialectical method—ascend, apprehension of the absolute principle, and descent—and the ontological character of the objects of these stages; but most of the article is concerned with the 'descent' and with the thesis that Plato's rejection of Parmenidean ontology by a reconciliation of being and diversity involves difficulties of its own and, being necessary only in the sense that without it Platonic dialectic would be impossible, was itself a dialectical operation. In treating the dialectical techniques of the *Sophist* and the *Politicus* (pp. 148—151) Dubarle insists that the five γένη of the *Sophist*, the four of the *Philebus*, and the 'determinations' underlying the dialectic of the second part of the *Parmenides* were meant by Plato to be 'categories' in the modern sense of the term.

¹⁾ A shorter version of this article was later published as the introduction (pp. 9—51) to Adorno's translation of the *Politicus* and *Laws*, the second volume of his *Opere politiche di Platone*, the introduction to the first volume of which (pp. 9—67) contains a section on the dialectic, the ideas, and the idea of good (pp. 45—49) which should be read in connection with this:

1169a) *Opere politiche di Platone a cura di F. Adorno*, Vol. I (*Repubblica, Timeo, Crizia*), Torino 1953; Vol. II (*Politico, Leggi*), Torino 1958.

—. P. Grenet, Note sur la structure du *Lachès* (510 *supra*).

—. J.-H. Kühn, System- und Methodenprobleme im Corpus Hippocraticum (704 *supra*), pp. 63—66 (for 'hypothesis' in Plato) and pp. 84—97 (for diacresis).

—. P. Lachière-Rey, Réflexions sur un procédé de Platon (1100 *supra*).

1171. E.W. Platzcek, Grundlage und Hauptformen der platonischen Logik, Zeitschr philos Forsch 10, 1956, 493—508. Platzcek's professed purpose in this article is to formulate more sharply and to corroborate the theses of his earlier book (1164 *supra*).

1172. H.-P. Stahl, Interpretationen zu Platons Hypothesis-Verfahren: *Menon/Phaidon/Staat*, Diss. Kiel 1956. This is a careful analysis of the relevant Platonic texts and their implications and a close critique of the significant earlier literature on the subject including especially Robinson's book (1133 *supra*). Robinson's later article (1165 *supra*) Stahl apparently had not seen.

1173. M. Vanhoutte, La méthode ontologique de Platon, Paris/Louvain 1956 (cf. Schaerer, *Studia Philos* 17, 1957, 155—157; Trevaskis, *Cl Rev N.S.* 9, 1959, 122—124). Plato's ontology is here approached by way of his theory of dialectic, in which Vanhoutte contends there is a 'duality' of method. Plato, he argues, moved from an 'intuitive method' through the methodological crisis of the *Parmenides* to a 'synthetic method', which itself comprised both a 'minor' and a 'major' dialectic. The minor dialectic is the method of definition by diacresis, which operates with abstract concepts that have no ontological status; the major dialectic is an ontological synthesis of the 'greatest kinds', which are themselves not ideas but which by their combinations in various degrees of perfection produce ideas (no longer now regarded as absolute or transcendent), soul, perceptible body, and, in short, all existents. See Vanhoutte's Note sur la communauté des genres . . . (909 *supra*) and his article, La méthode intuitive . . . (841g *supra*), which in more concise form is incorporated in this book (pp. 70—85).

—. Marisa Grondona, La dialettica nel *Sofista* di Platone (894 *supra*).

—. J. L. Ackrill, Plato and the copula (908 *supra*).

—. E. G. Ballard, Plato's movement from an ethics of the individual to a science of particulars (801 *supra*). See especially pp. 21—32 and 36—37 on the hypothetical method, the problem of participation and the 'new method' of dialectic in the *Sophist*.

—. R. S. Bluck, ἐποθέσεις in the *Phaedo* and Platonic dialectic (657 *supra*). The nature of diaeresis and the relation of it and elenchus in Platonic dialectic are discussed on pp. 29—30.

1174. É. de Strycker, La distinction entre l'entendement (*dianoia*) et l'intellect (*nous*) dans la *République* de Platon, Estudios de Historia de la Filosofía en homenaje al Prof. R. Mondolfo, Fasc 1, Tucuman 1957, pp. 209—226. *Noûs* and *διάνοια*, dialectical and mathematical reasoning, are distinguished neither as being the former an ascent and the latter a descent nor as having for their objects the former ideas and the latter 'intermediate' entities but in that the latter uses images in handling its ideal objects and hypotheses which it does not and cannot justify; and the connection between this use of images and of hypotheses by the mathematician de Strycker then tries to explain on the basis of his notion that the objects of mathematical reasoning, though ideas and not 'intermediates', are ideas of an 'inferior grade'.

—. E. A. Havelock, The liberal temper in Greek politics (152 *supra*), pp. 202—223. An attack on the elenchus and Plato's dialectical method.

—. K. F. Johansen, The One and the Many . . . (621 *supra*).

—. L. Sichirollo, Antropologia e dialettica nella filosofia di Platone (145 *supra*). See also for brief remarks on Plato in a similar vein Sichirollo's book, Logica e dialettica (Milano 1957), pp. 23—25, pp. 28—29, and pp. 40—44.

—. M. Vanhoutte, La notion de la liberté dans le '*Gorgias*' de Platon (482 *supra*). On the problem of 'dialectical assent', the freedom of the interlocutors in the face of the '*logos*' of the dialogue (cf. Kerferd, Cl Rev N.S. 9, 1959, 75).

1175. E. Paci, La dialettica in Platone, Riv Filos 49, 1958, 134—153. Paci treats the subject under four rubrics: the being of non-being, dialectic and eros, the technique of dialectic, and diaeresis. His main thesis is that the dialectic of the *Sophist* and the conception of relational being is implicit in all the Platonic dialogues where a

notion of dialectic appears, implicit, in fact, in the 'Socratic situation'; and he holds that the *Phaedrus* is proof of the coherence with which Plato developed the problem of dialectic by joining Socratic dialectic to that of the *Republic* and the *Sophist* (see also 676 *supra*)¹.

— Ilse von Loewenclau, *Mythos und Logos bei Platon* (1115 *supra*).

1176. O. Becker, Zum platonischen Hypothesis-Begriff, *Archiv für Begriffsgeschichte* 4, 1959, 210—212. This is a note apropos of K. von Fritz's remarks on the subject in *Archiv für Begriffsgeschichte* 1, 1955, 38—42, for which see 846 *supra* and under that number the other references to von Fritz and Szabó.

1177. R. Demos, Partly so and partly not so, *Mind* N.S. 68, 1959, 51—56. In discussing certain statements in 'ordinary language' which seem to violate the law of contradiction Demos tries to show how Plato's determination to avoid all conflict with the law is connected with his doctrines of the tripartite soul, of selfpredication of ideas and participation of things in ideas, of relative terms, and of the intermediacy of the empirical world between being and non-being.

1178. G. Mainberger, *Die Seinsstufung als Methode und Metaphysik: Untersuchungen über 'Mehr und Weniger' als Grundlage zu einem möglichen Gottesbeweis bei Platon und Aristoteles*, Freiburg (Schweiz) 1959. In the second section of this book (pp. 25—103) Mainberger tries to track down the theme of 'the more and less' in all its various manifestations in Plato's works but chiefly in the *Symposium*, *Phaedo*, *Parmenides*, *Sophist*, *Politicus*, and *Philebus* and chiefly with regard to his dialectical method and his theory of ideas (for Aristotle's reports and criticisms see especially pp. 131—136 and

¹ Preceding this article and following it in the same fascicle there are two others which contain some relevant discussion:

1175a) N. Abbagnano, *Quattro concetti di dialettica*, *Riv Filos* 49, 1958, 123—133. La dialettica come metodo della divisione (pp. 124—126) deals with Platonic dialectic.

1175b) C. A. Viano, *La dialettica in Aristotele*, *Riv Filos* 49, 1958, 154—178. Much of this article deals with Aristotle's criticism of Platonic dialectic and diaeresis. With this compare Viano's earlier book (1166 *supra*).

The whole of this second fascicle of *Rivista di Filosofia* 49 (1958) is also separately printed as a book with new pagination under the title, *Studi sulla dialettica*, Torino 1958. In this volume Paci's article (1175 *supra*) appears on pp. 18—37, Abbagnano's (1175a *supra*) on pp. 7—17, and Viano's (1175b *supra*) on pp. 38—62.

pp. 164—171), Mainberger's interpretation of which is summed up neatly on pp. 96—103. He concludes that for Plato there is no hierarchical cosmos in an ontological sense but there is a graduated ascent of the mind through the various stages to the highest knowledge, no scale of being or 'more and less' in the world of ideas but only in the sphere of becoming and the phenomenal; but at the end he lapses into dubious assertions about a doctrine of idea-numbers and ultimate principles propounded in Plato's 'Altersvorlesungen', all accepted without scruple from Wilpert (see 111, 112, 124 *supra*) and Saffrey (122 *supra*).

1179. J. Stannard, Socratic eros and Platonic dialectic, *Phronesis* 4, 1959, 120—134. His thesis is that Socratic eros served a philosophical function later paralleled by Plato's dialectical method, the formulation of which was the outcome of Plato's reflection on the rôle of Socratic eros in philosophical inquiry. In arguing this thesis he constantly assumes the very kind of 'hierarchy' among the ideas that Mainberger (1178 *supra*) denies.

V B: The Theory of Ideas¹⁾

Discussion of almost any topic in Plato's philosophy is likely to involve interpretation of the theory of ideas. Many of the works listed in the preceding section on dialectic are in large part concerned with this subject; and it is an important element in many others which, judged by their titles and the central issue involved, belong rather in one or another of the sections to follow. Some of these must therefore be anticipated here, though they will be listed again in their more obvious contexts, just as many of those already treated must be mentioned here once more. Even so, not every book and essay that contains some interpretation of the theory or reference to it could be given here without repetition of a large part of the survey, and I shall confine myself to those works which are devoted primarily to this subject or profess significant discussion of some aspect of it. Of such works, moreover, I shall as usual give only a selection from among those published in the 'thirties and the early 'forties.

¹⁾ It has become fashionable in the English literature—and to some extent also in the French and German—to call the Platonic ideas 'forms'; but, since I can see no advantage and many disadvantages in this innovation, I retain the traditional designation 'ideas'. See J. Moreau (1234 *infra* [p. 3, n. 1]) and J. Chevalier (14 *supra* [p. 637]).

The ontological status of the ideas, the origin of the theory or its first appearance, Plato's development of it or even his radical alteration or complete repudiation of it, the relation of the ideas to one another and to the phenomenal world, to god, and to the human mind,—not only are all these subjects still debated, as the following survey will testify, but so are the nature and significance of the vocabulary used by Plato to give expression to his theory; and it may be helpful here at the beginning of this section to give a collection of references to the more important discussions of the terminology of the theory of ideas:

- G. F. Else, The terminology of the ideas (1189 *infra*).
- H. C. Baldry, Plato's 'technical terms' (1195 *infra*).
- K. von Fritz, Philosophie und sprachlicher Ausdruck (1064 *supra*).
- P. Brommer, *EΙΔΟΣ* et *ΙΔΕΑ* (1203 *infra*).
- P. Louis, Les métaphores de Platon (1066 *supra*), pp. 143—146.
- P. Grenet, Les origines de l'analogie philosophique . . . (1144 *supra*), pp. 217—225.
- Dorothy Tarrant, Style and thought in Plato's dialogues (1069 *supra*), pp. 33—34.
- P. Kucharski, Les chemins du savoir . . . (1148 *supra*).
- A. de Marignac, Imagination et dialectique . . . (1070 *supra*), pp. 33—63 and pp. 138—146.
- Sir David Ross, Plato's theory of ideas (1236 *infra*), pp. 228—233; and see the references to Owen, Cherniss, Maguire, Stefanini, and Shorey in the note on 1236 *infra*.
- P. Friedländer, Platon (11a *supra*), I, pp. 17—33 = (11b *supra*), I, pp. 16—31.
- R. Loriaux, L'être et la forme . . . (1167 *supra*), pp. 23—40, 46—65, 73—89, 115—127.
- T. G. Rosenmeyer, Plato and mass words (1081 *supra*).

In addition to these see also the following books on other topics which are incidentally important for their treatment of certain words used by Plato in connection with the ideas:

—. J. van Camp et P. Canart, *Le sens du mot ΘΕΙΟΣ chez Platon*, Louvain 1956. See *Table Analytique* (p. 426), s. v. Idées.

—. G. François, *Le polythéisme et l'emploi au singulier des mots ΘΕΟΣ, ΔΑΙΜΩΝ*, Paris 1957, pp. 281, 297—303, 312—313.

—. C. J. Classen, *Sprachliche Deutung als Triebkraft platonischen und sokratischen Philosophierens*, München 1959, pp. 43—84, 88—96, 158—163.

It is appropriate here as it was at the beginning of the last section (V A *supra*) to mention J. Stenzel's book, *Studien zur Entwicklung der platonischen Dialektik von Sokrates zu Aristoteles*, and here to add another volume of his, the first edition of which was also reviewed by C. Ritter in 'Bursian' 225, 1930, 126—133. Nine years after the first edition of this book was published a revised and substantially enlarged edition of it appeared:

1180. J. Stenzel, *Zahl und Gestalt bei Platon und Aristoteles*, Leipzig/Berlin 1933. Taking into account some of the criticism of the first edition (Berlin 1924), especially that by A. E. Taylor and by H. Leisegang, and other work published in the interim¹), Stenzel here tried to establish more firmly the 'later theory of ideas' which he had reconstructed for Plato on the basis of Aristotle's critique and traces of which he had sought to identify in Plato's own writings. A 'dritte durchgesehene Auflage' of this work has recently been published (Darmstadt 1959); it is, in fact, a reprint of the second and definitive edition with a few insignificant corrections, a slightly expanded bibliography (p. XI), and—most unfortunately—somewhat different pagination. In the year after the publication of the second edition Stenzel published a compendious account of his whole interpretation of the theory of ideas, Plato's development of it from the Socratic search for definition and his ultimate transformation of it into the theory of idea-numbers.

¹) Among such publications between 1930 and 1933 two of Stenzel's own are relevant here:

1180a) J. Stenzel, *Metaphysik des Altertums*, München/Berlin 1931 (= *Handbuch der Philosophie* herausgegeben von A. Baeumler und M. Schröter, Abteilung I D, München/Berlin 1930), pp. 100—151. Here after a few pages of general introduction on Plato Stenzel discusses 'Die Idee des Guten als die platonische Seinsidee' (pp. 105—125) and then 'Die Dialektik des platonischen Seinsbegriffs' (pp. 125—151).

1180b) J. Stenzel, *Anschauung und Denken in der klassischen Theorie der griechischen Mathematik*, Antike 9, 1933, 142—158.

This essay has been reprinted in Stenzel's *Kleine Schriften zur griechischen Philosophie*, Darmstadt 1956, pp. 319—332.

1181. J. Stenzel, Zur Entstehung des wissenschaftlichen Begriffes in der griechischen Philosophie, *Scientia* 55, 1934, 169—176.

—, L. Stefanini, Platone (9 *supra*). Stefanini (II, pp. 378—411) is critical of such attempts as Stenzel's to ascribe to Plato on the basis of Aristotle's critiques a later theory of idea-numbers. For Stefanini's interpretation of the theory of ideas in its various aspects see the references in his *Sillogi dei problemi* (II, pp. 513—514).

1182. T. de Laguna, Notes on the Theory of Ideas, *Philos Rev* 43, 1934, 443—470. Aristotle's account of 'elements' of the ideas is here taken to be a malicious interpretation for which, however, the *Philebus* gave him an excuse. The essay, posthumously published, discusses many of the problems, such as 'self-predication' that have been developed in greater detail by recent critics of Plato's theory and ends with the opinion that 'there was a great deal of the neo-Platonist in Plato'.

1183. H.-D. Gardeil, Le rationalisme de Platon, *Rev Sc Philos Théol* 23, 1934, 189—220. Tracing the development of Plato's conception of the nature of ideas and the knowledge of them, Gardeil concludes that the discovery of non-being within the world of ideas compromised the perfect rationality of the knowledge for the sake of which it was invented.

1184. J. Klein, Die griechische Logistik und die Entstehung der Algebra, *Quellen u. Studien Gesch Math B* 3, 1934/36, 18—105 and 122—235. In the first part of this monograph (pp. 29—105) Klein distinguishes and analyses Plato's conceptions of mathematical number and ideal number and the different modes of knowing the two, and on the basis of this and of Aristotle's critiques he tries to reconstruct a Platonic theory of idea-numbers. Of Stenzel's book on the subject (1180 *supra*) he had available at this time only the first edition (cf. p. 65, n. 1).

1185. R. Demos, The fundamental conceptions of Plato's metaphysics, *Journ Philos* 32, 1935, 561—578. By combining *Politicus* 278 D with the *Timaeus* and the *Philebus* Demos tries to elicit from it the basic principles of Plato's ontology, his notion of which he developed further in a paper published a year later, *The One and the Many in Plato*, *Philosophical Essays for Alfred North Whitehead* (London/New York 1936), pp. 41—66. Here he argued that Plato's system was an ontological and causal hierarchy with 'the Limit, the Categories, the Forms arranged in a pyramidal order'. Then in the year following this Demos proceeded to interpret the idea of good

as 'the most fundamental of the metaphysical factors', Plato's treatment of which, however, he characterized as paradoxical, in an article, Plato's Idea of the Good, *Philos Rev* 46, 1937, 245—275. The substance of these articles with much more to similar effect was incorporated by Demos in his book, *The philosophy of Plato* (New York 1939), which is less a responsible, scholarly interpretation of Plato than it is a systematic variation à la Whitehead on themes suggested by Platonic texts (cf. R. Robinson, *Philos Rev* 49, 1940, 688—691). See also the more recent articles by Demos, *Types of Unity . . . (907 supra)*¹⁾, Partly so and partly not so (*1177 supra*).

—. G. M. A. Grube, Plato's thought (3 *supra*), pp. 1—50, pp. 167—171, and pp. 295—304.

1186. N. Hartmann, Das Problem des Apriorismus in der Platonischen Philosophie, *Sitzungsber Preuss Akad Wiss Phil-Hist Kl*, Berlin 1935, 223—260 (reprinted in Hartmann's *Kleinere Schriften* 2, Berlin 1957, pp. 48—85). The soul by turning towards itself remembers the ideas, though these are not in it but are the principles of the phenomenal world; and this is possible because both soul and phenomena participate in the world of ideas. See also Hartmann's later article, *Zur Lehre vom Eidos bei Platon und Aristoteles (1207 infra)*.

1187. A. K. Rogers, Plato's theory of forms, *Philos Rev* 44, 1935, 515—533 and 45, 1936, 61—78. This too is an attempt to interpret Plato's theory in his own writings from the point of view of Aristotle's testimony; but Rogers without reference to other earlier attempts of this kind concludes that Plato, extending his theory to include ideas of natural classes, which it had not previously included, sought to find the essence only of these ideas in numbers and that consequently the 'number-theory' was 'not the equivalent of Plato's conception of form but its application to a special subject-matter'.

—. Klara Buchmann, Die Stellung des *Menon* . . . (583 *supra*), especially pp. 36—73; and see the other references given in that item.

1188. H. Cherniss, The philosophical economy of the theory of ideas, *AJPh* 57, 1936, 445—456.

—. C. J. de Vogel, Een keerpunt in Plato's denken (612a *supra*). See the review by Cherniss mentioned there and the references to Miss de Vogel in 612 *supra*.

¹⁾ With the thesis of Demos in this article compare the first of the distinctions discussed by A. C. Lloyd, *Phronesis* 1, 1955/56, 59—64: Multiplication of the Universal in the Middle Academy.

1189. G. F. Else, The terminology of the ideas, *Harvard Studies in Class Phil* 47, 1936, 17—55 (cf. Cherniss, *AJPh* 58, 1937, 362).

1190. A. J. Festugière, *Contemplation et Vie Contemplative selon Platon*, Paris 1936. See especially pp. 77—122, pp. 164—234, and pp. 253—267 for his interpretation of the ideas as a hierarchy of intelligible essences transcended by the 'Un-Bien-Beau' which, being the cause of their existence and unity, is itself not an idea but God, an intellect accessible not to thought but only to the mystical union of intuition. For criticism of this interpretation see É. Bréhier (*Rev Ét Grecques* 51, 1938, 489—498), M. Vanhoutte (1173 *supra*, pp. 17—20 and pp. 22—25), and R. Joly (232 *supra*, pp. 101—104). Festugière has insistently reasserted it, however, in his more recent publications (1000 *supra*, pp. 135—152 and pp. 156—161 [cf. *Gnomon* 22, 1950, 209—210]; and 116 *supra*, especially pp. 79—91); and with it he has tried to combine the Aristotelian testimony concerning the 'elements' of the ideas (116 *supra*, pp. 25—31, pp. 48—53, pp. 307—314).

— W. F. R. Hardie, A study in Plato (610b *supra*). The whole of this book is concerned in one way or another with the theory of ideas, for which, however, see especially pp. 9—24, 35—65, 73—130, and 147—171. On his interpretation see A. E. Taylor (*Mind* N.S. 46, 1937, 222—232), G. M. A. Grube (*Cl Journ* 34, 1939, 544—546), R. Robinson (601 *supra*), F. La Touche Godfrey (603 *supra*).

1191. P.-P. Joannu, *Die Erfahrung in Platons Ideenlehre: Die Idee als Gestalt der Erfahrung*, München 1936 (cf. Büchner, *Gnomon* 13, 1937, 545—548). According to this thesis the ideas are the ontological reality of the sensible world and are not 'separate' from it; but constituting the first level of being, the physical world as a totality and not as 'partial effects', they are the first creation of god, who transcends the whole hierarchy of being. For Plato consequently there is a dualism not in the world external to us but in our apprehension of it through '*doxa*' and '*noesis*'.

1192. A. Karmann, *Methodische und systematische Untersuchungen erkenntnistheoretisch wichtiger sachlicher Grundprobleme in der platonischen Ideenlehre, dargestellt mit besonderer Berücksichtigung des Problems der Einheit idealer und realer Strukturmomente in der Erkenntnis des Wirklichen*, Würzburg 1936. This dissertation comes from the same school as did that of Joannu's (1191 *supra*); and, as its discursive title suggests, it interprets 'the idea' in similar fashion as being in 'things' the reality which is the goal of formulation by the dialectical process of reason, this process itself

giving the real thing determination as the true object of knowledge and so producing in a *γένεσις εἰς οὐσίαν* the unity of the 'idea' and the 'real thing'.

1193. P. Lachière-Rey, *Réflexions sur la théorie platonicienne de l'idée*, *Rev Philosophique* 122, 1936, 5—14. The ideas, he argues, are neither static and transcendent objects of contemplation nor empirically verifiable objective qualities; they are of the nature of subject rather than object, intentional and directional powers of spiritual activity and laws or conditions of the realization of intelligible being, all having as their source the idea of good.

1194. F. S. C. Northrop, The mathematical background and content of Greek philosophy, *Philosophical Essays for Alfred North Whitehead*, London/New York 1936, pp. 1—40. Most of this article (pp. 11—40) is concerned with Plato's theory of ideas, which Northrop interprets in a mathematical sense, reading into the dialogues on the supposed authority of Aristotle and on the basis of a mistranslation of Aristoxenus¹) the doctrine that all the ideas are mathematical ratios and the idea of the good is all these ratios considered in their irreducible order and unity as 'the one'.

1195. H. C. Baldry, Plato's 'technical terms', *Cl Quart* 31, 1937, 141—150. The terms here studied are those used by Plato for the ideas and for the relation to them of particulars. Baldry maintains that Plato, having learned from Socrates to distinguish qualities of value from their particular exemplifications and having seen an analogy between the former and the numbers represented by the Pythagoreans as patterns, combined the two as separate quality-patterns, which he then called *εἶδη* or *ιδέαι* because they were both 'forms' and 'qualities visible to the eye of the mind'; and that to express the relation of particulars to these he adopted the Pythagorean term *μίμησις* but also employed the terms already used by others for the connection of qualities and things (*μετέχειν*, *κοινωνεῖν*, *παρεῖναι*, *ἐνεῖναι*), being induced to do this by the analogy between his own 'chorismos' and the disputed 'chorismos' of the sensible *εἶδη* to which these words were currently applied.

¹) In this Northrop follows Toeplitz. Similar mistranslations of *Harmonics* II, 30—31 for a similar purpose are common: e. g. C. J. de Vogel, 38 *supra* (p. 274, n. 1), 38 *e supra* (p. 53, n. 6), and 109 *supra* (pp. 306—307); O. Wichmann, 1274 *infra* (p. 419 and n. 45). For the correct translation see Aristosseno, *L'Armonica* a cura di Rosetta Da Rios, Roma 1954, p. 45.

1196. M. Gentile, Nuovi studi intorno alla dottrina platonica delle idee-numeri, *Ann Scuol Norm Sup Pisa, Lettere* 2 Ser 6, 1937, 111—127. This is a defence and expansion of the argument of his earlier book, *La dottrina platonica delle idee-numeri e Aristotele* (Pisa 1930), especially in reply to the criticism of it by A. Levi in *Riv Filolog Cl N.S.* 11, 1933, 88—94. Gentile professes even greater assurance than before in his thesis that the discussions in the last book of the *Metaphysics* refer to the new development of the theory of ideas which he sees in the *Philebus*.

— E. M. Manasse, Platons *Sophistes* und *Politikos* . . . (738 *supra*). For the theory of ideas, intercommunion of ideas, and participation see especially pp. 18—37, 44—49, 84—156, 165—183, and 213—224. Manasse's interpretation contains some important criticism of Stenzel's treatment.

1197. M. De Corte, La question platonicienne, *Rev Philosophie* N.S. 7, 1938, 501—531. Platonism is here characterized as a confused mysticism, and the theory of ideas with its dialectic is criticized as a futile attempt to rationalize the irrational.

1198. K. Nawratil, Zu Platons *Apologie* und *Ideenlehre*, *Phil Woch* 58, 1938, 1215—1216. Here he suggests that the personality of Socrates was the origin of Plato's conception of the idea. See Nawratil's later articles, Platons *Dialog vom Sophisten* . . . (890 *supra*) and *Zur Komposition des platonischen Symposions* (924 *supra*).

1199. H. Scholz, Die mathematische Logik und die Metaphysik, *Philos Jahrbuch* 51, 1938, 257—291. See pp. 278—280 for his argument in favor of the existence of Platonic ideas.

1200. M. F. Sciacca, La dialettica platonica delle idee nel *Parmenide* e nel *Sofista*, Roma 1938. On this monograph, which was also published as two articles in *Logos* 21, 1938, 139—171 and 289—336, see L. Stefanini (9 *supra* [2a edizione, 1949]), pp. 149—152 and pp. 357—358 and A. Rigobello (34 *supra*), p. 60, n. 133 and pp. 71—72. See also Sciacca's other book, published in the same year (987 *supra*), and his later article, I due idealismi, *Actas Primer Cong Nac Filos, Mendoza* 1949, III, pp. 2033—2040, where the objective idealism discovered by Plato (pp. 2033—2035) and developed by Plotinus, by Augustine, and by the later Christian idealists is contrasted to modern subjective idealism.

— K. von Fritz, Philosophie und sprachlicher Ausdruck . . . (1064 *supra*).

1201. P. H. DeLacy, The problem of causation in Plato's philosophy, *Cl Phil* 34, 1939, 97—115. The causality of soul in the later dialogues is here taken as replacing the earlier causality of the ideas and as involving a modification in the theory with the extension of true being to include besides the immutable ideas the world of concrete objects and souls and with a change in the ontological relation between ideas and particulars.

— J. Moreau, La construction de l'idéalisme platonicien (5 *supra*) and the supplementary volume, L'Ame du Monde . . . (5 *supra*), pp. 1—84 (cf. H. Cherniss, *AJPh* 68, 1947, 113—124). See for Moreau's later development and defence of this Neo-Kantian interpretation his articles, Sur la signification du 'Parménide' (605 *supra*) and Platon et l'idéalisme chrétien (1224 *infra*), and especially his booklet, Réalisme et idéalisme chez Platon (1234 *infra*), with the subsequent publications listed under that item.

1202. A. Preiswerk, Das Einzelne bei Platon und Aristoteles, Leipzig 1939. The later writings of Plato are here interpreted (pp. 3—78, cf. pp. 185—192) under the influence of Stenzel and of O. Becker as developing a theory of idea-numbers in which real being is the animate order of an articulated whole, the 'eidos' is definite position in this diaeretical order of idea-numbers and therewith in a sense itself the whole order, and true individuality is the determinateness of such integration in the ordered system of ideas. Much of this interpretation is closely connected with that of Aristotle, to which the larger part of the volume is devoted, and especially with the treatment of Aristotle's criticism of diaeresis (pp. 143—156 and 163—170).

— A. Rey, La science dans l'antiquité 3 (1051 *supra*), pp. 222—319 and pp. 330—347. Rey's earlier article, Logique, mathématique et participation à la fin du Vme siècle (*Rev Philosophique* 121, 1936, 338—371), is reprinted with only slight alterations of expression as pp. 166—209 of this volume; it has practically nothing to do with Plato.

1203. P. Brommer, *ΕΙΔΟΣ* et *ΙΔΕΑ*: Étude sémantique et chronologique des oeuvres de Platon, Assen 1940 (cf. H. Cherniss, *AJPh* 68, 1947, 126—133). Brommer tries to draw a distinction between *εἶδος* and *ιδέα* and professes to find in this the key to Plato's thought and its development. The utterly confused and self-contradictory book has a long Epilogue (pp. 236—277) dealing with Aristotle's

testimony and criticism particularly in the matter of 'idea-numbers', a subject which Brommer treats again in his later article, *De numeris idealibus* (1216 *infra*).

1204. Sir Patrick Duncan, Socrates and Plato, *Philosophy* 15, 1940, 339—362. This is an attempt to trace the theory of ideas from Socrates' faith in immortality and from his search for the 'real thing' distinct from the particular instances through its elaboration by Plato as the theory of supra-sensible reality which Aristotle from his own point of view criticized as 'separation of the universal' to Plato's later development of its logical and mathematical aspects beyond the Socratic doctrine.

1205. E. Frank, The fundamental opposition of Plato and Aristotle, *AJPh* 61, 1940, 34—53 and 166—185. This article has been reprinted in the collection of Frank's essays entitled *Wissen, Wollen, Glauben: Gesammelte Aufsätze* (Zürich/Stuttgart 1955), pp. 86—119. Its central thesis is that Plato did not in his later development modify the doctrine of transcendent ideas in the direction of the Aristotelian conception of immanent form and that Aristotle in his earlier works had not espoused the Platonic theory but that the latter's criticism of the doctrine of transcendent ideas in all its aspects—ontological, mathematical, logical, epistemological, and ethical—and Plato's persistent maintenance of it constitute the classical expression of an irreconcilable opposition recognizable throughout the history of philosophy. In regard to Plato's theory Frank constantly talks of 'the idea', identifying Plato's ultimate reality with the transcendent good and this with god, the principle of all thinking and being and the link by which all *εἶδη* and all individual things are united into 'one'. On Plato's use of *εἶδος*, on the nature of the ideas and their relation to number and proportion, and on idea-numbers see also in this volume (*Wissen, Wollen, Glauben*) pp. 30—34, 36—40, and 47—48 in the essay *Der Wandel in der Beurteilung der griechischen Philosophie* (pp. 26—50), a lecture delivered in 1926 but published for the first time in this collection (1955).

— A. Levi, *Questioni platoniche* (1087 *supra*), pp. 121—126. Concerning the Platonic origin of the theory of ideas and the Socratic and non-Socratic influences upon Plato's formulation of it. Levi holds that the theory is silently implied even in the earliest dialogues in which it is not explicitly formulated.

1206. Z. Markovič, Sur la théorie de la mesure de Platon, *Bull Internat Acad Yugoslave Sciences et Beaux Arts, Cl Sciences Math et Nat* 33, 1940, 1—25. In this résumé of a longer mémoire, which

is not available to me (RAD 261, pp. 1—64), Markovič, adopting indiscriminately the reconstructions of Stenzel, Toeplitz, and Becker, professes to discover in the dialogues the basis of the theory of the One, the Indefinite Dyad, and the idea-numbers. See also his later paper and article on the same subject (118 *supra*).

1207. N. Hartmann, *Zur Lehre vom Eidos bei Platon und Aristoteles*, Abhandl. Preuss. Akad. Wiss. Phil.-Hist. Kl., 1941, Nr. 8 (reprinted in Hartmann's *Kleinere Schriften* 2, Berlin 1957, pp. 129—164). After emphasizing how much Aristotle's 'forms' and the Platonic ideas have in common and contending that the 'chorismos' on which Aristotle concentrates his criticism was not essential to Plato, who never meant it as substantial separateness and who abandoned it in his later revision of the theory, Hartmann professes to find the essential point of difference between Aristotle and Plato in the fact that while the former gave overwhelming significance to the lower levels of the universal, the species, the determinateness and ontological significance of the Platonic ideas increase with their greater universality and higher degree in the ideal hierarchy. Hartmann then argues that on this score Aristotle's criticism of Plato's theory is invalid and that the Platonic scheme is less vulnerable to the charge of tautology than is Aristotle's own 'eidos'. See also Hartmann's earlier article (1186 *supra*).

1208. K. Kerényi, *Platonismus*, Europäische Revue 17, Oktober 1941, 619—623. A general article on the Platonic conception of ideas, of the good, and of being, in which the ideas of good and of being are identified and Platonism is called 'die Weltanschauung der Qualität'.

— K. Marc-Wogau, *Der Staat und der Begriff des Guten* . . . (779 *supra*).

1209. R. Palas, *Die Bewertung der Sinnenwelt bei Platon: Eine Studie zur Psychologie der Weltanschauungen*, Helsinki 1941 (cf. *Almberg*, *Theoria* 8, 1942, 306—309). See for the theory of ideas especially pp. 7—56 and pp. 204—209, though it is referred to throughout the book, since it is the thesis of Palas that this theory determined Plato's philosophical view of all matters at all times including his 'ambivalent' attitude towards the sensible world.

— W. van der Wielen, *De Ideegetallen van Plato* (113 *supra*). Besides the reviews of this book given in 113 *supra* cf. P. Brommer (1216 *infra*); Sir David Ross (1236 *infra*), pp. 199—202; K. R. Popper (175 *supra*) p. 151, n. 1.

1210. K.-H. Volkman-Schluck, *Plotin als Interpret der Ontologie Platos*, Frankfurt am Main 1941 (reprinted 1945), pp. 12—35. In those pages the author gives his own preliminary exposition of Plato's ontology based chiefly upon the *Parmenides* and the *Sophist* interpreted under the influence of H. G. Gadamer.

— E. Kapp, Greek foundations of traditional logic (1135 *supra*), pp. 31—36.

— F. LaTouche Godfrey, Plato's doctrine of participation (603 *supra*).

1211. K. Reidemeister, *Mathematik und Logik bei Platon*, Leipzig 1942 (reprinted in his book, *Das exakte Denken der Griechen*, Hamburg 1949, pp. 45—65). For a comparison of the position of mathematics in Aristotle's system and in the Platonic theory of ideas see also Reidemeister, *Das System des Aristoteles* (Leipzig 1943), pp. 18—20 (= *Das exakte Denken der Griechen*, pp. 85—87). For reviews of the separate monograph on Plato see: E. J. Dijksterhuis, *Museum* 50, 1943, 163—165; H. Scholz, *DLZ* 64, 1943, 655—658.

1212. G. Rudberg, *Hellenisches Schauen*, *Class et Med* 5, 1942, 159—186. On the visual element in Plato's conception and presentation of the theory of ideas see especially pp. 167—168, pp. 170—171, and pp. 180—184.

1213. F. Steckerl, On the problem: Artefact and Idea, *Cl Phil* 37, 1942, 288—298. Maintaining that Plato to the end did posit idea of artefacts, Steckerl tries to trace to Xenocrates both the notion that there are no such ideas, the paradeigmata of artefacts being in the soul of the artist, and the doctrine that the ideas as paradeigmata are in the mind of god. See H. Cherniss (1218 *infra*, pp. 240—260) and R. S. Bluck (1222 *infra*).

1214. E. Pastore, *Numeri logici e numeri matematici*, *Atti Accad Scienze Torino II*, *Cl Scienze Mor Stor Filol* 78, 1942/43, 120—139. On the Aristotelian testimony concerning Platonic idea-numbers, ideal number, and mathematical number see especially pp. 135—138.

1215. J. E. Boodin, The discovery of form, *Journ Hist Ideas* 4, 1943, 177—192. The theory of ideas interpreted as a kind of 'dynamic wholism', is here compared with Aristotle's doctrine of form and with later conceptions.

1216. P. Brommer, *De numeris idealibus*, *Mnem* III 11, 1943, 263—295. Brommer here attempts to supplement and expand the interpretation of 'idea-numbers' and elements of the ideas given in

the Epilogue of his earlier book (1203 *supra*), taking into account especially the thesis of van der Wielen (113 *supra*) which Brommer had reviewed in *Museum* 49, 1942, 249—254.

1217. H. M. Conacher, The later thought of Plato, *Philosophy* 18, 1943, 99—113. The general assumption of this rather vague and confused account is that Plato moved more and more away from the theory of 'separate' ideas towards a science of the physical world; and this is supposed to be shown by the *Sophist*, which best expresses the essence of his later thought, and by the development in the *Timaeus* of the doctrine of the *Philebus*.

1218. H. Cherniss, Aristotle's criticism of Plato and the Academy 1, Baltimore 1944. For the theory of ideas and Aristotle's testimony and criticism of it see especially pp. 174ff. See also on the 'idea-numbers' H. Cherniss, The Riddle of the Early Academy (103a *supra*) and besides the critical reviews there listed cf. D. J. Allan, *Mind* N.S. 55, 1946, 263—272; de Strycker, *Ant Cl* 18, 1949, 95—107; and C. J. de Vogel (109 *supra*).

— Chung-Hwan Chen, On the *Parmenides* of Plato (604 *supra*).

— W. Jaeger, *Paideia* (4 *supra*). For the theory of ideas see especially II, pp. 230—239 and III, pp. 3—23 and pp. 341—344. On Jaeger's treatment of the theory cf. Grube, *AJPh* 68, 1947, 211 and 214; Manasse, *Philos Rundschau* 5, Beiheft 1, 1957, 10—11; and G. Reale, *Riv Filos Neoscholastica* 48, 1956, 42—67 ('*Paideia*' o metafisica delle idee).

— G. Brown, The alleged metaphysics in the *Republic* (782 *supra*). See on this the papers of G. C. Field and S. S. Orr (783 and 784 *supra*).

— R. G. Collingwood, The idea of nature (996 *supra*), pp. 55—72.

— G. C. Field, The alleged metaphysics in the *Republic* (783 *supra*). Arguing against G. Brown (782 *supra*) Field contends that in the *Republic* the objects of mathematics are ideas and the metaphysical first principle of all the ideas is the idea of good; but he holds that this theory of the idea of good was abandoned in the *Timaeus* and that later Plato reduced some mathematical to 'intermediate entities', identified the ideas with numbers, and made the principles of idea-numbers the principles of good and evil. On this see S. S. Orr (784 *supra*).

— R. Guardini, *Der Tod des Sokrates* (319 *supra*), especially pp. 250—271 of the fourth edition, 1952.

— S. S. Orr, The alleged metaphysics in the *Republic* (784 *supra*).

1219. A. Speiser, Platons Ideenlehre, *Eranos-Jahrbuch* 12, 1945, 23—31. He asserts that the notion of irrational number first led Plato to formulate the doctrine of ideas and to conceive of soul as a mathematical essence. See also Speiser's earlier article, Platons Ideenlehre und die Mathematik, *Studia Philos* 2, 1942, 123—140, where he contends that the identification of ideas and mathematical entities was the origin of the theory and not a late form of it; most of this article (pp. 127—137) deals with the argument for immortality in the *Phaedo* (639b *supra*), but at the end it returns to the *Parmenides* which is treated in more detail by Speiser elsewhere (see the references in 610 *supra*).

1220. P. Merlan, Aristotle's Unmoved Movers, *Traditio* 4, 1946, 1—30. This being an attempt to solve the problem of *Metaphysics A*, chap. 8 by connecting it closely with Aristotle's criticism of Platonic and Platonistic theories, much of the article is concerned with the idea-numbers and related theories ascribed to Plato. See also Merlan's more recent book, *From Platonism to Neoplatonism* (121 *supra*).

— C. G. Rutenber, The doctrine of the imitation of God in Plato (968 *supra*). The book contains much discussion of μέθεξις, μίμησις, and ὁμολωσις in connection with the theory of ideas, on its treatment of which cf. R. Hackforth, *Cl Rev* 62, 1948, 129—130.

1221. H. Barth, Philosophie der Erscheinung: Eine Problemgeschichte 1, Basel 1947, pp. 52—123: Idee und Erscheinung in der Philosophie Plato's. Barth here develops the theme of the 'ambivalence' of the doctrine in the relation of the ideas to appearance, the latter in contrast to real being sinking to mere indefiniteness and yet playing a necessary part in the theory and itself becoming 'eidetic' existence inasmuch as its substantial determination makes possible the manifestation of the ideas, so that their separation from the phenomenal cosmos determined by them becomes scarcely more than a formal distinction.

— M. Beck, Plato's problem in the *Parmenides* (606 *supra*).

1222. R. S. Bluck, Aristotle, Plato, and ideas of artefacta, *Cl Rev* 61, 1947, 75—76. Bluck, writing apparently without knowledge of the treatment of this subject by Steckerl (1213 *supra*) and by Cherniss (1218 *supra*, pp. 240—260) concludes that Plato did not reject ideas of artefacts nor did Aristotle intend to suggest that he had done so.

— A.-H. Chroust, The problem of Plato's *Parmenides* (607 *supra*).

1223. T. M. Forsyth, Aristotle's concept of God as final cause, *Philosophy* 22, 1947, 112—123. The interpretation of Aristotle's metaphysics is connected with what the author calls Plato's kindred doctrine by a section on Aristotle's criticism of the theory of ideas and Platonic physics.

— W. A. Gerhard, Plato's theory of dialectic (1143 *supra*).

— V. Goldschmidt, *Les Dialogues de Platon* (1091 *supra*), pp. 20—22, pp. 144—152, pp. 199—212, and pp. 338—342; *Le paradigme dans la dialectique platonicienne* (1092 *supra*), pp. 48—81. See also Goldschmidt's earlier monograph, *Essai sur le 'Cratyle'* (343 *supra*), pp. 68—83, pp. 176—183, and pp. 199—205. Discussion of the theory of ideas is to be found also in his later book, *La religion de Platon*, Paris 1949, pp. 2—6 and pp. 14—54.

— M. Heidegger, *Platons Lehre von der Wahrheit* (847 *supra*).

— E. Karlin, The method of ambiguity (608 *supra*). This is concerned primarily with Plato's solutions of the paradoxes generated by the solution of the epistemological and ontological problems which consists in positing the world of ideas as a system of real meanings internally related in a hierarchical arrangement.

1224. J. Moreau, *Platon et l'idéalisme chrétien*, *Rev Ét Anciennes* 49, 1947, 65—77. Here Moreau, objecting to the 'realistic' interpretation of the theory, defends the Christian interpretation of the theory, defends the Christian interpretation of the ideas as 'thoughts of god' and argues that the Christian conception of immaterial spirit was a renewal and elaboration of Platonic 'idealism'. See also for Moreau's interpretation of the theory of ideas his other publications: *La construction de l'idéalisme platonicien* (5 *supra*), especially pp. 470—474 and pp. 477—479; *Sur la signification du 'Parménide'* (605 *supra*); *Réalisme et idéalisme chez Platon* (1234 *infra*); and the subsequent articles listed in this last item, especially 1261 *infra*.

1225. G. Colli, *ΦΥΣΙΣ ΚΡΥΠΤΕΣΘΑΙ ΦΙΛΑΙ*: Studi sulla filosofia greca, Milano 1948, especially pp. 193—239. The theory of ideas is here represented as a mystical doctrine, refuted in the *Parmenides*, and thereafter abandoned by Plato, who reduced philosophy to a science of phenomena. See also Colli's lectures, *Il 'Parménide' platonico* (611 *supra*).

1226. A. F. Dawson, Plato's aesthetic in its bearing on his theory of ideas, *Cl Journ (Malta)* 3, 1948, 5—16. According to Dawson Plato, having adopted from the Pythagoreans the notion of eternal

ideas, was prevented by the malign influence of Socrates' hostility towards art from recognizing that artistic intuition is the only means of mental access to supra-sensory objective entities and consequently, despite his own misgivings suppressing the aesthetic aspects of the theory, confused ideas with concepts, insisted that dialectic is the way to knowledge, deprived art of any ontological basis, and unconsciously deformed the sound rudimentary version of his doctrine by an introjection of Socratism which involved the conscious version of it in insoluble difficulties and unresolved inconsistencies.

—. C. J. de Vogel, *La dernière phase du platonisme* ... (108 *supra*). See in connection with this especially her article published the next year (109 *supra*); and besides her earlier book (612a *supra*), see for her notion of 'the final phase' of Plato's theory the series of articles listed 38a—38f *supra* supplemented by her recent article in *Rev Philosophique* 149, 1959, 21—39 (1285 *infra*).

1227. É. Gilson, *L'être et l'essence*, Paris 1948. See pp. 21—38 for Plato's theory of ideas and pp. 46—52 for Aristotle's criticism of it. These passages, somewhat revised and expanded, reappear on pp. 6—20 and pp. 41—50 in the 'second edition corrected and enlarged' of Gilson's book, *Being and some philosophers*, Toronto 1952 (first edition: Toronto 1949). Gilson's 'essentialist' interpretation of the theory of ideas is the target of Loriaux's attack in his book, *L'être et la forme selon Platon* (1167 *supra*).

—. P. Grenet, *Les origines de l'analogie philosophique dans les dialogues de Platon* (1144 *supra*), pp. 35—38, pp. 62—68, pp. 84—97, and pp. 216—225.

—. H. W. B. Joseph, *Knowledge and the Good in Plato's Republic* (787 *supra*), pp. 61—73.

—. G. Junge, *Platos Ideen-Zahlen* (110 *supra*). Without reference to the more recent work on the subject Junge on the basis of Stenzel's notions and O. Becker's tries to reconstruct the theory of idea-numbers which he thinks was misunderstood by Aristotle and to connect it with remarks in the *Philebus* and especially with the 'diaeresis' of the *Sophist* and *Politicus* interpreted as Plato's attempt to arrange all the ideas in a pyramid with the one, i. e. the idea of good, at its apex and thus to provide the connection hitherto missing between the one and the phenomenal world. See also Junge's later article, *Von Hippasus bis Philolaus*, *Class et Med* 19, 1958, 41—72 (1276 *infra*).

— B. Liebrucks, *Das Problem der Entwicklung bei Platon* (1130 *supra*). The ontology of the 'middle dialogues', he contends, is diametrically opposed to that of the *Theaetetus*, *Sophist*, and *Parmenides*. See his book, published the next year, *Platons Entwicklung zur Dialektik* (217 *supra*) and for the theory of ideas especially pp. 31—54, pp. 75—96, pp. 139—163, and pp. 169—188.

— R. Schaerer, *La dialectique platonicienne ...* (1138 *supra*), p. 27. Here the 'separation' of the ideas is denied; and it is asserted that they are hypotheses as provisional principles at the summit of each 'logos', not objects but values which affirm themselves from the beginning in man's efforts to attain them. See Schaerer's later article, *La structure des dialogues métaphysiques* (618 *supra*), pp. 218—219, where Plato is said to have saved the ideas by erecting them as values accessible to the ascending dialectic and employable in the descending dialectic.

— K. Schilling, *Platon* (1131 *supra*), especially pp. 139—148 and pp. 212—267. With this later section compare his more recent article (1155 *supra*).

— D. H. T. Vollenhoven, *The course of Plato's development* (1125 *supra*). Here the change from the 'non-realistic phase' to the 'realistic phase' is located between the *Euthyphro* and the *Hippias Major*, after which Plato remained true to his realism, though there were many changes in his conception of the structure of both 'background' (i. e. ideas) and 'foreground' (i. e. physical cosmos) and after the *Phaedrus* (386/367) the ideas were no longer regarded as being transcendent. See also the series of Vollenhoven's later articles (1126—1129 *supra*).

— R. M. Agoglia, *La actualidad de la doctrina platónica del ser* (1145 *supra*).

— G. E. Bariè, *L'esigenza dell' unità da Talete a Platone* (1146 *supra*).

— W. Bröcker, *Plato über das Gute* (107 *supra*). Contending that the dialectic of Plato's latest works turns upon the problem of 'das Wesen der Idee als Idee' and that in the lecture on the Good the intelligibility of the idea was said to entail its being a number, Bröcker tries to put together from the *Parmenides*, the *Sophist*, and the simile of the sun in the *Republic* a theory of idea-numbers and their principles in accordance with the apparent testimony of Aristotle, Theophrastus, and the Aristotelian commentators.

— C. J. de Vogel, Problems concerning later Platonism (109 *supra*). This is primarily a criticism of Cherniss (1218 *supra*), being at the same time an attempt to defend the notion of a Platonic doctrine of idea-numbers and the principles from which they are derived. For Miss de Vogel's conception of this doctrine see her articles numbered 108 *supra*, 38a—38f *supra*, and Rev Philosophique 149, 1959, 21—39 (1285 *infra*).

— P. Kucharski, Les chemins du savoir dans les derniers dialogues de Platon (1148 *supra*); and in connection with this see his earlier articles, 1148a and 1148b *supra*. Against Kucharski's thesis that in the later dialogues Plato abandoned the earlier theory of ideas see besides the reviews listed in 1148 *supra*, especially that by É. des Places, the remarks on the theory of ideas and the *Laws* made in different contexts by É. de Strycker, Ant Cl 16, 1947, 150, by H. Cherniss, Gnomon 25, 1953, 375—378, and by F. Egermann, Hermes 87, 1959, 137. For Kucharski's attempt, while maintaining his earlier thesis, to interpret the *Philebus* in accordance with Aristotle's testimony to a theory of idea-numbers see his later articles: La musique et la conception du réel dans le '*Philèbe*' (117 *supra*); Le '*Philèbe*' et les '*Éléments harmoniques*' d'Aristoxène, Rev Philosophique 149, 1959, 41—72 (especially pp. 42—47 and pp. 68—72); Archives de Philos 22, 1959, 410—431 in his article, Les principes des Pythagoriciens et la dyade de Platon, *ibid.* pp. 175—191 and pp. 385—431 (1287 *infra*).

1228. W. Lutoslawski, Plato's change of mind, Proc Tenth Internat Cong Philosophy 1, Fasc 2, Amsterdam 1949, 1076—1080. He reasserts here his old thesis that in the later dialogues the ideas are replaced by individual souls as the only real substances. In conformity with this notion Maria Maykowska (526a *supra*) supposes that in the *Laws* the ideas are said to exist in the minds of the gods.

— L. Malverne, La condition de l'être et la mission du logos (1149 *supra*). See also his more recent article, Remarques sur le "*Sophiste*" (900 *supra*).

1229. Suzanne Mansion, La critique de la théorie des idées dans le *Περὶ ἰδεῶν* d'Aristote, Rev Philos Louvain 47, 1949, 169—202. On some of the interpretation here see L. Lugarini (624 *supra*), pp. 47—50 and É. de Strycker, Autour d'Aristote: Recueil . . . offert à A. Mansion, Louvain 1955, 127—128.

— G. E. Mueller, The Platonic Aristotle (717a *supra*). He takes Aristotle's criticism of the theory of ideas to have been directed against

those who in their misunderstanding of the theory made the ideas transcendental entities and absolutized numbers, whereas Plato meant by them the reality within the soul which the soul explicates. Mueller's Natorpian interpretation of the ideas was clearly stated in his earlier article, Plato's dialectical idealism (*Monist* 45, 1935, 199—219), reprinted as pp. 87—107 of his book, *What Plato thinks*, La Salle (Illinois) 1937. See also his later articles: 642, 717, and 686 = 688 *supra*.

1230. M. D. Philippe, La participation dans la philosophie d'Aristote, *Rev Thomiste* 49, 1949, 254—277. At the beginning of this article there is a defence of Aristotle's denial of efficient causality in Plato's system. See also Philippe's book, *Initiation à la philosophie d'Aristote*, Paris 1956, pp. 14—17 and pp. 24—26.

— M. B. Trías, Nota sobre la belleza como transcendental (696 *supra*).

la/ 1231. U. Urrutia, Contribución al esclarecimiento de ~~la~~ genuina sentencia de Platón sobre las ideas, *Actas Primer Cong Nac Filos*, Mendoza 1949, III, pp. 2061—2064. Relying chiefly upon misinterpretation of *Phaedrus* 249 B 6—D 3 and *Timaeus* 39 E 7—9, he argues that the ideas exist in the essence of god as the objects of his contemplation and were used as archetypes by him in the fabrication of the world; and Urrutia suggests that Plato got this theory from Jews in Egypt through whom he became acquainted with the sacred books.

— P. Wilpert, Zwei aristotelische Frühschriften über die Ideenlehre (111 *supra*). Observe that according to Wilpert Plato even before developing the theory of idea-numbers, with the reconstruction of which this book is chiefly concerned, made important alterations in the earlier theory of ideas, one manifestation of which was the substitution of the conception of *φύσις* for that of *εἶδος* with the concomitant abandonment of ideas of artefacts (pp. 56—66); and observe also pp. 76—78 and pp. 83—96 on the 'third man' argument, his earlier interpretation of which (*Philologus* 94, 1940/41, 51—64; cf. É. de Strycker, *Ant Cl* 18, 1949, 104) save for one slight alteration he here defends and develops. See also Wilpert's article, published in the same year, *Platons Altersvorlesung über das Gute* (112 *supra*), and his subsequent articles which deal with various aspects of what he supposes was Plato's later theory of ideas and their principles (176, 295, 716, and 124 *supra*).

— C. J. de Vogel, Greek philosophy . . . (38 *supra*), pp. 172—184, pp. 224—263, pp. 272—281. See also her article published in the same

year, Plato en het moderne Denken (38a *supra*), the later publications listed 38b—38f *supra*, the two earlier items (108 and 109 *supra*), and her recent article in Rev Philosophique 149, 1959, 21—39 (1285 *infra*).

— H.-G. Gadamer, Zur Vorgeschichte der Metaphysik (215 *supra*). See also his much earlier book (710a *supra*), especially pp. 56—66, pp. 73—80, and pp. 89—115.

— E. Hoffmann, Platon (22 *supra*), especially pp. 52—64, pp. 88—118, and pp. 185—188 on the doctrine of ideas (cf. H. Cherniss, Cl Phil 47, 1952, 259—260; E. M. Manasse, Philos Rundschau 5, Beiheft 1, 1957, 16—20).

— H. Leisegang, Platon (26 *supra*), especially cols. 2460—2467, 2481—2486, and 2520—2522. What is here represented as the definitive results of the latest research on the theory of ideas was long out of date when the article was published in 1950.

— C. Librizzi, I problemi fondamentali della filosofia di Platone (29 *supra*), pp. 40—80.

1232. E. Paci, Democrito-Platone-Aristotele, Studi di filosofia antica e moderna (676 *supra*), pp. 100—103. Following Stenzel's comparison of the three philosophers, Paci here speaks of relations among the ideas and a theory of idea-numbers as Plato's way of overcoming dualism and solving the problem of non-being. See also Paci's later article, La dialettica in Platone (1175 *supra*); and for his interpretation of the theory of ideas and the development of the theory of idea-numbers see his earlier book, Il significato del Parmenide nella filosofia di Platone (Messina/Milano 1938), especially pp. 93—110, pp. 230—245, and pp. 261—270.

— H. Raeder, Platonische Stadier (142 *supra*).

— R. Robinson, Forms and error in Plato's *Theaetetus* (880 *supra*).

— P. Wilpert, Die Elementenlehre des Platon und Demokrit (176 *supra*). In connection with this see besides Wilpert's earlier book (111 *supra*) and article (112 *supra*), his later articles (295, 716, and 124 *supra*).

— B. Noll, Die Zeitstruktur im platonischen Dialog *Theätet* (952 *supra*).

— H. Daudin, Les rapports de l'être et de la connaissance chez Platon et chez Aristote (1152 *supra*).

—. A. de Marignac, *Imagination et dialectique* . . . (1070 *supra*), pp. 33—63 and pp. 138—146.

—. C. J. de Vogel, *Examen critique de l'interprétation traditionnelle du Platonisme* (38b *supra*). With this see also besides her earlier publications (108, 109, and 38a *supra*) and the others listed 38c—38f *supra* her recent article in *Rev Philosophique* 149, 1959, 21—39 (1285 *infra*).

—. A. Diès, *Les Lois: Introduction* (511 *supra*), pp. LXXVIII—LXXIX. He holds that in the *Laws* as everywhere in Plato the divine ideas with the idea of good at their summit, the source of all that is divine, are prior and superior to the divine intellect, which is god. See also his article, *Le Dieu de Platon, Autour d'Aristote: Recueil . . . offert à A. Mansion*, Louvain 1955, pp. 61—67.

—. G. Huber, *Platons dialektische Ideenlehre* . . . (612 *supra*).

—. P. Kucharski, *La musique et la conception du réel dans le 'Philèbe'* (117 *supra*). See here especially pp. 47—59 and with this his later articles in *Rev Philosophique* 149, 1959, 41—72 (especially pp. 42—47 and pp. 68—72) and *Archives de Philos* 22, 1959, 175—191 and 385—431 (especially 410—431). Together these constitute Kucharski's attempt to give the *Philebus* an interpretation in conformity with a theory of idea-numbers and their principles based upon Aristotelian testimony (see 1287 *infra*).

—. M. Landmann, *Erkenntnis und Erlebnis* (923 *supra*), pp. 85—97: *Kategorie und Wesenheit*. This essay on the theory of ideas from a phenomenological point of view has little to do with Plato's own presentation; and this holds with almost equal force for Landmann's treatment of the epistemological rôle of the ideas in the following essay (pp. 99—126), *Formen und Grenzen der Gleichheits-erkenntnis*.

1233. J. H. M. M. Loenen, *De Nous in het syteem van Plato's philosophie*, Amsterdam 1951 (cf. D. Loenen, *Algem Nederland Tijdsch Wijsbeg en Psychol* 44, 1951/52, 241—261; V. Goldschmidt, *Rev Ét Grecques* 67, 1954, 301—303; P. J. G. M. van Litsenburg, *God en het goddelijke in de dialogen van Plato*, Nijmegen 1955, pp. 172—177). See also Loenen's restatement of his thesis in his later article, *De ontwikkeling van Plato's teleologische natuurbeschouwing* (715 *supra*). Interpretation of the theory of ideas is here expressly subordinated to an explanation of Plato's system as the development of a teleological theory; but this results in the contention that for Plato god is not *voûς* but is the transcendent and ineffable

idea of good, identical with the *aitia* of the *Philebus* and mythically personified by the demiurge of the *Timaeus*, the source of the other ideas, reduced in number to those of 'concrete substances' after the notion of being had in the *Sophist* been extended to a 'pure category of thought'. According to Loenen Plato in the *Phaedo* had denied that intellect is the cause of cosmic order and in the *Republic* and the *Phaedrus* still rejected such an explanation for want of the doctrine of a world-soul, which was lacking because he thought of soul only as the static principle of knowledge of the static ideas; and, since he always held *voûs* to exist only as a function of the immortal part of the soul¹), it was only after discovering in the *Phaedrus* the dynamic conception of soul as principle of movement that he was led in the *Sophist* to recognize *voûs* as movement and so to extend his conception of being, to revise his earlier theory of ideas, and to formulate implicitly in the *Politicus* and expressly in the *Philebus* a doctrine comprising both a god, transcendent and ineffable, the source of the ideas, and a cosmic intelligence, immanent in a world-soul and the direct intermediate teleological principle.

— L. Lugarini, L'unità dell' idea nel *Parmenide* (613 *supra*). See also his later articles (218 *supra*; 624 *supra*; and 1168 *supra*, pp. 3—6, pp. 23—53, and pp. 88—89).

1234. J. Moreau, *Réalisme et idéalisme chez Platon*, Paris 1951 (cf. É. de Strycker, *Ant Cl* 21, 1952, 157—159; G. Reale, *Riv Filos Neoscholastica* 47, 1955, 135—153; W. J. Verdenius, *Mnem* IV 9, 1956, 64—65). This professed attempt to mediate between the idealistic and the realistic interpretations of the ideas turns out in the end to be another defence of Moreau's Neo-Kantian interpretation of the theory, for which see his earlier publications (5 *supra*, 605 *supra*, 1224 *supra*) and his later articles: one dealing primarily with the *Theaetetus* (955 *supra*) and two (1242 and 1261 *infra*) which are in fact succinct restatements of the thesis argued in the present booklet.

— N. R. Murphy, The interpretation of Plato's *Republic* (791 *supra*), especially pp. 100—150, pp. 181—186, and pp. 237—239. According to Murphy Plato never held a theory of degrees of reality and never thought that particular physical things are in any way unreal or depend for their reality upon participation in the ideas, which are primarily the objects presupposed by such sciences as mathematics and ethics and prove their reality only by being known.

¹) See also *Mnem* IV 9, 1956, 308—310 and 313—314 in Loenen's article, *Albinus' Metaphysics*, *ibid.* pp. 296—319.

1235. P. T. Raju, *The universal in the Western and the Indian philosophy*, Radhakrishnan: Comparative studies in philosophy presented in honour of his sixtieth birthday, London 1951, pp. 379—408. This essay begins with an account and criticism of the theory of ideas, the dominant ethical motivation of which according to Raju prevents it from being 'scientific' and self-consistent. On the basis of this interpretation, which depends largely upon antiquated scholarship and misunderstanding, Raju tries to compare Plato's theory with Hindu treatments of the universal. See also his later article (1255 *infra*).

1236. Sir David Ross, *Plato's theory of ideas*, Oxford 1951 (cf. J. L. Mackie, *Australasian Journ Philos* 30, 1952, 192—199; J. L. Ackrill, *Mind* N.S. 62, 1953, 549—556; J. Tate, *Cl Rev* N.S. 3, 1953, 91—94). The 'second edition' of this book (Oxford 1953) is merely a reprint of the first with a few slight corrections. In the first eight chapters Ross traces the development of the theory through Plato's writings, assuming that each fully expresses Plato's thought on the subject at the time of its composition. Chapters 9—16 (pp. 142—224) are devoted to Aristotle's testimony and criticism and the reconstruction of the theory of idea-numbers which Aristotle supposedly ascribes to Plato on the basis of the latter's oral teaching. The whole is summed up in a 'Retrospect' (pp. 225—245), which in some respects is curiously inconsistent with interpretations given in the body of the book. Ross holds that there is in Plato's writings a general movement away from the original immanence of the ideas towards transcendence¹, with which view, however, Plato was never entirely satisfied, and that no fundamental change of view was involved even in the 'later metaphysics' which he reconstructs from Aristotle's testimony, although in doing so he rejects Aristotle's interpretation on several crucial points including that of the identification of ideas and numbers, adopting here against his own earlier arguments the view of L. Robin.

— N.-I. Boussoulas, *L'être et la composition des mixtes dans le Philèbe de Platon* (714 *supra*). See also his later article (622 *supra*).

— H. Gauss, *Philosophischer Handkommentar . . .* (20 *supra*), I/1, pp. 54—99 and pp. 111—139. See here also pp. 13 and 148—149

¹ Against the argument of Ross on this point see G. E. L. Owen (294 *supra*), p. 84, n. 3; and against both Ross and Owen see H. Cherniss (800 *supra*), pp. 248—252. On the 'metaphors of imitation and participation' see also J. P. Maguire, *Yale Class Stud* 10, 1947, 166—167; L. Stefanini (9 *supra*) I, pp. 240—244 and II, pp. 275—281, pp. 325—327, and p. 431; P. Shorey (8 *supra*), p. 585 on *Parmenides* 131 A 5 and p. 595 on *Sophist* 256 B.

and Gauss's earlier articles (1153 and 1153a *supra*). The tendency of this interpretation may be gathered from the assertions that the ideas are the content of pure thought having validity rather than being, that we take refuge in them only to interpret the world of experience, and that, when we do so, they assume dialectical relations to one another whereby they modify their logical content and lose for us their essential self-identity, so that we have no access to the idea in itself but only to the ideas in so far as they are related to the empirical world, which must be thought as a process directed towards being, though there is no such being anywhere. If Plato at all, this is Plato 'through the looking-glass' (cf. H. Kuhn, *Gnomon* 25, 1953, 277—278; J. Tate, *Erasmus* 8, 1955, 454—457).

—. F. Gonzalez Cordero, *El diálogo Parménides dentro de la sistematización filosófica de Platón* (614 *supra*).

—. A. C. Lloyd, Plato's description of division (1158 *supra*). The suggestion made here with regard to diaeresis is supposed to have a bearing upon the metaphysical theory and the 'generation of numbers'. See also the assertion made concerning the theory of ideas in p. 106, n. 1.

—. R. Loriaux, *L'être et l'idée selon Platon* (841f *supra*). This article was later incorporated into his book (1167 *supra*).

1237. Concetta Orsi, *La dottrina plotiniana del numero e le sue premesse storiche*, *Ann Fac Lettere e Filos, Univ Napoli* 2, 1952, 137—174. The theory of numbers in the dialogues is treated under the title, *Rapporti tra pitagorismo e platonismo* (pp. 144—147); and the Aristotelian assertions concerning the theory of idea-numbers under the title, *Gli ἀγαρα δόγματα* (pp. 147—154).

—. A. L. Peck, Plato and the *ΜΕΓΙΣΤΑ ΓΕΝΗ* of the *Sophist* (883 *supra*).

—. Maria Rezzani, *I problemi fondamentali del "Sofista" di Platone* (885 *supra*). The last section of this article (pp. 307—309) is incorporated in her later monograph, *Note e ricerche . . .* (1084 *supra*), pp. 24—28.

—. K. Riezler, *Das Nichts und das Andere, das Sein und das Seiende* (884 *supra*), especially pp. 93—96. He takes the idea of being to be itself a *κοινωνία ἰδεῶν* and assumes that the elements in the mixture of soul in the *Timaeus* are ideas, a fatal misreading of the passage.

— U. Tavianini, L'oggettivarsi del concetto socratico nella speculazione platonica (146 *supra*).

— E. W. Beth, The prehistory of research into foundations (115 *supra*). This article has been reprinted without substantial alteration in Beth's book, The foundations of mathematics (Amsterdam 1959), pp. 3—30, where pp. 12—18 = 68—75 of the article, the sections on Plato's theory of ideas, the supposedly 'new theory' of idea-numbers, and Aristotle's criticism. See also Beth's earlier article, Les relations de la dialectique et la logique (115a *supra*), especially pp. 113—117.

— K. R. Popper, The nature of philosophical problems . . . : Plato and the crisis in early Greek atomism (175 *supra*). See also Popper's book, The open society and its enemies (46 *supra*), pp. 478—481, pp. 483—484, and especially pp. 525—531 (note 9 to chapter 6), of which this later article is an amplification and supplement with slight corrections (cf. the Addendum in the third edition of the book, London 1957, Vol. I, p. 319). At the end of the article (pp. 150—152) Popper, arguing that Plato purposely introduced $\sqrt{2}$ and $\sqrt{3}$ as elementary principles, attempts by combining this with a suggestion of van der Wielen's (113 *supra*) to reconstruct Plato's supposed generation of idea-numbers from the one and the indefinite dyad.

— J. Derbolav, Der Dialog 'Kratylos' . . . (349 *supra*), p. 29, pp. 43—44, pp. 54—69, and notes 4, 10, 31, and 32 (pp. 92, 95, and 102—104). In Derbolav's book, Erkenntnis und Entscheidung (16 *supra*), the theory of ideas is frequently touched upon (e. g. pp. 47—48, pp. 95—120, pp. 145—146) but usually in a peripheral and unenlightening fashion.

— C. J. de Vogel, On the Neoplatonic character of Platonism . . . (38c *supra*); and, published in the same year, her article, Platon a-t-il ou n'a-t-il pas introduit le mouvement dans son monde intelligible? (38e *supra*). In the latter she interprets the *Sophist* as supporting her contention that the world of ideas is a 'living being' with consciousness and thought (see on *Sophist* 246 A 4—249 D 8 *supra*). In connection with the former see especially her article published the next year (38f *supra*) and the remarks in 612 *supra*; and for her interpretation of the 'final phase' of Plato's theory see also her earlier articles (108, 109, and 38a *supra*) and her recent article in *Rev Philosophique* 149, 1959, 21—39 (1285 *infra*).

1238. G. di Napoli, La concezione dell'essere nella filosofia greca, Milano 1953, pp. 87—156: La trascendenza dell'essere nella metafisica di Platone. In this chapter, the second of four which constitute the

book, the development of the theory of ideas is interpreted as divided into three stages: Plato's adoption of Parmenidean ontology to provide a basis for Socratic axiology, the necessity of combatting rigid Eleaticism by introducing the conception of non-being as other than being in order to save the ideas from sceptical objections, and finally the systematization of the resulting theory of being in the *Politicus*, the *Philebus*, and the *Timaeus*, the demiurge of which di Napoli identifies with the idea of good.

1239. K. V. Gajendragadkar, *Aristotle's critique of Platonism*, Mysore 1953. This booklet, an essay on Aristotle's treatment of the theory of ideas, is wholly inadequate to its subject and without any scholarly significance.

— A. C. Lloyd, Falsehood and significance ... (887 *supra*). He argues that in Plato's theory mental concepts are likenesses or copies of the ideas but the immediate objects of pure knowledge are the ideas themselves.

— L. Lugarini, *Il principio logico in Platone* (218 *supra*). See also his earlier article (613 *supra*) and the two later ones (624 *supra* and 1168 *supra* [pp. 3—6, pp. 23—53, and pp. 88—89]).

1240. E. Maggioni, *Eternità e storicità del dialogo*, Assoc Filos Ligure (Univ di Genova): *Relazioni e discussioni* (1951/52), Milano/Roma 1953, 127—135. The 'dialectic of the ideas' is treated on pp. 134—135. For the occasion of this paper and the discussion of it by Mazzantini and Rezzani (pp. 135—138) see the note on 885 *supra*.

1241. I. Mancini, *Il platonismo di Vl. Arangio-Ruiz*, *Giorn Metafisica* 8, 1953, 312—323. The theory of ideas and the interpretation of it by Arangio-Ruiz, especially his criticism of Plato's 'compromise' in the *Theaetetus* and the *Sophist* (see 877 *supra*) are discussed on pp. 316—322.

— G. Martin, *Platons Lehre von der Zahl und ihre Darstellung durch Aristoteles* (119 *supra*). See also 120 *supra* and especially his more recent book (1268 *infra*).

— P. Merlan, *From Platonism to Neoplatonism* (121 *supra*). See also 1220 *supra*.

1242. J. Moreau, *El idealismo platónico*, *Rev Filos* (Madrid) 12, 1953, 481—502. This is a succinct restatement of the thesis defended at greater length in 1234 *supra*. See also Moreau's article published in this same year, *L'idée d'univers* ... (1012 *supra*), especially pp.

95—97, 102, 107, 328, and 342. His later article, *L'idéalisme platonicien et la transcendance de l'être* (1261 *infra*), is like the present item a restatement of the thesis argued in 1234 *supra*.

—. G. E. Mueller, The unity of the *Phaidon* (642 *supra*). See also his later articles (717 and 686 = 688 *supra*) for other applications of the Natorpian interpretation expounded by him earlier in 717 *a supra* and in *Monist* 45, 1935, 199—219.

—. G. E. L. Owen, The place of the *Timaeus* in Plato's dialogues (294 *supra*). The purpose of this attempt to prove the *Timaeus* earlier than the *Parmenides* and the *Cratylus* is to remove evidence against the hypothesis that after having written the *Parmenides* Plato abandoned the theory of paradigmatic ideas and radically altered his metaphysics. Against both this attempt to redate the *Timaeus* and the hypothesis which it is supposed such redating would support see H. Cherniss (300 *supra*).

—. A. L. Peck, Plato's *Parmenides* . . . (615 *supra*). See also his earlier article (883 *supra*), the substance of which is recapitulated in this article (*Cl Quart N.S.* 3, 1953, 146—149; cf. *N.S.* 4, 1954, 39—41). Against Peck's thesis concerning ideas see H. Cherniss (1043 *supra*), p. 23, n. 57; R. S. Bluck (895 *supra*), pp. 181—182, and especially A. R. Lacey (902 *supra*).

1243. D. F. Pró, Interpretación del ser en la filosofía griega, *Humanitas* (Tucumán) 1 Fasc 1, 1953, 41—97. Plato's theory of being is dealt with specifically on pp. 78—84; being, identical with the good and with the one, is the highest idea in the hierarchical cosmos of ideas, distinct from all the others and penetrating them all, at once an essence as original principle and a value.

1244. L. Quattrocchi, L'idea di bello nel pensiero di Platone, Roma 1953 (cf. P. Moraux, *Ant Cl* 23, 1954, 473—474). Preceded by a brief summary of Greek philosophy from Homer to Socrates and followed by a long but indiscriminate and inaccurate list of publications on the history of aesthetics and on Plato, the body of this work (pp. 37—101) is an essay on the development of Plato's idealism. According to this account, Plato in his desire to find an absolute basis for Socratic humanistic ethics hypostatized values and, having thus set up an ideal world apart from the sensible, sought to relate the two and especially to provide for man's knowledge of the former by means of the idea of the beautiful, which visibly realized in the sensible world and thus the object of man's love is sharply differen-

tiated from the idea of good¹). Quattrochi maintains that, if Plato had not failed to understand the significance of his new metaphysical insight in the *Sophist*, he could have overcome the difficulties of his dualism by making the supreme reality a living intellect.

1245. H. T. Schwartz, Plato, Aristotle, St. Thomas, and Univocity, *New Scholast* 27, 1953, 373—403. The universal conception of things considered in their greatest generality is here defended as the criterion judged by which Aristotle, in his refusal so to conceive the ultimate universals, is less philosophical than Plato and Thomas Aquinas is declared to be a Platonist.

—. Marion Soreth, Der platonische Dialog *Hippias Major* (491 *supra*). Against her thesis concerning the development of the theory of ideas and the necessary place of the *Hippias Major* in this development (pp. 19—28, pp. 38—46, pp. 63—64) see especially O. Gigon, *Gnomon* 27, 1955, 16—18 and Annemarie Capelle (493 *supra*), pp. 181—184 and p. 190.

—. E. Turolla, Il problema fondamentale del Platonismo e il 'mito solare' nel VI della *Politeia*, *Giorn Metafisica* 8, 1953, 241—259. This Neo-Platonic interpretation of the theory complete with an esoteric mysticism is reprinted as *Conclusione Generale* of Turolla's translation of the Platonic corpus (305 *supra*), III, pp. 857—878 (see also in 841 *supra*).

—. D. H. T. Vollenhoven, L'évolution d'Aristote ... (1126 *supra*), pp. 86—87. See also his earlier article (1125 *supra*) and the three later ones (1127—1129 *supra*).

—. P. Wilpert, Eine Elementenlehre im platonischen *Philebos* (716 *supra*). See also his earlier book (111 *supra*) and the three articles referred to in 716 (112, 176, and 124 *supra*), all of which are more closely concerned with this subject than is his other article published during this same year, *Die Stellung des Timaios im platonischen Korpus* (295 *supra*), though here too there are remarks and suggestions concerning the possible connection of the *Timaeus* with the 'later theory' of idea-numbers and their principles as Wilpert in his other publications tries to reconstruct it.

—. L. J. Eslick, The dyadic character of being in Plato (888 *supra*).

—. G. Capone Braga, Della dialettica (1161 *supra*).

¹ With this sharp differentiation of the ideas of the beautiful and the good cf. M. B. Trías (696 *supra*), whom Quattrochi does not mention, however.

1246. O. Constanzi, *La trascendenza in Platone e in Cartesio*, Città de Vita (Firenze) 9, 1954, 427—437.

1247. R. C. Cross, *Logos and forms in Plato*, *Mind* N.S. 63, 1954, 433—450. For the thesis of this article and the criticism of it by D. W. Hamlyn and R. S. Bluck see 957 *supra*. That Cross in support of his thesis misinterprets *Symposium* 211 A 7 is pointed out by J. L. Ackrill in *Mind* N. S. 66, 1957, 572—573.

— H. C. de Lima Vaz, *A dialéctica das ideias no Sofista* (889 *supra*). See also 927 *supra*.

— C. J. de Vogel, *A la recherche des étapes précises entre Platon et le néoplatonisme* (38f *supra*). A résumé of this article was published during the same year in Assoc G Budé, *Congrès de Tours et Poitiers 1953 Actes*, Paris 1954, 193—194. It is largely a restatement of her earlier interpretations (see 108, 109, and 38a—38e *supra*), identifying Plato's system with the Neo-Platonic hierarchy of being derived from the One in all but express terminology and his greater reticence concerning the structure of the intelligible world. With the position here given to the indefinite dyad as Plato's second principle at the base of the scale of being, however, contrast her more recent article in *Rev Philosophique* 149, 1959, 21—39 (1285 *infra*); and for the last five pages (pp. 118—122) see in 1249 *infra*.

— P. Friedländer, *Platon* (11a *supra*), I, pp. 17—33, 64—68, 93—94, 105—106, and 226—232 = *Plato* (11b *supra*), I, pp. 16—31, 60—64, 88, 100, 214—220. The first of these parallel passages especially deals with the meaning of 'eidos' and 'idea' for Plato, with the terminology of the theory, and with its history or 'development'; and the last is Friedländer's attempt to justify his conception of the theory's origin, expressed in the assertion that Plato 'intuited the idea'. This intuition or discovery according to Friedländer Plato came to in his search for the true state and for him 'eidos' and 'polis' were always inextricably linked; but, while 'the idea' is by implication or explicitly the centre of gravity in all his works, there is nowhere in them a 'doctrine' of ideas as such nor could there be any, as is made clear by *Epistle VII*, which Friedländer insists upon regarding as invaluable autobiographical evidence.

— N. Gulley, *Cl Quart* N.S. 4, 1954, 211—213 in his article, *Plato's theory of recollection*, *ibid.* pp. 194—213 (see 1357 *infra*). Against such interpreters as Stenzel and Robin Gulley here shows that the doctrine of intercommunion of ideas and the method of

diaeresis were never intended to eliminate the radical 'separation' of the ideas from the sensible world, a postulate retained by Plato to the end.

1248. A. Lowit, Pourquoi Husserl n'est pas platonicien, *Études Philos* N.S. 9, 1954, 324—336. In this confrontation of Plato and Husserl Lowit contends that the former, once having recognized the ideas as atemporal, separate, and independent entities (which they are for Husserl too), mistakenly confused their veritable being with absolute being, failing to see that it is in their very essence to be related to particular reality as its meaning and so not to be ontologically prior to it.

— L. Lugarini, L'argomento del 'terzo uomo' e la critica di Aristotele a Platone (624 *supra*). See also on the theory of ideas his later article (1168 *supra* [pp. 3—6, pp. 23—53, and pp. 88—89]) and his two earlier ones (613 and 218 *supra*).

— P. Piovani, L'antinomia della città platonica (796 *supra*), pp. 502—505. He contends that the tendency on the one hand to make the idea of good the idea of ideas, which would reduce the many ideas to mere relations (or degrees of realization), and on the other to maintain the real plurality of the world of ideas, which reduces the idea of good to one among many and so threatens its unity, constitute the insuperable antinomy at the root of Plato's thought.

1249. Audrey N. M. Rich, The Platonic ideas as the thoughts of God, *Mnem* IV 7, 1954, 123—133. The identification of the ideas with the thoughts of god, it is here argued, was neither Platonic nor drawn from Plato's dialogues but was a fusion of Platonic and non-Platonic elements, resting upon an analogy between the human mind and the divine and originating probably in a desire to reconcile Plato's theory with the Aristotelian doctrine of immanent form in the productive agent.

In the same year and in the same journal Miss de Vogel (381 *supra* [pp. 118—122]), insisting that Plato himself meant the ideas to be eternal thoughts of a divine and transcendent mind and that Alcimus must so have understood him (see *contra* *AJPh* 59, 1938, 354—355), argued after Witt that it was Posidonius who, interpreting the *Timaeus* in this way, identified the ideas with the thoughts of god.

Further, in the same year A. Solignac, writing on Augustine's *Quaestio de ideis*, reviewed the doxography of the interpretation and assigned it to the first century B. C. (Augustinus Magister: Congrès Internat Augustinien, Paris 21—24 Sept 1954, Communications I, pp. 307—315 [especially pp. 312—315]).

More recently J. H. Loenen has argued that the identification of the ideas with thoughts of an intellect immanent in the cosmos originated with Antiochus¹) but that Albinus was the first explicitly to transfer this notion to the level of a transcendent god (Mnem IV 10, 1957, 43—46 in his article, Albinus' Metaphysics . . . II . . ., *ibid.* pp. 35—56).

— W. J. Verdenius, *Christianiserende en historische Plato-Interpretatie* (70 *supra*). See also his article, published in the same year, *Platons Gottesbegriff, Entretiens Ant Cl 1, Vandoeuvres-Genève 1954*, 239—293. After having argued strongly against identifying Plato's demiurge with god in the Christian sense and the ideas with thoughts of god, Verdenius maintains that for Plato the highest divinity is the idea of good, of which the demiurge is the cosmogonic reflection, but the whole world of ideas also is god, the individual ideas being regarded as a transposition of the idea of good on the level of multiplicity.

— G. Vlastos, The Third Man argument in the *Parmenides* (625 *supra*). On this article see W. Sellars (626 *supra*), P. T. Geach (627 *supra*), R. S. Bluck (628 and 629 *supra*), N. B. Booth (630 *supra*), and H. Cherniss (300 *supra* [pp. 252—263]).

— D. H. T. Vollenhoven, *Ennoëtisme en 'ahoristos dyas'* . . . (1127 *supra*). See also his earlier articles (1125 and 1126 *supra*) and the later ones (1128 and 1129 *supra*). The present article deals with the *Philebus*, the *Laws*, and the *De Bono* and *Epinomis* as three stages in the development of Plato's views, criticism of each of which Vollenhoven professes to find in a different work of Aristotle's and the last of which he thinks represents Plato's discovery of the principles, the one and the indefinite dyad, interpreted by Vollenhoven as productive of *mathematical* numbers.

— G. E. Mueller, The unity of Plato's *Philebus* (717 *supra*). For the interpretation of the ideas here applied to the *Philebus* see Mueller's earlier articles (717a and 642 *supra*) and his later essay on the *Phaedrus* (686 = 688 *supra*).

— J. Ackrill, *Συμπλοκή εἰδῶν* (891 *supra*). See also his later article (908 *supra*) on the relation among the ideas.

(Continuation in Lustrum 5)

¹) See also G. Luck, *Der Akademiker Antiochos* (Stuttgart 1953), pp. 28—30, following W. Theiler's earlier identification against which Miss de Vogel argues.

Register

- I. H. Cherniss, Plato, 1950—1957**
(erscheint in Lustrum 5)

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Plato (1950—1957)

By

Harold Cherniss in Princeton/N.J./USA.

(Fortsetzung des Bandes 4 Seite 5ff.)

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V. Plato's Thought (Continuation)

V B. The Theory of Ideas (Continuation)

1250. G. Andreoni, Per una interpretazione di Platone, *Acme* 8, Fasc. 1, 1955, 109—118. In this posthumous essay the author, having argued that *εἶδος* is definable both as 'dynamic relation' and as the 'measure' of that which the *εἶδος* in the former sense represents, asserts the 'ideal' spatiality and temporality of the ideas as involving 'logical' *χώρα* and 'logical' *ἐξάφνης*; and on this basis he then tries to account for the apprehension of ideal being and of error. This is not really an exposition or interpretation of Plato's statements but is rather a free construction suggested by a few passages isolated from their contexts.

— R. S. Bluck, Plato's *Phaedo* ... (637 *supra*), Appendix VII and Appendix VIII (pp. 174—187). On the questions whether the ideas are 'universals' and why Plato 'separated' them.

1251. É. de Strycker, La notion aristotélicienne de séparation dans son application aux idées de Platon, *Autour d'Aristote: Recueil ... offert à A. Mansion*, Louvain 1955, 119—139. By means of the notion of 'separation' Aristotle makes the distinction between the 'real' and 'logical' orders, which is at the bottom of his criticism of the theory of ideas; and it was precisely the problem of the ideas as existing apart from sensibles that caused him to elaborate the notion of separation and thence that of substance.

— L. J. Eslick, The Platonic dialectic of Non-Being (616 *supra*). See also his earlier article (888 *supra*).

— R. Hackforth, Plato's *Phaedo* (638 *supra*), pp. 5—6, pp. 8—11, pp. 50—51, and pp. 141—146 (cf. J. Tate, *Cl Rev N.S.* 7, 1957, 27). See also and especially for Hackforth's conception of the relation of the idea of good to the other ideas *Cl Quart* 36, 1942, 7—8 in his earlier article, Plato's divided line and dialectic, *ibid.* pp. 1—9.

— D. W. Hamlyn, The communion of forms ... (617 *supra*). See also Hamlyn's later note, Forms and knowledge in Plato's *Theaetetus* ... (957 *supra*). R. S. Bluck, against whom this note is

directed, published during the same year still another article (895 *supra*) on the subject dealt with in 617 *supra*.

—. A. Lanzalaco, Il convenzionalismo platonico del *Cratilo* (353 *supra*).

—. R. Loriaux, L'être et la forme selon Platon . . . (1167 *supra*).

—. L. Lugarini, Il problema delle categorie in Aristotele (1168 *supra*), pp. 3—6, pp. 23—53, and pp. 88—89. See also for his interpretation of the theory of ideas, its development, and Aristotle's criticism of it the three earlier articles (613, 218, and 624 *supra*).

—. A. Manno, Il teismo di Platone (31 *supra*). He insists once more (pp. 175—299) that for Plato the idea of good was a transcendent and personal god, the perfect Being of which the ideas and the demiurge of the *Timaeus* were intended merely as two aspects, the former the actuality of divine thought and the latter that of divine goodness and creativity. This particular attempt to revive the old theistic interpretation against which W. J. Verdenius had recently protested (70 *supra*) was criticized by G. Reale (*Riv Filos Neoscolastica* 48, 1956, 193—230); and in reply to this criticism Manno published a detailed defence, *Sul rapporto tra le idee e Dio in Platone* (1278 *infra*).

—. J. Moreau, Platon et le phénoménisme (955 *supra*). For Moreau's interpretation of the ideas here see also 1234 *supra* and 1261 *infra* with the other publications of his referred to there.

1252. G. Nadór, Platon und das Problem des Naturgesetzes, *Acta Antiqua* 3, 1955, 211—221. This article was published again in *Deutsche Zeitschr Philos* 4, 1956, 261—270 (cf. Giannantoni, *Rass Filos* 5, 1956, 379). Nadór contends that, while Plato's teleological view of nature was a consciously reactionary opposition to the scientific attitude of his time, his attitude towards mathematics encouraged the quantitative investigation of nature and his theory of ideas, though nonsensical as a metaphysical doctrine, raised questions concerning the universal and the concept which, as Engels and Lenin show, contributed indirectly to the ultimate solution of the problem of 'laws of nature'.

—. J. Pieper, Über den Philosophie-Begriff Platons (71 *supra*), pp. 21—26. These pages are found also in Pieper's later essay on the same subject (71a), pp. 130—135.

—. H. D. Saffrey, Le *Περὶ φιλοσοφίας* d'Aristote et la théorie platonicienne des idées-nombres (122 *supra*). See the criticism of this by H. Cherniss, *Gnomon* 31, 1959, 36—51.

— W. Sellars, Vlastos and 'The Third Man' (626 *supra*). With this see the reply by Vlastos (Philos Rev 64, 1955, 438—448). In connection with the original thesis of Vlastos (625 *supra*), which Sellars here criticizes, see also P. T. Geach (627 *supra*), R. S. Bluck (628 and 629 *supra*), N. B. Booth (630 *supra*), and H. Cherniss (300 *supra* [pp. 252—263]).

1253. P. J. G. M. van Litsenburg, God en het goddelijke in de dialogen van Plato, Nijmegen 1955 (cf. P. Moraux, Ant Cl 24, 1955, 482—485; V. Goldschmidt, Rev Ét Grecques 69, 1956, 483—484). This is a critical examination in 'chronological order' of those texts considered by the author to be most important for Plato's conception of the divinity, the idea of good, the beautiful, and τὸ παντελῶς ὄν and of the theories concerning Plato's theology proposed by 27 modern scholars. Of these the Neo-Platonic interpretations are clearly rejected by the author. He would himself like to identify Plato's god with the idea of good and τὸ παντελῶς ὄν, which he thinks are 'the apex of Plato's system'; but he hesitates to do so because Plato does not call either of them god as he does the world-soul and the demiurge, the former of which van Litsenburg takes to represent god on a lower level of reality than does the latter, whom he is inclined to identify with the model, the ideas.

1254. W. Veauthier, Analogie des Seins und ontologische Differenz, Symposium: Jahrb Philos 4, 1955, 1—89. Being and the theory of ideas are here treated—or rather mistreated in Heideggerian jargon—chiefly on pp. 19—46 (see also p. 72 for Plato's 'One' and p. 69 for Parmenides, Plato, and Aristotle). By 'the idea' Plato is supposed to have meant 'die Bezugsmittel des analogen Verhältnisses zwischen dem Ureinen und der Welt der Vielheit' and in the second part of the *Parmenides* to have established the hierarchy of the ideas, all of them depending upon the first unhypothetical principle and arranged in levels on the first of which are elevated the ideas of good, of beauty, of similarity.

— A. Wedberg, Plato's philosophy of mathematics (123 *supra*). Wedberg's primary purpose is to argue that Plato did posit the class of 'intermediate mathematical' and to interpret or reconstruct Plato's philosophy of mathematics in agreement with Aristotle's exposition. He expressly excludes from consideration the supposed theory of idea-numbers as such (i. e. identification of all ideas with numbers and their derivation from other ultimate principles); but he does discuss the theory of ideas including ideas of numbers (see especially pp. 26—44; pp. 47—52, pp. 74—84, and the texts in the

Appendices), and he professes to find in the theory a fundamental contradiction that Plato never recognized though he drew from it consequences the absurdity of which he saw (pp. 36—40, pp. 55—56, pp. 97—99). His treatment of this 'fundamental antinomy' much resembles that by Vlastos (625 *supra*), on which see H. Cherniss (300 *supra* [pp. 252—263]). With Wedberg's strange assertion (pp. 55—56) that according to the general theory of ideas 'the idea of circle requires the existence of a multiplicity of perfect circles' contrast the correct formulation by A. C. Lloyd (887 *supra* [p. 70]): 'there can be no perfect copy (a contradictio in adjecto) or instance of the idea which is not the idea itself'.

—. P. Wilpert, Die aristotelische Schrift 'Über die Philosophie' (124 *supra*). See also his earlier book (111 *supra*) and his articles already mentioned (112, 176, 295, and 716 *supra*).

1255. P. T. Raju, Idealisms: Eastern and Western, *Philos East and West* 5, 1955/56, 211—234. This essay contains a criticism of Plato's theory of ideas and a comparison of it with other idealisms. It is vitiated by such flagrant errors as the assumption that non-being in the *Sophist* is the contrary of being, precisely what Plato says it is not. See also Raju's earlier article (1235 *supra*).

1256. L. J. Rosán, Desirelessness and the Good, *Philos East and West* 5, 1955/56, 57—60. Identifying Plato's idea of good with the Neo-Platonic 'One-Good', he argues that it and the Buddhistic Nirvāṇa are 'only two different ways of describing the same reality' and that this highest reality must be a state of consciousness. The argument is invalid at almost every step and obviously has nothing to do with Plato's own theory.

—. F. Adorno, *Dialettica e politica in Platone . . .* (1169 *supra*). On pp. 101—103 he summarizes his contention that the ideas are an order of value and obligation and are not transcendent entities. See also his earlier volume, *Opere politiche di Platone* (1169a *supra*), I, pp. 45—49.

—. R. S. Bluck, The *Parmenides* and the 'Third Man' (628 *supra*). See also his later article (629 *supra*).

1257. R. S. Bluck, Logos and forms in Plato: A reply to Professor Cross, *Mind* N.S. 65, 1956, 522—529. He here refutes the thesis of Cross (1247 *supra*) that ideas are meant to be not substantial entities but 'logical predicates displayed in logoi' and discusses the problem of knowledge of the ideas as raised by Cross and Ryle. In so doing

he rejects by implication an interpretation of D. W. Hamlyn's (617 *supra*), and to this Hamlyn replied in his note, Forms and knowledge in Plato's *Theaetetus* (957 *supra*).

— A. Capizzi, L'uno e i molti nel pensiero di Platone (620 *supra*).

— H. C. de Lima Vaz, A ascensão dialética no *Banquete* de Platão and Amor e conhecimento . . . (927 *supra*). See also his earlier article (889 *supra*).

1258. K. F. Doherty, God and the Good in Plato, *New Scholast* 30, 1956, 441—460. After considering arguments, chiefly Jaeger's and Festugière's, in favor of identifying god and the idea of good and those of Gilson and Solmsen against doing so, Doherty 'opts for the identification' although he thinks that no definite proof of it is possible and that Plato maintained a kind of 'skeptis' on the point.

— D. Dubarle, Dialectique et ontologie chez Platon (1170 *supra*).

1259. G. Fraile, Ser, saber y virtud en Platón, *Salamenticensis* 3, 1956, 137—163. I have not been able to procure a copy of this article.

— P. T. Geach, The Third Man again (627 *supra*). Besides the reply by Vlastos which follows this article (*Philos Rev* 65, 1956, 83—94), see on Geach's contention that the ideas are 'like the standard pound or yard' R. S. Bluck, Forms as standards (629 *supra*), and R. E. Allen's more recent article with the same title, *Philos Quart* 9, 1959, 164—167 (1283 *infra*).

1260. L. Gernet, Choses visibles et choses invisibles, *Rev Philosophique* 146, 1956, 79—86. This is a suggestive essay on the juridical and economic senses of *φανερά* and *ἀφανής οὐσία* as background for the notions of 'real' and 'unreal (illusory)' being and the relation of the 'invisible' to the 'visible' in Plato's expression of his theory and in Greek philosophical thought generally. Gernet's essay was inspired by that of P. M. Schuhl, *Adèla*, *Ann Fac Lettres Toulouse*, *Homo: Et Philos* 1, Mai 1953, 86—93 (for Plato see p. 88 and n. 16).

— R. Kroner, Speculation in pre-Christian philosophy (25 *supra*), pp. 152—182: The cosmos of the Ideas. This is a superficial survey of the theory, which like everything else in the book is measured by the criterion of Christian revelation and so found wanting. Plato is said to have 'remained to the end a representative of the contemplative ontology, even while he went far in the direction of an active quasi-Biblical faith'. He is charged at one time with having failed

to identify the source of the 'original negativity' which by restricting the purity and oneness of the highest idea produces the other ideas from that absolutely positive pole, the good, and at another with having failed to find the element transcending the ideas that holds the ideas together and to explain their relations to it.

— G. Martin, *Klassische Ontologie der Zahl* (120 *supra*). Most of the section on Plato himself (pp. 17—29) is devoted to the proposition that Plato posited both ideal numbers (limited, however, to ten) and 'intermediate mathematical', a thesis already defended by Martin earlier (see 119 *supra*). This is preceded by a paragraph on the derivation of numbers from 'the one' and the 'indefinite dyad' and followed by a brief discussion of the 'dialectical dialogues', the purpose of which Martin concludes is to raise the question what it means to ascribe to numbers being as ideas (see on this matter his later book [1268 *infra*]); but neither here nor in the following section (pp. 30—41), which deals chiefly with Aristotle's criticism of the theory of ideas and Platonic numbers, is there any discussion of Plato's supposed identification of all ideas with numbers.

1261. J. Moreau, *L'idéalisme platonicien et la transcendance de l'être*, *Mélanges Auguste Diès*, Paris 1956, pp. 191—207. Like the article, *El idealismo platónico* (1242 *supra*), this is in fact a succinct restatement of the thesis defended by Moreau in his small book, *Réalisme et idéalisme chez Platon* (1234 *supra*). It professes to interpret the theory of ideas as an 'idealistic theory of knowledge' without excluding the transcendence of being; but what is transcendent turns out to be an Intelligence (see his earlier article, 1224 *supra*), and the assertion, 'le réel ne peut consister que dans les réalisations d'une Pensée', openly declares the professed 'realism' to be 'un idéalisme intégral' as É. de Strycker said in his review of the book (*Ant Cl* 21, 1952, 157—159). See also Moreau's earlier expositions of this interpretation of the ideas in his books (5 *supra* with the review of H. Cherniss [*AJPh* 68, 1947, 113—124]) and in his articles on the *Parmenides* (605 *supra*) and on the *Theaetetus* (955 *supra*).

1262. J. Pépin, *Éléments pour une histoire de la relation entre l'intelligence et l'intelligible chez Platon et dans le néoplatonisme*, *Rev Philosophique* 146, 1956, 39—64. Relying upon misinterpretation of some isolated sentences and upon *Republic* 597 B—E, for which he appeals to Moreau (1224 and 1234 *supra*), Pépin concludes that Plato meant the demiurge to be the author of a system of ideas that constitute his thought and the intelligence not to be distinct from intelligible objects which could exist outside of itself (pp. 40—44 and

p. 64). The rest of the article deals with the identification of intelligence and intelligible by Plotinus, the hesitant attitude of other Neo-Platonists, and the rupture of the identification by Proclus. In connection with this latter part of the article see Pépin's earlier essay, *Une hésitation de Saint Augustin . . .*, Proc XIth Internat Cong Philosophy 12, Amsterdam/Louvain 1953, 137—145.

1263. A. Sodnik-Zupanec, Quelques remarques sur la théorie des idées de Platon, *Ziva Antika* (Skopljje) 6, 1956, 119—135. I have not myself seen this article, which is written in Slovenian with a résumé in French and which is said to trace in Plato's works the evolution of the theory of ideas and the influence of Orphic thought upon its formation.

— M. Vanhoutte, La méthode ontologique de Platon (1173 *supra*).

— D. H. T. Vollenhoven, Platoon I: De niet-realistische periode (1128 *supra*) and, published during the same year, Het begin van Platoon's realistische jaren (1129 *supra*). In the former article Plato's belief in a 'concrete universal' existing *beside* the particulars which as 'macrocosm' it reduces to 'microcosms' is ascribed to the influence of Eurytus and is found in the *Gorgias*, *Meno*, and *Euthyphro*; in the latter his discovery of the intelligible as a 'background' is found registered first in the *Symposium* and then only for the *ἀγενεαί*, so that he is said to be revealed as a complete realist first in the *Phaedo*, where magnitudes too are anchored in the 'background', and in the *Republic*, where to 'archetypal figures' are added 'numbers themselves' (as if 'numbers themselves' did not occur in the *Phaedo*!). See also Vollenhoven's earlier articles, 1125—1127 *supra*.

1264. H. Wagner, Die Schichtentheoreme bei Platon, Aristoteles und Plotin, *Stud Gen* 9, 1956, 283—291. Wagner contends that the theorem in its philosophical sense begins with the notion of two levels of being in the theory of ideas, although he agrees with Hartmann that its most obvious expression in Plato is the tripartition of the soul¹). After a brief discussion of the latter, where he identifies the unifying principle as justice, he argues that the two levels of the former became three with the introduction of the idea of good

¹) Wagner says that his article is a supplement to the earlier essay, which it presupposes:

1264a. N. Hartmann, Die Anfänge des Schichtungsgedankens in der Alten Philosophie, *Abhandl Preuss Akad Wiss Phil-Hist Kl*, 1943, Nr. 3 (reprinted in Hartmann's *Kleinere Schriften* 2, Berlin 1957, pp. 164—

as 'beyond Being' and that therewith the question of the unifying principle became a problem of which the *Parmenides* is a dialectical discussion, though Academic tradition converted it into authority for the doctrine of levels as such and the Neo-Platonists read into it their own theory of the hierarchy of being. The rest of the article deals with Aristotle's adapting to his own doctrine of levels the relation of original-likeness employed in the theory of ideas and then with the development of the doctrine of hypostases by Plotinus.

1265. H. Boeder, *Origine et préhistoire de la question philosophique de l'αἴτιον*, *Rev Sc Philos Théol* 40, 1956, 421—442; *La question de l'αἴτιον dans les premiers dialogues de Platon*, *Rev Sc Philos Théol* 41, 1957, 3—43. These two articles, which are really two parts of a single study, try to establish the Presocratic background of Plato's theory of ideas as a philosophy of αἴτιον and to show how the question, τί ἐστὶ, as connected with αἴτιον and δύναμις leads to the conception of αὐτὸ X.

—. Marisa Grondona, *La dialettica nel Sofista di Platone* (894 *supra*).

—. G. E. Mueller, *Unity of the Phaedrus* (686 = 688 *supra*). For this Natorpian interpretation of the ideas see also his articles on the *Phaedo*, the *Philebus*, and the 'Platonic Aristotle' (642, 717 and 717 *a supra*) and the still earlier article in *Monist* 45, 1935, 199—219, which is reprinted in his book, *What Plato thinks* (La Salle [Illinois] 1937), pp. 87—107.

1266. W. Stegmüller, *Das Universalienproblem einst und jetzt*, *Archiv Philos* 6, 1956, 192—225 and 7, 1957, 45—81. This article is primarily concerned with the 'Platonistic' position in the modern controversy concerning the status of universals; but the first part contains a brief survey (pp. 202—208) of Plato's own theory and Aristotle's criticism, which Stegmüller thinks valid not as regards the theory itself but at most in regard to Plato's deficient formulation of it.

—. J. L. Ackrill, *Plato and the copula . . .* (908 *supra*). See also Ackrill's earlier article (891 *supra*).

191). In this essay (pp. 6—9 = pp. 167—170 of the reprint) Hartmann treats the Platonic psychology, where alone according to him the principle of levels was employed by Plato, merely as an introduction, though an historically important one, to his interpretation of Aristotle's application of the principle in his psychology.

— E. G. Ballard, Plato's movement from an ethics of the individual to a science of particulars (801 *supra*), pp. 23—41. Ballard sees that intercommunion of the ideas does not, as Stenzel thought it does, have anything to do with solving the problem of participation; but he still persists in the assumption that Plato wished to eliminate the 'gap' between ideas and particulars, and he mistakenly believes that 'soul is that through which communication of form to materials takes place'.

— O. Becker, Zum Problem der platonischen Idealzahlen (114 *supra*).

1267. W. Beierwaltes, *Lux intelligibilis: Untersuchung zur Licht-metaphysik der Griechen*, München 1957, pp. 37—97. He argues that for Plato light is not a symbol but the idea of good itself; and this he identifies with the idea of beauty, with being, and with god (but not with the demiurge). It is, moreover, the transcendent cause of the other ideas, so that their essential constituent is light, their transparency for the mind resulting from their irradiation by the good is truth, i. e. their 'Unverborgenheit' (with Heidegger against Friedländer [see 847 *supra*]), and the direct view of them transforms the mind into light also, which is the state of virtue.

— R. S. Bluck, *ὑποθέσεις* in the *Phaedo* and Platonic dialectic (657 *supra*), especially pp. 25—30 on the idea of good and the relation to it of the other ideas in a 'teleological hierarchy'.

— R. S. Bluck, False statement in the *Sophist* (895 *supra*), especially pp. 181—182 with notes 16 and 17 on the ideas and their intercommunion.

— R. S. Bluck, Forms as standards (629 *supra*). See in connection with this the article by K. W. Mills (651 *supra*) and Bluck's reply to it in *Phronesis* 4, 1959, 5—11 (1284 *infra*), and on the subject see the article by R. E. Allen (1283 *infra*).

— H. Cherniss, The relation of the *Timaeus* to Plato's later dialogues (300 *supra*), pp. 236—265. This paper, directed especially against hypotheses of Owen (294 *supra*), Ross (1236 *supra*), and Vlastos (625 *supra*), deals in this section with the distinction of *γένεσις* and *οὐσία* in the later dialogues, the persistence in them of paradeigmatism but not as a change from an earlier theory of 'immanence', the invalidity of the regress in the *Parmenides* and Plato's understanding of it, and the relation to the 'separate' ideas of the particulars as their 'likenesses'.

— A. de Muralt, De la participation dans le *Sophiste* de Platon (896 *supra*).

— É. de Strycker, La distinction entre l'entendement (*dianoia*) et l'intellect (*nous*) dans la *République* de Platon (1174 *supra*). See especially pp. 218—219 and pp. 224—226 for his thesis that there are different levels or grades of ideas, mathematical objects being ideas of an inferior grade.

— E. Fink, Zur ontologischen Frühgeschichte von Raum-Zeit-Bewegung (1022 *supra*), especially pp. 164—166 and pp. 190—191. Plato first elaborated the theory of ideas and then left it behind, his static conception giving way more and more to a dynamic one as the communion of the ideas with one another and finally in the idea of good (of which *νοῦς* was originally the mode of being and which is identified with the demiurge, the 'idea of ideas', and being itself) led to the admission of motion into the world of ideas and finally to the conception of idea as event, as the movement of *νοῦς* that regulates the world, and of the idea of good as the living being that encompasses all the living ideas. This jumble, with some elements of which compare the notions of K. Marc-Wogau (779 *supra*) and C. J. de Vogel (38e, 38e, 38f *supra*), is steeped in 'Lichtmetaphysik' (compare Beierwaltes [1267 *supra*]) and presented without evidence in the bombastic jargon of Heidegger.

— R. Hackforth, Platonic forms in the *Theaetetus* (958 *supra*). On the question of ideas in the *Theaetetus* see also besides Miss Hicken's article of the same year mentioned below (960 *supra*) and those referred to in 957 *supra* the following: Adriana Bertozzi, *Giorn Metafisica* 3, 1948, 42; Ross (1236 *supra*), pp. 101 and 103; Luce, *Hermathena* 79, 1952, 119; Guzzo (954 *supra*), p. 585; J. Moreau (955 *supra*).

— Winifred F. Hicken, Knowledge and forms in Plato's *Theaetetus* (960 *supra*). This paper also discusses the question of the simplicity of ideas and their intercommunion as treated in the *Sophist* and in the earlier dialogues.

— K. F. Johansen, The One and the Many . . . (621 *supra*).

— F. W. Kohnke, Plato's Conception of *τὸ οὐκ ὄντως οὐκ ὄν* (632 *supra*).

1268. G. Martin, *Einleitung in die allgemeine Metaphysik*, Köln 1957 (cf. I. Leclerc, *Rev Metaphysics* 11, 1957/58, 426—440). According to this analysis of the emergence of metaphysics, the dis-

covery of 'the general' by Socrates and his question as to its nature led Plato to propound the theory that ideas are being in the true sense; but he came to see that this involves besides the problem of the relation of these entities to sensible particulars the more profound question as to the meaning of 'being' thus ascribed to the ideas, the question which according to Martin is alone metaphysical, so that only such late dialogues as the *Parmenides* and *Sophist* where it is consciously investigated can be called metaphysical. Although Plato saw the problem, Aristotle first made it the subject of a special discipline; and in the rest of the booklet (pp. 102—145) Martin is chiefly concerned to justify Aristotle's criticism of the ideas as *οὐσίαι* and to interpret the *Metaphysics* as an aporetic discussion of the fundamental questions raised in the *Parmenides* and the *Sophist*. See also his *Klassische Ontologie der Zahl* (120 *supra*), pp. 26—32.

— K. W. Mills, Plato's *Phaedo* 74 b 7—c 6 (651 *supra*). In the first part of this article (pp. 144—147) Mills adduces reasons why Plato thought the ideas self-predicational, in this replying to W. Sellars (626 *supra*), and 'separate' from the sensible world. On the second part of this article, in which he adopts the suggestion made by Geach (627 *supra*) and tries to reconcile this with the adjectives *ἀσύνθετον*, *μονοειδές*, *ἀμέριστον*, which are applied to the ideas, see besides Bluck's reply (1284 *infra*), already mentioned in 651 *supra*, the recent rebuttal of Geach by R. E. Allen (1283 *infra*).

1269. J. A. Notopoulos, The generic background of Plato's Theory of Ideas, *Cl Weekly* 50, 25 March 1957, 145—148. Homer's generic expression of experience, he maintains, is the origin of Plato's ideal theory, which was no novelty but only the explicit formulation of what had long been a habit of Greek thought. Compare H. Fränkel's notion, unnoticed by Notopoulos, that Pindar anticipated 'Platons Ideendenken' (223 *supra*); and more generally see L. Robin's earlier article, *Quelques survivances dans la pensée philosophique des Grecs d'une mentalité primitive*, *Rev Ét Grecques* 49, 1936, 255—292 (reprinted in his book, *La pensée hellénique des origines à Epicure*, Paris 1942, pp. 27—66), especially pp. 265—275 and p. 282 on the theory of ideas.

1270. G. E. L. Owen, A proof in the *Περὶ ἰδεῶν*, *JHS* 77 Part 1, 1957, 103—111. This is a new analysis and interpretation of the argument preserved by Alexander, In *Aristotelis Metaphysica*, pp. 82, 11—83, 16 (Hayduck). Owen is particularly critical of the earlier interpretation given by H. Cherniss (1218 *supra*). See also P. Wilpert (111 *supra*), pp. 41—44; Suzanne Mansion (1229 *supra*),

pp. 181—186 and pp. 200—201; É. de Strycker (1251 *supra*), pp. 126—128. Objection to several points in Owen's article is taken by K. W. Mills, *Phronesis* 3, 1958, p. 45, n. 1 and p. 56, n. 1 (651 *supra*).

1271. L. Robin, *Les rapports de l'être et de la connaissance d'après Platon*, Paris 1957 (cf. Moreau, *Rev Philosophique* 147, 1957, 378—382; Scimonelli, *Rass Filos* 7, 1958, 86—89). This is a course of lectures which Robin delivered at the Sorbonne in 1932/33. In his later book, *Platon* (7 *supra*), he included more succinctly the interpretation developed in these lectures, which deal primarily with *Republic* VI—VII and the beginning of X, the *Parmenides*, *Theaetetus*, *Sophist*, *Philebus*, and *Timaeus*. In these dialogues Robin professes to find the doctrine of idea-numbers, intermediate mathematical, and ultimate principles to which Aristotle presumably refers and of which he gives an incomplete or misleading account, i. e. one not in accord with Robin's interpretation. According to the latter the idea of good, tantamount in the end to the idea of being, is Plato's god, the demiurge of the world of ideas, which is a living hierarchy of relations, 'un devenir immobilisé', not separate from the sensible world but differing from it only in being a higher degree of exactness in the mixture of the principles that constitute both¹).

—. T. G. Rosenmeyer, *Plato and mass words* (1081 *supra*). At the end of this article (pp. 96—102) it is argued that Socrates did assume the existence of ideas and that Plato's 'separation' of them (which is said to recede into the background in the *Sophist* and *Philebus*) represents one of his 'essays in structure, metaphysical and phenomenological'.

—. Dorothy Tarrant, *Phaedo* 74 A—B (650 *supra*). On the problem of interpretation which is the occasion for this article see also the publications referred to in 627 (especially Vlastos, *Philos Rev* 65, 1956, 90—92) and 651 *supra*, the article by Rosenmeyer just mentioned (1081 *supra*), and that by A. R. Lacey (902 *supra*), pp. 50—52. See in addition Miss Tarrant's earlier article (1069 *supra*), especially pp. 33—34 on the expressions used by Plato to express the relation of particulars to ideas.

¹) With the interpretation of the *Philebus* in the lectures see also his earlier paper:

1271a. L. Robin, *Le cinquième genre de l'être dans le Philebe*, *Proc Seventh Internat Cong Philosophy* (Oxford 1930), London 1931, 432—436 (reprinted in his book, *La pensée hellénique des origines à Épicure*, Paris 1942, pp. 355—360).

On the good 'beyond being' see also Robin's later article, *Platon et la philosophie des valeurs* (848 *supra*).

1272. J. Xenakis, On the theological interpretation of Plato's ethics, *Harvard Theol Rev* 50, 1957, 67—70. This is exclusively concerned with proving that Plato did not identify god and the good. The author unfortunately mishandles his argument and does not do justice to his thesis.

— J. Xenakis, Plato on statement and truth-value (898 *supra*). See also his paper published the next year (1281 *infra*).

1273. H. Zucchi, Estudios de filosofía antigua y moderna, Tucumán 1957, pp. 21—70: Examen de las interpretaciones kantianas de la metafísica platónica. After a brief introduction with this title (pp. 21—26) the body of the article consists of an examination only of Natorp's interpretation and its antecedents. The author states that the whole will be treated in more detail in a later work, which so far as I know has not yet been published¹).

1274. O. Wichmann, Idee und Idealismus in der Platondeutung, *Kant-Studien* 49, 1957/58, 401—422. After having violently attacked H. Leisegang for his criticism of the Kantian and Neo-Kantian interpretation and after having himself rejected N. Hartmann's method of interpretation, Wichmann proceeds to defend the thesis that 'die Idee' is the fundamental problem of Platonic philosophy and that Plato's final word is not the doctrine of ideas but 'das Gute, der Wert, die Idee des Guten'. For support of his thesis he appeals to *Republic* 509 B, of course, to a misuse of *Sophist* 245 A 8—10, to a flagrant mistranslation of Aristoxenus (see note on 1194 *supra*), and to the 'thoroughly Platonic assertion' of Goethe that the idea is unique and that we do ill to use the plural since all that we perceive and all that we can speak of are only manifestations of 'die Idee'.

— N. B. Booth, Assumptions involved in the Third Man argument (630 *supra*).

— N.-I. Boussoulas, Essai sur la structure de la mixis platonicienne: être et non-être chez Platon (622 *supra*). See also his earlier book, *L'être et la composition des mixtes* . . . (714 *supra*).

1275. J. Christensen, Actus purus: An essay on the function and place of pure act in Aristotelian Metaphysics . . . , *Class et Med* 19, 1958, 7—40. The theory of ideas, idea-numbers, and diaeresis is

¹) The date of publication of the present volume is itself doubtful. None is given on the title-page; but the Advertencia del autor is dated febrero de 1957, and I have followed that date, although the end-paper declares that the volume was printed in December of 1956.

sketched in the section on 'the presuppositions' (pp. 8—11) and referred to frequently, especially in pp. 11—17, always in the manner of Stenzel's interpretation and without any apparent awareness of the later criticism of it.

1276. G. Junge, Von Hippasus bis Philolaus: Das Irrationale und die geometrischen Grundbegriffe, *Class et Med* 19, 1958, 41—72. Besides treating the mathematical passages of the *Meno* and the *Theaetetus* and the 'nuptial number' (pp. 45—50), Junge here (pp. 64—66 and pp. 69—71) contends that Plato posited the point as 'the indivisible', the expansion of which is the line; and this notion he connects in a vague fashion with diaeresis and the derivation of ideas from the one and the indefinite dyad. He recognizes that this contradicts Aristotle's testimony in *Metaphysics* 992 A 20—24, which he therefore rejects as erroneous. See also his earlier article, *Platos Ideen-Zahlen* (110 *supra*).

1277. F. Lasserre, Nombre et connaissance dans la préhistoire du Platonisme, *Mus Helvet* 15, 1958, 11—26. Against the background of earlier interest in number and especially of the Pythagorean tradition and the work of Archytas Lasserre (pp. 22—26) proposes to interpret the theory of idea-numbers as an epistemological method and not an ontology. The suggestion and supporting argument deserve serious consideration despite the fact that, misled by Saffrey (122 *supra*), Lasserre mistakenly uses *De Anima* 404 B 21—27 as evidence of Plato's theory.

1278. A. Manno, Sul rapporto tra le idee e Dio in Platone, Napoli 1958. This monograph is Manno's rejoinder to G. Reale's criticism (*Riv Filos Neoscolastica* 48, 1956, 193—230) of his earlier book, *Il teismo di Platone* (31 *supra*). Other critics of that book are disregarded; but Manno confidently asserts that his reply to the objections of Reale has reinforced his original thesis, which he maintains in its integrity.

1279. K. Oedingen, Der Ursprung des europäischen Rationalismus, *Zeitschr philos Forsch* 12, 1958, 218—240. There are here two insignificant pages (pp. 224—225) on the theory of ideas, based chiefly upon misinterpretation of a few isolated passages. To the elder Plato he ascribes a new tendency towards a constructive dialectical method of thinking 'with which every thought of transcendence vanishes'.

— A. Rigobello, L'intellettualismo in Platone (34 *supra*), pp. 8—80 and pp. 115—120.

1280. E. Tugendhat, *TI KATA TINOS*: Eine Untersuchung zu Struktur und Ursprung aristotelischer Grundbegriffe, Freiburg/München 1958. This application of Heidegger's notion, 'Anwesenheit', to the interpretation of Aristotle's ontology begins with a brief section (pp. 6—12) called Wahrheit und Präsenz als ausschließlicher Sinn des Seins bei Platon, a partial interpretation of the theory of ideas, based upon Heidegger's 'Unverborgenheit' (see 847 and 1267 *supra*) but in opposition to Heidegger's thesis that in Plato the essence of truth changes from ἀλήθεια to ἰδέα.

1281. J. Xenakis, Plato's Theory of Forms, *Class et Med* 19, 1958, 1—6. First it is said that the point of the objections in the *Parmenides* is the bad language of the theory of ideas; next that Plato posited the theory because he 'misconstrued generalisations', mistook mathematical statements for 'mentioning-statements', and was misled by Heraclitus; and finally that towards the end of his life he may have shaken off Heraclitus and 'got out of his own platonistic fly-bottle'. With this superficial article see also the earlier one (898 *supra*) and that published by Xenakis the next year (901 *supra*).

1282. M. A. Aimò, Contributi all' interpretazione del pensiero di Platone: L'esigenza dell' assoluto, *Riv Studi Class* (Torino) 7, 1959, 111—117. In this rather popular résumé the author emphasizes the apparently impassable distance between the reality of the ideas and the sensible world, 'the negative pole of Plato's system', and then depicts the love that is longing for the eternal as the force whereby all dualism is annulled and the first cause at the apex of the world of ideas where all the inferior levels dissolve in a single centre is attained.

1283. R. E. Allen, Forms as standards, *Philos Quart* 9, 1959, 164—167. Against the suggestion made by P. T. Geach (627 *supra*) that the ideas be regarded as 'standards' (see also K. W. Mills [651 *supra*]) Allen argues that such an interpretation would involve a vicious regress and that any interpretation is bound to fail if it neglects the 'separation' of the ideas from the particulars, of which they are the 'goals'. See also in opposition to Geach's suggestion the article by R. S. Bluck (629 *supra*) and further Bluck's reply to Mills (1284 *infra*).

1284. R. S. Bluck, Plato's form of equal, *Phronesis* 4, 1959, 5—11. This is a reply to the criticism made K. W. Mills (651 *supra*) of Bluck's article, Forms as standards (629 *supra*), in which Bluck criticized the interpretation of ideas proposed by P. T. Geach (627

supra). See also in criticism of Geach's interpretation the article by R. E. Allen just mentioned (1283 *supra*).

1285. C. J. de Vogel, *La théorie de l'ἄπειρον chez Platon et dans la tradition platonicienne*, *Rev Philosophique* 149, 1959, 21—39. She reiterates here at the beginning her old contention that Plato's intelligible world is an organic and living being endowed with soul and mind, the divine νοῦς identical with the demiurge who creates the world after the eternal model of the ideas that are his own thoughts (see her earlier articles (108, 109, 38a—38f *supra*). The bulk of this article is concerned, however, with the ἄπειρον or 'great-and-small' from which with the one as ultimate principles the idea-numbers were according to Aristotle derived; and, whereas earlier she had placed this ἄπειρον at the base of Plato's scale of being (see 38c *supra* [p. 53] and 38f *supra* [p. 113]), the testimony of Aristotle thus implicitly rejected she here thinks that she can vindicate by what is in fact the old expedient of ascribing to Plato a double ἄπειρον (cf. 1218 *supra*, pp. 479—487), one below the sensibles as before and another the intelligible matter of the ideas above them—but still according to her below the one, a solution for which she appeals to the Neo-Pythagoreans and Plotinus but which despite her apparent belief is then on two counts contrary to the assertion of Aristotle.

1286. O. Gigon, *Die Sokratesdoxographie bei Aristoteles*, *Mus Helvet* 16, 1959, pp. 174—212. The second part of this article (pp. 192—212) consists of an analysis of the account and criticism of the Platonic theory in *Eth. Nic.* 1095 A 14—1097 A 14, *Eth. Eud.* 1217 A 18—1218 B 12, and *Magna Moralia* 1182 A 10—1183 B 18; and substantial sections of the first part treat those passages which contain Aristotle's account of the origin and formulation of the theory of ideas (see especially pp. 181, 183—185, and 187—191). Little or no notice is taken here of other recent studies of these passages and their interpretation.

1287. P. Kucharski, *Les principes des Pythagoriciens et la dyade de Platon*, *Archives de Philos* 22, 1959, 175—191 and 385—431. In another article, published almost at the same time, *Le 'Philebe' et les 'Eléments harmoniques' d'Aristoxène* (*Rev Philosophique* 149, 1959, 41—72) Kucharski argues (pp. 42—47 and 68—72) that the *Philebus* represents the ideas themselves as mixtures of πέντας and ἄπειρον, thus giving them a quantified structure, and so alone among Plato's writings can be connected with Aristotle's account of idea-numbers (see his earlier article [117 *supra*]). In the present article, after

arguing that the Pythagoreans did posit as principles the one and the indefinite dyad but the latter as a 'dyad of inequality', he attempts (pp. 410—431) by combining passages of the *Politicus* and the *Philebus* with Aristotelian testimony to distinguish as the 'principle of incommensurability' the indefinite dyad ascribed to Plato, which the one as 'equality', he contends, renders commensurable, thus producing the idea-numbers.

— A. R. Lacey, Plato's *Sophist* and the Forms (902 *supra*). See especially pp. 49—52 on intercommunion of the ideas, 'self-predication', and at the end Lacey's notion that the ideas 'have gradually changed their nature in the course of their development'.

1288. W. F. Lynch, An approach to the Metaphysics of Plato through the *Parmenides*, Georgetown 1959 (cf. R. S. Brumbaugh, *Rev Metaphysics* 13, 1959/60, 271—277). This 'positive' interpretation takes the *Parmenides* to be Plato's attempt to formulate for any and every order of being and for the relation between orders a philosophy of unity by means of which the difficulties raised in the first part can be adequately resolved. To this end Lynch interprets the hypotheses of the second part one by one and in his conclusion (pp. 235—250) sketches the fundamental positions of Plato's metaphysics in the light of the *Republic* and the *Parmenides* so interpreted. The Neo-Platonic interpretation he rejects entirely; but he takes the ideas to be a totality or organism, the form and interrelations of which are to be found in the indivisible one called the good, this latter alone existing absolutely while its members, the ideas, as limited entities exist, though eternal and immutable, by the relative mode of participation, each idea itself being analogously a structural composition of one and many—as indeed is also the phenomenal world.

— G. Mainberger, *Die Seinsstufung als Methode und Metaphysik* (1178 *supra*).

— J. Xenakis, Plato's *Sophist* . . . (901 *supra*). With this attempt to eliminate the theory of ideas from the *Sophist* see the two earlier articles by Xenakis (898 and 1281 *supra*).

1289. R. E. Allen, Anamnesis in Plato's *Meno* and *Phaedo*, *Rev Metaphysics* 13, 1959/60, 165—174. Much of this article is concerned with the difference between the ideas of Plato and the a priori of Kant and the relation of the two theories to epistemological problems. Allen contends that anamnesis in the *Phaedo* solves epistemological problems generated by the 'chorismos' of the ideas which Plato when he wrote the *Meno* was perhaps groping for but had not yet clearly

formulated, a persistent misinterpretation of the *Meno* which has been frequently criticized and corrected (see the references to Cherniss, Eibl, and Gulley in 583 *supra*).

V C: Psychology

Studies dealing with the various aspects of Plato's theory of soul will here be listed in four subsections: a) The Soul's Constitution and Immortality, b) Soul as Epistemological Subject, c) Soul as Auto-kinetic Cause, d) Soul as Desire and Daemon: The Theory of Love. General treatments of the soul will be listed in the first of these subsections but will be mentioned again in any of the later three for which they are especially significant.

a) The Soul's Constitution and Immortality

— P. Frutiger, *Les mythes de Platon* (1102 *supra*). See especially pp. 76—96 on the question of the 'parts of the soul' and pp. 125—143 on immortality with the conclusions on pp. 211—225 concerning Plato's attitude towards these questions.

1290. J. Ithurriague, *La croyance de Platon à l'immortalité et la survie de l'âme humaine*, Paris 1931 (cf. Mazzantini, *BollFilol Cl N.S.* 7, 1935/36, 25—28).

1291. H. Neugebauer, *Platonische Mystik*, München-Planegg 1934 (cf. A. Steiner, *Phil Woch* 58, 1938, 1218—1225; E. Hoffmann, *Gnomon* 15, 1939, 469—470). Despite the title this book deals exclusively with Platonic metempsychosis and eschatology, here represented as having been taken over by Plato from a supposedly unified Orphic-Pythagorean doctrine.

1292. W. Stettner, *Die Seelenwanderung bei Griechen und Römern*, Stuttgart/Berlin 1934 (cf. W. Nestle, *Phil Woch* 55, 1935, 780—784; A. D. Nock, *Gnomon* 11, 1935, 504—506), pp. 31—41: Platon.

— G. M. A. Grube, *Plato's thought* (3 *supra*), pp. 120—149: The nature of the soul.

— H. W. B. Joseph, *Essays in ancient and modern philosophy* (787a *supra*), pp. 41—121: Plato's *Republic*: The nature of the soul and The comparison between the soul and the state.

— L. Robin, *Platon* (7 *supra*). See pp. 171—203 on soul in general and immortality, the myths, and the structure of soul according to the *Timaeus*, concerning which last see also pp. 217—229.

— M. F. Sciacca, *Studi sulla filosofia antica* (808 *supra*), pp. 145—222: Il problema dell' immortalità dell' anima e la metempsychosi in Platone. The whole of Plato's philosophy is here said to be developed around the doctrine of personal immortality and the purification of the soul through metempsychosis, all human and social activity being a preparation for the return to the celestial life in the realm of the unique reality, the supreme intelligence, of which the ideas are the internal organization. See also Sciacca's publications mentioned in item 1200 *supra*.

— A. J. Festugière, *Contemplation et vie contemplative selon Platon* (1190 *supra*). On immortality see especially pp. 83—94 and pp. 352—354; on the composition of soul see pp. 118—122. See also Festugière's more recent article (866 *supra*), especially pp. 137—143 on the 'three lives' in connection with the tripartition of soul.

1293. F. Guglielmino, *Rapporti dell' anima col corpo* = *Preconcetti teorici e realismo in Platone*, Catania 1936, pp. 1—32. He argues that the conflict between Plato the systematical theoretician and Plato the careful observer is exemplified by the oscillations in his treatment of the relation of soul and body with the concomitant incongruities of soul as simple or tripartite and as ruler of body or affected by physical factors.

— W. F. R. Hardie, *A study in Plato* (610b *supra*). On the relation of soul and body, the tripartition of soul, and immortality see pp. 134—147.

1294. J. A. G. van der Veer, *Reiniging en reinheid bij Plato*, Amsterdam 1936 (cf. H. J. Stukey, *AJPh* 59, 1938, 381—382; A. Kraemer, *Phil Woch* 60, 1940, 577—587). See especially pp. 26—65, where van der Veer considers Plato's notion of the purification of soul first in its intellectual and then in its non-intellectual aspect, and pp. 94—121, where he studies Plato's conception of punishment as a means of moral purification. See on this subject the later book by L. Moulinier, *Le pur et l'impur* . . . (1312 *infra*).

— R. G. Bury, *The theory of education in Plato's Laws* (515 *supra*), pp. 316—318: God and the soul. On *νοῦς* as 'simply a particular mode' of soul and on the educational importance of the doctrine of soul.

— B. A. M. Naaijken, Platoons leer over de ziel vergeleken met orphische of z. g. orphische opvattingen (207 *supra*).

— P. Thévenaz, L'âme du monde ... (989 *supra*).

— H. W. Thomas, *ΕΠΙΕΚΕΙΝΑ* ... (227 *supra*).

— A. Levi, I miti platonici sull' anima e sui suoi destini (1105 *supra*).

— J. Moreau, La construction ... (5 *supra*), pp. 241—262 and 366—406; and L'Âme du Monde ... (5 *supra*), pp. 43—80 (cf. Cherniss, *AJPh* 68, 1947, 118—119 and 122—123). See also Moreau's later articles on the 'ontological argument' in the *Phaedo* (658 *supra*) and *Platon et la connaissance de l'âme* (1316 *infra*).

1295. C. Mazzantini, Intorno all' immortalità dell' anima umana nella filosofia platonica, *Athenaeum* N.S. 18, 1940, 244—260. He contends that Plato consistently throughout his writings maintained the doctrine of personal immortality in a literal sense.

— N. Almqvist, Platons världssjäl och Aristoteles' gudsbegrepp (992 *supra*). See also Almqvist's book, *Till Platons differentiella psykologi* ... (1301 *infra*).

1296. M. P. Nilsson, The immortality of the soul in Greek religion, *Eranos* 39, 1941, 1—16. For Plato see pp. 13—16 and with this Nilsson's *Die Geschichte der griechischen Religion I* (München 1941), pp. 772—776 (= pp. 820—824 of the second edition, 1955).

— R. Palas, Die Bewertung der Sinnenwelt bei Platon ... (1209 *supra*), pp. 56—78.

1297. Sir Patrick Duncan, Immortality of the soul in the Platonic dialogues and Aristotle, *Philosophy* 17, 1942, 304—323. See also his earlier article, Socrates and Plato (1204 *supra*).

— H.-G. Gadamer, Platos Staat der Erziehung (780 *supra*). The tripartition of soul, it is here maintained (pp. 329ff.), is meant not as a psychological theory but as a doctrine of the danger of man's inner division, the opposite of his unity in the virtue of justice, the uniformity of soul being the objective of conduct governed by knowledge and not a theoretical scientific question.

— K. Kerényi, Der große Daimon des *Symposion* (940 *supra*). For the relation of Plato's theory of immortality to that of knowledge as anamnesis see pp. 10—14. Kerényi here follows E. Grassi's analysis (950 *supra* [pp. 136—142]).

— A. Speiser, *Der Unsterblichkeitsbeweis im Phaedon* (639b *supra*), in his article *Platons Ideenlehre und die Mathematik*. See also his later article, *Platos Ideenlehre* (1219 *supra*), for his contention that Plato conceived of soul as a mathematical essence.

1298. K. Ziegler, *R.-E.* I 18, 1942, 1373—1386 in his article, *Orphische Dichtung*, *ibid.* 1321—1417. For Ziegler's arguments in favor of Orphic influence on Plato's theory of the soul see the note on item 207 *supra*.

— N. Hartmann, *Die Anfänge des Schichtungsgedankens . . .* (1264a *supra*).

1299. R. R. Hartford, *Plato and immortality*, *Hermathena* 64, 1944, 1—18. This paper is chiefly concerned with the argument in *Republic* X (on which see also the other references in 870 *supra*). Hartford contends that Plato, while he thought highly of this argument, did not believe it to be equivalent to logical proof, which he knew he could not offer, and that for him the proof of immortality was not so much any specific argument as it was the conviction underlying his whole philosophy. For the contention that metempsychosis was meant by Plato to be only the mythical expression of the necessity of moral judgment see further Hartford, *Hermathena* 65, 1945, 78—79 in his article, *St. Paul, Plato and immortality*, *ibid.* pp. 74—79.

— I. M. Linforth, *Soul and Sieve in Plato's Gorgias* (210a *supra*). See also Linforth's later paper, *The Corybantic rites in Plato*, *Univ California Pub Cl Philol* 13 No. 5, 1946, 121—162.

— R. Schaerer, *Dieu, l'homme et la vie d'après Platon* (1137 *supra*), pp. 34—50, 65—75, 145—159, and 180—206. On the composition of the soul, its immortality, and its destiny in this world and the other (metempsychosis) especially in relation to the problem of evil and man's responsibility.

— O. Reverdin, *La religion de la cité platonicienne* (522 *supra*), pp. 24—33. On Plato's doctrine of immortality and its moral implications, which according to Reverdin proved to be too lofty for the crowd and too religious for those who were given to philosophical speculation and profane wisdom.

1300. W. Wili, *Probleme der Aristotelischen Seelenlehre*, *Eranos-Jahrbuch* 12, 1945, 55—93. The first section of this article has to do with Aristotle's criticism and rejection of Plato's doctrine of the soul's independent existence and of its tripartition, the second with those aspects of psychology which Aristotle developed under the

influence of Plato's doctrine concerning pleasure, happiness, virtue, and the mean.

1301. N. Almberg, Till Platons differentiella psykologi tillika ett bidrag till den Platonska pedagogiken och politiken, Lund 1946 (cf. W. Sjöstrand, *Lychnos* 1946/47, 378—380). This is a study of Plato's psychological typology chiefly in connection with its bearing upon his theories of education, rhetoric, and politics and in relation to Sophistic and Pythagorean pedagogy. See also Almberg's earlier book, *Platons världssjäl* . . . (992 *supra*).

1302. R. J. Burns, Plato and the soul, *New Scholast* 20, 1946, 334—343. A superficial account without any serious attempt at interpretation.

1303. G. Edison, Plato and Freud, *Univ Toronto Quart* 16, 1946, 1—16. Plato's theory of the soul as an anticipation of the themes of 'conflict', 'neurosis', and 'sublimation'. See in this connection also the essays by N. Padis (1313 *infra*) and by P. Lain-Entralgo (1332 *infra*).

— W. Jaeger, A new Greek word in Plato's *Republic*: The medical origin of the theory of the *θυμοειδές* (868 *supra*). See on this E. L. Harrison's article (1315 *infra*).

— P. Schmitt, Geist und Seele . . . (193 *supra*). See especially pp. 175—185 for the thesis that Plato's treatment of the theme 'soul' is similar to that of Heraclitus and yet essentially different from it.

— W. Szilasi, Macht und Ohnmacht des Geistes (710 *supra*). Betrachtung über die Seele (pp. 19—106) is a 'phenomenological' and 'existentialistic' interpretation of the *Philebus*, while Das Geistigsein des Daseins (pp. 169—208) is a misguided attempt to interpret the Sun and the Line of *Republic* VI as a representation of the 'transcendental human personality'.

1304. W. Wili, Die Geschichte des Geistes in der Antike, *Eranos-Jahrbuch* 13, 1945 (published 1946), 49—93. This contains a few pages on Plato (pp. 69—72) full of dubious assertions: identification of the idea of good and the divine *νοῦς*, existence of an evil world-soul, and the Persian origin of the latter and of the demiurge of the *Timaeus*.

— J. Moreau, L'argument ontologique dans le *Phédon* (658 *supra*). See also Moreau's earlier books, *La construction* . . . (5 *supra*), pp. 246—262 and 366—406 and *L'Ame du Monde* . . . (5 *supra*), pp. 43—80, and his later article, *Platon et la connaissance de l'âme* (1316 *infra*).

— Simone Pétrement, *Le dualisme chez Platon . . .* (244 *supra*). On the dualism of soul and body and the composition of soul (pp. 58—60), on the question of 'two souls' in the *Laws* (pp. 64—74), and on the 'other life' (pp. 116—120).

1305. A. Bremond, *Le syllogisme de l'immortalité*, *Rev Philos Louvain* 46, 1948, 161—176. In this attempt to formulate a proof of immortality the author examines mainly the arguments of St. Thomas and of Plato, and of Plato's chiefly that in the *Phaedo*.

1306. E. Ehnmark, Some remarks on the idea of immortality in Greek religion, *Eranos* 46, 1948, 1—21. See especially pp. 15—21, where he develops what he calls the antinomy of the idea of immortality and maintains that, whereas Socrates and 'the early Plato' believed in individual immortality, for the later Plato only pure reason, an element common in all men, is immortal. See also his later article, *Transmigration in Plato* (1325 *infra*).

— H. Grégoire, *Comment Athènes retrouva la croyance à l'immortalité de l'âme* (187a *supra*). See also Grégoire's more recent reassertion of his thesis (187 *supra*).

— H. S. Long, A study of the doctrine of metempsychosis in Greece from Pythagoras to Plato (227b *supra*) and Long's article, *Plato's doctrine of metempsychosis and its source* (227c *supra*). On the interpretation of *Meno* 81 B—C see also the references to K. von Fritz and R. S. Bluck in 593 *supra*.

1307. G. Nebel, *Griechischer Ursprung* 1, Wuppertal 1948, pp. 111—219: *Platon und die Unsterblichkeit der Seele*. The author of this volume characterizes himself as a 'humanistic dilettante' who makes no claim to erudition. Nevertheless, in this, the second of the two essays on Plato in the volume, he comes to grips with many German scholars who have written more pretentiously on Plato's theory of the human soul; and his own reflections on the subject are by no means negligible.

1308. F. Nuyens, *L'évolution de la psychologie d'Aristote*, Louvain 1948, pp. 136—145: *L'immortalité de l'âme chez Platon; La conception platonicienne du ψῆς*. This is the French translation of a work originally published in Dutch as an Amsterdam dissertation: *Ontwikkelingsmomenten in de zielkunde van Aristoteles*, Nijmegen/Utrecht 1939. Nuyens holds that Plato abandoned the theory of the simplicity of the soul for the theory of tripartition, in which a 'corporeal' character was ascribed to the inferior parts, but that despite

this he persisted in the doctrine of personal immortality, though this meant the survival of the superior part, the *voûς*, alone.

— D. H. T. Vollenhoven, The course of Plato's development (1125 *supra*). Here and in his subsequent articles (1126—1129 *supra*) Vollenhoven tries to force Plato's theory of soul like all the rest of his thought into the idiosyncratic categories of development that he has invented.

1309. V. Goldschmidt, *La religion de Platon*, Paris 1949 (cf. É. de Strycker, *Ant Cl* 20, 1951, 471—472; G. M. A. Grube, *AJPh* 72, 1951, 212—213; J. Moreau, *Rev Philosophique* 141, 1951, 431—432). A good third of this small book is devoted to Plato's theory of the human soul, its composition, its relation to the body and the universe, and its destiny (pp. 63—114; see pp. 49—54 on the soul and the demiurge).

— M. D. C. Tait, Spirit, gentleness and the philosophic nature in the *Republic* (823 *supra*). The doctrine of the 'tripartite soul' and especially of the *θυμοειδές* is treated on pp. 207—211 of this article. See p. 210, n. 14 for the essential 'self' and immortality. On the origin of *θυμοειδές* see E. L. Harrison (1315 *infra*).

— B. H. Bal, Plato's ascense in de *Phaedo* (639 *supra*). What is said of soul in the *Phaedo* is interpreted throughout in relation to the theory as it is presented in the other dialogues.

— É. de Strycker, Socrate et l'au delà d'après l'*Apologie* platonicienne (131a *supra*). A sound study of the attitude towards immortality ascribed to Socrates in the *Apology* as compared with that in the *Phaedo* and in the other early dialogues.

— R. Hackforth, Immortality in Plato's *Symposium* (922 *supra*).

— E. Hoffmann, Platon (22 *supra*). See pp. 105—111 and pp. 179—189 for his interpretation of Plato's theory of soul, and n. b. p. 62: 'als Wesen des Platonismus würde ich bezeichnen diese Problemverschlingung von Sein und Seele.'

— M. Landmann, Elenktik und Maieutik (139 *supra*). With this compare the essays by Éliane Amado-Lévy-Valensi (1099 *supra*) and by P. Lain-Entralgo (1332 *infra*).

— C. Librizzi, I problemi fondamentali della filosofia di Platone (29 *supra*), pp. 81—95: Il problema dell' anima. This chapter deals chiefly with the immortality of the soul; but there is much discussion of the relation of soul to body and to the world in the following

chapter (pp. 96—112), *Il problema del libero arbitrio*, originally published in *Sophia* 16, 1948, 190—194 and 319—325.

1310. A. Millan Puelles, *La teoría del ser vivo en Platón*, *Rev. Filos (Madrid)* 9, 1950, 371—408. The author, concentrating his attention upon the *Phaedo*, *Symposium*, and *Timaeus*, seeks to establish the relation between life as motion in the corporeal organism and as dynamic thought in the soul.

— F. Solmsen, *Tissues and the soul* (179 *supra*), pp. 445—459 on Plato and especially pp. 450—459 on the relation of soul and its 'parts' to the corporeal organs and tissues in the *Timaeus*. See also Solmsen's later article, *Antecedents of Aristotle's psychology . . .* (1019 *supra*), for the biological functions of soul and the 'parts' of soul in the *Timaeus*; and for other aspects of Plato's theory of soul see Solmsen's earlier book, *Plato's Theology* (1368 *infra*), especially pp. 89—97, pp. 106—127 and pp. 131—148.

— K. Schlechta, *Hirnforschung und philosophische Spekulation . . .* (1006 *supra*). See especially pp. 343—348 on Plato's localization of *νοῦς* and of the other parts of the soul; and with this treatment of the subject contrast that by R. B. Onians, *The origins of European thought . . .* (872 *supra*), pp. 118—120.

1311. A. S. Ferguson, *The Platonic choice of lives*, *Philos Quart* 1, 1950/51, 5—34. See especially pp. 9—12 and pp. 32—34 for the 'tripartite psychology' as an 'analysis fundamental to the *Republic*' and for its bearing upon Plato's doctrine of the soul's nature and the good.

— A. de Marignac, *Imagination et dialectique . . .* (1070 *supra*), pp. 70—124: *L'Ame*.

— C. J. de Vogel, *Examen critique de l'interprétation traditionnelle du platonisme* (38b *supra*). See also her later articles, *On the Neoplatonic character of Platonism . . .* (38c *supra* [pp. 55—57]) and *A la recherche des étapes précises entre Platon et le néoplatonisme* (38f *supra* [pp. 113—118]).

— E. R. Dodds, *The Greeks and the irrational* (230 *supra*), especially pp. 207—235: Plato, the irrational soul, and the inherited conglomerate. See also his earlier article, *Plato and the irrational* (243b *supra*), pp. 18—19 (on later introduction of irrational factors into the mind itself and ascription of psychical disorder to bodily causes), p. 21 (on evil or 'irrational' world-soul), and p. 24 (sources of Plato's belief in immortality and of his doctrine of soul).

— R. Hope, Plato's *Phaedo* on deathlessness (640 *supra*).

— J. H. M. M. Loenen, *De Nous* in het systeem van Plato's philosophie (1233 *supra*). See also 715 *supra* and his article on Plato's conception of the relation of man and beast in metempsychosis (1319 *infra*).

— V. Martin, Sur la condamnation des athées par Platon au Xe Livre des *Lois* (569 *supra*). For Plato's doctrine of soul and the 'parts' of soul in general see especially pp. 124—131.

— N. R. Murphy, The Interpretation of Plato's *Republic* (791 *supra*), pp. 24—44: The parts of the soul (see also pp. 90—96).

— R. B. Onians, The origins of European thought about the body, the mind, the soul . . . (872 *supra*), pp. 118—120. On the relation of soul to marrow and the localization of parts of the soul in the *Timaeus*. With this treatment cf. K. Schlechta (1006 *supra* [especially pp. 343—348]) and F. Solmsen (179 *supra* [pp. 450—452 and p. 458]).

— Sir David Ross, Plato's theory of ideas (1236 *supra*), pp. 213—215: The ideas and soul. First Ross rejects the notion that the intermediacy of soul was meant as implying a 'special affinity' of soul with intermediate mathematical; but then on the basis of *De anima* 404 B 18—27 he asserts that Plato in his latest phase 'established a correlation between four faculties of the soul and four types of geometrical objects'. This latter thesis is defended at greater length by H. D. Saffrey in a recent monograph (122 *supra*), in refutation of which cf. H. Cherniss, *Gnomon* 31, 1959, 36—51.

— H. Gauss, *Philosophischer Handkommentar* . . . (20 *supra*), I/1 pp. 139—163. Gauss holds that souls are for Plato 'causae secundae' and proposes as the Platonic definition of soul 'a transcendent finite cause'. He contends further that the 'parts' of soul are merely impulses or tendencies existing simultaneously in soul, that Plato in the *Laws* discreetly criticized the tripartite psychology that he had previously espoused, and that he altered his attitude towards immortality and the destiny of the soul also.

— R. Hackforth, Plato's *Phaedrus* . . . (668 *supra*). On the immortality of soul see pp. 64—68, on the problem of the tripartite soul pp. 75—77 (cf. W. K. C. Guthrie [1331 *infra*]), and on metempsychosis pp. 82—91.

1312. L. Moulinier, *Le pur et l'impur dans la pensée des Grecs d'Homère à Aristote*, Paris 1952 (cf. Jeanmaire, *Rev Hist Religions*

145, 1954, 99—104; Maddalena, *Riv Filolog Cl N.S.* 32, 1954, 303—312). The section on Plato (pp. 323—422) is very largely an essay on his doctrine of the soul, especially as it appears in the *Phaedo* and the *Republic*, representing him as having purified the Greek notion of purity by making it the soul's liberation from corporeality and moral stain whereby it rises to pure knowledge, contact with the ideas, which are essentially pure because they transcend all that is sensible. See also the earlier book by J. A. G. van der Veer, *Reiniging en reinheid* ... (1294 *supra*).

1313. N. Padis, *Plato and psychosomatic medicine*, *Trans and Studies of the College of Physicians of Philadelphia* 19, 1952, 127—129. Compare especially the articles by G. Edison (1303 *supra*) and by P. Lain-Entralgo (1332 *infra*).

— J. B. Skemp, *Plato's Statesman* ... (732 *supra*), pp. 223, 229, and 239. Against Skemp's assertion that the tripartite psychology of the *Republic* is explicitly supplanted in this dialogue see G. E. L. Owen, *Mind N.S.* 62, 1953, 272, and J. Tate, *Cl Rev N.S.* 4, 1954, 116. Skemp is followed by J. Gould, *The development of Plato's ethics* (Cambridge 1955), pp. 214—215 (see also pp. 114—115 and for further discussion of Platonic psychology pp. 150—153, pp. 184—191, and pp. 196—202).

1314. G. J. de Vries, *Plato's beeld van de mens*, *Tijdsch Philos* 15, 1953, 426—439. In this sketch of Plato's anthropology, of which the essential characteristic is said to be the fact that man's centre is not within the organism but beyond it, de Vries, beginning with the teleology of the bodily organs in view of the superiority of the soul and ending with the sense in which human life is regarded as a 'game', comments upon the significance of the tripartite psychology, the immortality of the individual soul, Plato's psychological typology, and the relation of metempsychosis to the free ethical choice.

1315. E. L. Harrison, *The origin of θυμοειδής*, *Cl Rev N.S.* 3, 1953, 138—140. Against Jaeger's suggestion (868 *supra*) he argues that Plato borrowed the term from 'hunting talk' (and with reminiscence of *Odyssey* 20, 13—18) and that in his use of it he was 'once again answering the devotees of φύσις by his usual method of hoisting them with their own petard'. Harrison makes no reference to the treatment of the subject by M. D. C. Tait (823 *supra* [pp. 209—211]).

— P. Merlan, *From Platonism to Neoplatonism* (121 *supra*), pp. 10—52, p. 174, and p. 186. Merlan is chiefly concerned here to establish as Platonic the identification of soul with 'mathematicals'.

1316. J. Moreau, Platon et la connaissance de l'âme, *Rev Ét Anciennes*, 55, 1953, 249—257 (résumé in Assoc G Budé, Congrès de Tours et Poitiers 1953 Actes, Paris 1954, pp. 169—170). He argues that the 'tripartite psychology' of the *Republic* is not inconsistent with the doctrine in the *Phaedo* of the soul's essential unity or with the intellectualism of the 'Socratic paradox', which Plato never abandoned. See Moreau's earlier article on the 'ontological argument' in the *Phaedo* (658 *supra*) and his books, *La construction . . .* (5 *supra*), pp. 246—262 and 366—406; *L'Âme du Monde . . .* (5 *supra*), pp. 43—80.

— G. E. L. Owen, The place of the *Timaeus* . . . (294 *supra*), p. 95. He contends that in regard to the nature of the discarnate soul the doctrine of the *Timaeus* is contradicted by the *Phaedrus* and the *Laws*.

1317. G. Faggin, L'anima nel pensiero classico antico (= pp. 29—69 of the volume of essays entitled *L'anima* a cura di M. F. Sciacca, Cremona 1954). Plato's doctrine of the soul is briefly treated on pp. 41—45 and pp. 56—59 of this essay, first the soul as the unique principle both of life and of intellection in the individual and in the universe and then the plurality of souls, their immortality, and reincarnation.

— P. Friedländer, Platon (11a *supra*), I, pp. 30—33, pp. 44—60, pp. 191—201, and pp. 203—208 = Plato (11b *supra*), I, pp. 28—31, pp. 41—56, pp. 180—190, and pp. 192—197. It is typical of Friedländer to insist that 'Plato does not in the strict sense of the word teach anything at all about the fate of the human soul' and that 'Plato has no "doctrine" of anything like the migration of souls'.

1318. Q. Huonder, Gott und Seele im Lichte der griechischen Philosophie, München 1954, pp. 128—144: Platon als Anwalt der Unsterblichkeit der Seele. This section is preceded by one entitled Platon als Theologe (pp. 99—128, see also pp. 36—37 and pp. 39—40), in which Huonder, for whom Plato is preëminently a theologian, argues that the idea of good is a personal god, the creator of the ideas on the model of which he then fashioned the world.

— H. Koller, Die Mimesis in der Antike (168 *supra*), p. 84 and n. 48 on p. 221. Arguing in this chapter (pp. 79—104) that Aristides Quintilianus preserves a pre-Platonic psychology and musical theory, Koller here contends that Plato's 'tripartite psychology' was originally a Pythagorean notion connected with the doctrine of a triple principle of music.

1319. J. H. Loenen, *De verhouding tussen mens en dier in de vóór-Aristotelische wijsbegeerte, Mens en Dier: Een bundel opstellen ... aan F. L. R. Sassen, Antwerpen/Amsterdam 1954, pp. 80—95. See especially pp. 89—90 and pp. 94—95 on Plato's theory of metempsychosis; Loenen argues that Plato maintained the essential similarity of human and animal life and the possibility that in principle all souls can pass from man to beast and back again, though in fact the soul incarnate as beast cannot during that incarnation acquire *νοῦς*. Loenen's thesis concerning Plato's conception of *νοῦς* (see 1233 *supra*) is, of course, involved in this question.*

1320. H. Marcus, *Plato und die Tugendtafel: Versuch einer Neuinterpretation, Archiv Rechts- und Sozialphilos 41, 1954, 281—286. This is more an attempt to recast than to interpret Plato's 'tripartite psychology' in relation to the four cardinal virtues as an adequate ethico-political theory.*

— R. S. Bluck, *Plato's Phaedo ... (637 supra), pp. 18—33. On Plato's arguments for immortality both in the Phaedo and later. See also Bluck's later articles on metempsychosis (695 supra).*

— J. Chevalier, *Histoire de la pensée I ... (14 supra), Appendice 105 and 111). On the relation of the 'tripartite psychology' to the doctrine of personal immortality and Plato's proofs thereof.*

1321. E. Frank, *Begriff und Bedeutung des Dämonischen in der griechischen Philosophie. This essay, delivered as a lecture in the late 'twenties, was first published in the collection of Frank's essays entitled Wissen, Wollen, Glauben: Gesammelte Aufsätze (Zürich/Stuttgart 1955), pp. 51—69. See for Plato especially p. 59 and pp. 65—67 on the incoherence of rational dialectic with the myths concerning personal immortality, an incoherence which Frank finds in Empedocles, the Atomists, and Aristotle as well and which is not to be explained away on the hypothesis of the 'development' of any of these thinkers. See also pp. 83—85 of the same collection in another previously unpublished lecture of Frank's, The religious origin of Greek philosophy, ibid pp. 70—85.*

— R. Hackforth, *Plato's Phaedo ... (638 supra), pp. 11—12 on the nature of the soul and pp. 16—24 on the arguments for its immortality in the different dialogues. With p. 21, n. 2 cf. Hackforth's earlier article, Immortality in Plato's Symposium, and the comments on it (922 supra).*

— A. Manno, *Il teismo di Platone (31 supra), pp. 310—375 in the chapter entitled Il problema psicologico.*

— G. Méautis, L'Orphisme dans l'*Eudème* d'Aristote (212 *supra*).

— F. Solmsen, Antecedents of Aristotle's psychology and scale of beings (1019 *supra*). See also on the relation in the *Timaeus* of soul and its 'parts' to the corporeal organs and tissues Solmsen's earlier article, Tissues and the soul (179 *supra*), especially pp. 450—459, and for other aspects of the Platonic theory of soul his still earlier book, Plato's theology (Ithaca 1942), pp. 89—97, pp. 106—127, and pp. 131—148.

1322. E. von Ivanka, Zur Problematik der aristotelischen Seelenlehre, Autour d'Aristote: Recueil . . . offert à A. Mansion, Louvain 1955, pp. 245—253. See on pp. 251—253 the formulation of the difficulty raised for the Platonic conception of soul by the problem of the relation of soul and body and by that of the unity of the spiritual principle with the lower parts of the soul and the corresponding difficulty raised for the Aristotelian definition that was formulated in criticism of Plato's dualism and in an effort to overcome it.

— F. Buffière, Les mythes d'Homère et la pensée grecque (200 *supra*), pp. 265—272. This section on the Homeric 'antecedents' of Plato's 'tripartite psychology' is preceded by one on Homer's psychology (pp. 257—265) and followed by one on the different use made of Homer by Plato and the Old Stoa for the localization of reason and the passions (pp. 272—278).

— É. des Places, Les derniers thèmes de la *République* de Platon (870 *supra*).

1323. F. Dirlmeier, Wiener Studien 69, 1956, 164—165 (in his article, Beobachtungen zur Nikomachischen Ethik, *ibid.* pp. 162—172). He argues that Plato must have had a 'table' of the *πάθη* not essentially different from that of Aristotle's. See also Aristoteles, Nikomachische Ethik übersetzt von F. Dirlmeier, Darmstadt 1956, p. 309 (note on 34, 4).

— H. Dörrie, Leid und Erfahrung (654 *supra*), pp. 333—334. On the designation of *φρόνησις* as a *πάθημα τῆς ψυχῆς* in *Phaedo* 79 D 1—7.

— R. Joly, Le thème philosophique des genres de vie . . . (232 *supra*). See especially pp. 76—87 and p. 99 on the 'tripartite psychology'.

— J.-H. Kühn, System- und Methodenprobleme im Corpus Hippocraticum (704 *supra*). See especially pp. 89—95 on the *εἶδη* of soul-*'parts'* or *'types'*?

— M. Vanhoutte, La genèse du plaisir dans le „*Philèbe*“ (719 *supra*). See also his book, published in the same year, La méthode ontologique de Platon (1173 *supra*), where he argues that the theory of the soul's nature, composition, and knowledge in the 'metaphysical dialogues' and the *Timaeus* is radically different from what it had been in the *Phaedo*, *Symposium*, *Republic*, and *Phaedrus* (see e. g. pp. 7, 12, 70—76, 135, 176—178).

— H. Wagner, Die Schichtentheoreme bei Platon (1264 *supra*). See also the earlier article by N. Hartmann, Die Anfänge des Schichtungsgedankens . . . (1264a *supra*), to which reference is there made.

— R. Demos, A note on *σωφροσύνη* in Plato's *Republic* (799 *supra*). See especially pp. 402—403 for his attempt to explain why there is no ἀρετή of the third part of the soul.

— E. G. Ballard, Plato's movement from an ethics of the individual to a science of particulars (801 *supra*). He contends (pp. 14—16) that the 'tripartite psychology' is not a quantitative analysis of the individual but that in the soul as in the state, both being 'functional wholes', the whole and the parts 'pervade each other'. See also pp. 34—35 for the notion that the soul as intermediate is meant to fill the gap between ideas and particulars and 'is that through which communication of form to materials takes place'.

1324. H. Dörrie, Kontroversen um die Seelenwanderung im kaiserzeitlichen Platonismus, *Hermes* 85, 1957, 414—435. This is a critical study of the various interpretations from Xenocrates to Proclus and the later Neo-Platonists of the range of metempsychosis and the question whether the soul as a whole or only its rational part is immortal (see also 231 *supra* [p. 453]), in the course of which Dörrie has some pertinent observations (e. g. pp. 416—417) on the difference between the later interpretations and Plato's own conception of soul as an intermediate and mediating entity.

1325. E. Ehnmark, Transmigration in Plato, *Harvard Theol Rev* 50, 1957, 1—20. He contends that the treatment of metempsychosis in connection with the epistemological problem and the treatment of it in connection with the problem of divine justice contradict each other and that Plato never thought the question of rebirth susceptible of serious formal treatment or worthy of it. See also Ehnmark's earlier article, Some remarks on the idea of immortality in Greek religion (1306 *supra*).

1326. D. A. Rees, Bipartition of the soul in the Early Academy, *JHS* 77 Part 1, 1957, 112—118. He argues that in the 'later dialogues'

tripartition of the soul, though not explicitly repudiated, disappears in favor of a theory of bipartition, which, he maintains, was familiar to the early Academy and was espoused by Aristotle in the *Protrepticus*.

—. W. Schadewaldt, *Das Welt-Modell der Griechen* (1026 *supra*), pp. 204—206.

1327. M. Untersteiner, *Spiritualità greca e spiritualità umana*, *Estudios de Historia de la Filosofía en homenaje al Prof. R. Mondolfo*, Fasc 1, Tucuman 1957, pp. 115—130. On the immortality of the soul in Greek thought generally and in Plato especially see pp. 120—130. Untersteiner contends that Plato had no real concern with the endless survival of the individual but that his attitude towards immortality was like that of Spinoza's (pp. 123—125 and p. 129).

1328. C. W. van Boekel, *Katharsis: Een filologische reconstructie van de psychologie van Aristoteles omtrent het gevoelsleven*, Utrecht 1957. The author gives (pp. 51—73) a résumé with texts of Plato's theory of the emotions and their 'purification' or control by reason (for the tripartite soul see pp. 62—64) as the background against which Aristotle's early theory was developed. See for the section on Plato H. Flashar, *Gnomon* 31, 1959, 213.

1329. K. von Fritz, *Ἐστὶς ἐκατέρωθεν* in Pindar's Second Olympian and Pythagoras' theory of metempsychosis, *Phronesis* 2, 1957, 85—89. On *Meno* 81 B—C, occasioned by H. S. Long's interpretation (227b *supra*) and on metempsychosis in the *Phaedrus* with the conclusion that the theory of reincarnation as it appears in Empedocles and Plato must have been well known in Sicily before Empedocles. See 593 *supra* and the references there to R. S. Bluck's articles, which follow:

—. R. S. Bluck, *The Phaedrus and reincarnation* (695 *supra*). The thesis of this article, which was written before the publication of that by K. von Fritz (1329 *supra*), was then defended against the implication of von Fritz's argument in another article by Bluck published later in the same year:

1330. R. S. Bluck, *Plato, Pindar, and metempsychosis*, *AJPh* 79, 1958, 405—414. In conclusion Bluck argues (pp. 412—414) that Plato's doctrine of immortality is one largely purged of superstitious ideas derived from legend and primitive beliefs which still reveals a realistic attitude towards human behavior combined with a fervent moral and religious outlook.

— A. J. Festugière, *Les trois vies* (866 *supra*). See especially pp. 137—143 on the 'three lives' in connection with the tripartition of the soul.

1331. W. K. C. Guthrie, Plato's views on the nature of the soul, *Entretiens Ant Cl* 3, Vandoeuvres-Genève 1957, 1—22. Guthrie in his presentation (pp. 3—19) argues that Plato from the end of his 'purely Socratic phase' through the *Laws* consistently held soul in its truest nature to be simple, the lower two elements of the tripartite psychology attaching to it only as contact with corporeality; and he contends that neither the myth of the *Phaedrus* nor *Laws* 897 A speaks against this thesis, which in the discussion reported (pp. 20—22) he defends against the objections of Waszink and Theiler.

1332. P. Lain-Entralgo, Die platonische Rationalisierung der Besprechung (*ΕΠΙΩΙΔΗ*) und die Erfindung der Psychotherapie durch das Wort, *Hermes* 86, 1958, 298—323. Surveying Plato's use of *ἐπωδή* and related words and analysing with special emphasis on the *Charmides* and the *Laws* his transformation of 'incantation' from the traditional magical procedures, which he rejects, into a philosophical, use of speech to purify the soul and restore it to a state of *σωφροσύνη* understood at first as its liberation from all corporeality but later as the reduction of its own rational and irrational constituents to their natural harmony, Lain-Entralgo declares Plato to have been the discoverer of 'oral psychotherapy'. Lain-Entralgo (p. 317, n. 2 and p. 319, n. 1) rejects the explanation of *Timaeus* 86 B and of Plato's merely metaphorical use of *κάθαρσις* given by H. Flashar, *Hermes* 84, 1956, pp. 23—25 (in his article, Die medizinischen Grundlagen der Lehre von der Wirkung der Dichtung . . ., *ibid* pp. 12—48). He does not mention, however, the earlier article on Platonic 'incantation' by Williger and the controversy concerning this between him and Capone Braga (653 *supra*); nor does he refer to the recent essays on Plato and psychosomatic medicine or psychiatry by G. Edison (1303 *supra*), M. Landmann (139 *supra*), N. Padis (1313 *supra*), and Éliane Amado-Lévy-Valensi (1099 *supra*).

— C. Mugler, *Alcméon et les cycles physiologiques de Platon* (1028 *supra*).

1333. C. J. Classen, Sprachliche Deutung als Triebkraft platonischen und sokratischen Philosophierens, München 1959, pp. 19—42: Erweiterung von Metaphern für die Seele zu Gleichnissen und ihr Einfluß auf Platons Psychologie. This chapter is concerned chiefly with the 'tripartite psychology', the comparison of the soul with a

state, and the development and application of the figure of tripartition in the *Republic*, *Phaedrus*, and *Timaeus*; and at the end Classen discusses the figures of *γαλήνη* and *ἀρμονία* used of the soul. This last topic, the harmony of the soul, is discussed at greater length in a book published almost at the same time by E. Moutsopoulos, *La musique dans l'œuvre de Platon*, Paris 1959, pp. 321—347 (see pp. 352—375 on the harmony of the world-soul).

1334. L. Rougier, *La religion astrale des Pythagoriciens*, Paris 1959. There is here repeated in somewhat more concise and popular form the thesis that Rougier argued in his earlier book, *L'origine astronomique de la croyance pythagoricienne en l'immortalité céleste des âmes*, Le Caire 1933. According to Rougier, whose persistent inaccuracy and uncritical confidence in spurious sources are remarkable, Plato, after he had written the *Phaedo*, learned from the Pythagoreans the scientific justification for Orphic beliefs that they had developed from their discovery of the regularity of planetary motions and from them took over the arguments for immortality used in the *Phaedrus* and the *Laws*, the theory that the motion of rational soul is uniform rotation, the doctrines of the duality of soul and body and of the fall of the soul and its return to the stars, with the substance of which its substance is identical, and their 'astral theology'.

1335. F. A. Wilford, *The status of reason in Plato's psychology*, *Phronesis* 4, 1959, 54—58. He argues that reason (*λογιστικόν*) is merely the mode of *ἐρως* moving to the appropriate object of soul, the idea of good, to which a transcendence denied other goals is given by the doctrine of reminiscence and that consequently like the other two 'parts' reason is a function only of the incarnate soul, superior to the others as being the highest form of activity appropriate to it but not as being different from them in kind, for all three are alike fragments into which the prior unity of soul is split by the impact of incarnation. Compare with this treatment of the 'tripartite psychology' that by J. Moreau (1316 *supra*).

b) Soul as Epistemological Subject

— P. Frutiger, *Les mythes de Platon* (1102 *supra*). See pp. 67—76 on the doctrine of reminiscence, especially as presented in the *Meno* and the *Phaedo*.

1336. J. Hirschberger, *Die Phronesis in der Philosophie Platons vor dem Staate*, Leipzig 1932 (cf. H. Leisegang, *Phil Woch* 53, 1933, 1361—1368; É. de Strycker, *Ant Cl* 4, 1935, 236—237). See

pp. 125—128: Die erkenntnistheoretische Neubegründung des Wissens: Anamnesis (with pp. 138—139) and pp. 140—185: Der spezifisch platonische Wissensbegriff (Die Phronesis im *Phaidon*). With this see also Hirschberger's article, published the next year, Wert und Wissen im platonischen *Symposion*, *Philos Jahrbuch* 46, 1933, 201—227.

—, H.-D. Gardeil, Le rationalisme de Platon (1183 *supra*), pp. 202—210 and pp. 218—220, where the difficulty raised on pp. 219—220 arises out of the very confusion of absolute non-being with otherness against which Plato issued an explicit warning.

1337. L.W. Keeler, The problem of error from Plato to Kant, Romae 1934 (*Analecta Gregoriana*, Vol VI), pp. 6—21: Plato. Keeler appears to believe (pp. 13—15) that Plato when he wrote the *Theaetetus* had abandoned his earlier doctrine of knowledge and reminiscence, and he asserts (p. 21) that in the *Sophist* the real problem of error far from being solved is not even stated. Compare the books by B. Schwarz (1339 *infra*) and W. Luther (1358 *infra*).

1338. P. Salzi, La genèse de la sensation dans ses rapports avec la théorie de la connaissance chez Protagoras, Platon et Aristote, Paris 1934. In this slim monograph Plato has a section to himself (pp. 15—29), but see also for him pp. 39—44 and the conclusion (pp. 49—52). Salzi's assertions are often unfounded, and the translated excerpts which he sometimes gives to support his interpretation frequently convey an impression quite different from the meaning of the unabbreviated Greek originals.

1339. B. Schwarz, Der Irrtum in der Philosophie, Münster i.W. 1934. See for Plato pp. 202—212 and for 'die Erkenntnis-schau' p. 46, n. 1 and p. 215. Compare the contemporary volume by L. W. Keeler (1337 *supra*) and the later book by W. Luther (1358 *infra*).

—, N. Hartmann, Das Problem des Apriorismus in der Platonischen Philosophie (1186 *supra*).

1340. Aline Lion, 'ANAMNESIS and the a priori, Oxford 1935 (cf. H. J. Paton, *Cl Rev* 49, 1935, 241). Comparing Plato's theory of knowledge as it is presented chiefly in the *Phaedo* with Kant's in the *Kritik der reinen Vernunft* she argues that the theory of ἀνάμνησις asserts the presence in human experience of a transcendental element which in satisfaction of the requirement of objectivity must be transcendental both subjectively and objectively and further that 'the interdependence of what has been called a priori knowledge with

what it conditions, the *a posteriori*, could not be more emphatically stressed than it is in the *Phaedo*. Compare and contrast Ettelt's phenomenological interpretation (1362 *infra*).

— L. Robin, *Platon* (7 *supra*), pp. 69—99: La méthode du savoir. With this see also Robin's lectures, delivered before this book was published but themselves published posthumously in 1957, *Les rapports de l'être et de la connaissance d'après Platon* (1271 *supra*).

— Klara Buchmann, *Die Stellung des Menon ...* (583 *supra*), pp. 60—100. On her treatment here of anamnesis and the new meaning of learning involved therein and of the new intellectual factor of $\delta\phi\theta\eta$ $\delta\phi\lambda\alpha$ and the question of Plato's 'intellectualism' see the references given in 583 *supra*.

— A. J. Festugière, *Contemplation et vie contemplative selon Platon* (1190 *supra*), pp. 77—249: Transposition de la connaissance, with which see also pp. 260—266 and pp. 318—321. See also Festugière's later volume, *La Révélation d'Hermès Trismégiste II: Le Dieu Cosmique* (1000 *supra*), pp. 135—144.

— W. F. R. Hardie, *A study in Plato* (610b *supra*), pp. 14—34 on sensation, thought, and opinion.

— P.-P. Joannu, *Die Erfahrung in Platons Ideenlehre* (1191 *supra*).

— A. Karmann, *Methodische und systematische Untersuchungen erkenntnistheoretisch wichtiger sachlicher Grundprobleme in der platonischen Ideenlehre* (1192 *supra*).

— J. A. G. van der Veer, *Reiniging en reinheid bij Plato* (1294 *supra*), pp. 26—43.

1341. L. Harap, *The imagination in Plato and Mr. W. W. Bundy*, *AJPh* 58, 1937, 222—225. A criticism of Bundy's treatment of Plato in his monograph. The theory of the imagination in classical and mediaeval thought, Urbana 1927, where Harap shows that the various meanings of $\varphiαντασία$, $εἰκασία$, and related words have been blurred and confused.

1342. Bianca Pepi Servi, *Il concetto platonico dell' Eros nei suoi rapporti con quelli della verità e del linguaggio*, *Mondo Class* 7 (Supplemento), 1937, 67—89. Adopting a distinction made by Calogero between 'spoken truth' and 'contemplated truth' and identifying the former with the discursive logic of Socratic dialogue for which knowledge is acquaintance by means of concepts and the

latter with the original Platonic theory of ideal reality that determines the truth of concepts and is known by spiritual vision, the direct contact of mind with the eternal object, she tries to trace the development of these two contrasting motives separately and in the problems raised by their interaction as they were woven together by Plato, who regarded them, she contends, as two modes of erotic activity, the former the philosophic discourse of two friendly souls transformed then into the latter, the eros that is the supreme vision of beauty and contemplation of truth.

— A. Cameron, *The Pythagorean background of the theory of recollection* (227a *supra*).

1343. C. Sandulescu-Godeni, *Das Verhältnis von Rationalität und Irrationalität in der Philosophie Platons*, Berlin 1938. To show that Plato's philosophy is fundamentally an integrated system is the avowed purpose of this highly schematized book. It is divided into two parts, the first of which (pp. 19—87) treats ontological rationality and irrationality and the second and longer of which (pp. 89—261) is concerned with Plato's epistemological rationality and irrationality, this latter being divided into the antilogical, the hypological, and the hyperlogical. A diagram of 'correlations' at the end of the summary of 'results' (pp. 262—278) emphasizes the excessive and implausible schematism of the interpretation. A great deal of the book is devoted to résumés and criticisms of much earlier interpreters, and this is not the least useful part of the work.

— E. Grassi, *Vom Vorrang des Logos* (950 *supra*). See the earlier work, *Il problema della metafisica platonica*, there referred to, especially pp. 85—132: *La teoria della reminiscenza*.

— G. Krüger, *Einsicht und Leidenschaft* (913 *supra*), especially pp. 170—172, pp. 189—228, pp. 249—278.

— J. Moreau, *La construction . . .* (5 *supra*), pp. 122—133, pp. 341—346, pp. 371—378, pp. 411—467. See also Moreau's later monograph and articles: *Réalisme et idéalisme chez Platon* (1234 *supra*), pp. 23—51 and pp. 69—78; *Platon et le phénoménisme* (955 *supra*); *L'idéalisme platonicien et la transcendance de l'être* (1261 *supra*).

1344. K. W. Wild, *Plato's presentation of intuitive mind in his portrait of Socrates*, *Philosophy* 14, 1939, 326—340. Wild holds that in Plato's portrait of Socrates the emphasis upon absolute values, the theory of direct aesthetic inspiration, and the doctrine of anam-

nesis (which with the personality of Socrates disappears, he says, in the late dialogues) show the portrait to have been drawn with the deliberate intention of depicting intuitive knowledge in a mind with rationalistic aspirations.

— Sir Patrick Duncan, *Socrates and Plato* (1204 *supra*), pp. 339 and 341. He wrongly takes the *Meno* to show that anamnesis preceded the theory of 'separate' ideas.

1345. H. Koop, *Über die Lehrbarkeit der Tugend: Untersuchungen zum platonischen und nachplatonischen Problem des Lehrens und Lernens*, Würzburg 1940 (cf. É. de Strycker, *Études Cl* 11, 1942, 115—116; A. Steiner, *Phil Woch* 62, 1942, 577—583). De Strycker's concise condemnation of this series of pretentious misinterpretations is fully justified and sufficient.

1346. J. H. Kühn, *ΥΨΟΞ: Eine Untersuchung zur Entwicklungsgeschichte des Aufschwungsgedankens von Platon bis Poseidonios*, Stuttgart 1941 (cf. Wehrli, *Gnomon* 20, 1944, 173—175). This monograph is concerned with the aesthetic notion of the 'sublime', but on pp. 74—93 Kühn studies its origin in Plato's conception of the ascent of the soul to the vision of true being, which is the highest knowledge, as it is depicted in the *Symposium*, the *Phaedrus*, the *Republic*, the *Theaetetus*, and in different form at the end of the *Timaeus*.

— R. Palas, *Die Bewertung der Sinnenwelt bei Platon . . .* (1209 *supra*), pp. 7—31: *Die Erkennbarkeit der Sinnenwelt*. See also pp. 74—78, pp. 82—85, and pp. 89—95 for Plato's epistemology.

1347. A. K. Coomaraswamy, *Recollection: Indian and Platonic*, *Journ American Oriental Soc*, Suppl 3 (with Vol. 64, 2), 1944, 1—18. An attempt to show that the doctrine of recollection is 'one of the many consistent features of a philosophy that is essentially the same in Plato and in the Vedanta'. In this attempt the connection of Platonic anamnesis with the doctrine of ideas is disregarded, and it is expressly assumed that for Plato the immortal soul is not individual but is a universal principle participated in by the individual.

— H. Barth, *Philosophie der Erscheinung: Eine Problemgeschichte* 1 (1221 *supra*), especially pp. 66—68, pp. 73—76, pp. 79—82, pp. 85—86, pp. 91—92, pp. 98—99.

— F. Pfister, *Die Autorität der göttlichen Offenbarung . . .* (209 *supra*). He insists that Plato considered divine revelation to be one of two sources of knowledge and the one to which recourse is to be had where, as in reference to the soul and god, the other, dialectical

reason, is wanting. See also Pfister's addendum to his argument in *Würzburger Jahrb* 4, 1949/50, 184.

1348. Adriana Bertozzi, *Il termine δόξα nei dialoghi di Platone*, *Giorn Metafisica* 3, 1948, 37—43. This is an attempt to trace through the dialogues, the relative chronology of which is assumed rather than demonstrated, the course of a conflict between two attitudes towards δόξα in its relation to the possibility of true knowledge, two attitudes which are said to confront each other in their antinomy in the *Timaeus* where there is thus recapitulated the conflict kept alive through all Plato's work by his inexhaustible dialectical spirit. See the article by C. A. Viano (1354 *infra*).

—. P. Grenet, *Les origines de l'analogie philosophique dans les dialogues de Platon* (1144 *supra*). See pp. 25—38, pp. 53—68, pp. 80—97 and especially pp. 221—222, pp. 229—235, and pp. 241—242.

—. H. W. B. Joseph, *Knowledge and the good in Plato's Republic* (787 *supra*).

—. H. Gundert, *Enthusiasmus und Logos bei Platon* (675 *supra*). See especially pp. 30—32 and pp. 37—46.

—. P. Kucharski, *Les chemins du savoir dans les derniers dialogues de Platon* (1148 *supra*).

1349. A. Portelli, *Platonica penetratio in Aristotelis doctrinam de intellectu agente*, Perugia 1949. This is a short pamphlet (48 pp.) in which the author outlines Plato's theory of knowledge as intuition of the ideas and anamnesis and then argues that despite Aristotle's criticism of the theory of ideas and the Platonic conception of soul his doctrine of the νοῦς ποιητικός is in fact a return to Plato's doctrine.

—. J. W. Yolton, *The ontological status of sense-data in Plato's theory of perception* (951 *supra*).

—. B. H. Bal, *Plato's ascese in de Phaedo* (639 *supra*), pp. 33—42, pp. 46—50, pp. 55—74, pp. 83—86, pp. 107—110, and pp. 122—124.

1350. M. Buccellato, *Un' aporia sofistica sulla comunicabilità del sapere e la sua risonanza platonica*, *Arch Filosofia: Il Solipsismo*, Padova 1950, 68—93. Reprinted in his book, *La retorica sofistica . . .* (150 *supra*), pp. 159—180. For the theory of anamnesis see especially pp. 73—76 and pp. 87—88 of the former = pp. 163—166 and pp. 175—176 of the latter.

—. E. Hoffmann, *Platon* (22 *supra*), pp. 79—87 and pp. 136—142.

— C. Librizzi, I problemi fondamentali della filosofia di Platone (29 *supra*), pp. 46—65.

— O. Regenbogen, Bemerkungen zur Deutung des platonischen *Phaidros* (290 *supra*), pp. 207—210. He argues that the theory of anamnesis is not replaced by diaeresis but that the latter is a methodical addition meant to be complementary to the former earlier theory.

— R. Robinson, Forms and error in Plato's *Theaetetus* (880 *supra*).

— H. Daudin, Les rapports de l'être et de la connaissance chez Platon et chez Aristote (1152 *supra*), especially pp. 28—32 and pp. 34—36. According to Daudin Plato, while holding that knowledge consists in a conformation to reality, saw that reason is not merely receptive in respect to its object but has an orientation and active function of its own.

— C. J. de Vogel, Examen critique de l'interprétation traditionnelle du platonisme (38b *supra*). In her belief that after the *Parmenides* Plato altered his conception of the world of ideas she contends that from the time of the *Theaetetus* and *Parmenides* onwards his theory of knowledge also underwent a considerable change, approaching that later held by Aristotle (see especially pp. 263—268).

— M. Landmann, Erkenntnis und Erlebnis (923 *supra*), pp. 99—126: Formen und Grenzen der Gleichheitserkenntnis. This phenomenological study, though it frequently refers to the epistemological function of the Platonic ideas, has little or no relevance to Plato's own theory.

— J. H. M. M. Loenen, De *Nous* in het systeem van Plato's filosofie (1233 *supra*). See also the restatement of his thesis in his later article (715 *supra*) mentioned in 1233 *supra*.

— N. R. Murphy, The interpretation of Plato's *Republic* (791 *supra*). See pp. 97—129 and pp. 186—188 on *δόξα* and *γνώσις*, pp. 151—186 on 'enlightenment and the good', and the summary on pp. 194—203.

1351. J. Rohmer, L'intentionnalité des sensations de Platon à Ockham, *Rev Sc Religieuses* 25, 1951, 5—39. The article, primarily concerned with Ockham's theory, begins by discussing the problem of the value of sensations in Plato, their specification by Aristotle, the Stoic theory of perception, and the balance struck by Plotinus.

1352. R. J. Collin, Plato's use of the word *μαρτεύομαι*, *Cl Quart N.S.* 2, 1952, 93—96. Collin concludes that Plato's use of *μαρτεύομαι*

and ἀπομαρτεύουμαι in a metaphorical sense is always epistemological, and he suggests that to trace through the dialogues the development of 'divination' as a *leit-motif* would be one way of tracing the development of Plato's epistemology. On Plato's use of these words to introduce into a discussion his own 'assumptions' and the connection of them with 'intuition' see the remarks made in the same issue of this journal by N. Gulley (137 *supra* [pp. 75—76]).

1353. F. M. Cornford, *Principium sapientiae: The origins of Greek philosophical thought*, Cambridge 1952, pp. 45—61: *Anamnesis*. With this chapter see also pp. 80—87 and pp. 110—112, and for criticism of Cornford's treatment of Plato's epistemology cf. J. Tate, *Cl Rev* N.S. 4, 1954, 239.

— H. Gauss, *Philosophischer Handkommentar* ... (20 *supra*), I/1, pp. 35—68, pp. 76—84, pp. 101—107, and pp. 111—112 (see also his earlier article, 1153a *supra*, pp. 167—176 on Plato and the 'Erkenntnisprozeß'). See pp. 42—46 and pp. 61—63 for anamnesis, which he insists was meant by Plato only in a 'passive' sense and never as implying the power of soul spontaneously to recall truths previously seen in a discarnate life. Gauss interprets Plato's theory of knowledge as involving not only the 'understanding' but also the aesthetic imagination and the will and in the event practically reduces knowledge to a function of the latter.

— N. Gulley, *Ethical analysis in Plato's earlier dialogues* (137 *supra*). Here it is argued that the theory of reminiscence, treated in the *Meno* as providing an adequate criterion of true knowledge, is implicitly criticized as unduly optimistic in the *Phaedo*, where an alternative explanation of 'tying opinions to knowledge' is attempted, and is unmentioned in the *Republic* because of Plato's increased confidence in the mathematical analysis of the *Meno* and *Phaedo* as now extended in scope to a single 'unhypothetical' principle under which the assumptions that had hitherto ranked as limiting first principles are united and cease to be assumptions. See further Gulley's later article, *Plato's theory of recollection* (1357 *infra*), where on p. 200 he recognizes that in the *Republic* anamnesis is presupposed as affording a final criterion of truth.

— S. Moser, *Theorie und Erfahrung bei Platon und Aristoteles* (1159 *supra*). See especially pp. 214—218 and p. 220.

— L. Moulinier, *Le pur et l'impur* ... (1312 *supra*). On 'pure knowledge' see especially pp. 340—343, pp. 356—361, pp. 376—380, pp. 383—388, pp. 391—393 and pp. 420—422.

1354. C. A. Viano, Il significato della "*doxa*" nella filosofia di Platone, *Riv Filos* 43, 1952, 167—185. According to this study Plato's treatment of *δόξα* has unity only in the consistency of his own attitude towards the positions permitted by his ontology and their importance for man and especially for the philosopher, but he never reduced *δόξα* to a formulaic unity either as a separate intellectual process modally differentiated from authentic knowledge or as a necessary stage in the dialectical process to be passed through on the way to knowledge. See the article by Adriana Bertozzi (1348 *supra*), which Viano does not mention, and the later article by G. Andreoni (1250 *supra* [p. 117]) where *δόξα* is said to be precisely what Viano says it is not.

—. D. Christoff, Contemplation et création (1094 *supra*). According to Christoff there is conflict between the doctrine that the mind has memory of its own proper objects, the intelligibles, from which it follows that not construction but revelation is the function of the philosopher, and the doctrine that the sage, though he is to contemplate, must be brought up to action. Creation, he holds, is the proper activity of the soul, and action is a means of attaining contemplation; but he contends (pp. 115—117) that by defining soul as the subject of intelligible truths and as the principle of motion Plato involved himself in an ambiguity that he never resolved but his embarrassment concerning which he indicated by making soul intermediate between the intelligible and the sensible.

—. J. Derbolav, Der Dialog '*Kratylos*' im Rahmen der platonischen Sprach- und Erkenntnisphilosophie (349 *supra*). See especially pp. 60—69: Die platonische Wiedererinnerungslehre und ihr 'dialektischer Zündstoff', but also pp. 56—60, pp. 75—80, and pp. 84—89. Much of this is repeated in Derbolav's book, published the following year, *Erkenntnis und Entscheidung* (16 *supra*), where see especially pp. 96—120 and pp. 373—387.

—. A. C. Lloyd, Falsehood and significance according to Plato (887 *supra*).

1355. G. Picht, Platons Lehre vom Wissen, *Merkur* 7, 1953, 720—740. This essay carries obfuscation so far that it sounds like a parody of Heidegger.

1356. G. Rovella, Memoria e ricordo in Platone e S. Agostino, *Sophia* 21 fasc 3—4, 1953, 107—111. Plato's theory of anamnesis, which is here said to have been derived through Socratic maieutics from the 'homo-mensura' aphorism of Protagoras, is interpreted as

being not merely an epistemological theory but an aspiration to immortality and a revival of Greek religious enthusiasm and is then compared with the mystical intuitionism of Augustine.

— G. Capone Braga, *Della Dialettica* (1161 *supra*), pp. 37—38.

— R. C. Cross, *Logos and forms in Plato* (1247 *supra*). His thesis is that the knowledge of which Plato speaks in connection with ideas is knowledge in which logos is inextricably involved and that this is not direct apprehension of ideas. On this see D. W. Hamlyn (617 *supra* [p. 302, n. 16]); R. S. Bluck (1257 *supra*); and J. L. Ackrill, *Mind* N.S. 66, 1957, 572—573.

— P. Friedländer, *Platon* (11a *supra*), I, pp. 14—16, pp. 56—58, and pp. 68—77 = *Plato* (11b *supra*), I, pp. 13—16, pp. 52—54, and pp. 64—72. On anamnesis, which Friedländer regards as 'half mythical' see 11a *supra*, p. 166, pp. 206—207, and p. 347, n. 13 = 11b *supra*, p. 156, pp. 195—196, and p. 370, n. 14.

1357. N. Gulley, *Plato's theory of recollection*, *Cl Quart* N.S. 4, 1954, 194—213. Gulley in his earlier article, *Ethical analysis in Plato's earlier dialogues* (137 *supra*), had dwelt upon the theory of anamnesis in the *Meno* and Plato's attitude towards it in the *Phaedo* and the *Republic*. In this later article he argues a) that the doctrine in the *Meno* does entail the existence of 'transcendent' ideas and that an 'empirical interpretation' of it is false, b) that in the *Phaedo* there is a new version of the doctrine which betrays inadequate appreciation of the problems involved in assigning a rôle to sense-experience, is inconsistent with what Plato says both in the *Phaedo* itself and elsewhere about sensation, and is consequently later abandoned, c) that the revised form of the doctrine in the *Phaedrus* is as a whole self-contradictory, and d) that the doctrine of anamnesis is not abandoned in the later dialogues. See on this article generally R. Hackforth, *Plato's Phaedo* (638 *supra* [pp. 74—77]). Hackforth criticizes some aspects of Gulley's second thesis, the interpretation of the version in the *Phaedo*, the essential part of which has more recently been attacked by H. D. Rankin (649 *supra*). Gulley's fourth thesis has been rejected by M. Vanhoutte (1173 *supra* [pp. 36—38 and pp. 72—85]), who has not, however, answered any of Gulley's arguments in support of it. For the first of his four theses see the references in 583 *supra*.

— A. Guzzo, *Il concetto di "scienza" e il "Teeteto" platonico* (954 *supra*).

1358. W. Luther, *Weltansicht und Geistesleben*, Göttingen, 1954. See pp. 98—102 on Plato in the section, *Aus dem Wortfeld für Irrtum*

und Lüge (pp. 85—106). Although the author several times approaches the interesting distinction between the psychological aspect of error and the ontological, he never comes to grips with the subject or gives any illuminating interpretation of specific passages dealing with it. Compare the books by L. W. Keeler (1337 *supra*) and B. Schwarz (1339 *supra*).

—. G. Andreoni, Per una interpretazione di Platone (1250 *supra*), pp. 115—118. Without mentioning Viano's study (1354. *supra*) Andreoni here makes of *δόξα* what Viano says it never is in Plato, for he asserts that both *δόξα* and *ἐπιστήμη* are necessary moments in the process whereby *διάνοια* expounds the modes of being of reality.

—. R. S. Bluck, Plato's *Phaedo* (637 *supra*). See pp. 8—12 and pp. 62—64 on anamnesis and pp. 146—150 on knowledge and the senses. Bluck mistakenly asserts that in the *Meno* it is not yet supposed that the objects of anamnesis are suprasensible entities, and he does not mention the refutation of this 'empirical interpretation' by Gulley (1357 *supra*) or by any of those who anticipated Gulley in this matter.

—. J. Chevalier, Historie de la pensée I . . . (14 *supra*), Appendice 103 (pp. 640—641) and 110 (pp. 645—646). On knowledge and right opinion in the *Meno* and the theory of anamnesis in the *Phaedo*.

—. R. Hackforth, Plato's *Phaedo* (638 *supra*), pp. 74—77: Sense-perception and recollection. In this section, possibly because account has been taken of Gulley's article (1357 *supra*), Hackforth admits at least that in the *Meno* the theory of anamnesis is implicitly connected with the theory of ideas, whereas in his article published posthumously two years later (959 *supra* [p. 129]) he asserts that in the *Meno* the objects of anamnesis are not ideas.

—. D. W. Hamlyn, The communion of forms and the development of Plato's logic (617 *supra*). See especially pp. 300—302 and with this Hamlyn's later note, Forms and knowledge in Plato's *Theaetetus* . . . (957 *supra*), and his reiteration of his thesis in *Philos Quart* 8, 1958, 15 and 21—22 (1363 *infra*).

—. A. Manno, Il teismo di Platone (31 *supra*). See pp. 321—340 (la facoltà conoscitive) with pp. 224—230 and pp. 350—354 on anamnesis.

1359. R. Mondolfo, La comprensión del sujeto humano en la cultura antigua, Buenos Aires 1955. See pp. 157—169; Platón: reminiscencia y eros; pp. 288—294: Platón y la actividad sintética

del alma; and also pp. 548—556 on Plato with regard to the 'creativity of spirit' and the idea of progress¹). In the Italian translation of this book, *La comprensione del soggetto umano nell' antichità classica*, Firenze 1958, the sections here mentioned are printed on pp. 175—190, pp. 338—346, and pp. 665—674. See also in this volume the section (pp. 499—511 of the original Spanish = pp. 603—618 of the Italian translation) on Plato's attitude towards labor or 'technical activity' and contemplation or the intellectual activity of the soul; and with this compare the contemporaneous article by Mondolfo:

1360. R. Mondolfo, *Lavoro e conoscenza nelle concezioni dell' antichità classica*, *Il Saggiatore* 5, 1955, 297—311. This was later published in Spanish in Mondolfo's book, *Problemas de cultura y de educación*, Buenos Aires 1957, pp. 9—32: *Trabajo y conocimiento en las concepciones de la antigüedad clásica*.

— A. Szabo, *Eleatica* (221 *supra*), pp. 98—102.

— G. Nakhnikian, *Plato's theory of sensation* (956 *supra*). See the article by H. Meyerhoff (975 *supra*).

— R. S. Bluck, *Logos and forms in Plato: A reply to Professor Cross* (1257 *supra*).

1361. F. Dirlmeier, *Aristoteles: Nikomachische Ethik*, Darmstadt 1956, pp. 298—304 (note on 29, 7). This long note, occasioned by the use of *κατὰ τὸν ὁρθὸν λόγον* in *Eth. Nic.* 1103 B 32, amounts to an essay on the epistemological criterion of virtue, *ὁρθὸς λόγος*, and *ὁρθὴ δόξα* in Plato (cf. I. Düring, *Gnomon* 29, 1957, 181—183).

— H. Dörrie, *Leid und Erfahrung* (654 *supra*), pp. 333—334. On the designation of *φρόνησις* as a *πάθημα τῆς ψυχῆς* in *Phaedo* 79 D 1—7.

— G. Fraile, *Ser, saber y virtud en Platón* (1259 *supra*).

— H. W. Meyer, *Das Verhältnis von Enthusiasmus und Philosophie bei Platon ...* (685 *supra*). This article contains important observations on the relation of knowledge, true opinion, and anamnesis.

¹) The thesis or programme of this work had been set out in two papers presented by Mondolfo earlier at two philosophical congresses:

1359a) R. Mondolfo, *Le sujet humain dans la philosophie antique*, *Proc Tenth Internat Cong Philosophy* 1, Fasc 2, Amsterdam 1949, pp. 1065—1068.

1359b) R. Mondolfo, *El hombre como sujeto espiritual en la filosofía antigua*, *Actas Primer Cong Nac Filos*, Mendoza 1949, III, pp. 1988—2004.

— C. Mugler, Sur deux passages de Platon (1049 *supra*), pp. 28—34. On what Mugler holds to be Plato's 'dynamic' theory of sensation.

— J. Pépin, Éléments pour une histoire de la relation entre l'intelligence et l'intelligible ... (1262 *supra*), pp. 40—44 and p. 64. He holds that Plato's epistemology is based upon the assimilation of the soul to an idea and that without explicitly saying so Plato inclines to the identification of the intelligence and the intelligible.

— H.-P. Stahl, Interpretationen zu Platons Hypothesis-Verfahren (1172 *supra*). See especially pp. 25—30 and pp. 34—36 on the hypothetical method as a way of access to the ideas, the practical application and consummation of anamnesis.

— M. Vanhoutte, La méthode ontologique de Platon (1173 *supra*). On anamnesis, which despite Gulley (1357 *supra*) he insists was abandoned in the later dialogues, see pp. 36—38, pp. 70—85 (La valeur de l'intuition [see 841g *supra*]), and p. 101, n. 3; for his notion that in the earlier 'dialogues of maturity' Plato considered *νόϋς* to be an idea but radically altered his conception of it in the later dialogues such as the *Timaeus* see p. 7, p. 12, and pp. 176—178. On Plato's treatment of memory and 'reminiscence' in the *Philebus* see also the article published by Vanhoutte in the same year, La genèse du plaisir dans le "*Philèbe*" (719 *supra*).

— E. G. Ballard, Plato's movement from an ethics of the individual to a science of particulars (801 *supra*). See pp. 21—23, pp. 31—36, and pp. 39—40 on intuition, knowledge, and true opinion. Ballard has some cogent but insufficient criticism of Stenzel's interpretation, being in part misled himself by neglect of the different meanings of *δόξα* in different contexts.

— W. Beierwaltes, Lux intelligibilis ... (1267 *supra*). See pp. 57—75 and especially pp. 85—97 and with this the monographs by M. Heidegger and by T. Ballauff with the criticisms of them listed in 847 *supra*.

— R. S. Bluck, False statement in the *Sophist* (895 *supra*).

— G. Calogero, Risposta ad Armando Carlini (728 *supra*), pp. 362—364. He holds that the motif of the soul's dialogue with itself in contrast to dialogue with others evolving through *Theaetetus* 189 E 6 — 190 A 6, *Sophist* 263 E — 264 A, *Philebus* 38 C 2 — E 4, and *Timaeus* 37 B 3 — C 5 shows the development of Plato's 'gnoseo-logical-metaphysical' reflections; and in this connection he discusses

the relation of such 'dialogue' to the acquisition of certain truth. Contrast the treatment of this subject by M. Vanhoutte (1173 *supra* [pp. 32—34]).

— É. de Strycker, La distinction entre l'entendement (*dianoia*) et l'intellect (*nous*) dans la *République* de Platon (1174 *supra*). See also pp. 221—222 of this article for de Strycker's treatment of 'true opinion'.

1362. W. Ettelt, Der Horizont des Erkennens und das Problem der Anamnesis, *Philos Jahrbuch* 65/1956, 1957, 401—411. This phenomenological interpretation is frankly a philosophical development of Plato's statements beyond his own intention. Nevertheless, according to the author the 'myth of anamnesis' and Husserl's 'Horizontlehre' have in common the basic conception that knowledge is possible for us because we stand in an ontological relation to an existing realm of ordered truths, and he contends that the material *a priori* of anamnesis is nearer to Husserl's 'horizon' than it is to Kant's formal *a priori*. Contrast Aline Lion's earlier essay (1340 *supra*).

— R. Hackforth, Platonic forms in the *Theaetetus* (958 *supra*). See also Hackforth's note on Midwifery and Anamnesis (*Theaetetus* 149 A—151 D) in his article published posthumously in the same year (959 *supra* [pp. 128—130]), and observe that what is said here (p. 129) of the objects of anamnesis in the *Meno* he had already contradicted in his annotated translation of the *Phaedo* (638 *supra* [p. 74]).

— D. W. Hamlyn, Forms and knowledge in Plato's *Theaetetus* (957 *supra*).

— Winifred F. Hicken, Knowledge and forms in Plato's *Theaetetus* (960 *supra*). See also her article published the next year, The character and provenance of Socrates' 'dream' in the *Theaetetus* (974 *supra*).

— J. Xenakis, Essence, being and fact in Plato . . . (971 *supra*).

— R. E. Cushman, *Therapeia* . . . (15 *supra*). The greater part of this book (pp. 52—303) is concerned with the interpretation of Plato's theory of knowledge as a theory of the 'purification' of the soul in the sense of an Augustinian volitionalism. According to Cushman metaphysical knowledge is for Plato 'decisional in nature' and so 'depends upon a volitional disposition favorable to the acknowledgement of reality or First Principle which, in its turn, answers to the native structure of human intelligence'.

1363. D. W. Hamlyn, *Eikasia* in Plato's *Republic*, *Philos Quart* 8, 1958, 14—23. Besides arguing that *eikasia* in the 'divided line' is the state of mind of one who holds that sense-data or appearances are all that there is (e. g. Protagoras—or Hume—or those who have been corrupted by the sophists) and that this is the state of the prisoners in the 'cave' (see 841 *supra* [*sub fin.*] and 841 d *supra*), Hamlyn connects this with a discussion of Plato's theory of knowledge in the *Republic* and a restatement (p. 15 and pp. 21—22) of his interpretation of Plato's position and purpose in the *Theaetetus* (see 957 *supra*).

— F. Lasserre, *Nombre et connaissance dans la préhistoire du Platonisme* (1277 *supra*), pp. 23—26.

— H. Meyerhoff, *Socrates' 'dream' in the Theaetetus* (975 *supra*).

— H. D. Rankin, *Immediate cognition of the forms in the Phaedo?* (649 *supra*).

— A. Rigobello, *L'intellettualismo in Platone* (34 *supra*). On Plato's epistemology and 'gnoseology' pp. 9—23, pp. 37—44, pp. 53—54, pp. 79—80, pp. 98—99, and pp. 101—106.

— Ilse von Loewenclau, *Mythos und Logos bei Platon* (1115 *supra*).

1364. H. Zantop, *Das Problem der Selbsterkenntnis bei Platon, Kant und Schopenhauer, Im Dienst der Wahrheit: Paul Häberlin zum 80. Geburtstag*, Bern 1958, pp. 67—90. Plato is here brought in (pp. 68—69, p. 84, and p. 87) only to show that while he had already recognized the problem of 'the experience of self' (which, however, like Kant and Schopenhauer he understood as a question of 'self-knowledge') he thought it insoluble because self-perception would require a mirroring alter ego and so is impossible.

— R. E. Allen, *Anamnesis in Plato's Meno and Phaedo* (1289 *supra*).

1364a. P. Boyancé, *Les epicuriens et la contemplation*, *Epicurea in memoriam Hectoris Bignone*, Genova 1959, pp. 89—99. On pp. 94—96 he formulates the psychological presuppositions of the 'contemplative life', connecting this contemplation with a divine soul and a divine object, whether ideas or cosmos, and tracing what he calls this 'astral mysticism' of the late Plato and early Aristotle to Pythagoreanism as its source.

— C. J. Classen, *Sprachliche Deutung als Triebkraft platonischen und sokratischen Philosophierens* (1333 *supra*), pp. 43—71: *Metaphern*

des Sehens für geistige Vorgänge als Grundlage für Gleichnisse. See also pp. 94—95 on *ἀλήθεια* against the implications seen by Heidegger (847 *supra*) in Plato's use of the word.

1365. R.W. Hall, Justice and the individual in the *Republic*, *Phronesis* 4, 1959, 149—158. Seeking an epistemological ground for the personal virtues of which all individuals are capable he avails himself of Ryle's distinction between 'knowing how' and 'knowing that' and, identifying the latter with knowledge of the ideas, argues that personal justice is produced by the former and that 'right opinion'—or rather the second of two kinds of 'right opinion' which he distinguishes—is the cognitive faculty by means of which all inhabitants of the ideal *polis* gain this 'knowledge how' necessary for personal justice. On this basis he concludes that the justice of the individual and that of the state 'exhibit a relation of mutual dependence' in a sense in which the state can plausibly be said to exist for the individual.

—. F. A. Wilford, The status of reason in Plato's psychology (1335 *supra*).

c) Soul as Autokinetic Cause

Phaedrus 245 C — 246 A 1 and *Laws* X 891 E 4 — 899 D 3 (especially 893 B 1 — 896 B 3) are the primary passages for the doctrine that soul is self-motion and as such is everlasting, prior to body, and the cause of all physical changes and processes. The latter of the two passages is itself explicitly connected with theology and with the 'problem of evil'; and it is in relation to these topics, to Plato's teleology and theory of causality generally, to the interpretation of the *Timaeus* and its treatment of soul, motion, and causality, or to the supposed development of Plato's psychology and of his attitude towards the physical world that this conception of soul as self-motion is usually discussed by modern interpreters.

—. L. Robin, *Platon* (7 *supra*), pp. 189—192, pp. 200—202 and pp. 223—229. See also his earlier lectures, published posthumously in 1957, *Les rapports de l'être et de la connaissance d'après Platon* (1271 *supra*), pp. 135—146 and pp. 150—153.

—. W. F. R. Hardie, A study in Plato (610b *supra*), pp. 146—156. Hardie is concerned to show that the argument of the *Laws* and of the *Phaedrus* is not coherent with the 'theism of the *Timaeus*', that in the *Timaeus* the ultimate cause is not meant to be soul, and that Plato's god is not to be identified with the 'best soul' of the *Laws*.

— F. M. Cornford, Plato's cosmology ... (981 *supra*), p. 39, p. 59, pp. 63—64, p. 76, and pp. 197—210.

1366. H. B. Hoffleit, An un-Platonic theory of evil in Plato, *AJPh* 58, 1937, 45—58. He argues against A. E. Taylor that despite the passages in the *Laws* and the *Phaedrus* 'matter' was for Plato 'a concrete and tangible source of evil', summing up his position with the sentence: 'Body alone is not an active principle, but a soul may be wholly or partially *σωματοειδής*'.

— P. H. De Lacy, The problem of causation in Plato's philosophy (1201 *supra*). The causality of soul, extended in the *Phaedrus* by making soul as self-moved mover the ultimate source of all motions, is treated (pp. 106—115) as a departure from the earlier causality of ideas (pp. 99—106) and one which involved a new attitude towards ontology, teleology, and ethics.

— J. Moreau, La construction ... (5 *supra*), p. 124 and pp. 487—489; and L'Ame du Monde ... (5 *supra*), pp. 59—80. See also Moreau's later article on the 'ontological argument' in the *Phaedo* (658 *supra*), pp. 339—343.

— G. Vlastos, The disorderly motion in the *Timaeus* (990 *supra*), pp. 77—83.

— N. Almqvist, Platons världssjäl och Aristoteles' gudsbegrepp (992 *supra*), pp. 94—114, pp. 256—261, and pp. 274—299.

1367. J. B. Skemp, The theory of motion in Plato's later dialogues, Cambridge 1942 (cf. A. E. Taylor, *Philosophy* 18, 1943, 80—84; G. C. Field, *Mind* N.S. 53, 1944, 90—91; L. A. Post, *AJPh* 65, 1944, 298—301). See also Skemp's later remarks in Plato's *Statesman* (732 *supra*), pp. 85—91, pp. 105—108, and p. 239.

1368. F. Solmsen, Plato's theology, Ithaca 1942 (cf. A. E. Taylor, *Mind* N.S. 52, 1943, 178—182; J. Tate, *Cl Rev* 57, 1943, 21—22; E. Frank, *AJPh* 66, 1945, 92—96; É. de Strycker, *Ant Cl* 16, 1947, 148—150). Much of this book is concerned with the theory of soul as autokinetic cause (see especially pp. 75—97, pp. 112—117, pp. 135—148, and pp. 161—172), for Solmsen's thesis is that, after having in the earlier dialogues merely proposed expurgations of the civic religion, Plato in the later dialogues constructed upon the foundation of his new theory of soul as the self-moving cause of all motions a revised ontology and a new cosmic religion, in which the divine principle is the world-soul, though he seems to waver between this immanent god and one that in his teleology is 'tran-

scendent' νοῦς. Besides the reviews already mentioned see that by W. C. Greene, *Cl Phil* 40, 1945, 128—133, where on pp. 131—132 Greene refers to his own treatment of the subject in a book published the year before, *Moirai: Fate, good and evil in Greek thought*, Cambridge Mass. 1944, pp. 287—296 and pp. 305—311.

— H. Cherniss, Aristotle's criticism of Plato . . . (1218 *supra*), pp. 391—414 and pp. 423—454. See also his later article, The sources of evil according to Plato (1370 *infra*), and on this see H. Herter's article (1024 *supra*).

— E. R. Dodds, Plato and the irrational (243b *supra*), pp. 20—21.

— O. Reverdin, La religion de la cité platonicienne (522 *supra*), pp. 13—17 and in connection with this section pp. 47—50 on the universe and the god of the *Laws*.

— A. J. Festugière, Platon et l'Orient (243 *supra*), pp. 19—22, p. 24, and pp. 34—44. According to Festugière the discovery by Eudoxus of the regularity of planetary motions led Plato to the new conception of soul in the *Phaedrus* and on the basis of this conception he developed the doctrine of god as the world-soul which is the eternal cause of all regular movements in the cosmos while terrestrial disorder is the result of the disorderly motions of χώρα itself. See also his later book, *La Révélation d'Hermès Trismégiste II: Le Dieu Cosmique* (1000 *supra*), pp. 101—131.

— Simone Pétrement, Le dualisme chez Platon . . . (244 *supra*), pp. 44—48 and pp. 72—73.

— V. Goldschmidt, La religion de Platon (1309 *supra*), pp. 49—62 and especially pp. 51—54.

— E. Hoffmann, Platon (22 *supra*), pp. 105—111, pp. 144—147, and pp. 184—188 (cf. J. L. Ackrill, *Mind* N. S. 60, 1951, 131—132).

1369. M. Meldrum, Plato and the 'APXH KAKΩN', *JHS* 70, 1950, 65—74. Arguing chiefly against Cornford (981 *supra*) and taking account of the theses of Vlastos (990 *supra*) and of Festugière (243 *supra*) but apparently unaware of the explanation given in 1218 *supra*, Meldrum contends that the 'disorderly motions' in the *Timaeus* are incompatible with the principle that self-moving soul is the ultimate source of all motions, that this principle expressed in the theory of a world-soul is irreconcilable with the conception of νοῦς δημιουργός, that as one or the other of these themes predominated in Plato's mind his view of evil varied, that there is no record of his

having reached a synthesis of them, and that there is no entity which can be called 'Plato's theology'.

— A. Millan Puelles, *La teoría del ser vivo en Platón* (1310 *supra*).

— G. R. Morrow, Necessity and persuasion in Plato's *Timaeus* (1005 *supra*), pp. 162—163.

— O. Regenbogen, Bemerkungen zur Deutung des platonischen *Phaidros* (290 *supra*), pp. 202—206. He argues that only after the *Sophist* could Plato have conceived of soul as self-motion and that the formulation of the demonstration in the *Phaedrus* implies the previous elaboration of the argument for the doctrine which is given in *Laws* X.

— C. J. de Vogel, Examen critique de l'interprétation traditionnelle du platonisme (38b *supra*), pp. 257—259. See also her article, On the Neoplatonic character of Platonism . . . (38c *supra*), pp. 55—57.

— A. Diès, *Les Lois*: Introduction (511 *supra*), pp. LXXIV—LXXIX.

— J. H. M. M. Loenen, *De Nous* in het systeem van Plato's philosophie (1233 *supra*). See especially pp. 119—178 and pp. 226—253 and with this the later article in which he summarizes his thesis (715 *supra*).

— V. Martin, Sur la condamnation des athées par Platon au Xe Livre des *Lois* (569 *supra*). See pp. 114—131 on Plato's doctrine of the soul and 'divinity' and especially pp. 114—124 for the argument of the *Laws* concerning soul as self-motion and its relation to *νοῦς*.

— G. Müller, Studien zu den platonischen *Nomoi* (528 *supra*), pp. 79—80 and pp. 85—93. In conformity with his general thesis Müller tries to show that the treatment of this topic in *Laws* X is an 'un-Platonic' misapplication of themes from the *Phaedrus* and other dialogues, but he also argues that the conception of soul as self-motion was not new to Plato when he wrote the *Phaedrus* and that the 'static' and 'kinetic' conceptions do not correspond to two chronologically distinct periods of his thought.

— A. Olerud, L'idée de macrocosmos et de microcosmos dans le *Timée* de Platon (234 *supra*), pp. 25—33.

— Sir David Ross, Plato's theory of ideas (1236 *supra*), pp. 236—239 with p. 111.

— H. Gauss, *Philosophischer Handkommentar* . . . (20 *supra*), I/1, pp. 139—143, pp. 158—163, and p. 174. The interpretation of the causality of soul given in these pages has little obvious connection with the conception of soul as self-motion until it is read in connection with Gauss's remarks on the argument in the *Phaedrus* in his *Handkommentar* . . . , II/2, pp. 246—248 (see *ibid* p. 73 and p. 234, n. 1).

— R. Hackforth, *Plato's Phaedrus* . . . (668 *supra*), pp. 64—68 and p. 76. On Hackforth's account (p. 68) of the relation between the argument in the *Phaedrus* and the final argument in the *Phaedo* see Winifred F. Hicken, *JHS* 77 Part 1, 1957, 171. On this relation see also H. Cherniss (1218 *supra*), pp. 435—437 with the references there to earlier works.

— P. Merlan, *From Platonism to Neoplatonism* (121 *supra*), pp. 10—52, p. 174, and p. 186. He ascribes to Plato the identification of soul with 'motive mathematical', but he has nothing to say about Plato's own arguments in the *Phaedrus* and the *Laws* concerning soul as self-motion.

— G. E. L. Owen, *The place of the Timaeus* . . . (294 *supra*), p. 95. He contends that the conception of soul as self-motion is absent from the *Timaeus* and that the 'disorderly motions' here have not been reconciled with the doctrine of soul as the principle of motion. On the former point see H. Cherniss (1370 *infra*), p. 26, n. 24.

1370. H. Cherniss, *The sources of evil according to Plato*, *Proc Am Philos Soc* 98, 1954, 23—30. A distinction is here made of negative, relative, and positive evil and of positive evil caused directly by evil souls and that which is the incidental result of all direct psychic influence upon phenomena, this last being the class of the 'disorderly' or random motions of secondary causality. This explanation of the manner in which soul is the ultimate source of chaotic motion and hence of incidental evil has been rejected by H. Herter (1024 *supra*), failing as it seems (pp. 333 and 341) to appreciate the significance of *Timaeus* 57 D 7 — 58 C 4 (cf. 1218 *supra* [p. 440—450]).

— M. Vanhoutte, *La philosophie politique de Platon dans les 'Lois'* (538 *supra*), pp. 373—382. On the argument in *Laws* X on the soul, in which according to Vanhoutte Plato's principal concern is to prove that soul, understood in its most general sense, is god.

— R. S. Bluck, *Plato's Phaedo* . . . (637 *supra*), pp. 29—32.

1371. R. Muth, *Zur Frage der Erkenntnis der Naturgesetzmäßigkeit durch die griechische Philosophie bis Platon*, *Natalicium Carolo Jax*

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... oblatum 1 (Innsbrucker Beiträge zur Kulturwiss 3), Innsbruck 1955, pp. 111—122. See pp. 119—122 where, after having asserted that the way from modern 'classical' physics to quantum mechanics is in a sense that from mechanical causality to teleology, he contends that the same kind of change took place when Plato, dissatisfied with the strict mechanical causality of atomism, saw the need for a teleological principle and consequently developed the theory of the subordination of the mechanical causality of φύσις as 'secondary' to the control of νοῦς as the primary cause of all process.

— H. Herter, *Bewegung der Materie bei Platon* (1024 *supra*). See 1370 *supra* as well as 1000 *supra* for the controversy involved.

— W. Spoerri, *Encore Platon et l'Orient* (259 *supra*), pp. 209—214. In arguing against the theory of Iranian influence on Plato Spoerri in these pages deals with the supposed 'evil world-soul' in the *Laws* and so with the larger question of the relation between the 'disorderly motions' and the principle that soul is the ultimate source of all motions, the problem dealt with in 1370 *supra* and in 1024 *supra*, neither of which articles was known to Spoerri at this time.

— W. K. C. Guthrie, *Plato's views on the nature of soul* (1331 *supra*), pp. 17—19.

1372. W. Theiler, *Gott und Seele im kaiserzeitlichen Denken*, *Entretiens Ant Cl* 3, Vandoeuvres-Genève 1957, pp. 65—91. This essay, which is printed in the same volume as that of Guthrie's just mentioned and which is largely concerned with the later interpretation and elaboration of the Platonic themes of god and soul, begins by asserting (pp. 65—66) what Guthrie had questioned, that the 'kinetic' conception of soul in the *Phaedrus* was a change in Plato's theory¹, and then states that this new theory of soul led Plato to develop in the *Timaeus* and the *Laws* a new physics and a new cosmic religion.

— C. Mugler, *Alcméon et les cycles physiologiques de Platon* (1028 *supra*). On Alcmæon as the source of Plato's 'kinetic' conception of soul also.

— L. Rougier, *La religion astrale des Pythagoriciens* (1334 *supra*).

¹ Against this common assumption Guthrie cites Cornford (920 *supra* [pp. 71 and 78]); see also H. Cherniss (1218 *supra* [pp. 433—437]) and G. Müller (528 *supra* [p. 79]).

d) Soul as Desire and Daemon: The Theory of Love

What Plato said of love and of human desire has often been used as the key to his character and taken as the motivation of all his works. By such as J. J. Chapman (40 *supra*), W. Fite (41 *supra*), and H. Kelsen (42 *supra*), whose analysis is cited with approval by K. R. Popper (46 *supra*), it has been interpreted either as the shameless glorification of sexual perversion and licentiousness or as damning evidence of Plato's own erotic passion, inner conflict, and lust for power. These critics and such charges have been examined in detail and rebutted by R. B. Levinson (28 *supra* [pp. 69—74, pp. 81—138, pp. 466—498, and pp. 586—588]). Not only Plato's detractors, however, but also many of his admirers like K. Hildebrandt and P. Friedländer have in their different fashions read autobiographical significance in what he says of love. For the most part, however, recent interpreters—and Friedländer among them—have been occupied with the relation of the Platonic doctrine of eros as psychic dynamism to that of the soul as epistemological subject and as daemonic intermediary between the phenomenal world and the world of ideas.

1373. R. Demos, *Eros*, *Journ Philos* 31, 1934, 337—345. Convinced that for Plato the completely real is a relational complex or mixture of the limit and the unlimited, Demos characterizes eros as 'the passage between the two', the author of the mixture, the primordial attraction of the actual by the ideal, the process towards a goal, dialectic operating in thought, and many things besides including 'Plato himself'. In the book by Demos, *The philosophy of Plato* (New York 1939), the greater part (pp. 82—98) of the chapter on the soul (pp. 78—98) is merely an expanded form of this article with the earlier characterizations of eros frequently transferred to soul itself which here is said to be eros.

— G. M. A. Grube, *Plato's thought* (3 *supra*), pp. 87—119: Eros.

— L. Robin, *Platon* (7 *supra*), pp. 74—79 and pp. 262—265. The clear tendency of Robin's interpretation is indicated by the fact that the former passage is a sub-section of 'La méthode de savoir' (see also p. 84, p. 99, p. 127, and p. 261).

— A. J. Festugière, *Contemplation et Vie Contemplative selon Platon* (1190 *supra*), pp. 334—357 and pp. 365—369.

— Bianca Pepi Servi, *Il concetto platonico dell' Eros ...* (1342 *supra*).

—. C. Sandulescu-Godeni, Das Verhältnis von Rationalität und Irrationalität in der Philosophie Platons (1343 *supra*), pp. 230—236, pp. 241—245, and pp. 252—253. He argues against the purely rationalistic interpretation of eros that its rôle in Plato's system is one of hyperlogical irrationality, that despite its close connection with dialectic it is a mystical factor in the epistemological process while yet essentially different from the mystical Neoplatonic ecstasy.

—. G. Krüger, Einsicht und Leidenschaft ... (913 *supra*).

—. J. Moreau, La construction ... (5 *supra*), pp. 263—298, pp. 441—448, and pp. 457—460. See also Moreau's later article, Platon et la connaissance de l'âme (1316 *supra*), pp. 251 and 255.

—. R. Palas, Die Bewertung der Sinnenwelt bei Platon ... (1209 *supra*), pp. 162—196. In this section Palas discusses first (pp. 162—177) Plato's attitude towards women and marriage, next (pp. 177—185) Socratic and Platonic homosexuality, and finally (pp. 185—196) what he calls after Friedländer the 'intentional character' of Platonic eros, of which he rejects both the exclusively intellectualistic and the exclusively sensualistic interpretations.

—. K. Kerényi, Der große Daimon des *Symposion* (940 *supra*). On the meaning and background of eros as 'daemonic' and the connection of this with the soul's 'remembering' and 'begetting'.

—. W. Jaeger, *Paideia* (4 *supra*), II, pp. 244—269.

—. O. Reverdin, La religion de la cité platonicienne (522 *supra*), pp. 134—139. On *δαίμων* and the soul in Plato.

1374. C. Murley, The didactic significance of erotic figures in Plato, *Classical Essays presented to James A. Kleist*, St. Louis 1946, pp. 61—73. Compare with this the more recent treatment by C. J. Classen, *Sprachliche Deutung* ... (1333 *supra* [pp. 147—150]).

1375. A. Levi, Sulla demonologia platonica, *Athenaeum* N.S. 24, 1946, 119—128. According to Levi Plato in representing eros as a 'daemon' intended not to make it a 'mythological reality' but merely to use the popular conception of a being intermediate between men and gods to personify a fundamental aspiration of the human soul, for eros is intermediate between empirical humanity and the perfect explication of intelligence turned wholly to contemplation of the ideas. Neither this characterization of eros nor any of the passages in which Plato uses the term *δαίμων* can in Levi's opinion be taken as the expression of a 'demonological doctrine' seriously accepted.

For Plato's use of *δαίμων* see the recent book by G. François, *Le polythéisme et l'emploi au singulier des mots ΘΕΟΣ, ΔΑΙΜΩΝ* (Paris 1957), pp. 272—273, p. 303, pp. 338—339, and pp. 342—344 (with which last cf. É. Magotteaux, *Ant Cl* 24, 1955, 346—349).

1376. V. Cilento, *Il demone*, *Parola Pass* 3, 1948, 213—227. In this essay on the conception of *δαίμων* from Thales to Plotinus see pp. 216—218 on the Socratic daemon that 'Plato took and presented in the figure of Eros'.

—. G. J. de Vries, *Spel bij Plato* (1121 *supra*), pp. 167—171. He makes a distinction between the 'erotic irony' of Socrates and the theory of love in the *Symposium* and *Phaedrus*.

—. H. Gundert, *Enthusiasmos und Logos bei Platon* (675 *supra*). See especially pp. 25—27, pp. 37—43, and p. 45.

—. A. Levi, *La teoria dell' ἔρως nel Simposio di Platone* (919 *supra*). With this see Levi's earlier article, *Sulla demonologia platonica* (1375 *supra* [pp. 121—122 and pp. 127—128]), as well as one published the next year, *La teoria della φιλία nel Liside* (578 *supra*).

—. M. D. C. Tait, *Spirit, gentleness, and the philosophic nature in the Republic* (823 *supra*), p. 211.

—. B. H. Bal, *Plato's ascese in de Phaedo* (639 *supra*), pp. II—IV, pp. 34—37, pp. 95—100. The theory of love in the *Symposium* and the *Phaedrus* and the 'asceticism' of the *Phaedo* are here presented as complementary aspects of a consistent Platonic conception of philosophy and theory of knowledge.

—. F. M. Cornford, *The doctrine of eros in Plato's Symposium* (920 *supra*). With this see also in his book, *Principium Sapientiae* (1353 *supra*), especially pp. 80—87. In connection with Cornford's assertion in the former essay that 'the ultimate standpoints of Plato and Freud seem to be diametrically opposed' see G. Tournay's article, *Empedocles and Freud, Heraclitus and Jung*, *Bull Hist Medicine* 30, 1956, 109—123 (especially pp. 114—116).

—. E. Hoffmann, *Platon* (22 *supra*), p. 85 and pp. 182—183.

—. M. Landmann, *Elenktik und Maieutik* (139 *supra*), pp. 75—81. See also in his book published the next year, *Erkenntnis und Erlebnis* (923 *supra*), pp. 194—199 and p. 205.

—. G. Méautis, *Platon vivant* (32 *supra*), pp. 259—360: *Le cycle de l'amour*.

—. O. Regenbogen, Bemerkungen zur Deutung des platonischen *Phaidros* (290 *supra*), pp. 212—216.

—. E. R. Dodds, The Greeks and the irrational (230 *supra*), pp. 218—219 and notes 57—62 on pp. 230—231.

—. J. Derbolav, Der Dialog 'Kratylos' . . . (349 *supra*), pp. 66—67 and p. 86. See further his book, published the next year, Erkenntnis und Entscheidung (16 *supra*), pp. 105—106, p. 143, pp. 169—177.

—. K. Hildebrandt, Platons *Phaidros* . . . (669 *supra*), pp. 49—65 and pp. 73—77. See also in the new edition of his earlier book, Platon . . . (669a *supra*), especially pp. 195—206, pp. 260—268, p. 368, and in the justificatory 'Nachwort' p. 385. On his anti-intellectualistic interpretation of Platonic eros see R. Palas (1209 *supra*), pp. 192—196 and A. Rigobello (34 *supra*), pp. 94—97.

—. L. Quattrocchi, L'idea di bello nel pensiero di Platone (1244 *supra*), pp. 70—79.

—. G. Rovella, Memoria e ricordo in Platone . . . (1356 *supra*).

—. G. Capone Braga, Della Dialettica (1161 *supra*), pp. 35—37.

—. P. Friedländer, Platon (11a *supra*), I, pp. 34—62 = Plato (11b *supra*), I, pp. 32—58: Demon and Eros.

—. A. Valensin, Platon et la théorie de l'amour (925 *supra*).

—. E. Frank, Begriff und Bedeutung des Dämonischen . . . (1321 *supra*).

—. R. A. Markus, The dialectic of eros in Plato's *Symposium* (926 *supra*).

—. R. Mondolfo, La comprensión del sujeto humano en la cultura antigua (1359 *supra*), pp. 157—169 (= pp. 175—190 of the Italian translation). He argues that the theory of eros connected with the passages concerning anamnesis proves Plato to have meant the latter to be an active process of mind sustained by the will which is stimulated by the contrast between the potentiality of knowing and actual lack of knowledge felt within itself simultaneously by the soul.

—. H. C. de Lima Vaz, Amor e conhecimento: sobre a ascensão dialéctica no *Banquete* (see in 927 *supra*).

1377. J. A. Mazzeo, Plato's Eros and Dante's Amore, *Traditio* 12, 1956, 315—337. The theory of eros in the *Symposium* and the *Phaedrus*, which are said to present two complementary aspects of love, and

Dante's conception of love are here analysed separately and then compared with the conclusion that the differences between the two only make their fundamental similarity more clearly apparent. See also *Proc Am Philos Soc* 99, 1955, 136—137 and 141—142 in the author's earlier article, *Dante, the Poet of Love* (*ibid.*, pp. 133—145).

— H. W. Meyer, *Das Verhältnis von Enthusiasmus und Philosophie bei Platon . . .* (685 *supra*). For his interpretation of the passages on eros in the *Symposium* and the *Phaedrus* see especially pp. 265—269 and pp. 272—274; and in reply to this see H. Flashar, *Der Dialog Ion . . .* (173 *supra*), p. 122, n. 2.

— R. G. Hoerber, Love or rhetoric in Plato's *Phaedrus* (687 *supra*). See also *Phronesis* 4, 1959, 25—28 in Hoerber's later article, *Plato's Lysis* (*ibid.*, pp. 15—28), on 'a threefold division of *philia*' in the *Lysis*, *Symposium*, *Phaedrus*, and *Laws*.

— R. E. Cushman, *Therapeia . . .* (15 *supra*), pp. 185—210: The rôle of love in knowledge.

— H. Flashar, *Der Dialog Ion als Zeugnis platonischer Philosophie* (173 *supra*). See especially pp. 125—134 on 'enthusiasm', eros, and anamnesis.

— W. Kranz, *Platonica* (932 *supra*), pp. 75—80. On the cosmological significance of eros as 'daemon' in the speech of Diotima.

— E. Paci, *La dialettica in Platone* (1175 *supra*), pp. 138—141: *Dialettica ed Eros*. See also in his earlier essay, *Lo stato come idea dell' uomo . . .* (789 *supra*), pp. 78—82: *Eros ed interiorità del mondo ideale; Divenire eros ed idea nello stato*.

— A. Rigobello, *L'intellettualismo in Platone* (34 *supra*), pp. 97—106.

— M. A. Aimo, *Contributi all' interpretazione del pensiero di Platone . . .* (1282 *supra*).

— C. J. Classen, *Sprachliche Deutung . . .* (1333 *supra*), pp. 147—150. Plato's 'erotic' interpretation of *φιλοσοφία* and its influence upon the language of the Platonic Socrates. See also C. Murley (1374 *supra*).

1378. J.-C. Fraisse, *Ascétisme et valeur de la vie chez Platon*, *Rev Philosophique* 149, 1959, 104—108. The authoritative asceticism of the works of political intent (*Republic*, and *Laws*) is here distinguished from the asceticism of the *Symposium*, *Phaedrus*, and *Phaedo*;

and this latter is explained as the control necessary to canalize the spontaneity of eros and thus enable it to pass from the plane of mere vitality to the pure activity of dialectic. To Plato eros was not merely a symbol of purely intellectual activity but was the expression of the conception of thought as an extension of life, which is identical with soul, the principle of all motion and organization; and Fraisse suggests that in the personality of Socrates he experienced this discipline in eros which was his initiation into the philosophic life and to which he gave expression in the speech of Alcibiades in the *Symposium*.

— J. Stannard, Socratic eros and Platonic dialectic (1179 *supra*).

— F. A. Wilford, The status of reason in Plato's psychology (1335 *supra*).

VD: The Phenomenal World

During the last three decades it has come to be the prevailing opinion that Plato in his later life altered the attitude towards the phenomenal world that he had previously held, shifted his interest more and more from the ideal to the empirical, and gave a new status in ontology and epistemology to sensible objects and to the process of becoming. Stenzel, who was himself eminently influential in giving currency to this opinion, formulated it concisely in an essay published shortly before his death and recently republished, by the very title of which he indicated what large significance he ascribed to this notion of Plato's altered attitude:

1379. J. Stenzel, *Platonismus einst und jetzt*, Festschrift für Heinrich Zangger, Zürich 1935, pp. 1025ff. (reprinted in Stenzel's *Kleine Schriften zur griechischen Philosophie*, Darmstadt 1956, pp. 345—350). Stenzel's attempt here to interpret in the sense of this altered attitude the treatment of sensation and knowledge in the *Theaetetus* is rejected by A. Preiswerk (1202 *supra* [pp. 3—19]).

Not all recent interpreters have subscribed to this prevailing opinion (see e.g. B. H. Bal, *Plato's ascèse* . . . [639 *supra*], pp. 65—70, pp. 155—156, and pp. 161—162), and one among them has maintained that in fact it reverses the direction in which Plato's interests turned (D. Grene, *Man in his pride* . . . [240 *supra*], pp. 96—103); but the influence of its acceptance can be seen in such various interpretations of Plato's later work as those by H. M. Conacher (1217 *supra*), A. J. Festugière (1000 *supra* [pp. 101—104]),

O. Regenbogen (290 *supra* [pp. 212—213 and p. 217]), and W. Theiler (1372 *supra* [pp. 65—66]) and in the assertion by D. A. Rees that one of the most noteworthy features distinguishing the later Plato from the earlier is 'the increasing regard which the physical world enjoys', an assertion which he makes despite his recognition that 'this is to be seen even in the *Republic*':

1380. D. A. Rees, *Philosophy* 29, 1954, 102—104 (in his article, Greek views of nature and the mind, *ibid.*, pp. 99—111). Rees here states that 'the growing divergence from the *Phaedo* is clearly to be seen if one examines the *Timaeus*' and that the three inseparable reasons for the change are Plato's growing interest in the physical world, the location of the soul within that world, and the theory of the soul as the source of all motion, the supreme exemplification of which is the world-soul in the *Timaeus*.

Since Plato's most detailed treatment of the phenomenal world does occur in the *Timaeus*, much of the material to be listed here is concerned with that writing and has already been mentioned in the section devoted to it. The *Theaetetus* is also sometimes involved in discussions of this subject, as has already been observed (1379 *supra*); and so is the *Philebus*, especially for the expressions *γένεσιν εἰς οὐσίαν* and *γεγενημένην οὐσίαν* there used (26 D 8 and 27 B 8—9).

— M. F. Sciacca, *La metafisica di Platone*, 1: Il problema cosmologico (987 *supra*).

— P. Thévenaz, *L'âme du monde, le devenir et la matière...* (989 *supra*).

— P. H. De Lacy, *The problem of causation...* (1201 *supra*), pp. 109—112. He contends here that the reality of the physical world is strongly emphasized in the *Philebus* and that the *Timaeus* shows a clear break with the ontology of the earlier theory of ideas (cf. 1218 *supra* [p. 452 in n. 396]).

— J. Moreau, *L'âme du monde...* (5 *supra*), pp. 3—55. See also his monograph, *Réalisme et idéalisme...* (1234 *supra*), pp. 52—62 and pp. 94—99, and his later articles, *L'idée d'univers...* (1012 *supra* [pp. 95—97]) and *Platon et le phénoménisme* (955 *supra*).

— N. Almqvist, *Platons världssjäl...* (992 *supra*), pp. 1—114.

1381. H. Leisegang, *R.-E.* I 20, 1 (1941), cols. 1144—1147, s.v. *Physis*. On Plato's rejection of the philosophy of nature and his 'Umdeutung des Wesens der Physis'. With this compare E. Frank's

remarks in Wissen, Wollen, Glauben (see 1205 *supra*), pp. 44—47, E. Grumach, *Physis und Agathon in der alten Stoa*, Berlin 1932, pp. 45—47; G. R. Morrow, *Essays in political theory presented to George H. Sabine*, Ithaca 1948, pp. 32—37; C. A. Disandro, *En torno al problema de la φύσις*, *Anales Filol Cl* (Buenos Aires), 4, 1947/1949, 183—210; R. Muth (1053 and 1371 *supra*); J. Wild (66 *supra* [pp. 138—152]); and the latest monograph on the meaning of the word φύσις as used by Plato, his contemporaries, and earlier authors: D. Holwerda, *Commentatio de vocis quae est ΦΥΣΙΣ vi atque usu praesertim in Graecitate Aristotele anteriore*, Groningae 1955 (cf. Tate, *Cl Rev N.S.* 6, 1956, 228—229; Stark, *Gnomon* 30, 1958, 153—155).

— R. Palas, *Die Bewertung der Sinnenwelt bei Platon . . .* (1209 *supra*). This is a study of the phenomenal world as it is treated by Plato not only in his ontological and epistemological theory but also in his philosophy of man, society, and the state, of women and marriage, of eros, and of art; and in addition Palas attempts a psychoanalytical explanation of the origin of Plato's negative attitude towards the sensible world, an attitude which, he maintains, continued unchanged despite Plato's increasing interest in the empirical and his attempt to close the gap between his ideal world and the sensible.

— J. B. Skemp, *The theory of motion in Plato's later dialogues* (1367 *supra*).

1382. A. Lautman, *Symétrie et dissymétrie en mathématiques et en physique / Le problème du temps*, Paris 1946 (also *Bull Soc Française Philos* 40, 1946, 1—39). On the basis of Rivaud's interpretation of the *Timaeus* he asserts that for Plato the properties of space and matter are the geometrical and physical transposition of a dialectical theory, the universe being formed of the pairs of ideal contraries, Same-Other, Symmetrical-Dissymmetrical, associated with each according to the laws of harmonious mixture, so that common participation in the same dialectical structure would give evidence of an analogy between the structure of the sensible world and that of mathematics.

— A.-H. Chroust, *The meaning of time in the Ancient World* (997 *supra*), pp. 15—28. See also the other publications listed in 1041 *supra*.

— H. Barth, *Philosophie der Erscheinung: Eine Problemgeschichte* 1 (1221 *supra*), pp. 53—123.

1383. C. Giacon, *Il divenire in Aristotele: Dottrina e testi*, Padova 1947, pp. 37—52: *Elementi del divenire in Platone*. This is a superficial résumé of Plato's doctrine, the third of three chapters introductory to the main theme of the book. In the 'testi' are given (pp. 151—164) translations of five passages from *Republic VII*, the *Sophist*, the *Timaeus*, the *Symposium*, and the *Phaedrus*.

—. J. F. Callahan, Four views of time in Ancient Philosophy (999 *supra*), pp. 3—37, pp. 188—193, and pp. 197—198. See also the other publications listed in 1041 *supra*.

—. A. Levi, *Parmenide, Platone, . . . e il problema dell' intelligibilità dell' esperienza* (216 *supra*), pp. 80—81.

—. P. Friedländer, Structure and destruction of the atom according to Plato's *Timaeus* (1001 *supra*). With this see also the articles by P. Wilpert, *Die Elementenlehre des Platon und Demokrit* (176 *supra*); by E. M. Bruins, *La chimie du Timée* (1007 *supra*); and by W. Heisenberg, *Platons Vorstellungen von den kleinsten Bausteinen der Materie . . .* (1011 *supra*).

—. J. W. Yolton, The ontological status of sense-data in Plato's theory of perception (951 *supra*).

—. E. Hoffmann, *Platon* (22 *supra*), pp. 40—51 and pp. 112—125 on Plato and the empirical world and on being and becoming.

—. C. Librizzi, I problemi fondamentali della filosofia di Platone (29 *supra*), pp. 19—39: Il problema del cosmo sensibile. See also pp. 69, 74—75, and 78—80.

—. O. Miró Quesada, *La trascendencia y la objectividad de la materia en Platón* (1004 *supra*).

—. G. R. Morrow, Necessity and persuasion in Plato's *Timaeus* (1005 *supra*). See also the passage of Morrow's earlier essay referred to in 1381 *supra* and *Journ Philos* 48, 1951, 389—390.

—. B. Noll, *Die Zeitstruktur im platonischen Dialog Theätet* (952 *supra*).

—. N. R. Murphy, The interpretation of Plato's *Republic* (791 *supra*), pp. 100—150. He argues that Plato never held a theory of 'degrees of reality' and never thought that particular physical things are in any way 'unreal' or depend for their reality upon participation in the ideas.

— H. Gauss, *Philosophischer Handkommentar* . . . (20 *supra*), I/1, pp. 63—76 and pp. 111—114. On the empirical world as 'process directed towards being' which is unattainable in the nature of things. This interpretation is closely connected with the thesis that according to Plato we have access only to the ideas in so far as they are related to the empirical world.

— Alice F. Braunlich, Plato on twentieth century physics (1010 *supra*). See also the two articles by C. E. M. Joad (1010a and 1010b *supra*).

— C. Mugler, Deux thèmes de la cosmologie grecque . . . (1013 *supra*), pp. 85—143. With this see also the articles published by Mugler in the same year, Les dimensions de l'univers platonicien . . . (1014 *supra*) and Sur quelques particularités de l'atomisme ancien (1015 *supra*).

— G. E. L. Owen, The place of the *Timaeus* in Plato's dialogues (294 *supra*), pp. 85—86. On the argument here that the disjunction of *γένησις* and *οὐσία* still propounded in the *Timaeus* was 'jettisoned in the *Laws* and its immediate predecessors' see H. Cherniss (300 *supra* [pp. 236—247] and 1043 *supra* [pp. 22—23]).

— Hedwig Conrad-Martius, Die Zeit (1017 *supra*), pp. 95—135. See also the other publications listed in 1041 *supra*.

— W. Kranz, Kosmos (1018 *supra*), pp. 30—31 and pp. 43—57.

— R. Loriaux, L'être et la forme selon Platon . . . (1167 *supra*), pp. 182—206.

— A. Manno, Il teismo di Platone (31 *supra*), pp. 103—174.

— R. Muth, Zur Frage der Erkenntnis der Naturgesetzmäßigkeit . . . (1371 *supra*), pp. 119—122. See also his article, Zum Physis-Begriff bei Platon (1053 *supra*), and compare the works listed in 1381 *supra*.

— A. Rivaud, Espace et changement dans le *Timée* de Platon (1020 *supra*).

— M. Vanhoutte, La méthode ontologique de Platon (1173 *supra*), pp. 39—41, pp. 127—128, p. 135, pp. 164—168. He contends that after the *Parmenides* sensibles are no longer regarded as 'participating' in the ideas, for 'dualism' disappears and sensibles are merely less perfect mixtures of the 'principles' which perfectly mingled produce the ideas.

— E. G. Ballard, Plato's movement from an ethics of the individual to a science of particulars (801 *supra*), pp. 29—41.

— E. Fink, Zur ontologischen Frühgeschichte von Raum-Zeit-Bewegung (1022 *supra*), pp. 163—193.

— W. K. C. Guthrie, In the beginning (1023 *supra*), pp. 104—109.

— W. Schadewaldt, Das Welt-Modell der Griechen (1026 *supra*), pp. 194—206.

1384. L. Cencillo, Hyle: Origen, concepto y funciones de la materia en el Corpus Aristotelicum, Madrid 1958. Plato's conceptions of 'space', 'receptacle', and *ἀπειρον* in relation to intelligibility and the sensible world are treated chiefly on pp. 20—31; p. 43, n. 5; pp. 49—53; pp. 68—77.

— R. E. Cushman, Therapeia . . . (15 *supra*). See especially p. 49, n. 40; pp. 116—117; p. 245; p. 277, n. 11; and with this see Cushman's earlier article, Greek and Christian views of time, pp. 254—258 (in 1041 *supra*).

— A. Rigobello, L'Intellettualismo in Platone (34 *supra*), pp. 89—90 and pp. 107—111.

1385. W. Bröcker, Platons ontologischer Komparativ, *Hermes* 87, 1959, 415—425. By 'ontological comparative' Bröcker means the expression *μᾶλλον ὢν* introduced in *Republic* 515 D and the conception implied in treating the sensible world as 'between being and non-being', 'at once being and non-being', and *καλούμενον ὢν* but not *ὄντως ὢν*. He contends that Plato himself in the *Sophist* criticized this usage, not with the intention of overcoming the distinction between the phenomenal world and the world of ideas, which he never abandoned, but in order to show that, while permissible in certain circumstances, it cannot be taken as a literal expression of ultimate philosophical seriousness. Bröcker argues that Plato was hampered in his critique by his failure to recognize 'internal perception' and by his lack of clarity concerning the nature of the existential proposition, that, while in the end there is no justification for this ontological 'grading' of intelligible and sensible, Plato persisted in it despite his own criticism of its implications, and that in exalting his newly discovered intelligible world he was performing an act of compensation for the degradation of the sensible which had already been wrought by the *φύσικοι* who preceded him.

V E: Mathematics and the 'Sciences'

a) Science and Technology (General)

1386. F. Enriques e G. Diaz de Santillana, *Platone e la teoria della scienza*, *Scientia* 51, 1932, 21—34. With some slight rearrangement of sentences this article reappeared during the same year as pp. 204—221 of the authors' book, *Storia del pensiero scientifico*, Vol. I: *Il mondo antico*, Bologna 1932. It is merely a French translation of the chapter on Plato and the Academy in this book (pp. 201—224) that was published five years later as pp. 3—30 of F. Enriques et G. de Santillana, *Histoire de la pensée scientifique V: Platon et Aristote*, Paris 1937.

1387. G. C. Field, *Plato and natural science*, *Philosophy* 8, 1933, 131—141. This is a sober refutation of the view frequently expressed in recent times that Plato was hostile to natural science and that the progress of scientific research was impeded by his malign influence. See also Field's later book (10c *supra*), pp. 32—37, pp. 54—56, pp. 185—187; and with his earlier article compare the one by C. E. M. Joad which immediately follows it, *Plato's theory of forms and modern physics* (1010b *supra*), and the later articles by Joad (1010a *supra*) and by Miss Braunlich (1010 *supra*).

1388. J. Geffcken, *Philosophie und Einzelwissenschaft in der Antike*, *Mélanges Bidez*, Bruxelles 1934, pp. 397—414. What is here briefly asserted (pp. 401—402) about Plato's rejection of specialized science and his opposition to Democritus is developed at greater length in Geffcken's comments on the *Timaeus* published during the same year (2 *supra* [pp. 143—148]).

1389. P. Brunet et A. Mieli, *Histoire des sciences: Antiquité*, Paris 1935. Though there are occasional references to Plato throughout the work (see *Index des personnes*, p. 1171), the only one of significance is that on pp. 210—213, where the authors give their general estimate of him. This is in fine that, while his interest in mathematics encouraged work in this field, his method diverted students from the observation of phenomena and arrested the development of the natural sciences which had already well begun. Of this judgment L. Robin in his review has some pertinent criticism (*Rev Ét Grecques* 49, 1936, 314). It is the misconception against which Field had protested (1387 *supra*) but which nevertheless prevails in most of the later histories of science, where in consequence Plato, if not neglected altogether, is dismissed with a few uninformative and misleading sentences or on the basis of misinformation and misinter-

pretation is paraded as the benighted and malicious enemy of scientific and technical progress.

1390. A. Diès, *Platon et la science de son temps*, Assoc. G. Budé, Congrès de Nice 1935, Paris 1935, pp. 308—328. After having surveyed recent studies of the state of technology, mathematics, and medicine in Plato's time, Diès considers briefly what influence Plato may have had upon medicine and mathematics and at greater length the use to which he put science in his own philosophy and writing.

1391. L. M. Hammond, Plato on scientific measurement and the social sciences, *Philos. Rev.* 44, 1935, 435—447. He argues that Plato's theory of measurement involves not merely the reduction of sense-qualities to the additive aspect of quantity but also by 'isomorphic mapping' the attainment of a 'Form' universal enough to preserve its mathematical character and capable of differentiating into systems embodying their own intelligible 'Form' domains not analysable in terms of instruments that are 'mathematical' in the more restricted sense and that this conception of measurement makes it possible as Plato does in the case of justice and of harmony to follow the dictum of Galileo in fields which have hitherto eluded exact scientific treatment because they were recalcitrant to analysis even in terms of numbers.

1392. G. de Santillana, *La crise du rationalisme grec*, *Thalès* 2, 1935, (Paris 1936), 183—210. Plato's conception of the nature and possibility of scientific knowledge is here analysed as a reaction to that of Democritus, whose notion of the meaning of science de Santillana supposes to be the object of criticism in *Theaetetus* 201 C 8ff. See especially pp. 207—210: *La vision platonicienne*.

— B. Farrington, *Science in antiquity* (53a *supra*), pp. 112—139; *Science and politics in the ancient world* (53b *supra*), pp. 87—147; *Greek science* (53c *supra*), Vol. 1, pp. 88—109 and 140—145; *Democritus, Plato and Epicurus* (53 *supra*). In all these writings Farrington represents Plato as 'a luminous intellect putting the lamps of knowledge out', a reactionary enemy of 'positive science' who, corrupted by his approval of the slave-society in which he lived, sought in the interests of social and economic privilege to impose upon the masses by means of deliberate falsehood and the persecution of heretics a religion which he substituted for science or identified with it. See the criticisms of Farrington's interpretation and method by I. E. Drabkin, *Cl. Weekly* 34, 1940/41, 123—125; A. Momigliano, *Journ. Roman Studies* 31, 1941, 149—157; F. M. Cornford (49 *supra*); G. C. Field, *Philosophy* 19, 1944, 49—62.

(see also 1387 *supra*, which antedates Farrington's publications); W. H. Stahl, *Cl Weekly* 44, 1950/51, 22—23; and especially L. Edelstein, *Journ Hist Ideas* 13, 1952, 579—596 (in his review-article, Recent trends in the interpretation of ancient science, *ibid.* pp. 573—604). Like Farrington the Marxians G. Thomson (63 *supra*) and G. Nadór (1252 *supra*) characterize Plato's attitude towards science as one of reactionary hostility, though Nadór sees something scientifically fruitful not only in his encouragement of mathematics but even in some aspects of the theory of ideas.

1393. L. Robin, *La classification des sciences chez Platon*, *Travaux IX^e Congrès Int Philos V*, 2, Paris 1937, 83—88 (reprinted in his book, *La pensée hellénique des origines à Épicure*, Paris 1942, pp. 361—367). Chiefly on the basis of *Philebus* 55 C—62 E Robin argues that Plato sets up a hierarchy of the sciences based upon the degree of mixture of their objects, disdaining no sort of knowledge and making mathematics the liaison or mediating term between dialectic and physics. Cf. the objection of É. Bréhier, *Les Études de philosophie antique*, Paris 1939, pp. 23—24.

— A. Rey, *La science dans l'antiquité* 3 (1051 *supra*). Save for pp. 213—227 on what is supposed to have been Socrates' own method and pp. 320—329 on the evolution of the conception of number in the second half of the fifth century Rey devotes all of pp. 213—347 to what he interprets as Plato's scientific thought. Much of this has to do, however, with the theory of ideas and the so-called idea-numbers, with participation, and with the conception of space (pp. 233—271). For Plato's attitude towards physical science generally and a comparison of it with that of Democritus and of Aristotle see pp. 228—233, pp. 241—242, pp. 272—276 (on the debt of scientific thought to Platonism), and also p. 347, pp. 420—421, p. 447, pp. 478—486. The so-called physics of the *Timaeus* is the subject of pp. 277—296, while pp. 297—319 and pp. 330—347 are devoted to Rey's interpretation of Plato's conceptions of mathematical method and of number. This volume of Rey's work was published in 1939; volumes 4 and 5 appeared after his death, the former in 1946 and the latter in 1948. Plato's astronomy is treated in the former (4, Paris 1946, pp. 37—54 and pp. 68—69), which also contains several passages on Plato's mathematics (pp. 244—253, pp. 255—266, p. 279, and pp. 291—296) as the latter does too (5, Paris 1948, pp. 125—128, pp. 130—133, pp. 214—215, and pp. 217—220).

1394. L. Edelstein, *Platonism or Aristotelianism? A contribution to the history of medicine and science*, *Bull Hist Medicine* 8,

1940, 757—769. In this judicious essay Edelstein without neglecting those aspects of Plato's attitude at variance with that of modern science shows that 'the current rejection of Platonism as anti-scientific is based on an incorrect oversimplification of Platonic thinking', that it is the scientists themselves who have appreciated the scientific trends in Plato's thought and the characteristics in it that are a stimulus to the study of nature, and that the antithesis of Plato the 'dreamer', 'philosopher', or 'metaphysical poet' and Aristotle the 'lover of facts' or 'scientist' is untenable, involving an inadequate estimate of both men.

— T. Negro, *La concezione platonica della scienza* (991 *supra*).

1395. F. Solmsen, Plato and the unity of science, *Philos Rev* 49, 1940, 566—571. Solmsen's thesis is that Plato, examining in the light of his theory of ideas the sciences existing in his time, became the first to seek out their common elements or unifying principles and that his suggestions in this matter led to important contributions to science and its methodological structure.

1396. J. Wild, Plato's theory of *τέχνη*, *Philos and Phenom Research* 1, 1940/41, 255—293. This article was reprinted as chapter 2 (pp. 45—87) of Wild's book, *Plato's theory of man*, Cambridge (Mass.) 1946, on which cf. G. Vlastos, *Philos Rev* 56, 1947, 184—193; H. Cherniss, *AJPh* 68, 1947, 259—265.

1397. A. Koyré, Galileo and Plato, *Journ Hist Ideas* 4, 1943, 400—428. See pp. 420—428 on the difference between the Platonic and the Aristotelian attitudes towards the science of nature and Galileo's belief that the new science is 'an experimental proof of Platonism'.

— A. Levi, *Parmenide, Platone, la scienza moderna e il problema dell'intelligibilità dell'esperienza* (216 *supra*).

1398. G. R. Morrow, Plato and the law of nature, *Essays in Political Theory* presented to George H. Sabine, Ithaca 1948, pp. 17—44. The primary purpose of this essay is to show how Plato developed his conception of ideal law and to argue that this theory of his was an important factor in the formulation of the Stoic doctrine of natural law; but in the course of doing this Morrow on pp. 31—37 argues that Plato like the investigators of nature before him was searching for the basic principles of the visible world, that he found these in the order of the ideas, which is purposive and beautiful as well as intelligible, and that in the *Timaeus* and the

Laws he tried to set forth in the terms of the natural science of his predecessors this new conception of *physis* which involves an idealization of the physical cosmos as an order of nature having planning intelligence for its essential ingredient. See in this connection Morrow's later essay also, Necessity and persuasion in Plato's *Timaeus* (1005 *supra*).

1399. E. Janssens, Platon et les sciences d'observation, Rev Université Bruxelles N.S. 2, 1949/50, 249—268. Plato is here represented as having ruined the foundation of experimental science by attacking 'evolutionary relativism' and 'experimental method', which according to Janssens Heraclitus had championed and Protagoras had developed, and by setting up concepts as ideas, thus taking a means to be an end. By systematizing this 'conceptualism' Aristotle fossilized science according to this interpretation of Janssens, who ultimately in view of Plato's influence in the renaissance puts the responsibility for the death of experimental science not upon Plato himself but upon 'Platonism'.

— E. J. Dijksterhuis, De mechanisering van het wereldbeeld (1002 *supra*), pp. 14—18. See also his later essay (1410 *infra*).

— B. L. van der Waerden, Ontwakende wetenschap (418 *supra*). Apart from merely casual or very general remarks (see e.g. pp. 165—168) what is said about Plato in this book concerns a few special mathematical problems (pp. 153—161, pp. 175—180, pp. 181—189, p. 202).

1400. G. Sarton, A history of science: Ancient science through the golden age of Greece, Cambridge (Mass.) 1952. The chapter entitled 'Plato and the Academy' (pp. 395—430) is a vilification of Plato's character and political intentions admittedly drawn from the works of Fite (41 *supra*), Farrington (53b *supra*), and Popper (46 *supra*); it contains practically nothing relevant to the ostensible subject of the book except the statement (p. 426) that Plato was not a man of science but a cosmologist, metaphysician, and seer and that the history of Platonism is the history of a long series of ambiguities, misunderstandings, and prevarications. Apart from casual references of a similarly derogatory nature scattered through the book, such treatment as there is of Plato's relation to science occurs in the chapter entitled 'Mathematics and astronomy in Plato's time' (pp. 431—454), the tone and profundity of which are fairly exemplified by Sarton's statements (p. 436) that 'we should . . . abandon the solution of Platonic riddles . . . to half-wits' and (p. 436, n. 16)

that 'Plato had the impudence to make a distinction between real knowledge . . . and opinions (what we would call scientific knowledge)'.

—. J.-P. Vernant, *Prométhée et la fonction technique* (765 *supra*).

1401. J. R. Buisman, *De wekker van Plato*, *Hermeneus* 24, 1952/53, 110—113. Taking the 'clock' referred to by Athenaeus (IV 174 C) to have been the origin of the water-organ and intended as an alarm to awaken the society of the Academy to study, Buisman draws extensive inferences concerning Plato's scientific originality and the life of the Academy. Against this see J. D. Meerwaldt (1402 *infra*).

1402. J. D. Meerwaldt, *Plato's nachtuurwerk*, *Hermeneus* 24, 1952/53, 189—194; 25, 1953/54, 61—70 and 162—173. Writing in opposition to Buisman's article (1401 *supra*) Meerwaldt also argues against Diels' earlier explanation of the nature and purpose of Plato's 'clock'. He contends that the real inventor of this kind of 'alarm-clock' must have been Archytas, the extent of whose influence upon Plato is the main subject of the third part of this article.

1403. L. Bourgey, *Observation et expérience chez les médecins de la Collection Hippocratique*, Paris 1953. Besides pp. 88—97 on *Phaedrus* 269 D—270 E (see 701 *supra*), see particularly pp. 143—144 and pp. 231—235 for a comparison of Plato's attitude and that of the physicians towards the possibility of scientific certainty concerning nature and the relation of scientific knowledge to *τέχνη*.

—. P.-M. Schuhl, *Remarques sur Platon et la technologie* (736 *supra*). See also his earlier article, *Science et mythe*, referred to in 1109 *supra*.

—. F. Albèrgamo, *La scienza . . .* (39e *supra*).

—. P. Friedländer, *Platon* (11a *supra*), I, pp. 97—104 = Plato (11b *supra*), I, pp. 92—98.

—. P. Mesnard, *La rencontre de Platon avec Hippocrate et les prémices de la méthode expérimentale* (702 *supra*).

1404. V. Goldschmidt, *La Ligne de la République et la classification des sciences*, *Rev Intern Philos* 9, 1955, 237—255 (see 841 *supra*). Insisting upon the 'quadripartite' interpretation and the strict correspondence of the Cave and the Line he contends that the latter provides a structural system of sciences in which the techniques of production are given a definite though inferior place and that to

this structure there corresponds a hierarchy of faculties all of which are present in the souls of all human beings; and he then attempts to establish the relation in the lower part of the Line between the techniques thus rehabilitated and the educational disciplines, music and gymnastics.

— R. Mondolfo, *La comprensión del sujeto humano . . .* (1359 *supra*). See pp. 553—556 for that aspect of Plato's thought in which is recognized the necessity for the cooperation of all technical and theoretical activities in the progressive production of human culture and pp. 503—504 and 508—511 for Plato's positive appreciation of manual skill and productivity and for his assertion of the dignity and necessary interdependence of physical and intellectual labor. See also Mondolfo's essay, *Lavoro e conoscenza . . .* (1360 *supra*), and the article by Vergez (1406 *infra*).

— R. Muth, *Zur Frage der Erkenntnis der Naturgesetzlichkeit . . .* (1371 *supra*).

— G. Nadór, *Platon und das Problem des Naturgesetzes* (1252 *supra*).

— G. Thomson, *Studies in ancient Greek society II . . .* (63 *supra*). According to this Marxian view Plato's idealism has nothing to do with science but is a metaphysical mystification of reality, 'a philosophy founded on the denial of motion and change and hence of life itself', a programme to scrap the achievements of Ionian natural philosophy and return to mythology as the remedy for the evils of the dying city-state.

— J.-H. Kühn, *System- und Methodenprobleme im Corpus Hippocraticum* (704 *supra*), pp. 34—46: *Der Seinscharakter der Wissenschaft: τέχνη ἐοῦσα*. See especially pp. 41—46 for science, τέχνη, and ἐμπεiria in Plato; and with this see also pp. 65—66 and pp. 84—97.

1405. S. Sambursky, *The physical world of the Greeks*, London 1956 (cf. G. S. Kirk, *Cl Rev N.S.* 8, 1958, 111—116). This is a translation of the original Hebrew edition, Jerusalem 1954, which I have not seen. For Plato see especially pp. 30—32, pp. 43—45, p. 49, pp. 53—55, pp. 67—68, pp. 82—84, p. 90, p. 176. Sambursky is free of the hysterical hostility to Plato so common in general accounts of this kind, though he holds that Plato by abandoning the belief that the cosmic harmony is revealed through contact with the sensible world (an assertion made in apparent oblivion of *Timaeus* 47 A—D and 90 D) distorted the Pythagorean doctrine from devel-

opment into a mathematical explanation of the physical world on the lines of modern theory and helped to delay the synthesis of the experimental method with mathematics.

1406. A. Vergez, *Technique et morale chez Platon*, *Rev Philosophique* 146, 1956, 9—15. Vergez argues that what Plato condemns is the exaltation of technique to a position of autonomy and not technique itself, to which he assigns a real rôle, contrasting the technician and the illusionist and holding that *τέχνη* properly understood implies intelligence and is not at variance with morality, for such *τέχνη* presupposes the ideas as its reference and morality itself is the technique of techniques. Hence Vergez concludes that at the very centre of Plato's philosophy can be found outlined a 'moral vision of the world' inseparable from a 'pantechnicism'. On 'technique' and morality see also J. Moreau's earlier book, not mentioned by Vergez, *La construction de l'idéalisme platonicien* (5 *supra*), p. 57, n. 1; pp. 101—138; pp. 174—203.

1407. M. Clagett, *Greek science in antiquity*, New York 1955. There are in this survey only a few casual and insignificant references to Plato, e.g. pp. 32, 35, 51, 86.

—, E. Fink, *Zur ontologischen Frühgeschichte von Raum-Zeit-Bewegung* (1022 *supra*), pp. 181—193: *Technē und Technik*. On Plato's transformation of *τέχνη* to what Fink calls a 'speculative concept' used to interpret the natural order of the world.

1408. L. Rougier, *L'évolution du concept de raison dans la pensée occidentale*, *Dialectica* 11, 1957, 306—323 (with résumés on pp. 324—326). Here on pp. 309—310 the development of Greek science is said to have been arrested by Plato's realistic theory of mathematical notions as intelligible essences to be discovered rather than as creations of the human mind and by his prejudice against practical application and the manual arts as unworthy of a free man.

1409. R. Taton (editor), *Histoire générale des sciences*, I: *La science antique et médiévale*, Paris 1957, pp. 249—257. Apart from this brief and cursory section by P.-H. Michel on Plato's mathematics, physics, and astronomy there are many casual references to Plato scattered through the volume, most of them of little or no significance. See, however, pp. 280, 281, and 288, n. 1 in the section on medicine by L. Bourgey and the remarks by L. Beaujeu on p. 311 and p. 352.

1410. E. J. Dijksterhuis, *Greek mathematics and natural science: Their meaning in the modern world*, *Acta Congressus Madvig.*

Hafn. 1954, Vol. 1, 1958, 185—197. This includes an account (pp. 189—194) of Plato's conception of mathematical entities (which Dijksterhuis takes without question as intermediate between ideas and sensibles), his explanation of mathematical judgments, his emphasis on the educational value of pure mathematics, and his influence upon the later development not only of mathematics but also of many physical sciences. Like others Dijksterhuis holds that natural science was adversely affected by a tendency of Platonism to overestimate the power of a priori reasoning and to discredit empirical research and technical application, but he also points to the persistence of Platonic influence even upon the antagonists of Platonism, who continue to denote as a 'model' the mathematical system by which they account for empirical data. See also the earlier book by Dijksterhuis (1002 *supra* [pp. 14—18]).

b) Mathematics (including Musical Mathematics)

See in III Cb *supra* the publications already referred to for the following passages in the Platonic writings:

Epinomis 990 C 5—991 B 4: P.-H. Michel (417 *supra*) and the reference there to É. des Places; B. L. van der Waerden (418 *supra* [and in the note on this item the reference to H. Koller]); P. Kucharski (419 *supra*); A. R. Lacey (420 *supra*); O. Becker (421 *supra*); N. B. Booth (422 *supra*); and F. Novotný (423 *supra*).

Euthyphro 12 D 7—10: É. de Strycker (474 *supra*).

Gorgias 451 A 7—C 5: É. de Strycker (484 *supra*).

Hippias Major 303 B: P.-H. Michel and É. de Strycker (496 *supra*).

Laws VII 819 D—820 B: P.-H. Michel and B. Einarson (562 *supra*).

Meno 82 B—85 B: D. A. Tsiribas (594 *supra*) and the references there to R. S. Brumbaugh, C. Mugler, and H. Cherniss. See further A. Szabó, *Maia* N.S. 10, 1958, 109—114.

Meno 86 D—87 B: A. Frajese, Maria Timpanaro Cardini, E. Stamatis, R. Robinson, R. S. Brumbaugh, A. Heijboer, O. Becker, and H.-P. Stahl (all in 595 *supra*). See also O. Becker, *Archiv für Begriffsgeschichte* 4, 1959, 210—212.

Phaedo 74 A—C: Dorothy Tarrant (650 *supra*); K. W. Mills (651 *supra*) with the references there to J. L. Ackrill, R. S. Bluck, W. J. Verdenius, G. Vlastos (*Philos Rev* 65, 1956, 91—92), and others.

Republic VI 510 C—511 B: K. von Fritz and A. Szabó (846 *supra*) with the references there to A. E. Taylor and Sir David Ross. See also O. Becker, *Archiv für Begriffsgeschichte* 4, 1959, 210—212.

Republic VII 525 D—526 A and 527 A—B: A. Szabó (854 *supra*) and the references there to G. Junge and B. L. van der Waerden.

Republic VII 528 B—C: A. E. Taylor (855 *supra*).

Republic VII 530 E 7—531 A 7: B. L. van der Waerden (856 *supra*); H. L. Tracy and A. Ahlvers (857 *supra*).

Republic VIII 546 B—D: A. Diès, É. de Strycker, A. Ahlvers, R. S. Brumbaugh, and M. Denkinger (all in 863 *supra*); see also O. Becker (863a *supra*) and R. S. Brumbaugh (863b and 863c *supra*).

Republic IX 587 A—588 A: R. S. Brumbaugh and G. Junge (867 *supra*).

Theaetetus 147 D 2—148 B 4: G. H. Hardy and E. M. Wright, J. H. Anderhub, C. Mugler, B. L. van der Waerden, P.-H. Michel, M. Pihl, J. Bousquet, R. S. Brumbaugh, E. Stamatis, S. Heller, G. Junge, and A. Wasserstein (all in 961 *supra*); and see R. Hackforth (959 *supra* [p. 128]).

Theaetetus 198 A—199 C: R. Hackforth (959 *supra* [pp. 137—139]), defending against H. D. P. Lee's criticism his earlier interpretation (see 973 *supra* on 197 C 1—200 C 7). With regard to the kind of number intended in this passage, concerning which Hackforth agrees with A. Wedeberg (123 *supra* [pp. 127—130]), see H. Cherniss, *A J Ph* 68, 1947, 238—239 (note 79) on W. van der Wielen (113 *supra* [pp. 24—30]).

Timaeus 35 B—36 B: O. Tiby, J. Handschin, A. Ahlvers, R. S. Brumbaugh, F. Lasserre, E. Moutsopoulos, and B. Kytzler (all in 1037 *supra*).

Of these publications those which are not exclusively concerned with the passages for which they have been cited will be listed below along with others that deal more broadly with Platonic mathematics. Some of these have already been entered in earlier sections, for they deal with Plato's mathematical theories primarily in connection with dialectic or with the theory of ideas and with the latter especially in relation to the so-called idea-numbers and the intermediate mathematics.

—. F. M. Cornford, Mathematics and dialectic in the *Republic* VI—VII (841 *supra*). See in connection with this the article by H. D. P. Lee also listed in 841 *supra*, Geometrical method and Aristotle's account of first principles. The account of analysis given in Cornford's article is criticized by R. Robinson, Analysis in Greek geometry, *Mind* N.S. 45, 1936, 464—473 (see also 1133 *supra* [pp. 172—173]). See also for Plato and the method of analysis: C. Mugler (1426 *infra* [pp. 283—356]); H. Cherniss, *Rev Metaphysics* 4, 1950/51, 418—419; A. Heijboer, *Mnem* IV 8, 1955, 106, n. 2 (595 *supra*); H.-P. Stahl (1172 *supra* [pp. 20—23]).

1411. K. von Fritz, Platon, Theaetet und die antike Mathematik, *Philologus* 87, 1932, 40—62 and 136—178. This is primarily a critique of Solmsen's earlier theory that under Platonic influence first upon Theaetet and later upon Eudoxus and his circle mathematics underwent two radical changes; but in refuting this theory von Fritz proposes important interpretations of his own, such as those concerning Plato's treatment of the five regular solids, his theory of the objects and methods of mathematics in relation to dialectic and the theory of ideas (cf. de Strycker [1174 *supra*, pp. 222—223]), and his influence upon later mathematics as opposed to that of Eudoxus. See also in 846 *supra* the reference to passages in two recent articles by von Fritz in *Archiv für Begriffsgeschichte*.

—. J. Stenzel, Zahl und Gestalt . . . (1180 *supra*). See also his essay, Anschauung und Denken in der klassischen Theorie der griechischen Mathematik (1180b *supra*).

—. J. Klein, Die griechische Logistik und die Entstehung der Algebra (1184 *supra*).

—. R. Mondolfo, L'infinito nel pensiero dei Greci, Firenze 1934, pp. 151—161: L'infinità numerica . . . in Platone. This section is reproduced without change on pp. 204—216 of the Italian edition of 1956 and on pp. 202—213 of the earlier Spanish version of this latter edition, *El infinito en el pensamiento de la antigüedad clásica* (1047 *supra*).

—. A. K. Rogers, Plato's Theory of Forms (1187 *supra*).

1412. W. Vetter, Die Musik im platonischen Staate, *Neue Jahrb für Wiss und Jugend* 11, 1935, 306—320. This article is primarily concerned with Plato's attitude towards music in its educational and aesthetic aspects and has but little to do with musical mathematics.

— W. F. R. Hardie, *A Study in Plato (610b supra)*. See pp. 35—65 on mathematical science and the ideas and on the intermediate mathematical, which Hardie insists is 'the explicit doctrine of the *Republic*'.

1413. A. T. Nicol, *Indivisible Lines*, *Cl Quart* 30, 1936, 120—126. Miss Nicol here argues that Plato's conception of the problem of continuity led him to posit the existence of indivisible lines, which she tries to fit into a process of derivation of sensible solids from the 'ultimate principles' ascribed by Aristotle to Plato, that Xenocrates made the theory generally known but confused the issue by bringing in the ideal line, and that those who did not completely understand the theory connected it with that of 'the point-atomists' as is done by the author of the *De Lineis Insecabilibus*. See on this subject W. Kranz (174 *supra* [pp. 32—33]), who takes no cognizance of Miss Nicol's article, and F. M. Cornford (599 *supra* [p. 199] and 981 *supra* [p. 212]), who refers to it with approbation; and against such interpretations of *Timaueus* 53 D 6—7 see R. Hackforth (995 *supra* [p. 34]).

— F. S. C. Northrop, *The mathematical background and content of Greek philosophy (1194 supra)*.

1414. D. A. Steele, *Über die Rolle von Zirkel und Lineal in der griechischen Mathematik, Quellen und Studien Gesch. Math.* B 3, 1936, 287—369. This is a detailed examination and analysis of the evidence to show that Plato did not restrict geometers to the use of rule and compass but censured only the use of special mechanical appliances and the abandonment of purely conceptual geometry, that there was at no time in Greek geometry a complete restriction to the use of rule and compass, and that the actual restriction as found in Aristotle and Euclid was established only with an eye to the learner and to orderly scientific presentation. See also Steele's later article (1434 *infra*).

— M. Gentile, *Nuovi studi intorno alla dottrine platonica delle idee numeri (1196 supra)*.

1415. Z. Jordan, *O matematycznych podstawach systemu Platona: Z historii racjonalizmu*, Poznan 1937, with a résumé in French, *Des fondements mathématiques du système de Platon: Un chapitre de l'histoire du rationalisme*. According to Jordan Plato, though he made no direct contribution to the content of mathematics, was the first to devote himself to the methodology of mathematics. The result of this and of his reflection upon the object of mathematical

knowledge was the doctrine of the ideality of geometrical figures leading to formulation of the fundamental theses of his philosophical doctrine and to the invention of the 'axiomatic method', which is really what is meant by the tradition that he invented 'analysis', dialectic being this method applied to philosophical problems. Jordan argues against ascribing to Plato the doctrine of indivisible lines, distinguishes two phases in the development of his theory of number, the first in opposition to the Pythagorean conception and the second leading to the notion that the essence of number is to be a 'class of relations', and contends that the successful application of mathematics to astronomy and acoustics induced Plato in later life to believe, contrary to his earlier doctrine, in the accessibility to true knowledge not only of the ideal world but of the world of sensible experience also. Thus there are two different orientations in Plato's writings, one which bases ontology and epistemology upon the ideal nature of geometrical figures and another which proposes by the application of mathematics to give the natural sciences a philosophical foundation; but the difference of these two is obscured by the fact that both have in common a conception of method derived from mathematics and not dependent for its validity upon the peculiarly Platonic epistemological and ontological theses.

1416. M. Dehn, Beziehungen zwischen der Philosophie und der Grundlegung der Mathematik im Altertum, Quellen u. Studien Gesch Math B 4, 1937/38, 1—28. See pp. 2—6 for Plato's requirement of strictly formulated mathematical definitions, his own disregard of the problem of axioms, and his rejection of 'constructions' in favor of 'theorems'.

1417. Z. Marković, Les mathématiques chez Platon et Aristote, Bull Internat Acad Yugoslave Sciences et Beaux Arts, Cl Sciences Math et Nat 32, 1939, 28—48. See also his articles, La théorie de Platon sur l'un et la dyade indéfinie . . . (118 *supra*) and Sur la théorie de la mesure de Platon (1206 *supra*).

— A. Rey, La science dans l'antiquité 3 (1051 *supra*), pp. 266—271 (on idea-numbers), pp. 297—319, and pp. 330—347 (on Plato and mathematical method, the conception of number, and the irrational). See also volume 4, Paris 1946, pp. 244—266 and pp. 291—296; volume 5, Paris 1948, pp. 125—128, pp. 130—133, and pp. 214—220.

1418. A. Frajese, I passi matematici di Platone, Boll Unione Matemat Ital 2 Ser 3 no. 1, 1940, 62—70. Some examples are here

given of the use of Platonic texts as evidence for the history of pre-Euclidean mathematics: Plato's conception of the Egyptian origin of mathematics, the suggestion that his criticism of 'probable' or 'analogical' reasoning in mathematics is a polemical reference to Democritus, and the suggestion that *Meno* 86 C—87 B refers to Leon and proves that he did invent the *diorismos*. See also 1421, 1429, and 1433 *infra*.

1419. A. M. Frenkian, *Le postulat chez Euclide et chez les modernes*, Paris 1940. See especially pp. 21—41 and pp. 46—51 where, Euclid's treatment of the postulate having been ascribed to the recognition of an irrational factor in geometry induced by its special 'matter', this notion is ultimately derived from Plato's supposed theories of idea-numbers and intermediate mathematical, the foundations of which Frenkian seeks to identify mainly in the *Philebus* but also in the *Timaeus* and the *Sophist*.

1420. P. Rucker, *Mathematik und Philosophie*, *Philos Jahrbuch* 53, 1940, 17—29 and 234—245. This contains a brief and largely derivative sketch (pp. 19—24) of the importance ascribed to mathematics by Plato and of its place in his philosophy relative to dialectic and the 'mystical experience' that Rucker thinks was meant to be the apex of the structure.

— R. Robinson, Plato's earlier dialectic (1133 *supra*). See especially pp. 107—109, 158—162, 172—176, and 202—213 in the first edition, to which in the second edition (Oxford 1953) correspond pp. 103—105, 152—156, 166—169 and 190—201.

— W. van der Wielen, *De ideegetallen van Plato* (113 *supra*). Besides the reviews of this book given in 113 *supra* cf. P. Brommer (1216 *supra*), Sir David Ross (1236 *supra* [pp. 199—202]), and K. R. Popper (175 *supra* [p. 151, n. 1]).

— K. Reidemeister, *Mathematik und Logik bei Platon* (1211 *supra*).

— E. Pastore, *Numeri logici e numeri matematici* (1214 *supra*).

— P. Brommer, *De numeris idealibus* (1216 *supra*). See also his earlier book, *ΕΙΔΟΣ et ΙΔΕΑ* (1203 *supra*), especially pp. 236—277.

1421. A. Frajese, *I dialoghi di Platone e la storia della matematica*, *Sophia* 11, 1943, 58—70. After having treated the *Meno*, *Euthydemus*, *Republic*, and *Philebus* as evidence of Plato's increasing interest in mathematics, having asserted that he was not himself

an active mathematician but that he probably influenced the general direction taken by contemporary mathematicians and that his influence upon the subsequent teaching of mathematics and upon the formation of Euclid's *Elements* was enormous, Frajese treats the *Theaetetus* as evidence for the difference in nature and spirit of the mathematical research of Theodorus and of Theaetetus. This article, reprinted with some rearrangement but no substantial modification, constitutes the bulk of what Frajese later published about Plato in his small book, *La matematica nel mondo antico* (1433 *infra*). See also 1429 *infra* and the earlier article, 1418 *supra*.

1422. G. L. Muskens, *De vocis ἀναλογίας significatione ac usu apud Aristotelem*, Groningae 1943, pp. 11—12: *De analogia in Platonis dialogis*. Compare with this K. Reidemeister, *Die Arithmetik der Griechen*, Leipzig/Berlin 1940, p. 15 = *Das exakte Denken der Griechen* (see 1211 *supra*), p. 27; and contrast the treatment of 'analogy' in Plato by P. Grenet (1144 *supra*), E.-W. Platzcek (1164 *supra*), and W. Veauthier (1254 *supra*).

1423. E. W. Beth, *De wijsbegeerte der wiskunde van Parmenides tot Bolzano*, Antwerpen/Nijmegen 1944, pp. 29—56: *Plato*. In this account of Plato's philosophy of mathematics Beth follows O. Becker in distinguishing an earlier period in which, the emphasis being put upon 'anamnesis', mathematics was taken by Plato as the prototype of philosophy and a later period in which his chief concern was the notion of *στοιχείωσις*, the building up of a systematic structure from ultimate principles. Of this the final stage is taken to be the theory of idea-numbers, the presentation of which in Aristotle's *De Bono* Beth follows Wilpert in supposing to be preserved by Sextus in *Adv. Math.* X, 248—280. On this last see also Beth's article published in 1948 (115a *supra* [pp. 113—117]) as well as his later article (115 *supra*) in *British Journ Philos Science* 3, 1952/53, 58—81, now republished without substantial change in his book, *The foundations of mathematics* (Amsterdam 1959), pp. 3—30, where pp. 12—18 = pp. 68—75 of the article, the main sections on Plato and on Aristotle's criticism.

1424. T. Greenwood, *Plato and Aristotle: A contrast between their mathematical outlooks*, *New Scholast* 18, 1944, 262—269. He defends Aristotle's view of mathematics against that of Plato. See his later articles in 1436 *infra*.

—. W. Jaeger, *Paideia* (4 *supra*) II, pp. 235—237 and III, pp. 25—35.

1425. A. Speiser, *Die Grundlagen der Mathematik von Plato bis Fichte*, *Eranos-Jahrbuch* 14, 1946 (published 1947), 11—38. Only pp. 12—16 have to do directly with Plato, and these are based primarily upon Speiser's interpretation of the second part of the *Parmenides*. See the similar remarks in his later book, *Elemente der Philosophie und der Mathematik* (Basel 1952), pp. 25—27, listed with other publications of his on the *Parmenides* in 610 *supra*, and both of his articles listed in 1219 *supra*: *Platons Ideenlehre und die Mathematik*, published in 1942, and the later article, *Platos Ideenlehre*.

— P. Grenet, *Les origines de l'analogie philosophique dans les dialogues de Platon* (1144 *supra*), pp. 100—163: Transposition de l'analogie mathématique. See besides the reviews of this book in 1144 *supra* the references in 1422 *supra*.

— H. W. B. Joseph, *Knowledge and the Good in Plato's Republic* (787 *supra*), pp. 46—60: Mathematics and the dialectic. On this see especially the review by Wick in 787 *supra*.

— G. Junge, *Platos Ideen-Zahlen* (110 *supra*). See also his later article, *Von Hippasus bis Philolaus . . .* (1276 *supra*). Junge's earlier article, *Die Sphären-Harmonie und die pythagoreisch-platonische Zahlenlehre* (235c *supra*), touches upon some of the mathematical passages in Plato but more closely concerns his astronomy.

1426. C. Mugler, *Platon et la recherche mathématique de son époque*, Strasbourg/Zürich 1948 (cf. D. J. Allan, *Cl Rev* 64, 1950, 112—113; É. de Strycker, *Ant Cl* 19, 1950, 254—256; H. Cherniss, *Rev Metaphysics* 4, 1950/51, 395—425). The thesis of this book, the conclusions of which depend for the most part upon misinterpretation of the Greek texts, neglect of relevant evidence, and untenable or inconsistent notions concerning the Platonic dialogues, is that Plato was a productive mathematician for whom mathematics was more often the end of metaphysical reflection than its point of departure. Mugler contends that Plato 'dematerialized' the foundations of geometry, made fruitful innovations in the theory of geometrical similarity¹, introduced into the physical sciences the principle of economy, looked forward to a non-Euclidean geometry by means of which the contradictions between cosmological finitude and the

¹) This is the subject of chapter 2 (pp. 47—108), the substance of which is contained in an article published earlier in German:

1426a. K. Mugler, *Platon und die geometrische Ähnlichkeitslehre*, *Hermes* 76, 1941, 321—338.

implications of parallelism would be resolved, inspired Theaetetus to try to reconcile Theodorus' conception of the irrational with the Pythagorean conception because he hoped thus to find a mathematical demonstration of his theory of becoming as a projection of being, and, when disappointed by the failure of Theaetetus to achieve this result, anticipated the ultimate solution himself by the mythical representation of the relation between time and eternity, a conception which at the same time made possible the formulation of the geometrical method of analysis.

—. W. Bröcker, Plato über das Gute (107 *supra*). Being primarily an attempt to reconstruct the theory of idea-numbers, this article is largely concerned with Plato's conception of number and with hypotheses concerning possible methods, Platonic and Platonistic, for deriving the number-series from ultimate principles.

1427. J. L. Coolidge, The mathematics of great amateurs, Oxford 1949, pp. 1—18: Plato. After examining the mathematical passages Coolidge grants Plato a 'bowing acquaintance' with all the pure mathematics of his time but clearly does not believe that he had true understanding of the subject.

—. O. Tiby, Note musicologiche al *Timeo* di Platone (1037 *supra*). Although the major part of this article is devoted to the interpretation of *Timaeus* 35 B—36 B (cf. R. P. Winnington-Ingram, *Lustrum* 3, 1958, 25), *Timaeus* 41 D, 47 D, 67 B—C, and 80 A—B are also commented on briefly by Tiby, who argues that Plato adopted without reserve the Pythagorean attitude towards music, that the passages here given contain the quintessence of the physico-acoustical knowledge of antiquity, and that this knowledge was vague, confused, and erroneous.

—. P. Wilpert, Zwei aristotelische Frühschriften über die Ideenlehre (111 *supra*). See especially pp. 157—172: Ideen und Zahlen, and pp. 202—221: Der Aufbau des Wirklichen, most of which has to do with the derivation of the idea-numbers from the ultimate principles.

1428. P. Zervos, *Tà μαθηματικά παρὰ Πλάτωνι, Πρακτικά Ἀκαδ Ἀθηνῶν* 24, 1949 (published 1951), 153—164. This is a general lecture, ascribing to Plato practically all the principles of modern mathematics, repeating all the old clichés, and adding nothing of significance. See also 1431 *infra*.

—. É. de Strycker, Trois points obscurs de terminologie mathématique chez Platon, *Rev Ét Grecques* 63, 1950, 43—57: Les nombres

scalènes et isocèles (474 *supra*), La logistique (484 *supra*), Les quantités en rapport (in 863 *supra*).

1429. A. Frajese, Sul significato dei postulati euclidei, *Scientia* 85, 1950, 299—305. See pp. 303—305 for Plato's influence on Euclid, the former's theory of the existence of mathematical entities, and the relation between this and his notion of theoretic contemplation on the one hand and the geometer's constructions and postulates on the other. The French translation of this article printed in the Supplément to this volume of *Scientia* (pp. 125—131) was reprinted without change the next year as an article in *Archives Internat Hist Sciences* 4 (*Archeion* 30), 1951, 383—392. The original Italian was reprinted with scarcely any change in Frajese's small book, *La matematica nel mondo antico* (1433 *infra*), pp. 87—97, the passage on Euclid and Plato occupying pp. 94—97.

— E. Hoffmann, *Platon* (22 *supra*), pp. 52—64: *Platon und die Mathematik*.

1430. P.-H. Michel, *De Pythagore à Euclide: Contribution à l'histoire des mathématiques préeuclidiennes*, Paris 1950 (cf. A. Rome, *Rev Philos Louvain* 49, 1951, 246—249; É. de Strycker, *Ant Cl* 21, 1952, 530—533; E. J. Dijksterhuis, *Centaurus* 3, 1953/54, 248—253). See for Plato especially pp. 75—77, pp. 184—186, and pp. 261—263 (summaries of his life and of his connection with mathematics and mathematicians and collections of mathematical passages in his works and the problems touched upon by him); pp. 455—481 (the evolution of the theory of irrationals from the beginnings to Euclid); pp. 498—522 (Plato and the irrationals); and pp. 635—637 (Reflection on principles and methods). Michel gives a compilation or at best a critical synthesis of earlier scholarship rather than an original interpretation of the primary sources. Moreover, he considers no publication later than 1946 and unfortunately has overlooked or neglected much that was published before that date.

— K. R. Popper, *The open society and its enemies* (46 *supra*), pp. 525—531. This extensive supplement of note 9 to chapter 6 made in the second edition (Princeton 1950) was amplified by Popper in an article published two years later, *The nature of philosophical problems . . . : Plato and the crisis in early Greek atomism* (175 *supra*); and the thesis of this article he has restated and sought to corroborate in an Addendum to the third edition of his book, *The open society . . .* (London 1957), Vol I, p. 319.

—. B. L. van der Waerden, *Ontwakende wetenschap* (418 *supra*), pp. 153—161, pp. 175—180, pp. 181—189.

1431. P. Zervos, *Αἱ μαθηματικαὶ ἔννοιαι παρὰ Πλάτωνι, Πρακτικὰ Ἀκαδ. Ἀθηνῶν* 25, 1950 (published 1952), 344—358. What has been said of 1428 *supra* holds also for this lecture, which differs from that earlier one only in being somewhat more detailed and specific.

1432. J. Dieudonné, *L'évolution de la pensée mathématique dans la Grèce ancienne*, Bull Assoc Budé 3 Sér 2, juin 1951, 6—18. He holds (pp. 14—15) that Plato probably got his 'essential conceptions' from mathematics, which fascinated him but in which he was himself never more than an amateur.

1433. A. Frajese, *La matematica nel mondo antico*, Roma 1951. See chapter 4 (pp. 55—74): Platone e la matematica greca nel IV secolo; pp. 94—97: Euclide e Platone; pp. 106—111: Un celebre brano del 'Teeteto'; pp. 111—116: I poliedri regolari e il 'Timeo' with an appendix on Plato and the semi-regular polyhedra. The main part of chapter 4 and pp. 108—111 are reprinted with slight verbal accommodations from Frajese's article, *I dialoghi di Platone...* (1421 *supra*), while pp. 94—97 are taken from his article, *Sul significato dei postulati euclidei* (1429 *supra* [pp. 303—305]). See also Frajese's earlier article, 1418 *supra*.

—. P. Kucharski, *La musique et la conception du réel dans le 'Philèbe'* (117 *supra*). With this see especially Kucharski's recent article, *Le 'Philèbe' et les 'Éléments harmoniques' d'Aristoxène* (Rev Philosophique 149, 1959, 41—72), where he tries to connect with the conception of idea-numbers the methods of contemporary musical research, the references to which in the *Philebus* he holds to be illuminated by the treatise of Aristoxenus. See also Kucharski's article, *Les principes des Pythagoriciens et la dyade de Platon* (1287 *supra*).

—. N. R. Murphy, *The interpretation of Plato's Republic* (791 *supra*), pp. 164—178, pp. 188—193; and pp. 195—197.

—. Sir David Ross, *Plato's theory of ideas* (1236 *supra*). See especially pp. 176—224 on the supposed theory of idea-numbers; on the intermediate mathematics see pp. 25, 58—67, 86, 177, 223—224 (cf. J. L. Ackrill, *Mind* N.S. 62, 1953, 553—554; J. Tate, *Cl Rev* N.S. 3, 1953, 94).

1434. D. A. Steele, *A mathematical reappraisal of the Corpus Platonicum*, *Scripta Mathematica* 17, 1951, 173—189. Steele here

presents fifteen topics in support of his thesis that Plato philosophized from a profound knowledge of advanced mathematics, and he then argues that Plato's view of mathematics is in closer accord with the mathematics of the current decade than is the Aristotelian and quantitative view. See also Steele's earlier article (1414 *supra*).

— A. Ahlvers, *Zahl und Klang bei Platon* (178 *supra*). See for this monograph also *Republic* VIII 546 B—D (863 *supra*), *Timaeus* 35 B—36 B (1037 *supra*), *Timaeus* 53 C4—57 D6, and the reviews by Trevaskis and by Winnington-Ingram there cited.

1435. J. Bousquet, *Le trésor de Cyrène* (Fouilles de Delphes, II: Topographie et Architecture), Paris 1952, pp. 79—98: *Le trésor de Cyrène et les mathématiques au temps de Platon* (and the conclusion: pp. 99—104). See on this the remarks in 961 *supra* and the review by R. Martin, *Rev Ét Grecques* 67, 1954, 273—278 (especially pp. 276—277). In the following year Bousquet in similar fashion tried to establish a connection between mathematical formulations in Plato's cosmology and the plan of the theatre at Epidaurus (the circular orchestra and the rows of seats divided by the diazoma in extreme and mean ratio): *Harmonie au théâtre d'Épidaure*, *Rev Archéologique* 6 Sér 41, 1953, 41—49.

— H. Gauss, *Philosophischer Handkommentar . . .* (20 *supra*), 1/1, pp. 84—94.

1436. T. Greenwood, *Euclid and Aristotle*, *Thomist* 15, 1952, 374—403. He argues here that Euclid constructed his *Elements* not under the influence of Platonism but under that of Aristotelian logic. Greenwood subscribes to the cliché that a 'qualitative interpretation of quantity' is Aristotelian whereas a 'quantitative interpretation of quality' is a Platonic ideal. Two years later he published an article in which he argued that Aristotle did not regard mathematics as 'merely abstractions' and that his conceptions are closer to modern mathematics than are Plato's (*Thomist* 17, 1954, 84—94). See Greenwood's earlier article (1424 *supra*), and contrast the argument of D. A. Steele (1434 *supra*).

— Concetta Orsi, *La dottrina plotiniana del numero e le sue premesse storiche* (1237 *supra*).

1437. E. Stamatis, *Ἀριθμοὶ τέλειοι, πλεονεξοί, διαμετρικοί: ἡ $\sqrt{2}$* , *ΠΛΑΤΩΝ* 4, 1952, 289—297. Plato is here treated among others in what Stamatis calls the Pythagorean method of the side and diagonal numbers. See also the earlier article by Stamatis cited in 595 *supra* and the later ones by him cited in 961 *supra*.

— E. W. Beth, The prehistory of research into foundations (115 *supra*). This is reprinted in his book, The foundations of mathematics (Amsterdam 1959). See also 1423 *supra*.

1438. J. Dewaele, Une genèse difficile: La notion de 'rythme', Archives Internat Hist Sciences 6 (Archeion 32), 1953, 420—429. He reviews the various senses and contexts in which Plato speaks of rhythm and concludes that, having failed to subtract the aspect of 'movement', Plato never saw that rhythm is a disposition of times and durations (pp. 421—423). He then considers and criticizes Aristotle's conception, and asserts finally that it was Aristoxenus who gave 'rhythm' the meaning that it has for us. For his notion of the development from Plato through Aristotle to Aristoxenus see pp. 424—425 and pp. 426—427.

— G. Martin, Platons Lehre von der Zahl und ihre Darstellung durch Aristoteles (119 *supra*). See also his later monograph, Klassische Ontologie der Zahl (120 *supra*), especially pp. 17—29.

— P. Merlan, From Platonism to Neoplatonism (121 *supra*). See especially pp. 10—52, p. 174, and p. 186 on the 'intermediate mathematical', with which Merlan insists upon identifying the soul as intermediate. The intermediacy of mathematical and aspects of the theory of idea-numbers are also involved throughout the argument of Merlan's earlier article, Aristotle's unmoved movers (1220 *supra*).

1439. O. Becker, Grundlagen der Mathematik in geschichtlicher Entwicklung, Freiburg/München 1954. For Plato see especially pp. 78—81, pp. 95—96, pp. 109—118. In connection with these passages see the brief remarks on Plato in Becker's later monograph, Das mathematische Denken der Antike (Göttingen 1957), pp. 16—18, pp. 85—86, and p. 94. In the year in which this latter monograph appeared Becker also published Zwei Untersuchungen zur antiken Logik (114 *supra* [see also 421 *supra*]), in the first part of which he tried to defend and to corroborate the interpretation of the idea-numbers that he had proposed in 1931. See besides that earlier article, cited in 114 *supra*, Becker's remarks in Quellen u. Studien Gesch Math B 3, 1936, 237—238 and 243 (Plato and the axiom of continuity) and 545—553 (Plato and the doctrine of 'even and odd').

1440. R. S. Brumbaugh, Plato's mathematical imagination, Bloomington (Indiana) 1954 (cf. B. Einarson, Cl Phil 50, 1955, 198—200; A. Boyce Gibson, Rev Metaphysics 9, 1955/56, 57—70; H. G. Apostle, Journ Philos 53, 1956, 415—418; O. Becker, Gnomon 28, 1956, 225—226; R. C. Taliaferro, New Scholast 31,

1957, 254—263). The author states that the main object of his inquiry is 'Platonic mathematics as it is revealed in mathematical imagery'. He expressly excludes from consideration the mathematics about which Plato talks and limits himself to passages in which mathematics appears as illustrating the subject under discussion. Such passages, grouped in five chapters, are subjected to an imaginative analysis consisting largely in reconstruction of the diagrams which the author assumes Plato had designed for the purpose of clarifying his text. To the chief passages treated reference has already been made in the appropriate places in **III Cb** *supra*. In the first chapter these are what Brumbaugh calls 'Examples from pure mathematics of methods and class-relations': *Euthyphro* 12 D 5—10, *Meno* 82 B—85 B (594 *supra*), *Meno* 86 D—87 B (595 *supra*) and *Theaetetus* 147 D 2—148 B 4 (961 *supra*). The second chapter, called 'Social statistics: arithmetic detail', is devoted to Atlantis and its institutions (372 *supra* [cf. 373 *supra*]) and to the social institutions of the *Laws*. In the third chapter, entitled 'geometric metaphor', Buchanan's notion of verbal matrices is applied to *Sophist* 265 E 5—266 D 7 and to the mathematical imagery in the *Republic*, mainly 424 A 4—B 1, 509 D—511 D (844 *supra*), 546 B—D (863 *supra*), 587 A—588 A (867 *supra*), 614 A—621 B; and the fourth chapter, called 'Algebraic metaphor', is concerned primarily with *Timaeus* 35 B—36 B (1037 *supra*), 46 A 2—C 6, and 53 C 4—55 C 6. The fifth chapter deals with Plato's mathematical jokes exemplified by *Republic* 534 D 3—6 and 580 C 9—D 5, *Symposium* 190 A 8—B 3, and *Politicus* 266 A 1—C 6. There is further consideration of Plato's mathematics, especially from the point of view of Aristotle's criticism of it, in Brumbaugh's article, Aristotle as a mathematician, *Rev Metaphysics* 8, 1954/55, 379—393.

— E.-W. Platzcek, *Von der Analogie zum Syllogismus* (1164 *supra*). See especially pp. 47—62 (Sokratische und geometrisch-platonische Analogie in Platons Beweisverfahren), and compare the references in 1422 *supra*.

1441. E. P. Wolfer, *Eratosthenes von Kyrene als Mathematiker und Philosoph*, Groningen 1954 (cf. O. Becker, *Gnomon* 27, 1955, 324—326). See pp. 4—19 on the rôle of Eratosthenes in the tradition concerning Plato and the 'Delian problem'. On this cf. besides Becker's review the article by D. A. Steele (1414 *supra*), of which Wolfer seems not to have taken account.

— D. A. Tsiribas, *Ὁ Σωκράτης διδάσκων γεωμετρίαν* (594 *supra*). This contains besides a commentary on *Meno* 82 B—85 B general

remarks on the nature, methods, and purpose of the Platonic teaching of geometry.

1442. G. Hauser, *Geometrie der Griechen von Thales bis Euklid*, Luzern 1955, pp. 127—138. This is a brief sketch in which Plato's effective influence in encouraging mathematical study is asserted and his original productivity as a geometer is denied, although in pronouncing the latter judgment Hauser at the end wavers in deference to the argument of Mugler's book (1426 *supra*).

— A. Wedberg, Plato's philosophy of mathematics (123 *supra*).

— G. Martin, *Klassische Ontologie der Zahl* (120 *supra*). See also his earlier article (119 *supra*). Both of these are concerned primarily with the theory of intermediate mathematical and of ideal numbers limited to ten. Martin, like Wedberg (123 *supra*), does not discuss the supposed identification of all ideas with numbers.

1443. C. Mugler, *Σύμμετρος* chez Platon, *Ant Cl* 25, 1956, 21—28. He contends that Plato uses the word to mean not only 'commensurable' but also 'having the same order of magnitude' (*Meno* 76 D, *Theaetetus* 156 D, *Timaeus* 67 C) and 'constituting a common limit' (see on *Timaeus* 73 B 5 — C 6 in III Cb *supra*).

1444. C. Mugler, La formule mathématique *πλήθει καὶ μεγέθει* chez Platon, *Ant Cl* 25, 1956, 28—31.

— O. Becker, Zum Problem der platonischen Idealzahlen (114 *supra*). See also 1439 *supra* for this and other publications of Becker's on Plato's mathematics.

1445. E. M. Bruins, Platon et la table égyptienne $2/n$, *Janus* 46, 1957, 253—263. He contends that *Laws* 819 A 8 — C 7 and the 'table $2/n$ ' of the Rhind Papyrus are mutually explanatory and that Plato meant to describe the method used by the Egyptians to obtain the relations between fractions.

— É. de Strycker, La distinction entre l'entendement (*dianoia*) et l'intellect (*nous*) dans la *République* de Platon (1174 *supra*).

1446. C. Mugler, *ἔξις, σχέσις* et *σχῆμα* chez Platon, *Rev Ét Grecques* 70, 1957, 72—92. Having first discussed the various applications of these three words and their relation to one another (pp. 72—78), Mugler raises the question whether *ἔξις* is applicable to Plato's universe and in what sense (pp. 78—82). This leads him to argue that *Timaeus* 73 A requires emendation (pp. 82—87 [see 1056

supra]). The third section of the article deals with the geometrical meaning of *σχῆμα* and ends with discussion of two passages in the commentary on Euclid by Proclus.

1447. C. Mugler, Sur l'histoire de quelques définitions de la géométrie grecque et les rapports entre la géométrie et l'optique I: La ligne droite: *τάσις, ἐπιπρόσθησις, ἐλάχιστον*, Ant Cl 26, 1957, 331—345. On three definitions of straight line, the first using the figure of the taut cord, the second an 'optical' definition, and the third a phoronomic definition, all three of which according to Mugler are combined in the myth of Er, whereas the first dominates the terminology of the *Meno*, the second, formulated by Plato himself, appears in the *Parmenides*, and the third is that adopted by Euclid. In connection with the second Mugler assumes here (p. 335) the emendation of *Parmenides* 137 E 3—4 that he had proposed in the preceding year (see 631 *supra*) but which is rejected as both unnecessary and linguistically unacceptable by J. Tréheux, Rev Ét Grecques 70, 1957, 356—360.

— F. Novotný, De Platonis miraculo geometrico (423 *supra*). Although this article is primarily concerned with *Epinomis* 990 C—991 A, it also contains a conspectus of the passages in the Platonic corpus that have to do with geometry.

— G. Junge, Von Hippasus bis Philolaus: Das Irrationale und die geometrischen Grundbegriffe (1276 *supra*). See also his earlier article, Platos Ideen-Zahlen (110 *supra*).

— F. Lasserre, Nombre et connaissance dans la préhistoire du Platonisme (1277 *supra*), pp. 22—26.

1448. C. Mugler, Sur l'histoire de quelques définitions de la géométrie grecque . . . II: La surface: *χρόα, ἐπιφάνεια, πέρας*, Ant Cl 27, 1958, 76—91. He argues here that the Pythagoreans identified surface with color, the school of Parmenides defined it as that by which *ἐπιφάνεται* an opaque body bathed in light, and the Atomists defined it as the limit between the plenum and the void, and that Plato then, having replaced the plenum of solid bodies by an interior void, made surface a geometrical entity of two dimensions, a conception ratified by the definitions of Euclid, I, 5 and XI, 1 and 2.

— A. Rigobello, L'intellettualismo in Platone (34 *supra*), pp. 84—91. On what he calls the mathematical phase of Plato's thought, the final consequence of 'horizontal analysis', and on the theory of idea-numbers, which he connects with the *Philebus*.

1449. Alda Barbieri, *Epicuro e le conquiste matematiche-astronomiche*: significato di una polemica, *Epicurea in memoriam Hectoris Bignone*, Genova 1959, pp. 73—88. The topic of this essay is the polemic of Epicurus against the mathematical astronomy of Eudoxus; but see pp. 78—79 on Plato's attitude towards number and mathematics and pp. 80—82 on the cosmological and theological theories derived by Platonists and Aristotelians from the new mathematical astronomy.

1450. H. Koller, *Harmonie und Tetraktys*, *Mus Helvet* 16, 1959, 238—248. This article purports to clarify the musico-geometrical background of *Epinomis* 991 A 1 — B 4, of *Republic* 400 A 4—7, and of the psychogony, cosmic intervals, and structure of the elementary bodies in the *Timaeus*; it concludes with a schematic account of the development of the meaning of *ἀσχυρία*.

—. P. Kucharski, *Les principes des Pythagoriciens et la dyade de Platon* (1287 *supra*). With this see the other articles by Kucharski mentioned in 1287 *supra*. There is little of consequence for Platonic mathematics in his article, *L'idée d'infini en Grèce*, *Revue de Synthèse* 34, 1954, 5—19.

1451. E. Moutsopoulos, *La musique dans l'œuvre de Platon*, Paris 1959. This is meant to be an exhaustive study of the subject in all its aspects including the milieu in which Plato's musical doctrines were formed, their development, the influences that affected them, and the way in which Plato absorbed and integrated these influences. The body of the book is divided into five parts: the technical foundations of musical creation, the dance, musical education, musical aesthetics, and the conception of harmony and the cosmos. It is in this last section (pp. 321—385) and especially in pp. 348—352 and pp. 363—385 that Plato's musical mathematics is discussed, but see in this connection also pp. 46—66 on Plato's rejection of musical empiricism in favor of harmonic science.

c) Astronomy, Geography, Cosmology

Among the studies of Plato's astronomy published during the thirties by far the most important is F. M. Cornford's in his translation and commentary of the *Timaeus*, Plato's cosmology (981 *supra* [pp. 72—93 and pp. 106—137]); and of earlier discussions of the subject I mention here only two, both apparently published too late for Cornford's consideration:

1452. A. E. Taylor, A note on Plato's astronomy, *Cl Rev* 49, 1935, 53—56. He here reaffirms his contention that Plato in the *Timaeus* gives the central earth an undefined motion which is not the diurnal revolution whereas in the *Laws* and the *Epinomis* he gives it real diurnal revolution, making it a planet among the other planets, and indicates his reason for not accepting the scheme of Eudoxus. See also Taylor's notes on pp. 242—243 of his posthumous translation of the *Epinomis* (409 *supra*).

1453. É. des Places, Platon et l'astronomie chaldéenne, *Mélanges Franz Cumont*, Bruxelles 1936, 1, pp. 129—142. See especially pp. 133—139 for the argument that despite details of expression the astronomical doctrine of the *Epinomis* is in accord with that of the *Laws* and the *Timaeus* and that therefore Plato in his later years had come under the influence of Chaldean astronomy. For the astronomy of the *Epinomis* as des Places interprets it see also pp. 102—103 and pp. 123—128 of his recent edition and translation of that dialogue (408 *supra*).

1454. W. A. Heidel, The frame of the ancient Greek maps, New York 1937, pp. 81—85: Plato on the sphericity of the earth. See also pp. 92—102 on the possible origins of Plato's and Aristotle's conceptions of the shape and size of the earth.

1455. A. Schmekel, Die positive Philosophie in ihrer geschichtlichen Entwicklung I: Forschungen zur Philosophie des Hellenismus, Berlin 1938, pp. 129—147. This volume was published posthumously, and the section here cited must have been written many years before the death of the author in 1934, for none of the scholarship of this century is considered in it. Schmekel here confines himself to upholding the thesis that in both the *Timaeus* and the *Laws* the earth revolves as a planet in the immediate vicinity of the empty centre of the cosmos and that the notorious remark of Theophrastus refers only to a subsequent transposition of the planetary orbits with those of earth and moon located between those of Venus and Mars.

1456. F. Enriques et G. de Santillana, Histoire de la pensée scientifique VI: Mathématiques et astronomie de la période hellénique, Paris 1939. This is for the most part merely a French translation of three chapters (pp. 247—302) in the authors' earlier book, *Storia del pensiero scientifico*, Vol. I (see 1386 *supra*); but, while this is true of the section (pp. 34—35) on the shape and dimensions of the earth according to Plato and Aristotle (= pp. 273—274 of the Italian original), the section on Plato's astronomy entitled *L'académie et les hypothèses astronomiques* (pp. 58—63) is new, replacing a few

sentences on p. 290 of the Italian work, as is also the note on the chronology of Eudoxus (p. 63, note 1).

— A. von Salis, *Die Gigantomachie am Schilde der Athena Parthenos* (694 *supra*). With this see also the other references in 694 *supra* for the controversy concerning the astronomical or cosmological interpretation of *Phaedrus* 246 E 4—247 C 2.

— N. Almqvist, *Platons världssjäl och Aristoteles' gudsbegrepp* . . . (992 *supra*). See especially pp. 163—179 and pp. 317—341.

— H. J. Pos, *De Kosmologie in Plato's Timaios* (993 *supra*). See particularly pp. 44—45.

1457. G. L. Andrisi, *Una nuova interpretazione di alcuni brani di Platone che esclude in Platone ogni ipotesi sulla reale rotazione diurna della terra*, *Atti secondo Cong Unione Matematica Ital*, Roma 1942, pp. 912—920. See 563 *supra* and the note on 1047 *supra*, where there is reference also to another article by Andrisi published in the same year, *Su alcuni punti controversi dell' astronomia antica*, *Scientia* 72, 1942, 1—13. In this article he argues that axial rotation of the earth was never asserted by Plato but was first explicitly posited by Heraclides Ponticus.

— J. B. Skemp, *The theory of motion in Plato's later dialogues* (1367 *supra*), pp. 68—73 and pp. 79—81. See also his later book, *Plato's Statesman* . . . (732 *supra*), pp. 238—239, where he questions the reasons given in the earlier work (pp. 69—70) for Plato's having ignored the scheme of Eudoxus. Skemp here assumes as secure for Eudoxus a chronology that has in fact been discredited (see 186 *supra*). L. A. Post in reviewing the earlier book (*A J Ph* 65, 1944, 301) seems to believe that Plato not only rejected the scheme of Eudoxus but did so in favor of the epicycles of Mercury and Venus proposed by Heraclides.

— R. von Erhardt and Erika von Erhardt-Siebold, *The helix in Plato's astronomy* (1045 *supra*).

— H. Cherniss, *Aristotle's criticism of Plato and the Academy* 1 (1218 *supra*), pp. 540—564.

— J. Bidez, *Eos* . . . (241 *supra*). For supposed oriental elements in Plato's astronomy see especially pp. 47—49 and Appendice I (the myth of Er), pp. 60—65 (the myth of the *Phaedrus*), pp. 66—67 (the myth of the *Politicus* and 'endless recurrence'), pp. 81—86 (the *Timaeus*), and pp. 94—95 (the *Epinomis*, which Bidez ascribes to Philip of Opus).

—. Julia Kerschensteiner, *Platon und der Orient* (242 *supra*), pp. 147—151, pp. 180—187, and pp. 194—200.

—. E. Tièche, *Atlas als Personifikation der Weltachse* (873 *supra*), pp. 78—85.

—. P. Boyancé, *Les muses et l'harmonie des sphères* (228b *supra*). See with this Boyancé's later article, *Note sur la tétractys*, *Ant Cl20*, 1951, 421—425 (see 366 *supra*).

—. A. Rey, *La science dans l'antiquité* 4, Paris 1946 (see 1051 *supra*), pp. 37—54 and pp. 68—69.

—. G. Junge, *Die Sphären-Harmonie und die pythagoreisch-platonische Zahlenlehre* (235c *supra*).

—. A. J. Festugière, *Platon et l'Orient* (243 *supra*), pp. 15—22 and pp. 24—31.

—. J. O. Thomson, *History of Ancient Geography* (379a *supra*). Besides pp. 90—93 on Atlantis see pp. 103—104 and pp. 113—116.

1458. C. Mugler, *L'infini cosmologique chez les Grecs et chez nous*, *Lettres d'Humanité* 8, 1949, 43—66. See pp. 61—62 where emphasis is laid upon Plato's theory of the axial rotation of the 'fixed stars', a bold conception the fruitfulness of which Mugler holds was nullified by Plato's resolute belief in an unique and geocentric universe. Apart from this the essay contains little of significance concerning Plato's astronomy and cosmology. To these Mugler devotes a chapter in his later monograph, *Deux thèmes de la cosmologie grecque...* (1013 *supra* [pp. 85—143]), in connection with which see also his article on the dimensions of Plato's universe (1014 *supra*).

—. L. Alfonsi, *Taleta e l'Egizio* (248 *supra*).

1459. H. G. Gundel, *Vom Werden und Wesen des antiken Weltbildes*, *Die Welt als Geschichte* 11, 1951, 65—82. The passage here on Plato (p. 71 and pp. 72—73) is merely a brief résumé of the somewhat fuller section on Plato in the article, *Planeten*, prepared by H. Gundel from material left by his father, W. Gundel, and published the same year in *R. E.* XX/2, 1950, cols. 2057, 50—2059, 32.

—. M. K. Munitz, *One universe or many?* (1008 *supra*).

—. A. S. Ferguson, *The Platonic choice of lives* (1311 *supra*), pp. 18—24. This is an interesting excursus on the purpose and method

of Platonic astronomy, its relation to observation and to mathematics, and its propaedeutic value.

— W. Brandenstein, *Iranische Einflüsse bei Platon* (250 *supra*). On the doctrine of 'endless return' here ascribed to Plato see also the references listed *supra* for *Timaeus* 39 C 5—D 7.

— A. Diès, *Les Lois* . . . , Introduction (511 *supra*), pp. LXIV—LXVI: L'astronomie. Against such interpretations as that on p. LXV see the references given by H. Cherniss, Aristotle's criticism of Plato . . . (1218 *supra*), pp. 550—551.

— W. J. W. Koster, *Le mythe de Platon, de Zarathoustra et des Chaldéens* (256 *supra*), pp. 4—11, pp. 55—58, and pp. 66—71.

1460. F. Solmsen, Epicurus and cosmological heresies, *AJPh* 72, 1951, 1—23. In this discussion of the Epicurean arguments against the Academic doctrine of the indestructibility of the world see especially pp. 5—19 on Plato's arguments in support of that doctrine combined with his retention of the notion of local terrestrial catastrophes and their possible connection with astronomical changes. See also *AJPh* 74, 1953, 48—50 in Solmsen's article Epicurus on the growth and decline of the cosmos (*ibid.* pp. 34—51), where it is pointed out that Plato is careful to deny any more than a restricted application of the biological formula of nutrition to his cosmos, since, though a ζῷον, it has no growth or decline. In a later essay (1029 *supra*), in which some of the themes of the former of these two articles are touched upon again, the question whether Plato meant his cosmos to have a literal beginning, left undetermined in both of them, is apparently decided in the affirmative.

— B. L. van der Waerden, *Die Astronomie der Pythagoreer* (235 *supra*). On this see 1044 *supra* with Pannekoek's critique in the note on that item and the review by Dijksterhuis, *Rev Hist Sciences et Applications* 5, 1952, 279—281. See in addition the two later articles by van der Waerden, *Das große Jahr und die ewige Wiederkehr* (235a *supra* and the titles referred to for *Timaeus* 39 C 5—D 7) and *Das große Jahr des Orpheus* (235b *supra* and the references in 694 *supra*).

— P. Boyancé, *La religion astrale de Platon à Cicéron* (228 *supra*). For matters touching upon Plato's astronomy see especially pp. 316—320, pp. 325—326, and pp. 345—349. See in this connection also the two earlier articles by Boyancé, *Les muses et l'harmonie des sphères* (228b *supra*) and *Note sur le tétractys*, *Ant Cl* 20, 1951, 421—425 (see 366 *supra*).

— R. Mondolfo, *El infinito en el pensamiento de la antigüedad clásica* (1047 *supra*), pp. 405—431. In this chapter on Plato and the development of astronomy from the Philolaic system to the heliocentric theory (= pp. 429—454 of the Italian edition [Firenze 1956]) the section on Plato himself (pp. 405—410 [= pp. 429—435 of the Italian edition]) is with some alterations and additions in the notes a reproduction of pp. 326—331 in the original edition of the book, *L'infinito nel pensiero dei Greci* (Firenze 1934); but the two appendices on the rotation of the earth in Plato (pp. 424—426 = pp. 449—451 of the Italian edition) and on Plato and the Philolaic system (pp. 428—431 = pp. 451—454 of the Italian edition) are entirely new. For the former of these appendices see the note on 1047 *supra*. In the latter Mondolfo attempts to defend his original contention that Plato in his old age adopted with the ardor of a neophyte the so-called Philolaic system.

1461 K. Grollios, *ἡ ἐπίδρασις τῆς πλατωνικῆς παραδόσεως ἐπὶ τῆς θεολογίας τῆς Κιζέρωνος*, *ΠΛΑΤΩΝ* 5, 1953, 126—144. For Plato's astronomy and Aristotle's in his *De Philosophia* and the relation to them of the astronomy in Cicero's *Somnium Scipionis* see pp. 131—137 of this, the second part of an article the first part of which is published in *ΠΛΑΤΩΝ* 4, 1952, 263—288. The thesis of the article is that Plato was the main source of Cicero's cosmological and theological conceptions.

— C. Mugler, *Deux thèmes de la cosmologie grecque . . .* (1013 *supra*). The primary thesis of the chapter on Plato (pp. 85—143) is the course of his emancipation from the cyclical conception of time and the doctrine of 'endless return' (see also Mugler's earlier book, 1426 *supra* [pp. 149—169]). For Plato's astronomy in the stricter sense see pp. 99—107, and for the relation of terrestrial change and cataclysms to astronomical events and the so-called Great Year pp. 116—133. See also Mugler's article, published in this same year, on the dimensions of Plato's universe (1014 *supra*) and his later article (1028 *supra*) concerning the influence of Alcmaeon and Empedocles on the cosmic and physiological cycles in the *Timaeus*.

— B. Sticker, *Weltzeitalter und astronomische Perioden* (262 *supra*). For Plato see especially p. 243 (where the interpretation of *Timaeus* 39 C—D is correct but that of *Timaeus* 22 D as referring to 'das Weltende' is obviously mistaken) and pp. 244—248.

— O. Becker, *Hat Platon Epizykel für Venus und Merkur angenommen? . . .* (1044 *supra*). See with this the references in 1044 *supra* to van der Waerden, Post, and Brignoli.

—. R. S. Brumbaugh, Plato's mathematical imagination (1440 *supra*), pp. 161—208: The myth of Er-Astronomy (cf. B. Einarson, *Cl Phil* 50, 1955, 199—200). Here the section on pp. 183—187 is a revision of Brumbaugh's article, Colors of the hemispheres in Plato's myth of Er (*Cl Phil* 46, 1951, 173—176); and that on pp. 198—202 is a revised version of his note, Plato *Republic* 616 E: The final 'Law of Nines' (*Cl Phil* 49, 1954, 33—34).

—. G. S. Claghorn, Aristotle's criticism of Plato's '*Timaeus*' (1016 *supra*), pp. 71—83. On this see also the references in 1047 *supra*.

—. M. Eliade, The myth of the Eternal Return (261 *supra*). See with this the references given *supra* for *Timaeus* 39 C 5—D 7.

—. P. Friedländer, Platon (11a *supra*), I, pp. 260—283 = Plato (11b *supra*), I, pp. 261—285: Plato as geographer, The beginnings of spherical geography.

—. E. Frank, Die Begründung der mathematischen Naturwissenschaft durch Eudoxus (185 *supra*). Frank here contends that the sphericity of the earth, though discovered by Pythagoreans before Eudoxus who probably learned of it from Archytas, was still a new notion when Plato wrote the *Phaedo* (see 661 *supra*) but that the use of this conception to project upon the earth the celestial equator and tropics and so to create terrestrial zones and 'climata' was the work of Eudoxus (see *contra* D. R. Dicks, *Cl Quart N.S.* 5, 1955, 254) and was unknown to Plato as well when he wrote the *Timaeus* as when he wrote the *Phaedo*.

—. W. Kranz, Kosmos (1018 *supra*), pp. 28—31 and pp. 43—57. See for astronomy proper especially pp. 46—49 and p. 54. Kranz ascribes the notion of a spherical earth to early Pythagoreans (p. 32) and insists that axial rotation of the earth is assumed even in the *Symposium*. See 661 and 1047 *supra* with Kranz's later article, Zwei kosmologische Fragen (1463 *infra*).

—. H. D. P. Lee, The spindle of necessity (771a *supra* [pp. 402—405] and 872 *supra*).

—. J. S. Morrison, Parmenides and Er (219 *supra*), pp. 65—68. This is concerned primarily with the astronomy of the myth of Er but with reference to that of the *Phaedo* and the *Phaedrus* also. Here Morrison asserts that the spherical earth of the *Phaedo* probably also implies the Philolaic system, but in a later article (1464 *infra*) he goes to the other extreme and denies that in the *Phaedo* the earth is even spoken of as spherical.

1462. Maria Timpanaro Cardini, Sui passi controversi di Platone, *Timeo* 40 B. 36 C. 36 D, *Leges* 822 A—C, e di Aristotele, *De Caelo* 293 A 15 — 293 B 33, *Parola Pass* 10, 1955, 20—40. For the astronomical passages here discussed, apparently in ignorance of all recent scholarship relevant to them, see 563 *supra*, 1039 *supra*, 1040 *supra*, and 1047 *supra*.

—. T. G. Rosenmeyer, *Phaedo* 111 C 4ff. (660 *supra*). See 661 for Calder's refutation of Rosenmeyer's thesis, Rosenmeyer's attempted rejoinder (see 1465 *infra*), the later article by Morrison on the shape of the earth in the *Phaedo* (see 1464 *infra*), and the references to E. Frank and to W. Kranz on the subject.

1463. W. Kranz, Zwei kosmologische Fragen, *Rhein Mus N.F.* 100, 1957, 114—129. In the first section (pp. 114—124) Kranz without reference to recent counter-arguments (cf. Cherniss, Aristotle's criticism . . . [1218 *supra*, pp. 546—558]) contends that in the *Timaeus* the earth is meant to have real axial rotation in the sense asserted by Cornford (see 1047 *supra*) and further that theories of the rotation of a spherical earth are assumed as known in the *Symposium* and probably in the *Phaedo* too (see 661 *supra*). The second section (pp. 124—129) is concerned with the formula, *διασφύζειν τὰ φαινόμενα*, ascribed to Plato in connection with the problem of planetary motions and with the apparent avoidance of the formula by Aristotle, with which Kranz connects the report concerning Heraclides and his astronomical hypothesis.

—. F. M. Brignoli, Problemi di fisica celeste nel 'Timeo' di Platone (1027 *supra*) and with this his article published later in the same year, La dinamica immobilità della terra nella concezione platonica dell' universo (see in 1047 *supra*).

—. W. M. Calder III, The spherical earth in Plato's *Phaedo* (661 *supra*). This is written in refutation of Rosenmeyer's attempt to prove that the earth in the *Phaedo* is not meant to be spherical (660 *supra*). See Rosenmeyer's reply (1465 *infra*) and Morrison's article on the subject (1464 *infra*).

—. C. Mugler, *Aléméon et les cycles physiologiques de Platon* (1028 *supra*). Cosmic cycles as well as physiological play a part in Mugler's argument here. See on this subject Mugler's earlier monograph also, *Deux thèmes de la cosmologie grecque . . .* (1013 *supra*).

1464. J. S. Morrison, The shape of the earth in Plato's *Phaedo*, *Phronesis* 4, 1959, 101—119. Though not accepting all of Rosen-

meyer's interpretations in his denial of the sphericity of the earth in the *Phaedo* (660 *supra*), Morrison, who four years earlier had himself asserted not only that the earth in that dialogue is meant to be spherical but also that the Philolaic system is there implied (219 *supra* [pp. 64—65]), now in this article argues against the refutation of Rosenmeyer by Calder (661 *supra*) that in the *Phaedo* the surface of the earth is a ring containing inhabited hollows set in a circle round the central hollow of Tartarus and that the whole earth including 'the things beneath' is not spherical in shape but hemispherical. Moreover, he goes to the still greater length of asserting that there are no good grounds for ascribing to anyone earlier than Aristotle himself the belief in the sphericity of the earth.

— E. Moutsopoulos, *La musique dans l'œuvre de Platon* (1451 *supra*), pp. 363—385 and especially pp. 375—383: L'harmonie' des sphères.

1465. T. G. Rosenmeyer, The shape of the earth in the *Phaedo*: a rejoinder, *Phronesis* 4, 1959, 71—72. This is Rosenmeyer's rather lame attempt, written before the publication of Morrison's article (1464 *supra*), to rebut Calder's refutation (661 *supra*) of his thesis that the earth in the *Phaedo* is not meant to be spherical (660 *supra*).

— L. Rougier, *La religion astrale des Pythagoriciens* (1334 *supra*), pp. 30—53. This is merely a curtailed version of pp. 19—61 in Rougier's earlier book, *L'origine astronomique de la croyance pythagoricienne en l'immortalité céleste des âmes*.

d) Physics and Chemistry

What was said at the beginning of the preceding subsection concerning publications dealing with Plato's astronomy can be repeated with equal appropriateness here with regard to Platonic 'physics'. The most important contribution to the study of this subject published during the 'thirties is F. M. Cornford's translation and commentary of the *Timaeus*, Plato's cosmology (981 *supra* [pp. 159—279 and especially pp. 210—257 with pp. 319—327]). Of earlier publications I mention here only one, which appeared in the year before Cornford's book was published.

— W. Schmid, *Epikurs Kritik der platonischen Elementenlehre* (985 *supra*). See also Schmid, *Rhein Mus N.F.* 92, 1944, 44—50 in his article, *Nugae Herculanenses*, *ibid.*, pp. 35—55.

— A. Schmekel, *Die positive Philosophie in ihrer geschichtlichen Entwicklung I . . .* (1455 *supra*), pp. 1—23. As it stands, this unfinished chapter, the revision of which was interrupted by the author's death in 1934, deals primarily with the 'physics' of the *Timaeus*. The chapter betrays no knowledge of any work done on the subject after 1900.

— A. Rey, *La science dans l'antiquité 3* (1051 *supra*), pp. 277—296: *Les principes du système du monde et de la physique générale*. See also pp. 246—257 on *χώρα*.

— T. Negro, *La concezione platonica della scienza* (991 *supra*), pp. 39—57 and pp. 96—107: *La dottrina simbolica degli elementi*.

— J. B. Skemp, *The theory of motion in Plato's later dialogues* (1367 *supra*). With pp. 96—107 compare F. M. Cornford, *Plato and Parmenides . . .* (599 *supra* [pp. 14—16 and pp. 197—199] and on this Tate, *Cl Rev* 55, 1941, 77) and L. A. Post's review of Skemp in *AJPh* 65, 1944, 299—301 (see also *AJPh* 79, 1958, 287).

— H. Cherniss, *Aristotle's criticism of Plato and the Academy 1* (1218 *supra*), pp. 83—173 and pp. 444—450 (see also 1370 *supra* [pp. 25—26 and p. 28]).

— A. J. Festugière, *La Révélation d'Hermès Trismégiste II: Le Dieu Cosmique* (1000 *supra*), pp. 111—132.

— P. Friedländer, *Structure and destruction of the atom according to Plato's Timaeus* (1001 *supra*).

— C. Mugler, *La philosophie physique et biologique de l'Épinomis* (415 *supra*).

— P.-M. Schuhl, *Imagination et science des cristaux ou platonisme et minéralogie* (1055 *supra*).

— K. R. Popper, *The open society and its enemies* (46 *supra*), pp. 526—531 (addition in note 9 to chapter 6 [see the Addendum in the third edition, London 1957, Vol. I, p. 319]). See pp. 146—152 in the section of Popper's later article (175 *supra*), *Plato and the crisis in early Greek atomism*.

— P. Wilpert, *Die Elementenlehre des Platon und Demokrit* (176 *supra*).

— C. E. M. Joad, *The world of physics and of Plato* (1010a *supra*). See also Joad's earlier article, *Plato's theory of forms and modern physics* (1010b *supra*).

- , E. M. Bruins, La chimie du *Timée* (1007 *supra*).
- , A. Frajese, La matematica nel mondo antico (1433 *supra*), pp. 111—116.
- , A. Vieira Pinto, Note sur la traduction de Platon, *Timée* 43 B (1048 *supra*).
- , Alice F. Braunlich, Plato on twentieth century physics (1010 *supra*).
- , W. Heisenberg, Platons Vorstellungen von den kleinsten Bausteinen der Materie . . . (1011 *supra*).
- , C. Mugler, Deux thèmes de la cosmologie grecque . . . (1013 *supra*), pp. 107—128. See also the article published by Mugler in this same year, Sur quelques particularités de l'atomisme ancien (1015 *supra*), and his earlier book, Platon et la recherche mathématique de son époque (1426 *supra*), pp. 111—133, pp. 174—188, and pp. 275—283.
- , R. S. Brumbaugh, Plato's mathematical imagination (1440 *supra*), pp. 238—248.
- , G. S. Claghorn, Aristotle's criticism of Plato's '*Timaeus*' (1016 *supra*), pp. 5—70 and pp. 84—98.
- , W. Kranz, Die Entstehung des Atomismus (174 *supra*). See also 1018 *supra*.
- , A. Rivaud, Espace et changement dans le *Timée* de Platon (1020 *supra*).
- , P.-M. Schuhl, Physique et Lumières (1059 *supra*).
- , E. Fink, Zur ontologischen Frühgeschichte von Raum-Zeit-Bewegung (1022 *supra*), pp. 163—193.
- , H. Herter, Bewegung der Materie bei Platon (1024 *supra*). See for the context of this article both 1000 *supra* and 1370 *supra*.
- , E. Moutsopoulos, La musique dans l'oeuvre de Platon (1451 *supra*), pp. 23—45: Les sons et les doctrines physiologiques de Platon. See also on physico-acoustical theory, which is in fact the subject of this section, O. Tiby, Note musicologique al *Timeo* di Platone (1037 *supra*), apparently overlooked by Moutsopoulos.

c) Biology, Physiology, and Medicine

This subsection like the two preceding ones is most appropriately begun by a reference to F. M. Cornford's commentary in his translation of the *Timaeus*, Plato's cosmology (981 *supra*), pp. 291—319 and pp. 327—359. For publications dealing with the special question of Plato's conception of Hippocratic medicine and the possible influence of this upon his thought see the references given in items 701—704 *supra*.

— W. Jaeger, Diokles von Karystos (986 *supra*). See also Jaeger's later volume, *Paideia*, II, pp. 32—39 and pp. 306—310 (4 *supra*); and the still later article in which Jaeger attempted to assign a medical origin to Plato's theory of the *θυμοειδές* (868 *supra* [with the references there to the dissents of Harrison and Tait]).

— L. Edelstein, Platonism or Aristotelianism? . . . (1394 *supra*), pp. 758—760.

1466. J. Schumacher, *Antike Medizin I: Die naturphilosophischen Grundlagen der Medizin in der griechischen Antike*, Berlin 1940 (cf. O. Hartlich, *Phil Woch* 62, 1942, 117—122; W. Nestle, *DLZ* 63, 1942, 279—284), pp. 212—242: Platon. See also pp. 249—250 of the conclusion, where Schumacher asserts that 'was Platon wirklich geben wollte und für die Medizin in wirklich klassischen Ausführungen auch tatsächlich gab, war die Schau ihres unwandelbaren Sinnes'.

— J. Bidez and G. Leboucq, *Une anatomie antique du coeur humain* . . . (994 *supra*).

— L. Edelstein, The rôle of Eryximachus in Plato's *Symposium* (917 *supra*). With the pages here on Plato's attitude towards medicine generally see also the article read by Edelstein in this same year but published for the first time, with some additions and changes, seven years later: The relation of ancient philosophy to medicine, *Bull Hist Medicine* 26, 1952, 299—316.

— G. Edison, Plato and Freud (1303 *supra*).

— J. B. Skemp, Plants in Plato's *Timaeus* (1057 *supra*).

— J. Filliozat, *La doctrine classique de la médecine indienne* (246 *supra*).

— C. Mugler, *La philosophie physique et biologique de l'Epinomis* (415 *supra*).

—. Erna Lesky, Die Zeugungs- und Vererbungslehren der Antike . . . (1003 *supra*).

—. P.-M. Schuhl, Platon et l'idée d'exploration pharmacodynamique (546 *supra*).

—. F. Solmsen, Tissues and the soul (179 *supra*), pp. 445—459: Plato. Attention in this section is concentrated upon the origins and functions of Plato's theories concerning marrow and blood in his account of the corporeal tissues and their relation to soul and its parts. For the connections made by Plato between soul and the corporeal organs and physiological processes see also Solmsen's later article, Antecedents of Aristotle's psychology . . . (1019 *supra*), especially pp. 153—157 and pp. 160—162. The process of nutrition as explained by Plato is discussed in both these articles and also in AJPh 74, 1953, 40—41 and 43—48 in Solmsen's article, Epicurus on the growth and decline of the cosmos (*ibid.*, pp. 34—51 [see in 1460 *supra*]); and Plato's account of respiration is the subject of a still more recent article by Solmsen (1058 *supra* [where see also the reference to D. J. Furley]).

—. K. Schlechta, Hirnforschung und philosophische Spekulation im griechischen Altertum (1006 *supra*).

—. C. Mugler, Sur quelques fragments d'Empédocle (1050 *supra*). On this interpretation of Plato's theory of vision and that of Empedocles see the references to H. Cherniss and W. J. Verdenius given in 1050 *supra*.

—. A. Olerud, L'idée de macrocosmos et de microcosmos dans le *Timée* de Platon (234 *supra*), pp. 17—25 and pp. 65—67.

—. R. B. Onians, The origins of European thought about the body . . . (872 *supra*), pp. 118—120 (see 1003 *supra*).

—. F. Wehrli, Der Arztvergleich bei Platon (156 *supra*). See L. Edelstein (917 *supra* [especially pp. 97—101]).

—. R. S. Brumbaugh, Genetic theory in the Pythagorean School (863c *supra*), and Brumbaugh's book, Plato's mathematical imagination (1440 *supra*), pp. 124—131 and pp. 284—285.

1467. A. Dobrovici, Les idées médicales de Platon, Bull Scientifique Roumain (Paris) 1, 1952, 90—98. I have been unable to procure a copy of this article.

—. N. Padis, Plato and psychosomatic medicine (1313 *supra*).

— P.-M. Schuhl, Les premières étapes de la philosophie biologique (1009 *supra*).

1468. L. S. King, Plato's concepts of medicine, *Journ Hist Medicine* 9, 1954, 38—48. According to this account Plato in his views of medicine as an art and a science is in accord with the modern conception, which in fact derives from his philosophy; but he held that the patient was to be treated not for the sake of his individual health but rather with a view to the good of the community, and in this respect his attitude is repugnant to modern medical ethics.

— J. H. Loenen, De verhouding tussen mens en dier . . . (1319 *supra*).

— K. Abel, Plato und die Medizin seiner Zeit (1021 *supra*).

— H. W. Miller, The flux of the body in Plato's *Timaeus* (1025 *supra*).

— P. Lain-Entralgo, Die platonische Rationalisierung der Besprechung (*ΕΠΙΘΙΛΗ*) und die Erfindung der Psychotherapie durch das Wort (1332 *supra*).

— E. Moutsopoulos, La musique dans l'œuvre de Platon (1451 *supra*). Besides some pages on the physiological aspects of Plato's acoustical theory (pp. 23—45) see especially the chapter on the physiology and 'curative' aspects of motion and rhythm (pp. 98—111) together with the section on the dance and hygiene (pp. 117—118).

— C. Mugler, Alcméon et les cycles physiologiques de Platon (1028 *supra*).

V F: Religion and Theology

It has already been observed in the sections on the theory of ideas (V B *supra*) and psychology (V C *supra*) that the authors of many of the works there listed are explicitly concerned with questions of Platonic theology and religion. Plato's attitude towards contemporary religion and its mythology is an important topic in some of the publications listed among those that deal with his own use of myth and allegory (IV C *supra*): D. Bassi (1106 *supra*), J. Tate (1106a *supra*), M. Untersteiner (1108 *supra*), L. Edelstein (1110 *supra* [pp. 465—466 and pp. 472—475]), F. Vian (824 *supra*), A. A. Roig (507 *supra*), F. Buffière (200 *supra* [pp. 14—21]), J. Pépin (1114 *supra* [pp. 112—121]). Moreover, decisive importance is sometimes

ascribed to the religious aspect of Plato's philosophy by authors of works on his ethical, political, educational, and aesthetic theories in studies which must be reserved for the sections of this survey devoted to those subjects. By way of example I call attention here to the recent volume on Plato's political thought by J. Luccioni, *La pensée politique de Platon* (Paris 1958), a chapter of which is entitled 'L'aspect religieux' (pp. 206—240) and ends with the assertion that Plato's political ideas can be said to have a theological basis and his politics to be the expression of a religion¹). Instructive though it would be, it is not possible to give here an exhaustive list of the cases in which modern writers on one particular Platonic topic after another have professed to identify in each such a 'religious aspect' or to suggest that Plato's way of treating it is the consequence of his 'religious attitude'. I can at best give only a fair sample of such interpretations along with the writings on Plato's religion and theology as such which have been published in the last decade and some of the more useful or influential works on the subject which appeared in the 'thirties and the 'forties.

1469. R. L. Calhoun, Plato as religious realist. This relatively unknown essay is published in the collection entitled *Religious Realism* edited by D. C. Macintosh (New York 1931), pp. 195—251. Despite the author's reliance upon *Epistle VII* and his attempt to eliminate the 'separation' of the ideas, this essay still deserves close study for its analysis of Plato's conception of god as a living intelligence and of god's relation to the good and especially for its thesis that Plato was a consistently critical realist in theology and religion who never became either a fanatical dogmatist or a visionary mystic.

1470. A. Bremond, *La religion de Platon d'après le X^e livre des Lois*, *Recherches Science Religieuse* 22, 1932, 26—53. Bremond's thesis here is that the exposition of Plato's theology in the *Laws* is in perfect accord with the other works, that throughout all Plato holds to the Socratic purpose of reestablishing as the rule and measure of everything an absolute divine principle, and that conformably with this purpose the state is in the *Laws* entirely subordinated to religion and not, as some have mistakenly believed, religion to the state.

¹) The other extreme is represented by K. R. Popper (46 *supra* [pp. 139—141 and note 15 to chapter 8]), according to whom Plato considered religion to be opium for the people, always subordinated to his political opportunism whatever religious feeling he may have had, and may in fact have been an atheist himself. On this cf. R. B. Levinson (28 *supra* [pp. 358 and 522]).

1471. Jeanne Croissant, *Aristote et les mystères*, Liège/Paris 1932, pp. 13—20: L'interprétation platonicienne des mystères. See also pp. 159—164 and in the conclusion p. 189 and pp. 191—192.

1472. A. J. Festugière, *L'idéal religieux des Grecs et l'Évangile*, Paris 1932. Besides the chapter on Plato (pp. 43—53) this volume contains an excursus, *Les origines de l'idée de Dieu chez Platon* (pp. 171—195), which was first published in *New Scholast* 4, 1930, 349—377 but according to the author had been finished in 1926. In this article the various aspects of Plato's theology are traced back to their putative origins in notions of the earlier poets and philosophers, but in the article together with the chapter of the book the interpretation of Platonic theology itself, later developed and defended by Festugière in a whole series of publications, is already given in its salient features: man's relation to the divine established by the doctrine that the *νοῦς*, which is man, and 'the idea', which is the divine, have the same constituent principles; apprehension of the divine object occurring through contemplation which, prepared by 'purification', culminates in a mystical union of intuition; and distinction of the highest god, the unknown god, who transcends essence and intelligibility and is called 'le Bien-Un-Cause' and 'l'Un-Bien-Beau', from the cosmic god who is the intelligence that moves his own divine body, the physical universe. See the developments in Festugière's later books and articles: *Contemplation et vie contemplative selon Platon* (1190 *supra*), especially pp. 45—73, pp. 204—209, pp. 221—233, and pp. 251—369: *Transposition de la religion; Épicure et ses dieux*, Paris 1946, pp. 7—10, pp. 102—107, and pp. 128—129; *Platon et l'Orient* (243 *supra*), pp. 19—29 and pp. 40—44; the two articles on cult and religion in the *Epinomis* (413 *supra* and 414 *supra*); *La Révélation d'Hermès Trismégiste II* (1000 *supra*), pp. 102—105, pp. 132—152, pp. 156—161, and pp. 198—218; *La Révélation . . . IV* (116 *supra*), pp. 79—91; and *Personal religion among the Greeks* (1495 *infra* [pp. 39—52, pp. 105—106, and pp. 125—129]). For a general critique of Festugière's point of view cf. van Litsenburg (1253 *supra* [pp. 148—154]); and on the interpretation of *Symposium* 211 A which he tries to defend in both of his books last mentioned cf. J. L. Ackrill, *Mind* N.S. 66, 1957, 572—573 and M. Vanhoutte (1173 *supra* [p. 22]).

1473. U. von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, *Der Glaube der Hellenen II*, Berlin 1932, pp. 246—260.

—. G. M. A. Grube, *Plato's thought* (3 *supra*), pp. 150—178: The gods.

— L. Robin, *Platon* (7 *supra*), pp. 244—252: *Le Dieu de Platon*. With this see Robin's lectures, earlier than this book in composition but published only recently, *Les rapports de l'être et de la connaissance d'après Platon* (1271 *supra*), especially p. 32, p. 45, pp. 138—139, and pp. 151—156. On Robin's interpretation see the review by Scimonelli cited in 1271 *supra*, where it is pointed out that the theological preoccupations of the Roman Catholic have taken precedence over the objectivity of the historian and have caused Robin to involve Plato in problems which are irrelevant to him. Much modern interpretation of Plato's theology is open to this criticism, for most scholars apparently cannot believe that their own Judaeo-Christian assumptions concerning the divinity were not shared by Plato. An honorable and enlightening exception to this fundamental error is the treatment by Grube in the section of his book cited in the immediately preceding item. One among many examples of the consciously Christianizing interpretations is the following work by Sciacca:

— M. F. Sciacca, *Studi sulla filosofia antica* (808 *supra*), pp. 145—222: *Il problema dell' immortalità dell' anima e la metempsi-cosi in Platone*. Plato is here called paganism's true theologian whose intuitions foretold the times to come and the centre of whose whole philosophy was the religious motif expressed in the transcendent world of ideas which is the internal organization of a supreme intelligence, god who is the highest good and the unique and infinite reality. To be sure, Plato's conception of god was not fully adequate; and this according to Sciacca accounts for his failure to solve the problem of becoming (see 987 *supra* and in 1200 *supra* his article, *I due idealismi*).

1474. F. Billicsich, *Das Problem des Übels in der Philosophie des Abendlandes I: Von Platon bis Thomas von Aquino*, Innsbruck 1936. In the zweite erweiterte Auflage, Wien 1955, Plato is treated on pp. 27—56. Here the idea of good is taken to be the source of the other ideas and is identified with god, who, however, being an intelligence, is then said to have these other ideas as his thoughts; these god cannot in his goodness completely realize in this world, because of the limit set by matter, which is thus the source of metaphysical evil, though the motions of this matter Plato ultimately ascribed to an evil world-soul, believed by Billicsich to be a transcendent and independent principle eternally opposed to the divine purpose.

1475. Johanna C. Bolkestein, *Ὁσως en Ἐὐσεβής*: *Bijdrage tot de godsdienstige en zedelijke terminologie van de Grieken*, Amsterdam

1936, pp. 128—157: Plato. Besides the review of this by P. Chantraine (Rev Philol 3 Sér 12, 1938, 77—78) see the article by M. H. A. L. H. van der Valk, *Zum Worte "Οσιος*, Mnem III 10, 1942, 113—140. Throughout this article there is pertinent discussion of Plato's usage and its implications with special attention to the relation of *ὄσιον* and *δίκαιον*. There is but little concerning Plato in the article by H. Jeanmaire, *Le substantif hosia* (Rev Ét Grecques 58, 1945, 66—89) and nothing at all in the remarks on Jeanmaire's article by van der Valk (Rev Ét Grecques 64, 1951, 417—422); but see on this subject the later book by Moulinier (1312 *supra* [especially pp. 330—334, pp. 374—376, and pp. 394—395]) and the still more recent work by A. A. T. Ehrhardt, *Politische Metaphysik von Solon bis Augustin I*, Tübingen 1959, p. 62, pp. 64—66, and p. 102.

1476. R. Hackforth, Plato's theism, Cl Quart 30, 1936, 4—9. He argues that Plato's god is *νοῦς* distinguished as an ultimate principle from *ψυχή* as a derivative existent; and, while declining to discuss the relation of god so conceived to the idea of good or the ideas generally, he asserts that Plato's conception of god is one 'very similar to his transcendent-immanent Forms'. On this interpretation see R. G. Bury (515 *supra* [p. 317]), H. Cherniss (1218 *supra* [pp. 606—608]), and P. J. G. M. van Litsenburg (1253 *supra* [pp. 158—162]).

— W. F. R. Hardie, A study in Plato (610 b *supra*), pp. 131—156 and especially pp. 147—156. In this defence of the Neo-Platonic interpretation of Plato it is contended that the argument of the *Laws* and of the *Phaedrus* is not coherent with the 'theism of the *Timaeus*', in which the ultimate cause is not meant to be soul, and that not the 'best soul' of the *Laws* but the idea of good is the god recognized in Plato's philosophy. See on this P. J. G. M. van Litsenburg (1253 *supra* [pp. 154—158]).

— P.-P. Joannu, Die Erfahrung in Platons Ideenlehre (1191 *supra*), pp. 51—55: Gott, Idee des Guten, Schöpfer und Archē der Ideen.

1477. G. E. Mueller, Plato and the gods, Philos Rev 45, 1936, 457—472. This article is reprinted as chapter VII (pp. 108—128) in Mueller's book, *What Plato thinks* (La Salle [Illinois] 1937). He is concerned chiefly with the thesis that Plato's polytheism, ethical dualism, and absolute monotheism are compatible with one another as 'three levels of religious thought'.

— J. A. G. van der Veer, Reiniging en reinheid bij Plato (1294 *supra*), pp. 66—93: Reiniging en reinheid in verband met den godsdienst.

— P. Boyancé, Le culte des muses . . . (208a *supra*). For the thesis of Orphic influence on Plato which is here defended see also Boyancé's two later articles (208b and 208 *supra*); and with the chapter of this book (pp. 167—184) entitled *Platon et la théorie des fêtes religieuses* see his review-article, *La religion de Platon* (Rev Ét Anciennes 49, 1947, 178—192), in the first part of which (pp. 178—187), reviewing O. Reverdin's book (522 *supra*), he reasserts his thesis (228a *supra*) that traits of the cosmic religion of the *Timaeus*, the *Laws*, and the *Epinomis* are prefigured in what he calls 'the system of Euthyphro' in the *Cratylus*. On this Platonic cosmic religion or astral theology, the Pythagorean origins of which he maintains against Bidez, whose book (241 *supra*) is the subject of the second part of his review-article (pp. 187—192), see also Boyancé's later articles, *La religion astrale* . . . (228 *supra*) and *Les épicuriens et la contemplation* (1364a *supra*).

— R. G. Bury, The theory of education in Plato's *Laws* (515 *supra*), pp. 316—319. In these pages he discusses god and the soul, maintaining that *νοῦς* is simply a particular mode of *ψυχή*, and the theme of man as god's puppet.

— F. M. Cornford, Plato's cosmology . . . (981 *supra*). Cornford's treatment of Plato's theology here (see especially pp. 34—39, pp. 137—139, pp. 162—177, p. 197, and pp. 205—210), identifying the demiurge with the reason in the world-soul and sharply criticizing the interpretation of A. E. Taylor as one inspired by the wish to make Plato's divine reason an omnipotent 'God', drew from Taylor a defence of his position to which Cornford replied in turn (*Mind* N.S. 47, 1938, 180—199 and 321—330 [988 *supra*]).

1478. É. des Places, La portée religieuse de l'*Epinomis*, Rev Ét Grecques 50, 1937, 321—328. The purpose of this article is to show that the 'demonology' of the *Epinomis*, its astral cult, and its attitude towards god, providence, and piety are all in keeping with Plato's doctrines and attitudes in the other dialogues. Much of this article is reprinted in the introduction to the Budé edition of the *Epinomis* (408 *supra* [see especially pp. 114—118]). Des Places leans heavily upon the *Epinomis* as well as upon *Epistle* VII when in his later book, *Pindare et Platon* (222 *supra* [pp. 133—162]), he treats certain aspects of Platonic religion under the titles of the purification of mythology, the religious sense, and the gifts of nature

and of grace. His article entitled *La théologie de Platon* (Rev Ét Grecques 59/60, 1946/47, 461—466) is in fact a résumé of F. Solmsen's book (1368 *supra*) at the end of which des Places asserts once more the authenticity of the astral religion of the *Epinomis* and the importance of Platonic piety. He has more recently given a general sketch of Plato's religion as he interprets it in volume III (pp. 251—264) of the *Histoire des Religions* published under the direction of M. Brillant and R. Aigrain (1498 *infra*).

1479. A. H. Armstrong, *The gods in Plato, Plotinus, Epicurus*, Cl Quart 32, 1938, 190—196. Here it is argued that the attitude of Plotinus towards the gods and prayer as expressed in *Ennead* III, 2—3 differs from Plato's and is closer to that of Epicurus, he and Plotinus despite all their dissimilarities being both under the pervasive influence of the post-Platonic conception of the world-order.

— R. Demos, *The philosophy of Plato* (see in 1185 *supra*), pp. 99—125: God. The tenor of this conglomerate of all possible interpretations is fairly indicated by the assertion that god and the ideas, though irreducible each to the other, may both be regarded as abstractions from one ultimate fact of patterned activity and by the contention that as creator of mind Plato's supreme god can be shown necessarily to be a mind and not to be a mind.

— G. Krüger, *Einsicht und Leidenschaft* (913 *supra*). See especially pp. 59—66, pp. 147—154, pp. 213—219, pp. 256—258, and pp. 278—283 for this thesis that 'erotic understanding' shows the meaning of the ideas to be primarily religious. According to Krüger they are living and thinking parts of an 'ideal organism', the divine being beyond the world for which the philosophically appropriate name is equally the beautiful in the *Symposium* and the good in the *Republic*.

— J. Moreau, *La construction de l'idéalisme platonicien* (5 *supra*), pp. 484—489: Dieu et les âmes dans la philosophie de Platon; and *L'Âme du Monde . . .* (5 *supra*), pp. 35—45 on the demiurge and god in the *Timaeus* and pp. 56—84 on the 'physico-theology' of the *Laws* (cf. Cherniss, *AJPh* 68, 1947, 120—124). See also Moreau's later publications: *Platon et l'idéalisme chrétien* (1224 *supra*); *Réalisme et idéalisme chez Platon* (1234 *supra*), especially pp. 117—118; *L'idéalisme platonicien et la transcendance de l'être* (1261 *supra*), p. 207.

1480. Edmund G. Berry, *The history and development of the concept of ΘΕΙΑ ΜΟΙΡΑ and ΘΕΙΑ ΤΥΧΗ down to and including*

Plato, Chicago 1940, pp. 49—85. On Berry's treatment see W. C. Greene's review in *Cl Phil* 40, 1945, 194—195 and Greene's own book, *Moirā: Fate, Good, and Evil in Greek thought* (Cambridge, Mass. 1944), pp. 299—300 and p. 420. Compare also the treatment of the subject by R. Schaerer in his book, *Dieu, l'homme et la vie...* (1137 *supra*), pp. 168—169; by É. des Places, *Pindare et Platon* (222 *supra*), pp. 149—155; by P. C. Bonaventura Pistorio (1496 *infra*); by Jacqueline Duchemin, *Rev Ét Grecques* 68, 1955, 24—29; by J. van Camp et P. Canart, *Le sens du mot ΘΕΙΟΣ chez Platon* (Louvain 1956), pp. 396—403 and p. 418 with the references s.v. *μοῖρα* on p. 428; by H. Flashar, *Der Dialog Ion...* (173 *supra*), pp. 65—66 and pp. 114—121; and by K. Gäiser, *Protreptik und Paränese bei Platon* (1101 *supra*), especially pp. 97—99 and p. 119. For *τύχη* see also Agatha A. Buriks (1488 *infra*).

1481. M. P. Nilsson, *The origin of belief among the Greeks in the divinity of the heavenly bodies*, *Harvard Theol Rev* 33, 1940, 1—8. He here represents Plato as being responsible for initiating the belief in the divinity of the heavenly bodies as the philosophical defence of belief in the gods. See also his article published in the following year, *The immortality of the soul in Greek religion* (1296 *supra*); and his *Geschichte der griechischen Religion I* (München 1941), pp. 770—776 and pp. 791—793 (= pp. 818—824 and pp. 841—842 of the second edition, 1955), where Nilsson begins by saying that Plato did not consider himself to be either the founder of a new religion or a reformer of the old one and would have protested had he known that he was to be so regarded, as in fact he did not come to be until 500 years after his death.

1482. A. Speiser, *Die platonische Lehre vom unbekannten Gott und die christliche Trinität*, *Eranos-Jahrbuch* 8/9, 1940/41, 11—29. Recognizing that Plato was not in any sense a 'prophet of Christianity', Speiser nevertheless holds that he prepared the way for the Christian doctrine of revelation by showing that there is through knowledge no access to god, 'the one beyond being', and finds in *Timaeus* 31 B—32 B the source of the trinity as a formula for naming the unknowable and inexpressible god.

— N. Almberg, *Platons världssjäl och Aristoteles' gudsbegrepp* (1992 *supra*). See especially pp. 37—52, pp. 184—299, and pp. 341—364.

1483. W. C. Greene, 'God' in Plato's theology, *Cl Weekly* 35, 1941/42, 220. See also Greene's later book, *Moirā: Fate, Good, and Evil in Greek thought* (Cambridge, Mass. 1944), pp. 286—299, pp.

305—314, and pp. 419—421 and his review of Solmsen's book (1368 *supra*) in *Cl Phil* 40, 1945, 128—133. Greene is expressly in agreement with Hackforth's thesis (1476 *supra*). He maintains that for Plato god is not a soul but is impersonal *νοῦς*, mythically represented as the personal demiurge, which through the creation of soul imparts its goodness to the world and is thus both transcendent and immanent.

— J. A. Notopoulos, Socrates and the sun (841e *supra*). He argues that the *Apology* and the *Symposium* preserve biographical data concerning Socrates' sun-worship, of which the formal, religious aspect is reflected in the *Laws* and the cosmological aspect in the *Timaeus*, while in the *Republic* all aspects of the symbol are united and endowed by Plato with a profundity that is original but with a significance that issued from Socrates' own life.

— J. B. Skemp, The theory of motion in Plato's later dialogues (1367 *supra*). See especially pp. 108—115, The ultimate ἀρχὴ κινήσεως in Plato, where Skemp opposes Hackforth's thesis (1476 *supra*), and with this Skemp's later remarks in Plato's *Statesman* (732 *supra*), pp. 103—108: God as framer and father of the universe. On the earlier book cf. P. J. G. M. van Litsenburg (1253 *supra* [pp. 162—164]).

— F. Solmsen, Plato's theology (1368 *supra*). See also his earlier article, The background of Plato's theology, *Trans Am Philol Assoc* 67, 1936, 208—218. On the later book besides the reviews cited in 1368 *supra* cf. P. J. G. M. van Litsenburg (1253 *supra* [pp. 164—166]).

1484. A. Weiher, Platon und die Gottheit, *Gymnasium* 54/55, 1943/44, 13—35. Supposing that to understand and describe the essence of divinity was Plato's abiding purpose, Weiher traces what he takes to have been the modifications in Plato's theology, modifications which never came to a clear theistic solution, since Plato remained essentially a metaphysician and was not a pious and obedient prophet of his god.

— H. Cherniss, Aristotle's criticism of Plato and the Academy 1 (1218 *supra*), pp. 603—610.

— W. Jaeger, *Paideia* (4 *supra*). For Plato's religion and theology see III, pp. 8—11, pp. 20—23, p. 94, pp. 303—304, pp. 320—322, pp. 341—344, and in Vol. II of the English translation note 39b on pp. 414—415, most of which is lacking in the German original although

this was published later than the translation. Despite the remarks in this note about the many aspects and forms of the divine in Plato's philosophy, Jaeger in fact identifies god with the idea of good and sees in this doctrine a conscious attempt to found a new religion. Contrast the opinion of Nilsson cited in 1481 *supra*; and cf. G. M. A. Grube, *AJPh* 68, 1947, 211 and 214, whose criticism was apparently unknown to P. J. G. M. van Litsenburg (1253 *supra* [pp. 168—169]).

— R. Schaerer, *Dieu, l'homme et la vie d'après Platon* (1137 *supra*). See especially pp. 15—31, pp. 38—45, and the final chapter (pp. 171—213), *Platonisme et christianisme*. According to Schaerer the demiurge is not god but the aspect of god turned towards us, that aspect which causes order to prevail in matter in the same way as on the intelligible plane the supreme unity engenders the ideas. For Schaerer's interpretation of the ideas see 1138 and 618 *supra*.

1485. A. H. Armstrong, *Platonic mysticism*, *Dublin Review* 216, 1945, 130—142. He contends that neither Socrates nor Plato was a mystic and that the only mystic among the pagan Platonists was Plotinus.

— E. R. Dodds, *Plato and the irrational* (243b *supra*). See especially pp. 21—25 of this article, which is in part restated and expanded in the later book, *The Greeks and the irrational* (230 *supra*), pp. 207—235: Plato, the irrational soul, and the inherited conglomerate. The pages of the earlier article deal, however, with some questions concerning Plato's religious attitude and doctrine which are not considered in the later book and provide a more nearly complete though more compendious interpretation of the whole subject.

— Julia Kerschensteiner, *Platon und der Orient* (242 *supra*), pp. 116—129: *Die platonische Gottesidee*.

— O. Reverdin, *La religion de la cité platonicienne* (522 *supra*). See besides the reviews cited in 522 *supra* P. J. G. M. van Litsenburg (1253 *supra* [pp. 166—168]), who confines his comment to Reverdin's chapter, *Dieu et les dieux* (pp. 39—55).

— A. Levi, *Sulla demonologia platonica* (1375 *supra*).

1486. I. M. Linforth, *The Corybantic rites in Plato*, *Univ California Pub Cl Philol* 13 No. 5, 1946, 121—162. See also Linforth's article of the same year, *Telestic madness in Plato*, *Phaedrus* 244

DE (691 *supra*) and in this connection the publications by F. Pfister, E. R. Dodds, and F. M. Cornford cited in 691 *supra*.

— C. J. Rutenber, The doctrine of the imitation of God in Plato (968 *supra*).

— W. Wili, Die Geschichte des Geistes in der Antike (1304 *supra*).

— T. M. Forsyth, Aristotle's concept of God as final cause (1223 *supra*). The purpose of this article is to show that Plato's doctrine is akin to this conception of Aristotle's.

— Simone Pétrement, Le dualisme chez Platon . . . (244 *supra*). See especially pp. 35—76, pp. 88—93, and pp. 116—125.

— F. Pfister, Die Autorität der göttlichen Offenbarung, Glauben und Wissen bei Platon (209 *supra*). See also Pfister's addendum to his argument in Würzburger Jahrb 4, 1949/50, 184.

1487. H. A. Wolfson, The knowability and describability of God in Plato and Aristotle, Harvard Studies in Class Phil 56/57, 1947, 233—249. The thesis of this article is that neither in Plato nor in Aristotle is there any suggestion of the principle that god is unknowable and indescribable; but much of Wolfson's argument concerning Plato (pp. 233—241) depends upon the premise that for Plato god is either one of the ideas, the idea of good, or a demiurge who is *above* the ideas though of the same nature as the ideas, so that he treats the question of the knowability of god simply as a special case of the knowability of ideas.

1488. Agatha A. Buriks, *Περὶ τύχης*: De ontwikkeling van het begrip tyche tot aan de Romeinse tijd hoofdzakelijk in de filosofie, Leiden 1948 (cf. M. Untersteiner, *Paideia* 4, 1949, 412—413), pp. 49—54 and p. 114. She contends that Plato, although he knew all the aspects of *τύχη*, made little use of the concept, which was alien to his idealistic outlook, until with the growing religious tendency of his late period he connected it once more with the deity. Miss Buriks mentions neither the works by E. G. Berry and by W. C. Greene, which are cited in 1480 *supra*, nor the still earlier publication by V. Cioffari, *Fortune and fate from Democritus to St. Thomas Aquinas* (New York 1935), the third chapter of which (pp. 33—44) is mainly concerned with Plato, for whom Tyche is said to be a powerful agent but as the minister of god.

— V. Cilento, Il demone (1376 *supra*), p. 218.

1489. C. J. de Vogel, *L'idée de l'unité de Dieu une vérité rationnelle*, Library Tenth Internat Cong Philosophy 2, Amsterdam, 1948, pp. 24—39. Maintaining that both Plato and Aristotle had a clearly 'monotheistic' tendency and lacked not the conception of the unity of god, as Gilson maintained, but the notion of creation, Miss de Vogel here defends Plato's philosophical monotheism by identifying the good of the *Republic*, the being of the *Sophist*, and the one of 'the unwritten doctrines' as the ultimate god whose eternal logos is the ideas and by taking the demiurge as a *δεύτερος θεός*, the identification of whom with the ideas would be a correction of Plato rather than interpretation of him. The year before this in her inaugural lecture she declared that Plato had meant the idea of good or the one to be a living intelligence and will, the cause of the being of the ideas (Een groot probleem uit de antieke wijsbegeerte gezien in zijn historisch perspectief, Utrecht 1947). In a later article on the problem of evil (Het probleem van het kwade in de antieke wijsbegeerte, *Studia Catholica* 27, 1952, 20—38 [pp. 22—27 on Plato]) she asserts that the one, identical with the good, must as the highest principle have been Plato's god in the sense in which *we* use that term, admitting at the same that time Plato himself called god the 'Nous-Demiourgos' which she argues is not the highest principle and which she here identifies with the world of ideas. In support of this identification she here appeals (p. 26, n. 31) to *Sophist* 248 E—249 A, for her interpretation of which see the two articles of hers published in the following year (38c *supra* [pp. 56—57] and especially 38e *supra* [for which see also the section on *Sophist* 246 A 4 — 249 D 8 *supra*]). In this same year Miss de Vogel published a third article, *Het christelijk scheppingsbegrip en de antieke wijsbegeerte* (38d *supra*), in which she argued that Plato came closer to the Christian doctrine of creation than did Aristotle, the Stoics, or the Neo-Platonists, differing from it, however, in having the transcendent mind which is the demiurge create the world directly only in part, in making this transcendent mind something other and lower than the supreme principle, the one, and in making the infinite and indeterminate a second fundamental principle independent of the one. Many of her earlier interpretations are restated in an article published the next year and the latest of which van Litsenburg in his critique (1253 *supra* [pp. 177—180 and p. 198]) could take cognizance: *A la recherche des étapes précises entre Platon et le néoplatonisme* (38f *supra*). There Plato is said at least to imply that the ideas are thoughts of a transcendent mind, itself lower than the supreme principle, the one. This interpretation is reasserted and the assimilation of Plato's doctrine to the Plotinian system here advocated is further extended

to the indeterminate or 'material principle' in the article published by Miss de Vogel in 1959, *La théorie de l'ἄπειρον chez Platon . . .* (1285 *supra* [especially pp. 23—24 and pp. 32—39]). The year before this in an essay entitled *Antike Seinsphilosophie und Christentum im Wandel der Jahrhunderte* (Festgabe Joseph Lortz I, Baden-Baden 1958, pp. 527—548), the purpose of which is the defence of the union of Greek ontology and Christian faith, she insisted (pp. 537—541) that Plato and Plotinus were not far from the Christian conception of god and that Plato had conceived the world of ideas as the perfect being of a divine mind but lacking revelation could not identify this with the highest principle, which he thought must be unity beyond being and which he called 'the good' and later 'the one'.

— P. Grenet, *Les origines de l'analogie philosophique dans les dialogues de Platon* (1144 *supra*). On Plato's theology and his representation of the divine see pp. 33—36, pp. 60—62, pp. 73—74, pp. 80—89, p. 174, pp. 201—209 (on *ὁμολώσεις τῷ θεῷ*). According to Grenet Plato represented divinity by analogy with intelligence, which as universal cause he identified first with the idea of good, then with the principle of determination (the 'limit' of the *Philebus*), and finally in the *Timaeus* and the *Laws* with the 'moteur non-mû' (sic!).

— G. E. Bariè, *L'esigenza dell' unità da Talete a Platone* (1146 *supra*), pp. 75—78 and pp. 80—83.

1490. P. Brommer, *Plato's wijsbegeerte, wetenschap of mystiek*, *Algem Nederland Tijdsch Wijsbeg en Psychol* 41, 1949, 156—166. He argues that Plato avoids the characteristics of genuine mysticism.

— É. des Places, *Pindare et Platon* (222 *supra*), pp. 133—162. See 1478 *supra* with the other titles listed there.

— A. J. Festugière, *La Révélation d'Hermès Trismégiste II: Le Dieu Cosmique* (1000 *supra*), pp. 102—105, pp. 132—152, pp. 156—161, pp. 198—218; *La Révélation . . . IV: Le Dieu Inconnu et la Gnose* (116 *supra*), pp. 79—91. See also 1472 *supra* and the titles listed there.

— G. C. Field, *The philosophy of Plato* (10c *supra*), pp. 145—162: *Theology and religion*.

— V. Goldschmidt, *La religion de Platon* (1309 *supra*). This is in fact a review of the essentials of Plato's philosophy interpreted as religion, Goldschmidt's express premise being that to Plato, who sought in god the reconciliation and unification of all things, religion

and philosophy were inseparable. So the theory of ideas, epistemology, causality, and matter are treated in the chapter entitled 'Dieu', the first of three into which the body of the book is divided, the following two dealing with man (i.e. with the nature and destiny of the human soul and its relation to the body and the universe) and with the city (i.e. with the social and political aspects of religion in tradition, cult, and legislation). Goldschmidt identifies Plato's god with the idea of good, to which he formally denies personality, but also with the demiurge, which he takes to be the idea of good 'projecting itself on an inferior plane', for by a sort of 'procession' the idea of good appears in different hypostases that have different designations, none of which is appropriate to it in its plenitude. With the note on *θεολογία* (p. 42, n. 1) see Goldschmidt's article on this subject (825 *supra*), published in the following year, and the references in 825 *supra* to W. Jaeger, G. Vlastos, and A. J. Festugière.

1491. L. Stefanini, Forma estetica del misticismo dei Greci, *Giorn Metafisica* 4, 1949, 370—380. See pp. 376—377 and pp. 378—379.

— U. Urrutia, Contribución al esclarecimiento de la genuina sentencia de Platón sobre las ideas (1231 *supra*).

— W. K. C. Guthrie, The Greeks and their gods (211 *supra*), pp. 333—353: Plato. On Plato and the Orphics see also pp. 311—324 and with this section Guthrie's earlier book and article (211a and 211b *supra*). For Guthrie's interpretation of Plato's doctrine of the soul see his more recent article (1331 *supra*).

— E. Hoffmann, Platon (22 *supra*). To Hoffmann Plato's philosophy is fundamentally a theistic doctrine in which god, identified in his different aspects with the 'dynamic' idea of good, the demiurge 'who calls the cosmos into being out of nothing', and the absolute one 'above being', is superior to the 'living organism' of the world of ideas not as its creator but as the sun is supreme in the starry firmament (see especially pp. 14—16, p. 31, pp. 53—58, p. 65, pp. 113—114, p. 188, and pp. 203—204), Cf. P. J. G. M. van Litsenburg (1253 *supra* [pp. 169—171 and p. 198]); E. M. Manasse, *Philos Rundschau* 5, Beiheft 1, 1957, 18—19.

— M. Meldrum, Plato and the *ἈΡΧΗ ΚΑΚΩΝ* (1369 *supra*).

— O. Regenbogen, Bemerkungen zur Deutung des platonischen *Phaidros* (290 *supra*), pp. 213—216. Here it is argued that the *Phaedrus* manifests to a degree that ranges it with the *Philebus* and the

Timaeus the theocentric attitude which grew on Plato steadily from the time when he wrote the philosophical digression of the *Theaetetus*.

— A. de Marignac, *Imagination et dialectique . . .* (1070 *supra*), pp. 63—70: Dieu: les rapports entre Dieu et le monde sensible.

— J. H. M. M. Loenen, *De Nous in het systeem van Plato's filosofie* (1233 *supra*). See also Loenen's summary statement of his thesis in his later article (715 *supra* [especially pp. 183—185 and p. 187]).

— V. Martin, *Sur la condamnation des athées par Platon au Xe Livre des Lois* (569 *supra*).

— Sir David Ross, *Plato's theory of ideas* (1236 *supra*), pp. 43—44, pp. 78—79, pp. 127—128, and pp. 235—239 (cf. P. J. G. M. van Litsenburg [1253 *supra*, pp. 171—172]). Ross argues that Plato did not mean god to be identified with the idea of good or with the world of ideas and that the demiurge is not a mere doublet of the world-soul. On p. 78 he says that Plato when he wrote the *Republic* seems not yet to have thought out the relation between god and the ideas, but this is contradicted by what is said of the *Phaedo* on pp. 234—235.

— A. H. Weston, *The question of Plato's Euthyphro* (464 *supra*). The answer clearly indicated, this author thinks, is that holiness consists in conforming to the will of god, which is discovered by revelation, and that there are many ways in which man may thus be called to help god administer the world.

1492. D. Loenen, *Een ineffabele God bij Plato*, *Algem Nederland Tijdsch Wisbeg en Psychol* 44, 1951/52, 241—261. This is in fact a critique of the book by J. H. M. M. Loenen (1233 *supra*).

1493. T. Boman, *Das hebräische Denken im Vergleich mit dem griechischen*, Göttingen 1952 (cf. R. Bultmann, *Gnomon* 27, 1955, 551—558). In this book, of which a second edition with insignificant changes was published in 1954, Boman, contending that there is a close affinity between Plato's religious spirit and the Old Testament, holds that the idea of good and the demiurge are two aspects of the one personal and supreme being which for Plato was god (see especially pp. 12—13, pp. 41—45, pp. 57—59, pp. 101—103, and p. 152).

1494. G. Delcuve, *Platon: un message toujours actuel*, *Au seuil du Christianisme présenté par l'Abbé Charles Moeller*, Paris/Bruxelles 1952, pp. 1—24. Plato's philosophy is presented as a 'preparation' for Christianity.

— C. J. de Vogel, *Het totalitarisme van Plato's Staat en het totalitarisme van de Katholieke Kerk* (50 *supra*). This defence of Plato, though it has little to say of his theology as Miss de Vogel interprets it (see 1489 *supra*), turns largely upon her conception of the religious orientation of all his thought.

— H. Gauss, *Philosophischer Handkommentar . . .* (20 *supra*), I/1, pp. 52—53, pp. 123—133, and pp. 211—236 (characteristically entitled *Vom 'historischen' Plato zu einem christlichen Platonismus*). Gauss identifies τὸ ἔν of the first hypothesis of the *Parmenides* with τὸ ἀγαθόν (by which he thinks Plato really meant 'das Vollkommene'), and this he takes to be Plato's god.

— H. Merki, *Ὀμολογίς θεῶν . . .* (see 968 *supra*), pp. 1—7.

— L. Moulinier, *Le pur et l'impur dans la pensée des Grecs . . .* (1312 *supra*), pp. 323—422: *Platon*. See also in his later book, *Orphée et l'Orphisme à l'époque classique* (213 *supra*), pp. 20—36 on Plato.

— R. Stark, *Platons Dialog 'Euthyphron'* (467 *supra*).

— U. Tavianini, *Il misticismo platonico nelle opere anteriori al Timeo* (146a *supra*). He argues that religious conviction dominates philosophical demonstration in Plato's thought, which he holds was deeply and indelibly colored by Orphic mysticism.

— C. J. de Vogel, *Het christelijk scheppingsbegrip en de antieke wijsbegeerte* (38d *supra*). See on this article also 1489 *supra* with the other publications there listed.

— G. Capone Braga, *La religione . . .* (39b *supra*).

— J. Derbolav, *Erkenntnis und Entscheidung . . .* (16 *supra*), pp. 143—144, p. 198, pp. 274—302, and pp. 398—400. According to Derbolav, for whom 'Platons religionsphilosophische Gedanken deutlich auf Christliches vorausweisen', Plato in maturity and old age came ever nearer to reconciling religion and philosophy until finally in the *Laws* faith became for him a symbol of the fact that only feeling and not intellect can heal the flaws of human existence.

1495. A. J. Festugière, *Personal religion among the Greeks*, Berkeley/Los Angeles 1954 (cf. N. O. Brown, *AJPh* 76, 1955, 435—437; H. J. Rose, *JHS* 75, 1955, 199—200 [with *Cl Rev N.S.* 5, 1955, 277—278]; W. K. C. Guthrie, *Cl Rev N.S.* 6, 1956, 49—51). On Plato see pp. 39—52, pp. 105—106, and pp. 125—129 of this book and in addition Festugière's other publications listed in 1472 *supra*.

— P. Friedländer, *Platon* (11a *supra*), I, pp. 39—47, pp. 60—62, and pp. 63—89 = *Plato* (11b *supra*), I, pp. 37—44, pp. 55—58, and pp. 59—84. Friedländer has little to say of Plato's theology. In these sections he discusses the relation of the demonic to the divine and the rôle of 'mysteries' in Plato's thought, denying that Plato had a demonology and that he was himself a mystic and in this connection giving an interesting analysis of the difference between Plato and Plotinus.

— Q. Huonder, *Gott und Seele im Lichte der griechischen Philosophie* (1318 *supra*), pp. 36—37, pp. 39—40, and especially pp. 99—128: *Platon als Theologe*.

1496. P. C. Bonaventura Pistorio, *Fato e divinità nel mondo greco*, Palermo 1954. See for Plato especially pp. 135—137 and p. 385 (*μοῖρα*), pp. 156—162 and pp. 500—501 (*ἀνάγκη*), pp. 169—171 (*εἰσαγωγή*), pp. 231—234 (astral fatalism in Plato and the *Epinomis*), and pp. 342—343 (the liberation of the soul through *θεωρία* and its reascension to god).

— M. Vanhoutte, *La philosophie politique de Platon dans les 'Lois'* (538 *supra*), pp. 311—382: *Dieu*. See also pp. 461—462 in the Conclusion. It is here argued that in the *Laws* Plato identifies god with soul, understood in its most general sense, identifies legislation with religion, and tries to produce a syncretism of philosophical religion and traditional, ancestral religion.

1497. W. J. Verdenius, *Platons Gottesbegriff, Entretiens Ant Cl 1*, Vandoeuvres-Genève 1954, 239—293. According to this interpretation the god who for Plato is the measure of all things must be the highest principle, the idea of good, but the world of ideas as a whole is god also, and the several ideas can be viewed as a transposition of the idea of good on the level of multiplicity, while the demiurge is god from the cosmogonical point of view but from the metaphysical point of view is an aspect of the absolute organization and the traditional gods of Greek cult are lower manifestations of divinity. In short, Plato is said to have conceived of a scale of divinity corresponding to the hierarchical structure of reality and descending from the idea of good to the individual souls in degrees of decreasing divinity and concomitantly increasing personality. On the basis of his interpretation here Verdenius in the same year published another article in which he attacked the tendency to assume that god in Plato's conception must have the personality ascribed to god in the Christian sense, to identify with god in this sense the demiurge

of the *Timaeus*, and to interpret the ideas as thoughts of god: Christianiserende en historische Plato-Interpretatie (70 *supra*).

—. R. S. Bluck, Is Plato's *Republic* a theocracy? (48 *supra*). The idea of good, Bluck contends, if not itself god, has the rôle of god in a theocracy, that of a divine force external to the state acknowledged not only as the sanction of the state's laws but as the ever-present guide of the guardians, who like high priests by constant reference to it interpret the laws and put them into effect.

—. J. Chevalier, *Histoire de la pensée* I... (14 *supra*), pp. 249—264 and pp. 654—656. To the references given by Chevalier in his note (p. 654) on the close connection of Plato's political and religious preoccupations add especially the chapter in the more recent book by J. Luccioni, *La pensée politique de Platon*, Paris 1958, pp. 206—240.

1498. É. des Places, *La religion de Platon* = *Histoire des religions* publiée sous la direction de M. Brillant et R. Aigrain, Tome 3, Paris 1955, pp. 251—264. See also 1478 *supra*.

1499. A. Diès, *Le Dieu de Platon, Autour d'Aristote: Recueil*... offert à A. Mansion, Louvain 1955, pp. 61—67. This is a schematic presentation of Platonic theology and theodicy with the conclusion that, despite elements which prefigure Christian doctrine, Plato's conception of god falls short of perfect monotheism in failing to unify the divine object, the ideas with the good at their summit, and the divine subject, the intellect that knows this object and in varying degrees of participation penetrates and fashions the physical world, the state, and the individual. See also the passage written by Diès somewhat earlier in his introduction to the Budé edition of the *Laws* (511 *supra* [pp. LXXVIII—LXXIX]).

1500. G. Fraile, *Teología de Platón*, *Ciencia Tomista* 82, 1955, 607—624. The conceptions of ideas, demiurge, and world-soul are here taken to show how far Plato fell short of demonstrating the existence of god as absolute and transcendent being.

—. L. T. J. M. Gubbels, *De godsdienst in de staat van Plato's Wetten* (539 *supra*).

—. A. Manno, *Il teismo di Platone* (31 *supra*). See especially pp. 175—299, *Il problema teologico*, and with this chapter pp. 340—375 on the immortality of the soul and eschatology and Manno's final words on pp. 376—378. This is an extreme example of the Christianizing tendency to which W. J. Verdenius had

recently objected (70 *supra*). Plato's philosophy is explicitly declared to be a theism 'which to become absolute had only to overcome the obstacle of *materia increata*', for the idea of good is taken to be the one transcendent god, of whom the ideas and the demiurge are actual aspects, the former of his will as thought and the latter of his goodness and creativity. Three years later Manno published a monograph (1278 *supra*) devoted to the defence of his thesis against the critique of it by G. Reale, *Riv Filos Neoscolastica* 48, 1956, 193—230. On this defence of Manno's see G. Soleri's article, *Il preteso teismo di Platone* (1517 *infra*).

— G. Méautis, *L'Orphisme dans l'Eudème d'Aristote* (212 *supra*).

— P. J. G. M. van Litsenburg, *God en het goddelijke in de dialogen van Plato* (1253 *supra*).

— K. F. Doherty, *God and the good in Plato* (1258 *supra*).

— R. Kroner, *Speculation in pre-Christian philosophy* (25 *supra*). In the chapter on Plato, *The cosmos of the ideas*, see pp. 168—179: *Cosmotheology*. Here Kroner denies that Plato ever achieved a fixed theology and that his speculation about the philosophic god ever superseded his belief in the traditional gods, but the section is concluded with the assertion that speculation takes the place of revelation in the philosophy of Plato 'even while he went far in the direction of an active quasi-Biblical faith'.

— R. C. Lodge, *The philosophy of Plato* (30 *supra*), pp. 159—198: *Philosophy of religion*.

— J. Pépin, *Éléments pour une histoire de la relation entre l'intelligence et l'intelligible . . .* (1262 *supra*).

1501. G. Rudberg, *Plato's belief in God*, *Platonica Selecta*, Stockholm 1956, pp. 109—126. This is a revised and amplified translation of the lecture, *Platons gudstro*, delivered in 1940 and first published in *Årsbok för kristen Humanism*, 1941, 28—39. According to this interpretation the fundamental belief that god is goodness first led Plato to the identification of god with the idea of good, whereas in the later works the road to a personal god is found in the notion of creation in which the greatness and goodness of god are manifest. Rudberg concludes that the great religious thought concerning the all-powerful creator and father flitted briefly before Plato but eluded him because it was difficult to connect with his doctrine of ideas, a reason scarcely consistent with the earlier assertion

(p. 118) that the ideas are divine thoughts created by god, the idea of good.

1502. J. van Camp et P. Canart, *Le sens du mot ΘΕΙΟΣ chez Platon*, Louvain 1956 (cf. É. de Strycker, *AntCl* 26, 1957, 458—461; H. Koller, *Gnomon* 29, 1957, 466—468; G. Soleri, *Riv Studi Class* [Torino] 5, 1957, 269—286; I. G. Kidd, *Philos Quart* 8, 1958, 377—378). The special value of this volume resides in its minute analysis of the meaning and implications of the adjective *θειός* in all the contexts in which Plato uses it. In the general conclusion (pp. 409—423) the authors emphasize the independence of the adjective from the substantive *θεός*, assert that one cannot on the basis of this adjective ascribe to the ideas the rôle of supreme god, and maintain that as apart from the vocabulary there is in Plato's works no justification for speaking of a philosophical doctrine of god as superior principle, person, or creator so neither can such a philosophical conclusion be supported by the vocabulary itself.

— W. Beierwaltes, *Lux intelligibilis . . .* (1267 *supra*), pp. 47—51.

1503. S. Casas Blanco, *Crítica ruibalista de las pruebas platónicas de la existencia de Dios*, Augustinus (Madrid) 2, 1957, 197—224.

1504. A. Fox, *Plato and the Christians*, New York/London 1957. The body of this small book consists of translated extracts from the Platonic corpus, passages which according to Archdeacon Fox 'seem to bear in one way or another on Christian theology and morals'. Following these extracts there are 24 'aphorisms' and a summary of *Laws* X, 884—889 D; and preceding them there is a brief introduction containing a strangely naïve section on Plato's religion.

1505. G. François, *Le polythéisme et l'emploi au singulier des mots ΘΕΟΣ, ΔΑΙΜΩΝ dans la littérature grecque d'Homère à Platon*, Paris 1957. Chapter X (pp. 246—304) is devoted to Plato; but see also pp. 312—313, pp. 322—323, pp. 338—339, and pp. 342—344. François concludes that in most cases Plato used (*ô*) *θεός* and (*ôi*) *θεοί* interchangeably and within traditional limits, that he purposely refrained from so designating the ideas or 'the supreme object of philosophical reflection', and that the demiurge is a spiritualization of the *νοῦς* of Anaxagoras not to be identified with the idea of good and unconnected with Plato's religion.

— J.-G. Préaux, *Deus Socratis* (726 *supra*). On the later debate from Varro and Cicero to Tertullian as to whether the demiurge or the world-soul is 'the true god of Plato'.

1506. G. Soleri, Il significato di $\Theta EIO\varsigma$ in Platone, Riv Studi Class (Torino) 5, 1957, 269—286. The interpretation given by van Camp and Canart (1502 *supra*) is here reviewed and analysed as the antithesis to R. Mugnier's in his earlier book with the same title, *Le sens du mot $\Theta EIO\varsigma$ chez Platon* (Paris 1930). Soleri, who in a review published in the preceding year (*Studia Patavina* 3, 1956, 353—358) had severely criticized Manno's theistic interpretation (31 *supra*), here rejects Mugnier's in favor of the view expressed by van Camp and Canart that Plato's orientation was metaphysical and not specifically theological. For further support of this position he refers at the end of this article (p. 286, n. 60) to a study of his own which was in fact published, however, not in 1957 as stated in this note but in 1958 (see 1511 *infra*).

— W. Theiler, Gott und Seele im kaiserzeitlichen Denken (1372 *supra*).

— E. Voegelin, Order and history, Vol. III (36 *supra*). Whatever Plato says about god and religion is here interpreted from a political point of view and in a nebulous 'symbolical' fashion. See for example pp. 151—157, pp. 196—204, pp. 231—239, pp. 254—257, and pp. 263—265. Plato is called the savior who in the *Laws* has withdrawn, his polis being impenetrable by the presence of his divine reality, the founder of a religion who is faced by the problem of translating into a dogma with obligatory force the substance of his mystical communication with god.

1507. J. H. Waszink, Der Platonismus und die althechristliche Gedankenwelt, *Entretiens Ant Cl* 3, Vandoeuvres-Genève 1957, 139—179, especially pp. 164—173 on the theme $\delta\mu\omega\iota\omega\sigma\iota\varsigma\ \vartheta\epsilon\acute{\omega}$ (see 968 *supra*).

— J. Xenakis, On the theological interpretation of Plato's ethics (1272 *supra*).

1508. C. Axelos, Das Phaenomen des Scheines und der Gedanke der Wahrscheinlichkeit im griechischen Denken, *ΠΛΑΤΩΝ* 10, 1958, 209—225. The beginning of this article is concerned with Plato's analysis of $\psi\epsilon\acute{\upsilon}\delta\omicron\varsigma$ in connection with the theological discussion in *Republic* II, 380 D — 383 C. From this Axelos proceeds to argue that Plato and the Greeks generally restricted the notion of probability to the past, their doing so being neither accidental nor the result of neglect in elaborating the notion; and finally he denies that Plato or any Greek knew the concept of 'hypothesis' in the modern scientific sense.

— R. E. Cushman, *Therapeia* . . . (15 *supra*). Cushman holds that Plato's ontology is 'basically theomorphic', and this gives the whole of his book a theological color. See especially, however, pp. 23—26, pp. 53—59, pp. 159—160 (note 60), and pp. 242—281 (The sovereignty of the Good) with the final sentence on p. 281: 'Teleology and the Good, therefore, are conjointly represented by a cosmic intelligence which comes closer than anything else to being Plato's God'.

1509. Cornelia J. de Vogel, *Antike Seinsphilosophie und Christentum im Wandel der Jahrhunderte*, Festgabe Joseph Lortz I, Baden-Baden 1958, pp. 527—548 (especially pp. 537—541 on Plato). See 1489 *supra* for this and Miss de Vogel's other publications on this topic.

1510. S. Eitrem, 'Götter und Daimonen' — Einige Bemerkungen zu Platon, *Phaidr.* 246 E, *Symbol Osl* 34, 1958, 39—42. Beginning with this passage of the *Phaedrus* but drawing upon the *Laws*, *Republic*, and *Symposium* Eitrem argues that Plato in opposition to the tendency of his time to depreciate the 'daimones' conservatively held to the traditional hierarchy in which they came as 'gods of second rank' after the *θεοί* and before the *ἡρώες*.

— A. Manno, *Sul rapporto tra le idee e Dio in Platone* (1278 *supra*). On this see G. Soleri, *Il preteso teismo di Platone* (1517 *infra*).

— W. G. Rabinowitz, *Platonic piety* . . . (472 *supra*).

1511. G. Soleri, *Le dottrine teologiche di Platone*, *Rass Scienze Filosofiche* 11, 1958, 1—30 and 133—160. In this essay, composed apparently before 1506 *supra*, Soleri in opposition to the theistic interpretation as variously represented by W. Jaeger (4 *supra*), A. J. Festugière (1190 *supra* [see also 1472 *supra*]), E. Turolla (305 *supra*), and A. Manno (31 *supra*) maintains that Plato never achieved a theological principle, i.e. a principle that is both absolute and personal. There appear in his works, Soleri argues, different strictly metaphysical principles (the ideas, the idea of good, the one) and other principles of a theological kind (soul, the demiurge, the *παντελῶς ὄν* of *Sophist* 248 E — 249 A [translated here 'ente perfetto' and taken to be a 'personal subject', the highest point reached by Plato's theological intuition]); but of these there is nowhere any unification or reconciliation whether metaphysical or theological, and furthermore the theological is always subordinated to the meta-

physical. See also the article by Soleri published the following year, *Il preteso teismo di Platone* (1517 *infra*).

1512. P. Vicaire, *Platon et Dionysos*, Bull Assoc Budé 4 Sér, Octobre 1958 (3), 15—26. The silence about Dionysus in the *Republic* as against the important place given to him in other dialogues, notably the *Phaedrus* and the *Laws*, is explained partly as a manoeuvre to depreciate the drama but also on the ground of his association rather with the dithyramb, which is retained, than with tragedy, which Plato banishes and of his late connection with which Vicaire suggests that Plato may have had information now lost.

— Alda Barbieri, *Epicuro e le conquiste matematiche-astro-nomiche . . .* (1449 *supra*), pp. 80—82.

1513. G. J. de Vries, *By way of Athens*, Free University Quarterly 6, 1959, pp. 195—206. On Plato in relation to Christianity see p. 197 and pp. 200—206.

1514. J. K. Feibleman, *Religious Platonism: The influence of religion on Plato and the influence of Plato on religion*, London 1959. The second and larger part of this book (pp. 85—224) is devoted to Plato's influence upon religious thought from Aristotle to modern times. In the first part Feibleman begins by asserting that Plato wavered between two philosophies, 'objective idealism', in which the ideas are held to be more real than sensible particulars, and 'realism', according to which 'actual concrete objects are as real as the ideas though not as complete or perfect'; and then, after having distinguished 'the two well-defined Greek religions', the Olympian and the Chthonian, and thirdly the Orphic 'importation', he proceeds to emphasize the Orphic influence on Plato (pp. 57—66) and to maintain (pp. 67—82) that Plato had two religions, a supernaturalism consistent with his idealistic philosophy and with Orphic religion and a naturalism in keeping with his realistic philosophy and with the traditional Greek religion. The essence of Feibleman's interpretation is concentrated in the questionable statement on p. 66: 'Plato was bowled over by Orpheus and never recovered his equilibrium. Metaphysical realism and this-worldliness was what he had wanted to advocate; whereas metaphysical idealism and other-worldliness was the theology to which Orphism brought him'.

— K. Gaiser, *Protreptik und Paränese bei Platon . . .* (1101 *supra*). See especially pp. 210—215 and p. 228 but also p. 101 and p. 199. He takes it for granted that for Plato god and the idea of

good are identical, Platonic philosophy consisting in the 'turning' of man to this idea and the 'binding' of him to the divine.

1515. Virginia Guazzoni Foà, Il concetto di provvidenza nel pensiero classico e in quello pagano, *Giorn Metafisica* 14, 1959, 69—95. The last word in the title of this article is a misprint which should be corrected to 'cristiano'. For Plato see pp. 73—75.

— G. Mainberger, *Die Seinsstufung als Methode und Metaphysik*... (1178 *supra*). See especially p. 97 for his conclusions concerning the mere potentiality in Plato's works for the kind of 'Gottesbeweis' with which this study is concerned.

1516. J. E. Rexine, *Religion in Plato and Cicero*, New York 1959. The material of this comparative study is almost exclusively the religion of Plato's *Laws* and of Cicero's *Laws*. The practical function of religion and the theology of the former are summarized chiefly by means of translated excerpts in two brief chapters (pp. 6—32), two similar chapters are devoted to Cicero (pp. 33—51), and the concluding comparison is given in a single paragraph (p. 52). The final chapter (pp. 53—63) deals with Plato's attitude towards poetry, and was added because that attitude in the author's opinion is intimately connected with the religious and theological principles enunciated in the *Laws*.

— L. Rougier, *La religion astrale des Pythagoriciens* (1334 *supra*).

1517. G. Soleri, Il preteso teismo di Platone, *Rass Scienze Filosofiche* 12, 1959, 234—254. In a review of A. Manno's book, *Il teismo di Platone* (31 *supra*), Soleri had criticized the theistic interpretation there put forward, and in two subsequent articles (1506 *supra* and 1511 *supra*) he had argued that Plato never achieved a theological principle and that his philosophy, though lacking unification even on the metaphysical plane, is in orientation rather metaphysical than theological. Here he reexamines the subject with special reference both to Manno's earlier book (31 *supra*) and to the later monograph, *Sul rapporto tra le idee e Dio in Platone* (1278 *supra*), in which Manno tried to defend his thesis against the criticism of it by G. Reale; and once again Soleri maintains that confrontation with the Platonic texts proves the theistic interpretations generally and that of Manno's specifically to be unhistorical and supports the conclusions which he had himself formulated in his own earlier article, *Le dottrine teologiche di Platone* (1511 *supra*).

V G: Ethics

The subjects of this section and of the three which follow it are in Plato's thought scarcely distinguishable from one another, for his educational and aesthetic theories are determined by his ethics and politics and are understandable only in connection with them, while these are themselves really two facets of the same subject. It is inevitable, therefore, that many publications, which to judge by their titles are concerned specifically with one of the four topics, are equally relevant to one or more of the others; and this is especially true of those which profess their subject to be simply Plato's ethics or Plato's politics. Moreover, such studies frequently and properly become involved in his psychological theories and often, as has been observed at the beginning of the last section (V F *supra*), in his religion and theology as well and through his treatment of the problem of evil, where theology, ethics, and psychology meet, in his ontology and physics besides. Consequently, although in this section and the next an attempt will be made to mention all the publications which within the period covered by this survey have dealt significantly with ethics and with politics respectively, anyone who is interested in either of these topics should not neglect the other section on the assumption that it contains no additional material relevant to his interest. As in the preceding sections, in both of these and in the two to follow them I prefix to the list of works published in the last decade a selection from among those which appeared in the 'thirties and the 'forties.

1518. B. Horváth, Die Gerechtigkeitslehre des Sokrates und des Platon, *Zeitschr. öffentliches Recht* 10, 1930/31, 258—280. After contending that Plato identified morality with justice by isolating one aspect of Socrates' synthetic conception, Horváth undertakes to distinguish the formal aspect of Plato's conception of justice from its content and to establish a strict parallelism in his ethics, politics, psychology, and metaphysics. The formal is order in the multiplicities of soul and of state, the rational content the complete sovereignty of reason over the irrational; but the parallelism with the theory of ideas requires that there be also an irrational content, the realization of the suprarational good, in the face of which the rational content is in the end reduced to mere form, so that justice becomes for Plato the logical moment of the good, the ethical moment of truth.

— H.-G. Gadamer, *Platos dialektische Ethik* (710a *supra*). See especially pp. 115—175 in Gadamer's interpretation of the *Philebus*

and with this his later article on the *Republic*, Platos Staat der Erziehung (780 *supra*).

— J. Hirschberger, Die Phronesis in der Philosophie Platons vor dem *Staat* (1336 *supra*). See especially the second section, Platons kritische Stellungnahme zum ethischen Wert- und Wissensbegriff der Philosophie vor und um ihn (pp. 53—139), and the second chapter of the third section, Die Phronesis in der Ethik und der Pädagogik des Phaidon (pp. 185—195), and in connection with this the article published in the following year, Wert und Wissen im platonischen *Symposion*, Philos Jahrbuch 46, 1933, 201—227. See also the two later articles (1533 and 1534 *infra*).

— H. Kelsen, Justice platonicienne (775 *supra*). See also the later German and English versions of this article listed in 775 *supra* and his more recent article, Platon und die Naturrechtslehre (1704 *infra*), especially pp. 15—30.

1519. J. A. Maurant, Plato's doctrine of temperance, New Scholast 6, 1932, 19—31. Distinguishing a lower kind of σοφροσύνη from a higher kind, he argues that the latter differs from wisdom chiefly in that wisdom is possible only for a few and can be fully practised by them only during the few moments of contemplation, apart from which it serves the social order and so is identical with σωφροσύνη. The latter is also closely connected with justice in the social setting, he contends, but in a wider sense is higher, being both a social virtue like justice and an individual virtue. This treatment of the subject is radically different from Horváth's (1518 *supra* [pp. 268—269]) which was clearly unknown to Maurant.

— B. M. Laing, The problem of justice in Plato's *Republic* (776 *supra*).

— C. R. Morris, Plato's theory of the good man's motive (777 *supra*).

1520. H. Gauss, Das Problem der Willensfreiheit bei Plato, Festschrift für Karl Joël, Basel 1934, pp. 70—87. In this article, the substance of which Gauss restates in his Philosophischer Handkommentar . . . (20 *supra*), I/1, pp. 173—184, the problem, falsely posed by the question whether the will itself is free or not, is said to have been resolved by Plato on the basis of the double principle that wrongdoing is involuntary and man is free only when he does the right, a principle which in the *Laws* (860 D — 864 C) is shown not to be irreconcilable with the apparently contradictory evidence of experience.

— H. W. B. Joseph, Aristotle's definition of moral virtue and Plato's account of justice in the soul (787 *a supra*). In Joseph's book, *Essays in ancient and modern philosophy*, Oxford 1935, in which (pp. 156—177) this essay was reprinted 'with some additions and alterations' the year after its original publication, see also the essay published here (pp. 122—155), *Plato's Republic: The proof that the most just man is the happiest*.

— G. M. A. Grube, Plato's thought (3 *supra*). See pp. 51—86 on pleasure, pp. 216—230 on virtue as knowledge, and pp. 253—258 on the knowledge that is virtue.

1521. F. Guglielmino, Il problema del libero arbitrio nel sistema platonico, *Arch Storia Filosofia* 4, 1935, 197—223 (reprinted separately under the same title, Catania 1936). In opposition to Stenzel's earlier treatment of this subject Guglielmino argues that Plato did not succeed in reconciling liberty with necessity but that the relative freedom of the will in his system amounts in fact to determinism. See in connection with this the essay published by Guglielmino the following year, *Il codice penale di Platone e l'involontarietà del male* (514 *supra*). The two essays were reviewed together by H. Raeder, *Gnomon* 14, 1938, 660—661 and by H. Leisegang, *Phil Woch* 59, 1939, 1041—1044.

1522. O. Kunsemüller, *Die Herkunft der platonischen Kardinaltugenden*, Erlangen 1935 (Diss. München). He traces the canon back to Aeschylus (on this see Helen North, *AJPh* 69, 1948, 304—308) and holds that its acceptance by the Socratic circle caused it to be taken for granted by Plato, who was himself responsible, however, for reducing the number of cardinal virtues to four, a step which he finally took when he wrote the *Republic*. See E. Schwartz, *Ethik der Griechen* (1559 *infra*), pp. 52—53 and note 17 on pp. 230—231.

— L. Robin, *Platon* (7 *supra*), pp. 253—325: *La conduite humaine* (especially pp. 253—275 and pp. 316—325). See also Robin's later book (1527 *infra*) and his article, *Platon et la philosophie des valeurs* (843 *supra*).

— F. Billiesich, *Das Problem des Übels in der Philosophie des Abendlandes I . . .* (1474 *supra*), pp. 27—56. In this section on Plato see especially pp. 35—43 and pp. 50—51 on moral evil and meta-physical freedom.

1523. A. J. Festugière, *La doctrine du plaisir des premiers sages à Épicure*, *Rev Sc Philos Théol* 25, 1936, 233—268. On pp. 247—253

Festugière gives what he calls the final conclusions in the *Philebus* and the *Laws* of the evolution of Plato's thought concerning pleasure.

— M. B. Foster, Some implications of a passage in Plato's *Republic* (853 *supra*).

— A. van Bilsen, Plato's *Charmides* en de Sophrosunè; . . . De beteekenis van de sophrosunè . . . (335 *supra*).

1524. R. Demos, Plato's idea of the good, *Philos Rev* 46, 1937, 245—275. This article, in which the good is treated as the basic ethical principle as well as the supreme metaphysical factor, is reprinted as chapter III (pp. 48—77) of Demos's book, *The philosophy of Plato*, New York 1939 (see 1185 *supra*), of which chapter XVI (pp. 303—337) and part of chapter XVIII (pp. 372—379) are also concerned with Plato's ethics.

— H. B. Hoffleit, An un-Platonic theory of evil in Plato (1366 *supra*).

1525. A. Krystallis, Gerechtigkeitsidee bei Platon, Athens 1937 (Diss. Heidelberg). This was also published under the title *Δικαιοσύνη και δικαία ψυχή παρὰ Πλάτωνι, Ἀρχεῖον φιλοσοφίας καὶ θεωρίας τῶν ἐπιστημῶν* 8, 1937, 147—184 and 338—362.

— J. D. Mabbott, Is Plato's *Republic* utilitarian? (778 *supra*). See also the more recent attack on Prichard's thesis by A. S. Ferguson (1311 *supra*).

— E. M. Manasse, Platons *Sophistes* und *Politikos* . . . (738 *supra*), pp. 84—92 and pp. 158—171.

1526. P. Lachièze-Rey, Les idées morales, sociales et politiques de Platon, Paris 1938 (cf. G. Mathieu, *Rev Ét Anciennes* 41, 1939, 172—174). Originally published in small sections in the *Revue des Cours et Conférences* during 1937 and 1938 and reprinted in an unaltered 'deuxième édition' in 1951, this volume gives a systematic presentation of Plato's ethical and political philosophy avowedly interpreted as an essentially consistent unity with variations on its fundamental theme answering to different conditions and degrees of applicability and not as an evolution of thought determined by the external vicissitudes of personal political experience.

— N. R. Murphy, The 'comparison of lives' in Plato's *Philebus* (710b *supra*). With the conclusions of this article see Murphy's later book, *The interpretation of Plato's Republic* (791 *supra*), pp. 50—56, pp. 95—96, and pp. 222—223.

1527. L. Robin, *La morale antique*, Paris 1938 (cf. C. Mazzantini, *Boll Filol Cl N.S.* 10, 1938/39, 134—140; F. Solmsen, *Philos Rev* 48, 1939, 437—440). This small volume, of which a second 'corrected' impression was published in 1947, is divided into three chapters devoted respectively to the notion of moral good, happiness and virtue, and the psychological conditions of moral action. Plato's doctrine is treated under each of these headings on pp. 34—43, pp. 80—99, and pp. 140—142, p. 147, and pp. 152—153. See also Robin's earlier book, *Platon* (7 *supra* [pp. 253—325]), and his later article, *Platon et la philosophie des valeurs* (843 *supra*).

1528. W. Venske, *Plato und der Ruhm*, Würzburg 1938 (cf. W. Nestle, *Gnomon* 17, 1941, 197—199; W. Luther, *Weltansicht und Geistesleben* [1358 *supra*], pp. 78—81). In contrast to the traditional and aristocratic ethical codes Plato, Venske contends, denies renown as an unconditional moral motive but in contrast to the Cynic morality affirms its value as an external good and as an instrument of political education; nor does this endanger the foundation of his ethics, since it is in the just state, where being and appearance are properly combined, that there exists the possibility of genuine renown, which added to the internal goods makes up the happiness of state and citizens. See in connection with this (especially p. 33) Venske's brief article, *Platons Rede auf den Ruhm Athens*, *Die alten Sprachen* 6, 1941, 77—79.

— H. Zeise, *Der Staatsmann . . .* (739 *supra*). See pp. 85—87 on virtue and courage and pp. 96—99 on the connection of the 'parts of virtue'.

1529. P. Albertelli, *Il problema morale nella filosofia di Platone*, Roma 1939.

1530. A. Diès, *Le rôle moral et social de l'humanisme gréco-latin*, Assoc G. Budé, Congrès de Strasbourg 1938 Actes, Paris 1939, pp. 473—493. The dominant theme of this lecture is the rôle of logos, measure, and proportion in Greek ethics as exemplified particularly by Plato's thought, where what has been mistaken as two inconsistent attitudes is explained by Diès as the two poles of simple morality and the heroic ideal which maintain the constant, rhythmic oscillation of human life.

— J. Moreau, *La construction . . .* (5 *supra*). See in this volume all of the first five chapters (pp. 31—262 [cf. *AJPh* 68, 1947, 114—115]) as well as the ninth (pp. 407—469: *Le bien*) but especially the fifth (pp. 204—262): *Le système de la moralité*. With regard to the

'Socratic paradox' in relation to the 'tripartite psychology' and the question of Plato's development see also Morceau's later article, *Platon et la connaissance de l'âme* (1316 *supra*).

1531. É. Bréhier, *ΑΡΕΤΑΙ ΚΑΘΑΡΣΕΙΣ*, *Rev Ét Anciennes* 42, 1940, 53—58. This article, which is reprinted in the collection of Bréhier's papers, *Études de Philosophie Antique* (Paris 1955), pp. 237—243, is concerned with the 'morality of purification' as understood by Plato and developed by Plotinus, with whose commentaries on the expression in *Phaedo* 69 B—C the article chiefly deals.

1532. B. Giger, *Der Tyrann: Werden und Wesen des tyrannischen Menschen und des Staatstyrannen*, Immensee 1940 (Diss. Zürich). Stress is properly laid here (pp. 40—79) upon the ethical and psychological motives in Plato's treatment of the tyrannical soul as the completely unjust soul which is the contrary of the philosophical soul and enemy to itself as well as to philosophy and to society. Aspects of this theme are later touched upon by K. Büchner, *Hermes* 80, 1952, 368 (in his article, *Der Tyrann und sein Gegenbild in Ciceros 'Staat'*, *ibid.*, pp. 343—371) and by A. Alföldi, *Scientiis Artibusque* 1, 1958, 15—19 (in his lecture, *Der Philosoph als Zeuge der Wahrheit und sein Gegenspieler der Tyrann*, *ibid.* pp. 7—19).

1533. J. Hirschberger, *Quod sit officium sapientis* (S. Thomas, *S.c.g.* I, 1), *Philos Jahrbuch* 53, 1940, 30—44. The connection of knowledge and value in the conception of wisdom for which Thomas of Aquinas cites Aristotle is here traced back to Plato in whose philosophy there was never any separation between metaphysics and ethics, between theoretical and practical reason. This Platonic identification of being and value, distinguishable only conceptually (the axiom, *omne ens est bonum*, being interpreted as an analytic proposition resting upon a synthesis and not being a tautology or leading to a subjective relativism), is explicated in another article published by Hirschberger later in the same year:

1534. J. Hirschberger, *Omne ens est bonum*, *Philos Jahrbuch* 53, 1940, 292—305. After arguing that *Republic* 509 B does not imply the separation of value from being, he interprets the idea of good as the ultimate purpose by participation in which man achieves his own better self, which is the highest value for him but not such by reason of his choice, so that by analogical predication the moral good can be subsumed under the transcendental good without losing its specific character. With this article and the preceding one see also Hirschberger's earlier monograph, *Die Phronesis in der Philo-*

sophie Platons vor dem Staate (1336 *supra*), and his article, Wert und Wissen im platonischen *Symposion*, *Philos Jahrbuch* 46, 1933, 201—227.

1535. F. Kallfelz, Die Charakterkunde in der antiken Philosophie von den Anfängen bis Platon, Berlin 1940, pp. 122—220: Platon.

— H. Koop, Über die Lehrbarkeit der Tugend . . . (1345 *supra*).

— A. Schneider, Die Einheit von Politik und Ethik in den Lehren der Sophisten und in Platos '*Staat*' (781a *supra*).

1536. F. Stroisch, Über die weltanschaulichen Grundlagen der Gerechtigkeitsidee bei Platon: eine rechts- und staatspolitische Untersuchung, Leipzig 1940 (cf. A. Steiner, *Phil Woch* 63, 1943, 1—6). According to the author of this Kiel dissertation, who in general subscribes to Hildebrandt's interpretation (see 669a *supra*), the conception of the 'Kosmosreich' as manifested in the creation-myth of the *Timaeus* is the basis of Plato's ethics and politics and in particular of his notion of justice, the constituents of justice as of the state being purity of blood and the substantial qualities of the soul, while the specific uniformity of Hellenic blood replaces civic equality in the Platonic conception of freedom. Whether this attempt by Stroisch to assimilate Plato's ethics and politics to 'Nationalsozialismus' is characteristic of the two following dissertations with similar titles published in the same year I cannot say, for I have not been able to acquire a copy of either of them:

1537. K. Tilmann, Über die weltanschaulichen Grundlagen der Gerechtigkeitsidee bei Platon, Leipzig 1940.

1538. W. Weyersberg, Die Idee der Gerechtigkeit und der ständische Gedanke in Platons '*Staat*', Gießen 1940.

— A. Diès, *Philèbe* . . . (707 *supra*). In the 'Notice' see especially pp. X—XVII, pp. XXXI—LXX, pp. LXXV—LXXXIX, and pp. XCV—CIX. See also the earlier article by Diès, *Le rôle moral et social* . . . (1530 *supra*), especially pp. 490—491.

— H. Gomperz, Plato on personality (979 *supra*).

1539. A. Kollmann, *Sophrosyne*, *Wiener Studien* 59, 1941, 12—34. See pp. 27—33: Die Erkenntnis der *Sophrosyne*: Platon. With this cf. the later article by G. J. de Vries (1541 *infra*) and especially the latter's remarks (p. 101, n. 1) on Kollmann's treatment.

— K. Marc-Wogau, Der Staat und der Begriff des Guten . . . (779 *supra*). See p. 33, note 1 for his notion that *σωφροσύνη* and

δικαιοσύνη express two different moments in the Platonic conception of 'harmony'.

1540. E. B. Stevens, Pity in Plato's dialogues, *Cl Weekly* 35, 1941/42, 245—246. He concludes that mildness is a virtue in Plato's ethics but compassion is an auxiliary emotion rather than a virtue and that pity as an emotion is a useful assistant to the ruling reason so long as it is disciplined but the designation of it as a virtue is not supported by Plato's treatment. See also 1550 *infra*.

—. H.-G. Gadamer, *Platos Staat der Erziehung* (780 *supra*). See also his earlier book, *Platos dialektische Ethik* (710a *supra*), pp. 115—175.

—. A. R. Henderickx, *De rechtvaardigheid in de Staat van Platoon* (793a *supra*).

1541. G. J. de Vries, *Σωφροσύνη* en grec classique, *Mnem* III 11, 1943, 81—101. For Plato see pp. 97—98 and pp. 100—101.

1542. W. C. Greene, *Moira: Fate, Good, and Evil in Greek thought*, Cambridge (Mass.) 1944. For Plato see besides the chapter that bears his name (pp. 277—316) the treatment of Socrates and the sophists (pp. 221—276), in much of which the interpretation of Plato himself is involved. Among the reviews of the book cf. for Greene's interpretation of Plato especially J. Tate, *Cl Rev* 59, 1945, 13—14, and A. J. Festugière, *Rev Philol* 3 Sér 22, 1948, 161—177 (this latter amounting to an independent essay on the problem of evil in Plato).

—. R. G. Hoerber, The theme of Plato's *Republic* (781 *supra*).

—. W. Jaeger, *Paideia* (4 *supra*), II, pp. 141—164 (*Arete als philosophisches Problem*) and pp. 273—281 (*Der Ursprung der Idee des besten Staates aus dem Problem der Gerechtigkeit*). With this latter section see *Die Antike* 10, 1934, 13 in Jaeger's essay, *Die griechische Staatsethik im Zeitalter Platons* (pp. 1—16), and also his later lecture (1575 *infra*).

1543. R. Mondolfo, *La etica antigua y la noción de conciencia moral*, Córdoba 1944 (*Publicaciones del Instituto de Filosofía y Humanidades* No. 41). The different sections of this essay reappear in different parts of Mondolfo's book, *La comprensión del sujeto humano en la cultura antigua* (1359 *supra*), the pages of the essay dealing with Plato (pp. 19—22) becoming the section of the later book entitled (pp. 409—416) *Platón: La conciencia del pecado y la responsabilidad, la sanción interior de la conciencia*.

— L. Robin, *Platon et la philosophie des valeurs* (843 *supra*). See also Robin's earlier works, *Platon* (7 *supra* [pp. 253—325]) and *La morale antique* (1527 *supra*).

— R. Schaerer, *Dieu, l'homme et la vie d'après Platon* (1137 *supra*). See especially in the fourth chapter (*Notre transition terrestre*) the sections on evil (pp. 123—137) and on the formula for the good life (pp. 138—144) and in the fifth chapter pp. 159—169 on moral responsibility, freedom, and determinism or the 'data' of moral living. See also Schaerer's later articles, 1553 *infra* and 1111 *supra*.

— E. R. Dodds, *Plato and the irrational* (243b *supra*). See especially pp. 17—20 for the thesis that Plato's ethical thought moved steadily away from the intellectualistic attitude which was a general inheritance from the rationalism of the fifth century, the meaning of which he first transformed by giving it a 'metaphysical extension'. The substance of these pages and much of the expression are repeated in Dodds's later book, *The Greeks and the irrational* (230 *supra*), pp. 208—216. See there p. 17 and p. 26, n. 105 for the assertion that the Socratic paradoxes were merely the explicit formulation of what had long been an ingrained habit of thought and pp. 184—185 for the Protagorean view of human nature and the Socratic as set out against each other by Plato.

— R. Hackforth, *Plato's examination of pleasure* (708 *supra*), pp. 4—10, pp. 31—36, pp. 51—112, and pp. 122—139. See also the article published by Hackforth in the following year:

1544. R. Hackforth, *Moral evil and ignorance in Plato's ethics*, *Cl Quart* 40, 1946, 118—120. With special reference to *Sophist* 227 D and *Laws* 863 Bff. Hackforth argues that Plato in these dialogues does not intend to modify his earlier doctrine but, having come to recognize the defect of his account in *Republic* IV, 'over-compensates' for it in these passages and thereby obscures his real belief which is better expressed in *Timaeus* 86 Bff. See J. Gould, *The development of Plato's ethics* (1567 *infra*), p. 201.

1545. A. Jagu, *Épictète et Platon: Essai sur les relations du Stoïcisme et du Platonisme à propos de la Morale des Entretiens*, Paris 1946 (cf. A.-J. Festugière, *Rev Ét Grecques* 59—60, 1946/47, 506—508). See especially pp. 19—46, where Jagu attempts to identify the ethical theses of Plato which despite the fundamental differences between Platonism and Stoicism are anticipations of Stoic ethical doctrine. See also Jagu's later article on the Platonic conception of freedom (1566 *infra*).

1546. J. Wild, *Plato's theory of man*, Cambridge (Mass.) 1946. On this cf. the reviews by Vlastos and Cherniss cited in 1396 *supra*, Wild's earlier article which is here reprinted as chapter 2. In Wild's later book, *Plato's modern enemies and the theory of natural law* (66 *supra*), the fifth chapter of which (pp. 134—156) is entitled *Plato as the founder of moral realism and natural-law philosophy*, see especially pp. 137—149: *The ontological foundations of Platonic ethics*.

1547. C. del Grande, *Hybris: Colpa e castigo nell' espressione poetica e letteraria degli scrittori della Grecia antica da Omero a Cleante*, Napoli 1947 (cf. C. Mazzantini, *Riv Filolog* CI 28, 1950, 155—158; J. A. Philip, *AJPh* 73, 1952, 432—436), pp. 320—348. According to del Grande the term kept its traditional meaning for Plato as an active concept despite the various ways in which he used the word; its area of meaning largely coincides with *ἁδικία*, and it is above all opposed to *σωφροσύνη* as chaos to cosmos.

—. A. J. Festugière, *Platon et l'Orient* (243 *supra*). See pp. 34—44 of this article for Festugière's interpretation of the problem of evil in Plato, an interpretation which he summarized again the next year in his review of W. C. Greene's book, *Moirā . . .* (1542 *supra*), *Rev Philol* 3 Sér 22, 1948, 161—177 and developed at greater length the year after that in his own book, *La Révélation d'Hermès Trismégiste II: Le Dieu Cosmique* (1000 *supra*), pp. 100—149.

1548. Helen North, *A period of opposition to Sôphrosynê in Greek thought*, *Trans Am Philol Assoc* 78, 1947, 1—17. See pp. 11—16 and especially pp. 15—16 for Plato's emphasis upon *σωφροσύνη* and his distinction of higher and lower varieties interpreted as a response to the hostile attitude towards this traditional virtue which prevailed in the intellectual Athenian circles during his youth.

—. Simone Pétrement, *Le dualisme chez Platon . . .* (244 *supra*), pp. 79—109.

1549. C. Librizzi, *Il problema del libero arbitrio in Platone*, *Sophia* 16, 1948, 190—194 and 319—325. This article was later reprinted as chapter VII (pp. 96—112) of Librizzi's book, *I Problemi fondamentali della filosofia di Platone* (29 *supra*), in which see also chapter VIII (pp. 113—135): *Il problema morale*.

1550. E. B. Stevens, *Envy and pity in Greek philosophy*, *AJPh* 69, 1948, 171—189. For Plato see pp. 174—179, pp. 180—181, pp. 183—184 and with this the earlier article, *Pity in Plato's dialogues* (1540 *supra*).

1551. C. Cossio, *La filosofía y la ciudad humana*, Actas Primer Cong Nac Filos, Mendoza 1949, I, pp. 547—550. Plato's conception of justice as the total equilibrium of the other virtues applying to the morality of the individual is here contrasted to Aristotle's notion that justice is the specific virtue of law and not of an individual, and this is then related to problems in the modern philosophy of law.

— É. des Places, *Pindare et Platon* (222 *supra*). See pp. 116—132 on the unity of virtue especially with regard to the question of courage and pp. 155—162 on virtue and knowledge. See also his later essay (1577 *infra*).

— G. C. Field, *The philosophy of Plato* (10 *e supra*), pp. 66—107: Moral and political theory.

— V. Goldschmidt, *La religion de Platon* (1309 *supra*). See pp. 56—62 (*Le problème du mal*) and pp. 84—91 (*Le choix des conditions*).

1552. M. C. D. Kuilman, *Gedachten over geluk en adel bij Platoon*, Vlaardingen 1949 (cf. Broos, *Mnem* IV 3, 1950, 168—170). In this Leiden dissertation Plato's conception of *εὐδαιμονία* is traced back to a notion of felicity as a collective possession of the landed aristocracy, itself a conflation of the martial felicity of an invading Indo-Germanic chivalry and the conception of agricultural prosperity taken over and transposed by these invaders.

1553. R. Schaerer, *L'homme et ses plans de responsabilité chez Platon*, Proc Tenth Internat Cong Philosophy I Fasc 2, Amsterdam 1949, 1081—1083. He argues here that in ascribing wrong-doing to ignorance Plato still subordinates determinism to freedom, having man voluntarily engage himself in the train of his destiny and even so remain free so far as virtue is concerned. See Schaerer's earlier book, *Dieu, l'homme et la vie d'après Platon* (1137 *supra* [pp. 123—137 and pp. 159—169]), and his later article, *The mythical portrayal of evil and of the fall of man* (1111 *supra*).

— C. Librizzi, *I problemi fondamentali della filosofia di Platone* (29 *supra*), pp. 113—135: *Il problema morale*. See for the preceding chapter of this book (pp. 96—112) the item 1549 *supra*.

— M. Meldrum, *Plato and the ἈΡΧΗ ΚΑΚΩΝ* (1369 *supra*). See especially pp. 70—74 on the material and spiritual views of evil which according to Meldrum were never really reconciled or systematized by Plato.

1554. P. Prini, *Itinerari del platonismo perenne*, Torino 1950. This small volume consists of four essays, in the first of which, *L'etica della contemplazione creatrice e il suo fondamento nella teologia di Plotino*, the ethics of Plato, interpreted as one of flight from the world and detachment, is treated as the background to what Prini considers the positive ethical doctrine of Plotinus (cf. Maria Rezzani, *Sophia* 20, 1952, 279).

— A. S. Ferguson, *The Platonic choice of lives* (1311 *supra*). The avowed purpose of this article is to show the defects of the tradition taken for granted by H. A. Prichard when he maintained that according to Plato a man in performing an action deliberately, even if he does what is virtuous or speculates, does it simply from the desire to become happy. See also 778 *supra* for J. D. Mabbott's earlier argument against Prichard's thesis and that of M. B. Foster and Foster's rejoinder to Mabbott.

1555. P. Boyancé, *Platon et le vin*, Bull Assoc G Budé, Nouvelle Série, Décembre 1951 (4) = *Lettres d'Humanité* 10, 3—19. Against the background of the rôle of the symposium in Athenian life Boyancé here analyses Plato's conception of the uses of wine and the function of drinking especially as reflected in his comments and regulations in the *Laus*. See also A. P. McKinlay's article, *Attic temperance* (1558 *infra*).

1556. J. Jérôme, *La volonté dans la philosophie antique*, Laval Théol Philos 7, 1951, 249—261. Plato is summarily treated (pp. 255—257) as having emphasized the intellectual or physiological causes of the voluntary act but having failed to recognize the integrating function of the will.

1557. I. Lana, *L'etica di Democrito*, Riv Filos 42, 1951, 13—29. The ethical and political thought of Democritus is here declared (p. 29) to have been the very antithesis to that of Plato's and hence to have been congenial to Cynicism, which had been developed in violent opposition to Platonism.

— C. W. R. Larson, *The Platonic synonyms, δικαιοσύνη and σωφροσύνη* (830 *supra*).

1558. A. P. McKinlay, *Attic temperance*, Quart Journ Studies on Alcohol 12, 1951, 61—102. On Plato's attitude towards the use of wine and his proposals for the regulation of drinking see pp. 70—73, pp. 79—80, pp. 87—89, and pp. 99—100. Compare with this the article by P. Boyancé (1555 *supra*).

— G. Müller, Studien zu den platonischen Nomoi (528 *supra*). See pp. 13—23 on the doctrine of virtue, pp. 51—56 on involuntary wrong-doing, pp. 59—67 on hedonism in *Laws* II and V, and pp. 74—78 on ethical concepts in *Laws* V.

— N. R. Murphy, The interpretation of Plato's *Republic* (791 *supra*). See especially pp. 1—23, pp. 45—67, and pp. 87—96 on justice and its advantages, pp. 28—36 on psychology and ethics, pp. 81—86 on the political analogy and personal morality, and pp. 207—223 on pleasure. With this compare Murphy's earlier article on the *Philebus* (710b *supra*).

1559. E. Schwartz, Ethik der Griechen, Stuttgart 1951 (cf. H. Langerbeck, *Gnomon* 24, 1952, 121—127; W. J. Verdenius, *Erasmus* 6, 1953, 804—807). In this volume edited with additional notes by W. Richter on the basis of lectures delivered by Schwartz in 1933/1935 see for Plato especially p. 18, pp. 92—99, pp. 120—125, and pp. 151—152.

1560. B. Snell, Theorie und Praxis im Denken des Abendlandes, Hamburg 1951 (Hamburger Universitätsreden 13). For Plato see pp. 14—18 of this Rektoratsrede which is reprinted with slight alterations in the third edition of Snell's book, Die Entdeckung des Geistes (Hamburg 1955), pp. 401—411, where the passage on Plato occurs on pp. 406—409.

— T. G. Tuckey, Plato's 'Charmides' (338 *supra*). The whole monograph is important for the study of *σωφροσύνη*, the relation of knowledge to virtue, and Plato's ethics generally.

1561. F. Wehrli, Ethik und Medizin: Zur Vorgeschichte der aristotelischen Mesonlehre, *Mus Helvet* 8, 1951, 36—62. Contrasting Aristotle's conception of the mean to Plato's limit or absolute measure Wehrli derives the former from the medical theory of the fifth century which made health a balance of opposing elements and, taking Aristotelian ethics to be an autonomous development from an anthropology based upon a monistic psycho-physiology, finds in this characteristic the roots of its opposition to Platonic ethics for which the spiritual as an independent principle is subject to its own special laws.

— L. W. Beals, On appearing just and being unjust (818 *supra*). His contention is that by elaborating a story of reality and the good which does not suggest the necessity of ignorance, defect, and limitation Plato in attempting to provide a basis for ethics makes

ethics a mystery. See the reply by Edith W. Schipper cited with this article in 818 *supra*.

1562. C. J. de Vogel, *Het probleem van het kwade in de antieke wijsbegeerte*, *Studia Catholica* 27, 1952, 20—38. See pp. 21—27 and pp. 28—29 for her treatment of Plato here, who, she maintains, is the first to have stated explicitly and emphatically the problem of evil. Evil exists and may not be ascribed to god (see 1489 *supra* on her notion of Plato's god), nor will she allow that it is to be explained by an evil world-soul or that matter or the sensible world is for Plato evil or the principle of evil but only that somatic existence is less perfect than intelligible being by reason of an element in it (i.e. the indeterminate dyad) which is itself not real existence but a negative limiting concept at the bottom of the hierarchy of being.

— F. Egermann, *Sokrates und das platonische Menschenbild* (135 *supra*). On this interpretation of Plato's ethics and of his ideal incorporated in the figure of Socrates as the perfected realization of a new morality exhibited by the heroic figures of Sophoclean drama see A. Barigazzi, *Athenaeum* N.S. 30, 1952, 226—228, and A. Lesky, *Anz Altertums* 7, 1954, 142—143. Lesky's criticism is vehemently rejected by Egermann in his later essay, *Arete und tragische Bewußtheit bei Sophokles und Herodot* (Vom Menschen in der Antike hrsg. von F. Hörmann, München 1957, 5—128), pp. 90—93 (Anhang V). In this essay Egermann further maintains (see pp. 11—14, 22, 24, 44 [with note 26], 73—78) that a single line of development and articulation leads from Homer's ideal of heroic virtue through that of Sophocles and of Herodotus to Plato's conception of virtue and of the *καλὸς καγαθός* (cf. K. Vretska, *Anz Altertums* 11, 1958, 92—93).

— D. Faucci, *Morale e politica in Platone* (68 *supra*). On this see G. Semerari's article (69 *supra*) and D. Pesce's review, *Atene e Roma* N.S. 1956, 75—76.

— H. Gauss, *Philosophischer Handkommentar . . .* (20 *supra*), I/1, pp. 45—48, pp. 141—147, pp. 158—163, and pp. 172—194 (for pp. 173—184 see also his earlier article, *Das Problem der Willensfreiheit bei Plato* [1520 *supra*]).

— V. Guarrella, *Intorno al rapporto tra morale greca e morale cristiana* (465 *supra*).

— N. Gulley, *Ethical analysis in Plato's earlier dialogues* (137 *supra*).

— L. Moulinier, *Le pur et l'impur dans la pensée des Grecs . . .* (1312 *supra*), pp. 364—380, pp. 390—395, and p. 400.

— J.-P. Vernant, *Prométhée et la fonction technique* (765 *supra*).

— G. J. de Vries, *Plato's beeld van de mens* (1314 *supra*).

1563. E. Levinas, *Liberté et commandement*, *Rev Métaph et Morale* 58, 1953, 264—272. This discussion of the problem of freedom and of action and of obedience to external law instituted to preserve freedom from tyranny turns largely upon Plato's treatment of the problem and his recognition that philosophy, the interiorization of the order of rational command, is the sole immunization against tyranny.

— E. Marcellusi, *Critone e l'angelo del Signore* (400 *supra*).

1564. H. Weinstock, *Die Tragödie des Humanismus: Wahrheit und Trug im abendländischen Menschenbild*, Heidelberg 1953 (cf. *O. Regenbogen, Gnomon* 26, 1954, 289—299). The purpose of this book, twice reprinted (1954 and 1956), is to indict as false and dangerous doctrine the humanism that arrogates to man control of his own destiny and to contrast as the true humanism the tragic view of man as a responsible agent yet ultimately dependent upon the incomprehensible will of god. Among the representatives of this true humanism in antiquity Weinstock places Socrates (pp. 70—77) and Plato (pp. 77—100), who recognized that man is essentially self-contradictory, that the highest justice is for human reason the most horrible injustice, and that the human tragedy is a divine comedy. The contrast between Aristotle's conception of man's absolute moral freedom and Plato's conception of human freedom as an insoluble riddle is further emphasized by Weinstock in his later lecture, *Das Menschenbild bei Plato und Aristoteles* (1571 *infra*).

1565. F. Zucker, *Verbundenheit von Erkenntnis und Wille im griechischen Sprachbewußtsein beleuchtet durch Erscheinungen aus der Bedeutungsentwicklung von ἀγνοια, ἀγνοεῖν, ἀγνόημα*, *Studies Presented to David Moore Robinson II*, St. Louis 1953, pp. 1063—1071. The linguistic phenomenon is thought by Zucker to provide a solution to the problem of the Socratic-Platonic doctrine of virtue as knowledge.

— H. Cherniss, *The sources of evil according to Plato* (1370 *supra*).

— J. Derbolav, *Erkenntnis und Entscheidung . . .* (16 *supra*). See pp. 136—169 and pp. 177—234 in the chapter entitled *Platon*

und das 'Gute', pp. 244—261 on the origin of evil, pp. 265—269 on hedonism, and pp. 387—403 on freedom and the good.

1566. A. Jagu, La conception platonicienne de la liberté, Assoc G Budé, Congrès de Tours et Poitiers 1953 Actes, Paris 1954, pp. 181—183. The full text of this article was published two years later in *Mélanges Auguste Diès*, Paris 1956, pp. 129—139 (see 567 *supra*). According to Jagu Plato, while he clearly recognized the metaphysical conditions of freedom, was prevented by his fidelity to Socratic intellectualism from escaping determinism altogether or from so much as suspecting that human freedom requires the superiority of will over intelligence and that what is tragic about humanity is just the possibility of divorce between the two. See also Jagu's earlier monograph (1545 *supra*).

—. G. B. Kerferd, *Cl Quart N.S.* 4, 1954, 87—88 in his article, Plato's noble art of sophistry (154 *supra*). Kerferd argues against the assertion often made in connection with theories of the development of Plato's ethics that in *Sophist* 227 D — 230 A Plato distinguishes two kinds of wrong-doing, one springing from ignorance and the other from conflict between parts of the soul.

—. H. Marcus, *Plato und die Tugendtafel...* (1320 *supra*).

—. G. Semerari, *Filosofia ed esistenza umana in Platone* (69 *supra*).

—. R. Stark, *Aristotelesstudien* (443 *supra*), pp. 28—29, pp. 65—68, pp. 70—72, and p. 76, n. 1. See Stark's assertion (p. 70) that for Plato ethics was practical metaphysics, so much so that he neglected and violated *φύσις* (cf. W. J. Verdenius, *Mnem* IV 9, 1956, 266—267).

1567. J. Gould, *The development of Plato's ethics*, Cambridge 1955 (cf. T. G. Rosenmeyer, *Cl Weekly* 49, 1955/56, 72—73; N. Gulley, *Philosophy* 31, 1956, 376—379; H. Kuhn, *Gnomon* 28, 1956, 336—340; G. Vlastos, *Philos Rev* 66, 1957, 226—238). The development here ascribed to Plato is a steady movement away from the personal idealism of Socrates (for whom *ἐπιστήμη* was not intellectualistic contemplation but a moral skill amounting to subjective faith) to the abandonment of idealistic morality and the replacement of the individual by society as the unit of virtue, a movement which Gould characterizes as 'a progressive coming to terms with the possible' accompanied by increasing disillusion, despair, and weariness until in the *Laws* the final seal of doom is

set on the Socratic approach. Gould takes as self-evident the 'overall pessimism' and 'articulate despair' of the *Timaeus* and says that in this work is made explicit the source of pessimism in the later dialogues to which he supposes the *Timaeus* to be a prelude, but Festugière asserted just as unequivocally (Rev Philos 3 Sér 22, 1948, 161) that Plato's thought evolved from the radical pessimism of the *Gorgias*, the *Phaedo*, and the *Republic* to the relative optimism of the *Timaeus* and the *Laws*; and one who puts these statements side by side must be excused for feeling suspicious about such categories and the reconstructions of Plato's development that are based upon them.

— R. Mondolfo, *La comprensión del sujeto humano en la cultura antigua* (1359 *supra*). See pp. 409—416 for Plato on the consciousness of sin, responsibility, and the inner sanction of the conscience (compare the earlier version of this in 1543 *supra*); pp. 499—511 on Plato's attitude towards work (with this see the contemporary article by Mondolfo, *Lavoro e conoscenza*... [1360 *supra*]); and pp. 548—556 on Plato with regard to the 'creativity of spirit' and the idea of progress (see also 748 *supra*). In the Italian translation of this book listed in 1359 *supra* the sections here mentioned are printed on pp. 487—497, pp. 603—618, and pp. 665—674 respectively.

1568. J. Monestier, *L'idée de justice dans la philosophie de Platon*, Montpellier 1955. I have been unable to procure a copy of this address delivered at the Audience solennelle de rentrée du 16 septembre 1955 de la cour d'appel de Montpellier.

1569. M. Pohlenz, *Griechische Freiheit: Wesen und Werden eines Lebensideals*, Heidelberg 1955. See pp. 89—102 with pp. 107—109, pp. 133—134, and pp. 174—176 for the treatment of Plato as having given the notion of political freedom a clear philosophical foundation by relating external freedom to inner moral freedom, the absolute sovereignty of reason in the individual as in the cosmos.

— R. Schaerer, *The mythical portrayal of evil and of the fall of man* (1111 *supra*). See also 1553 *supra* for Schaerer's earlier essay, *L'homme et ses plans de responsabilité chez Platon*, and for the relevant passages in his earlier book (1137 *supra*).

1570. P. Siwek, *The problem of evil in the theory of dualism*, Laval Théol Philos 11, 1955, 67—80. Representing Plato as having held that the source of evil is matter until under Oriental influence he changed his opinion and in the *Laws* and *Epinomis* declared it

to be an evil world-soul, Siwek without mentioning any of the arguments that have been presented against this interpretation then undertakes to refute Zoroastrian and Manichaeic dualism.

— W. J. Verdenius, *Plato Rep.* 433 A—E (65 *supra*). Criticizing the interpretation of justice in relation to the other virtues given by Murphy (791 *supra*) and others but without noticing Larson's article on the subject (830 *supra*), Verdenius contends that Plato believed in the existence of four different virtues, one of which, justice, raises the other three to their highest level by assigning to them their proper places within the whole of life.

1571. H. Weinstock, *Das Menschenbild bei Plato und Aristoteles*. This lecture, a summary of which is printed in *Humanismus und Christentum* (Schriftenreihe der Evang Akad Hamburg, Heft 8 [Hamburg 1955], pp. 4—6), was then published in full in Weinstock's book, *Realer Humanismus: Eine Ausschau nach Möglichkeiten seiner Verwirklichung*, Heidelberg 1955, which is a kind of supplement to *Die Tragödie des Humanismus . . .* (1564 *supra*).

— J. Xenakis, *Plato on ethical disagreement* (718 *supra*).

— F. Dirlmeier, *Aristoteles: Nikomachische Ethik* (1361 *supra*), pp. 298—304. See also p. 309 with the note in *Wiener Studien* referred to in 1323 *supra*; pp. 566—567 (829 *supra*); and pp. 281—283 (cf. I. Düring, *Gnomon* 29, 1957, 184).

— G. Fraile, *Ser, saber y virtud en Platón* (1259 *supra*).

— R. Joly, *Le thème philosophique des genres de vie . . .* (232 *supra*).

— R. C. Lodge, *The philosophy of Plato* (30 *supra*), pp. 61—112: *Ethics*.

1572. S. Brasa Rodriguez, *Contribución Platónica para un mundo mejor*, *Helmantica* 7, 1956, 329—344. This is an address delivered at the opening of the academic year at the University of Salamanca.

— *Plato, Philebus and Epinomis . . .* by A. E. Taylor (409 *supra*). See Taylor's Introduction to the *Philebus*, pp. 13—30, pp. 35—37, and pp. 54—99 (cf. J. Tate, *Cl Rev N.S.* 7, 1957, 212—213).

1573. J. Tenkku, *The evaluation of pleasure in Plato's ethics*, Helsinki 1956 (cf. J. Moreau, *Rev Ét Anciennes* 59, 1957, 420—421;

M. Vanhoutte, *Rev Philos Louvain* 56, 1958, 510—512). In view of the initial assertion that despite Plato's own contrary conviction a great part of his ethics can be understood without his metaphysics (p. 11) it is not surprising that this review of what is said about pleasure in the *Protagoras*, the *Gorgias*, the *Phaedo*, the *Republic*, and the *Philebus* proves to be superficial and often naïve. In the end Tenkku believes Plato to have agreed with his hedonistic opponents in holding that desire is one criterion of good but in disagreement with them to have maintained that satisfaction of man's ultimate desire comes not from pleasure but from seeking the highest good, to which his own nature is somehow akin.

— A. Vergez, *Technique et morale chez Platon* (1406 *supra*).

1574. M. Villey, *Sur l'antique inclusion du droit dans la morale*, *Archiv Rechts- und Sozialphilos* 42, 1956, 15—30. This essay has to do with the two senses of *δίκαιον*, which before Aristotle isolated the narrow sense and defined it as a social virtue exercised only in the relation among men meant morality as a whole, the sum of all the virtues, although seen as only one among four when the cardinal virtues are classified. In disengaging the exteriority of law Aristotle, Villey contends, did not take law out of the realm of morals, however; he too insisted upon the necessity of a stable law within morality as had Plato, for whom to be just was, as the larger and older sense of the word implies, to live in total conformity with the whole moral law.

— Plato's *Protagoras* . . . with an Introduction by G. Vlastos (756 *supra*), pp. xxxviii—lvi. With this see the later essay by Vlastos, *The paradox of Socrates* (147 *supra*).

— R. Demos, A note on *Σωφροσύνη* in Plato's *Republic* (799 *supra*).

— E. G. Ballard, *Plato's movement from an ethics of the individual to a science of particulars* (801 *supra*).

1575. W. Jaeger, *Die Griechen und das philosophische Lebensideal*, *Zeitschr philos Forsch* 11, 1957, 481—496. This is a lecture on the ideal of the contemplative life as developed in the work of Plato and of Aristotle. For Plato see pp. 487—489 and the remark that the theoretical life of the philosopher, which in the beginning had been tolerated as a purely individual eccentricity, becomes for Plato the centre of the social organism, since the contemplation of being becomes the foundation of the best life.

- M. O'Brien, Plato and the 'Good Conscience' 568 (*supra*).
 - H. Reiner, Unrechttun ist schlimmer als Unrechtleiden (487 *supra*).
 - W. Spöerri, Encore Platon et l'Orient (259 *supra*), pp. 209—214 on Platonic 'dualism' and the theory of evil.
 - G. Vlastos, Socratic knowledge and Platonic 'pessimism' (749 *supra*). This is a critique of Gould's book and is listed among the reviews of it in 1567 *supra*.
 - J. Xenakis, On the theological interpretation of Plato's ethics (1272 *supra*).
1576. C. O. Brink, Plato on the natural character of goodness, *Harvard Studies in Class Phil* 63, 1958, 193—198. On the basis of *Charmides* 163 C—D, *Lysis* 221 D—222 D, *Republic* 586 E, and *Symposium* 205 E Brink argues that to Plato it is 'only the best for each that is also most akin', so that *oikeiōn* does and does not qualify as a Platonic definition of goodness. He then suggests that the difficulty of this position caused early Academics to take up the question anew and that in controversy with Polemo Zeno gave a 'more tough-minded answer' to the problems posed by the assumption of natural goodness.
- R. E. Cushman, *Therapeia* . . . (15 *supra*). See especially pp. 30—51 (The human plight and Plato's task), pp. 52—76 (Virtue and knowledge, where Cushman tries to explain away the Socratic paradox in accordance with his 'volitional' interpretation of Plato), pp. 251—254 (Knowledge as personal decision), pp. 269—276 (The final preference of the human mind), and pp. 287—301 on the conception of wisdom and Cushman's evaluation of Plato's 'therapeia'.
1577. É. des Places, L'éducation des tendances chez Platon et Aristote, *Archives de Philos* 21 cahier 3, 1958, 410—422. See especially pp. 410—417 (Platon: L'instinct de la vertu) where des Places dwells upon the place in Platonic ethics accorded to feeling and to instinct and upon the importance in Plato's ethical and educational theories of pleasures and pains as factors contributing to the formation of virtuous habits and as means of testing the stability of such habits. For a more extensive discussion of the same subject see pp. 32—45 of Funke's monograph (1578 *infra*).
- A.-J. Festugière, Les trois vies (866 *supra*), pp. 137—143 and p. 146, where it is stated that from the *Phaedo* and the *Republic*

onwards, although the model that is the object of contemplation changed, the moral life for Plato always remained directly dependent upon contemplation of that model and assimilation to it.

1578. G. Funke, *Gewohnheit*, *Archiv für Begriffsgeschichte* 3, 1958, 7—606. See pp. 32—45: Die wahlbestimmende Kraft der 'ethischen' Lebensgewohnheiten (Platon). With this section see also pp. 78—83 and pp. 86—87 for references to Plato in his discussion of *ἔξις*, *ἔθος*, *ἥθος*, *συνήθεια*, *νόμος* und 'zweite Natur' im klassischen Denken.

1579. M. O'Brien, Modern philosophy and Platonic ethics, *Journ Hist Ideas* 19, 1958, 451—472. Analysing the interpretations of the Socratic paradoxes in Platonic ethics propounded by a dozen scholars from Grote to Friedländer O'Brien argues that much of their disagreement derives from their employment of modern conceptions such as the faculty of will, the issue of free will and determinism, and the contrast of metaphysical and psychological freedom, which are unsuitable and irrelevant to Plato's own analyses and obscure his real meaning.

1580. A. E. Raubitschek, *Ein neues Pittakeion*, *Wiener Studien* 71, 1958, 170—172. He traces back to Pittacus a maxim of personal morality concerning *σωφροσύνη*, which having been generalized by Critias was then, as Mewaldt contended, reinterpreted by Plato and made by him one of the foundations of classical morality and political ethics.

— A. Rigobello, *L'intellettualismo in Platone* (34 *supra*), pp. 118—120.

1581. F. Egermann, *Platonische Spätphilosophie und Platonismen bei Aristoteles*, *Hermes* 87, 1959, 133—142. The apparent difference of ethical concepts in the *Republic* and the *Laws*, sometimes taken to show a transition from Plato's earlier position to an 'Aristotelian' ethics, is to be explained, Egermann contends, not by any such hypotheses of development but by the special purpose of the *Laws* as distinguished from that of the *Republic* and means only that Plato recognized throughout two different levels of morality, a higher based upon metaphysical insight and a lower, which is based upon habituation but which depends for its existence and its sanction upon the higher. In the remainder of the article similar objections are made to hypotheses of Aristotle's development.

1582. J. Ferguson, *Moral values in the ancient world*, New York 1959 (cf. A. H. Armstrong, *Hibbert Journ* 57, 1958/59, 297—298).

For Plato, who is here assumed to have been deeply influenced by Hinduism through Pythagoras as an intermediary, see pp. 24—30, 35, 41, 43—45 (on the cardinal virtues), pp. 62—63 (on friendship), pp. 84—95 (on eros), pp. 138—141 (on self-sufficiency).

— J.-C. Fraisse, *Ascétisme et valeur de la vie chez Platon* (1378 *supra*).

— R. W. Hall, *Justice and the individual in the Republic* (1365 *supra*).

1583. G. Lieberg, *Geist und Lust: Untersuchungen zu Demokrit, Plato, Xenokrates und Herakleides Pontikus*, Tübingen 1959. Two thirds of this monograph (pp. 11—36) are devoted to Plato under the sub-title, *Die Lust als integrierender Bestandteil des platonischen Denkens*, and of this section the largest part (pp. 18—36) is concerned with the *Philebus*. Lieberg here leans heavily upon the version of his dissertation published in the preceding year, *Die Lehre von der Lust in den Ethiken des Aristoteles* (München 1958 [Zetemata 19]), where for the many references to Plato and especially to the *Philebus* see pp. 27—42, pp. 62—79, pp. 87—93, and pp. 100—108.

1584. G. Lieberg, *Die Stellung der griechischen Philosophie zur Lust*, *Gymnasium* 66, 1959, 128—137. Here on pp. 133—135 Lieberg summarizes his interpretation of Plato's theory of pleasure, again chiefly on the basis of the *Philebus*.

V H: Politics and Society

Perusal of the last section (V G *supra*) will have confirmed what was said at the beginning of it concerning the intimate connection between much of its material and what must be included in the present section and will have made the division between works on Plato's ethics and those on his political thought appear to be a painfully arbitrary one. It would be even more arbitrary and quite misleading besides to subdivide this section and by isolating in one subdivision or another studies of Plato's political or economic or legal theories or of his analysis and critique of contemporary societies and his conception of the historical causes of such actual conditions to suggest that any of these does not involve interpretations relevant to the topics of the other subsections. Consequently no such subdivision will be made here; but for convenience of reference I shall

add at the end of this section a brief topical index referring to the chief works mentioned that purport to deal specifically with legal theory, the status of women and of slaves, economics, historical theory, and the subject of war and peace.

As usual I proceed in chronological order and begin with a selection of the relevant works published during the twenty years before 1950, omitting many, however, since the author of almost every text-book, treatise, and essay on political theory has felt himself obliged to include something about Plato even if only, as it usually is, a summary statement and collection of clichés taken from some earlier survey of the same kind or from an antiquated history of philosophy.

— B. Horváth, *Die Gerechtigkeitslehre des Sokrates und des Platon* (1518 *supra*).

1585. R.-L. Klee, *La théorie et la pratique dans la cité platonicienne*, *Rev Hist Philos* 4, 1930, 309—353 and 5, 1931, 1—41. As in many later treatments of the subject Plato's political thought in its origin and development is here interpreted as a function of his personal experience, the ultimate evidence for which is drawn largely from *Epistle VII*, assumed without question to be authentic. Klee traces the antitheses of the pleasurable and the good, of rhetoric and philosophy, of the sensible and the ideal worlds, of force and reason as so many manifestations of the political antinomy which Plato sought to resolve in diverse ways but always on the principle of theory determining action, of reason as alone sovereign by right though in the end made effective only by grace of a factually sovereign divine power.

1586. J. Sauter, *Die philosophischen Grundlagen des antiken Naturrechts*, *Zeitschr. öffentliches Recht* 10, 1930/31, 28—81. See pp. 40—54 for Plato, who is interpreted as having developed from the dualistic idealism of the *Phaedo* and *Republic*, where in principle at least the natural law is accessible to all men, though only the wise comprehend it and announce it to the rest, and positive laws are unnecessary, through the intermediate position of the *Politicus*, where positive laws are necessary because of the differences in men and situations, to the state of the *Laws*, where because of the intellectual and moral imperfection of the rulers positive laws are necessary to guarantee the common weal and are not merely useful to a ruling part.

1587. J. Ithurriague, *Les idées de Platon sur la condition de la femme au regard des traditions antiques*, Paris 1931. This is an

attempt, unfortunately rather vague and at times uncritical in judgment, to show that Plato's 'feminism' was well founded in historical precedent as well as in the principles of his own philosophy and was not a utopian exaggeration but a systematization and development of the liberal notions of his own day.

— W. G. Becker, *Platons Gesetze und das griechische Familienrecht* (512 *supra*).

— H. Kelsen, *Justice platonicienne* (775 *supra*). See also his recent article, *Platon und die Naturrechtslehre* (1704 *infra*).

1588. W. Nestle, *Griechische Geschichtsphilosophie*, *Archiv Gesch Philos* 41, 1932, 80—114. This article is reprinted in Nestle's collection, *Griechische Weltanschauung in ihrer Bedeutung für die Gegenwart* (Stuttgart 1946), pp. 334—372, where for Plato see pp. 347—350. Disagreement with Nestle's thesis in so far as it ascribes a philosophy of history to Plato and other writers earlier than Polybius was expressed by É. Bréhier in his article, *Quelques traits de la philosophie de l'histoire dans l'antiquité classique*, *Rev Hist et Philos Religieuses* 14, 1934, 38—40, which is reprinted in his collection, *Études de Philosophie Antique* (Paris 1955), pp. 139—141.

1589. G. Rohr, *Platons Stellung zur Geschichte*, Berlin 1932 (cf. W. Nestle, *Phil Woch* 53, 1933, 401—404; F. Solmsen, *Gnomon* 9, 1933, 532—539). The first half of this monograph is devoted to an intensive study of *Laws* III and a summary account of *Laws* IV. Chiefly on this basis Rohr then considers the significance of the construction and development of states in the *Republic* and *Laws*, Plato's conception and use of 'historical myth', his historical insight and relation to historiography (e. g. to that of Thucydides), and finally his conviction that particular historical events are not absolute data from which norms or valid laws are derivable but are manifestations of intelligible norms which they serve to illustrate.

— A. H. Chase, *The influence of Athenian institutions upon the Laws of Plato* (513 *supra*).

1590. A. Falchi, *Storia delle dottrine politiche*, *Introduzione: Il pensiero greco*, a cura degli studenti M. Giordano, J. Balbi e D. Pavaglianti, Padova 1933 (cf. A. Beccari, *Sophia* 2, 1934, 128—135). For Plato see pp. 168—236.

1591. F. Ollier, *Le mirage spartiate: Étude sur l'idéalisation de Sparte dans l'antiquité grecque de l'origine jusqu'aux Cyniques*,

Paris 1933 (cf. A. Blakeway, *Cl Rev* 49, 1935, 184—185; K. A. Eichenberg, *Phil Woch* 55, 1935, 1420—1422), pp. 217—293: Platon. According to Ollier admiration of Sparta obsessed Plato from his cradle; and, as this admiration was the driving force behind his political theories and constructions, so he idealized Sparta in turn to make it approximate the perfect state, his vision of which it had inspired.

1592. E. de Martino, *Il dramma tra individuo e stato nella politica platonica*, *Logos* 17, 1934, 290—305. The ultimate exaltation of law over individual dignity and freedom is here represented as the failure of Plato's hope to resolve what he recognized as being the essential tragedy of the civic community.

1593. R. Harder, *Plato und Athen*, *Neue Jahrb für Wiss und Jugend* 10, 1934, 492—500. This is a concise and impressive protest against the biographical and developmental interpretation of Plato's political writing. Harder argues that Plato's attitude towards Athens always remained essentially the same and that his 'politics' never had anything to do with the practical contemporary politics of power but was from beginning to end a metapolitics concerned with the inner 'renovatio' of man.

1594. W. Jaeger, *Die griechische Staatsethik im Zeitalter des Platon*, *Die Antike* 10, 1934, 1—6. See pp. 11—15, where Plato's philosophizing is said to have arisen from the actual problem of the state which for him was exclusively one of recreating a civic ethics and of establishing upon an impregnable normative foundation the law for which Socrates had given his life. See also 1604 and 1647 *infra* and *Paideia* (4 *supra*), II, pp. 188—227, pp. 273—281, pp. 310—360 and III, pp. 309—324 and pp. 341—344.

1595. F. M. Cornford, *Plato's Commonwealth, Greece and Rome* 4, 1934/35, 92—108. In this essay, which is reprinted in Cornford's collection, *The unwritten philosophy and Other Essays* (Cambridge 1950), pp. 47—67, Cornford contrasts the Socratic and the Platonic approaches to the construction of an ideal society, contending that Plato sought a social order that will make the best of human nature as it is instead of proceeding by moral reformation of individuals. His contention that despite certain similarities the Bolshevik system and Plato's are inspired by diametrically opposed philosophies was called in question by E. F. Carr in an article published the next year under the same title, *Plato's Commonwealth, Greece and Rome* 5, 1935/36, 41—45. See also Cornford's later article, *The Marxist view of Ancient Philosophy* (49 *supra*).

1596. A. Beccari, *La fondazione delle dottrine politiche in Grecia*, Napoli 1935. In the second half of this book (pp. 109—193) Plato's political thought is covered in four chapters, the original versions of which had been published as four articles, the first two in 1931 and 1932 in *Convivium*, and the third and fourth in 1932 and 1933 in *Riv Internaz Filos del Diritto*. Six years later Beccari published another version of this treatment with additional references to some of the more recent Italian literature on the subject: A. Beccari, *Il pensiero politico del mondo classico* (Padova 1941), pp. 68—126. This was revised once more to provide the section on Plato in Beccari's later survey of political thought from Homer to the Roman jurists: A. Beccari, *Il pensiero politico classico*, Milano 1949.

— M. B. Foster, *The political philosophies of Plato and Hegel* (787b *supra*). On this critical analysis of the political philosophy in the *Republic* and of Hegel's interpretation and criticism of it see besides the review by H.-G. Gadamer (787b *supra*) the note by H. W. B. Joseph, *Essays in ancient and modern philosophy* (787a *supra* [pp. 114—121]), with Foster's reply to this and Joseph's rejoinder (*Mind* N. S. 45, 1936, 350—354 and 489—491). See also Foster's later article, *Plato's conception of justice in the Republic* (54 *supra*).

— G. M. A. Grube, *Plato's thought* (3 *supra*), pp. 259—289: *Statecraft*.

— L. M. Hammond, *Plato on scientific measurement and the social sciences* (1391 *supra*).

— H. W. B. Joseph, *Essays in ancient and modern philosophy* (787a *supra*), pp. 82—121: *Plato's Republic: The comparison between the soul and the state*.

1597. A. O. Lovejoy and G. Boas, *Primitivism and related ideas in antiquity*, Baltimore 1935, pp. 155—168: *Plato and primitivism*. While Plato's social and moral ideal contains ingredients of hard primitivism and while he occasionally endorses the general thesis of chronological primitivism, he is strongly anti-primitivistic in his antipathy to the belief in the superiority of the instinctive elements of man's constitution, in his rejection of certain eulogistic senses of 'nature', and in his opposition to equalitarianism and to the glorification of the juristic state of nature.

1598. L. Pignato, *Metafisica dello stato di Platone*, Palermo 1935 (cf. C. Carbonara, *Logos* 18, 1935, 380—382).

— L. Robin, *Platon* (7 *supra*), pp. 275—316: L'organisation politique de la vertu.

1599. G. Bornkamm, *Ὁμολογία*: Zur Geschichte eines politischen Begriffs, *Hermes* 71, 1936, 377—393. For Plato, he argues (pp. 377—385), the term implied free assumption of political obligation and responsibility which was connected with dialectic understood as the common endeavor of fellow citizens committed to one another and to their state in the search for ἀρετή, a sense which it no longer had for Aristotle or for the Stoics.

— F. Guglielmino, Il codice penale di Platone e l'involontarietà del male (514 *supra*).

1600. A. Menzel, *Griechische Soziologie*, Sitzungsber Akad Wiss in Wien Phil-Hist Kl 216, 1. Abhand, Wien 1936 (cf. W. Ensslin, *Phil Woch* 57, 1937, 801—803). In this attempt to show that the Greeks were familiar with 'sociology', i. e. the description, classification, and analysis of processes as they do in fact occur in the relations among men, see for Plato especially pp. 42—45 (the relation of forms of government to the psychological dispositions of individuals), pp. 47—49 (mass-psychology), pp. 54—57 (the interactions of leaders and masses), pp. 71—73 (rulership), pp. 76—78 (division of labor), pp. 129—131 (the state as organism), pp. 168—176 (the original forms of the state), and pp. 186—190 (the transformations of the state and of society).

1601. H. Perls, La philosophie platonicienne du droit, *Rev Philosophique* 121, 1936, 80—107. The substance of this article, rewritten and rearranged, is incorporated in the later book by Perls, *Platon: Sa conception du kosmos* (6 *supra*), II, pp. 124—207: Themis.

1602. R. Schlaifer, Greek theories of slavery from Homer to Aristotle, *Harvard Studies in Class Phil* 47, 1936, 165—204. For Plato see pp. 168, 170, 173, 178, and 190—191.

— R. H. S. Crossman, *Plato today* (43 *supra*). On this see R. B. Levinson (28 *supra*), pp. 13—16, 200—201, 370—392, and 570—571. The 'revised edition' of Crossman's book (London 1959) is in fact 'a reprint of the original text with changes or deletions only where topical references have become unintelligible'.

1603. U. Galli, *Platone e il Νόμος*, Torino 1937 (cf. C. Mazzantini, *Riv Filolog Cl* 16, 1938, 182—188; É. des Places, *Rev Ét Grecques* 54, 1941, 282). Plato's conception of human laws as reflections of universal, transcendent, and absolute law, to which

they can be made to approximate despite their mutability and instability, the human and contingent thereby being brought closer to the divine and eternal, is here connected with the traditional attitude towards νόμος as held by the poets and the pre-sophistic philosophers.

1604. W. Jaeger, *The problem of authority and the crisis of the Greek spirit*, Harvard Tercentenary Publications: *Authority and the individual*, Cambridge (Mass.) 1937, pp. 240—250. See pp. 246—250 for the *inner* problem of authority which confronted Plato, whose philosophy is here interpreted as a response to actual political events and situations. See also 1594 *supra* and 1647 *infra*.

—. E. M. Manasse, *Platons Sophistes und Politikos . . .* (738 *supra*). For statesman, law, and knowledge in the *Politicus* and the *Republic* see pp. 77—92, pp. 145—156, and pp. 159—160; for comparison of the *Republic* and the *Politicus* with regard to their purposes and the possibility of realizing the perfect state see pp. 123—144.

1605. W. Nestle, *Der Führergedanke in der platonischen und aristotelischen Staatslehre*, *Gymnasium* 48, 1937, 73—89. For Plato see pp. 76—82 and pp. 87—89.

1606. C. B. Papadimitriou, *La part du réel dans l'utopie de Platon*, Paris 1937 (cf. D. Dubarle, *Rev Sc Philos Théol* 27, 1938, 587—588). In this attempt to absolve Plato of the charge of utopianism he is said to have intended the *Republic*, the *Politicus*, and the *Laws* as expositions of strictly interdependent parts of his political theory, the purpose of which was to create a synthesis of the two forms of government represented by Athens and Sparta.

1607. H. Roszbacher, *Platon und die politische Methode*, Halberstadt 1937. The thesis of this booklet is that Plato mistakenly combined the valid scientific method of ordering concepts with the totally different political task of regulating human relations and unjustifiably attacked the sophists for refusing to take his conceptualistic view of politics, to the total bankruptcy of which, however, he had finally though unwillingly himself to testify in the *Laws*.

1608. George H. Sabine, *A history of political theory*, New York 1937 (reprinted with bibliographical additions 1950 and 1959), pp. 35—87. Sabine contends that the omission of law from the ideal state of the *Republic* indicates Plato's failure to perceive an important moral aspect of the very society which he desires to

perfect, that his own suspicion of having failed to plumb the problems involved led him to formulate another kind of state in which not knowledge but law should rule, and that in the *Laws*, though the restoration of law was inconclusive since it really required complete revision of Plato's psychology and epistemology, still the nature of such a revision was suggested by the analysis of institutions and laws and the recognition of the connection of such studies with history in this last work, where far more than in the *Republic* a serious approach was made to the problem of the city-state.

1609. M. Salomon, Die Stellung der Frau in den Staatsidealen bei Plato und Aristoteles, *Rev Internat de la Théorie du Droit* 11, 1937, 322—331. The inferiority of women in Aristotle's theory is here contrasted to the equality envisaged by Plato for the two sexes of his élite.

1610. H. B. Acton, The alleged fascism of Plato, *Philosophy* 13, 1938, 302—312. Against National Socialists on the one hand and Russell and Crossman on the other he argues that certain fundamentals of fascism are contradictory to the essence of Plato's doctrine. Levinson (28 *supra*) does not mention either this article or the following one by Hoernlé, to which Acton does not refer either.

1611. R. F. A. Hoernlé, Would Plato have approved of the National-Socialist State?, *Philosophy* 13, 1938, 166—182. He answers his question in the affirmative, holding that Plato's philosopher-king is best understood by analogy with the modern dictator who purports to be a leader, not a tyrant, and is obeyed by his genuine followers because of their faith in him and in the good for which he stands and which for them and with their help he strives to realize.

1612. E. Kapp, Theorie und Praxis bei Aristoteles und Platon, *Mnem* III 6, 1938, 179—194. See especially pp. 185—188 and pp. 191—194 on the autonomous statesman in relation to his own written prescriptions and the relation of political 'theory' to 'practice' in Plato's thought from the *Gorgias* and the *Republic* to the *Politicus* and the *Laws*.

— P. Lachière-Rey, Les idées morales, sociales et politiques de Platon (1526 *supra*).

1613. W. Nestle, Der Friedensgedanke in der antiken Welt, *Philologus Suppl* 31/1, 1938. On Plato's attitude towards war see pp. 28—30.

— R. Schaerer, *La Question Platonicienne* . . . (1061 *supra*). On Plato's attitude towards history see pp. 147—148, 193—195, 208—209, and 259—260; and on his attitude towards Athens see especially p. 72.

1614. K. J. Vourveris, *Αἱ ἱστορικαὶ γνώσεις τοῦ Πλάτωνος, Α: Βαρβαρικά, ἐν Ἀθήναις* 1938. This is a collection of the Platonic passages relating to barbarians and a commentary on them and their significance for Plato's knowledge of history and way of using it as well as for his attitude towards non-Greek peoples. In the same year Vourveris published in German a lecture in which he had summarized the conclusions drawn from this research: *Platon und die Barbaren*, Athen 1938 (for both publications cf. G. Müller, *Gnomon* 14, 1938, 661—663; W. Nestle, *Phil Woch* 58, 1938, 918—922). So far as Plato's attitude towards history is concerned, the conclusions drawn here do not differ substantially from those which had been formulated with greater elaboration and subtlety by Rohr (1589 *supra*); but Vourveris is furthermore concerned to prove that Plato was a champion of Pan-Hellenism and a nationalistic patriot who hated the barbarians and believed the Greeks to be not only culturally but also racially a distinct and superior people.

— H. Zeise, *Der Staatsmann* . . . (739 *supra*). See pp. 12—64 and pp. 85—99 on the statesman of the *Republic* and the *Politicus* and on Plato's conception of genuine and imitative politics.

1615. Stella Lange, *Plato and Democracy*, *Cl Journ* 34, 1938/39, 480—486. Because Plato held that men are unequal and believed in the supremacy of talent and moral value does not mean, she contends, that his political ideal was an anti-democratic one.

1616. G. Colli, *Lo sviluppo del pensiero politico di Platone*, *Nuova Riv Storica* 23, 1939, 169—192 and 449—476. This is in fact a hypothetical biography of Plato constructed in part upon the basis of *Epistle VII* in order to justify what Colli believes to be the otherwise inexplicable discordances and contradictions in the political doctrines of the *Republic*, the *Politicus*, and the *Laws*. In connection with this see Colli's later reconstruction of the course of Plato's philosophical 'development' or decline (1225 *supra*) and his interpretation of the *Parmenides* as a confession of despair (611 *supra*).

— B. Farrington, *Science and politics in the ancient world* (53b *supra*). See especially pp. 90—120 for his thesis that Plato's whole philosophy was a political philosophy representing a reaction

against Ionian enlightenment in favor of the ideal of a slave-owning, class-divided, chauvinistic city-state which was already an anachronism.

1617. K. Glaser, *Die Bewertung der Staatsformen in der Antike*, Wiener Studien 57, 1939, 38—57. See pp. 44—53 for Plato in the *Republic*, the *Politicus*, and the *Laws* with reference at the end to *Epistles VII* and *V* as well.

1618. H. D. Lewis, *Plato and the Social Contract*, Mind N. S. 48, 1939, 78—81. Plato, it is here contended, while insisting that morality has roots deeper than mutual agreement, still held that the true state, an instrument for moral ends depending upon the free cooperation of ruler and subject, is founded upon contract.

1619. G. R. Morrow, *Plato and Greek slavery*, Mind N. S. 48, 1939, 186—201. This article amounts to a summary account of the monograph on the subject published by Morrow in the same year: *Plato's law of slavery in its relation to Greek law* (517 *supra*).

1620. M. Salomon, *La communauté des biens chez Aristote et chez Platon*, Archives de Philos du Droit et Soc Jur 9, 1939, 177—195. Plato in fact proposes not any 'community of goods', as Aristotle inaccurately asserts in his critique, but rather the elimination of all personal possessions and that only for the class of guardians; but the real point at issue between the two, Salomon points out, is that according to Plato man can attain moral perfection only if emancipated from possessions of his own whereas according to Aristotle property is a necessary condition of moral perfection.

— A. E. Taylor, *The decline and fall of the state in Republic VIII* (862 *supra*).

1621. K. J. Vourveris, *Ἡ ἐθνικὴ συνείδησις τοῦ Πλάτωνος, ἐν Ἀθήναις* 1939 (cf. J. Tate, *Cl Rev* 54, 1940, 113; P. Chantraine, *Rev Philol* 3 Sér 16, 1942, 80). As in 1614 *supra* Vourveris here denies any tendency to cosmopolitanism in Plato and portrays him as keenly conscious of a national tradition and devoted to its regeneration.

1622. K. J. Vourveris, *Ἱστορικαὶ συγκρίσεις παρὰ Πλάτωνι, ΕΛΛΗΝΙΚΑ* 11, 1939, 5—11. This is little more than a summary repetition of parts of 1614 *supra* with the intention of showing that Plato did not disregard the world of historical events, although his judgments of historical persons, peoples, and places were those of a philosopher and not an historian.

1623. M. Gentile, *La politica di Platone*, Padova 1940. Gentile tries to show that the focus of all Plato's speculation was the political problem and how through the *Republic*, the *Politicus*, and the *Laws* his political theory without undergoing essential alteration became more and more profound with the development of the theory of ideas, as Gentile understands that development (see 1196 *supra*). Insisting that Plato's political ideal was pragmatic and not at all utopian, Gentile proudly claims it as the precursor of the fascistic state, of which, in his opinion, it fell short only because Plato's thought lacked the expansive capacities of imperialism and Christian charity.

— B. Giger, *Der Tyrann: Werden und Wesen des tyrannischen Menschen und des Staatstyrannen* (1532 *supra*).

1624. H. Herter, *Platons Staatsideal*, Gymnasium 51, 1940, 112—125. The catastrophe of Socrates, Herter believes, taught Plato that perfection of the individual is impossible without the perfection of the community, that justice must have absolute validity for the latter as well as for the former, and that this can be so only if the natural differences of men are duly regarded and each has and does what befits him. The premises of Plato's philosophy, he holds, and not the example of actual states such as Sparta determined the political plans both of the *Republic* and of the *Laws*, which implies no recantation of the former but follows Plato's tendency to seek in greater measure connections with the phenomenal world; but like Gentile (1623 *supra*) Herter insists that neither form of the political ideal was utopian, and like Gentile also he maintains that no thinker in the past was so close as Plato to the contemporary German conception of political community. See also Herter's later pamphlet published two years later under the same title (1633 *infra*).

— A. Meremetis, *Verbrecher und Verbrechen: Untersuchungen zum Strafrecht in Platons 'Gesetzen'* (518 *supra*).

— A. Schneider, *Die Einheit von Politik und Ethik in den Lehren der Sophisten und in Platons 'Staat'* (781 *a supra*).

— F. Stroisch, *Über die weltanschaulichen Grundlagen der Gerechtigkeitsidee bei Platon . . .* (1536 *supra*). With this see the contemporary publications on the same subject by K. Tilmann (1537 *supra*) and by W. Weyersberg (1538 *supra*).

— A. D. Winspear, *The genesis of Plato's thought* (44 *supra*). On this Marxist interpretation of Plato's philosophy as crypto-

political propaganda for an oligarchical reaction see R. B. Levinson (28 *supra* [p. 583]) and the article by E. A. Havelock, The riddle of Plato's politics, The Canadian Forum, April 1941, 15—19.

1625. O. Zwengel, Verhältnis von Staat und Wirtschaft in Platons Staatsschriften, Gießen 1940. This is a rather schematic and superficial presentation of the economic arrangements in their intimate connection with the political ideal in the *Republic* and the *Laws*, an ideal which is asserted to be in neither form utopian but rather an 'Abbild der altgriechischen Polis'.

1626. R. McKeon, Plato and Aristotle as historians, *Ethics* 51, 1940/41, 66—101. History as it appears in the works of Aristotle and Plato's 'dialectical' conception and use of history are here contrasted and exemplified chiefly by their respective attitudes towards the history of philosophy.

1627. G. Coniglio, L'uomo di stato nella concezione politica di Platone, Verona 1941. This monograph has the same political bias as Gentile's book (1623 *supra*) but is much briefer and more restricted in its scope.

1628. G. C. Field, Plato's political thought and its value today, *Philosophy* 16, 1941, 227—241. As the complement to this see the criticism of Crossman's interpretation (43 *supra*) and Farrington's (53 b *supra*) in Field's subsequent article, On misunderstanding Plato, *Philosophy* 19, 1944, 49—62. This sober and scholarly estimate of Plato's social and political philosophy and its significance was restated by Field in his small book, The philosophy of Plato (10c *supra*), pp. 66—107 and pp. 195—208.

1629. E. Frank, Plato's view of the state: An appreciation, *Harvard Educational Rev* 11, 1941, 481—494. This article is reprinted in the collection of Frank's essays entitled Wissen, Wollen, Glauben: Gesammelte Aufsätze (Zürich/Stuttgart 1955), pp. 120—133. Plato is here said to have intended the ideal state to be an expression of the true and eternal nature of man, for the realization and preservation of which the institutions of that state are devised; but at one point he is said to have made several attempts to realize his ideal state both in Greece and Sicily and later is said to have believed that it never existed or would exist on earth but is a supermundane pattern according to the laws of which the true philosopher is already living even in his earthly existence.

— K. Marc-Wogau, Der Staat und der Begriff des Guten . . . (779 *supra*).

—. G. R. Morrow, On the tribal courts in Plato's *Laws* (519 *supra*); Plato and the rule of law (520 *supra*); The status of the alien in Plato's *Laws* (521 *supra*).

—. M. Mühl, Über die Herkunft des platonischen Versöhnungsgedankens (835 *supra*).

1630. W. J. Oates, The ideal states of Plato and Aristotle, The Greek political experience: Studies in honor of William Kelly Prentice, Princeton 1941, pp. 187—213. The thesis of this article is that both Plato and Aristotle 'believed fundamentally in the essence of democracy'.

—. R. Palas, Die Bewertung der Sinnenwelt bei Platon . . . (1209 *supra*). See pp. 95—144 on the state in Plato's life and thought—his attitude towards Athens (pp. 95—112), his political theory (pp. 112—129), and whether he believed that his ideal state could be realized (pp. 129—144)—and with this pp. 162—177 on his attitude towards women, marriage, and the family.

1631. A. Tovar, Sobre los orígenes de los sentimientos políticos de Platón, *Rev Estudios Politicos* 1, 1941, 397—412. This article is reprinted in Tovar's book, *En el primer giro* (Madrid 1941) and incorporated in his later work, *Los hechos políticos . . .* (1680 *infra*), pp. 17ff.

1632. G. Vlastos, Slavery in Plato's thought, *Philos Rev* 50, 1941, 289—304. Plato, Vlastos here contends, conceiving the condition of 'slave' to be deficiency of reason, which justifies subordination to him who has 'logos', i. e. knowledge of the good, extended this 'slave-metaphor' to politics, anthropology, and cosmology, in his polemic against Ionian physics and the contract-theory which idealizes democracy employing this single pattern to maintain that the slave, the multitude in the state, the body of man, and material necessity in the universe all lack 'logos' and must have order imposed upon them by a benevolent superior whose title to authority is possession of 'logos'.

—. H. G. Gadamer, *Platos Staat der Erziehung* (780 *supra*).

1633. H. Herter, *Platons Staatsideal*, Bonn 1942 (cf. E. Hoffmann, *Gnomon* 19, 1943, 164—165). This pamphlet, a lecture published with supporting notes, and that with the same title published two years earlier (1624 *supra*) were intended by the author to supplement each other.

1634. H. Cairns, Plato's theory of law, *Harvard Law Rev* 56, 1942/43, 359—387. This article in a revised and expanded form

was published as the second chapter (pp. 29—76) of the book by H. Cairns, *Legal philosophy from Plato to Hegel* (Baltimore 1949); and the original, unexpanded version was reprinted again under the title, *Plato as jurist*, as chapter 16 in the revised English translation of the book by P. Friedländer, *Plato* (11 b *supra*), I, pp. 286—313 and pp. 392—394.

— G. J. D. Aalders, *Het derde boek van Plato's Leges I — Prolegomena* (547 *supra*). The first section (pp. 6—58) deals with Plato's predecessors and with his own political activities and political theory in general. In the second section see pp. 64—73 for myth and history in *Laws* III; pp. 73—115 for the origin and development of the state as conceived in *Laws* III, by Plato elsewhere, and by his predecessors and contemporaries; pp. 116—129 for the theory of political forms or 'constitutions'; pp. 129—135 for Plato's other historical passages in relation to *Laws* III; and pp. 135—142 for Plato's attitude towards barbarians, Athens, and Greek unity.

— W. Jaeger, *Paideia* (4 *supra*), II, pp. 188—227, pp. 273—281, and pp. 310—360; III, pp. 309—324 and pp. 341—344, as well as pp. 271—288, where, taking the authenticity of *Epistles* VII and VIII as established, Jaeger interprets Plato's philosophy in the light of his supposed political activity. See also Jaeger's essays (1594 and 1604 *supra* and 1647 *infra*).

1635. G. Murray, *Reactions to the Peloponnesian War in Greek thought and practice*, JHS 64, 1944, 1—9. Plato is here charged (pp. 2—4) with having been unaffected by the Peloponnesian War and with having treated war and peace as indifferent, natural alternatives; and this attitude of his is said to have been the result at once of his epistemology and of his personal prejudice against Athenian democracy.

1636. K. Sprey, *Plato en de geschiedenis*, *De zin der geschiedenis* (Lustrumbundel van het Genootschap van Christelijke Historici), Wageningen 1944. This volume I have been unable to procure, and Sprey's article is known to me only from the important review of it by G. J. de Vries, *Tijdsch Philos* 8, 1946, 483—490.

1637. F. W. Walbank, *The causes of Greek decline*, JHS 64, 1944, 10—20. Plato's political theory is here represented (pp. 11—12 and 13—15) as a symptom of Greek decline if not one of its causes, as 'the blackest treason to . . . Hellenism', the motive of which treason was the desire to maintain privilege and to preserve an oligarchical and paternal form of society.

1638. V. Goldschmidt, *Le paradigme dans la théorie platonicienne de l'action*, *Rev Ét Grecques* 58, 1945, 118—145. This is an attempt to show in some detail how Plato envisaged politics as philosophy which while remaining itself becomes action by imitation of the ideas, reproducing the ideal model in accordance with the supreme requirements of the good and against the resistance of matter and necessity increasing with the descent from level to level in the scale of reality. See also Goldschmidt's later book, *La religion de Platon* (1309 *supra*), pp. 115—145: *La cité*, and his article, *La théorie platonicienne de la dénonciation* (55 *supra*).

— A. Koyré, *Discovering Plato* (10 b *supra*), pp. 53—111.

— O. Reverdin, *La religion de la cité platonicienne* (522 *supra*), pp. 169—241: *Le droit pénal et la protection de la religion*.

1639. J. P. Maguire, *Some Greek views of democracy and totalitarianism*, *Ethics* 56, 1945/46, 136—143. Maguire argues that the democracy condemned by Plato is not the equivalent of modern democracy and that in significant features that distinguish the latter from modern totalitarianism Plato is on the side of democracy. See also his later article (1648 *infra*).

— N. Almqvist, *Till Platons differentiella psykologi . . .* (1301 *supra*), pp. 279—343: *Den politiska typologien*.

1640. E. Cassirer, *The myth of the state*, New Haven 1946. On Plato's political theory see especially pp. 61—77, pp. 98—99, and pp. 154—155 (on the difference between Plato's conception of the art of politics and Machiavelli's); and cf. S. Moser (*Anz Altertums* 8, 1955, 161—165) in his review of the German translation of Cassirer's book, *Vom Mythos des Staates*, Zürich 1949.

1641. R. C. Lodge, *Plato and progress*, *Philos Rev* 55, 1946, 651—667. Plato, it is here maintained, even while trying to design a relatively permanent pattern of life, did envisage the probability of change and deliberately provided for the continuous guidance of such change in the direction of progress. See also Lodge's later writings (58 *supra*) defending Plato against the charge of 'totalitarianism'.

1642. G. Pugliese Carratelli, *La città platonica*, *Parola Pass* 1, 1946, 6—21. *Epistle VII* is here used as the master-key to Plato's writings on the political problem, the centre of his meditation from his youth to the day of his death. The resulting interpretation is in this case 'unitarian'; it is denied that the *Republic* is in any sense 'corrected' by the *Laws*, and it is asserted that Plato, mindful of

the limits of the philosopher's political action, never expected the city of the *Republic* to be realized in Sicily.

— H. Schmalenbach, *Macht und Recht: Platons Absage an die Politik* (289 b *supra*).

1643. A. Verdross-Drossberg, *Grundlinien der antiken Rechts- und Staatsphilosophie*, Wien 1946. In the second edition of this book (Wien 1948) the section on Plato (pp. 69—126, see also pp. 143—144) was augmented by a few pages (pp. 115ff.) criticizing some recent interpretations of Plato's political thought, especially those which make it out to be fascistic. Emphasis is here placed upon the uniquely moral purpose and the pacific character of the Platonic state. Plato is interpreted as primarily a patriot whose political ideal always remained the old city-state, the imminent threat to which he recognized and the salvation of which he considered to be his own divinely inspired mission. Seeing that in Athens there was no strength for renewal from any quarter, he tried to create a new state out of the spirit of Socrates and so produced in the *Republic* a new philosophy of the community. Since this was impractical to realize, presupposing as it did a ruler with vision of the ideas, he projected on the basis of his experience in Sicily a second form of his state with ordinary rulers chosen by the people and ruling on the basis of laws made by an enlightened legislator, for law always remained in his eyes a rational formulation which is a copy of the idea and not the mere ordinance of social authority; but at the same time he indicated that in different circumstances a still different form of state would have to be constructed, though even this would have in some way to make provision for leadership by wisdom founded on the ideas. His original plan for a theory of the state whereby to renew and restore Athens is seen as expanding into a Panhellenic theory and then outgrowing all theories of the state and gradually becoming a theory of the law of nations with its goal the peaceful settlement of international disputes. See the brief restatement in his later book, *Abendländische Rechtsphilosophie . . .* (1714 *infra*).

— J. Wild, Plato's theory of man (1546 *supra*). Besides the reviews by Vlastos and Cherniss cited in 1396 *supra* see on this book as an interpretation of Plato's political thought the review-article by L. Strauss, *On a new interpretation of Plato's political philosophy*, *Social Research* 13, 1946, 326—367 (cf. A. Verdross-Drossberg [1643 *supra*]), pp. 119—121), and in connection with this review the differentiation between ancient and modern political philosophy drawn in an article published in the preceding year by

L. Strauss: On classical political philosophy, *Social Research* 12, 1945, 98—117.

—, P.-M. Schuhl, Platon et l'activité politique de l'Académie (105 a *supra*). See also 1722 *infra*.

1644. S. Accame, Demostene e l'insegnamento di Platone, Milano 1947. In the second part of this book (pp. 123—217) Accame goes through the Platonic corpus from the *Georgias*, the *Apology*, and the *Crito* to the *Laws* to bring out the similarities and the differences between the ethico-political thought of Plato and that of Demosthenes analysed in the first part on the basis of the latter's orations.

1645. J. Barion, Macht und Recht: Eine Platon-Studie, Krefeld 1947. In this essay Plato's political writings are presented on the basis of *Epistle VII* and against the background of the political and moral disintegration of his time as evidence of his passionately devoted attempt to renovate the state by means of philosophy and as testimony to 'the unity of idea and existence that dominated him'.

1646. A.-J. Festugière, Liberté et civilisation chez les Grecs, Paris 1947. Of this booklet pp. 30—50 (Critique philosophique de l'idée de liberté) are chiefly concerned with Plato's criticism of democracy. There are also a few pages (pp. 112—114) on the origin of the community and the insufficiency of isolated human beings and cities.

1647. W. Jaeger, Praise of law: The origin of legal philosophy and the Greeks, Interpretations of modern legal philosophies: Essays in honor of Roscoe Pound edited by Paul Sayre, New York 1947, 352—375. On Plato see pp. 363—371. This essay has been translated into German (*Zeitschr philos Forsch* 3, 1948, 321—338 and 512—529) and into French (*Lettres d'Humanité* 8, 1948, 5—42). See also 1594 and 1604 *supra*.

1648. J. P. Maguire, Plato's theory of natural law, *Yale Class Studies* 10, 1947, 151—178 (cf. K. von Fritz, *AJPh* 71, 1950, 428—431 and the article by H. Kelsen [1704 *infra*]).

1649. A. Polet, Le communisme dans la pensée grecque, *Revue du Caire* 10, 1947, 6—35 and 107—130 (cf. A. W. Gomme, *Cl Rev* 62, 1948, 161).

—, E. Bayer, Thukydides und Perikles (236 a *supra*). See pp. 31—36 on the differences and the similarities in the attitudes of Plato and Thucydides towards history, towards the state and

the individual, towards democracy and Athens, and towards Pericles.

1650. J. et R. Lacour-Gayet, *De Platon à la Terreur*, Paris 1948, pp. 7—52: *Platon et l'économie dirigée*. J. Lacour-Gayet in this chapter gives in detail the striking analogies between contemporary economic regulations and those devised by Plato, observing at the same time the difference that all Plato's proposed regulations were dominated by the principle of the moral improvement of his citizens.

1651. D. Loenen, *Dikē: Een historisch-semantische analyse van het Griekse gerechtigheidsbegrip*, Med Nederland Ak Wet, Afd Letter N. R. 11 No. 6, 1948, 159—261. For Plato see especially pp. 226—228. pp. 231—232, pp. 237—239 und in the Conclusion pp. 240—245 and pp. 249—251.

—. G. R. Morrow, *Plato and the law of nature* (1398 *supra*).

—. G. Nebel, *Griechischer Ursprung 1* (1307 *supra*), pp. 11—107: *Platon und die Polis*. In this essay Plato's philosophy is interpreted as an attempt to make rationally conscious and absolute the identity of the human self with the state which was already innocently unconscious in the Greek polis. Nebel insists at every point that the resulting absolutism, a despotism of the good and of virtue, is the very opposite to modern political absolutisms, which have been superficially called descendants or rebirths of the Platonic state; but this state he criticizes himself on the ground that its citizens would have no choice of evil and would therefore be neither free nor human.

—. H. van Effenterre, *La Crète et le monde grec de Platon à Polybe* (524 *supra*).

1652. C. B. Welles, *The economic background of Plato's communism*, *Journ Economic Hist Suppl* 8, 1948, 101—114. The social and economic plans of the *Republic* and the *Laws* as well as their difference in tone are here interpreted as different responses to the changing situation and increasing difficulties of Athens.

1653. L. Ziegler, *Von Platons Staatheit zum christlichen Staat*, Olten 1948 (cf. V. M. Naumann, *Anz Altertums* 3, 1950, 117—120), pp. 9—110.

—. É. des Places, *Pindare et Platon* (222 *supra*). See chapters 8 and 9 (pp. 87—105) on Plato's attitude towards Athens and on the Syracusan episode and chapter 10 (pp. 107—132), *Par delà l'idéal de Sparte*.

1654. B. Leoni, *Lezioni di filosofia del diritto 1: Il pensiero antico*, Pavia/Milano 1949, pp. 67—90. The central thesis of this chapter is that for Plato positive law as a datum of historical experience was not irreconcilable with a metahistorical law accessible only to reason.

— R. C. Lodge, *Plato and freedom* (58 *supra*). See also his article, *Plato and progress* (1641 *supra*).

1655. J. Moreau, *Platon et la crise de la civilisation contemporaine*, *Giorn Metafisica* 4, 1949, 169—175. A résumé of this article is published in *Proc Tenth Internat Cong Philosophy I Fasc 2*, Amsterdam 1949, 1084—1087. Long before the modern socialist critics, Moreau points out, Plato diagnosed the cause of economic disorder, the most striking aspect of social disorder, as being the divorce between service and profit; but contrary to both socialism and liberalism he denied the indifference of morality to economy and, condemning the primacy of economic ends, insisted upon their subordination to social ends and of these to human ends, i. e. to what is transcendent and divine in man.

1656. G. R. G. Mure, *The organic state*, *Philosophy* 24, 1949, 205—218. This defence of the organic theory in a modified sense contains some incidental but significant remarks on Plato's theory of the state.

— H. Ryffel, *METABOAH ΠΟΛΙΤΕΙΩΝ* (548 *supra*), pp. 88—135: *Platon*. On this section cf. H. Strohm, *Gnomon* 23, 1951, 147—148 in his review *ibid.*, pp. 144—149.

1657. A. M. Franklin, *Communism and dictatorship in ancient Greece and Rome*, *Cl Weekly* 43, 1949/50, 83—89. This is an edifying and hortatory presentation rather than a scholarly analysis of the views of Plato, Aristotle, Demosthenes, and Cicero.

1658. M. B. Amzalak, *Platão e a economia da cidade*, Lisboa 1950. In the first part of this booklet the social and economic views of Plato are summarily described, the more radical of them being treated as utopian dreams of an elegant and aristocratic visionary; the second part consists of a bibliography and derivative translations of selected passages from the *Republic* and the *Laws*.

— C. Bello, *Communisme platonicien et Marxisme* (1150 *supra*).

— F. M. Cornford, *The Marxist view of ancient philosophy* (49 *supra*), pp. 127—136. See also Cornford's earlier article, *Plato's Commonwealth* (1595 *supra*).

—. D. Grene, *Man in his pride . . .* (240 *supra*). Leaning heavily upon *Epistle VII* for support Grene in the section on Plato entitled *The man in the duststorm* (pp. 93—204) interprets 'what he says and what he did about politics' as a development showing his 'gradually declining interest in all practical activities and the emergence of a new and almost mystical conception of intellectual work'. On this section besides the review by Gomme cited in 240 *supra* cf. G. R. Morrow, *Ethics* 62, 1951/52, 141—142.

—. E. Hoffmann, *Platon* (22 *supra*), pp. 163—175: *Platons Staatsgedanke*.

—. C. Librizzi, *I problemi fondamentali della filosofia di Platone* (29 *supra*), pp. 136—176: *Il problema pedagogico-politico*. I have been unable to procure for comparison with this Librizzi's earlier article published under a similar title, *Platone educatore politico*, *Rass Pedagogia*, 1948, 221—248.

—. E. Paci, *Lo stato come idea dell'uomo nella 'Repubblica' di Platone* (789 *supra*).

1659. R. Perpiña, *Los tres pensadores griegos sobre el fenómeno colonial*, *Helmantica* 1, 1950, 214—237. This is a review and comparison of Pindar's, Plato's, and Aristotle's notions concerning the cause of colonization.

—. K. R. Popper, *The open society and its enemies* (46 *supra*). On Plato's sociology and politics see pp. 37—167 and pp. 189—195 (in the third edition, London 1957, Volume I, pp. 35—171 and pp. 194—201). Of the considerable literature called forth by this violent attack on Plato as an enemy of democracy and the 'open society' see besides R. Robinson's review, Dr. Popper's defense of democracy (*Philos Rev* 60, 1951, 487—507), and the review-article by J. Plamenatz (60 *supra*) especially the monograph by G. J. de Vries, *Antisthenes redivivus* (51 *supra*) and the book by R. B. Levinson, *In defense of Plato* (28 *supra*), and in addition to them the following: J. A. Faris (52 *supra*); M. B. Foster (54 *supra*); C. J. de Vogel (50 *supra*); V. Goldschmidt (55 *supra*); W. C. Greene (56 *supra*); R. Jordan (57 *supra*); J. Wild (66 *supra* [pp. 1—63]); and R. C. Lodge, *The philosophy of Plato* (30 *supra*), pp. 313—332: *Plato and recent criticism*.

1660. G. A. Roggerone, *La natura pedagogica del diritto in Platone*, *Rass Pedagogia* 7, 1950, 307—313.

—. G. A. Roggerone, *La funzione del 'politico' nella dottrina platonica dello stato* (735 *supra*).

— W. Steidle, Der Dialog *Laches* und Platons Verhältnis zu Athen in den Frühdialogen (508 *supra*).

1661. K. J. Vourveris, *Πλάτων καὶ Ἀθήναι, ἐν Ἀθήναις* 1950 (cf. O. Gigon, *Erasmus* 4, 1951, 564—566). What Vourveris had done twelve years earlier with the passages relating to barbarians (1614 *supra*) he does in this book with those relating to persons and events in Athenian history. In the commentary of 141 pages on the 47 excerpts, some consisting of only a few words, collected from the writings of the corpus without regard to their authenticity and in the introduction of 28 pages he tries to establish Plato's patriotic concern for Athens and its institutions and the practical nature of his purpose to regenerate Athenian political life by restoring the regard for law and making knowledge the basis of action.

— M. B. Foster, Plato's conception of justice in the *Republic* (54 *supra*). It is here maintained that for Plato justice, which is conformity to nature and not to the interests of the state as such, resides in the state and implies the presence of divinity, so that in so far as actual states are 'natural' and to this extent the residence of deity there is true ground for obedience to them and in so far as this condition is absent the ground of political obligation is absent.

1662. A. Tovar, El verdadero fin de la utopia platónica, *Estudios Clás* 1, 1950/52, 73—80. The Platonic state, Tovar argues, though totalitarian in its intervention in the life of its citizens, is not like modern totalitarian states an end in itself but is merely an instrument for the moral perfection of the individual; and Plato in fashioning it, unlike all utopians who have thought that they were following him, sought not to organize human prosperity but to save the possibility of true philosophy. This article somewhat rearranged is reprinted in the second chapter of Tovar's later booklet (1680 *infra*), pp. 41—44 and pp. 52—57.

1663. R. G. Bury, Plato and history, *Cl Quart N. S.* 1, 1951, 86—93. This essay begins with the observations of J. B. Bury, J. Adam, and A. E. Taylor on Plato's philosophy of history, goes on to examine what Plato says concerning the rôles of nature, providence, chance, and the ultimate cause of all change in determining historical events, and comes to the conclusion that for Plato all history is the history of soul, the story of reason driving the team, passion and desire.

— Les *Lois* ..., Introduction de A. Diès et L. Gernet = Platon, *Oeuvres Complètes* XI, 1re partie (511 *supra*). The second part of

this introduction (pp. XCIV—CCVI) is a very important monograph by L. Gernet, *Les Lois et le droit positif*. Of this the section, *L'organisation politique* (pp. CIV—CXIV), necessarily impinges upon Plato's political theory, aspects of which are treated by A. Diès in the first part of the introduction, especially on pp. XXXI—LIII and LXXXIII—XC (see also pp. XIII—XXXI on Plato's attitude towards history and 'sociology').

— E. R. Dodds, *The Greeks and the irrational* (230 *supra*), pp. 210—212, p. 216, p. 219, and pp. 223—224. On this cf. R. B. Levinson, *In defense of Plato* (28 *supra*), p. 521, note 48 and p. 554, note 120.

1664. M. Hamburger, *Morals and law: The growth of Aristotle's legal theory*, New Haven 1951. There are throughout this book occasional references to Plato (see especially pp. 6—8, pp. 91—93, pp. 169—171, and pp. 176—177), made mostly for the purpose of magnifying by comparison the accomplishment of Aristotle in legal theory. See also Hamburger's earlier book, *The awakening of western legal thought* (London 1942), pp. 111—113.

1665. M. Hammond, *City-state and world state in Greek and Roman political theory until Augustus*, Cambridge (Mass.) 1951, p. 12 and pp. 16—20. See also Hammond's later lecture, *The classical tradition in political theory and experience and its survival*, *Cl Journ* 51, 1955/56, 171—187 (especially pp. 171—173, p. 178, and p. 181).

— G. R. Morrow, *Popular courts in Plato's Laws* (527 *supra*).

— G. Müller, *Studien zu den platonischen Nomoi* (528 *supra*). See pp. 131—183 on the ideal state in the *Laws*, the *Republic*, and the *Politicus*; pp. 56—59 on criminal law in *Laws IX*; and pp. 168—173 on the conception of νόμος in the *Laws*.

— N. R. Murphy, *The interpretation of Plato's Republic* (791 *supra*), pp. 68—86: The political analogies.

— A. Ravà, *Le origini dell'azione redibitoria e la filosofia greca* (576 *supra*).

1666. T. A. Sinclair, *A history of Greek political thought*, London 1951 delayed until 1952 (cf. K. von Fritz, *Gnomon* 25, 1953, 155—158; Margherita Isnardi, *Riv Filos* 45, 1954, 85—88). Four chapters (pp. 115—208) comprising nearly a third of the book minus a dozen pages given to Isocrates, Antisthenes, Aristippus, and Xenophon are devoted to Plato, whose political thought

is interpreted with the aid of the *Epistles*, the authenticity of these and of the *Epinomis* being assumed without argument, but without relation to the rest of his philosophy. Parts of the tenth chapter are used again in Sinclair's article, *Myth and politics in the 'Laws'* of Plato (529 *supra*). See also 1688 *infra*.

1667. R. Stanka, *Geschichte der politischen Philosophie I: Die politische Philosophie des Altertums*, Wien/Köln 1951 (cf. K. von Fritz, *Gnomon* 25, 1953, 158—161), pp. 142—181: Platon. This section contains a very brief sketch of Plato's life and intellectual world followed by a superficial and often naive review of the *Republic*, the *Politicus*, and the *Laws* interspersed with dubious biographical interpretations.

—. W. Theiler, *Die bewahrenden Kräfte im Gesetzesstaat Platos* (530 *supra*).

1668. S. Moser, *Platons Begriff des Gesetzes*, Österreich Zeitschr öffentliches Recht N. F. 4, 1951/52, 134—158. This is an important and subtle analysis of Plato's conception of the nature and ground of positive law and its necessity, which Moser maintains remained essentially the same from the *Republic* through the *Laws*, so that the use of this by recent scholars as a criterion for differentiating Plato's political theory in these two works is unfounded and improper. The *Politicus* cannot then represent an intermediate stage between the *Republic* and the *Laws*, and Moser takes its sharp contrast of intuitive ruler and actual ruler, neither of whom corresponds to Plato's conception in either of the other two works, to be an expression of the clash between Plato's extreme idealism and his political experience, the resolution of which is given in the *Laws*.

—. V. de Magalhães-Vilhena, *Socrate et la légende platonicienne* (127 *supra*), pp. 97—167. The essence of these three chapters on Plato's political thought (*Le platonisme, philosophie d'action; Philosophie et politique: le 'Gorgias'; Socrate et l'utopie platonicienne*) was distilled in an article published two years later by de Magalhães-Vilhena, *La pensée et l'action: Socrate et la politique platonicienne*, *L'Information Littéraire* 6, 1954, 108—113 and 147—151 (see 481 *supra*). Plato is interpreted as having been from first to last, though not a revolutionary in the true sense of the word, a politician for whom philosophy was 'the continuation of politics by other means' and whose philosophy was simply a retrograde utopianism founded not on contemporary conditions of society and the forces and classes with which the future lay but

upon an idealization of the dead past and upon a decadent class that feared reality and had already been condemned by it.

—. C. J. de Vogel, *Het totalitarisme van Plato's Staat en het totalitarisme van de Katholieke Kerk* (50 *supra*).

—. D. Faucci, *Morale e politica in Platone* (68 *supra*). On Faucci's interpretation of Plato's political thought as a movement away from Socraticism to an 'exteriorized' realization of the good by means of an authoritarian organization of the state see G. Semerari, *Filosofia ed esistenza umana in Platone* (69 *supra*).

—. H. Gauss, *Philosophischer Handkommentar . . .* (20 *supra*), I/1, pp. 204—211.

—. A. R. Henderickx, *Staatsleer of staatsbeeld in de Politeia van Platoon* (793 *supra*).

1669. J. Lambrecht, *De zin van de geschiedenis bij Plato*, *Bijdragen Philos en Theolog Facult N en Z Nederlandse Jezuiten* 13, 1952, 233—261. Lambrecht holds that Plato never abandoned the traditional cyclical conception of the history of the soul and the cosmos save for one timid attempt in asserting the possibility of the philosopher's breaking out of the cycle and that his indirect treatment of the question of history leaves it uncertain whether he had ever put it to himself consciously and clearly.

—. J. B. Skemp, *Plato's Statesman . . .* (732 *supra*), pp. 26—66: The development of Plato's political thought.

—. M. Andronikos, *Le problème des remparts chez Platon* (560 *supra*). Plato's solution of a problem in appearance purely practical and material is here interpreted as an expression of the essence of his political philosophy, the application to human experience of the teleological ideal theoretically described and justified in the *Republic*.

—. V. Goldschmidt, *La théorie platonicienne de la dénonciation* (55 *supra*). In this defence of Plato against modern indictments of his 'totalitarianism' the crucial question of delation in the *Laws* is made the occasion for a penetrating study of the central problem of politics as that of the alliance of enlightened power with unoppressed morality which involves a passage from 'lexis' to 'praxis' understood by Plato as it has not been in modern history to be ultimately and in the strict sense impossible of realization without the 'divine' and rationally inexplicable intervention of 'tyche'. See also 1638 *supra* for Goldschmidt's earlier article and for the section of his book (1309 *supra*) there cited.

1670. H. Gomperz, *The Greek conception of the state*, Philosophical Studies by Heinrich Gomperz edited by D. S. Robinson, Boston 1953, pp. 108—118. In this lecture, delivered in 1940 but first published here, see pp. 114—116, where Gomperz contends that Plato's presupposition of unlimited state-control was in fact unchallenged even by his ancient critics and was taken for granted by all the states of his time, the democracies themselves being totalitarian.

1671. A. H. M. Jones, *The Athenian democracy and its critics*, Cambridge Historical Journ 11, 1953, 1—26. The Athenian democracy, Jones maintains, was not the pernicious form of government of which Plato and Aristotle in their oligarchic spirit condemn the principles and Thucydides the actions.

— H. Karpp, *Die Philosophenkönige bei Platon und bei Kant* (794 *supra*).

1672. S. Lauffer, *Der antike Fortschrittsgedanke*, Proc XIth Internat Cong Philosophy 12, Amsterdam/Louvain 1953, pp. 37—44. The ideal state of Plato is here interpreted (pp. 40—41) as a practical form of belief in progress based upon observation of the past in relation to the present and expressed in the assertion of man's own responsibility in the world of becoming, although Lauffer still holds (p. 44) that Plato tried to combine with this the cyclical theory of history.

— E. Levinas, *Liberté et commandement* (1563 *supra*). This is criticized by M. Djuric (1706 *infra* [p. 83, n. 5]).

— R. B. Levinson, *In defense of Plato* (28 *supra*). This critical examination of the charges brought against Plato by his modern detractors is necessarily concerned in large part with his social and political thought and his alleged political activity, with regard to which it provides important and soberly constructive interpretations especially of the following subjects: his supposed 'totalitarianism' (pp. 499—579 and pp. 618—619); the so-called 'Sicilian venture' (pp. 369—395); his attitude towards life and suffering, towards the common man, and towards the manual worker (pp. 195—201, pp. 232—244, and pp. 253—269); his attitude towards women (pp. 125—138); his position with regard to slavery (pp. 139—195); his attitude towards barbarians and Greeks and the notion of humanity as such (pp. 201—232 and pp. 601—603); his attitude towards Athens (pp. 269—369 and pp. 609—611); his 'philosophy of history' and alleged 'historicism' (pp. 612—615 and pp. 622—629).

1673. D. Loenen, *Polemos: Een studie over oorlog in de Griekse oudheid*, Med Nederland Ak Wet, Afd Letter N. R. 16 No. 3, 1953, 71—168. For Plato see especially pp. 76—77, pp. 86—88, pp. 104—106, pp. 118—126, pp. 133—136, pp. 142—143, and pp. 157—158.

1674. E. Michelakis, *Platons Lehre von der Anwendung des Gesetzes und der Begriff der Billigkeit bei Aristoteles*, München 1953 (cf. G. B. Kerferd, *Cl Rev N. S.* 4, 1954, 291—292; E. Seidl, *Gnomon* 27, 1955, 50—51; G. K. Plochmann, *Cl Phil* 51, 1956, 194—195). The first part of this monograph (pp. 5—27) is devoted to Plato, the second to Aristotle; and at the end (pp. 46—47) the author gives his judgment in favor of Plato as founder and champion of a logic of law in which teleological unity is based upon an idea and the meaning of the legal norm is determined by a teleological method, for the lack of which Aristotle in his theory had to introduce the doctrine of equity.

—. R. Mondolfo, *Platon y el concepto unitario de cultura humana* (748 *supra*).

—. G. R. Morrow, *Plato's conception of persuasion* (59 *supra*).

—. G. E. L. Owen, *The place of the Timaeus in Plato's dialogues* (294 *supra*), pp. 89—94: Second thoughts on government. In this section Owen tries to support his redating of the *Timaeus* by arguing that, whereas in that work and in the *Critias* the political theories of the *Republic* are adopted without comment, the *Politicus* repudiates them and there is no consistent reversion to them in the *Laws*.

1675. L. H. Rifkin, *Aristotle on equality: A criticism of A. J. Carlyle's Theory*, *Journ Hist Ideas* 14, 1953, 276—283. Here Aristotle is said by his 'functional theory of inequality' to have obliterated the sharp distinction between slaves and all other classes of society which Plato is represented as having drawn on the basis of his belief in the racial inferiority of barbarians and because of his 'almost monomaniacal concern . . . to maintain the purity of the Greek race', the expression according to Rifkin of his extreme nationalism and the key to his theory of inequality.

—. H. F. Tecoz, *L' 'arte regia' di Socrate* (489 *supra*). On the nature of the true political art which Socrates is made to say he alone among Athenians practises.

—. M. Vanhoutte, *La réalisation d'un plan politique selon Platon* (533 *supra*).

1676. G. Vlastos, *Isonomia*, *AJPh* 74, 1953, 337—366. On Plato's 'moralistic over-simplification of the problem of social justice' and on his scornful use of what Vlastos holds to have been the slogan of the democrats or his 'semantic legerdemain' in turning it against them see p. 347; p. 352, n. 53; p. 355; p. 359; and p. 361, n. 78. See also A. A. T. Ehrhardt (1717 *infra* [pp. 85—89]).

— K. J. Vourveris, *Πλάτων καὶ Κορήτη* (531 *supra*).

— J. Wild, Plato's modern enemies and the theory of natural law (66 *supra*). The first two chapters of this book (pp. 1—63) deal with modern indictments of Plato as an enemy of freedom and democracy, indictments here said to derive from misunderstandings of his moral philosophy some of which are then in the third chapter (pp. 64—99) identified with basic misconceptions of natural law; and in the fifth chapter (pp. 134—156) Wild argues that Plato was the founder of moral realism and the first philosopher at least in the West to work out an exact and coherent theory of natural law, on which thesis cf. H. Kelsen (1704 *infra*).

— K. F. Stroheker, Zu den Anfängen der monarchischen Theorie in der Sophistik (155 *supra*).

— K. J. Vourveris, *θεῖος φόβος* (534 *supra*).

— G. J. D. Aalders, Totalitarian tendencies in ancient Greece (47 *supra*).

— G. Barbieri, Le dottrine economiche (39h *supra*).

1677. E. Barker, Elections in the Ancient World, *Diogenes* 8, 1954, 1—12. There are a few pages here (pp. 7—9) on striking characteristics of election in the *Laws* as against selection in the *Republic*.

— G. Barraud, La puériculture et l'eugénisme chez les Grecs (536 *supra*).

— R. S. Brumbaugh, Plato's mathematical imagination (1440 *supra*). See pp. 47—71 on 'Social statistics', pp. 85—91 on 'The State and the musical scale' and 'The cycle of social progress', and pp. 107—160 on the Nuptial Number and the Tyrant's Number (pp. 112—114 on the philosophy of history and the rulers' problem).

— B. Brunello, Politica e diritto (39g *supra*).

1678. M. d'Addio, L'idea del contratto sociale dai Sofisti alla Riforma e il '*De Principatu*' di Mario Salamonio, Milano 1954. On Plato see pp. 120—121 and pp. 124—131.

— J. Derbolav, *Erkenntnis und Entscheidung* . . . (16 *supra*). On Plato's political thought see especially pp. 190—196, pp. 237—244, and pp. 261—274.

— C. Diano, *Il concetto della storia* (39d *supra*).

1679. F. Flückiger, *Geschichte des Naturrechtes I: Altertum und Frühmittelalter*, Zollikon/Zürich 1954 (cf. W. Schönfeld, *Hist Zeitschr* 182, 1956, 72—76), pp. 125—163: Platon. It is here argued that Plato's attempt to determine rationally the essence of justice ends in a pure formalism, the principle of unity, in which the state as the highest social unity becomes its own end and whatever furthers this end is *eo ipso* just and right. Against this position see A. Verdross (1714 *infra*).

— P. Friedländer, *Platon* (11a *supra*), I, pp. 3—21, pp. 93—94, and pp. 105—113 = *Plato* (11b *supra*), pp. 3—20, p. 88, and pp. 100—107. Friedländer insists that it was in searching for the best state that Plato discovered the world of ideas, that he founded the Academy when he felt himself compelled to renounce participation in the political affairs of his time, and that the Academy was oriented in a political sense and waited for the moment when it could become the center of an ideal state that had become a reality.

— G. R. Morrow, *The Demiurge in politics* . . . (537 *supra*).

— P. Piovani, *L'antinomia della città platonica* (796 *supra*). On this see the remarks of F. Adorno (1169 *supra* [pp. 182—184]).

— R. Stark, *Aristotelesstudien* (443 *supra*). See on Plato's political thought especially pp. 9—15 and pp. 20—22; Stark's interpretation here is deeply compromised by the untenable assumption that Plato when he conceived the *Politicus* regarded the 'chorismos' as a myth and in the *Timaeus* presents a new theory of ideas 'that knows nothing of it'.

— Marguerite Tête, *Le totalitarisme de Platon* (62 *supra*).

1680. A. Tovar, *Los hechos políticos en Platón y Aristóteles*, Buenos Aires 1954. In the first two chapters (pp. 9—57) of this small book Tovar interprets Plato's political thought as a series of reactions to the political events and conditions in Athens and Sicily during his lifetime. The substance of two earlier articles (1631 and 1662 *supra*) is incorporated in this sketch, and much emphasis is put upon the *Politicus* as a work apart and in contradiction to both the *Republic* and the *Laws*.

— M. Vanhoutte, La philosophie politique de Platon dans les 'Lois' (538 *supra*).

1681. K. von Fritz, The theory of the mixed constitution in antiquity, New York 1954 (cf. P. A. Brunt, JHS 76, 1956, 143—144). For Plato see pp. 45—46 and pp. 49—51 (the 'origin' of human society), pp. 63—73 (the transition from one type of government to another), pp. 78—81 (the mixed constitution), and p. 111 and pp. 398—399 (the constitutions of Sparta and Crete).

1682. K. J. Vourveris, *Πλάτων και ιστορία, ΠΛΑΤΩΝ 6*, 1954, 179—213. After a rapid summary of the philosophy of history among the Greeks before Plato (pp. 180—188) Vourveris here gives what amounts to a recapitulation of his earlier works on Plato's attitude towards history as an 'ancilla philosophiae' and his paradigmatic use of it, his sources and his treatment of them, his attitude towards Athens, Sparta, Crete, and barbarians, his position with regard to democracy and sound political principles, and what Vourveris maintains was his national consciousness and his sense of a patriotic mission (see 1614, 1621, 1622, 1661, and 531 *supra*).

1683. L. Wickert, Theorie und Wirklichkeit in Platons Staatsdenken, Rhein Mus N. F. 97, 1954, 68—75. It is here maintained that Plato despite all disquieting hesitation and distrust of himself believed that his ideal state could be realized and in this belief accepted the invitation of the younger Dionysius to Syracuse, which in his eyes was peculiarly suited to such an undertaking. See also Wickert's earlier article, Platon und Syrakus (98 *supra*).

— E. Wolf, Der sokratische Rechtsgedanke in Platons *Apologie*, . . . in Platons 'Kriton' (322 *supra*).

— J. Last, Stichtte Plato de republiek Tenganan (797 *supra*). With this see the earlier article by E. Bréhier (797 *a supra*).

— H. G. Wolz, The *Republic* in the light of the Socratic method (798 *supra*). The article is avowedly a defence of Plato's political philosophy.

— R. S. Bluck, Is Plato's republic a theocracy? (48 *supra*). Against those who accuse Plato of reaction and of seeking the interest of a single class within the population as well as against the reply to such detractors by M. B. Foster (54 *supra*) Bluck maintains that Plato's ideal state acknowledges a divine force external to itself as the sanction of its laws and the guide by reference to which the guardians like high priests interpret and apply those laws in promotion of the weal of all the population. See also 1715 *infra*.

— É. de Strycker, Vrees als principe van staatsburgerlijke tucht in de democratie . . . (545 *supra*). This article contains a treatment of Plato's praise of the 'old democracy' of Athens as a 'mixed constitution'.

1684. M. Gelzer, Staat und Bürger im Altertum, Mus Helvet 12, 1955, 1—19. For Plato's views of citizenship and what constitutes a 'state' see pp. 1—3.

1685. W. J. W. Koster, Naar aanleiding van het communisme bij Aristophanes en Plato, Groningen 1955. In this inaugural address equipped with justificatory notes the rector of the State University in Groningen sketches the social background of the Aristophanic parody of communism and, comparing this parody with Plato's theories, concludes that it could not have been directed against them and that it exercised upon Plato's formulation of them rather an indirect stimulus than a direct influence.

1686. D. Loenen, Plato's reserve tegenover het actieve staatsleven, Amsterdam 1955. This lecture, delivered in 1954, is the revised form of an article by Loenen published in Tijdsch Wijsbegeerte 23, 1929, 198—213. Here Loenen develops in detail his thesis that Plato, throughout his life one of history's greatest champions of the social ideal against individualism, was the victim of an inner struggle between the wish to engage in political action and the love of speculation.

— R. Mondolfo, La comprensión del sujeto humano en la cultura antigua (1359 *supra*). See pp. 548—556 for Plato on the history of society and the notion of progress.

— M. Pohlenz, Griechische Freiheit (1569 *supra*).

1687. L. Rodríguez Aranda, Platón como pensador, político y artista, Rev Estudios Politicos 82, Julio-Agosto 1955, 131—153. The 'evolution' of Plato's thought and his lack of 'system' are here taken for granted but are said not to impair the inseparable unity of his metaphysical speculation, his politics, and his artistic expression which was the product of the unity of his character. The death of Socrates required him to abandon his original political aspirations and to meditate upon reality; but hence came his conviction that the idea of justice can be realized in life, and this was the source of his political action whether expressed in the voyage to Sicily or in such artistic production as the *Republic*.

1688. T. A. Sinclair, Plato's idea of history, Proc Cl Assoc 52, London 1955, 22—23. This is the summary of a paper the thesis

of which is that 'Plato allowed his politics and his psychology to write history for him'.

1689. E. von Hippel, *Geschichte der Staatsphilosophie in Hauptkapiteln*, Meisenheim am Glan 1955, I, pp. 118—142: Platon. Save for the correction of a few misprints the second edition (1958) is identical with the first. Plato's philosophy of law and of the state is sketched in such a way as to show that his political ideal grows out of his theory of the tripartition of the soul and is parallel to his theory of virtue, and the section ends with an exposition of his theory of the forms of political constitutions.

1690. M. Wheeler, Self-sufficiency and the Greek city, *Journ Hist Ideas* 16, 1955, 416—420. Wheeler here distinguishes Plato's assertion that man is not self-sufficient and his use of this in his 'history' of the origins of society from the Platonic and Aristotelian political ideal of self-sufficiency, which he calls 'backward-looking' and in defiance of the lesson of history.

—. F. Adorno, *Dialettica e politica in Platone* (1169 *supra*). With this see besides 1169 *a supra* Adorno's anthology of Plato's political thought with an introduction (309 *a supra*).

1691. C. J. Despotopoulos, *La guerre chez Platon et chez Hegel*, *Φιλοσοφικὸν Συμπόσιον Ἀθηνῶν* (Entretiens philosophiques d'Athènes 2—6 avril 1955: Dialogue et Dialectique), Institut Internat de Philosophie 1956, pp. 57—62. He compares Plato's treatment of war as an object of dialogue in the *Laws* with Hegel's treatment of it as an element in the dialectic of history.

—. F. Dirlmeier, *Beobachtungen zur Nikomachischen Ethik* (1323 *supra*), p. 171. He calls Plato the discoverer of the principle of organic development and gives examples of his use of 'Entwicklungsgeschichte', a principle which neither Plato nor Aristotle ever applied, however, to an author's work.

1692. V. Fazio Allmayer, *Origine e dissoluzione del concetto di teoretico puro*, *Giorn Crit Filos Ital* 3 Ser. 10, 1956, 1—22. See pp. 7—15 and especially pp. 9—10 for his interpretation of the relation of action to theory in Plato's conception of the political problem, upon which his meditation is here said always to have been concentrated.

—. L. Ferrari, The origin of the state according to Plato (821 *supra*). It is here maintained that the accounts in *Republic* 369A—374E and *Laws* 677A—683C, though different, are both historical and not in conflict with each other, the latter explaining how and

the former why families began to live side by side, the latter being also a 'concretion' of the more abstract account in the former. Plato, Ferrari insists, does use the facts of history but as a philosopher and not as an historian.

— M. Gigante, *NOMOS BASILEYS* (488 *supra*). See especially pp. 253—267 on Plato's conception of νόμος and on the two basic motives of his political thought, the struggle against tyranny and the exaltation of law as sovereign.

— Margherita Isnardi, *Teoria e prassi nel pensiero dell'Accademia Antica* (104 *supra*). She holds that the ideal of the *Republic*, the realization of a communal élite, was transformed in the *Politicus* and the *Laws* but that through these and to the last Plato tenaciously maintained the communal motive of his political thought which after his death was gradually eliminated from Academic thought. See also her later article, *Nomos e basileia . . .* (1699 *infra*).

1693. J.W. Jones, *The law and legal theory of the Greeks*, Oxford 1956. There are passing references to Plato throughout this book, see particularly pp. 57—58 (on slavery), pp. 269—271 (on responsibility) and besides these pp. 68—69, 79—80, 82, 87, 107, 118—119, 146—147, 201, 228.

— E. Koller, *Muße und musische Paideia* (540 *supra*). On the nature and the difference of the ideal states in the *Republic* and the *Laws* see especially pp. 9—10, pp. 12—13, p. 19, p. 117, and p. 120.

1694. J. Llambías de Azevedo, *El pensamiento del derecho y del estado en la antigüedad desde Homeros hasta Platón*, Buenos Aires 1956. The fifth section, which is two-fifths of the book (pp. 239—400), is devoted to Plato, whose philosophy as a whole is interpreted as a response to the problems of politics. A dozen pages on the *Gorgias* and a few paragraphs on the *Theaetetus* are followed by analyses of the *Republic*, occupying half of the section, of the *Politicus*, interpreted as Plato's attempt to adapt his ideal of government to an actual political situation, and of the *Laws*, to which a third of the section is given, the 'common denominator' of these three writings being identified as 'the inverse relation between philosophical education and the binding force of law'. See also 803 *supra*.

1695. S. Ch. Manginas, *Η ιδεολογική θεμελίωση της αρχαίας πόλεως, ΠΛΑΤΩΝ* 8, 1956, 189—205. It is here argued that for the Presocratics (especially Heraclitus) and for Plato the fundamental principle of the organization of the state is the indissoluble harmony of philosophic thought and political action.

1696. J. J. Navone, The division of parts in society according to Plato and Aristotle, *Philos Studies* (Maynooth) 6, 1956, 113—122. I have been unable to procure a copy of this article.

— M. Villey, Sur l'antique inclusion du droit dans la morale (1574 *supra*).

1697. H. Volkmann, *Ἐνδοξος δουλεία* als ehrenvoller Knechtsdienst gegenüber dem Gesetz, *Philologus* 100, 1956, 52—61. This is concerned with the notion expressed in *Symposium* 196 C, *Laws* 715 D and 762 E, *Epistle* VIII 354 C, in Xenophon's *Memorabilia*, and in the story told by Aelian and with the influence exercised by this theory that the true king is slave of the law against the other theory, of which there are indications in Platonic and Aristotelian texts, that the king is νόμος ἔμπροχως.

— C. B. Welles, The Greek city (541 *supra*).

1698. D. Ben Gourion, Platon et l'esclavage, *Evidences* 9 No. 64, avril-mai 1957, 25—34. In this article, which was originally published in Hebrew (*Eškoloṭ* [Jerusalem] 2, 1956, 1—15), Ben Gourion gives a review and sympathetic analysis of Plato's attitude towards manual labor and the status of women as well as towards slavery and compares it with that of Aristotle and with the prescriptions in the Old Testament.

— H. Berve, Dion (90 *supra*). See also Berve's own summary of this monograph (91 *supra*).

— R. Demos, Paradoxes in Plato's doctrine of the ideal state (800 *supra*). With this article see besides the later note by Demos (807 *supra*) his account of Plato's political thought in his earlier book, *The philosophy of Plato*, New York 1939 (see 1185 *supra*), pp. 338—372; and against the 'paradoxes' developed by Demos see the article by R. S. Bluck (1715 *infra*).

— E. A. Havelock, The liberal temper in Greek politics (152 *supra*). On Havelock's thesis (see especially pp. 40—51, pp. 87—103, and pp. 159—254) that Plato deformed and subverted a scientific anthropology and sociology of Democritus and the Sophists in order to combat their political liberalism with a regressive theory of history subordinated to metaphysics in the interest of political reaction see J. A. O. Larsen, *Philos Rev* 68, 1959, 103—109 and L. Strauss, *Rev Metaphysics* 12, 1958/59, 390—439.

1699. Margherita Isnardi, Nomos e basileia nell'Accademia Antica, *Parola Pass* 12, 1957, 401—438. This article begins (pp. 401—412) with Plato's treatment of the problem of law mainly

in the *Politicus* and the *Laws*, presenting the former as giving the theoretical explanation of the absence of codified law in the state of the *Republic* but at the same time raising the problem of the theoretical justification of positive law which is dealt with in the latter, where in the end Plato's fidelity to the sovereignty of νόμος over mere law is signalized by the institution of the nocturnal council. The remainder of the article traces the development of the problem in the presumably early works of Aristotle and in Academic theory after Plato's death until the Academy brought face to face with an actual monarchy to which its traditional formulae of justification could not be adapted gave up its own political theorizing. Compare her earlier article, *Teoria e prassi* . . . (104 *supra*).

1700. A. Jannone, *Esposizione e allevamento in Aristotele*, *Sophia* 25, 1957, 67—75. Aristotle's attitude towards the exposure of children is represented here as having been the opposite to Plato's, who is said to have had a purely military end in view in his solution of demographic problems.

— J. Llambías de Azevedo, *Platón: La teoría del estado justo* (803 *supra*). See also his book, *El pensamiento del derecho y del estado* . . . (1694 *supra*).

1701. J. Luccioni, *Platon politique*, *Rev de la Méditerranée* 80, juillet-août 1957, 406—414. Plato's political writings are here presented as reflections of the principal episodes of his life, and he is himself judged to have been above all a man of action who never was given the occasion to take an active part in Athenian politics. See 1710 *infra*.

— D. Pesce, *Città terrena e città celeste . . . : La società dei filosofi* . . . (804 *supra*).

— W. Schadewaldt, *Das Welt-Modell der Griechen* (1026 *supra*).

1702. V. Sirago, *Tyrannus: Teoria e prassi antitirannica in Cicerone e suoi contemporanei*, *Rend Accad Archeol Lett e Belle Arti N S* 31 (1956), Napoli 1957, 179—225. See pp. 182—184 on the hatred of tyrants on the part of Greek philosophers and especially as expressed by Plato, who was for Cicero the chief enemy of tyranny. In connection with this see B. Giger's dissertation and the articles by K. Büchner and by A. Alföldi cited in 1532 *supra* as well as the article by K. F. Stroheker (155 *supra*).

1703. G. Uscatesco, *L'utopia platonica, Humanitas* (Brescia) 12, 1957, 422—430. Here the *Republic*, the *Politicus*, the *Laws*,

and the myth of Atlantis are all explained as different but coherent parts or aspects of Plato's single utopia, to which the *Gorgias* was meant to be the prelude and which differs from all other 'utopias' in being not a dream of past or future or far distant places but a concrete notion of a perfect political structure wherein a man could achieve the supreme end of his political destiny, i. e. to become a philosopher.

— G. Vlastos, Socratic knowledge and Platonic 'pessimism' (749 *supra*). In this review of the book by J. Gould (1567 *supra*) see pp. 234—238 for the thesis that Plato when he wrote the *Politicus* still believed in the possibility of a human philosopher-king but thereafter as a result of his final encounter with the younger Dionysius changed his mind and when he wrote the *Timaeus*, *Critias*, and *Laws* no longer believed in such a possibility, although even this change did not make him fundamentally pessimistic about the possibility of political reform.

— E. Voegelin, Order and history (36 *supra*). The whole treatment of Plato here (III, pp. 3—268) is a political interpretation of his work in 'existentialist' terms with the 'autobiographical passage' of *Epistle VII* taken as a guide and with express disavowal of any concern with a 'Platonic philosophy'. The tone and drift of this interpretation are nakedly revealed in the section on pp. 223—228, where Plato is said to have appeared in the *Republic* in his own divine reality as the leader of his people but in the *Laws*, because the 'existential potency' of that people was so low, to have withdrawn the direct existential appeal and to have appeared as the ecclesiastic statesman comparable now to St. Paul instead of to Jesus as before.

1704. H. Kelsen, Platon und die Naturrechtslehre, Österreich Zeitschr öffentliches Recht N. F. 8, 1957/58, 1—43. This article is directed against both J. P. Maguire's thesis (1648 *supra*) and J. Wild's (66 *supra*) but especially against the latter. To the former Kelsen objects mainly that the kind of idealistic legal theory ascribed by him to Plato is not a theory of natural law in the specific and legitimate modern sense of the term; but against the latter, who does understand the term in this sense, he argues in detail that Plato's theory was not at all such as Wild ascribes to him but was an idealistic and in fact thoroughly theological doctrine based upon transcendent norms and sanctions rather than upon an analysis of human nature or the observable facts of sensible reality from which the norms of human conduct are deduced. See on this A. Verdross (1714 *infra* [pp. 36—38]).

1705. D. Caiazzo, *L'idea di giustizia nel pensiero greco*, Roma 1958. The tenth chapter of this book contains (pp. 202—215) a rapid and superficial interpretation of the ideal state as a manifestation of the idea of justice and of the relation between individual and state in Plato's political theory.

1706. M. Djuric, Was Plato a Machiavellian?, *Archiv Rechts- und Sozialphilos* 44, 1958, 79—93. According to this diatribe Plato and Machiavelli, though typical of conflicting points of view and aiming at different ends, both believed that the end justifies the means and both, looking upon political means in a technical and amoral manner, believed that force and fraud are the most important instruments of political technique; but the technique of political crime proposed by Plato in order to establish and maintain his fixed caste-society makes the methods of Cesare Borgia, which Machiavelli admired, seem like child's play.

1707. Rita Falke, Problems of utopias, *Diogenes* 23, 1958, 14—22. She compares with modern 'utopias' Plato's ideal, asserting that this was constructed as a conscious deception whereby men are on principle deprived of individuality and reduced to mere functionaries of a totalitarian state supposed to be an ideal for the future 'after the end of history' and yet to have existed once in the distant past but emphatically distinguished from the earthly paradise of the age of Cronus.

—, H. Flashar, *Der Dialog Ion als Zeugnis platonischer Philosophie* (173 *supra*), pp. 112—121: Der Enthusiasmus des Politikers.

1708. C. J. Friedrich, The philosophy of law in historical perspective, Chicago 1958. In this somewhat revised English version of the German original, *Die Philosophie des Rechts in historischer Perspektive* (Berlin 1955), the third chapter (pp. 13—26) entitled Law as participation in the idea of justice is devoted to Plato and Aristotle together.

1709. D. C. Hodges, Judicial supremacy, *Journ Philos* 55, 1958, 101—111. Plato's doctrine of the philosopher-king is here presented as one of the rare examples of a body of theory which fully dignifies the judicial authority as the ultimate sovereignty in the community.

1710. J. Luccioni, *La pensée politique de Platon*, Paris 1958 (cf. G. B. Kerferd, *Gnomon* 31, 1959, 373—374). In this book, a kind of preview of which the author had published the year before in his article, *Platon politique*. (1701 *supra*), four essential

aspects of Plato's thought are treated one after the other: the historical, the philosophical, the religious, and the practical. The whole is in fact dominated by the thesis that Plato's political work is identical with his life; and it is in this sense that Luccioni interprets the writings, reading into them autobiographical references for which there is no real evidence and not infrequently unwittingly contradicting himself. He relies heavily upon *Epistles* VII and VIII, the authenticity of which he assumes, though in one case at least he does not scruple to dismiss as erroneous a statement made in the former by 'Plato' about his own thought. In the second section Plato's politics is said to be in large measure the application of his philosophy and in the third to be the expression of his religion; but in the end Plato the theoretician, philosopher, and believer is declared always to have been in politics above all the man of action lacking only the opportunity to act.

1711. J. S. Morrison, The origins of Plato's philosopher-statesman, *Cl Quart N. S.* 8, 1958, 198—218. See 105 *supra* for the résumé of this article published in the preceding year.

— M. Pavan, La grecità politica da Tucidide ad Aristotele (483 *supra*), pp. 37—77. After having argued in the first of these two chapters (pp. 37—66) that in the *Gorgias* Plato passes on all 'practical' politics a judgment from which he never deviated Pavan in the second (pp. 67—77) maintains that the *Menexenus* does not differ from the attitude of the *Gorgias* but confirms it.

1712. F. Sartori, Platone e le eterie, *Historia* 7, 1958, 157—171. This is an important study of *ἐταῖρος* and *ἐταῖρία* in Plato, who uses the latter, Sartori concludes, in a laudatory sense of 'friendship', in a laudatory sense of 'philosophical association' but only where philosophy is cultivated with honest intent, and always with harsh condemnation in the sense of 'secret association' for political cooperation against the state, thus revealing that he had no sympathy with the Athenian oligarchical 'clubs'.

1713. P.-M. Schuhl, Théorie et pratique dans la pensée de l'ancienne Académie, *Rev Philosophique* 148, 1958, 373—374. This is merely a résumé of the article by Margherita Isnardi (104 *supra*).

1714. A. Verdross, Abendländische Rechtsphilosophie: Ihre Grundlagen und Hauptprobleme in geschichtlicher Schau, Wien 1958, pp. 30—39: Die Rechtsidee (Platon). In this section Verdross restates briefly the essential points of the more detailed treatment in his earlier book, *Grundlinien . . .* (1643 *supra*), and insists against

F. Flückiger (1679 *supra*), though without mentioning him, that Plato's concept of justice is not merely formal, and against H. Kelsen (1704 *supra*) that, though he rightly rejects Wild's interpretation of Platonic 'nature', yet Plato did recognize a natural law and did not leave justice undefined and accessible only to the mystical vision of the philosopher-kings. Concerning the relation of individual and state Verdross emphasizes once more the point which in an earlier article, *Die Idee der menschlichen Grundrechte* (Anz Österreich Akad Wiss Phil Hist Kl 91, 1954 [Wien 1955], 335—342), he had made in passing (p. 337), that according to Plato one must endure anything rather than acquiesce in a political system the nature of which is to make men morally worse and that only those laws are binding that emanate from reason.

1715. R. S. Bluck, Plato's 'ideal' state, *Ci Quart N. S.* 9, 1959, 166—168. Writing against the 'paradoxes' developed by R. Demos (800 *supra*) Bluck contends that in the *Republic* Plato begins by describing ordinary goodness in man and society and then passes on to something higher, the philosophic life for the individual and the philosopher-king for the state, but that the state then described is a model meant to be 'ideal' only in the sense of the best attainable and not in the sense of the best conceivable, i. e. a *perfect* commonwealth all of whose citizens are *perfect* men.

1716. J. de Romilly, Le classement des constitutions d'Hérodote à Aristote, *Rev Ét Grecques* 72, 1959, 81—99. See pp. 86—92 and pp. 98—99 on Plato.

1717. A. A. T. Ehrhardt, *Politische Metaphysik von Solon bis Augustin, I: Die Gottesstadt der Griechen und Römer*, Tübingen 1959. On Plato see pp. 26, 31—33, 50—52, 64—66, 70—72, 80, 86—89 and especially pp. 99—102, 125—127, 130—131, 151—155, 165, and 167—172.

—, R. W. Hall, Justice and the individual in the *Republic* (1365 *supra*). According to this interpretation Plato's intention was not to subordinate the will of the individual to the good of the state or to identify the true good of the individual with service to the state but to show that the two goods are in a relation of mutual dependence such that the state exists for the sake of the individual.

1718. J. Luccioni, Platon et la mer, *Rev Ét Anciennes* 61, 1959, 15—47. After sections on the sea in Plato's life, that is on his knowledge of it from literature and from personal experience (pp. 15—20), on his treatment of it as part of the physical universe

(pp. 20—23), and on his use of nautical comparisons and metaphors (pp. 23—39) Luccioni discusses (pp. 39—46) the rôle of the sea and the navy in Plato's interpretation of the history and politics of Athens and in his own provisions for the state.

1719. K. Papaioannou, *Nature and history in the Greek conception of the cosmos*, Diogenes 25, 1959, 1—27. In this attempt to show that the premises and implications of any authentic philosophy of history are incompatible with the Greek conception of the cosmos and man's proper place in it the author to support his thesis leans heavily upon Plato and Aristotle, whom he treats almost as one in this respect. See especially pp. 6—9, pp. 18—19, and pp. 23—27.

1720. E. Paresce, *Storia della filosofia del diritto nell' antica Grecia*, Messina 1959. This volume despite its title has nothing to say of Plato except in so far as he is occasionally called in evidence for the earlier speculations on law, politics, and justice from Homer through Solon, who is here treated as 'the founder of political science'.

1721. N. Scholl, *Der platonische Menexenos*, Roma 1959, pp. 99—117: *Platon und die Geschichte*. After having given an analytical interpretation of the *Menexenus* and having compared this work with others which reveal Plato's attitude towards rhetoric, Scholl in this last chapter argues that the *Menexenus* (which he takes to be the pendant to the *Gorgias* and the germ-cell of the *Phaedrus* and to be internally related to the *Laws*) presents Plato's criticism of the Thucydidean funeral oration and at the same time not only of the politics of Pericles himself but also of the political and historical ideals of Thucydides and his conception of the ultimately effective forces in political events, Plato maintaining that these forces are exclusively moral principles and that this fact as well as pedagogical interest requires the writing of history to have a moral orientation.

1722. P.-M. Schuhl, *Une école des sciences politiques*, Rev Philosophique 149, 1959, 101—103. Plato is here said to have founded the Academy as a school of political science for the training of legislators such as that of which he dreamed in writing of the Nocturnal Council in *Laws* XII. See Schuhl's earlier article on Plato and the political activity of the Academy (105 *supra*).

1723. R. Weil, *L' 'archéologie' de Platon*, Paris 1959. The bulk of the monograph (pp. 55—164) is a regular philological and historical commentary treating passage by passage Book III of the

Laws and 706 A—707 D in Book IV. This is preceded by an introduction (pp. 7—54) in which after six pages of generalities on Plato's formation and evolution and the attitude of Socrates and his contemporaries towards history Weil gives an account of the Platonic passages earlier than the *Laws* that have to do with history and then an introduction to the *Laws* itself, commenting on Plato's notions concerning 'serious play', history as dialogue, and the value of history. He characterizes his work himself as an attempt to combine the points of view of G. Rohr (1589 *supra*) and of K. J. Vourveris (1614 and 1661 *supra*). The work of G. J. D. Aalders on *Laws* III (547 *supra*) he appears not to have known.

Of the items listed in this section see the following especially for

Law and legal Theory: J. Sauter (1586 *supra*), W. G. Becker (512 *supra*), H. Kelsen (775 and 1704 *supra*), A. H. Chase (513 *supra*), F. Guglielmino (514 *supra*), H. Perls (1601 *supra*), U. Galli (1603 *supra*), G. R. Morrow (1619, 517, 519, 520, 521, 1398, and 527 *supra*), A. Meremetis (518 *supra*), H. Cairns (1634 *supra*), O. Reverdin (522 *supra* [pp. 169—241]), A. Verdross-Drossberg (1643 and 1714 *supra*), W. Jaeger (1647 *supra*), J. P. Maguire (1648 *supra*), D. Loenen (1651 *supra*), B. Leoni (1654 *supra*), G. A. Roggerone (1660 *supra*), L. Gernet (511 *supra* [XI/1, pp. XCIV—CCVI]), M. Hamburger (1664 *supra*), G. Müller (528 *supra* [pp. 56—59 and pp. 168—173]), A. Ravà (576 *supra*), S. Moser (1668 *supra*), E. Michelakis (1674 *supra*), J. Wild (66 *supra* [pp. 134—156]), B. Brunello (39g *supra*), F. Flückiger (1679 *supra*), E. Wolf (322 *supra*), M. Gigante (488 *supra* [pp. 253—267]), J. W. Jones (1693 *supra*), J. Llambías de Azevedo (1694 *supra*), M. Villey (1574 *supra*), H. Volkmann (1697 *supra*), Margherita Isnardi (1699 *supra*), C. J. Friedrich (1708 *supra*).

Status of Women: J. Ithurriague (1587 *supra*), M. Salomon (1609 *supra*), R. Palas (1209 *supra* [pp. 162—177]), R. B. Levinson (28 *supra* [pp. 125—138]), G. Barraud (536 *supra*), D. Ben Gourion (1698 *supra*).

Slavery and the Status of Slaves: R. Schlaifer (1602 *supra*), G. R. Morrow (1619 and 517 *supra*), G. Vlastos (1632 *supra*), R. B. Levinson (28 *supra* [pp. 139—195]), L. H. Rifkin (1675 *supra*), D. Ben Gourion (1698 *supra*).

Economics: M. Salomon (1620 *supra*), O. Zwengel (1625 *supra*), A. Polet (1649 *supra*), J. Lacour-Gayet (1650 *supra*), C. B.

Welles (1652 *supra*), J. Moreau (1655 *supra*), M. B. Amzalak (1658 *supra*), G. Barbieri (39h *supra*), M. Wheeler (1690 *supra*).

Interpretation of History and of Different States and Peoples:

W. Nestle (1588 *supra*), G. Rohr (1589 *supra*), F. Ollier (1591 *supra*), R. Harder (1593 *supra*), A. Menzel (1600 *supra* [pp. 168—176 and pp. 186—190]), R. Schaerer (1061 *supra* [pp. 147—148, pp. 193—195, pp. 208—209, pp. 259—260]), K. J. Vourveris (1614, 1621, 1622, 1661, 531, and 1682 *supra*), A. E. Taylor (862 *supra* [pp. 31—38]), R. McKeon (1626 *supra*), R. Palas (1209 *supra* [pp. 95—112]), G. J. D. Aalders (547 *supra* [pp. 64—142]), K. Sprey (1636 *supra* [with the review by G. J. de Vries]), E. Bayer (236a *supra*), E. van Effenterre (524 *supra*), É. des Places (222 *supra* [pp. 87—93 and pp. 107—116]), W. Steidle (508 *supra*), R. G. Bury (1663 *supra*), A. Diès (511 *supra* [XI/1, pp. XIII—XXXI]), J. Lambrecht (1669 *supra*), S. Lauffer (1672 *supra*), R. B. Levinson (28 *supra* [pp. 201—232, pp. 269—369, pp. 601—603, pp. 609—615, and pp. 622—629]), L. H. Rifkin (1675 *supra*), R. S. Brumbaugh (1440 *supra* [pp. 87—91 and pp. 112—113]), C. Diano (39d *supra*), K. von Fritz (1681 *supra*), R. Mondolfo (1359 *supra* [pp. 548—556]), T. A. Sinclair (1688 *supra*), L. Ferrari (821 *supra*), E. A. Havelock (152 *supra* [pp. 40—51, pp. 87—103, and pp. 159—254]), K. Papaioannou (1719 *supra*), N. Scholl (1721 *supra*), R. Weil (1723 *supra*).

War and Peace: W. Nestle (1613 *supra*), M. Mühl (835 *supra*), G. Murray (1635 *supra*), A. Verdross-Drossberg (1643 *supra* [pp. 110—111 and p. 117] and 1714 *supra* [p. 39]), É. des Places (222 *supra* [pp. 115—132]), R. B. Levinson (28 *supra* [pp. 223—229, pp. 515—516, and pp. 565—570]), D. Loenen (1673 *supra*), C. J. Despotopoulos (1691 *supra*), R. Weil (1723 *supra* [pp. 50—52]).

VI: Education

In prefixing here as usual to the list of relevant works published during the fifties a selection of those which appeared during the two decades preceding 1950 it is doubly appropriate to begin with an article published first in 1930 and recently reprinted. Two years before that its author, J. Stenzel, had published a volume, *Platon der Erzieher* (Leipzig 1928), in which he sought from the pedagogical point of view to comprehend the unity of Plato's

philosophizing; and the essence of this interpretation is succinctly presented in the following article:

1724. J. Stenzel, *Wissenschaft und Bildung im platonischen Erziehungsbegriff*, *Zeitschr Geschichte Erziehung und Unterricht* 20, 1930, 89—120. This is reprinted in J. Stenzel, *Kleine Schriften zur griechischen Philosophie* (Darmstadt 1956), pp. 271—299. In this same collection (pp. 220—270) there is reprinted another work, *Die griechisch-römische Bildungswelt*, the fifth section of which (pp. 250—257) gives still more concisely Plato's educational theory and programme as interpreted by Stenzel; this too was first published in 1930 (H. Nohl und L. Pallat, *Handbuch der Pädagogik I*, Langensalza 1930, pp. 122ff.).

1725. E. Hoffmann, *Der pädagogische Gedanke in Platons Höhlengleichnis*, *Archiv Gesch Philos* 40, 1931, 47—57. This article has been reprinted in the collection of essays by E. Hoffmann, *Pädagogischer Humanismus* (Zürich/Stuttgart 1955), pp. 146—161. In connection with this see Hoffmann's later book, *Platon* (22 *supra*), pp. 65—87 (see in 841 *supra*).

— J. Ithurriague, *Les idées de Platon sur la condition de la femme . . .* (1587 *supra*), pp. 97—116: *L'éducation des femmes*.

— J. Hirschberger, *Die Phronesis in der Philosophie Platons vor dem Staate* (1336 *supra*), pp. 191—195: *Die Pädagogik*.

1726. R. Weirich, *Körper und Körpererziehung bei Platon*, *Endingen* 1932. This is a study of the way in which Plato, rejecting sport for its own sake as having no rational meaning in the structure of his state, gave physical culture a well defined place in his single, integrated conception of the education of the whole person and further by connecting with his cosmological principles the physiology of gymnastics gave the latter an expressly hygienic purpose as the true dietetic art and the natural form of physical therapy.

1727. C. Eckle, *Der platonische Bildungsgedanke im 19. Jahrhundert: Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte und Theorie seiner Interpretation*, Leipzig 1935 (cf. H.-G. Gadamer, *Blätter Deutsche Philos* 10, 1936/37, 338—340).

— G. M. A. Grube, *Plato's thought* (3 *supra*), pp. 216—258: *Education*.

— W. Vetter, *Die Musik im platonischen Staate* (1412 *supra*). Vetter here undertakes to show that Plato is concerned with music primarily as an instrument of ethico-political education and how he makes the 'art of the Muses' in the sense of an organic complex

of music, poetry, and gymnastics with the musical disposition underlying it the foundation of his educational state. In connection with what is here said of the ethico-pedagogical attitude towards music see also Vetter's accounts in *R.-E.* I 16, 1 (1933), cols. 838, 39—843, 11 and cols. 877, 15—884, 8 and in *Die Musik in Geschichte und Gegenwart* 3, 1954, 1581—1591.

1728. D. Roser, *Erziehung und Führung: Versuch über Sokrates und Platon*, Stuttgart 1936. Sokrates is here contrasted as the conservatively pious 'educator' to Plato as the revolutionary, philosophical 'leader', proud and confident of his knowledge, who constrains an elite to achieve true knowledge. The reconciliation of these two opposite attitudes is said to have been begun in the *Laws*.

— P. Boyancé, *Le culte des Muses ...* (208 *a supra*). See pp. 167—184 on Plato's conception of the educational value and uses of music, wine, and religious festivals; and with this see Boyancé's later article, *Platon et le vin* (1555 *supra*).

— R. G. Bury, *The theory of education in Plato's Laws* (515 *supra*).

— P. Lachière-Rey, *Les idées morales, sociales et politiques de Platon* (1526 *supra*), pp. 142—151.

— W. Venske, *Plato und der Ruhm* (1528 *supra*). Renown does have positive value in Plato's system of political education.

— H. Zeise, *Der Staatsmann ...* (739 *supra*), pp. 87—95: *Die erzieherische Aufgabe des Staatsmanns*.

1729. O. Zwengel, *Platons politische Erziehungstheorie im Lichte des nationalpolitischen Erziehungsgedankens*, Düren, 1938. I have been unable to procure a copy of this Frankfurt dissertation.

1730. Valeria Benetti Brunelli, *Il pensiero educativo della Grecia*, Roma 1939. After a section on the Socratic 'revolution' (pp. 201—233), based largely upon the *Apology*, *Crito*, and *Euthyphro*, Plato's philosophy of education is dealt with in the final section (pp. 237—289) under the title, *Platone e l'educazione alla 'sofrosyne'*. Plato's educational programme is here interpreted as an instrument of political reform intended to restore the ancient ideal of the independent city-state by a purification which ends in subverting the very foundation of the ideal meant to be restored.

— J. Moreau, *La construction ...* (5 *supra*). Not only the first chapter of this book (pp. 31—100), *Le problème de l'éducation*, but the second as well (pp. 101—133), *Technique et pratique*, and

pp. 217—226, 229—234, and 433—435 also are directly concerned with Plato's philosophy of education, Moreau's interpretation of which is stated more succinctly in his later essay, *Platon et l'éducation* (1743 *infra*).

1731. K. J. Vourveris, *Κράτος καὶ Παιδεία κατὰ Πλάτωνα, ἐν Ἀθήναις* 1939. This is an essay explaining that in Plato's view true education as distinct from technical training can alone prevent political chaos and so is the primary function of the state, which must therefore be governed by genuine philosophy achieving the goodness, which is its end, by exercising certain sanctions. See also the later monograph by Vourveris, *Παιδιά καὶ παιδεία* (1122 *supra*).

1732. O. Wichmann, *Platons Erziehungslehre, Die Erziehung* 14, 1939, 361—383 and 443—457; 15, 1940, 130—141, 172—181, and 203—223 (also published separately: Leipzig 1940). Beginning with the educational aspect of Socrates' personality and doctrine in the early dialogues Wichmann goes on to treat separately the intellectual or dialectical education involved in the theory of ideas, the conception of educational 'eros', and the different forms of political education in the *Republic* and in the *Laws*, concluding his account with a brief section on the Academy in its relation to Plato's views of education. These, he maintains, are highly suggestive and fruitful but different and disparate approaches to the problem but were never worked up into a unified and systematic pedagogical doctrine even in the *Laws*, where Plato, though he went further in this direction than ever before, really gives only a methodical clarification of educational questions related to his doctrine of the state. This thesis with the essence of the analyses here given in support of it was presented by Wichmann again in the following article; which was also published in 1940:

1733. O. Wichmann, *Das Problem der Systematik in Platons Erziehungslehre, Τεσσαρακονταετηρίς Θεοφίλου Βορέα, ἐν Ἀθήναις* 1940, II, p. 145—161.

—. R. Palas, *Die Bewertung der Sinnenwelt bei Platon ...* (1209 *supra*), pp. 85—95: Das Problem der Erziehbarkeit des Menschen. According to Palas, who in this section pays no attention to the *Laws*, Plato's pedagogy is basically intellectualistic throughout but not in the optimistic sense of the 'Enlightenment', for to Plato the great majority of mankind is incapable of being educated.

—. H.-G. Gadamer, *Platos Staat der Erziehung* (780 *supra*)

—. W. J. Verdenius, *L'Ion de Platon* (501 *supra*).

— W. Jaeger, *Paideia* (4 *supra*). Jaeger interprets Plato's philosophy throughout as essentially 'pedagogical', but see especially the following sections: II, pp. 165—187 (*Sophistische oder Sokratische Paideia?*), pp. 188—227 (*Der Erzieher als der wahre Staatsmann*), pp. 264—269 (*Pädagogie des Eros*), pp. 281—334 (*Die Reformation der alten Paideia, Die Kritik der musischen Bildung, Kritik der Gymnastik und Medizin, Die Stellung der Erziehung im Staate der Gerechtigkeit, Die Erziehung der Frauen und Kinder, Rassenauslese und Erziehung der Besten, Kriegererziehung*); III, pp. 1—47 (*Die Paideia der Herrscher*), pp. 90—98 (*Der erzieherische Wert der Poesie*), pp. 289—309 (*Der Gesetzgeber als Erzieher, Der Geist der Gesetze und die wahre Bildung*), pp. 324—341 (*Die Gesetze für Volksbildung*). See also in Jaeger's later essay, *Praise of law . . .* (1647 *supra*), pp. 366—368 for his conception of the relation between Plato's ideal education and his practical legislation.

— R. Schaerer, *Dieu, l'homme et la vie d'après Platon* (1137 *supra*), pp. 88—104.

— V. Goldschmidt, *Le paradigme dans la théorie platonicienne de l'action* (1638 *supra*). See pp. 129—136 and p. 142 on education and especially on the difference between education and technical instruction.

— R. Hackforth, *The ἀνεξέταστος βίος in Plato* (798 a *supra*). He argues that in the *Republic*, the *Sophist*, the *Politicus*, and the *Laws* Plato consistently maintains the cathartic value of the Socratic elenchus in the educational process.

— N. Almqvist, *Till Platons differentiella psykologi . . .* (1301 *supra*). See especially pp. 52—112 (*Lärjungetyper och balansering av motsatta temperament*) and pp. 206—245 (*De platonska urvalsproven såsom en reaktion mot sofisternas pedagogik, . . . och den pythagoreiska pedagogiken*).

1734. R. C. Lodge, *Plato's theory of education*, London 1947 (cf. R. C. Cross, *Mind* N. S. 57, 1948, 537—538; M. Vanhoutte, *Rev Philos Louvain* 48, 1950, 569—571). In this book, which ends with an appendix (pp. 287—308) by S. Frank, *Education of women according to Plato*, Lodge in his eagerness to show that Plato's views are not antiquated presents them in dress as modern as possible. After stressing the practical aim of Plato's educational theories he first treats vocational and professional education, then education for citizenship and for leadership, and after that the rôle of association, imitation, and 'imaginative self-projection' in

the educational process, whom Plato meant the teachers to be, how the teaching of composition was to be handled, and then the pupil himself in his course of learning from babyhood to officialdom, the growth, that is, of mind, which according to Lodge Plato identified with the interaction and development of selves in a social tissue of civic life. The final chapter on education and democracy is a defence of Plato's theory and programme against modern critics of them. See also Lodge's later book, *The philosophy of Plato* (30 *supra*), pp. 199—280: Philosophy of education.

— H. Ryyfel, *Eukosmia* . . . (166 *supra*). Plato's conception of the educational effect and the ethico-political character of music is ascribed to the influence of Damon in this attempt to reconstruct the latter's *Areopagiticus* (cf. R. P. Winnington-Ingram, *Lustrum* 3, 1958 [published 1959], 53).

1735. W. Witwicki, *Platon jako pedagog*, Warszawa 1947. I have been unable to procure a copy of this book.

— J. Aerts, *Staatsburgerlijke opvoeding, onderwijs en schoolboeken in de 'Wetten' van Platoon* (523 *supra*).

— P. Grenet, *Les origines de l'analogie philosophique dans les dialogues de Platon* (1144 *supra*), pp. 198—209. Education according to this was for Plato an artistic activity, the fundamental law of which is imitation, the model imitated being the divinity.

— H.-I. Marrou, *Histoire de l'éducation dans l'Antiquité* (201 *supra*), pp. 99—120: Platon.

— P. Zenoni Politeo, *Intorno al significato del 'Protagora' platonico* (761 *supra*).

1736. J. S. Morrison, An introductory chapter in the history of Greek education, *Durham Univ Journ* 41 = N. S. 10, 1948/49, 55—63. The avowed purpose of this article is to give 'a juster appreciation of the sophists' rôle in Athenian education and the nature of the quarrel Plato had with them'. See also in Morrison's later article, *The origins of Plato's philosopher-statesman* (1711 *supra*), pp. 203—207, p. 212, and pp. 216—218 on the development of Plato's educational theories in relation to the sophists, to Pythagorean influences, and to Isocrates.

— G. C. Field, *The philosophy of Plato* (10c *supra*), pp. 175—180.

— G. F. Hourani, *The education of the third class in Plato's Republic* (788 *supra*).

1737. L. Barrington, Plato's theory of education, *Cl Journ* (Malta) 4, 1950, 23—35. The author of this paper, following very closely the topical arrangement of Lodge's book (1734 *supra*), comes to the conclusion that the spirit of Plato's theory rather than his curriculum should interest us because, 'although Plato was not illuminated by the light of Christ, he held fast to absolute values'.

— C. Librizzi, I problemi fondamentali della filosofia di Platone (29 *supra*). See besides pp. 136—176 (Il problema pedagogico-politico), the conclusion of this book (pp. 188—193), L'educatore dell'umanità. I have been unable to procure Librizzi's earlier articles published in *Rass Pedagogia*, 1948, 176—183 (Arte ed educazione in Platone) and 221—248 (Platone educatore politico).

— G. A. Roggerone, La natura pedagogica del diritto in Platone (1660 *supra*).

— J. Barns, *Cl Quart N. S.* 1, 1951, 4—8 and 10 (561 *supra*) in his article, A new Gnomologium . . . II, *ibid.*, pp. 1—19. On Plato's attitude towards the use of poetry and of the 'anthological method' in education.

— Les *Lois* . . . , Introduction de A. Diès . . . = Platon, Oeuvres Complètes XI, 1^{re} partie (511 *supra*), pp. VIII—XIII p. L, pp. LIII—LXVI, and pp. LXXXVII—XC.

— T. Ballauff, Die Idee der Paideia . . . (214 *supra*), pp. 17—52.

1738. H. Knoth, Platon im Lichte lebensnaher Pädagogik, Frankfurt am Main 1952. This monograph is concerned with Plato's notions of popular education as reflected in the provisions of the *Laws*.

— R. B. Levinson, In defense of Plato (28 *supra*), pp. 253—254, pp. 362—369, p. 516, pp. 543—548, pp. 557—560, and pp. 618—619.

— G. R. Morrow, Plato's conception of persuasion (59 *supra*). Morrow adduces in support of his thesis here an outline of the educational proposals in the *Laws* and the provisions there made for achieving unconditional obedience to the laws and institutions of the state.

— J. Derbolav, Erkenntnis und Entscheidung . . . (16 *supra*). See besides pp. 60—66 and pp. 120—128 in the chapter entitled Platons erzieherisches Anliegen especially pp. 188—190, pp. 267—270, and pp. 403—438.

— G. Flores d'Arcais, *La pedagogia* (39f *supra*).

— P. Friedländer, *Platon* (11a *supra*), I pp. 72–73 and pp. 90–108 = *Plato* (11b *supra*), I, p. 68 and pp. 85–102.

— H. L. Hudson-Williams, *Three systems of education* (682 *supra*).

— H. Koller, *Die Mimesis in der Antike* (168 *supra*). See pp. 25–36, *Mimesis des Tanzes in den Gesetzen Platons*, and pp. 57–58, *Mimesis der Erziehung*. With this see also the article published by Koller in the following year, *Ἐγκύκλιος Παιδεία* (966 *supra*), on which cf. R. P. Winnington-Ingram, *Lustrum* 3, 1958 (pub. 1959), 49.

— Plutarque, *De la musique . . .* par F. Lasserre (167 *supra*), pp. 80 and 89 on Plato and musical education.

1739. J. Portnoy, *The philosopher and music*, New York 1954. The brief section on Plato (pp. 14–22) deals almost exclusively with his conception of music as an educational discipline to be employed for the attainment of a sound morality and with his consequent opposition to musical innovation and to the hedonistic theory of music.

— W. D. Anderson, *The importance of Damonian theory in Plato's thought* (170 *supra*). See especially pp. 91–92 and pp. 95–102 on Plato's conception of the purpose of musical education and on the differences as well as the similarities between his theory and Damon's. With regard to the theory of 'paideutic ethos' in music see also *Harvard Studies in Class Phil* 63, 1958, 509 and 510 in the summary of Anderson's dissertation, *Paideia and ethos in Hellenic music . . .*, *ibid.*, pp. 507–510.

— V. Goldschmidt, *La Ligne de la République et la classification des sciences* (1404 *supra*).

— J. Gould, *The development of Plato's ethics* (1567 *supra*), pp. 77–87, pp. 110–118, and pp. 148–150.

1740. J. Moreau, *Platon et la pédagogie de l'intériorité*, *Il Problema Pedagogico* (*Atti del X Convègno del Centro di Studi Filosofici tra Professori Universitari*-Gallarate 1954), Brescia 1955, pp. 87–91. See 1743 *infra*.

— K. J. Vourveris, *Παιδιά καὶ παιδεία* (1122 *supra*). See also his earlier essay, *Κράτος καὶ παιδεία κατὰ Πλάτωνα* (1731 *supra*).

1741. I. Düring, *Greek music: Its fundamental features and significance*, *Cahiers d'Histoire Mondiale* 3, 1956, 302–329. See

pp. 314—315 and p. 317 for Plato's doctrine of the ethical effects of music and his programme of musical instruction.

—. E. Koller, *Muße und musische Paideia* (540 *supra*). Besides pp. 4—15 (Über die Stellung der Musik bei Platon) with Koller's thesis (pp. 8—9 and p. 12) of the extended educational importance of music in the *Laws*, where two different attitudes towards music in the *Republic* converge, see also pp. 15—28, pp. 111—113, and pp. 115—120 for Plato's educational and cultural ideal and programme and the relation to them of Aristotle's.

—. R. C. Lodge, *The philosophy of Plato* (30 *supra*), pp. 199—280: Philosophy of education. After a chapter on the educational theories of the predecessors of Socrates and of Plato and one on the attitude of Socrates towards the educational theories of his contemporaries Lodge here presents as Plato's own the educational ideal and programme of the *Laws* in contrast to those of Socrates himself as expounded by Plato in the *Republic*. See also his earlier book, *Plato's theory of education* (1734 *supra*).

1742. R. Meister, *Die Entstehung der höheren Allgemeinbildung in der Antike*, *Wiener Studien* 69, 1956, 256—264. For Plato's contribution to this process and his testimony concerning it see p. 257, p. 258, and pp. 260—262.

1743. J. Moreau, *Platon et l'éducation*, *Les grands pédagogues par J. S. Brubacher, . . . J. Moreau, . . . R. Savioz sous la direction de J. Chateau*, Paris 1956, pp. 1—22. The thesis of the paper by Moreau published in the preceding year (1740 *supra*) is developed more fully in this essay, which is itself an admirably succinct account of Plato's educational philosophy as interpreted at length by Moreau in his earlier book, *La construction . . .* (5 *supra*), pp. 31—133, pp. 217—226, pp. 229—234, and pp. 433—435. Holding that the point of departure for Plato's philosophy of education as for all his philosophy was the question of the teachability of virtue, Moreau contends that the essence of the Platonic doctrine of education is the 'interiority' of the acquisition of knowledge and that Plato absorbed and transformed all the sophistic forms of education as well as the traditional education by making them different stages in his educational process, which has the character of an initiation into the knowledge of the good, the science of value.

1744. K. E. Vasilakis, *Πλατωνικαὶ ἐρευναὶ Α': Ὁ Πλάτων καὶ ἡ ἐποπτικὴ διδασκαλία, ἐν Ἀθήναις* 1956. The thesis of this doctoral dissertation is that Plato far from scorning the uses of the senses proposed to make use of them in education in a way that anti-

cipated the methods of Pestalozzi. Taking the *Laws* as a general treatise on didactics, the author relies chiefly upon interpretation of sections of this work for his account of Plato's pedagogical principles, their relation to his philosophical doctrine, and their application in the method of teaching gymnastics, music, mathematics, and dialectic.

1745. Isobel Henderson, *Ancient Greek music*, New Oxford History of Music I: *Ancient and Oriental Music* edited by E. Wellesz, London 1957, pp. 336—403. See pp. 338—340, pp. 384—387, pp. 395—397, and p. 401 for her brief but fresh and important remarks on Plato and musical education, what he meant by the associations of the *harmoniae* and the later misunderstanding of his meaning, and his reaction to the musical revolution with its avowed hedonism and the consequent decay of musical education.

1746. D. L. Clark, *Rhetoric in Greco-Roman education*, New York 1957. This book contains two rather slight passages (pp. 26—40 and pp. 162—167) dealing with Plato on rhetoric and rhetorical education and one still slighter (pp. 18—20) treating his criticism of the use of poems as educational texts and his banishment of poets on the ground that they are 'nonrational'.

— R. E. Cushman, *Therapeia* . . . (15 *supra*), pp. 135—172 and pp. 211—241.

— É. des Places, *L'éducation des tendances chez Platon et Aristote* (1577 *supra*).

— G. Funke, *Gewohnheit* (1578 *supra*), pp. 39—42.

1747. G. Nussbaum, *Socrates' educational method in the Apology*, *Proc Cl Assoc* 55, London 1958, 22. This is the résumé of a paper in which the *Apology* is interpreted as representing the procedure whereby through successive stages Socrates educates the jury as elsewhere he educates men into a right view of things.

1748. H. D. Rankin, *Toys and education in Plato's Laws*, *Hermathena* 92, 1958, 62—65. This is primarily concerned with *Laws* 643 B 4—D 4, which Rankin argues has not the implications seen in it either by R. C. Lodge (1734 *supra*) or by J. Gould (1567 *supra*) but is illustrative rather than legislative and comparable to the preambles which some of the laws possess.

1749. W. Barclay, *Educational ideals in the Ancient World*, London 1959. In the chapter on education among the Athenians (pp. 78—142) there are many references to Plato and quotations from him but these are used primarily as evidence of the nature of

Athenian education rather than as material for a study of Plato's own educational theory.

— F. Egermann, *Platonische Spätphilosophie und Platonismen bei Aristoteles* (1951 *supra*). See p. 138 for the relation between the two kinds of education, the 'higher' or 'more exact' and the 'lesser'.

1750. E. L. Fortin, *Christianisme et culture philosophique au cinquième siècle*, Paris 1959. See pp. 33—39, pp. 163—167, and pp. 186—189 on the place of rhetoric vis-à-vis philosophy in Plato's theory of education and 'culture'.

— J.-C. Fraisse, *Ascétisme et valeur de la vie chez Platon* (1978 *supra*), pp. 106—108.

— E. Moutsopoulos, *La musique dans l'oeuvre de Platon* (1951 *supra*). In the section of the book explicitly devoted to musical education (pp. 157—226) see especially pp. 198—226 on Plato's proposal of a new musical education and this as an institution in the Platonic state, and in the section on the dance (pp. 97—156) see especially pp. 98—121.

1751. F. Pérez Ruiz, *El concepto de filosofía en los escritos de Platón: Filosofía y sabiduría*, Comillas 1959, pp. 70—106: *Filosofía y educación de la juventud*. The author gives a résumé of this chapter in the conclusion of his dissertation on p. 132.

— N. Scholl, *Der platonische Menexenos* (1971 *supra*). Much of the chapter entitled *Platon und die Rhetorik* (pp. 71—97) is concerned with interpretation of what Plato considered the pedagogical rôle and method of a genuine rhetoric—and of poetry, music, and history too (pp. 90—95 and see also pp. 115—116)—in relation to philosophy and the philosopher as educator.

V J: Aesthetics

Perusal of the studies listed in the last section will have made evident the intimate connection between the topics of that section and of this which was emphasized at the beginning of the section on *Ethics* (V G *supra*). It is chiefly in the context of educational theory that Plato gives expression to his opinions concerning literature, music, and the plastic arts; and it has in fact been asserted that 'eine zusammenhängende, auf Prinzipien fundierte

Ästhetik ist aus Platons Schriften nicht zu gewinnen', a judgment which, however, as the following list will show, has not won universal concurrence. What has chiefly exercised later critics, of course, is his 'banishment of the poets', and it is with this and with his rejection of the new music and 'modern' art that most scholars who write on his aesthetics still concern themselves. Many, as will be seen, consider his attitude a special paradox because he so obviously possessed and employed unusual literary taste and artistry himself; and, as in the case of a similar problem found in his concomitant condemnation and fabrication of myths (see D. Bassi, 1106 *supra*, and the publications listed in the note on that item), so this apparent paradox has inspired some to seek out the positive influence upon him of the very literature and art which he criticizes or condemns (see for example Luigia A. Stella [1758 *infra*]).

There have been attempts, however, to treat Plato's aesthetics in the more specific sense as a part or aspect of the larger problem of τέχνη in its relation to his theory of knowledge, and with one such study it is proper to begin the selection of works published in the two decades preceding 1950:

1752. R. Schaerer, *Ἐπιστήμη et τέχνη: Étude sur les notions de connaissance et d'art d'Homère à Platon*, Mâcon 1930 (cf. G. Mathieu, *Rev Ét Anciennes* 32, 1930, 392—395; W. Nestle, *Phil Woch* 57, 1937, 151—153), pp. 57—216: Platon. In his later book, *La Question Platonicienne* (1061 *supra*), Schaerer treats Plato's aesthetics again and in its more specific sense on pp. 157—168 and pp. 182—209, attempting in this latter section (pp. 190—209) to prove that Plato's written work is in accord with his theory of a 'moral aesthetics'.

1753. E. E. Sikes, *The Greek view of poetry*, New York 1931, pp. 63—90: Plato. On Sikes's criticism of Plato's position see J. Tate (1756 *infra*).

1754. E. Bignami, *La poetica di Aristotele e il concetto dell'arte presso gli antichi*, Firenze 1932 (cf. F. Guglielmino, *Boll Filol Cl N. S.* 3, 1932/33, 2—9; A. Gudeman, *Phil Woch* 53, 1933, 673—678). To Plato's aesthetics, interpreted as the extreme expression of a transcendental religious dualism separating the good and beautiful as rational from the artistic as material and irrational, a dualism which Aristotle tried without complete success to overcome, there are references throughout the book, the most important passages being pp. 94—100, pp. 128—136 with the appendices on pp. 270—272 and pp. 273—274, pp. 191—195, pp. 241—244, and

pp. 250—251. Bignami's knowledge of Platonic scholarship was obviously retarded; so, for example, he took it for granted (p. 191) that the *Phaedrus* is a youthful production earlier even than the *Gorgias*.

—. Jeanne Croissant, *Aristote et les mystères* (1471 *supra*). See pp. 51—59 (especially pp. 51—55) and pp. 190—192. She holds that Plato had already raised all the problems of aesthetics that Aristotle took up in his turn and that the latter produced his subtle reply to the former's indictment of art by synthesizing elements hitherto unconnected, answering the *Republic* with an interpretation of the facts which Plato himself had suggested in the *Laws*. See in this connection J. Tate's article, *Tragedy and the Black Bile* (1776 *infra*).

1755. F. Solmsen, *Drei Rekonstruktionen zur antiken Rhetorik und Poetik*, *Hermes* 67, 1932, 133—154. See p. 137 and pp. 143—144 on the occurrence in Alcidas' *Μουσείον* of the concepts *συμπάθεια*, *μίμησις*, and *ἡδονή* which figure in Plato's indictment of poetry.

1756. J. Tate, *Plato and 'Imitation'*, *Cl Quart* 26, 1932, 161—169. In this important and incisive article Tate offers further argument in support and expansion of one published by him four years earlier (*Cl Quart* 22, 1928, 16—23). Plato, he contends, in his aesthetic theory consciously used the word imitation in two senses, a bad sense which is literal and a good sense which is metaphorical, his treatment being a special application of his doctrine of the opposition of 'opinion' and 'knowledge' and his pronouncements on poetry and art being consequently thoroughly consistent and in accord with his general metaphysical position and, whether finally acceptable or not, invulnerable to such criticism as that of Saintsbury, Butcher, and Sikes (1753 *supra*). In connection with Tate's remarks on Strabo and *Republic* 598E on p. 166 of this article see his note published in the same year, *Cl Phil* 27, 1932, 282—284. See also among Tate's later articles on Plato's aesthetic theories especially 1763, 1768, and 1783 *infra*.

1757. E. Wind, *Θεῖος φόβος*: Untersuchungen über platonische Kunstphilosophie, *Zeitschr für Ästhetik und Allgemeine Kunstwiss* 26, 1932, 349—373. Purposely disregarding the metaphysical basis of Plato's aesthetics, Wind undertakes to show the validity of Plato's 'holy fear' of the power of art to penetrate and transmute the human soul by tracing the course of modern aesthetic attitudes from Lessing's doctrine of the autonomy of the arts, Kant's moral

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autonomy, and Schiller's aesthetic freedom to Wild's doctrine of paradox ending in moral perversity, Verlaine's 'absolute poet' ending in 'poète maudit', and the juridical justification of morally dangerous works on the ground of 'artistic value'.

1758. Luigia A. Stella, *Influssi di poesia e d'arte Ellenica nell'opera di Platone*, *Historia* (Milano) 6, 1932, 433—472; 7, 1933, 75—123; 8, 1934, 179—203 and 491—526. The avowed purpose of the authoress is to prove that Plato as much as any of his contemporaries had surrendered himself to the spell of the art and poetry of which in theory he so strongly disapproved. To this end she undertakes to identify in his writings the positive influence first of comedy and then of tragedy and finally what his myths, figures, and images owe to the influence of the plastic arts as well as to that of the Orphics, Empedocles, and Pindar.

1759. G. Flores d'Arcais, *L'antinomia dell'estetica platonica*, *Sophia* 1, 1933, 398—409. Art, being imitation, is irrational and therefore condemned as immoral; but as an instrument of education it must be productive of rational goodness, and as such it negates its own nature as art:—this is the antinomy which is here formulated and which Plato is supposed to have resolved by the conception of rational imitation in rhythm, the primary element of education, and of music as the perfect art imitating the ideal in the real.

1760. G. E. Mueller, *Concerning Platonic esthetics*, *Journ Philos* 30, 1933, 337—346. This article is reprinted 'with minor changes' as chapter V (pp. 73—86) in Mueller's book, *What Plato thinks* (La Salle [Illinois] 1937).

1761. P.-M. Schuhl, *Platon et l'art de son temps* (*Arts plastiques*), Paris 1933 (cf. R. K. Hack, *Cl Phil* 30, 1935, 273—275). A second edition of this book 'revue et augmentée' was published, Paris 1952. It contains a few additions to the bibliographical index, corresponding additional references in the notes, and a few new phrases in the text; but the only substantial augmentation consists in an additional preface (pp. IX—XXII), itself a slightly altered version of an earlier article by Schuhl, *Platon critique d'art* (*Bull périodique de l'Office des Inst d'Archéologie et d'Hist de l'art* 4/10, 1937, 39—49), which gives in outline the argument of the book. This is that Plato shows both sensitivity for the general forms of art and precise knowledge of the technical terms and procedures of painters, that he was severe towards artists because he feared the effect of certain contemporary innovations and particularly the illusionistic impressionism which he connected with the sophistic

in spirit, but that, though a partisan of hieratic art and of the archaizing school (on this see Hack's review *supra*), he subtly qualifies this position and even displays a tendency towards an aesthetics liberated from the principle of imitation. Compare with this Schuhl's later article on Plato's attitude towards music (1849 *infra*).

1762. R. G. Steven, Plato and the art of his time, *Cl Quart* 27, 1933, 149—155. In this paper, which is contemporaneous with the first edition of Schuhl's book (1761 *supra*) and which R. K. Hack calls 'ingenious but unsound' (*Cl Phil* 30, 1935, 275), it is held that Plato, compelled by his philosophy to condemn art utterly and by his educational ideals to disapprove of most types, was precluded from appreciating the revolution achieved by Agatharchus and Apollodorus but nevertheless had 'a sneaking regard' for art, probably approved of Euphranor and the Sicyonian School, and no doubt was influenced by the latter in the views on art as expressed in the *Laws*.

1763. J. Tate, Plato and didacticism, *Hermathena* 48, 1933, 93—113. In this article, which should be read in connection with 1756 *supra*, Tate, pointing out that what Plato wished to subject to control is not poetry as such but the 'prose content' of poetry, explains and defends this position, distinguishing the 'positive and negative didacticism' required by Plato of poetry in the ideal state and rebutting the charges that this poetry is intended to be dull, mechanical, and unpleasing and that the poets would be robbed of artistic freedom, while at the same time he objects to the exaggerated intellectualism of Platonic philosophy revealed, he believes, by Plato's inability in his justifiable but over-violent reaction against intuitionism and consequent insistence upon the utter irrationality of 'opinion' to explain save by the miracle of 'divine possession' the admitted fact that the opinions of such poets as Homer are sometimes right. See also among Tate's later articles especially 1768 and 1783 *infra*.

1764. J. W. H. Atkins, Literary criticism in antiquity, Cambridge 1934 (cf. J. Tate, *Cl Rev* 49, 1935, 73—75; R. K. Hack, *A J Ph* 58, 1937, 99—101), I, chapter III (pp. 33—70): The attack on poetry: Plato.

1765. H.-G. Gadamer, Plato und die Dichter, Frankfurt am Main 1934 (cf. J. Tate, *Cl Rev* 50, 1936, 147; K. von Fritz, *Gnomon* 12, 1936, 251—255). Save for the addition of two pages of notes this is the text of a lecture in which Plato's banishment

of the poets is seriously interpreted as the necessary consequence of his philosophical opposition to all that the poetic tradition embodied and his condemnation of art as imitation is taken to be a critique not merely of false and dangerous content or of an inadmissible form of presentation but also of the 'aesthetic consciousness' itself in all its moral implications.

1766. Katharine Gilbert, The relation of the moral to the aesthetic standard in Plato, *Philos Rev* 43 (1934), 279—294. She argues that Plato's censorship of art in the *Republic* and the *Laws*, being relative to the educational programmes and politics there proposed, is not evidence for his aesthetic standards or definition of fine art and that in his metaphysics, where she assumes the identification of the idea of good and the idea of beauty, there is no evidence for his having confused moral and aesthetic categories, because 'the concept of measure rationalizes the connection between "beauty absolute" and aesthetic excellence in specific examples of beauty in the arts'. Compare the chapter on Plato by Mrs. Gilbert in the later book, *A history of esthetics* (1786 *infra*).

1767. H. Perls, *Μοῦσα: Étude sur l'esthétique de Platon*, *Rev Philosophique* 117, 1934, 259—284 and 441—471. The essential thesis of this article was succinctly stated by Perls three years later in a paper entitled *La beauté platonicienne* (1774 *infra*) and appeared full blown the next year in his book, *L'art et la beauté vus par Platon* (1782 *infra*). Rewritten and rearranged, all this was finally incorporated by Perls in his later work, *Platon: Sa conception du Kosmos* (6 *supra*), I, pp. 115—123 and II, pp. 7—123. Without knowledge of Mrs. Gilbert's argument (1766 *supra*) that Plato, though identifying absolute beauty and absolute good, did not confuse aesthetic and moral categories, Perls insists that the ideas of good and of beauty have nothing in common but their transcendence and that Plato unequivocally distinguished from one another the realms of art, of scientific knowledge, and of morality, separating the 'artistic truth' of beauty entirely from logical truth and from the good and establishing the complete autonomy of the fine arts and of the aesthetic judgment. By arbitrary selection, suppression, and combination of Plato's phrases and sentences Perls makes him profess a super-Kantian aesthetic theory; but the acme of his audacity may be seen in his interpretation of the banishment of Homer from the city which he compares with the separation of the soul from the body and adduces as proof of Plato's intention to vindicate the freedom of art from morality to the advantage of both (compare the thesis of T. Moretti-Costanzi [1804 *infra*]).

1768. J. Tate, On the history of allegorism, *Cl Quart* 28, 1934, 105—114. See pp. 106, 108, 110, 112, and 114 for Plato's attitude towards poetic inspiration in connection with allegorical interpretation, a subject which Tate had treated more fully in an earlier article, *Cl Quart* 23, 1929, 142—154 and 24, 1930, 1—10. See also Tate's later articles, 1783 and 1806 *infra*.

1769. F. Albeggiani, La polemica sulla tragedia nel mondo greco, *Atene e Roma* 3 Ser 3, 1935, 136—152. For Plato's criticism, which, applicable to all poetry though tragedy is most vulnerable to it and though in a way inevitable, was easily overcome, he maintains, by Aristotle's reflections, see especially pp. 140—142.

— G. M. A. Grube, Plato's thought (3 *supra*), pp. 179—215: Art. See also Grube's later articles (1820 *infra* and 1852 *infra*).

1770. G. M. Lattanzi, La catarsi delle passioni in Platone e in Aristotele, *Mondo Class* 5, 1935, 121—122. He argues against Finsler's derivation of Aristotle's theory of 'catharsis' from Plato and especially from *Laws* 791 A. He does not, however, mention Croissant's thesis (1471 *supra*) or the polemic against Finsler by A. Gudeman in his edition and commentary, *Aristoteles Περὶ ποιητικῆς* . . ., Berlin/Leipzig 1934, pp. 21—28. On the relation of *Laws* 791 A to the Aristotelian 'catharsis' see J. Tate, *Tragedy and the Black Bile* (1776 *infra*).

— L. Stefanini, Platone (9 *supra*), II, pp. 9—34 and pp. 435—447. See also Stefanini's later article, *Forma estetica del misticismo dei Greci* (1491 *supra*), pp. 376—377 and pp. 378—379.

— W. Vetter, *Die Musik im platonischen Staate* (1412 *supra*). See especially pp. 317—320 for the aesthetic aspects of Plato's opposition to the 'new music'.

1771. I. Edman, Poetry and truth in Plato, *Journ Philos* 33, 1936, 605—609. This paper is interesting mainly as an example of the notion that one so much a poet as Plato could not have been entirely serious in his condemnation of poetry. Edman therefore takes the condemnation to be at least half ironic, holds that Plato could not really decide whether to take his stand with poetry or with philosophy, and maintains that in his theory of truth he was ultimately thrown back upon the poetry which he had tried to desert.

1772. R. McKeon, Literary criticism and the concept of imitation in antiquity, *Modern Phil* 34, 1936/37, 1—35. For Plato's

method of using the term 'imitation' and the implications of this method for the relation of his aesthetics to his whole philosophy see pp. 2—16, and for Aristotle's use of it in contrast to Plato's see pp. 16—26.

— P. Boyancé, *Le culte des Muses* . . . (208 *a supra*). On pp. 122—131 he resolves the 'inconsistency' of the banishment of Homer and the frequent quotations from him as an authority by supposing that Plato adopted from the Pythagoreans a symbolic interpretation of Homer and use of him in musical purgation. See also pp. 188 and 197—199 for Boyancé's notion of Plato's relation to the Aristotelian theory of 'catharsis'.

1773. Sarah H. Brown, Plato's theory of beauty and art, *Deuxième Congrès Internat d'Esthétique et de Science de l'Art*, Paris 1937, II, pp. 13—18. This is an attempt to formulate for Plato definitions of beauty, of art, and finally of the beautiful art object. So, for example, 'the art object is beautiful when it is a simulation directly pleasing to the eye or ear, so organized as to be expressive of man's nature perfected, the purpose of which is to produce a harmony of the motions and dispositions of the soul in accordance with reason'.

1774. H. Perls, *La beauté platonicienne*, *Deuxième Congrès Internat d'Esthétique et de Science de l'Art*, Paris 1937, II, pp. 9—12. See 1767 *supra*.

1775. K. Svoboda, *Le problème de la structure de l'oeuvre d'art dans l'esthétique ancienne*, *Deuxième Congrès Internat d'Esthétique et de Science de l'Art*, Paris 1937, II, pp. 4—9. For Plato's comments on the various elements of works of art see pp. 5—6.

1776. J. Tate, *Tragedy and the Black Bile*, *Hermathena* 50, 1937, 1—25. See pp. 12, 16, and 22—24 for the argument that the Aristotelian theory of 'catharsis', while marking the difference between the attitudes of Plato and Aristotle towards poetry and the affective life, was not meant as a justification of poetry against Plato's criticism but was suggested to Aristotle by *Laws* 790—791, where Plato makes an observation which he failed to see 'cuts across his general position in regard to music'. To Tate's interpretation of Aristotelian 'catharsis' in this article W. F. Trench replied in *Hermathena* 51, 1938, 110—134. At about the same time Tate published a brief discussion of Aristotle's views on beauty in relation to Plato's (1783 *infra* [pp. 137—141]), summarizing there his interpretation of 'catharsis'.

1777. W. Tatarkiewicz, Art and poetry: A contribution to the history of ancient aesthetics, *Studia Philosophica (Commentarii Soc Philos Polonorum)* 2, 1937, 367—418. It is here argued that the archaic and classical Greeks had no general theory of art and no unified concept of 'fine art', particularly that they considered poetry to be not one of the arts in this sense but a much higher activity; and this thesis is supposed to be confirmed by Plato's treatment, which is interpreted on pp. 396—400 under the subtitle, Plato: Two types of poetry. See also pp. 372—396 for references to Plato in the sections on the conceptions of art, of poetry, of beauty, and of creativeness and on the mimetic theory.

1778. M. Treves, L'estetica di Platone, *Arch Storia Filosofia Italiana* 6, 1937, 353—374. In express opposition to Croce it is here maintained that far from banishing all art from the well ordered state Plato, identifying the beautiful and the good, formulated an aesthetics at once idealistic and moralistic in which imitation of the ideas and expression of psychical states are reconciled, which is free of the self-contradictions of later aestheticians, and which is moreover practical, being that of all sincere, honest, and religious artists.

— H. L. Tracy, Plato as satirist (1116 *supra*). The fundamentalist view of poetry as a repository of all instruction, he contends (pp. 160—162), is as much the target of Plato's criticism as is the content of poetry; and on the former rather than on the poets themselves falls the brunt of the satire of poetry in the *Republic*.

1779. R. G. Collingwood, *The principles of art*, Oxford 1938. See pp. 18—19 for Plato's treatment of poetry as a 'craft', p. 38 for disconnection of his theories of beauty and of art, and especially pp. 46—52 and 97—99, where Collingwood argues that Plato banished not art or poetry as such but only 'amusement art', mistakenly identifying this, however, with representative art, of which it is only one kind. Collingwood's analysis and interpretation are criticized and rejected by S. H. Rosen (1870 *infra*).

1780. R. Demos, *Ἡ φιλοσοφία τοῦ ὠραίου κατὰ τὸν Πλάτωνα, Ἀρχεῖον Φιλοσοφίας καὶ Θεωρίας τῶν Ἐπιστημῶν* 9, 1938, 177—234. The substance of this article in an English version is incorporated in the book by Demos which was published the next year, *The philosophy of Plato* (see 1185 *supra*), pp. 216—252: Art and beauty; Visible and ideal beauty.

— P. Lachière-Rey, Les idées morales, sociales et politiques de Platon (1526 *supra*), pp. 151—160.

1781. J. Lameere, *Les concepts du Beau et de l'Art dans la doctrine platonicienne*, *Rev Hist Philos N. S.* 6, 1938, 1—28. It is here emphasized that in Plato's doctrine beauty and art belong to strictly separate domains, beauty to the intelligible and ethical while art is concerned solely to represent things as they appear in the sensible world in such a way as to arouse pleasure by the representation irrespective of truth or falsehood, virtue or vice, or any other distinction. Art can attain beauty, then, only under the direction of philosophy; and this is beauty not in the modern 'aesthetic' sense but beauty which is identical with the true and the good. Lameere insists that this ethical conception of beauty is in conformity with the meaning of 'beautiful' in all writers from Homer to Euripides and that the conception of art as revealing reality by means of sensible appearance would have seemed to Plato to contradict the facts themselves.

1782. H. Perls, *L'art et la beauté vus par Platon: Quelques problèmes esthétiques vus par Platon*, Paris 1938. For the thesis of this book, originally a course of lectures delivered at the Institut d'Art in Paris, see 1767 *supra*.

1783. J. Tate, Plato, Art and Mr. Maritain, *New Scholast* 12, 1938, 107—142. In this attempt to show that Maritain misconceives Plato's theory of art and beauty which rightly understood is in substantial agreement with his, Tate gives an integrated restatement of the interpretations which he had already proposed in his earlier articles (1756, 1763, 1768, and 1776 *supra*). See in addition the later paper, Greek views of inspiration (1806 *infra*).

1784. F. H. Anderson, Notes on Plato's aesthetic, *Philos Rev* 48, 1939, 65—70. There are here ten separate 'notes', the first six tending to show that Plato had no generalized aesthetic theory as such and the last four dealing with his poetic criticism as falling into the three divisions of choral *mimesis*, musical education, and the cognitive function of poetry.

1785. A. H. Gilbert, Did Plato banish the poets or the critics?, *Studies in Philology* 36, 1939, 1—19. The thesis of this essay is that Plato meant to strip poetry of the theological and didactic value mistakenly assigned to it by interpreters of his age and that it is bad critics like these whom he attempted to banish in order that the poets might be seen by a fit audience in their true nature as artists. The essay contains a few correct observations and many interesting quotations, mostly irrelevant to the argument, which is itself in the main utterly inconsequent. The essence of it, that

Plato held a 'purely aesthetic view' of poetry, is restated by Gilbert on pp. 5—7 of the book which was published the next year, *Literary criticism: Plato to Dryden* (New York 1940). In this book, which is an anthology of excerpts in English with some slight introductory remarks, the first section (pp. 5—62) is devoted to Plato.

1786. Katharine E. Gilbert and Helmut Kuhn, *A history of esthetics*, New York 1939, pp. 19—58: Plato. This chapter, for which Mrs. Gilbert 'is in the main responsible', is reprinted without alteration in the 'revised and enlarged' edition of the book, Bloomington (Indiana) 1953. See her earlier article, *The relation of the moral to the aesthetic standard in Plato* (1766 *supra*), to which no reference is made in this chapter, where in the concluding paragraphs (pp. 55ff.) she emphasizes 'the tumbling back and forth in Plato of esthetic experience in the narrower sense and a general theory of values'.

— G. Krüger, *Einsicht und Leidenschaft* (913 *supra*). See pp. 29—48: *Die platonische Kritik am kosmischen Mythos und an seiner Dichtung*; pp. 133—138 and pp. 290—308 on 'comic tragedy' (Agathon's speech) and tragedy and comedy (the end of the *Symposium*).

— J. Moreau, *La construction . . .* (5 *supra*), pp. 218—219, pp. 221—225, and pp. 229—233.

1787. T. B. L. Webster, *Greek theories of art and literature down to 400 B. C.*, *Cl Quart* 33, 1939, 166—179. In distinguishing here seven Greek ways of regarding art and in tracing their early history Webster discusses the reflection of several of them in Plato's criticism, especially the 'imitation theory', here said to have originated in the third quarter of the sixth century but to have become dominant only a century afterwards, the view of art and literature as a technique or craft, the didactic theory, and the hedonistic theory. He has little or nothing to say of Plato in connection with the 'monument theory' and 'inspiration'. See also Webster's later article and book (1827 and 1856 *infra*).

— K. W. Wild, *Plato's presentation of intuitive mind in his portrait of Socrates* (1344 *supra*). The origin of the quarrel with the poets and of the theory of 'inspired madness' is here ascribed (pp. 334—338) to the inability of Socrates to understand the influence of poetry upon himself and others and to his mistrust of the emotions and of the persuasive power of any mental force other than reason.

1788. Kathleen Freeman, *Plato: the use of inspiration, Greece and Rome* 9, 1939/40, 137—149. Plato's 'unfair' treatment of inspiration and his harshness to the poets are here explained as the irritated struggle of the philosopher to crush the poetical inspiration working in himself.

1789. K. Glaser, *Platons Stellung zum Kampfe von Philosophie und tragischer Dichtung*, *Wiener Studien* 58, 1940, 30—73. Glaser's thesis is that Plato's long struggle against poetry and art was in origin and remained throughout essentially a polemic against Gorgias and his illusionistic theory of rhetoric and poetry and that this theory included the notion of 'catharsis' which, rejected by Plato, was for that very reason taken up and developed by Aristotle in the attempt to defend tragedy against Plato's condemnation.

1790. Sir Patrick Duncan, *The place of art in Plato's Ideal State*, *Univ Toronto Quarterly* 10, 1940/41, 27—38. Plato's interpretation of the causes of the Athenian disaster, which he had experienced, is here emphasized as a reason for his dread of the influence of art upon the human soul and for his consequent 'exclusion of the poets' from his ideal state.

—. J. Wild, *Plato's theory of τέχνη* (1396 *supra*). Art in the 'aesthetic' sense is dealt with only at the end of this article, pp. 81—86 of Wild's book (1546 *supra*), where it is reprinted as chapter 2 with the title, *The human arts and their inversion*.

—. R. Palas, *Die Bewertung der Sinnenwelt bei Platon ...* (1209 *supra*), pp. 144—162: *Platon und die Kunst*. Plato's attitude towards art is here declared to have been 'ambivalent', the result of an unresolved inner conflict brought on by the constraint of Socrates upon him to renounce poetry for philosophy. His condemnation of art is interpreted as a 'compensatory reaction', and his own writing is adduced as proof of his suppressed but unconquered artistic aspiration. Against this kind of explanation see W. J. Verdenius, *Platon et la poésie* (1798 *infra*), pp. 120—122 and p. 141.

—. H. Kuhn, *The true tragedy: On the relationship between Greek tragedy and Plato* (1089 *supra*). For Plato's criticism of the poets see especially section iii in the first part of the essay (52, 1941, 11—33): *Plato, enemy and follower of the tragedians*.

1791. W. J. Oates, *Plato's 'Philosophical creative artist'*, *Cl Weekly* 35, 1941/42, 247. Adopting and reemphasizing the interpretation of J. Tate (1756 *supra*) Oates in this note contends

that Plato's aesthetic theory is dominated by the conception of the 'philosophical creative artist' and suggests that he may have seen in Homer, his admiration for whom he acknowledges, 'an imposing though imperfect embodiment' of this type.

1792. F. O. Nolte, Imitation as an aesthetic norm, *Studies in Honor of Frederick W. Shipley* (Washington Univ Studies N. S., Lang and Lit, 14), St. Louis 1942, pp. 289—301. Plato is the subject of the last section of this paper (pp. 297—301), the general conclusion of which is that 'imitation', being primarily a metaphysical concept, is aesthetically justified only in the pattern of Platonic philosophy, where all *aesthetic* qualities and values have a comprehensive status outside the work of art. Plato, Nolte observes, is 'unaesthetic' in his contemplation of art because his whole conception of the world is aesthetic; and with this broader conception of beauty he has considerable aesthetic justice for censoring and circumscribing artistic beauty.

1793. G. Patroni, La mimesi artistica nel pensiero di Platone, *Rend Accad Archeol Lett e Belle Arti N. S.* 21 (1941), Napoli 1942, 107—128. Having argued that Adam was wrong in interpreting *Republic* 377 E to mean that all arts consist in imitation and having pointed out that *μίμησις* is misrepresented by the Latin translations and the modern 'imitation', Patroni maintains that Plato considered only some arts to be 'representational' or 'figurative' and that there was no Platonic basis whatever for Aristotle's generalized definition of art as 'mimetic'.

1794. J. J. Donohue, The theory of literary kinds: Ancient classifications of literature, Dubuque (Iowa) 1943. The significant passages on Plato in this volume are on pp. 15—21, pp. 29—31, pp. 52—58, and pp. 86—90. The second part of this historical study was published six years later, *The theory of literary kinds II: The ancient classes of poetry*, Dubuque 1949. In this latter volume see for Plato especially pp. 36—37, pp. 57—62, pp. 117—119, pp. 150—151, and pp. 184—185.

—, W. Jaeger, *Paideia* (4 *supra*). See II, pp. 285—305 (*Die Kritik der musischen Bildung*) and III, pp. 90—98 (*Der erzieherische Wert der Poesie*).

1795. T. S. Duncan, Plato and poetry, *Cl Journ* 40, 1944/45, 481—494. This is an attempt to explain away Plato's criticisms of poetry on the ground of special circumstances and to argue that Plato, being in method and spirit a poet himself, shows by his use

of myths that in his view the philosopher in order to arrive at truth requires the inner vision of the poet as well as the dialectician's method.

1796. P. W. Harsh, *Ἀμαρτία* again, Trans Am Philol Assoc 76, 1945, 47—58. See pp. 50—51, p. 52, and p. 58 on Plato's view of the tragic hero's responsibility and the relation of this to his criticism of tragedy.

1797. Anna Tumarkin, Die Kunsttheorie von Aristoteles im Rahmen seiner Philosophie, Mus Helvet 2, 1945, 108—122. This essay is as much concerned to account for Plato's condemnation of art and especially of tragic drama as it is to elucidate Aristotle's *Poetics*, for the latter is taken to be intelligible only as a reply to the former and in the wider context of Aristotle's fundamental opposition to the principles of Plato's philosophy, of which the rejection of tragic drama was a necessary consequent.

1798. W. J. Verdenius, Platon et la poésie, Mnem III 12, 1945, 118—150. The apparent paradox of Plato's attitude towards poetry is here resolved by arguing from *Philebus* 62C—63E and *Republic* 605 C 6—8 that he considered poetry to be not evil but dangerous and not even dangerous for philosophers, among whom he must have included himself; and this, it is contended, is not inconsistent with the censorship proposed in the *Republic*, chiefly because such measures in that work are meant to be taken not literally as ideal political legislation but as 'models' for the individual soul. In conclusion it is asserted that the purpose of Plato's critique was not to purify the content of poetry but to deny the basis of the traditional admiration of that content and not to denigrate poetry or refuse it all value but to emphasize the necessity of mental stability on the part of those who expose themselves to it and to designate as its proper sphere that of *παιδεία*, where one must be on one's guard against seduction. Verdenius uses the results of his earlier article, *L'Ion* de Platon (501 *supra*), in the present essay (see especially pp. 136ff.), the conclusions of which he later sought further to corroborate in his monograph, *Mimesis* . . . (1808 *infra*).

1799. P. Font Puig, La doctrina estética de Platón, Rev Universidad Oviedo, 1946, 65—89. I have not been able to procure a copy of this article.

— E. Grassi, Von der Dichtung im platonischen Dialog 'Ion' (502 *supra*). This is the second section of the chapter entitled Die Erfahrung des Dichterischen (pp. 35—63).

1800. H. D. Lewis, On poetic truth, *Philosophy* 21, 1946, 147—166. Arguing for the thesis that art symbolizes an aspect of reality other than that which can be comprehended intellectually, Lewis rejects the view that Plato opposed not poetry itself but a mistaken notion of its function and maintains that consistently with his philosophy he held poetry and all other forms of fine art to be debasing and mischievous, at best doing imperfectly what is done better by the strictly intellectual operations of mind (see pp. 149—154 and p. 162).

—, F. Pfister, *Der Begriff des Schönen und das Ebenmaß* (674 *supra*), pp. 347—348.

—, F. Wehrli, *Der erhabene und der schlichte Stil . . .* (503 *supra*). See especially pp. 11—21; and with this compare the earlier article by K. Glaser (1789 *supra*), which Wehrli seems not to have noticed. See also Wehrli's later article (1864 *infra*).

1801. H. J. M. Broos, *Plato's beschouwing van kunst en schoonheid*, Leiden 1948 (cf. G. J. de Vries, *Mnem* IV 1, 1948, 338—339). It is the thesis of this doctoral dissertation that Plato never recognized any autonomous aesthetic value and never entertained the idealistic conception of art according to which the artist's works can and should be revelations of the eternal ideas themselves but always and with complete seriousness—and not because of any 'inner conflict'—held art to be a dangerous rival of philosophy by which it must be controlled if permitted to function at all, for it is to the philosopher alone that true beauty is accessible. The case here presented was summarized and supplemented in an article which Broos published in the same year (1802 *infra*). See also his later article, *Plato and art: A new analysis of the 'Philebus'* (713 *supra*).

1802. H. J. M. Broos, *Plato en de kunst*, *Bull Vereeniging tot Bevordering der Kennis van de Antieke Beschaving te 's-Gravenhage* 23, 1948, 1—6. Besides presenting more succinctly the case argued in 1801 *supra* Broos here tries to explain why Plato's Greek contemporaries would have found more comprehensible than modern readers do his indictment of the poets on the ground of 'ignorance' and of art on the assumption that it is *μίμησις*, and he also suggests that Plato's readiness to banish the art that he knew may be explained by his having regarded it as an expression and a symptom of Athenian democracy.

—, A. F. Dawson, *Plato's aesthetic in its bearing on his theory of ideas* (1226 *supra*).

1803. V. Goldschmidt, *Le problème de la tragédie d'après Platon*, *Rev Ét Grecques* 61, 1948, 19—63. After having argued in an introductory section on Plato's critique of poetry that neither imitation as such nor even an anthropological representation of divinity is condemned and that the point of view of pure aesthetics is considered and is rejected ultimately in the name of truth, Goldschmidt tries to construct an integral account of Plato's critique of tragedy by considering his various remarks relevant to Aristotle's definition and his analysis of the six constitutive parts of a tragedy. Plato was hostile to tragic drama, he concludes, not because of the 'immorality' of the poets but because in representing 'an action and life' it is contrary to the truth, its subtle danger residing in the connection of plot with all the elements that conspire to suggest the imitation of life and so to give the 'lying' story the appearance of reality; and as all his criticism tends to dissociate the story and the music so what in the *Laws* is permitted to remain of tragedy is these two elements in separation. Compare with the introductory section of this article the earlier one by Goldschmidt, *Le paradigme dans la théorie platonicienne de l'action* (1638 *supra*), pp. 130—142.

—, P. Grenet, *Les origines de l'analogie philosophique dans les dialogues de Platon* (1144 *supra*), pp. 179—192: *L'analogie dans l'imitation artistique selon Platon*.

1804. T. Moretti-Costanzi, *L'estetica di Platone: sua attualità*, Roma 1948 (cf. M. T. Antonelli, *Giorn Metafisica* 4, 1949, 560—562). In this monograph dedicated to P. Carabellese, whose 'critical ontologism' is supposed to express the authentic spirit of Plato's philosophy, the 'banishment of art' from the state is taken to indicate the high value that Plato ascribed to art by showing that on the empirical level of politics there can be only imitation of nature and no art at all in the sense in which it is understood by Plato to be consubstantially with love the human aspiration for the divine in its aspect of beauty, for to Plato according to this interpretation 'the idea' is the divine unity of the good, the just, and the beautiful as the objective existence of consciousness, participation in which alone makes possible the existence of intelligent, sentient, and moral agents. With the interpretation here of the banishment of the poets in the *Republic* compare that proposed by H. Perls (1767 *supra*).

1805. Helen North, *The concept of Sophrosyne in Greek literary criticism*, *Cl Phil* 43, 1948, 1—17. See pp. 3, 14—15, and 17 on

Plato's recognition that *σωφροσύνη* is a condition of the poet which affects (and affects adversely) the literary quality as distinguished from the moral content of his work.

1806. J. Tate, Greek views of inspiration, *Proc Cl Assoc* 45, London 1948, 22—23. Distinguishing naturalistic from super-naturalistic theories of inspiration and within the latter category contrasting the Apollonian to the Dionysiac Tate contends that Plato purposely translated the former of these into Dionysiac terms thereby humorously reducing the inspired bards to the less respectable Corybantic level. For Tate's earlier articles on Plato's aesthetic theories see 1783 *supra* and the references given there.

— V. Arangio-Ruiz, *Gioco e serietà in Platone* (1120 *supra*).

— G. C. Field, *The philosophy of Plato* (10 c *supra*), pp. 167—173.

— H. Gundert, *Enthusiasmus und Logos bei Platon* (675 *supra*), especially pp. 27—30, pp. 33—39, p. 43 and p. 45. See also the note on item 502 *supra*.

1807. F. Puglisi, *Nota sulla concezione estetica di Platone*, *Sophia* 17, 1949, 116—117. He contends that aesthetics received its definite form from Plato and that the ancient and modern aestheticians from Aristotle to Croce all move within his orbit.

— L. Roussel, *Pan! Sur l'Ion de Platon* (504 *supra*). The conclusion of this tirade is that Plato was unaware even of the existence of literary criticism and had not the slightest notion of the purposes of poetry or of the nature of aesthetic feeling.

— M. B. Trías, *Nota sobre la belleza como transcendental* (696 *supra*). While not explicitly concerned with Plato's theories of art and poetry, this article is relevant to those interpretations of his aesthetics which turn upon his doctrine of the nature of the beautiful and its relation to the good.

1808. W. J. Verdenius, *Mimesis: Plato's doctrine of artistic imitation and its meaning to us*, Leiden 1949 (cf. M. Vanhoutte, *Rev Philos Louvain* 48, 1950, 566—569; J. Tate, *Cl Rev N. S.* 2, 1952, 227; A. Caracciolo, *Paideia* 10, 1955, 140—142). Verdenius in two earlier articles already mentioned (501 and 1798 *supra*) had laid the foundation for this small monograph. Here he first tries to reconcile Plato's conceptions of artistic imitation and of the divinely inspired artist in an idealistic aesthetics based upon the

philosophy of 'a hierarchical structure of reality' and to show the compatibility of this idealistic interpretation of art with the conviction that painting cannot be a direct reflection of true being; and then in the second of the two chapters he urges the actual importance of Plato's conception of art as an interpretation of reality in combatting the dangers, theoretical and practical, of regarding art as essentially creative.

1809. W. C. Greene, *The Greek criticism of poetry: A reconsideration*. In this essay, which is printed in the collection, *Perspectives of Criticism* edited by Harry Levin = *Harvard Studies in Comparative Literature* 20, Cambridge (Mass.) 1950, pp. 19—53, Plato's criticism is considered on pp. 24—34 (see also pp. 36, 44—45, and 48). Greene would read Plato's 'exile of poetry from an imagined Paradise' as 'a dramatic gesture, as a bit of satire on the accepted educators of Hellas'; he holds that Plato's early distrust of the imagination was replaced by a view that linked imagination with inspiration by god or the ideas; and he concludes that the value of Plato's criticism 'consists not so much in its strong negations or even in specific principles of aesthetic appreciation as in the bridge that it provides between poetry and philosophy'. See also Greene's later essay, *Platonism and its critics* (56 *supra*), p. 45 and pp. 60—61.

—. C. Librizzi, *I problemi fondamentali della filosofia di Platone* (29 *supra*), pp. 177—187: *Il problema dell'arte*. I have been unable to procure Librizzi's earlier article published in *Rass Pedagogia*, 1948, 176—183 (*Arte ed educazione in Platone*).

1810. J. A. Mourant, *Plato and the poets*, *Thomist* 13, 1950, 249—270. This is an attempt to show that Plato's attitude towards poetry is consistent throughout and justifiable in the light of his own philosophy and that Plato himself, though often 'poeticizing' his philosophy, is at all times primarily a philosopher, what occasionally seems in him to be 'poetic vision' being really a 'metaphysical vision' expressed for purposes of persuasion in a poetic medium.

—. E. Paci, *Lo stato come idea dell'uomo nella 'Repubblica' di Platone* (789 *supra*), pp. 93—96.

1811. C. Murley, *Plato and the arts*, *Cl Bull* 27, 1950/51, 13—14. He maintains that Plato's alleged hostility to the arts is merely a matter of a hierarchy of values and that his real hostility is directed against works that are empty of content or that serve ignoble ends.

1812. K. Bloch, *Platons Metaphysik der Kunst*, Class et Med 12, 1951, 1—8. He contends that Plato ascribed great ontological importance to art and based it upon his theory of ideas, criticizing the 'official arts' but envisaging the possibility of a 'true art' which by sensible beauty is reminded of true being and represents the latter in concrete works of art by means of *ἀντονομητική*.

— H. J. M. Broos, Plato and art: A new analysis of the '*Philebus*' (713 *supra*). The point of view here is the very antithesis of Bloch's (1812 *supra*). See also the dissertation and the article by Broos contemporary with it (1801 and 1802 *supra*).

1813. A. M. Cervi, *Introduzione alla estetica neoplatonica*: Parte 1, Roma 1951, pp. 68—69 and pp. 82—83.

1814. E. Cione, *L'estetica di Platone*, Atti dell Accad Peloritana 47, 1951. I include this title even though I know it only from its citation in this form by F. Cupaiuolo, *Paideia* 10, 1955, 92. I have not been able to procure a copy of the work itself, nor have I found any other reference to it.

— S. Ferri, *Binomi obbligati nella critica d'arte degli antichi* (346 *supra*). See especially pp. 153—154 and p. 157.

1815. P. Guéguen, *Platon et l'art abstrait*, XX^e Siècle N. S. 1, juin 1951, 19—20. Plato in his rejection of 'figurative' art and artistic imitation is here claimed as the prophet of modern abstract painting and sculpture and even of 'functional design'. Compare the article by Mme. Savić Rebac, *Une anticipation platonicienne . . .* (1844 *infra*).

— J. Hartland-Swann, *Plato as poet . . .* (1072 *supra*). He contends that Plato was not hostile to poetry as such but only to specific kinds of poetry and that this is compatible with his own use of a 'poetic method of philosophizing'.

1816. H. Jeanmaire, *Dionysos: Histoire du culte de Bacchus*, Paris 1951. See pp. 134—138 on 'inspiration' in the chapter, *La 'mania' divine*, pp. 295—301 on *La mania et la mystique du 'Phèdre'*, and pp. 319—321 on Plato and the Aristotelian 'catharsis'. See also pp. 286—295 with Jeanmaire's earlier article, *Le Satyre et la Ménade: Remarques sur quelques textes relatifs aux danses 'orgiaques'*, *Mélanges d'Archéologie et d'Histoire offerts à Charles Picard*, Paris 1949, I, pp. 463—473 (= *Rev Archéologique* 6 Sér 29—30, 1948).

— C. La Drière, *The problem of Plato's Ion* (505 *supra*).

1817. A. Masaracchia, *Genesi e significato della valutazione platonica della poesia*, Riv Crit Storia Filos 6, 1951, 119—130. He argues that Plato's intention was not to determine the place of art in the life of the spirit or to produce an aesthetic theory in an Aristotelian sense but to examine the relation of artistic activities to the life of the state and their influences upon the 'paideia' of its citizens, that his condemnation of art in so far as it is 'mimetic' was not meant to be a condemnation of all art, and that therefore the condemnation in *Republic* X is not incompatible with the apparently different attitude in the *Phaedrus* and the *Symposium* or with his own 'poetic' writing.

— N. R. Murphy, The interpretation of Plato's *Republic* (791 *supra*). See pp. 224—237 (Plato's treatment of art) with the three appendices (pp. 237—246) and especially the last (pp. 243—246) on the criterion of beauty.

1818. Catherine Rau, *Art and society: A reinterpretation of Plato*, New York 1951 (cf. G. H. Clark, *Philos Rev* 61, 1952, 241—242; R. D. Mack, *Journ Philos* 49, 1952, 192—196). The 'reinterpretation' consists in denying that Plato in his views on art was guilty of 'the moralistic fallacy'; and this is done sometimes by arguing that in the passages concerned Plato is giving not his aesthetic but his educational or political theory and that for him the value of art as art is beauty while moral efficacy is its value as pedagogical or propagandistic material but at other times by defending him for holding that beauty and good are not two separate spheres and that the aesthetic judgment is mediated by the moral judgment. Miss Rau directs her polemic chiefly against Bosanquet, Croce, Carritt, and Santayana, apparently unaware that during the twenty years preceding the publication of her booklet each of her own arguments had already been exploited many times.

1819. A. E. Vassilion, The Platonic theory of inspiration, *Thomist* 14, 1951, 466—489. After examining the passages dealing with inspiration in Plato's writings the author of this rather confused and verbose article comes to the conclusion that Plato's theory of knowledge rests upon the same notion of intuition as does the 'inspiration' which he makes responsible for the creative process and that for this reason he could not allow the creative arts the dignity of their functions since to do so would be to belie his effort to promote the thinking man.

1820. G. M. A. Grube, Three Greek critics, *Univ Toronto Quart* 21, 1951/52, 345—361. See pp. 345—352 on Plato and pp. 360—361

for comparison of his attitude with those of Aristotle and Longinus. See also Grube's later essay (1852 *infra*) and his earlier book, Plato's thought (3 *supra* [pp. 179—215]).

1821. M. Andronikos, *Ὁ Πλάτων καὶ ἡ τέχνη, Θεσσαλονίκη* 1952 (cf. G. B. Kerferd, JHS 73, 1953, 157—158; J. Tate, Cl Rev N. S. 4, 1954, 294). In the first part of this expanded doctoral dissertation the author after two chapters on the beautiful and on 'mimesis' makes of Plato's remarks on 'play' a transition to the conclusion in which the supposed ambivalence of his attitude is ascribed to the tension between philosopher and artist in his personality. In the second part Plato's remarks on architecture, sculpture, and painting are reviewed; and an attempt is made to explain his supposed toleration of sculpture. The final section deals with the autonomy of art, and here Andronikos argues that Plato recognized a true art based upon knowledge in contrast to the art which he condemned.

— R. Ca'diou, *Le Philèbe et le théâtre* (87 *supra*).

1822. E. de Bruyne, *Geschiedenis van de aesthetica: De Griekse Oudheid*, Antwerpen/Amsterdam 1952 (cf. W. J. Verdenius, Mnem IV 7, 1954, 246—249), pp. 65—123: Plato.

1823. P. De Lacy, Biography and tragedy in Plutarch, AJPh 73, 1952, 159—171. See pp. 167—168 and p. 171 on Plato's view of tragedy, with which rather than with Aristotle's Plutarch's own is here said to agree.

— F. Egermann, *Vom attischen Menschenbild* (135 *supra*), pp. 89—92: Platons Stellung zur Tragödie. It is Egermann's thesis that Plato meant to condemn not poetry and drama as such but primarily Euripidean tragedy, that he recognized and approved poetical and artistic 'mimesis' the purpose of which is to express as adequately and beautifully as possible the perfect and 'what should be', and that his attitude towards Sophocles was consequently 'more positive' than it might at first appear to be. See for Egermann's 'Platonic interpretation' of the tragic heroes of Sophocles his later essay, *Arete und tragische Bewußtheit . . . (Vom Menschen in der Antike hrsg. von F. Hörmann, München 1957, pp. 5—128)*; and in criticism of this and of its implications for Plato's view of tragedy cf. K. Vretska, Anz Altertums 11, 1958, 92—93.

— H. Gauss, *Philosophischer Handkommentar . . .* (20 *supra*), I/1, pp. 48—50 and pp. 194—203. See also II/2, pp. 223—228 on

the criticism of art as imitation in *Republic* X, which Gauss dismisses as written 'ad captum vulgi' and as not expressing Plato's genuine views.

— D. R. Grey, Art in the *Republic* (792 *supra*).

— G. A. Levi, Il bello nel *Fedro* platonico (678 *supra*).

— L. Moulinier, Le pur et l'impur dans la pensée des Grecs . . . (1312 *supra*), pp. 367—369. See also pp. 410—419 on Plato and the Aristotelian 'catharsis'.

1824. Helen North, The use of poetry in the training of the ancient orator, *Traditio* 8, 1952, 1—33. This includes a few remarks on Plato's views concerning the relation of poetry to rhetoric and its place in rhetorical teaching. See pp. 3 and 5—6; and compare the later book by D. L. Clark (1746 *supra*).

1825. C. H. Reeves, The Aristotelian concept of the tragic hero, *AJPh* 73, 1952, 172—188. See pp. 184—185 for the distinction which he draws between Plato's conception of *μίμησις* as literal reproduction of particulars and Aristotle's 'dynamic' conception of it as concerned with universals; and with this compare H. C. Baldry's interpretation, *Phronesis* 2, 1957, 44—45 (1858 *infra*).

1826. P.-M. Schuhl, Platon et les musées, *Mélanges d'Esthétique et de Science de l'Art offerts à Étienne Souriau*, Paris 1952, pp. 249—250. In this fanciful note Schuhl says that Plato referred to museums almost in the modern sense of the word and posed the problem of the restoration of works of art.

— M. F. Sciacca, Il discorso di Socrate nel *Convito* platonico . . . (939 *supra*).

1827. T. B. L. Webster, Plato and Aristotle as critics of Greek art, *Symbol Osl* 29, 1952, 8—23. Webster here tries to identify influences of contemporary artistic practice, especially in painting and sculpture, upon the aesthetic theories of Plato and Aristotle and the possible influence of these in turn upon artistic practice. See especially pp. 8—13, pp. 15—16, and pp. 18—21 on Plato, whose appreciation of sculpture and painting is represented as having undergone a change, perhaps under the influence of Euphranor and the Sicyonian school, but a change 'limited to his definition of beauty in the *Philebos* and *Sophistes*, the standards of criticism in the *Laws*, and the admission of charm and *techné* in the *Sophistes*'. Compare with this Webster's later book (1856 *infra*), and see also his earlier article (1787 *supra*).

1828. C. Cavarinos, Plato's teaching on fine art, *Philos and Phenom Research* 13, 1952/53, 487—498. Here again it is contended that Plato distinguished true art, which is concerned with universals and based upon knowledge, from pseudo-art and that he condemned the latter not for being 'imitative' but for being concerned with particulars and for being immoral, a condemnation which he could validly make since for him 'the moral is a species of the aesthetic'. Contrary to the belief of the author there is nothing novel about his thesis or the arguments which he uses to support it.

1829. D. L. Stockton, Plato's quarrel with the poets, *Durham Univ Journ N. S.* 14, 1952/53, 64—70. Plato's arguments against poetry are here denounced as spurious, and his quarrel with the poets is ascribed simply to his fear of them as rivals in the teaching of wisdom and the moulding of character.

1830. A. Ardizzoni, *ΠΟΙΗΜΑ*: Ricerche sulla teoria del linguaggio poetico nell'antichità, Bari 1953 (cf. J. Labarbe, *Ant Cl* 23, 1954, 508—510). On the meanings of *ποίημα* and *ποίησις* as used by Plato in connection with poetry see pp. 106—109 and pp. 111—112.

— D. Christoff, *Contemplation et création* (1094 *supra*). The fact that Plato condemns poets while being a poet himself is here adduced as one manifestation of the more general problem of the rôle of artistic creation and its relation to contemplation in Plato's doctrine.

— J. Dewaele, *Une genèse difficile: La notion de 'rythme'* (1438 *supra*).

1831. R. C. Lodge, *Plato's theory of art*, London 1953 (cf. A. Boyce Gibson, *Rev Metaphysics* 8, 1954/55, 283—286; G. C. Field, *Philosophy* 30, 1955, 67—68; I. M. Crombie, *Mind N. S.* 67, 1957, 273—274). To Plato's critique and proposed censorship of art Lodge had devoted a few pages in his earlier book, *Plato's theory of education* (1734 *supra* [pp. 162—171]). In two chapters on aesthetics in his later book, *The philosophy of Plato* (30 *supra* [pp. 113—158]), he gives the essence of the interpretation developed more discursively in the present volume. Lodge here takes 'art' as *τέχνη* in the widest sense, holding that for Plato this constitutes a hierarchy of skills with the art of politics at its apex and literature, music, and the 'fine arts' on lower levels and being 'arts' only as fulfilling their proper functions in the integrated life of the model city. It is the community's way of living, Lodge

says, that is the master of the master-art; and it is to enhance the life of the community, which is itself the final art-product, that painter, musician, and administrator practise their specialized skills. Here as in Lodge's other books whatever a Platonic phrase or passage, often taken out of context, may suggest to the modern author as a commentary on his own society and experience is presented without distinction as his own belief and Plato's intention. The result, though often interesting and sometimes illuminating, is not a serious exegesis or even a trustworthy account of Plato's statements but rather modern variations by Lodge upon Platonic themes.

1832. A. Pagliaro, *Saggi di critica semantica*, Messina/Firenze 1953, pp. VIII—XI. See the note on 505 *supra*.

— L. Quattrocchi, *L'idea di bello nel pensiero di Platone* (1244 *supra*). More specifically for the problem of art and the supposed changes or 'development' of Plato's aesthetics, here closely connected with his 'double conception of soul as dynamic and contemplative form' and with his ontology, see pp. 68—83 and pp. 94—99.

1833. A. Savić Rebac, *Le fond de l'esthétique platonicienne: Socrate et la tragédie, Eros et les idées*, Ziva Antika (Skoplje) 3, 1953, 110—141. I have not myself seen this article, which is written in Serbian with a résumé in French and which is said to be a study of the political, ethical, and metaphysical foundations of Plato's aesthetics. For résumés of two other papers on Platonic aesthetics by Mme. Savić Rebac see 1843 and 1844 *infra*.

1834. B. Schweitzer, *Platon und die bildende Kunst der Griechen*, Tübingen 1953 (cf. T. B. L. Webster, *Gnomon* 26, 1954, 447—449; W. J. Verdenius, *Mnem* IV 8, 1955, 240—243; W. Weischedel, *Gött Gel Anz* 209, 1955, 113—120). Schweitzer argues that Plato was enthusiastic in his appreciation and expert in his knowledge of the plastic arts, being primarily interested in works of the early and high classical style, that there are close and specific affinities between his writing and the work of contemporary artists, that his cosmology betrays the eye of a painter and sculptor, and that in the epistemology of his early and middle periods works of art are assigned at least the limited value of an indispensable prelude or propaedeutic to true knowledge, whereas in the final period of his development art is utterly condemned partly because in strict accord with his dualistic ontology and epistemology he now turned away from the empirical world al-

together and partly because his opposition was aroused by the illusionistic perspective developed by the Sicyonian school. Both the course of the 'development' here explained and the explanation of the latest stage in both its facets are contrary to the prevalent interpretations and theories. See besides the reviews here listed the article by A. W. Byvanck, *Platon et l'art grec* (1846 *infra*), and the later book by T. B. L. Webster, *Art and literature in fourth century Athens* (1856 *infra*).

1835. W. D. Anderson, 'Hymns that are Lords of the Lyre', *Cl Journ* 49, 1953/54, 211—215. See pp. 213 and 214 for some of the changes taking place in Greek music to which Plato objected. With regard to 'modal ethos', mentioned in the former of these passages, see Anderson's article, The importance of Damonian theory in Plato's thought (170 *supra*), and *Harvard Studies in Class Phil* 63, 1958, 509 and 510 in the summary of Anderson's dissertation, *Paideia and Ethos in Hellenic music . . .*, *ibid.*, pp. 507—510.

1836. H. F. Bouchery, *Plato en de beeldende kunst*, *Gentse Bijdragen tot de Kunstgeschiedenis* 15, 1954, 125—159. In conscious opposition to the position taken by Broos (see 1801, 1802, and 713 *supra*) Bouchery argues that Plato did not condemn the plastic arts as such but, rejecting and condemning 'realistic' art, which was the modern tendency of his time, recognized and recommended an idealistic art, identifiable with the classical style, which takes as its model the ideas and the supreme good and by material representation elevates to knowledge of the good the masses of men who have no access to it by way of philosophy.

1837. Jacqueline Duchemin, *Platon et l'héritage de la poésie*, *Assoc G Budé, Congrès de Tours et Poitiers 1953 Actes*, Paris 1954, pp. 186—189. The full text of this article was published the next year under the same title in *Rev Ét Grecques* 68, 1955, 12—37. Beginning with the apparent contradiction between Plato's banishment of the poets and his own reliance upon the poetic imagination Mlle. Duchemin argues that Plato condemns not all poets but only those who fail to respect the just, the good, and the true and these not for being 'mimetic' but for using the lowest of three kinds of 'mimesis', that he recognizes an authentic poetry in which the inspiration of *θελα μοιρα* and the use of 'mimesis' in a higher sense coincide to transmit to men a divine message, that this attitude is in accord with that of Pindar's, and that Pindar's poetry exemplifies that authentic poetry which Plato recognizes as actually existing and which he prescribes for his ideal state. Emphasizing

the affinities between Pindar and Plato, especially in the myths (compare the book by E. des Places [222 *supra*]), she contends that the reflections of the philosopher give the ontological foundations of the poet's message, both being 'resurgences' of a single 'esoteric tradition'. What she means by this 'esoteric tradition' becomes apparent in her book on Pindar's religion, *Pindare poète et prophète* (Paris 1955), in which are incorporated (e. g. p. 33, n. 2; p. 41; pp. 221—223) some passages from this article.

— P. Friedländer, *Platon* (11a *supra*), I, pp. 125—132 and pp. 231—232 = *Plato* (11b *supra*), I, pp. 118—125 and pp. 218—220.

— M. Gigante, *Catullo, Cicerone e Antimaco* (158 *supra*). See in the note on this item the references to Howald-Staiger and de Vries as well for Plato's praise of Antimachus and its supposed implications.

1838. A. W. Gomme, *The Greek attitude to poetry and history*, Berkeley/Los Angeles 1954. In chapter III (Some problems in Aristotle's 'Poetics') see pp. 50—53 and pp. 57—62 on Plato, who, Gomme maintains, in banishing the poets was consciously refraining from theorizing about poetry and art in general and was restricting himself to political and social considerations and who neither confused aesthetic with moral judgments nor believed that art is imitative in a 'photographic' sense.

1839. Elfriede Huber-Abrahamowicz, *Das Problem der Kunst bei Platon*, Winterthur 1954 (cf. H. Meyerhoff, *Gnomon* 28, 1956, 226—228). This monograph is avowedly not primarily an 'historical' study but an existentialist attempt to understand the nature of art by starting from Plato, who as an artist himself is presumed to have had a more essential relation to the subject than does the merely passive amateur. The relation of art to sophistry in the dialogues is made the introduction to the problem of the beautiful in appearance and reality, then the objective and subjective sides of art are discussed in respect of truth and untruth, and finally the relation of art to pleasure and imitation and the question of Plato's own art are treated as aspects of the 'existential problematics of art', two solutions of the problem being discovered in Plato: *die Aufhebung der Kunst in den Kult als Forderung und die Aufhebung der Kunst in die Philosophie, die uns vorliegt in seinen eigenen philosophischen Dialogen*.

— H. Koller, *Die Mimesis in der Antike* (168 *supra*), pp. 15—21, pp. 25—36, pp. 57—58, pp. 63—68, and pp. 174—175, 177—179,

184, and 212. See the reviews listed in 168 *supra* and besides them the remarks of J. Tate, *Cl Rev N. S.* 5, 1955, 259.

1840. S. Ch. Manginas, 'Ο χαρακτήρ τῆς τραγικῆς περιπέτειας κατὰ τὸν Πλάτωνα, *ΠΛΑΤΩΝ* 6, 1954, 45—55. He holds that Plato anticipated Aristotle's conception of the peripeteia but attached tragedy to epic poetry instead of epic poetry to tragedy.

—. C. Mazzantini, *L'estetica* (39c *supra*).

1841. F. Mehmél, Homer und die Griechen, *Antike und Abendland* 4, 1954, 16—40. See pp. 27—33 for the necessity of Plato's rejection of Homer and the poets and of 'allegorical' interpretation as a substitute for philosophy. See the note on 502 *supra*, and on Plato and allegorism the articles by J. Tate (1768 *supra*) apparently unknown to Mehmél.

—. J. Portnoy, The philosopher and music (1739 *supra*), pp. 14—22: Plato.

1842. G. Révész, Drie grote persoonlijkheden in de griekse aesthetica: Plato, Aristoteles en Plotinos, *Nederland Tijdsch Psychologie* 9, 1954, 360—371.

1843. A. Savić Rebac, Encore le problème de l'imitation platonicienne, *Assoc G. Budé, Congrès de Tours et Poitiers 1953 Actes*, Paris 1954, pp. 176—178. This is the résumé of a paper in which Mme. Savić Rebac points out that Aristophanes presents the aesthetic theory of imitation in its subjective aspect as a psychological condition of artistic creation whereas Plato and Aristotle usually approach it from the point of view of the object of art, the subjective aspect when considered by Plato being treated primarily as the response of the receptive auditor and as such being in part the reason for condemning poetry. She then outlines the ways in which after Plato and Aristotle the subjective and objective aspects of imitation were developed and interpreted in different currents of aesthetic theory.

1844. A. Savić Rebac, Une anticipation platonicienne: Platon et l'art abstrait, *Assoc G. Budé, Congrès de Tours et Poitiers 1953 Actes*, Paris 1954, pp. 178—179. Here Mme. Savić Rebac maintains that Plato in condemning actual art dreamed of a new art which he could not himself produce but for which he gave specifications and that these specifications correspond to the principles and the practice of modern abstract art. Compare the article by P. Guéguen (1815 *supra*).

— R. Stark, *Aristotelesstudien* (443 *supra*). See pp. 37—38 and p. 45 in chapter IV (Die ethische Leistung der Tragödie), in general one of the least successful chapters of the monograph.

— W. D. Anderson, The importance of Damonian theory in Plato's thought (170 *supra*). See pp. 91—92, pp. 94—96, and pp. 99—102; and see also 1835 *supra*.

1845. A. W. Byvanck, De beeldende kunst in den tijd van Plato, Med Nederland Ak Wet, Afd Letter N. R. 18 No. 16, 1955, 429—475 (pp. 463—475 being a résumé in French of the preceding Dutch text). Concerned here primarily to clarify Plato's attitude towards the plastic arts by a precise chronological determination of the works and tendencies that could have influenced him and to which his remarks refer, Byvanck concludes that everything condemned by Plato is to be found in the works done in the last third of the fifth century, that the artistic controversies of that period must have made a great impression upon him, and that his attitude is not explicable as a 'reactionary classicism' but was in part the opposition to 'modern art' that is common to every epoche and in part a manifestation of the normal Greek attachment to tradition. Although this essay in its printed form contains several references to Schweitzer's book (1834 *supra*) including (p. 460) an alternative explanation of the supposedly greater vehemence with which Plato in his later writings opposes painting, the text was originally a lecture delivered just before the publication of Schweitzer's book. Of this book Byvanck took full account in another article:

1846. A. W. Byvanck, Platon et l'art grec, Bull Vereeniging tot Bevordering der Kennis van de Antieke Beschaving te 's-Gravenhage 30, 1955, 35—39. Byvanck here gives an account of B. Schweitzer's interpretation (1834 *supra*), accepting most of it and incorporating (pp. 36—37) H. Koller's theory of *μίμησις* (168 *supra*) including his notion that Plato's conception of it in *Republic* X is different from what it had been in *Republic* III. He appears to dissent from Schweitzer mainly on two points: the latter's dating of Praxiteles and his contention that what caused Plato in his later years to attack painting with special bitterness was the Sicyonian development of illusionistic perspective.

1847. F. Cupaiuolo, Studi d'estetica antica, Paideia 10, 1955, 81—97. On p. 92 of this bibliographical survey, which is supposed to cover fifteen years, a dozen titles of works dealing with Plato are listed.

— A. Plebe, *Antologia de critica letteraria di Platone* (309 *supra*). See also Plebe's later book (1855 *infra*) and his articles (1857, 1862, 1863 and 1869 *infra*).

1848. W. Schadewaldt, *Furcht und Mitleid? Zur Deutung des Aristotelischen Tragödiensatzes*, *Hermes* 83, 1955, 129—171. On Plato see pp. 139—140, pp. 143—145, pp. 151—152, pp. 157—159, p. 162, and p. 165. Schadewaldt holds that Aristotle's definition of tragedy is for tragedy at least that justification which Plato in *Republic* 607 C said he would welcome for poetry—and which he foresaw himself. The 'Nachwort' to this article by M. Pohlenz, *Hermes* 84, 1956, 49—74, contains nothing of significance for Plato.

1849. P. M. Schuhl, *Platon et la musique de son temps*, *Rev Intern Philos* 9, 1955, 276—287. This is a rapid survey of the innovations in music to which Plato was opposed and of the reasons for his opposition with modern instances of this 'eternal quarrel between the pit and the critics'. Compare with this Schuhl's earlier book, *Platon et l'art de son temps* (1761 *supra*).

— Dorothy Tarrant, *Plato as dramatist* (1080 *supra*). This includes comment on Plato's condemnation of drama (pp. 83—84), in which Miss Tarrant thinks he was not whole-hearted.

1850. K. von Fritz, *Tragische Schuld und poetische Gerechtigkeit in der griechischen Tragödie*, *Stud Gen* 8, 1955, 194—237. See pp. 203—204.

— R. Bianchi Bandinelli, *Osservazioni storico-artistiche e un passo del 'Sofista' platonico* (905 *supra*). For the connection here of Plato's attitude towards perspective with the modern question of 'realism' and 'abstractionism' see also the articles by P. Guéguen (1815 *supra*) and by Mme. Savić Rebac (1844 *supra*).

— F. Buffière, *Les mythes d'Homère et la pensée grecque* (200 *supra*), p. 12, pp. 14—19, and pp. 26—27.

— I. Düring, *Greek music . . .* (1741 *supra*), pp. 314—315 and p. 317.

1851. H. Flashar, *Die medizinischen Grundlagen der Lehre von der Wirkung der Dichtung in der griechischen Poetik*, *Hermes* 84, 1956, 12—48. In attempting to establish the medical analogy of the notion that the effect of poetry and music is *φρόσις* and *ἔλεος*, the connection of this with the theory of *μανία* and *ἐρθρονιασμός*,

and the implications for the significance of *κάθαρσις* Flashar considers Plato's use of these conceptions chiefly on pp. 19—26, pp. 33—34, and p. 44. See also Flashar's later monograph, *Der Dialog Ion . . .* (173 *supra* [pp. 106—112 and pp. 133—139]).

1852. G. M. A. Grube, Rhetoric and literary criticism, *Quart Journ of Speech* 42, 1956, 339—344. In this essay, which emphasizes the predominantly rhetorical orientation of ancient literary criticism, there are many perceptive remarks about Plato's suggestions of a different orientation. See also Grube's earlier article, Three Greek critics (1820 *supra*), and his book, *Plato's thought* (3 *supra* [pp. 179—215]).

1853. M. Guicheteau, L'art et l'illusion chez Platon, *Rev Philos Louvain* 54, 1956, 219—227. Plato's own artistry and taste for art are here again taken as reason for supposing that his banishment of the poet and artist is really meant to be their liberation and the restoration of them to their proper domain, an indication that the true artist is not an imitative illusionist as is the sophist but the creator of beautiful works intermediate between sensible objects and the ideas.

1854. H. House, Aristotle's *Poetics*: A course of eight lectures revised, with a preface, by C. Hardie, London 1956. Plato's criticism and condemnation of poetry and art, referred to throughout the lectures as the incentive to Aristotle's defence, are themselves discussed in pp. 22—28 and pp. 116—125.

— E. Koller, Muße und musische Paideia (540 *supra*), pp. 4—15: Über die Stellung der Musik bei Platon. See also pp. 117—120 in the statement of Koller's conclusions.

— R. C. Lodge, The philosophy of Plato (30 *supra*), pp. 113—158: Aesthetics. See also 1831 *supra*.

1855. A. Plebe, La nascita del comico nella vita e nell'arte degli antichi Greci, Bari 1956 (cf. W. Kraus, *Anz Altertums* 12, 1959, 71—73). See pp. 230—236 on Plato's condemnation of the comic and Aristotle's defence of it. Earlier in the book there are a few pages (pp. 132—135) on the 'intellectual humor' of Plato's own dialogues. See also Plebe's later essays on Plato's aesthetics (1857, 1862 [with 1863], and 1869 *infra*) and his earlier anthology of Plato's literary criticism (309 *supra*).

1856. T. B. L. Webster, Art and literature in fourth century Athens, London 1956 (cf. J. S. Morrison, *Cl Rev N. S.* 8, 1958,

124—126; K. Schefold, *Gnomon* 30, 1958, 241—243). See especially pp. 10—45 (Art and literature in Plato's Athens) but also pp. 50—62 (Aristotle and Plato), p. 79, pp. 103—104, and pp. 150—153. Questionable parallels and fanciful interpretations are here used to establish an affinity of outlook and expression in Plato's work and that of contemporary artists and then to argue that Plato's criticism of art in the *Republic* called forth a response in the late classical style and that his own 'kindlier view of art and literature in the later dialogues was influenced by the Sicyonian school of painting and by the emphasis on composition in Isocratean rhetoric' (cf. B. Schweitzer [1834 *supra*]; A. W. Byvanck [1845 and 1846 *supra*]). See also the two earlier articles by Webster (1787 and 1827 *supra*).

1857. A. Plebe, *Die Begriffe des Schönen und der Kunst bei Platon und in den Quellen von Platon*, *Wiener Zeitschr für Philos Psych Pädag* 6, 1956/58, 126—143. Plato's notions of the concept of art, of the difference between fine arts and techniques, and of *μουσική* are here represented as having been unclear and uncertain; and this is said to have been the result of his having tried to take over and to unite disparate aesthetic notions already extant. See with this especially Plebe's later essay (1869 *infra*) but also his earlier book on comedy (1855 *supra*).

1858. H. C. Baldry, *The interpretation of Poetics IX, Phronesis* 2, 1957, 41—45. According to Baldry (pp. 44—45) the background of Aristotle's theory here is the discussion of literature in *Republic* II and III and the assumptions underlying it with regard to the nature and extent of invention permitted to the poet and the sphere in which he must be guided by reason, a point of view 'crystallized in the doctrine of *μίμησις* as first enunciated in *Republic* III . . . , the creative representation of characters who already exist, . . .'. On this basis Baldry defines the extent to which Aristotle follows Plato and where and how he diverges from him.

—. E. G. Ballard, *Plato's movement from an ethics of the individual to a science of particulars* (801 *supra*). It is here maintained (pp. 7ff.) that Plato in the *Republic* discusses politics and ethics not for themselves but as examples in his analysis of 'art', which in the end is interpreted as a 'functional unit' involving creation, use, and representation (preservation), and that he does not assert the vanity of fine art but, holding that the three parts of art are not independent of one another, indicts the poets specifically of misconceiving their function to be the preservation and communication of knowledge.

1859. H. Blumenberg, 'Nachahmung der Natur': Zur Vorgeschichte der Idee des schöpferischen Menschen, *Stud Gen* 10, 1957, 266—283. In section III (pp. 270—273), connecting the indictment of art as imitative with the 'negative implication' of *μίμησις*, Blumenberg goes on to argue that the conception of a truly creative act is, despite the *πυτυργός* of *Republic* 597 D, alien to Platonic metaphysics, according to which as the *Timaeus* presents it every possibility is already actualized and nothing unrealized remains for the work of man to produce.

—. D. L. Clark, Rhetoric in Greco-Roman education (1746 *supra*).

1860. G. F. Else, Aristotle's *Poetics*: The argument, Cambridge (Mass.) 1957. See pp. 21—23, pp. 97—100, pp. 187—188, pp. 304—306, pp. 374—375, and pp. 636—641. It is in these passages chiefly that Else discusses Plato's condemnation of poetry and drama and Aristotle's defence of them against his charges.

—. Isobel Henderson, Ancient Greek music (1745 *supra*), pp. 384—387, pp. 395—397, and p. 401.

1861. G. A. Kennedy, The ancient dispute over rhetoric in Homer, *AJPh* 78, 1957, 23—35. See for Plato p. 27, p. 29, and pp. 33—34 (Aristides' reply to Plato's criticism of rhetoric).

1862. A. Plebe, La sacralità della musica in Platone, negli stoichi, nello pseudo-Plutarco, *Arch Filosofia*, 1957 No. 3 (La filosofia dell'arte sacra), 184—194. Plato's musical conservatism is here ascribed to the theory of the divine origin of music, which Plebe thinks he was the first to formulate explicitly (pp. 184—188). Compare with this Plebe's remarks on Plato's theory of music and of art made in another article published during the same year:

1863. A. Plebe, Filodemo e la musica, *Filosofia* 8, 1957, 585—602. See on Plato pp. 590, 594, 595, and 597 (= pp. 10, 14, 15, and 17 of the separate publication with the same title [*Studi di Estetica* 6, Torino 1957]).

—. C. W. van Boekel, Katharsis . . . (1328 *supra*). Besides pp. 51—73 see also pp. 76—93, pp. 117—122, and pp. 130—131.

1864. F. Wehrli, Die antike Kunsttheorie und das Schöpferische, *Mus Helvet* 14, 1957, 39—49. Concerned here primarily with the beginnings in classical times of the Hellenistic theory of artistic creation lying behind the Plotinian defence of art against

Plato's depreciation of it in *Republic* X, Wehrli argues that the treatment of art as 'mimetic' in that passage was meant not as a dogmatic theory but only as a casual illustration of a philosophical doctrine which does not exclude other aspects of art and that what is there said of poetry is in fact contradicted by Plato's recognition of it elsewhere as spiritual creativity. Compare with this Wehrli's earlier article, *Der erhabene und der schlichte Stil* . . . (503 *supra* [pp. 11—21]).

1865. W. K. Wimsatt Jr. and C. Brooks, *Literary criticism: A short history*, New York 1957. For Plato see especially pp. 5—20, p. 36, pp. 45—46, and pp. 57—68.

— H. Flashar, *Der Dialog Ion* . . . (173 *supra*). See especially pp. 106—112 (*Platon und die Dichter*) and pp. 133—139; and see also Flashar's earlier essay, *Die medizinischen Grundlagen der Lehre von der Wirkung der Dichtung* . . . (1851 *supra*).

1866. E. Lledo, *Póesis-Mímesis*, *Actas Primer Cong Español Estudios Clásicos* (Madrid 15—19 Abril 1956), Madrid 1958, 321—327. Plato criticizes the poet, Lledo argues, not for 'imitating' but for what he chooses to imitate, the world of appearance and untruth which he does not recognize as such. See also the following article in this volume (pp. 327—333), *Demócrito, Fragmento 18*, where Lledo discusses Plato's ascription of the poet's activity to *ἐνθουσιασμός*.

1867. E. Moutsopoulos, *Περὶ τῆς ὀντολογικῆς ὑποστάσεως τῆς τέχνης ἐν τῷ Σοφιστῇ τοῦ Πλάτωνος*, *ἈΘΗΝΑ: Σύγγραμμα περιοδικὸν τῆς ἐν Ἀθήναις ἐπιστημονικῆς ἐταιρείας* 62, 1958, 369—379. This purports to explain that Plato's apparent wavering between being and non-being is the result of his having tried to face the problem of art at once as a philosopher and as an artist.

1868. M. H. Philipson, *Some reflections on tragedy*, *Journ Philos* 55, 1958, 197—203. This analysis of Aristotle's definition of tragedy, assumed to be a defence against Plato's indictment, comes 'full circle back to Plato' with the conclusion that the function of art is moral.

— P. Vicaire, *Platon et Dionysos* (1512 *supra*).

— W. Barclay, *Educational ideals in the ancient world* (1749 *supra*). Plato's criticism of poetry is here treated (pp. 118—121) mainly as an attack upon the Greek method of education.

— E. Moutsopoulos, *La musique dans l'oeuvre de Platon* (1451 *supra*). See especially pp. 227—319 (*L'esthétique musicale*) but also pp. 42—45 (the effects of harmony on the soul), pp. 54—66 (the study of music and the revelation of beauty), pp. 81—96 (Plato and the evolution of musical instruments), and pp. 127—135 (Plato's aesthetics of the dance).

1869. A. Plebe, *Origini e problemi dell'estetica antica = Momenti e problemi di storia dell'estetica, Parte Prima: Dall'antichità classica al Barocco*, Milano 1959, pp. 1—80. In this essay of Plebe's, which is the first of eight by different authors in this volume, see pp. 22—45 (*I problemi dell'arte nel moralismo platonico e nell'estetica di Aristotele*) and pp. 46—54 (*I rapporti tra poetica e retorica in Gorgia, in Platone e in Aristotele*). Here as in his earlier essay (1857 *supra*) Plebe finds uncertainty and self-contradiction in Plato's notion of the relation between the beautiful and the good and in his conception of *μίμησις*, and he contends that Plato in his parallel polemics against rhetoric and poetry denied to both the psychagogical aspect which according to Gorgias was the very foundation of both and by condemning which Plato prevented himself from adequately appreciating the nature of either. See also Plebe's book on comedy (1855 *supra*), his remarks on Plato's theory of music (1862 and 1863 *supra*), and his anthology of Plato's literary criticism (309 *supra*).

— J. E. Rexine, *Religion in Plato and Cicero* (1516 *supra*), pp. 53—63: *The Platonic attitude toward poetry*.

1870. S. H. Rosen, *Collingwood and Greek aesthetics*, *Phronesis* 4, 1959, 135—148. Rosen here analyses in detail and rejects as erroneous the interpretation given by Collingwood (1779 *supra*) of Plato's views on art and the relation to them of Aristotle's. Collingwood, he contends, misinterprets the implications of *τέχνη*, is mistaken in supposing Plato to have held that some art is not mimetic, and misses Plato's most important point in not seeing that he does discuss 'art proper' and means to criticize all art, what Collingwood calls 'magic' as well as what he calls 'amusement' art.

— N. Scholl, *Der platonische Menexenos* (1721 *supra*). In the chapter, *Platon und die Rhetorik* (pp. 71—97) see especially pp. 88—94 on Plato's theory of the proper purpose and function of rhetoric, poetry, and music.

1871. E. Utitz, *Bemerkungen zur altgriechischen Kunsttheorie* (Deutsche Akad Wiss Berlin, Schriften der Sektion Altertumswiss 18), Berlin 1959. The central thesis of this posthumously published monograph is that the doctrine of imitation rightly understood is in accord with Greek artistic theory and practice and despite all its defects remains the basis of all subsequent genuinely philosophical study of art. Plato himself is discussed only occasionally (pp. 5—6, pp. 9—14, pp. 17—18, and pp. 23—24), his hostility to art being ascribed to his aversion from the sensible world and his failure to see the capacity of art to reach from the sensible to true being.

VI. Terminology

This section is not meant to be a complete glossary or index of all the discussions and interpretations of Platonic concepts and expressions contained in the publications already listed in the earlier sections of this survey. A few key-words to Platonic themes, the discussions of which would otherwise not easily be located in the earlier sections, will be included; but save for these it must be limited to those words and locutions the meaning, incidence, or usage of which in the Platonic corpus has been the subject of special study.

There has been no new index or lexicon of the Platonic vocabulary published during the last thirty years; but Ast's *Lexicon Platonicum* has been made available once more in a photomechanical reprint (Darmstadt 1956), and there has been published, avowedly as a supplement to Ast's *Lexicon*, an index of proper names with indication of the places in the corpus where they appear:

1872. J. Zürcher, *Lexicon Academicum*, Paderborn 1954.

The terminology of the theory of ideas has been the subject of several publications (see s. v. *εἶδος* *infra*), but there have also been studies made of other special aspects or sections of Plato's vocabulary:

— G. Röttger, *Studien zur platonischen Substantivbildung* (1063 *supra*).

— K. von Fritz, *Philosophie und sprachlicher Ausdruck ...* (1064 *supra*).

— P. Louis, *Les métaphores de Platon* (1066 *supra*).

— Dorothy Tarrant, *Imagery in Plato's Republic* (786 *supra*).

— Dorothy Tarrant, *Colloquialisms, semi-proverbs, and word-play in Plato* (1067 *supra*) with the later supplement to this article (1083 *supra*).

— A. de Marignac, *Imagination et dialectique ...* (1070 *supra*).

— Dorothy Tarrant, *Metaphors of death in the Phaedo* (641 *supra*).

— A. N. Amman, -ικός bei Platon . . . (1076 *supra*).

— C. J. Classen, Sprachliche Deutung als Triebkraft platonischen und sokratischen Philosophierens (1333 *supra*).

— Maria Rezzani, Note e ricerche intorno al linguaggio di Platone (1084 *supra*).

For Plato's mathematical vocabulary one must now take account of the dictionary by Mugler, a book which should be used with caution, however, the more so because the author has carried over into it many of the interpretations and theories which he advanced in his earlier work, *Platon et la recherche mathématique de son époque* (1426 *supra*):

1873. C. Mugler, Dictionnaire historique de la terminologie géométrique des Grecs (*Études et Commentaires* 28 and 29), Paris 1958 and 1959.

ἀγνοεῖν — ἄγνοια

— F. Zucker, Verbundenheit von Erkenntnis und Wille . . . (1565 *supra*).

ἀγγίνοια

— F. Dirlmeier, Beobachtungen . . . (1323 *supra* [p. 167]); see also his *Nikomachische Ethik* (1361 *supra* [p. 461]).

αἰδώς

— R. Stark, *Aristotelesstudien* (443 *supra* [pp. 65—67 and pp. 70—72]).

αἰσθησις

— C. Mugler (1049 *supra*).

ἀκρόπολις

— K. Vretska, *Platonica* (861 *supra* [pp. 419—420]).

ἀλήθεια

— M. Heidegger, *Platons Lehre von der Wahrheit* (847 *supra*). For criticism of this etymological interpretation of the term

and its implications see the references to G. Krüger, P. Friedländer, and E. M. Manasse given in 847 *supra*; the beginning of the essay, Adèla, by P. M. Schuhl referred to in 1260 *supra*; and C. J. Classen (1333 *supra* [pp. 94—95]). For attempts to defend Heidegger's interpretation against Friedländer's refutation of it see W. Beierwaltes (1267 *supra* [pp. 75—77]) and E. Tugendhat (1280 *supra* [pp. 6—12]).

ἀμαθής — ἀμαθία

— F. Zucker, *Verbundenheit von Erkenntnis und Wille ...* (1565 *supra*).

1874. O. Luschnat, *Das Problem des ethischen Fortschritts in der alten Stoa*, *Philologus* 102, 1958, 178—214. On pp. 207—209 and pp. 211—213 Luschnat traces the Stoic formulation back through a schematic argument of Xenocrates to Plato's connection of his conception of μέσον or intermediate with the logic of contradictory opposition. In this context on p. 208 he elucidates the meaning assigned by Plato to the ἀμαθής in relation to the philosopher as μέσον and to positive knowledge or wisdom.

ἀμήχανος

— F. Dirlmeier, *Beobachtungen ...* (1323 *supra* [p. 168]); see also his *Nikomachische Ethik* (1361 *supra* [p. 480]).

ἀνάλογια

— G. L. Muskens, *De vocis ἀναλογίας significatione ...* (1422 *supra*). See also the treatments by K. Reidemeister (1211 *supra*), P. Grenet (1144 *supra*), E.-W. Platzeck (1164 *supra*), W. Veau-thier (1254 *supra*), all cited in 1422 *supra*, and besides these R. Robinson, *Plato's earlier dialectic* (1133 *supra*), pp. 221—230 = pp. 209—217 of the second edition.

ἀπραγμοσύνη — ἀπράγμων

1875. K. Dienelt, *Απραγμοσύνη*, *Wiener Studien* 66, 1953, 94—104. Concerned chiefly to oppose Nestle's connection of Socrates with the ἀπράγμονες to whom the Thucydidean Pericles refers, Dienelt argues that in Plato as well as in Thucydides

ἀπράγμων and *ἀπραγμοσύνη* emphasize rather the lack of interest in the community than mere inactivity.

ἀριθμητική

— É. de Strycker, *La logistique* (484 *supra*).

ἀριθμός

— W. van der Wielen, *De ideegetallen van Plato* (113 *supra*), pp. 13—44 (cf. H. Cherniss, *A J Ph* 68, 1947, 238—240); P. Wilpert, *Zwei aristotelische Frühschriften . . .* (111 *supra*), pp. 177 and 181; Sir David Ross, *Plato's theory of ideas* (1236 *supra*), pp. 179—180, p. 189, and pp. 197—198; A. Wedberg, *Plato's philosophy of mathematics* (123 *supra*), pp. 122—135; O. Becker, *Zwei Untersuchungen . . .* (114 *supra*), pp. 2—4, pp. 16—17, and pp. 20—21.

ἄρρητος

— É. de Strycker, *De irrationalen in den Hippias Maior* (496 *supra*), pp. 29—34. With this see the other references in 496 *supra* and C. Mugler, *Dictionnaire historique . . .* (1873 *supra* [pp. 83—84]), where there is no mention of de Strycker's article.

ἀρχή

1876. A. Lumpe, *Der Terminus 'Prinzip' (ἀρχή) von den Vorsokratikern bis auf Aristoteles*, *Archiv für Begriffsgeschichte* 1, 1955, 104—116. See pp. 107—111 for the word as used by Plato in its colloquial senses and for its transition in his works to the status of a technical term for *principium cognoscendi* and *principium reale*. With Lumpe's first paragraph on p. 109 compare K. von Fritz, *Archiv für Begriffsgeschichte* 1, 1955, 38—42 and 4, 1959, 80—81; H.-P. Stahl, *Interpretationen zu Platons Hypothesis-Verfahren . . .* (1172 *supra*), pp. 90—92 and pp. 96—98; and C. Mugler, *Dictionnaire historique . . .* (1873 *supra*), p. 85 s. v. *ἀρχή*.

— P. Grenet, *Note sur la structure du Lachès* (510 *supra*). On the meaning and function of *ἀρχή* and *ἐξ ἀρχῆς* in the dialectical structure of the dialogues see pp. 124—128.

αὖξῃ

—. C. Mugler, *Platon et la recherche mathématique* . . . (1426 *supra* [pp. 7—10]) and *Dictionnaire historique* . . . (1873 *supra* [pp. 88—89]).

βάθος

—. C. Mugler, *Platon et la recherche mathématique* . . . (1426 *supra*), pp. 10—13 (cf. H. Cherniss, *Rev Metaphysics* 4, 1950/51, 398) and *Dictionnaire historique* . . . (1873 *supra*), p. 93.

βαναυσία — βάνανσος

1877. P. Chantraine, *Trois noms grecs de l'artisan* (*δημιουργός, βάνανσος, χειρῶναξ*), *Mélanges Auguste Diès*, Paris 1956, pp. 41—47. See pp. 43—44 and p. 46.

γῆρας

—. C. J. Alsina, *Platon y la vejez* (535 *supra*).

δαίμων

—. É. Magotteaux, *Manes Virgiliens et Démon Platonicien* (574 *supra*), pp. 346—349. On δαίμων as 'destiny' which depends upon human choice, i. e. upon the development of the superior part of the human soul (see also *Republic* X 617 D—621 B *supra*). Compare G. Funke, *Gewöhnheit* (1578 *supra*), p. 83.

—. G. François, *Le polytheisme et l'emploi au singulier des mots ΘΕΟΣ, ΔΑΙΜΩΝ* (1505 *supra*). See especially pp. 272—273, p. 303, pp. 338—339, and pp. 342—344.

δεξιός

1878. P.-M. Schuhl, *Platon et la prééminence de la main droite*, *Cahiers Internat de Sociologie* 4, 1948, 172ff. (reprinted in Schuhl's collection, *Le merveilleux, la pensée et l'action*, Paris 1952, pp. 182—187). According to Schuhl *Laws* 794 D—795 D shows how the spirit of sociological reform overcame the conservatism in Plato, who, though elsewhere following current usage and 'Pythagorean tradition' in making the right and orientation to the right preëminent over the left, here ascribes the differen-

tiation to social habit and traditional prejudice which he proposes to discard in favor of the natural equality of right and left.

— Alice F. Braunlich, "To the Right" in Homer and Attic Greek (1039 *supra*). See also the references given in 1039 *supra* to the discussions by É. des Places, J. Cuillandre, Maria Timpamaro Cardini, F. M. Brignoli, B. Einarson, and L. Robin. These are primarily concerned with the meaning of ἐπὶ δεξιὰ in astronomical or cosmological orientation. Its significance in an entirely different Platonic context and without consideration of astronomical passages is discussed by H. Koller, *Glotta* 34, 1955, 177—179 (966 *supra*).

δέος

— É. de Strycker, Vrees als principe van staatsburgerlijke tucht . . . (545 *supra*).

δεσμός

1879. P.-M. Schuhl, ΔΕΣΜΟΣ, *Mélanges Auguste Diès*, Paris 1956, 233—234. This is a collection of references purporting to show that the notion of 'bond' plays a central rôle in all aspects of Plato's philosophy.

δημιουργός

1880. C. M. A. van den Oudenrijn, *Demiourgos*, Assen 1951. For the various meanings and nuances of the word as used by Plato see pp. 123—132 and pp. 138—140.

— P. Chantraine, *Trois noms grecs de l'artisan* (1877 *supra*).

1881. W. Theiler, *Reallexikon für Antike und Christentum* 3, 1957, 696—697 in the article, *Demiurgos*, *ibid.*, cols. 694—711.

— Maria Rezzani, *Note e ricerche intorno al linguaggio di Platone* (1084 *supra*), pp. 9—11.

διαλεκτική

— R. Robinson, *Plato's earlier dialectic* (1133 *supra*), pp. 92—96. This section (Who invented Dialectic?) appears in a somewhat altered form in the second edition, pp. 88—92.

— W. Müri, *Das Wort Dialektik bei Platon* (1136 *supra*).

δικαιοσύνη

— C. W. R. Larson, The Platonic synonyms, *δικαιοσύνη* and *σωφροσύνη* (830 *supra*).

δίκη

— D. Loenen, *Dikē: Een historisch-semantic analyse van het Griekse gerechtigheidsbegrip* (1651 *supra*).

— A. A. T. Ehrhardt, *Politische Metaphysik von Solon bis Augustin, I . . .* (1717 *supra*), pp. 50—53, p. 101, and p. 152.

δύναμις — δυνατόν

1882. A. Faust, *Der Möglichkeitsgedanke: Systemgeschichtliche Untersuchungen I*, Heidelberg 1931, pp. 45—66. Though published at the beginning of the two decades preceding 1950, this important study of Plato's conception of *δύναμις* appears to have escaped the notice of most Platonic scholars. It is given serious consideration, however, by Smeets in his monograph:

1883. A. Smeets, *Act en Potentie in de Metaphysica van Aristoteles*, Louvain 1952, pp. 63—69. Dealing in this section with Plato's conception of *δύναμις* Smeets naturally gives an interpretation of *Sophist* 247 D 8—E 4 and 248 C 4—5. In the item on *Sophist* 246 A 4—249 D 8 (Section III C b *supra*) reference has already been made to this and to other interpretations of the occurrence of *δύναμις* there. Among these is one to R. C. Taliaferro, who in his review of R. S. Brumbaugh's book (1440 *supra*) has several pages on the profound significance of *δύναμις* for the understanding of Plato's 'transcendent dynamism'.

— C. Mugler, *Dictionnaire historique . . .* (1873 *supra*), pp. 149—150 s. v. *δύναμις*, p. 152 s. v. *δύνασθαι*, pp. 153—154 s. v. *δυνατόν*. To the reference given (p. 150, n. 2) for *Epinomis* 990 E add A. R. Lacey, *Phronesis* 1, 1955/56, 87—89 (420 *supra*).

ἔθος

— G. Funke, *Gewohnheit* (1578 *supra*), pp. 78—83.

εἶδος

— For the use of εἶδος and ἰδέα and the terminology of the theory of ideas generally see G. F. Else (1189 *supra*), H. C. Baldry (1195 *supra*), K. von Fritz (1064 *supra* [pp. 38—64]), P. Brommer (1203 *supra*), P. Louis (1066 *supra* [pp. 143—146]), P. Grenet (1144 *supra* [pp. 217—225]), Dorothy Tarrant (1069 *supra* [pp. 33—34]), P. Kucharski (1148 *supra*), A. de Marignac (1070 *supra* [pp. 33—63 and pp. 138—146]), Sir David Ross (1236 *supra* [pp. 228—233]), P. Friedländer (11a *supra* [I, pp. 17—33] = 11b *supra* [I, pp. 16—31]), R. Loriaux (1167 *supra* [pp. 23—40, pp. 46—65, pp. 73—89, and pp. 115—127]), T. G. Rosenmeyer (1081 *supra*), C. J. Classen (1333 *supra* [pp. 43—71, pp. 88—89, and pp. 158—163]). See also on the terminology used to express relations among the ideas—κοινωνεῖν, μετέχειν, μέλυνσθαι with their cognate nouns and compounds—J. L. Ackrill, Plato and the copula . . . (908 *supra*).

εἰκών

1884. H. Willms, *EIKON*: Eine begriffsgeschichtliche Untersuchung zum Platonismus I, Münster i. Westf. 1935, pp. 2—24, pp. 30—31, and p. 34. See also R. Robinson (1133 *supra* [pp. 230—234 = pp. 218—222 of the second edition]), V. Goldschmidt (1092 *supra* [pp. 109—110]), H. Cherniss (1054 *supra* and 300 *supra* [pp. 263—266]), N. Gulley (1357 *supra* [pp. 208—209]), F. W. Kohnke (632 *supra* [pp. 37—38 and p. 40]).

εἰκώς

— R. Robinson, Plato's earlier dialectic (1133 *supra*), pp. 228—230 = pp. 216—217 of the second edition.

1885. S. Sambursky, On the Possible and the Probable in Ancient Greece, *Osiris* 12, 1956, 35—48. See pp. 36—37 for Plato on 'probability'; and compare with this C. Axelos (1508 *supra*).

εἰμασμένη

— P. C. Bonaventura Pistorio, Fato e divinità . . . (1496 *supra*), pp. 169—171. See also the remarks of A.-J. Festugière, *Rev Ét Grecques* 58, 1945, 41 on Plato's use of this substantive.

ἔξις

- C. Mugler, *Ἐξις, σχέσις et σχῆμα* chez Platon (1446 *supra*).
 — G. Funke, *Gewohnheit* (1578 *supra*), pp. 78—83.

ἑταιρία — ἑταῖρος

- F. Sartori, *Platone e le eterie* (1712 *supra*).

ἐϑνωρία

1886. P. M. M. Geurts, *Ἐϑνωρία*, *Mnem* III 11, 1943, 108—114.
 Against Jaeger (986 *supra* [p. 22]) he argues that Diocles did not borrow the word from Plato and that it was not a Platonic neologism.

εὐλογος

1887. J. M. Le Blond, *Eulogos et l'argument de convenance* chez Aristote, Paris 1938. For the incidence and the meaning of the term in Plato see pp. 5—7.

εὐνομία

- A. A. T. Ehrhardt, *Politische Metaphysik von Solon bis Augustin*, I . . . (1717 *supra*), pp. 71—72, p. 80, pp. 83—84.

εὐσέβεια — εὐσεβής

- Johanna C. Bolkestein, "*Ὁσιος en Εὐσεβής* . . . (1475 *supra*), pp. 145—149, pp. 154—155, and p. 156.

ἦθος

- G. Funke, *Gewohnheit* (1578 *supra*), pp. 78—83. See also K. von Fritz, *Stud Gen* 8, 1955, 233, n. 6 (1850 *supra*).

θάλαττα

- J. Luccioni, *Platon et la mer* (1718 *supra*). See especially the third section (pp. 23—39) on nautical comparisons and meta-

phors; and see also the references given in 746 *supra* on *Politicus* 273 D 5—E 1.

θάνατος

1888. I. de Amezola, El concepto de la muerte en la filosofía platónica, *Humanidades* (Comillas) 3, 1951, 180—199.

—. Dorothy Tarrant, Metaphors of death in the *Phaedo* (641 *supra*).

θεῖος

—. J. van Camp et P. Canart, Le sens du mot *ΘΕΙΟΣ* chez Platon (1502 *supra*). Observe that among the reviews of this book listed in 1502 *supra* is the review-article by G. Soleri (1506 *supra*), in which R. Mugnier's earlier book on the same subject is compared with this. For the phrases *θεία μοῖρα* and *θεία τύχη* see the references given in 1480 *supra*.

θεολογία

—. V. Goldschmidt, *Théologia* (825 *supra*). See also the references in 825 *supra* to Jaeger, Festugière, and Vlastos.

θεός

—. G. François, Le polythéisme et l'emploi au singulier des mots *ΘΕΟΣ*, *ΔΑΙΜΩΝ* (1505 *supra*). See also the earlier remarks of G. M. A. Grube in *AJPh* 68, 1947, 211, n. 17 and 214; the book just mentioned on the meaning of *θεῖος* by van Camp and Canart (1502 *supra*); and the book by P. J. G. M. van Litsenburg, *God en het goddelijke . . .* (1253 *supra*), which, though concerned mainly with interpretation of Plato's doctrine, gives some attention in passing to his terminology.

θήρα — θηρευτής

—. W. Schmid, *Die Netze des Seelenfängers: Zur Jagd-metaphorik . . .* (1078 *supra*). Besides C. J. Classen and P. Chantraine, referred to in 1078 *supra*, see also P. Louis, *Les métaphores de Platon* (1066 *supra* [pp. 53—55, p. 75, p. 124, and pp. 161—162]), and H. Cherniss, *Rev Metaphysics* 4, 1950/51, 422—423.

θυμοειδής

— W. Jaeger, A new Greek word in Plato's *Republic* ... (868 *supra*); M. D. C. Tait, Spirit, gentleness and the philosophic nature in the *Republic* (823 *supra* [pp. 207—211]); E. L. Harrison, The origin of θυμοειδής (1315 *supra*).

ιατρική — ιατρός

— F. Wehrli, Der Arztvergleich bei Platon (156 *supra*). See also the earlier article by L. Edelstein, The rôle of Eryximachus ... (917 *supra* [pp. 97—101]).

ιδέα

— See s. v. εἶδος *supra*.

ισονομία — ισόνομος

— G. Vlastos, Isonomia (1676 *supra*). See also in 1676 *supra* the reference to A. A. T. Ehrhardt (1717 *supra*).

ἴσος (ἴσος καὶ ὅμοιος)

— C. Mugler, Platon et la recherche mathématique ... (1426 *supra*), pp. 47—65, pp. 72—77, and pp. 103—108. On this interpretation, the 'evidence' for which is repeated by Mugler in his Dictionnaire historique ... (1873 *supra* [p. 231]), see H. Cherniss, *Rev Metaphysics* 4, 1950/51, 399—404.

ἰσοσκελής

— É. de Strycker, Les nombres scalènes et isocèles (474 *supra*).

κηφήν

— A. Pelletier, L'image du 'frelon' ... (864 *supra*); K. Vretska, *Platonica* (861 *supra* [pp. 418—419]).

κίνδυνος

1889. H. J. Mette, Die 'Große Gefahr', *Hermes* 80, 1952, 409—419. For variations on this theme in Plato see pp. 417—418.

κοινωνεῖν

— J. L. Ackrill, Plato and the copula ... (908 *supra*). See especially p. 5 for Plato's conscious use of this verb, its compounds, and the cognate noun in two different ways to express the general symmetrical notion of 'connectedness' and a determinate non-symmetrical notion, 'sharing in', which he expressed by *μετέχειν* and *μέθεξις* also.

κοσμιότης

— F. Dirlmeier, Beobachtungen ... (1323 *supra* [p. 165]). See also his *Nikomachische Ethik* (1361 *supra* [p. 317]).

κτῆμα

1890. P. Chantraine, Sur l'emploi de *κτῆματα* au sens de 'bétail, cheptel', *Rev Philol* 3 Sér 20, 1946, 5—11. He discusses certain Platonic passages especially in the *Phaedo* and the *Laws* where the word is used in the sense of 'cattle' or 'herd' (as well as some in which it means rather 'goods' in general [p. 9, n. 2]) and the possible origin or origins of this usage.

λογιστική

— É. de Strycker, *La logistique* (484 *supra*).

μαντεύεσθαι

— R. J. Collin, Plato's use of the word *μαντεύομαι* (1352 *supra*). See also the reference in 1352 *supra* to the remarks of N. Gulley (137 *supra* [pp. 75—76]).

μέγεθος

— C. Mugler, *La formule mathématique πλήθει καὶ μεγέθει chez Platon* (1444 *supra*).

μέσον

— O. Luschnat, *Das Problem des ethischen Fortschritts* ... (1874 *supra*).

μετέχειν

— J. L. Ackrill, Plato and the copula . . . (908 *supra*). See also s. v. *κοινωνεῖν supra*.

μοῖρα

— For the expression *θεία μοῖρα* see the references given in 1480 *supra*.

ξύν

— Julia Kerschensteiner, Zum Gebrauch von σύν und ξύν bei Platon (1075 *supra*).

οἰκεῖος

— C. O. Brink, Plato on the natural character of goodness (1576 *supra*).

ὅμοιος

— See the references given *supra* s. v. ἴσος (ἴσος καὶ ὅμοιος). For the meaning of ὅμοιοι ἀριθμοί and ἀριθμῶν ὁμοίωσις (*Epinomis* 990 D) see the discussions listed in items 417—423 *supra*.

ὁμολογία

— G. Bornkamm, 'Ὁμολογία: Zur Geschichte eines politischen Begriffs (1599 *supra*).

ὄναρ — ὀνειρώττειν

— G. J. de Vries, Notes on some passages of the *Cratylus* (351 *supra* [p. 297]).

ὀρεῖχάλκος

— See the references to H. Michell and W. Brandenstein in 393 *supra*.

ὄσιος

— Johanna C. Bolkestein, "Ὄσιος en Ἐὐσεβής . . . (1475 *supra*), pp. 128—145 and pp. 150—156. See also the references given in 1475 *supra* to Chantraine's review, to van der Valk's article in *Mnemosyne*, and to the books by Moulinier and by Ehrhardt.

παράδειγμα

— V. Goldschmidt, Le paradigme dans la dialectique platonicienne (1092 *supra*). See also the two articles by Goldschmidt referred to in 1092 *supra*. For Skemp's contention that 'a complete change in the sense of the word' occurs in the *Politicus* (J. B. Skemp, *Plato's Statesman* [732 *supra*]), pp. 80—82 and pp. 158—162) see G. E. Ī. Owen, *Mind* N. S. 62, 1953, 272 and J. Gould (1567 *supra* [pp. 210—211]); and for the meaning and use of παράδειγμα here (*Politicus* 277—279) see also N. Gulley (1357 *supra* [pp. 208—209]), A. Zadro (306a *supra* [vol. 2, p. 287]), and R. Demos (807 *supra* [pp. 305—306]). On G. Müller's assertion that the word is used in an un-Platonic way in the *Laws* (528 *supra* [p. 104]) see H. Cherniss, *Gnomon* 25, 1953, p. 370.

πλήθος

— C. Mugler, La formule mathématique πλήθει καὶ μεγέθει chez Platon (1444 *supra*).

ποίημα—ποίησις

— A. Ardizzoni, *ΠΟΙΗΜΑ* ... (1830 *supra*).

πόλεμος

— See on this theme: W. Nestle (1613 *supra*), M. Mühl (835 *supra*), G. Murray (1635 *supra*), A. Verdross-Drossberg (1643 *supra* [pp. 110—111 and p. 117] and 1714 *supra* [p. 39]), É. des Places (222 *supra* [pp. 115—132]), R. B. Levinson (28 *supra* [pp. 223—229, pp. 515—516, and pp. 565—570]), D. Loenen (1673 *supra*), A. W. Gomme (1838 *supra* [p. 160, n. 9]), C. J. Despotopoulos (1691 *supra*), R. Weil (1723 *supra* [pp. 50—52]).

προσήγορος

— É. de Strycker, Les quantités en rapport (see in 863 *supra* on *Republic* VIII 546 B—D).

ῥυθμός

1891. E. Benveniste, La notion de rythme dans son expression linguistique, *Journ Psychol Norm et Path* 44, 1951, 401—410. To

Plato's use of *ῥυθμός* for the form of movement in the dance and his association of it with *μέτρον* is here ascribed the transition from the original meaning of 'the momentary form of what is flowing', the meaning which the word had in Ionian atomism.

— J. Dewaele, Une genèse difficile: La notion de 'rythme' (1438 *supra*).

1892. E. Wolf, Zur Etymologie von *ῥυθμός* und seiner Bedeutung in der älteren griechischen Literatur, Wiener Studien 68, 1955, 99—119. For Plato's use of the word, the background of his usage, and its influence see p. 112 and pp. 115—119. This article, based upon an unpublished dissertation of 1947, was written apparently without knowledge of Benveniste's (1891 *supra*), the extreme thesis of which it nevertheless refutes.

σεμνός

1893. G. J. de Vries, *Σεμνός* and cognate words in Plato, Mnem III 12, 1945, 151—156. In the genuine works of Plato these words are used in an ironical or unfavorable sense 28 times and only twice without irony in a favorable sense, whereas in the spurious or doubtful works they occur only once in an ironical sense and six times without irony in a favorable sense.

σκαληνός

— É. de Strycker, Les nombres scalènes et isocèles (474 *supra*).

σκεναστός — σκεῦος

— O. Becker, Über eine schwer erklärbare Stelle ... (849 *supra*), pp. 204—205: die Bedeutung der verwandten aber nicht identischen Wörter *σκεναστόν* und *σκεῦος*.

στοιχεῖον

— H. Koller, Stoicheion (723 *supra*), pp. 164—169. See also his article, Harmonie und Tetraktys (1450 *supra* [p. 247]); and Glotta 38, 1959, 61—64 in his article, Das Modell der griechischen Logik, *ibid.*, pp. 61—74.

1894. R. Cadiou, Atomes et éléments graphiques, Bull Assoc Budé 4 Sér, Octobre 1958, 54—64. This article is concerned chiefly

with Greek reflections on the character and significance of graphic representations of language and has very little to say of the meaning or the use of the term *στοιχεῖον* in Plato.

1895. W. Burkert, *Στοιχεῖον*: Eine semasiologische Studie, *Philologus* 103, 1959, 167—197. For Plato see especially pp. 171—179, p. 192, and p. 197.

σύμμετρος

—. C. Mugler, *Σύμμετρος* chez Platon (1443 *supra*). See also the earlier article, 1050 *supra*, to which Mugler refers in his *Dictionnaire historique* . . . , p. 390, s. v. *σύμμετρος*.

συμφωνεῖν

—. R. Robinson, Plato's earlier dialectic (1133 *supra* [pp. 131—141 = pp. 126—136 of the second edition]). See H.-P. Stahl, *Interpretationen zu Platons Hypothesis-Verfahren* . . . (1172 *supra* [pp. 54—55 and pp. 66—68]).

σύν

—. See s. v. *ξύν* *supra*.

συνήθεια

—. G. Funke, *Gewohnheit* (1578 *supra*), pp. 86—87.

σχέσις

—. C. Mugler, *Ἐξίς, σχέσις et σχῆμα* chez Platon (1446 *supra*).

σχῆμα

—. See s. v. *σχέσις* *supra*.

σωφροσύνη

—. B. Horváth, *Die Gerechtigkeitslehre des Sokrates und des Platon* (1518 *supra*). In opposition to Hirzel he contends that

σωφροσύνη was meant to be intermediate between 'Einzel- und Universal tugend', arising through limitation of the natural tendency of the soul's lowest part and making possible the development of the natural tendencies of its two higher parts.

— J. A. Mourant, Plato's doctrine of temperance (1519 *supra*).

— A. van Bilsen, Plato's *Charmides* en de Sophrosunè; ... De beteekenis van de sophrosunè ... (335 *supra*).

— Valeria Benetti Brunelli, Il pensiero educativo della Grecia (1730 *supra*), pp. 237—289: Platone e l'educazione alla 'sofrosyne'. Here *σωφροσύνη* is interpreted as the very opposite of the heroic ideal of justice which Plato intended to fortify by 'purification'.

— A. Kollmann, Sophrosyne (1539 *supra*).

— K. Marc-Wogau, Der Staat und der Begriff des Guten ... (779 *supra*), p. 33, n. 1. He contends that *σωφροσύνη* and *δικαιοσύνη* express two different moments in the Platonic conception of 'harmony'.

— G. J. de Vries, *Σωφροσύνη* en grec classique (1541 *supra*).

— Helen North, A period of opposition to *Sôphrosynê* in Greek thought (1548 *supra*). See also her later article, The concept of *Sophrosyne* in Greek literary criticism (1805 *supra*).

— C. W. R. Larson, The Platonic synonyms, *δικαιοσύνη* and *σωφροσύνη* (830 *supra*).

— T. G. Tuckey, Plato's '*Charmides*' (338 *supra*). Most of the monograph is concerned with *σωφροσύνη*, of course; but see especially pp. 5—9, pp. 80—95, and pp. 102—104.

— R. Hackforth, Plato's *Phaedrus* (668 *supra*), pp. 47—48. See J. Tate in his review, *Cl Rev N. S.* 5, 1955, 158.

— J. Gould, The development of Plato's ethics (1567 *supra*). See pp. 11—12, pp. 37—41, pp. 97—98, pp. 149—150, and pp. 214—215.

— F. Dirlmeier, Beobachtungen ... (1323 *supra* [p. 165]). See s. v. *κοσμιότης supra*.

— R. Demos, A note on *σωφροσύνη* in Plato's *Republic* (799 *supra*).

— A. E. Raubitschek, Ein neues Pittakeion (1580 *supra*).

1896. A. Pinilla, *Sofrosine: Ciencia de la ciencia*, Madrid 1959. This book is in reality a running commentary on the *Charmides* with the insertion at the end of the penultimate chapter (after the comment on 172 B) of brief supplements (pp. 145—159) on the connection of the *Charmides* with the *Theaetetus* and with the thought of Aristotle.

τραγικός

— T. G. Rosenmeyer, *AJPh* 76, 1955, 226—227 (see 590 *supra*).

τύχη

— Agatha A. Buriks, *Περὶ τύχης* ... (1488 *supra*). For *θέλα τύχη* see also the references given in 1480 *supra*.

ὑβρις

— C. del Grande, *Hybris* ... (1547 *supra*).

ὑπόθεσις

— H.-G. Gadamer, *Platos dialektische Ethik* (710a *supra* [pp. 52—66]).

— J. Stenzel, *Anschauung und Denken* ... (1180b *supra* [pp. 150—153] = *Kleine Schriften*, pp. 326—328).

— A. J. Festugière, *Contemplation et vie contemplative selon Platon* (1190 *supra* [pp. 101—102, pp. 168—171, and pp. 178—179]). See also Festugière's *Hippocrate: L'Ancienne Médecine* (701 *supra* [pp. 25—26]).

— Anna Tumarkin, *Die Methode und die Grenze der Methode bei Plato* ... (841b *supra*).

— R. Robinson, *Plato's earlier dialectic* (1133 *supra* [pp. 97—191 = pp. 93—179 of the second edition, where the original has been somewhat altered]). In the second edition of this book there is added (pp. 223—280) as an extra chapter with the title, *Hypothesis in the Parmenides*, a revised version of Robinson's earlier article, *Plato's Parmenides* (601 *supra*). See also Robinson's later article, *L'emploi des hypothèses selon Platon* (1165 *supra*).

— V. Goldschmidt, *Les Dialogues de Platon* ... (1091 *supra* [pp. 44—48, pp. 117—128, pp. 185—189, pp. 196—197, and p. 200]).

— N. R. Murphy, The interpretation of Plato's *Republic* (791 *supra* [p. 169, n. 2; pp. 177—178; and p. 195]).

— Sir David Ross, Plato's theory of ideas (1236 *supra* [pp. 27—29, pp. 50—52, and pp. 63—65]).

— H. Diller, *Hermes* 80, 1952, 388—391 and 393 in his article, Hippokratische Medizin und Attische Philosophie, *ibid.*, pp. 385—409 (see in 701 *supra*).

— S. Moser, *Theorie und Erfahrung* ... (1159 *supra*).

— M. D. C. Tait, A problem in the method of hypothesis in the *Phaedo* (656 *supra*).

— K. D. Georgoulis, *Der Begriff* ... (845 *supra*).

— R. S. Bluck, Plato's *Phaedo* ... (637 *supra* [pp. 14—16, pp. 160—173, and pp. 201—202]). See with this Bluck's later article, *ὑποθέσεις* in the *Phaedo* and Platonic dialectic (657 *supra*).

— R. Hackforth, Plato's *Phaedo* ... (638 *supra* [pp. 138—143]).

— A. Heijboer, Plato 'Meno' 86 E—87 A (see in 595 *supra*), pp. 90—91 and pp. 105—106.

— K. von Fritz, *Archiv für Begriffsgeschichte* 1, 1955, 37—42 and 4, 1959, 80—81 (846 *supra*); and apropos of the former passage see O. Becker (1176 *supra*).

— J.-H. Kühn, *System- und Methodenprobleme im Corpus Hippocraticum* (704 *supra* [pp. 63—66]).

— H.-P. Stahl, *Interpretationen zu Platons Hypothesis-Verfahren* ... (1172 *supra*).

— M. Vanhoutte, *La méthode ontologique de Platon* (1173 *supra* [pp. 42—48, pp. 58—63, pp. 69—70, pp. 82—83, and pp. 173—175]).

— W. Beierwaltes, *Lux Intelligibilis* ... (1267 *supra* [pp. 57—61]).

— É. de Strycker, *La distinction entre l'entendement (dianoia) et l'intellect (nous) dans la République de Platon* (1174 *supra* [pp. 220—226]).

— C. Axelos, Das Phaenomen des Scheines und der Gedanke der Wahrscheinlichkeit . . . (1508 *supra*).

— A. Szabó, Studi Ital Filol CI 30, 1958, 9—12 (see 846 *supra*).

— O. Becker, Zum platonischen Hypothesis-Begriff (1176 *supra*).

— C. J. Classen, Sprachliche Deutung . . . (1333 *supra* [pp. 72—78]).

φιλολογία — φιλόλογος

1897. G. R. F. M. Nuchelmans, Studien über *φιλόλογος*, *φιλολογία* und *φιλολογεῖν*, Zwolle 1950, pp. 11—14, pp. 59—60, p. 64, and pp. 68—69.

φιλοσοφία — φιλόσοφος

1898. A.-H. Chroust, Philosophy: Its essence and meaning in the ancient world, *Philos Rev* 56, 1947, 19—58. Plato's statements about the meaning and implications of the terms 'philosophy' and 'philosopher' are collected and briefly discussed on pp. 30—36.

— H. Gundert, Enthusiasmus und Logos bei Platon (675 *supra*). On Gundert's thesis here that Plato conceived philosophy to be essentially 'enthusiasm', a *θεία μανία*, see H. W. Meyer's article, Das Verhältnis von Enthusiasmus und Philosophie bei Platon . . . (685 *supra*), and in connection with both these articles H. Flashar, Der Dialog *Ion* . . . (173 *supra*), pp. 121—139: Der Enthusiasmus des Philosophen.

— P. Kucharski, Les chemins du savoir . . . (1148 *supra*), pp. 342—375. In these pages Kucharski tries to show how the conception of 'philosophy' and 'philosopher' changes in the dialogues with what he supposes to be the change in Plato's 'theory of Forms'. See the note on 1110 *supra*.

— M. D. C. Tait, Spirit, gentleness and the philosophic nature . . . (823 *supra*). See especially pp. 207 and 211 for the way in which Plato is supposed to have exploited the conflation of two distinct meanings of *φιλόσοφος*.

— J. Sulliger, Platon et le problème de la communication de la philosophie (454 *supra* [pp. 156—162]).

— G. Semerari, *Filosofia ed esistenza umana in Platone* (69 *supra*).

1899. F. E. Maffei, *Reflexione en torno a Platón: La filosofía como disciplina directora*, *Rev Estudios Cl* 5, 1955, 197—201. Plato is here said to have conceived of philosophy as having a directive function in all forms of activity and so as giving the various sciences their organization and their definite directions as well as being the knowledge on which all are founded.

— J. Pieper, *Über den Philosophie-Begriff Platons* (71 *supra*). See also Pieper's later essay, which is in part a repetition of the earlier one: *Was versteht Platon unter 'Philosophie'* (71a *supra*).

— R. Joly, *Le thème philosophique des genres de vie . . .* (232 *supra*). See especially pp. 70—75, pp. 81—93, pp. 100—101, and p. 189.

— W. Jaeger, *Die Griechen und das philosophische Lebensideal* (1575 *supra*).

— A. Tovar, *El sofista y el filosofo en Platón* (897 *supra*).

1900. A. Alföldi, *Der Philosoph als Zeuge der Wahrheit und sein Gegenspieler der Tyrann*, *Scientiis Artibusque* 1, 1958, 7—19. The climax of the essay (pp. 15—19) emphasizes Plato's part in raising the philosopher to spiritual sovereignty based upon virtue and in forming the conception of him as the martyr in this world to truth and the polar opposite of the tyrant (see 1532 *supra*).

— R. E. Cushman, *Therapeia . . .* (15 *supra*). The whole book is meant to be an 'Augustinian interpretation' of what Plato conceived *φιλοσοφία* to mean (pp. 52—55), but for this see especially pp. 43, 55—59, 162, 187, 227, 242, and 290—291.

— A.-J. Festugière, *Les trois vies* (866 *supra* [pp. 141—143]).

— O. Luschnat, *Das Problem des ethischen Fortschritts . . .* (1874 *supra* [pp. 207—209]).

— J. S. Morrison, *The origins of Plato's Philosopher-Statesman* (1711 *supra*). Having argued for the authenticity of the tale that Pythagoras introduced the term *φιλοσοφία* and its cognates and having reviewed the overtones of these words in their four occurrences before Plato (pp. 207—209), he then traces (pp. 209—212) what he considers to be the history of the implications that they had for Plato, beginning with the 'Socratic philosophia'; and to this

he adds an appendix (pp. 216—218) on 'the Platonic and Isocratean philosophia'.

— C. J. Classen, Sprachliche Deutung . . . (1333 *supra* [pp. 148—150]).

— F. Pérez Ruiz, El concepto de filosofía en los escritos de Platón: Filosofía y sabiduría (1751 *supra*). Of the three chapters which constitute the body of this doctoral dissertation the first attempts to determine the relation of Plato's conception of 'philosophy' and 'the philosopher' to that of knowledge, the second its relation to that of education, and the third its relation to that of truth. The author concludes that Plato had a 'dynamic conception' of philosophy, that such a conception had necessarily to manifest itself in the kind of 'sepsis' which Stefanini thought necessary to account for the content of the dialogues, and that therefore Stefanini's interpretation of Plato's thought and the results of the present investigation confirm each other.

1901. K. Ries, Isokrates und Platon im Ringen um die Philo-
sophia, München 1959 (Diss. München).

1902. C. A. Viano, L'esperienza in Aristotele, Riv Filos 50, 1959, 299—335. See pp. 302—307 for Plato's conception of philosophy in contrast to that of Isocrates; and for the relation between Plato's position and Aristotle's and the development of the latter see pp. 310—324, p. 326, and pp. 332—333.

φόβος

— K. J. Vourveris, θεῖος φόβος (534 *supra*).

— É. de Strycker, Vrees als principe van staatsburgerlijke
tucht . . . (545 *supra*).

φύσις

— See the references in 1381 *supra* to H. Leisegang, E. Frank, E. Grumach, G. R. Morrow, C. A. Disandro, R. Muth, J. Wild, and D. Holwerda; and to these add J. Moreau (La construction . . . [5 *supra*], pp. 477—479), P. Kucharski (1148a *supra* and 1148 *supra* [pp. 3—4, pp. 80—116, and pp. 311—324]), P. Wilpert (111 *supra* [pp. 63—66]), and R. Robinson (354 *supra* [pp. 230—234]).

φντουργός

— J. Moreau, La construction . . . (5 *supra* [p. 350, n. 1 and p. 478]) and L'âme du monde . . . (5 *supra* [p. 44]). This is the type of all interpretations by which *φντουργός* and *δημιουργός* are 'reconciled'. See, however, H. Blumenberg, 'Nachahmung der Natur' . . . (1859 *supra* [p. 272]); and Maria Rezzani, Note e ricerche . . . (1084 *supra* [pp. 9—11]).

χρόρος

— See the references given in 1041 *supra* on *Timaeus* 37 D 1—39 E 2 and Festugière's article (1042 *supra*). For the polemic of Epicurus against Plato's conception of time see the recent article by Barigazzi, who argues that in this polemic Epicurus was dependent upon Aristotle:

1903. A. Barigazzi, Il concetto del tempo nella fisica atomistica, Epicurea in memoriam Hectoris Bignone, Genova 1959, pp. 29—59. See especially pp. 35—49, pp. 52—53, and pp. 57—59.

χώρα

— See among the references given in 1051 *supra* on *Timaeus* 48 E 2—52 D 1 those to A. Rey, T. Negro, C. Mugler, A. J. Festugière, J. W. Yolton, T. Davis, J. Moreau, A. Rivaud, H. Cherniss, and Maria Rezzani; and besides these see also P. Thévenaz (989 *supra* [pp. 109—118]), N. Almberg (992 *supra* [pp. 86—94]), R. Palas (1209 *supra* [pp. 47—49]), W. van der Wielen (113 *supra* [pp. 100—104 and pp. 181—188]), A. Lautman (1382 *supra*), H. Barth (1221 *supra* [pp. 114—117]), P. Friedländer (1001 *supra* [pp. 229—231] = 11a *supra* [pp. 286—289] = 11b *supra* [pp. 249—252]), O. Miró Quesada (1004 *supra*), Sir David Ross (1236 *supra* [pp. 123—127]), G. S. Claghorn (1016 *supra* [pp. 5—19, pp. 25—26, and pp. 36—38]), E. Fink (1022 *supra* [pp. 181—193]), L. Robin (1271 *supra* [pp. 50—61, p. 71, and pp. 73—78]), N. I. Boussoulas (622 *supra*), L. Cencillo (1384 *supra*).

Addenda

Of the works in this supplement some have already been mentioned or have even been discussed under a number to which reference is here made. These are properly 'addenda', however, to earlier sections of the Survey which were completed before they were published or before they became available to me. Others have not previously been mentioned at all, either because of oversight on my part or because they were not published until after completion of the section or sections to which they are relevant.

I purposely refrain from mentioning anything published after 1959; but even at the late date when this is written many serial publications which must have appeared in 1958 and 1959 and some of still earlier date remain unavailable to me, and I am painfully aware that these probably contain pertinent material which deserves mention here but of which I have no knowledge. Even with the addenda here given, therefore, the Survey certainly falls far short of being exhaustive for the fifties or even for the years 1950—1957; and I repeat at the end the warning with which I began: the omission of a title is more probably an indication of my ignorance than a sign of intentional disparagement.

The order in which the following addenda are given is that followed in the body of the Survey.

To the reports of Platonic scholarship which are mentioned at the very beginning (Lustrum 4, pp. 8—9 *supra*) should be added that by D. A. Rees, *Philosophy in the Mid-Century* edited by R. Klibansky (Firenze 1959) 4, 12—39: *Ancient Philosophy*. Here on pp. 19—24 Rees mentions or summarizes 28 books or monographs and 17 articles dealing with Plato, the majority of the former and almost all the latter being works which are written in English.

I. Comprehensive Expositions

1904. A. Freire, *Platão*, Braga 1954. Most of the material in the ten chapters that constitute this small volume had previously appeared in the periodicals, *Brotéria* and *Rev Portuguesa Filos.* They deal chiefly with Plato's conception of god, of the soul, and

of love and with his aesthetic, political, social and educational theories.

1905. A. Tovar, *Un libro sobre Platón*, Madrid 1956 (cf. Alonso del Real, *Cuadernos Hispanoamericanos* 97, Enero 1958, 112—114; Salcedo, *Papeles Son Armadans* 23, 1958, 199—209 [criticizing both this and Tovar's earlier book, *Vida de Sócrates*]). This is an interpretation of Plato's life and thought intended for non-professionals but is on a higher level than Freire's book (1904 *supra*).

1906. E. Topitsch, *Vom Ursprung und Ende der Metaphysik: Eine Studie zur Weltanschauungskritik*, Wien 1958 (cf. N. Bobbio, *Riv Filos* 49, 1958, 551—556; J. Habermas, *Philos Rundschau* 6, 1958, 215—228). See especially pp. 121—135, pp. 151—152, and pp. 286—287 for Plato, whose philosophy is here interpreted as an attempt to overcome the experience of the irrationality of human reality and in particular of social relations by constructing beyond the empirical world, thereby depreciated to the status of superficial appearance, an ideal world of rational value and whose later work is here explained as an elaboration of the sociomorphic and technomorphic interpretations of the cosmos already employed by the Presocratics. On these 'models' of Presocratic cosmology see the contemporary article by Topitsch, *Vom Mythos zur Philosophie*, *Stud Gen* 11, 1958, 12—29.

1907. A. Wedberg, *Filosofiens historie I: Antiken och medeltiden*, Stockholm 1958. Plato is treated along with the Pythagoreans and Eleatics in the second chapter, which deals with religion and mathematics, and along with Socrates and Aristotle in the fourth chapter, which deals with conceptual analysis and definition.

1908. G. E. Bariè e C. Sini, *I Greci e noi*, Milano 1959, pp. 113—145: Platone (with the note on pp. 200—204). Compare Bariè's earlier essay (1146 *supra*).

1909. H. J. Krämer, *Arete bei Platon und Aristoteles: Zum Wesen und zur Geschichte der platonischen Ontologie*, Heidelberg 1959 = *Abhandl Heidelberger Akad, phil-hist Kl*, 1959, 6. This voluminous work is an elaborate attempt to resuscitate the notion that Plato in the Academy taught an esoteric philosophy, to reconstruct this esoteric doctrine chiefly from texts of Aristotle, the Aristotelian commentators, and Sextus Empiricus (this last on the basis of Wilpert's thesis [111 *supra*]), and to interpret the exoteric Plato, i. e. the Platonic dialogues, in the light of this esoteric

doctrine. In the first three chapters of the book this method is applied to the conception of order in the earlier dialogues (pp. 41—145), measure and mean in the later dialogues (pp. 146—243), and the foundation of the doctrine of *μεσότης* in Plato's ontology (pp. 244—379). This part of the work culminates in the statement that 'beyond the mountain-range of Platonic dialogues stands the *Περὶ τὰ γὰρ τοῦ* like a massif towering over them all' . . . remaining 'the unattainable peak of Greek speculation upon *οὐσία* until there arises a late successor to it in the Neo-Platonism of Plotinus'. After this the fourth chapter consists of a defence of the historical reality of an esoteric Platonic philosophy (pp. 380—454), in large part a violent attack upon the two earlier books by H. Cherniss (1218 and 103a *supra*), and a section on the relation between the exoteric and the esoteric Plato (pp. 454—486). This is followed by a chapter on Plato and Parmenides (pp. 487—551) and one on Plato and Aristotle (pp. 552—571).

I A: Accusations of Plato and Responses

- M. Djuric, Was Plato a Machiavellian? (1706 *supra*).

I B: Platonic Interpretation in General

1910. C. Mazzantini, Platone in alcuni suoi recenti interpreti, *Giorn Metafisica* 13, 1958, 477—486. Using the form of a composite review-article Mazzantini here defends and seeks to reinforce his principles of interpreting Plato's philosophy as a dialectic of current appositeness in which the terms metaphysical and political are coessential (see 894 *supra*, to which Mazzantini himself refers at the end of this article [p. 486, n. 13]). Among the modern writings which he makes the occasion for this project are Heidegger's *Platons Lehre von der Wahrheit* (847 *supra*), G. Müller's *Studien zu den platonischen Nomoi* (528 *supra*), a composite review by R. S. Brumbaugh entitled *Plato Studies as Contemporary Philosophy* (*Rev Metaphysics* 6, 1952/53, 315—324), Ross's *Plato's theory of ideas* (1236 *supra*), and an article by I. Mancini, *La struttura dell'essere* (*Giorn Metafisica* 9, 1954, 720—744), in the course of which Mancini had criticized Mazzantini's interpretations of Greek philosophy including that of Plato (see especially pp. 721—724 and pp. 736—741).

II. Plato's Life

— J. Luccioni, *Platon et la mer* (1718 *supra*), pp. 15—20.

II B: Plato's Activity in the Academy

1911. W. R. Corti, *Die platonische Akademie im Wandel der Geschichte und als Aufgabe unserer Zeit*, *Eranos-Jahrbuch* 26, 1957 (Zürich 1958), 387—413.

— K. Gaiser, *Protreptik und Paränese bei Platon* (1101 *supra*). On Plato's 'esoteric' teaching in the Academy see especially pp. 17—20, pp. 198—200, p. 221, and pp. 222—223. Gaiser's book and H. J. Krämer's (1909 *supra*) are elaborations of dissertations from the same school, and each cites the thesis of the other as supporting evidence for its own.

— H. J. Krämer, *Arete bei Platon und Aristoteles . . .* (1909 *supra*). The whole book is concerned in one way or another with Plato's 'esoteric' teaching in the Academy, but see on this topic especially pp. 13—36 and pp. 249—486.

— P. Kucharski, *Les principes des Pythagoriciens et la dyade de Platon* (1287 *supra*), pp. 410—431. See also the other article mentioned in 1287 *supra* which Kucharski published in the same year, *Le 'Philèbe' et les 'Éléments harmoniques' d'Aristoxène* (1980 *infra*), pp. 42—47 and pp. 68—72; and compare with these the contemporaneous article by C. J. de Vogel, *La théorie de l'ἀπειρον chez Platon . . .* (1285 *supra*).

— P.-M. Schuhl, *Une école des sciences politiques* (1722 *supra*).

II C: The Relation of Plato to the Influence of Others

1912. P. Wilpert, *Die philosophische Kritik im Altertum und Mittelalter*, *Stud Gen* 12, 1959, 471—485. See pp. 477—478 for Plato's critique of his predecessors, especially of the sophists, the influence of Empedocles and of Democritus upon him, and for his method of 'immanent criticism'.

Since in the body of the Survey there is recorded no special study of the relations between Plato and Aristophanes, one such

publication, which had previously been overlooked, must here be prefixed to the subsections dealing with particular persons and groups:

1913. M. Andronikos, *Πλάτων καὶ Ἀριστοφάνης*, *ΕΛΛΗΝΙΚΑ* 12, 1952/53, 231—251. After a section on the historical setting the main part of the article is concerned with the relation of the *Phaedo* on the one hand and the *Timaeus* on the other to the *Clouds*.

a) Socrates

1914. E. Wolf, Zur rechtsphilosophischen Interpretation des platonischen Socratesbildes, *Munera Friburgensia* Fr. Pringsheim Oblata = *Ἀρχεῖον Ἰδιωτικοῦ Δικαίου* 16, 1953, 189—219. See E. Wolf, Der sokratische Rechtsgedanke in Platons 'Apologie', ... in Platons 'Kriton' (322 *supra*).

—, F. Pérez Ruiz, El concepto de filosofía en los escritos de Platón ... (1751 *supra*). See especially pp. 49—51, pp. 77—80, pp. 122—124, and pp. 141—142.

h) Damon

—, J. S. Morrison, The origins of Plato's Philosopher-Statesman (1711 *supra*), pp. 204—206.

i) Democritus

—, W. Capelle, Farbenbezeichnungen bei Theophrast (2001 *infra*).

—, S. Sambursky, A Democritean metaphor in Plato's *Kratylos* (1936 *infra*).

n) Gorgias

1915. V. di Benedetto, Il *περὶ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος* di Gorgia e la polemica con Protagora, *Rend Accad Lincei, Cl Scienze Mor* 8 Ser 10, 1955, 287—307. The article contains general remarks on Plato's attitude towards the two sophists. Specifically di Benedetto contends that Gorgias wrote his monograph against the *περὶ τοῦ ὄντος* of Protagoras, itself a polemic against the Eleatics which Plato employed in the second part of the *Parmenides* where he put its anti-Eleatic arguments into the mouth of Parmenides, and that

in the *Sophist* the first five 'definitions' are meant to refer to Protagoras and the doctrine of non-being is established in opposition to him. On the apparent discrepancy in the assertions about Gorgias in *Gorgias* 459 C—460 A and *Meno* 95 C see pp. 305—306.

—, Maria Rezzani, Note e ricerche intorno al linguaggio di Platone (1084 *supra*), pp. 14—16 and pp. 34—35 especially.

o) Heraclitus

1916. R. Mondolfo, El flujo universal en Heráclito y el simbolo del rio, *Cultura Universitaria* (Caracas) 68/69, julio-diciembre 1959, 29—40. Mondolfo here undertakes to restate and reinforce the interpretation that he had given in 197 *supra* and had defended in 165 and 165a *supra*. On Plato and the Heraclitean 'flux' see pp. 29—30, p. 36, and pp. 37—38.

1917. R. Mondolfo, La conflagración universal en Heráclito, *Philosophia* (Mendoza) 23, 1959, 14—25. Here Mondolfo renews his campaign to ascribe to Heraclitus the doctrine of the *ἐκπύρωσις*, and in an apostilla (pp. 24—25) replies to the criticism of his argument by G. S. Kirk in *Phronesis* 4, 1959, 73—76 (see 198 *supra*).

1918. L. Sichirolo, Per una interpretazione della dossografia platonica: Eraclito in Platone, *Pensiero* 4, 1959, 313—327.

q) Homer

1919. H. Kleinknecht, Platonisches im Homer: Eine Interpretation von Odyssee XIII 187—354, *Gymnasium* 65, 1958, 59—75. With the extravagance of Proclus at his worst Kleinknecht interprets these lines in terms of Plato's epistemology; and, though only hinting at the consequences implied for the historical growth of Platonic philosophy, he concludes that there is in this scene 'eine Weise und eine "Bewegung des Erkennens" gedichtet die eine Art präformierter Platonismus ist'. Compare the notion of J. A. Notoopoulos (1269 *supra*) concerning Homer's generic expression of experience and H. Fränkel's (223 *supra*) that Pindar anticipated 'Platons Ideendenken'.

r) Isocrates

—, J. S. Morrison, The origins of Plato's Philosopher-State-man (1711 *supra*). See p. 210 and especially pp. 216—218: The Platonic and Isocratean philosophia.

—. K. Ries, Isokrates und Platon im Ringen um die *Philosophia* (1901 *supra*).

—. C. A. Viano, L'esperienza in Aristotele (1902 *supra*), pp. 302—307.

s) Orphics

—. J. K. Feibleman, Religious Platonism ... (1514 *supra*), pp. 47—66: The influence of Orphism.

1920. R. Turcan, L'âme-oiseau et l'eschatologie orphique, *Rev Hist Religions* 155, 1959, 33—40. He contends that the conception of the soul as a winged bird is Orphic and that Plato in taking it over for the myth of the *Phaedrus* consciously 'transposed' the Orphic eschatology by substituting for the theosophic content of the imagery an intellectual and moral content.

t) Parmenides

1921. A. Breuninger, *Parmenides und der frühe Platon*, Tübingen 1958 (Diss. Tübingen). It is the purpose of this dissertation to establish the unity of the early dialogues by making the Parmenidean ontology, the Parmenidean 'Konversion auf das Sein hin', the decisive influence from the beginning in determining Plato's representation of Socrates and in orienting his reflection upon the method and the object of the Socratic elenchus. Written in the same school as the dissertations of K. Gaiser (1101 *supra*) and of H. J. Krämer (1909 *supra*), whose help the author acknowledges, the thesis here defended is supplementary to theirs; and the essence of it, Plato as Eleatic ontologist from the beginning, is in fact defended by Krämer himself in the fifth chapter of his book:

—. H. J. Krämer, *Arete bei Platon und Aristoteles* ... (1909 *supra*), pp. 487—551: Platon und Parmenides.

v) Protagoras

—. V. di Benedetto, *Il περὶ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος* di Gorgia e la polemica con Protagora (1915 *supra*).

w) Pythagoreans

1922. V. Capparelli, *Il tenore di vita pitagorico ed il problema della omoiosis*, Padova 1958. A modern 'Pythagorean' himself,

Capparelli believes that everything of Plato's from the *Phaedo* onwards and especially, of course, the *Timaeus* is Pythagorean. See, for example, pp. 17—23, pp. 33—35, and pp. 46—47.

— J. S. Morrison, The origins of Plato's Philosopher-Statesman (1711 *supra*). Besides the main body of the article with the résumé of it published in the preceding year (105 *supra*) see Appendix B, pp. 213—216: Archytas and Plato.

1923. M. Detienne, Sur la démonologie de de l'ancien pythagorisme, *Rev Hist Religions* 155, 1959, 17—32. See particularly p. 20, p. 22, and pp. 29—32 for his conception of the relation of Plato's theory of the *δαίμων* to that of the early Pythagoreans.

1924. H. Kayser, Die Harmonie der Welt, *Eranos-Jahrbuch* 27, 1958 (Zürich 1959), 425—451. See pp. 432—433, p. 440, and pp. 449—451 for Plato, who is said to have turned in his old age to the Pythagoreans because he saw that their harmonical theorems and philosophemes provided his theory of ideas with the objective support that could not be obtained within a merely dialectical framework.

— L. Rougier, La religion astrale des Pythagoriciens (1334 *supra*).

— S. Sambursky, A Democritean metaphor in Plato's *Kratylos* (1936 *infra*).

x) Thucydides

— N. Scholl, Der platonische *Menexenos* (1721 *supra*), pp. 89—92 and pp. 99—117. Compare with this the few remarks by R. Weil in his monograph, L'archéologie de Platon (1723 *supra*), p. 26.

y) Oriental Influence

1925. A. N. Marlow, Hinduism in Plato, *Proc Cl Assoc* 49, London 1952, p. 24. In this summary half a dozen 'parallels to the *Upanishads*' in Plato are listed, and it is assumed that these indicate influence of the former upon the latter. On the image of the charioteer and team in the *Phaedrus* and in the *Katha Upanishad* see P. Friedländer, Plato I (11 b *supra*), p. 193.

— J. Ferguson, Moral values in the ancient world (1582 *supra*).

III A: Transmission of the Text and Indirect Tradition

1926. P.-M. Schuhl, La transmission de l'oeuvre de Platon, Encyclopédie Française 19 (Philosophie: Religion), Paris 1957, pp. 20/13—20/15. This brief account of the history and the problems of the Platonic text is part of an article by Schuhl entitled Transmission, établissement, édition des textes philosophiques, *ibid.*, pp. 20/12—22/2.

1927. É. des Places, Les citations de Platon chez les Pères, Texte und Untersuchungen zur Geschichte der althechristlichen Literatur 64 (5. Reihe 9), 1957, 340—341. These two pages are merely an introduction to the material published by des Places in the articles listed as items 268, 270, 271, and 272 *supra*.

1928. (Philebus) Damascius: Lectures on the *Philebus* wrongly attributed to Olympiodorus, Text, Translation, Notes and Indices by L. G. Westerink, Amsterdam 1959. The editor of the commentaries on *Alcibiades* I by Proclus and by Olympiodorus has here made available for the first time a critical text and therewith succinct exegetical notes and an illuminating translation of the Neo-Platonic commentary hitherto printed only in an unsatisfactory condition as an adjunct to the rare edition of the *Philebus* by Stallbaum (Leipzig 1820 and 1826).

—. To 284 *supra*, the list of Platonic papyri given by R. A. Pack, add the following: *Euthyphro* 2A1—C4 (Pap Soc Ital 1392 [Vol. 14, 1957, pp. 67—68]), *Phaedo* 96D8—E9 (Pap Soc Ital 1393 [Vol. 14, 1957, pp. 69—70]), *Sophist* 223E4—224A2 and 224B1—3 (Pap Hibeh 228 [see 904 *supra*]). Prof. E. G. Turner, calling my attention to these, also informs me that the following, which have not yet been published, will soon appear: *Phaedrus* 257D (Pap Antinoopolis II, 77), *Theaetetus* 143C—145D (Pap Antinoopolis II, 78), *De Justo* 372A (Pap Antinoopolis II, 79), and *Politicus* 257, 261, 262 (Pap Oxy XXVII, 2468).

III B: Authenticity and Chronology

1929. R. Böhme, Von Sokrates zur Ideenlehre: Beobachtungen zur Chronologie des platonischen Frühwerks, Bern 1959 (cf. A. Plebe, Riv Filolog Cl N.S. 37, 1959, 409—413). For Böhme's thesis see Lustrum 4, 1959, 250, n. 2. Böhme's monograph was

published almost simultaneously with the edition of the *Gorgias* by E. R. Dodds, for whose dating of the dialogue see 1951 *infra*.

— H. Kesters, *Plaidoyer d'un Socratique contre le Phèdre de Platon* . . . (1975 *infra*).

III C: Editions, Commentaries, Interpretations of the Writings Themselves

a) To the translations of selected writings significant for their introductory essays, such as those listed in 307 and 308 *supra*, should be added the two volumes by F. Adorno, whose anthology of 'political' passages was mentioned in this section (309a *supra*):

— Opere politiche di Platone a cura di F. Adorno, Vol. I (*Repubblica, Timeo, Crizia*) and Vol. II (*Politico, Leggi*), Torino 1953 and 1958 (1169a *supra*). For the introductions to these two volumes see the note on 1169 *supra* and the review of the first volume by D. Pesce, *Atene e Roma* N. S. 1956, 71—75 in his critique, *Alcuni recenti interpretazioni della 'Repubblica' platonica*, *ibid.*, pp. 65—79 (see 804 *supra*).

b) In supplementing here the list of editions and translations of the several works I omit as I did in the body of the Survey the many 'school editions' and translations that neither make nor pretend to make any contribution to the advancement of Platonic scholarship.

Apology

α

1930. Platone: *L'Apologia di Socrate*, Commento e note di N. Casini, Firenze 1957. Though the editor disclaims any originality for his text and commentary, this book is worthy of mention because of the attention given in the introduction, notes, and appendices to historical and legal questions, in his study of which Casini had the help of the editors of the series, V. Arangio-Ruiz and U. E. Paoli.

β

— G. Nussbaum, Socrates' educational method in the *Apology* (1747 *supra*).

1931. W. Kendall, The people *versus* Socrates revisited, *Modern Age* 3, 1958/59, 98—111. In opposition to the modern 'liberal' interpretation of the *Apology* and the *Crito* as evidence of Plato's adherence to the ideal of freedom of speech Kendall contends that the former shows why the Athenians had to act they did and the latter why Socrates had to do as he did.

γ

1932. On 21 A: E. Orth, *Helmantica* 6, 1955, 69 (in his article, *Varia Critica*, *ibid.*, pp. 69—79).

Axiochus

β

1933. B. Wiśniewski, Prodicus et Épicure, *Ant Cl* 25, 1956, 32—40. Chiefly on the basis of the *Axiochus* he argues that the notions of Prodicus and of Epicurus concerning the fear of death were similar and that both had the same end in view though they had different conceptions of the way in which men were to be freed from fear. The whole construction depends upon unquestioned acceptance of the invalid conclusions concerning Prodicus in the book by E. Dupréel (151 *supra*).

Charmides

β

—, A. Pinilla, *Sofrosine: Ciencia de la ciencia* (1896 *supra*).

Clitophon

β

—, H. Kesters, Plaidoyer d'un Socratique contre le *Phèdre* de Platon . . . (1975 *infra*), pp. 125—139 and p. 143.

Cratylus

β

1934. J. Lecerf, Remarques sur le '*Cratyle*' de Platon et la grammaire générale, *Mélanges Louis Massignon* III, Damas 1957,

pp. 37—43. This has little or nothing to do with the *Cratylus* itself but is concerned with the modern survival of the controversy as to whether language is *νόμος* or *φύσει* and with the attempt to find in Arabic a link connecting the Greek and the modern tradition of the question.

1935. V. Li Carrillo, Platón, Hermogenes y el lenguaje, Lima 1959. This is mainly an interpretation of the 'conventionalist' theory of language in the *Cratylus* and of Plato's refutation of it by assimilating it to the doctrine of Protagoras, a refutation leading to the establishment of an absolute entity as norm of things and actions and thus giving a point of departure for the theory of ideal language. The 'conventionalist' theory, from which the modern theory of language derives, is according to Li Carrillo the negation of the Greek conception of the essence of speech.

γ

— On 412 C—413 C: R. Mondolfo, La conflagración universal en Heráclito (1917 *supra*). This is to be added to 197 and 198 *supra*.

1936. On 420 D 3—E 4: S. Sambursky, A Democritean metaphor in Plato's *Kratylos*, *Phronesis* 4, 1959, 1—4. Contending that in the etymology of *ἐξούσιον* given in this passage Plato alludes to an expression of Democritus, Sambursky then connects the passage with Pythagorean maxims concerning *ἀνάγκη* and *ἐξούσιον* and concludes: 'The generation of harmony out of the free play of atomic motions *in vacuo* embodies for the Plato of the *Kratylos* the realization of the Pythagorean principle of *ἐξούσιον*. The Plato of the *Timaeus*, however, by a process of sublimation has substituted for the physical antithesis of Democritus a metaphysical one of his own—the conflict between Necessity and Reason which, in a never ending process, is slowly won by Reason through the constructive medium of persuasion'.

— On 424 B 7—C 3: W. Burkert, *Philologus* 103, 1959, 178 in his article, *Στοιχειῖον* . . . (1895 *supra*).

Critias

α

— Opere politiche di Platone a cura di F. Adorno (1169a *supra*), I, pp. 709—737: Crizia. See pp. 65—67 of the Introduction to this volume of the translation.

β

1937. L. Sprague de Camp, *Lost Continents: The Atlantis theme in History, Science and Literature*, New York 1954 (cf. R. Furon, *Rev Hist Sciences et Applications* 8, 1955, 189—190).

1938. G. Manganaro, *Il mito dell'Atlantide e la logografia ionica (La visione geopolitica di Platone)*, *Giorn Ital Filol* 12, 1959, 309—313. This is an attempt to reinforce and to make more concrete the thesis defended by M. Pallottino (381 *supra*) and C. Corbato (387 *supra*). Manganaro holds that Plato constructed the myth of Atlantis by reworking motifs of Ionic logography and amalgamating them with mythological motifs in order to give expression to a political need of his own by projecting into the past a contemporary reality, the confrontation of Greek Italy and Sicily with the Punic civilization.

Crito

 α

1939. Platone: *Critone* a cura di N. Casini, Firenze 1959. This, though an edition intended for schools, is like Casini's edition of the *Apology* (1930 *supra*) worthy of notice because of its Introduction.

 β

1940. A. W. Gomme, *The structure of Plato's Crito*, *Greece and Rome* 2 Ser 5, 1958, 45—51. Holding that this alone of Plato's dialogues is a *μίμησις πράξεως*, Gomme analyses its structure from this point of view.

— W. Kendall, *The people versus Socrates revisited* (1931 *supra*).

1941. D. S. Constantopoulos, *L'autonomie du droit et la loi dans la Grèce des cités (5^e siècle avant J. C.)*, *Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilos* 45, 1959, 55—80. On the *Crito* and the teaching of Socrates see pp. 68—72.

Epigrams

 β

1942. H. von den Steinen, *Die Epigramme Platos*, *Bull Fac Arts Cairo, Fouad I Univ*, 15, 1, 1953, 1—13. The author of two

earlier articles on the Egyptian inspiration of Plato (247 *supra*) here exercises his imagination in an attempt to interpret as expressions of Platonic philosophy the 32 epigrams ascribed to Plato, fourteen of which he translates into German verse at the end of the essay.

Epinomis

β

1943. O. Specchia, Introduzione all' '*Epinomis*' (XIII libro delle *Leggi* di Platone), Giorn Ital Filol 12, 1959, 231—257. The purpose of this article is to prove that Plato was the author of the *Epinomis*. It amounts to a review of the arguments hitherto advanced in favor of authenticity and against it, though some of the latter have been overlooked and the force of others unduly minimized; and it cannot be said that Specchia has here provided either new evidence or new clarification of the old evidence bearing on the question.

Epistles (General)

β

1944. M. Fernandez Galiano, Los problemas de autenticidad de la literatura griega, Rev Universidad Madrid 1, 1952, 213—238. The collection of letters ascribed to Plato is here taken as one among seven examples of Greek writings, four of them collections of letters, the authenticity of which has been the subject of scholarly controversy. The author discusses the internal and external criteria employed, the hypercritical and hypertolerant attitudes taken, and the emotional factor involved in the debate about these problems.

Epistle VII

β

1945. A. Llanos, La séptima carta de Platón, Rev Educación (La Plata) 4/2, 1959, 290—295. I have been unable to procure a copy of this article.

Euthyphro

 β

1946. M. Philibert, *Euthyphron*, Rev Hist et Philos Religieuses 36, 1956, 136—146. He maintains that the apparently negative result, while a dialectical form habitual to Plato, is especially appropriate to a dialogue on piety because of the ambiguity of the term and the stimulation thus afforded and that the frustration of the search is meant to recall the defeat of Socrates in his mission and his consequent death.

1947. E. Lledó Iñigo, La estructura dialéctica del *Eutifrón* platónico, Rev Filos (Madrid) 17, 1958, 363—393. The dialogue is here analysed as the context in which for the first time and 'before Plato had explicitly established his theory of ideas' there appears the term *idéa*—with *εἶδος* as a synonym of it—in the sense of 'an ideal norm, regulatory and determinative, abstract and immutable' in opposition to 'the individualistic and dynamic conception of Euthyphro'.

1948. G. Reale, *L'Eutifronte*: Il concetto del santo e la prima teoria platonica delle idee, Riv Filos Neoscolastica 51, 1959, 311—333.

Gorgias

 α

1949. Platón: *Gorgias*, Texto griego, traducción y notas por J. Calonge Ruiz, Madrid 1951 (cf. M. F. Galiano, Emerita 20, 1952, 223—227).

1950. Platone: *Gorgia*, Traduzione, introduzione e commento di V. Arangio-Ruiz, Firenze 1958.

1951. Plato: *Gorgias*, A revised text with introduction and commentary by E. R. Dodds, Oxford 1959. This is a work of primary importance which should replace all earlier editions of the *Gorgias* and be the point of departure for any future discussion of the dialogue. It contains a text based upon an independent collation of the MSS followed by a full commentary on all aspects of the dialogue with an appendix on Socrates, Calicles, and Nietzsche and preceded by an introduction in which besides the evidence for the text (see also the earlier article [274 *supra*]) Dodds discusses the subject and structure of the dialogue, its personages and 'period',

its relative and absolute date (about 387—385 after the *Euthydemus* and just before the *Menexenus* and *Meno*), and Plato's attitude towards Athens.

Hippias Major

β

1952. G. E. Mueller, Unity of the Platonic *Hippias Major*, *CI Bull* 32, 1955/56, 37—40. He argues that the apparent theme, the beautiful, is merely taken as the occasion for the real theme, which is philosophical reflection as such. The article is criticized by R. G. Hoerber, *CI Bull* 32, 1955/56, 69, for whose earlier article on the dialogue see 492 *supra*.

1953. Ch. I. Karouzos, τί τὸ κάλλιστον, *ΕΛΛΗΝΙΚΑ* 15, 1957, 286—292. On the relation to this traditional question of the question of Socrates, τί τὸ καλόν; and against K. Reinhardt (Parmenides..., pp. 250ff.) on the use of τὸ . . . for 'abstractions'.

γ

1954. On 288B8: E. Kapp, *Hermes* 87, 1959, 130—131. He corrects *θήλεια* to *Ἡλεία*.

Hippias Minor

β

1955. A. Guzzo, Logos, dialogue, dialectique et le divin Ulysse, *Φιλοσοφικὸν συνέδριον Ἀθηνῶν* (Entretiens philosophiques d'Athènes 2—6 avril 1955: Dialogue et Dialectique), Institut Internat de Philosophie 1956, pp. 84—94. See the following item (1956 *infra*).

1956. A. Guzzo, La parole et le divin Ulysse, *Études Philos* N. S. 13, 1958, 161—171. See 1955 *supra*. According to Guzzo Plato's 'defence' of Odysseus is a return to Homer's conception of Odysseus and this corresponds to the courageous and the prudent man of the early dialogues, one who knows what danger is and how to conquer or avoid it and who, knowing the truth, knows how in prudence or pity to vary the expression of it or to be silent. The conclusion of the *Hippias Minor*, Guzzo contends, is combined with that of the *Gorgias* in the *Phaedrus*, where rhetoric is said to become a true art when the orator by means of dialectic knows what kind of discourse to use on what kind of man, for, though dialectic is unlike Odysseus in that it always knows and tells the

truth without consideration of circumstances, Plato is the philosopher not of dialectic alone but also of dialogue fitted to the character and the comprehension of his interlocutors, the philosopher who would train his warriors to have rational courage in the manner of Odysseus.

Ion

β

1957. G. Galli, Socrate ed alcuni dialoghi platonici, Torino 1958, pp. 219—244: *Il Ione*. The original version of this article, which I have been unable to procure, is said to have appeared in an issue of *Il Saggiatore* in 1956. The other articles on Platonic dialogues, revised forms of which are published in this volume of Galli's, are items 320, 470, 509, 577, and 921 *supra*.

1958. E. A. Wyller, Platons 'Ion': Versuch einer Interpretation, *Symbol Osl* 34, 1958, 19—38. This article presents the essence of the interpretation given by Wyller in the commentary appended to his translation of the dialogue into Norwegian, Platons dialog *Ion*, Oslo 1958 (cf. D. Føllesdal, *Gnomon* 31, 1959, 281). He analyses the structure of the dialogue in terms of a 'magnetic field' and argues that the principal subject is the nature of the rhapsode and that, since rhapsodes are defined as ἐρμηνέων ἐρμηνῆς, the theme of the exposition must be ἐρμηνεία and in this context the relation between τέχνη and ἐνθουσιασμός.

Laws

α

—. Opere politiche di Platone a cura di F. Adorno (1169a *supra*), II, pp. 179—685: *Le Leggi*. In the Introduction to this volume of the translation see on the *Laws* especially pp. 26—51.

β

—. H. Knoth, Platon im Lichte lebensnaher Pädagogik (1738 *supra*).

—. F. Adorno, Dialettica e politica in Platone: Saggio sul 'Politico' e sulle 'Leggi' (1169 *supra*).

—. C. J. Despotopoulos, La guerre chez Platon et chez Hegel (1691 *supra*).

— F. Egermann, *Platonische Spätphilosophie und Platonismen bei Aristoteles* (1581 *supra*).

— J. E. Rexine, *Religion in Plato and Cicero* (1516 *supra*).

— R. Weil, *L'archéologie de Platon* (1723 *supra*), pp. 34—54: *Les Lois*.

γ

— On I 643 B4—D4: H. D. Rankin, *Toys and education in Plato's Laws* (1748 *supra*).

— On Book III (676 A—702 E): R. Weil, *L'archéologie de Platon* (1723 *supra*), pp. 55—158: *Commentaire du livre III des Lois*.

1959. On IV 704 A—707 C: C. Macdonald, *Cl Rev N. S.* 9, 1959, 108—109. Against Toynbee's suggestion that this passage is an intentional rebuttal of the Funeral Speech of Pericles Macdonald argues that the similarity between Plato's remarks here and the 'Old Oligarch' shows that both are expressing conservative prejudices that go well back into the fifth century.

— On IV 706 A—707 D: R. Weil, *L'archéologie de Platon* (1723 *supra*), pp. 159—164.

— On VII 819 A 8—C 7: E. M. Bruins, *Platon et la table égyptienne 2/n* (1445 *supra*).

1960. On X 891 E—908 C: F. Solmsen, *Textprobleme im zehnten Buch der platonischen Nomoi*, *Studien zur Textgeschichte und Textkritik* hrsg von H. Dahlmann und R. Merkelbach, Köln-Opladen 1959 (Günther Jachmann . . . gewidmet), pp. 265—277. The passages here discussed and emended are the following: 891 E 7 (p. 266), 893 C 3—4 (p. 267, n. 4), 893 D 8 (p. 267), 894 C 4—5 (p. 268), 894 E 1 (pp. 268—269), 897 B 8—C 1 (p. 269), 897 E 5 (pp. 269—270), 900 A 4 (pp. 270—271), 901 C 2—6 (p. 271), 903 E 6 (p. 272), 904 A 8 (pp. 272—273), 904 C 6—E 3 (pp. 273—275), 906 C 8—D 4, i. e. 906 D 2 (pp. 275—276), 908 A 5—7 (p. 277, n. 20), 908 B 4—C 6, i. e. 908 C 1—2 (pp. 276—277).

Lysis

β

1961. R. G. Hoerber, *Plato's Lysis*, *Phronesis* 4, 1959, 15—28. Holding that the content of the dialogue is 'more positive and com-

prehensive' than generally supposed and that this is to be seen by observing the interplay of dramatic technic and philosophic content, he tries to show that the use of 'triads' in the work is symbolic of the three aspects of *φιλία*, this 'triad of *φιλία*' being manifest not only in the *Lysis* but also in the *Laws*, the *Symposium*, and the *Phaedrus*, to the unity of which last it is also the clue.

Menexenus

β

— N. Scholl, Der platonische *Menexenos* (1721 *supra*).

Meno

α

1962. Platón: *Menón*, Edición bilingüe por A. Ruiz de Elvira, Madrid 1958. This edition is of importance chiefly for the use made of Vindobonensis 21 in establishing the text and for the editor's study of the textual tradition and the history of the Latin translations of the dialogue.

β

1963. G. Drago, Lettura del 'Menone', *Humanitas* (Brescia) 12, 1957, 707—713. Drago regards the dialogue as an expression of the advanced social conception of the accessibility of truth and virtue to all human beings regardless of birth and class; but he believes that Plato, though unable to close his eyes to the social aspects of the question, was not yet able to see all the consequences implied and to recognize the inhuman indolence of a society that supports itself on slavery.

γ

— On 82 B—85 E: A. Szabó, *Maia N. S.* 10, 1958, 109—114 in his article, *Δείκνυμι* als mathematischer Terminus für 'Beweisen', *ibid.*, pp. 106—131 (see 854 *supra* for pp. 123—124 of this article).

— On 86 D—87 B: O. Becker, Zum platonischen Hypothesis-Begriff (1176 *supra*).

Parmenides

 β

— V. di Benedetto, *Il περὶ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος* di Gorgia e la polemica con Protagora (1915 *supra*). On the *Parmenides* see especially p. 295 and pp. 297—299.

— W. F. Lynch, An approach to the metaphysics of Plato through the *Parmenides* (1288 *supra*).

1964. W. G. Runciman, Plato's *Parmenides*, Harvard Studies in Class Phil 64, 1959, 89—120. It is here argued that the dialogue contains no fundamental modification of the theory of ideas but does express Plato's recognition of serious difficulties involved in the theory and that the second part, though containing no exposition of metaphysical doctrine, is meant not merely to recommend dialectical training but to indicate that ideas are not definable by deduction from existential hypotheses and so to prepare the way for a new method (i. e. diaeresis) which will define them by determining their relations to one another. The earlier interpreters of the dialogue whose views are here most seriously scrutinized are R. Robinson (601 *supra*), R. Scoon (602 *supra*), A. L. Peck (615 *supra*), and G. Ryle (in his earlier article, *Mind* N. S. 48, 1939, 129—151 and 302—325).

1965. A. Speiser, Ein Parmenideskommentar: Studien zur platonischen Dialektik (Zweite, erweiterte Auflage), Stuttgart 1959. The first section of this edition, the 'Parmenideskommentar' proper (pp. 9—72), is a reprint of the earlier monograph with the same title (see in 610 *supra*), but Speiser has now added as the most appropriate introduction to what he considers Plato's way of thinking a new section, Fichtes Wissenschaftslehre von 1804 (pp. 73—106).

 γ

1966. On 132A—B and 132D—133A: R. Juárez-Paz, Vlastos, Sellars y el 'tercer hombre' en el Parménides: Notas sobre una polémica, *Rev Psicología General y Aplicada* 14, 1959, 21—32. I have been unable to procure a copy of this article, which obviously deals with items 625 and 626 *supra*.

— On 134A—B: W. Bröcker, *Hermes* 87, 1959, 420 in his article, Platons ontologischer Komparativ (1385 *supra*). He treats the logic of this passage as showing that Plato was troubled because he had no conception of 'innere Wahrnehmung'.

1967. On 137 E3—4: J. Tréheux, *Επιπροσθεῖν*, *Rev Ét Grecques* 70, 1957, 356—360. This is a refutation of C. Mugler's attempt (631 *supra*; see 1447 *supra* and 1873 *supra* [p. 195]) to read this word into the passage.

1968. On 156 C—157 A: J. Thyssen, Platons *ἐξαιρήτης* und das Problem der historischen Krise, *Kant-Studien* 50, 1958/59, 391—394. Thyssen, connecting this passage with *Epistle* VII 341 C 5—D 2, discusses its relevance to the question how and when an historical movement becomes an actuality with force enough to determine subsequent events. Thyssen's remarks were occasioned by a reference made to the passage in an article by G. Beyerhaus, *Notwendigkeit und Freiheit in der deutschen Katastrophe* (*Hist Zeitschr* 169, 1949, 73—87), towards the end of which (pp. 85—86) Plato's formula is interpreted as an expression of what is indeterminate, latent, and incalculable in an historical crisis.

Phaedo

β

1969. R. G. Turnbull, Aristotle's debt to the 'Natural Philosophy' of the *Phaedo*, *Philos Quart* 8, 1958, 131—143. The thesis that Aristotle appropriated certain doctrines of causality presented in the *Phaedo* is based upon what the author himself calls an unorthodox interpretation of this dialogue. According to this interpretation individuals, characters, and ideas are sharply distinguished from one another, characters being ontologically dependent upon both the other two which are themselves both equally ultimate, the character 'instancing' the idea in the individual in consequence of the individual's striving to attain the idea and there being as a necessary corollary no place in the theory of the dialogue for ideas of 'substances'.

γ

1970. On 66 B 1—C 2: P. Courcelle, 'Trames Veritatis': La fortune patristique d'une métaphore platonicienne, *Mélanges offerts à Étienne Gilson de l'Académie Française*, Paris 1959, pp. 203—210.

—. On 79 A 6—B 17: W. Bröcker, *Hermes* 87, 1959, 419—420 in his article, *Platons ontologischer Komparativ* (1385 *supra*).

1971. On 82 E—83 E: P. Courcelle, La colle et le clou de l'âme dans la tradition néo-platonicienne et chrétienne (*Phédon* 82 E; 83 D), *Rev Belge Philol* 36, 1958, 72—95.

— On 103 C 10—105 E 6: W. Bröcker, *Hermes* 87, 1959, 423 in his article, Platons ontologischer Komparativ (1385 *supra*).

Phaedrus

α

1972. Platón: *Fedro*, Edición bilingüe, traducción, notas y estudio preliminar por L. Gil Fernández, Madrid 1957. The editor here gives a text of his own based upon study of recent scholarship, and in his apparatus he has recorded the points of disagreement among modern editors of the dialogue. The preliminary study is especially concerned to demonstrate the unity of the dialogue by analysing the various themes in relation to the central purpose but it also includes competent sections on other relevant matters such as the date of composition, the dramatic date and setting, and the history of the dialogue's later influence.

β

1973. L. Gil, De nuevo sobre el '*Fedro*', *Emerita* 26, 1958, 215—221. This supplement to Gil's earlier article (684 *supra*) contains substantial notes on 274 D 4 (pp. 215—219) and 275 C 8—D 2 (pp. 219—220) and ends with brief notes on 249 A 4—5, 267 B 10—C 3, and 272 C 2, all three in disagreement with the treatment of these passages by Verdenius (683 *supra*).

— A. Guzzo, La parole et le divin Ulysse (1956 *supra*). See also 1955 *supra*.

1974. Maryse Maciel, A retorica isocrática no *Fedro* de Platón, *Doxa* (Pernambuco) 4 no. 7, Dezembro 1958, 47—59. I have been unable to procure a copy of this article.

1975. H. Kesters, Plaidoyer d'un Socratique contre le *Phèdre* de Platon: XXVI^e Discours de Thémistius, Louvain/Paris 1959 (cf. F. Petit, *Recherches Théol Ancienne et Méd* 26, 1959, 343—346). Kesters here revives and tries to fortify the thesis which he had espoused a quarter of a century ago that the twenty-sixth oration of Themistius, a critical text and translation of which he now

publishes at the end of this volume (pp. 219—279), is essentially the work of an anonymous Socratic (whom he had previously identified as Antisthenes), a discourse written as an attack upon Plato's *Phaedrus* in its original form, and that the conclusion of the *Phaedrus* as it now exists (272 Bff.) was subsequently added to the dialogue by Plato as a reply to this attack, as rejoinders to which from the 'ethico-dialectical' and political points of view respectively the *Clitophon* and *Republic* V—VII were also composed, these three books of the *Republic* being inserted between two parts of the work that had been previously published.

γ

See the article by L. Gil (1973 *supra*).

1976. On 229 B 4—230 A 1: A. Wagner de Reyna, Mito y misterio, *Philosophia* (Mendoza) 11 = no. 19, 1954, 13—34. On the basis of this passage he elaborates a theory of myth and of its relation to 'truth', which he does not pretend was Plato's own theory. For Plato see pp. 13—17.

1977. On 230 E 6—234 C 5: Sp. Manginas, 'Ο 'Φαῖδρος' τοῦ Πλάτωνος καὶ ὁ περὶ τοῦ ἔρωτος λόγος τοῦ Ἀνσίου, *ἈΘΗΝΑ: Σύνγραμμα περιοδικῶν τῆς ἐν Ἀθήναις ἐπιστημονικῆς ἐταιρείας* 63, 1959, 33—118. He argues that the speech of Lysias is the work of Plato himself, composed to be the first of three stages in the investigation of the nature of love, this being Plato's usual procedure, i. e. to set up as the subject for investigation a thesis from which the antithesis is deduced and discussed, the road to the truth about the subject leading from thesis through antithesis to conclusion.

—. On 246 A—256 E: R. Turcan, L'âme-oiseau et l'eschatologie orphique (1920 *supra*).

—. On 246 E 4—247 A 1: S. Eitrem, 'Götter und Daimonen'... (1510 *supra*).

1978. On 258 E 6—259 D 8: O. Schönberger, Zikaden: Ein platonisches Motiv im modernen Hörspiel, *Antike und Abendland* 8, 1959, 119—125.

1979. On 274 B—278 B: L. Gil, El 'logos' vivo y la letra muerta: En torno a la valoración de la obra escrita en la antigüedad, *Emerita* 27, 1959, 239—268. See pp. 244—248 on Plato.

Philebus

 α

See L. G. Westerink's new edition of the lectures on the *Philebus* by Damascius (1928 *supra*).

 β

— C. J. de Vogel, La théorie de l'*ἄπειρος* chez Platon . . . (1285 *supra*).

1980. P. Kucharski, Le '*Philèbe*' et les '*Éléments harmoniques*' d'Aristoxène, *Rev Philosophique* 149, 1959, 41—72. For the theory of ideas in the *Philebus* as interpreted in this article, where the references to music and musical theory in the dialogue are explained by means of the treatise of Aristoxenus, see 1287 *supra* and with this the contemporaneous publication by Kucharski there listed, Les principes des Pythagoriciens et la dyade de Platon.

— G. Lieberg, Geist und Lust . . . (1583 *supra*), pp. 18—36: Der platonische *Philebos*. See also in 1583 *supra* the references to treatment of the *Philebus* in Lieberg's dissertation, which was published in the preceding year, Die Lehre von der Lust in den Ethiken des Aristoteles.

 γ

1981. On 18 B 6—D 2: E. Iversen, Papyrus Carlsberg Nr. VII: Fragments of a Hieroglyphic Dictionary, *K. Danske Vid Sel, Hist-Fil Skrifter* 3 no. 2, 1958, 1—31. On p. 8 this passage combined with several of Plutarch's is adduced as evidence of 'certain alphabetic conceptions' developed by the Egyptians.

1982. On 35C—41B: J. Gosling, False pleasures: *Philebus* 35C—41B, *Phronesis* 4, 1959, 44—53.

1983. On 36C—44A: A. W. Begemann, De posities van Sokratès en Protarchos in Plato's *Philèbos* 36C—44A, *Wetenschappelijke bijdragen door leerlingen van Dr. D. H. Th. Vollenhoven aangeboden* . . . gebundeld door S. U. Zuidema, Franeker 1951, pp. 99—119.

Politicus

 α

— Opere politiche di Platone a cura di F. Adorno (1169a *supra*), II, pp. 75—177: Il *Politico*. In the Introduction to this volume of the translation see on the *Politicus* especially pp. 9—26.

β

—. F. Adorno, *Dialettica e politica in Platone: Saggio sul "Politico" e sulle "Leggi"* (1169 *supra*).

1984. H. Read, *The flower of peace*, *Eranos-Jahrbuch* 27, 1958 (Zürich, 1959), 299—332. See pp. 305—306 and pp. 322—332 for the thesis, supported mainly by interpretation of the *Politicus* (pp. 322—326 and pp. 329—330), that Plato conceived of the statesman as a 'prince of peace' and, regarding a peaceful world as itself a work of art, proposed in the *Politicus* and the *Laws* a discipline of integration and education whereby the state might be permanently organized for peace rather than for war.

 γ

1985. On 268 E—274 E: H. Herter, *Gott und die Welt bei Platon: Eine Studie zum Mythos des Politikos*, *Bonner Jahrbücher* 158, 1958, 106—117.

1986. On 271 D3—E4: É. des Places, *Rev Belge Filol* 36, 1958, 1302—1303 in his review of the book by G. François (1505 *supra*).

1987. On 273 D5—E1: P. Courcelle, *Tradition néo-platonicienne et traditions chrétiennes de la région de dissemblance (Platon, Politique 273 D)*, *Archives Hist Doct et Litt du Moyen Age* 32, 1957, 5—33.

Protagoras

 α

1988. Platon, *Protagoras*: Vollständige Textausgabe mit Kommentar, besorgt von F. Dirlmeier und H. Scharold, München 1959. This is a text for schools without critical apparatus and with an elementary commentary and a simple but sensible introduction on Plato as a philosopher and on the relation of Socrates to the sophists.

 γ

1989. On 320 C—328 D: P. Joos, *Τύχη, φύσις, τέχνη*: Studien zur Thematik frühgriechischer Lebensbetrachtung, Winterthur 1955 (Diss. Zürich), pp. 54—77: Der 'Prometheus-Mythos' im platonischen '*Protagoras*'.

Republic

 α

—. Opere politiche di Platone a cura di F. Adorno (1169a *supra*), I, pp. 115—588: *Repubblica*. Almost all of the Introduction (pp. 9—63) is devoted to the *Republic*.

 β

—. Rita Falke, Problems of Utopias (1707 *supra*).

—. R. S. Bluck, Plato's 'Ideal' State (1715 *supra*).

—. R. W. Hall, Justice and the individual in the *Republic* (1365 *supra*).

1990. H. D. Rankin, Plato and Bernard Shaw: Their ideal communities, *Hermathena* 93, 1959, 71—77. The fifth act of *Back to Methusaleh* and the *Republic* are here compared by way of establishing the influence of the latter on the former.

 γ

1991. On II 359 B 6—360 D 7: To the references given in 819 *supra* add G. Dossin, *Bull Lettres Acad Belgique* 5 Sér 43, 1957, 523—525; and G. M. A. Hanfmann, *Harvard Studies in Class Phil* 63, 1958, 76—79.

1992. On II 375 C—376 B: C. Láscaris Comneno, Los 'perros filósofos' de Platón, *Actas Primer Cong Español Estudios Clásicos* (Madrid 15—19 Abril 1956), Madrid 1958, pp. 338—342. He considers the passage a veritable commentary on Heraclitus, *Frag. B 97* (D.-K.) and connects Plato's conception here with the first stage of dialectic.

—. On II 380 D—383 C: C. Axelos, *Das Phaenomen des Scheines . . .* (1508 *supra*).

—. On Books V—VII: H. Kesters, *Plaidoyer d'un Socratique contre le Phèdre de Platon . . .* (1975 *supra*), pp. 93—114.

1993. On VI 506 D—511 E: N.-I. Boussoulas, La créativité du bien et la métaphysique de la mixis platonicienne, *Sophia* 27, 1959, 209—219. The foundation of the article (pp. 209—215) is an interpretation of this passage according to which the entities in each section of the Line create by their intermixture the entities

in the next section below while the ideas in the highest section are created by the good at the upper limit of that section. Then (pp. 215—219) Boussoulas reads this construction into the *Philebus*, *Timaeus*, *Cratylus*, and *Symposium* and concludes that the ideas, nourished by the supreme flame of the good, are effective structures, each being a particle of the sun, which is the good, the idea of ideas, the one-infinite, the whole of being and the infinitude of non-being at once. See for the same sort of thing his article of the preceding year (622 *supra*) and his earlier book (714 *supra*).

1994. On VII 514 B 8—515 A 1: K. Vretska, Rhein Mus N. F. 102, 1959, 286—287. He rejects the emendation and interpretation proposed by O. Becker (849 *supra*) and gives his own interpretation of the traditional text. O. Becker on the next page (Rhein Mus N. F. 102, 1959, 288) replies to Vretska's objections and defends the conjecture that he had made in 849 *supra*.

—. On VII 515 D 2—3: W. Bröcker, Platons ontologischer Komparativ (1385 *supra*).

Sophist

β

—. V. di Benedetto, *Il περὶ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος* di Gorgia e la polemica con Protagora (1915 *supra*). See especially pp. 289—290.

—. E. Moutsopoulos, *Περὶ τῆς ὀντολογικῆς ὑποστάσεως τῆς τέχνης ἐν τῷ Σοφιστῇ τοῦ Πλάτωνος* (1867 *supra*).

1995. G. Wills, 'Being' in the *Sophist*, Modern Schoolman 36, 1958/59, 197—205. This article, in which the author supposes that the metaphysics of the *Republic* had been repudiated by Plato when he wrote the *Sophist* and that the five γένη in the latter dialogue are not ideas but are functions of the ideas in their combined state, is directed against two earlier articles by L. J. Eslick (888 *supra* and 616 *supra*). Immediately following it there is printed a rejoinder by L. J. Eslick, Plato on being: A reply to Mr. Wills (Modern Schoolman 36, 1958/59, 205—208).

γ

—. On 242 D 6—243 A 1: R. Mondolfo, La conflagración universal en Heráclito (1917 *supra*). See especially pp. 20—25.

— On 248 E—259 E: W. Bröcker, Platons ontologischer Komparativ (1385 *supra*).

— On 248 E—249 D: G. Soleri, Le dottrine teologiche di Platone (1511 *supra*), pp. 143—147 and p. 158. See also his article, Il preteso teismo di Platone (1517 *supra*), pp. 245—247.

Symposium

α

— To the reviews of the edition by J. Sykutris (910 *supra*) add the note on the importance of the edition published by H. Herter, Platons Symposium in Sykutris' Sicht, Griech. Bulletin (Bonn), 1958, fasc 1, 1—2.

β

— H. Kesters, Plaidoyer d'un Socratique contre le *Phèdre* de Platon . . . (1975 *supra*), pp. 17—27 and pp. 201—202.

1996. J. Ortega y Gasset, The difficulty of reading, *Diogenes* 28, Winter 1959, 1—17. This is a posthumous translation of the first part of a rough draft found among the author's papers and intended to be a commentary on Plato's *Symposium*. What is here published is not especially concerned with this dialogue but is rather an essay on the difficulties of interpreting any writing and more particularly the writings of Plato, whose ambiguous attitude towards the written word is dwelt upon at the end.

Theaetetus

β

1997. J. A. Nuño, Ser y conocer en la filosofía platónica: Fundamentos e implicaciones ontológicas de la teoría del conocimiento del *Teteto*, *Episteme* (Caracas) 2, 1958, 217—276. I have been unable to procure a copy of this article.

— A. Pinilla, Sofrosine: Ciencia de la ciencia (1896 *supra*), pp. 145—148: Conexión entre el '*Cármides*' y el '*Teteto*'.

γ

1998. On 153 C 8—D 5: P. Lévêque, Aurea Catena Homeri: Une étude sur l'allégorie grecque, Paris 1959 (*Annales Litt Univ*

Besançon 27), pp. 15—20 and p. 55. See also the essay, apparently unknown to Lévêque, by L. Edelstein, *The Golden Chain of Homer* (Studies in Intellectual History by G. Boas et al., Baltimore 1953, pp. 48—66), where on pp. 51—52 this passage of the *Theaetetus* is discussed.

1999. On 167 A 6—B 1: F. Adorno, *Accad Toscana* . . . 'La Colombaria', *Atti e Mem* 23, 1958/59 (Firenze 1959), 163—167 in his article, *Note su testi sofistici*, *ibid.*, pp. 161—170.

—. On 201 D 8—202 C 5: W. Burkert, *Στοιχείων* . . . (1895 *supra*), pp. 175—176.

Timaeus

α

—. Opere politiche di Platone a cura di F. Adorno (1169a *supra*), I, pp. 589—707: *Timeo*. See pp. 63—65 of the Introduction to this volume of the translation.

2000. J. C. M. van Winden, *Calcidius on matter*, His doctrine and sources: A chapter in the history of Platonism, Leiden 1959. The body of this work consists of a translation and detailed interpretation, paragraph by paragraph, of the *De Silva* of Chalcidius, i. e. of his *In Platonis Timaeum* parag. 268—354 (pp. 299, 4—378, 10 [Wrobel]), the commentary on *Timaeus* 47 E 3—53 B 7.

β

—. H. Herter, *Gott und die Welt bei Platon* . . . (1985 *supra*). With the interpretation here given of the *Timaeus*, especially of the demiurgic action and precosmic chaotic motions, in connection with the myth of the *Politicus* compare the thesis of Herter's earlier article, *Bewegung der Materie bei Platon* (1024 *supra*).

γ

—. On 37 D 1—39 E 2: A. Barigazzi, *Il concetto del tempo nella fisica atomistica* (1903 *supra*). Concerning the criticism of this account by Epicurus and the dependence of this criticism on that by Aristotle see pp. 35—49, pp. 52—53, and pp. 57—59.

—. On 40 C 7—9: J. Tréheux, *Ἐπιπροσθεῖν* (1967 *supra*), pp. 358—359. In refutation of C. Mugler on this passage (631 *supra* [pp. 24—27]).

—. On 47 E 3—53 B 7: J. C. M. van Winden, Calcidius on matter . . . (2000 *supra*).

—. On 47 E 4—48 A 7: S. Sambursky, A Democritean metaphor in Plato's *Kratylos* (1936 *supra*), pp. 3—4.

—. On 48 B 6—C 2: W. Burkert, *Στοιχείων* . . . (1895 *supra*), p. 176, n. 1.

2001. On 67 D 1—68 D 7: W. Capelle, Farbenbezeichnungen bei Theophrast, Rhein Mus N. F. 101, 1958, 1—41. See especially pp. 16—17 on this passage where Plato is said to have taken over in principle the solution of Democritus though with many variations in detail and with adaptations to preserve the contrary point of view of his own philosophy. There are references throughout the article to Plato's designation and explanation of particular colors.

IV A: Language, Style, and Figures of Expression

—. C. J. Classen, Sprachliche Deutung als Triebkraft platonischen und sokratischen Philosophierens (1333 *supra*).

—. J. Luccioni, Platon et la mer (1718 *supra*), pp. 23—39. This third section of the article deals with Plato's use of nautical comparisons and metaphors.

IV C: Myth and Allegory

—. A. Wagner de Reyna, Mito y misterio (1976 *supra*).

IV E: Plato's Estimate of Writing

—. L. Gil, El 'logos' vivo y la letra muerta . . . (1979 *supra*).

—. J. Ortega y Gasset, The difficulty of reading (1996 *supra*), pp. 14—17.

V A: Dialectic (Logic and Method . . .)

—. C. Axelos, Das Phaenomen des Scheines und der Gedanke der Wahrscheinlichkeit im griechischen Denken (1508 *supra*).

—. O. Luschnat, Das Problem des ethischen Fortschritts . . . (1874 *supra*), pp. 207—209 and pp. 211—213.

V B: The Theory of Ideas

2002. M. van Straaten, Het hylomorphisme in de antieke wijsbegeerte, *Studia Catholica* 27, 1952, 237—254. After a section on Aristotle's doctrine of form and matter and before sections on the Stoics and Plotinus van Straaten has a section (pp. 241—247) in which Plato's theory of the indefinite dyad and idea-numbers and of the relation of ideas to sensibles and to *χώρα* is presented on the basis of Aristotelian reports.

2003. O. N. Derisi, Los dos tipos de participación lógica y real, *Rev Filos (Madrid)* 17, 1958, 43—53. The thesis of this article is that participation, discovered by Plato, abandoned by Aristotle, and 'purified' by Augustine who made the ideal world the Word, was first given its true force by Thomas Aquinas when he drew the distinction between logical and real participation, the neglect of which had caused Plato to confuse logic and metaphysics by raising to the order of being what is merely mental.

2004. J. Moreau, La conscience et l'être, Paris 1958. See pp. 13—16, p. 22, pp. 47—48, pp. 54—55, and pp. 150—151. In arguing that classical philosophy from Descartes to Kant elaborated a theory of knowledge and being to satisfy the requirements of 'intentionality' such as Plato had formulated, Moreau here reasserts his interpretation of the Platonic ideas as neither 'entities existing in themselves' nor 'merely mental modalities'. See 1261 *supra* and the references there given to Moreau's other publications.

2005. F. Skotton, Der Chorismos-Begriff ein Grundproblem der Philosophie, *Wiener Zeitschr für Philos Psych Pädag* 6 Heft 3—4, 1958, 163—177. Plato's theory of ideas is noticed on pp. 164—165.

— G. Soleri, Le dottrine teologiche di Platone (1511 *supra*), pp. 8—26: Le idee. See also Soleri's article published the next year, Il preteso teismo di Platone (1517 *supra*), pp. 238—249.

— E. Topitsch, Vom Ursprung und Ende der Metaphysik (1906 *supra*), pp. 121—123 and pp. 128—132.

— R. G. Turnbull, Aristotle's debt to the 'Natural Philosophy' of the *Phaedo* (1969 *supra*).

— G. Wills, 'Being' in the *Sophist* (1995 *supra*). See also on the pages immediately following this article the rejoinder to it by L. J. Eslick (also in 1995 *supra*). The interpretation defended by Eslick in this rejoinder reappears in another article of his published in the next issue of the same periodical:

2006. L. J. Eslick, Aristotle and the identity of indiscernibles, *Modern Schoolman* 36, 1958/59, 279—287. The Platonic theory rejected by Aristotle is here said to be one in which the separation both of sensibles from their essential principles, the ideas, and of the ideas from their essential principle, the One ('a principle of act higher than forms'), makes all differences fall into the domain of existing non-being, accidental multitude being possible only by 'the defective imaging of essential perfection in a receptacle itself defined by privation of form'. See Eslick's earlier articles (888 and 616 *supra*).

— N.-I. Boussoulas, La créativité du bien et la métaphysique de la mixis platonicienne (1993 *supra*).

— W. Bröcker, Platons ontologischer Komparativ (1385 *supra*).

2007. M. Giorgiantonio, Sulla via delle teorie definitive di Platone, *Sophia* 27, 1959, 114—119. Assuming that in the *Sophist* the fully real is identified with life, soul, and thought, this author asserts that Plato after the *Parmenides* profoundly changed his epistemology and ontology and opened the way to a 'dynamic pantheism' like that of Plotinus.

— H. Kayser, Die Harmonie der Welt (1924 *supra*).

— H. J. Krämer, Arete bei Platon und Aristoteles: Zum Wesen und zur Geschichte der platonischen Ontologie (1909 *supra*). For a summation of this interpretation of Plato's ontology and the place of the ideas in it see pp. 514—551, the tenor of which may be gathered from an italicized passage on p. 517: 'Die Idee gehört nicht primär zum Bestand der platonischen Ontologie, sondern tritt erst nachträglich zwischen den Seinsgrund, das Eins, und das einzelne, individuell Seiende ein. Sie ist, genetisch betrachtet, gegenüber beiden sekundär, ihrem ontischen Rang nach aber von jeher dem Eins untergeordnet'.

2008. J. Owens, Thomistic common nature and Platonic idea, *Mediaeval Studies* (Toronto) 21, 1959, 211—223. He argues that, though Thomas Aquinas, following Aristotle, criticized the ideas as being wrongly hypostatized universals, they correspond more nearly to the essences or common natures in his own doctrine, their difference from the latter deriving from Plato's having to identify the ideas with being whereas for Thomas the common natures like all created things have from their creator whatever aspect of being they possess.

2009. G. Patzig, Bemerkungen über den Begriff der Form, *Archiv Philos* 9, 1959, 93—111. For the theory of ideas with the One interpreted as 'the form of the pure forms' and for Aristotle's criticism of it see pp. 98—102.

—. G. Reale, *L'Eutifronte*: Il concetto del santo e la prima teoria platonica delle idee (1948 *supra*). Compare with this the article on the *Euthyphro* published in the preceding year by E. Lledó Iñigo (1947 *supra*); and for Reale's earlier statements concerning the theory of ideas see his reviews of the books by J. Moreau (1234 *supra*) and by A. Manno (31 *supra*) in *Riv Filos Neoscolastica* 47, 1955, 135—153 and 48, 1956, 193—230.

V C: Psychology

a) The Soul's Constitution and Immortality

2010. Maria Helena Monteiro da Rocha Pereira, *Concepções helénicas de felicidade no além de Homero a Platão*, Coimbra 1955. For Plato's conception of the destiny of the soul and its mode of survival she studies the eschatological myths of the *Gorgias*, *Phaedo*, *Republic*, and *Phaedrus*, and with these that of the pseudo-Platonic *Axiochus*. See pp. 77—93, pp. 167—189, and pp. 198—203.

2011. V. Fazio Allmayer, Dal 'soggetto' all' 'io', *Giorn Crit Filos Ital* 3 Ser 11, 1957, 1—16. See pp. 3—9 on the question of the unity, substantiality, and immortality of the soul as involved for Plato and Aristotle in the problems of epistemology.

2012. P. Laín Entralgo, *Reflexiones sobre lo puro y la pureza a la luz de Platón*, *Cuadernos Hispanoamericanos* 100, Abril 1958, 12—22. Distinguishing five senses of *κάθαρσις* and *καθαρός*, he contends that two of these, purification of soul from body in order to exercise 'theoria' and a sense at once ethical, psychological, and medical, were developed by Plato, who was the first to make soul the subject of purification. Most of the article has to do with the topic of 'purification of soul' in the *Phaedo* and with the notion of 'pure pleasures' in the *Philebus*. See the German article by Lain-Entralgo published in the same year (1332 *supra*).

2013. W. Jaeger, The Greek ideas of immortality, *Harvard Theol Rev* 52, 1959, 135—147. For Plato see especially pp. 143—147.

2014. E. Topitsch, Die platonisch-aristotelischen Seelenlehren in weltanschauungskritischer Beleuchtung, *Sitzungsber Österreich*

Akad Wiss Phil-Hist Kl 233, 4. Abhandl, Wien 1959. See pp. 7—17 on Plato, who according to Topitsch never succeeded in fashioning a uniform and consistent theory of the soul but used heterogeneous models as they suited his immediate purpose and allowed them to stand side by side without attempting to reconcile them. See also in the article published by Topitsch during this same year, *Seelenglaube und Selbstinterpretation* (Archiv Philos 9, 1959, 1—36), pp. 24—26 on Plato; and in Topitsch's book of the preceding year, *Vom Ursprung und Ende der Metaphysik* (1906 *supra*), see pp. 124—130, where the main emphasis is placed upon the 'sociomorphic' model of Plato's psychology.

b) Soul as Epistemological Subject

—. V. Fazio Allmayer, Dal 'sogetto' all' 'io' (2011 *supra*).

—. H. Kleinknecht, Platonisches im Homer . . . (1919 *supra*).

—. P. Laín Entralgo, Reflexiones sobre lo puro y la pureza a la luz de Platón (2012 *supra*).

—. J. Moreau, La conscience et l'être (2004 *supra*).

—. J. A. Nuño, Ser y conocer en la filosofía platónica . . . (1997 *supra*).

2015. F. H. Anderson, Platonic elements in epistemology, *Proc Am Catholic Philos Assoc* 33, 1959, 21—27. His central thesis is that Plato's examination of knowledge moves entirely within the content of cognition and does not consider a causal process in which through the agency of sense or other faculties external objects may affect, enter, or become the mind. He holds that, whereas in the earlier dialogues intelligibles were by 'anamnesis' innate in the individual psyche, in the late dialogues they are inherent in a universal mind and this inherence accounts for the intelligibility of the cosmos.

—. M. Giorgiantonio, Sulla via delle teorie definitive di Platone (2007 *supra*).

—. F. Pérez Ruiz, El concepto de filosofía en los escritos de Platón: Filosofía y sabiduría (1751 *supra*).

—. A. Pinilla, Sofrosine: Ciencia de la ciencia (1896 *supra*).

—. C. A. Viano, L'esperienza in Aristotele (1902 *supra*), pp. 303—305, pp. 315—324, p. 326, and pp. 332—333. Compare his earlier article on *δόξα* in Plato's philosophy (1354 *supra*).

e) Soul as Autokinetic Cause

— R. G. Turnbull, Aristotle's debt to the 'Natural Philosophy' of the *Phaedo* (1969 *supra*), pp. 136—140.

d) Soul as Desire and Daemon: The Theory of Love

— S. Eitrem, 'Götter und Daimonen' . . . (1510 *supra*).

— M. Detienne, Sur la démonologie de l'ancien pythagorisme (1923 *supra*).

— J. Ferguson, Moral values in the ancient world (1582 *supra*), pp. 84—95: Eros.

2016. J. Orcibal, Une formule de l'amour extatique de Platon à St. Jean de la Croix et au Cardinal de Bérulle, *Mélanges offerts à Étienne Gilson de l'Académie Française*, Paris 1959, 447—463. On the conception of love as that which takes the soul 'out of itself' or 'out of the body'.

V D: The Phenomenal World

— J. Luccioni, Platon et la mer (1718 *supra*), pp. 20—23. This, the second section of the article, deals with Plato's treatment of the sea as part of the physical universe.

V F: Religion and Theology

— H. Herter, Gott und die Welt bei Platon . . . (1985 *supra*).

2017. H. J. McLendon, Plato without God, *Journ Religion* 39, 1959, 88—102. Taking *Laws* 888 B—D to be an 'autobiographical clue', McLendon maintains that Plato was preëminently a theologian who all his life kept trying different experiments to vindicate a teleological conception of the universe, that in the *Phaedo* he rejected the central principle of all theism and substituted for it his theory of ideas, and that, finding difficulties with this in his 'late-middle period', he abandoned it and returned to theism, which he tried to develop in such a way as to resolve the difficulties presented by his non-theistic cosmology.

2018. G. Siegmund, Platon über Unglaube, Theologie und Glaube 49, 1959, 374—379. I have been unable to procure a copy of this article.

V G: Ethics

2019. A. A. Roig, La noción de ocio en el mundo clásico y en el mundo contemporáneo, *Philosophia* (Mendoza) 12 = nos. 20/21, 1955, 31—52. Roig, after a few paragraphs on 'Socratic leisure' (pp. 33—34) and before going on to Aristotle and 'the crisis of the theoretic ideal in antiquity', discusses the conception in Plato (pp. 34—39), emphasizing his connection of it with philosophy and saying that in common with all the ancient world Plato confused leisure and tranquillity and supposed it to be an essential attribute of the master as labor was supposed to be an essential attribute of a particular kind of being, the slave.

— P. Laín Entralgo, Reflexiones sobre lo puro y la pureza a la luz de Platón (2012 *supra*).

— O. Luschnat, Das Problem des ethischen Fortschritts ... (1874 *supra*). On the neutral 'middle' term between *κακόν* and *ἀγαθόν* see pp. 211—213 with the preceding pages 207—209.

— E. Topitsch, Vom Ursprung und Ende der Metaphysik (1906 *supra*), pp. 121—135.

— H. J. Krämer, Arete bei Platon und Aristoteles ... (1909 *supra*), pp. 146—379.

V H: Politics and Society

— A. A. Roig, La noción de ocio en el mundo clásico ... (2019 *supra*).

2020. J. Hall, Plato's legal philosophy, *Indiana Law Journal* 31, 1956/57, 171—206. In the first half of this article Hall argues that the *Republic* and the *Laws* do not present two different 'states' but are related to each other as ideal construct or model to a point in the continuous effort to actualize the ideal and that they represent no change in Plato's position, for he consistently held positive law to be the embodiment, though the imperfect embodiment, of reason and the rule of law to be the essential condition of the actualization of values. The second half of the article expounds the amplitude of Plato's philosophy of law, leading up to the conclusion that positive law is the central thread which unifies his philosophy.

- . G. Drago, Lettura del 'Menone' (1963 *supra*).
- . E. Topitsch, Vom Ursprung und Ende der Metaphysik (1906 *supra*), pp. 121—135.
- . D. S. Constantopoulos, L'autonomie du droit et la loi dans la Grèce des cités . . . (1941 *supra*). See pp. 68—72 for the theory of Socrates in the *Crito* and pp. 72—80 for positive law and the theories of Callicles, Thrasymachus, and Protagoras, discussed on the basis of the *Gorgias*, the *Republic*, and the *Theaetetus*.
- . Plato: *Gorgias* . . . by E. R. Dodds (1951 *supra*), pp. 30—34: Plato and Athens.
- . H. Read, The flower of peace (1984 *supra*).

V J: Aesthetics

2021. A. Ruiz Díaz, La estética griega, *Philosophia* (Mendoza) 12 = nos. 20/21, 1955, 11—29. On pp. 18—29 Plato and Aristotle are discussed together, primarily in connection with the conceptions of *μίμησις* and *ποίησις*. The article was intended to be part of the first chapter of a book to be entitled, *Historia de la Estética*.

2022. R. Vela, Il concetto di arte in Platone, *Sapienza* (Roma) 12, 1959, 162—171. I have been unable to procure a copy of this article.

VI. Terminology

εἶδος

—. E. Lledó Iñigo (1947 *supra*), H. J. Krämer (1909 *supra* [p. 529 and pp. 539—542]).

εἰκόν

2023. F.-W. Eltester, *Eikon im Neuen Testament*, Berlin 1958. For the use of the word by Plato see pp. 2—5, p. 7, pp. 27—30, p. 103, p. 104, and pp. 111—112. Most of this monograph is devoted not to the New Testament but to Philo, Plutarch, Plotinus, and the Hermetica.

ῥεῦμα

2024. W. Kranz, Das 'Rheuma', Sudhoffs Archiv für Gesch Medizin 42, 1958, 145—148. See p. 147 and 148 on Plato's use of the word in physiological contexts and 'ironically'.

χρόνος

2025. G. E. Mueller, Experiential and Existential Time and their relation to Eternity, Kant-Studien 50, 1958/59, 89—108. This essay contains incidental remarks on Plato's notion of time but fails to mention his conception of eternity and the relation of time to it.

—. J. Thyssen, Platons *ἐξαίφνης* . . . (1968 *supra*).

χώρα

—. J. C. M. van Winden, Calcidius on matter . . . (2000 *supra*).

Corrigenda to Lustrum 4¹

p. 8, line 15.	<i>For Magalhães read: Magalhães</i>
p. 8, note 1, line 6.	<i>For some these read: some of these</i>
p. 20, 66, line 3.	<i>For 353—358 read: 282—283</i>
p. 28, 106, line 2.	<i>For Piepers' read: Pieper's</i>
p. 28, note 2, line 4.	<i>For 195 a read: 105 a</i>
p. 30, 115, line 2.	<i>For Journ Hist read: Journ Philos</i>
p. 35, 144, line 3.	<i>For Socratism read: Socraticism</i>
p. 42, 185, line 2.	<i>For Eudoxos read: Eudoxus</i>
p. 43, line 15.	<i>For Cratylus read: Cratylus</i>
p. 43, note 1, line 2.	<i>For forms of read: form from</i>
p. 49, line 10.	<i>For hoth read: both</i>
p. 54, note 1, line 4.	<i>For 19—41 read: 29—41</i>
p. 55, 247, line 1.	<i>For van read: von</i>
p. 57, line 3.	<i>For van read: von</i>
p. 61, 280, line 3.	<i>For indedita read: inedita</i>
p. 64, line 23.	<i>For Allen read: Allan</i>
p. 67, note 1, line 2.	<i>For 208—210 read: 209—210</i>
p. 68, note 2, line 10.	<i>For Lönberg read: Lönborg</i>
p. 72, 317, line 2.	<i>For le read: Le</i>
p. 74, 335, line 4.	<i>For betseekenis read: beteekenis</i>
p. 77, 349, line 7.	<i>Remove the comma after Derbolav</i>
p. 86, 414, line 2.	<i>For 48¹). read: 48²).</i>
p. 87, line 15.	<i>For the Places read: des Places</i>
p. 90, 435, line 4.	<i>For B. C.¹). read: B. C.²).</i>
p. 98, 478, line 2.	<i>For Masarachia read: Masaracchia</i>
p. 101, line 27.	<i>For eading read: leading</i>
p. 102, 502, line 2.	<i>For 45—56 read: 45—58</i>
p. 107, 536, line 2.	<i>For 8 Ser read: 4 Sér</i>
p. 107, 537, line 3.	<i>For think read: thinks</i>
p. 108, line 1.	<i>For ist read: is</i>

¹ The following list of corrections would have been shorter if the author had been given the opportunity, as he was not, to see page-proof of the section printed in Lustrum 4 or at least galley-proof of the whole of that section.

[Anmerk. d. Red.: Bei Abschluß des Bandes Lustr. 4 sah sich die Redaktion unter einem besonderen Zeitdruck, wenn sie die der UNESCO zugesicherten Termine nicht allzulange überschreiten wollte; insbesondere sah sie sich veranlaßt, die Korrekturen zu S. 249—308 (deren Satz sich besonders verspätet hatte) anhand des sehr sauber geschriebenen Manuskriptes selber zu lesen. Für die Zukunft hat die Redaktion beschlossen, den einzelnen Verfassern stets mindestens zwei eigene Korrekturen zu ermöglichen. H. J. M.]

- p. 108, 539, line 3. *For the most following read: the most part following*
- p. 108, line 34. *For passagers read: passages*
- p. 111, 565, line 1. *For Die read: Das (sic)*
- p. 113, line 8. *For X 896 C—896 C read: X 896 C—898 C*
- p. 114, 574, line 1. *For Magotteux read: Magotteaux*
- p. 115, 582, line 2. *For 104—11 read: 104—114*
- p. 115, 588, line 10. *For rightly read: rightly*
- p. 119, 602, line 5. *For attampt read: attempt*
- p. 121, note 2, line 4. *For — 340 read: — 240*
- p. 124, line 27. *For Paris/Bruxelles read: Bruges*
- p. 124, note 1, line 3. *For indentifications read: identifications*
- p. 128, note 1, line 5. *For Phaidon read: Phaëdon*
- p. 132, line 1. *For 347a read: 374a*
- p. 134, 671, line 1. *For Phèdre read: Phèdre*
- p. 136, 686, line 1. *For B. E. read: G. E.*
- p. 139, 701, line 7. *For 72 read: 73*
- p. 139, 701, line 10. *For perniers read: derniers*
- p. 141, 705, line 9. *For recherche read: ricerca*
- p. 149, 748, line 4. *For socologia read: sociologia*
- p. 150, lines 23—24. *For — 230, and 407 — read: — 230, 243 — 245, and 407 —*
- p. 155, 775, line 3. *For Ethics read: Ethics*
- p. 157, note 1, line 7. *For 1934, 1934 read: 1934*
- p. 160, 803, line 1. *For Llambias read: Llambias*
- p. 160, 804, line 3. *For Popper's read: Popper's*
- p. 163, 818, line 1. *For Beale read: Beals*
- p. 166, 836. *For IV read: VI*
- p. 171, 846, line 5. *For Scoul read: Scuol*
- p. 173, line 2. *For Gully read: Gullely*
- p. 174, 866, line 1. *For On 580 C 9 — read: On IX 580 C 9 —*
- p. 176, note 1, line 1. *For n. 18 read: n. 118*
- p. 184, line 2. *For Mem 29 read: Mem 20*
- p. 184, 905, line 8. *For Plato' scriticism read: Plato's criticism*
- p. 188, 909, line 11. *For operazione read: operazioni*
- p. 204, 966, line 1. *For J. Koller read: H. Koller*
- p. 209, 987, line 1. *For M. S. read: M. F.*
- p. 214, 1014, lines 8—9. *For Venus 9 1/3 . . . Jupiter 11 1/9 read: Venus 9 1/9 . . . Jupiter 11 1/3*
- p. 217, line 1. *For pattern of read: pattern for*
- p. 225, line 7. *For oblatum read: oblatum 1*
- p. 242, note 1, line 3. *For dernier read: derniers*
- p. 260, line 31. *For op. 159 — read: pp. 159 —*
- p. 261, paragraph 2, lines 9—10. *For prefixed it to his translation and read: prefixed to his translation an*
- p. 263, line 1. *For le read: la*
- p. 263, 1137, line 8. *For sources of the read: sources of this*
- p. 263, 1137, lines 9—10. *For Suppliantes read: Suppliants*
- p. 263, 1139, line 1. *For Le read: La*
- p. 264, 1143, line 9. *For hat read: had*
- p. 264, line 31. *For le dialectique read: la dialectique*
- p. 266, 1148, line 4. *For 141, 1945, read: 141, 1951,*

- p. 266, note 1, line 2. *For witch read: which*
- p. 267, 1152, line 5. *For partical read: partial*
- p. 269, 1156, line 2. *For it read: is*
- p. 269, note 1, line 10. *For artivle read: article*
- p. 270, 1159, line 2. *For 201— read: 210—*
- p. 270, 1159, line 3. *For — contemplativa read: — contemplative*
- p. 270, line 27. *For pp. 198—read: pp. 298 —*
- p. 270, line 30. *For recherche read: ricerche*
- p. 271, 1161, lines 5—6. *For dialectic of the relations read: dialectic, the dialectic of the relations*
- p. 272, 1164, line 6. *For tranformed read: transformed*
- p. 272, 1164, line 8. *For So read: To*
- p. 272, 1164, line 10. *For partical read: partial*
- p. 273, line 17. *For contrains read: constrains*
- p. 274, line 16. *For Amore read: Amor e*
- p. 280, 1180, line 16 (last line). *For idea-numbers. read: idea-numbers:*
- p. 281, 1182, line 5. *Insert comma after 'self-predication'*
- p. 282, line 10. *For (907 supra)¹ read: (907 supra), Note on Plato's theory of ideas (659 supra)¹*
- p. 286, line 11. *For this read: his*
- p. 288, 1209, line 5. *For theoriy read: theory*
- p. 289, 1210, line 2. *For 1945) read: 1957)*
- p. 289, 1210, line 3. *For those read: these*
- p. 289, 1213, line 2. *For idea read: ideas*
- p. 290, 1218, line 3. *For 174ff. read: 174—478*
- p. 291, 1221, line 2. *For 52 read: 53*
- p. 292, 1224, line 3—4. *Omitting the words, defends the Christian interpretation of the theory, read: of the theory, defends the Christian interpretation of the ideas as*
- p. 292, 1224, line .7 *For Moreaus's read: Moreau's*
- p. 294, line 17. *For later read: latter*
- p. 294, line 25. *For (386/ read: (368/*
- p. 296, 1231, line 1. *For al genuina read: la genuina*
- p. 298, line 16. *For especielly read: especially*
- p. 303, 1242, line 3. *For lenght read: length*
- p. 304, 1244, line 8. *For ethicas read: ethics*
- p. 306, 1246, line 2. *For de read: di*
- p. 307. 1249, line 1. *For Audney read: Audrey*

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